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NATO's Article 5 has been invoked once… in support of the US shortly after September 11, 2001. Donald Trump wasn't the first president to complain about NATO. Nor was he the first to call out NATO members who fall short of their commitment to spend 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense. George W. Bush often used NATO summits to demand that member nations meet their obligations. Barack Obama once referred to those who didn't as "free riders."When US presidents (and others) criticize nations that fall short of the 2% commitment, they aren't being petty or shrill. Taken together, the defense budgets of NATO members go to the heart of the alliance's ability to deter attacks, which, after all, is the very reason for NATO's existence. It provides tangible proof of what NATO could do if its Article 5 provision (which states that if any NATO ally is attacked, it is considered a defendable attack against all NATO allies) were invoked. In 2006, NATO defense ministers agreed that each member nation would spend a minimum of 2% of its GDP on defense… though only a handful would follow through. At the 2014 NATO summit, held not long after Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, member heads of state formally reaffirmed the 2% commitment. At the time, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, "the security of our countries and citizens is too important for us to cut corners, or to cut still more funds, and without security, we can have no prosperity." By the end of 2014, the number of member countries giving the full 2% rose to 10. In 2022, in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the number of member nations meeting the 2% standard increased again and reached 18 by 2024. And, as NATO officials were quick to point out, when the new contribution levels of all European NATO members are counted together, it adds up to 2% of their combined GDP. NATO's overall membership has grown since Russia launched its war on Ukraine. Finland and Sweden are now members, increasing the number of NATO allies to 32, bringing both additional defense dollars and strategic assets to NATO's defense capabilities. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine (already "NATO partners") have also declared their intent to join the alliance. While the nearly two-decades-old 2% commitment is fundamental to NATO's deterrence effect, by itself it's not enough. Deterrence only works if foes and potential foes believe that the alliance and its members are ready and willing to mobilize after Article 5 is invoked. One day after the horrific 9/11 terrorist strikes that killed thousands in New York, Pennsylvania, and our nation's capital, the North Atlantic Council met and announced its intention to invoke Article 5. Secretary General Lord Robertson declared the move a "reaffirmation of a solemn treaty commitment." This marked the first time in NATO's 52-year history—and the only time since—that Article 5 has been invoked. And to its credit, NATO went beyond mere words. In the months and years that followed, even though the US had by far the largest military and defense budget of any NATO member, others in the alliance still stepped forward to defend America and by extension, the alliance. NATO launched operation "Eagle Assist," its first anti-terror operation, and the first deployment of NATO military assets. Seven NATO AWACS (the world-renowned radar aircraft) were flown by 830 crew members of 13 nationalities to patrol and protect American skies. A second operation to deter terrorist activities on the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, dubbed "Operation Active Endeavor," soon followed. In addition, the North Atlantic Council unanimously adopted eight measures to promote intelligence-sharing, increase security, backfill assets, and provide further support against terrorist activities. Just as Russia's 2022 invasion brought NATO new members and greater compliance with the 2% commitment, it also changed how alliance members mobilized their own military resources against an increasingly aggressive, increasingly hostile Russia. Article 5's promise of collective security likely emboldened members to send arms to Ukraine—they knew it wouldn't diminish their own ability to respond to an attack. Allies pledged $700 million in aid, from body armor and transport vehicles to medical supplies and combat rations. If you visit NATO headquarters in Brussels, you'll find that a part of the World Trade Center's North Tower rests on a gleaming silver pedestal… a somber reminder of American lives lost. But it also serves as a clear symbol of Article 5's importance to its members, even the member with the largest military and defense budget. In his reflection on the memorial, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reaffirmed: "To bring an end to conflicts which fuel terrorism, we need political, diplomatic, and economic efforts. And we need military might." Stoltenberg's words ring true for battles past and future against terrorism, and our current battle against a dictatorship on the march. This article was researched and drafted with the assistance of Katherine Schauer.

NATO's Article 5 has been invoked once… in support of the US shortly after September 11, 2001. Donald Trump wasn't the first president to complain about NATO. Nor was he the first to call out NATO members who fall short of their commitment to spend 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense. George W. Bush often used NATO summits to demand that member nations meet their obligations. Barack Obama once referred to those who didn't as "free riders."When US presidents (and others) criticize nations that fall short of the 2% commitment, they aren't being petty or shrill. Taken together, the defense budgets of NATO members go to the heart of the alliance's ability to deter attacks, which, after all, is the very reason for NATO's existence. It provides tangible proof of what NATO could do if its Article 5 provision (which states that if any NATO ally is attacked, it is considered a defendable attack against all NATO allies) were invoked. In 2006, NATO defense ministers agreed that each member nation would spend a minimum of 2% of its GDP on defense… though only a handful would follow through. At the 2014 NATO summit, held not long after Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, member heads of state formally reaffirmed the 2% commitment. At the time, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, "the security of our countries and citizens is too important for us to cut corners, or to cut still more funds, and without security, we can have no prosperity." By the end of 2014, the number of member countries giving the full 2% rose to 10. In 2022, in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the number of member nations meeting the 2% standard increased again and reached 18 by 2024. And, as NATO officials were quick to point out, when the new contribution levels of all European NATO members are counted together, it adds up to 2% of their combined GDP. NATO's overall membership has grown since Russia launched its war on Ukraine. Finland and Sweden are now members, increasing the number of NATO allies to 32, bringing both additional defense dollars and strategic assets to NATO's defense capabilities. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine (already "NATO partners") have also declared their intent to join the alliance. While the nearly two-decades-old 2% commitment is fundamental to NATO's deterrence effect, by itself it's not enough. Deterrence only works if foes and potential foes believe that the alliance and its members are ready and willing to mobilize after Article 5 is invoked. One day after the horrific 9/11 terrorist strikes that killed thousands in New York, Pennsylvania, and our nation's capital, the North Atlantic Council met and announced its intention to invoke Article 5. Secretary General Lord Robertson declared the move a "reaffirmation of a solemn treaty commitment." This marked the first time in NATO's 52-year history—and the only time since—that Article 5 has been invoked. And to its credit, NATO went beyond mere words. In the months and years that followed, even though the US had by far the largest military and defense budget of any NATO member, others in the alliance still stepped forward to defend America and by extension, the alliance. NATO launched operation "Eagle Assist," its first anti-terror operation, and the first deployment of NATO military assets. Seven NATO AWACS (the world-renowned radar aircraft) were flown by 830 crew members of 13 nationalities to patrol and protect American skies. A second operation to deter terrorist activities on the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, dubbed "Operation Active Endeavor," soon followed. In addition, the North Atlantic Council unanimously adopted eight measures to promote intelligence-sharing, increase security, backfill assets, and provide further support against terrorist activities. Just as Russia's 2022 invasion brought NATO new members and greater compliance with the 2% commitment, it also changed how alliance members mobilized their own military resources against an increasingly aggressive, increasingly hostile Russia. Article 5's promise of collective security likely emboldened members to send arms to Ukraine—they knew it wouldn't diminish their own ability to respond to an attack. Allies pledged $700 million in aid, from body armor and transport vehicles to medical supplies and combat rations. If you visit NATO headquarters in Brussels, you'll find that a part of the World Trade Center's North Tower rests on a gleaming silver pedestal… a somber reminder of American lives lost. But it also serves as a clear symbol of Article 5's importance to its members, even the member with the largest military and defense budget. In his reflection on the memorial, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reaffirmed: "To bring an end to conflicts which fuel terrorism, we need political, diplomatic, and economic efforts. And we need military might." Stoltenberg's words ring true for battles past and future against terrorism, and our current battle against a dictatorship on the march. This article was researched and drafted with the assistance of Katherine Schauer.

[spa] El objeto de esta investigación es visibilizar la presencia femenina en las dinámicas de cambio social acaecidas en las islas occidentales del Archipiélago Canario durante la II República, la Guerra Civil y la dictadura franquista. El presente trabajo inicia el camino para cubrir un vacío en la historia reciente de nuestras islas: la presencia histórica de las mujeres durante la Segunda República y la Dictadura franquista, ya que los estudios feministas y de género sobre estas cuestiones son, en las islas, todavía muy escasos y además parciales al tratar sobre cuestiones muy diversas, de manera que el conocimiento sobre la labor de las mujeres de la provincia de Santa Cruz de Tenerife en este periodo histórico no había sido tratado de manera general. Nuestra investigación abarca tanto la construcción socio-cultural de los diferentes modelos de feminidad existentes en Canarias en el periodo estudiado como el modo de comprender el impacto de las dinámicas políticas, sociales y económicas en la concepción social de la mujer canaria. Profundizando en algunos aspectos más específicos y determinantes en la vida cotidiana de la población femenina; aspectos como la violencia de género, la presencia de las mujeres en el ámbito laboral, la religiosidad, la educación, etc. Gracias a estos elementos analizados se pueden establecer diferentes parámetros que explican las ideas de feminidad existentes en las islas, las modificaciones que sufren y las actuaciones socio-políticas más destacadas de las mujeres isleñas en las etapas históricas estudiadas. Algunos de los parámetros destacados en el estudio fueron: el alto índice de analfabetismo, la existencia de una rígida moral sexual frente a la supervivencia de determinadas conductas culturalmente más laxas en lo referente al sexo fuera del matrimonio, el aumento de la presión social y moral al imponerse el ultracatolicismo de la España franquista, el machismo confrontado con la emigración masiva de hombres a América Latina, la infravaloración del trabajo de las isleñas, la de la participación activa de las mujeres en las revueltas sociales en la etapa republicana, la destrucción tras el golpe de estado del 18 de julio de los logros alcanzados por las mujeres durante la República, la represión sistemática a las mujeres que cuestionaban el orden político o social impuesto por las fuerzas franquistas, etc. Este trabajo se divide en dos grandes etapas: la II República y su impacto entre las mujeres de las islas (realizamos un análisis comparando cuatro tipologías ideales que representan cuatro maneras de entender la feminidad: mujeres modernas, obreras, católicas y falangistas) y la dictadura franquista desde el golpe militar del 36, momento en que se configura el nuevo régimen en el archipiélago. Para completar la realidad femenina del periodo histórico investigado se estudia a aquellas mujeres que quedaron al margen en su paso por la prisión provincial de Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Para la elaboración del presente trabajo de investigación se han consultado diversos archivos y fuentes: el Archivo Histórico Provincial de Santa Cruz de Tenerife (fondo de la Sección Femenina, expedientes de reclusas de la prisión provincial, series del Gobierno Civil, expedientes del Tribunal de Represión de la Masonería y el Comunismo, etc.) ; [eng] Thesis title: WOMEN AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PROVINCE OF SANTA CRUZ DE TENERIFE.1931-1975. HOUSEWIVES, COMRADES AND MARGINALIZED. The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the presence of women in the dynamics of social change that occurred in the western islands of the Canary Archipelago during the Second Republic, the Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship. We studied the presence of women in the province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife between 1931 and 1975. There are two main stages: in the first place the Second Republic, and its impact among women in the islands (performing an analysis comparing four ideal types representing four understandings of femininity, modem women, working c1ass, Catholics and Falangists) and in the second place the Francoist dictatorship since the military coup of 36, at which time the new regime is set in the archipelago (studying women's participation in various associations, standing out one called Sección Femenina). To complete the feminine reality of the studied historical period, we investigated women who were marginalized (government opponents, prostitutes, etc.) on their way through the provincial prison of Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Special attention is paid to the socioeconomic asymmetries existing in the Canary Islands population of the first half of the twentieth century, to understand the reality of multiple and variable inequalities faced by the island women in this historical period, characterized by profound social conflicts and major changes within the sphere of politics, economics and socio-culture. It also discusses the presence of women at different social classes, the development of patriarchy within a chieftainship system and increasingly repressive (especially after the military uprising of 1936) and, therefore, the inequality and violence of a kind on another, exercising their power of repression and domination over all the women. For the preparation of this research have been consulted various sources in the Provincial Historic Archive of Santa Cruz de Tenerife (collection of the "Sección Femenina", records of inmates in the provincial prison, series of civil government, court records for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism, etc.) municipal and parish archives, insular press, and so on.

Examining the origins of the First World War has been called "the ultimate who dunnit". In his book, published on the anniversary of the assassination said to have triggered it, John Zametica, focusing on the Habsburg Empire and the Balkans, re-examines the evidence. This leads to a number of radical new interpretations and some remarkable revelations about the events that in 1914 led to the outbreak of the First World War. The centenary of WW1 has spawned many new books on the subject. Utilizing a wide range of Serbo-Croat and German-language sources, the author overturns most of what we have been led to believe about the respective culpability of Austria-Hungary and Serbia for the outbreak of war. He also re-examines the role of Russia and Germany in this. The reader is left to conclude that Britain was drawn reluctantly into the war in defence of two small countries, one on each side of Europe, which had been attacked simultaneously by Austria-Hungary and Germany without provocation. In Folly and Malice John Zametica reveals that: The First World War was kick-started by an ailing Austria-Hungary which believed that waging a successful war was the only way it could remain a Great Power; This empire, with its eleven squabbling nations, and with its statesmen unwilling to contemplate any meaningful internal reform, was the real powder keg of Europe; Franz Ferdinand, the Austro-Hungarian Heir to the Throne normally portrayed as a likely enlightened reformer of the Empire, was actually seeking to destroy the Dualist political compromise between Austria and Hungary and replace it with his own centralist autocracy; Serious antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Serbia really only began as late as 1906 and had on the whole almost nothing to do with the supposedly crucial 'South Slav' question; Gavrilo Princip, Franz Ferdinand's assassin, was impelled to do his deed by a Yugoslav ideology conceived and propagated from within Habsburg Croatia, not independent Serbia; The notorious Black Hand, the secret Serbian officers' organisation, far from planning to assassinate Franz Ferdinand during his visit to Bosnia, was in May-June 1914 busy plotting to overthrow civilian rule in Serbia and replace it with a military-led dictatorship; The famous Serbian warning to Vienna, intended to thwart Franz Ferdinand's assassination, was the work of Lieutenant-Colonel Apis, the leader of the Black Hand; In July 1914, Vienna also wanted its 'good' war against Serbia so as to dislo ...

Baseball reflects the sacrifice, commitment, and determination that Dominicans displayed during foreign occupation (1916–1924; 1965–1966), dictatorship (1930–1961; 1966–1978), and the struggle for sovereignty. Success in international tournaments and as the birthplace of a majority of foreign-born players in Major League Baseball (MLB) fosters national pride and generates revenue. But baseball has also been marred bycorruption political interference and exploitation. After its late-19th-century arrival, baseball helped knit Dominicans together, overcoming geographic, racial, and class divisions. It became the national pastime during the first US occupation, when games against US forces asserted Dominican nationalism while anti-imperialist guerrillas battled in the mountains. Baseball encouraged a national identity based on competition and achievement. During baseball's "Romantic Epoch," men or boys of similar social standing organized teams and tournaments, sometimes recruiting top players regardless of race or class. Rivalries led teams to import players from Cuba and across the hemisphere, integrating the country into a transnational circuit of leagues and barnstorming. Interaction with other baseball-playing countries furthered competition for talent and led to Dominicans playing in the Negro Leagues. In the 1950s, factories, sugar mills, and the military sponsored clubs which competed in an amateur system that produced players like Juan Marichal and Manuel Mota. During the 1940s and 1950s, after US baseball integrated, competition for players pushed Latin American leagues to affiliate with MLB. Dominican organizers resumed national professional tournaments in 1951 and founded the Dominican Professional Baseball League in 1955. Financial and institutional support from Trujillo helped establish what became a baseball industry. Integration also brought opportunities for Dominicans in MLB, beginning with Ozzie Virgil in 1956 and Felipe Alou in 1958. Cuba's prohibition of professional sport in 1961 coupled with the prominence of players like Alou and Juan Marichal drew attention to Dominican players. Over time, Dominicans developed prototype academies that now lie at the center of MLB's player development system. More than a thousand Dominican recruits as young as sixteen train in these academies and compete in the Dominican Summer League with the goal of becoming major leaguers; most are released without leaving the island. While Dominican baseball has been a point of pride and opportunity for many Dominicans, it has also reflected the inequities of global capitalism. Despite criticism of the academy system for exploiting youth, tens of thousands seek the chance to play in the major leagues.

Defence date: 24 September 2021; Examining Board: Professor Lucy Riall (European University Institute); Professor Alexander Etkind (European University Institute); Professor John Foot (University of Bristol); Professor Marla Stone (Occidental College) ; My PhD has utilised the cultural representation of Italy's most popular military figure from the Fascist period to account for the myth-making and warped remembrance of Rodolfo Graziani in Modern-day Italy. By proving himself to Mussolini with his brutal tactics, namely, mass hangings, the erection of concentration camps, and utilisation of poison gas during the Italian 'pacification' of Libya in the 1920's and the Fascist conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, my project highlights that Graziani was chosen by the Fascist government to be a national imperial war hero. Facilitated by the dawn of totalitarianism and mass consumption, the propaganda campaign to promote the Fascist Empire utilised Graziani as a modern-day celebrity, through many mediums, which became the source base for my research. Images of Graziani filtered back to Italy in the 1930s through postcards, books, magazines, film, radio, busts and the like. During the Second World War, collaboration with the Nazis under the Salò Republic led to his trial in 1948, but his colonial crimes remained unquestioned, testament to the effect of heroisation for his previous colonial career. Since then, this manipulation of historical consciousness has continued to pervade Italian society as the state searched for a collective 'usable' past from the remnants of the Fascist dictatorship. As Mussolini's most popular enterprise, colonial ambition remained a shared goal across the political spectrum in the immediate post-war period. By countering national insecurities through the utilisation of male symbols, men like Graziani provided an opportunity to promote such ideals through untainted virtues of masculinity. Institutionally therefore, the role of individuals in bringing 'civilisation' to its African colonies continued to be revered in post-fascist and post-colonial Italy. Moreover, most recently, a regionally funded monument that was built in Graziani's honour near Rome in 2012 only led to public outcry abroad and from interested national parties with almost no negative response from the Italian public. Graziani's memory thus remains a fervent, multifaceted one and signifies tension in popular attitudes to Italy fascist and colonial history. It is with this timely and noteworthy case-study that I aim to shed light on the persistently neglected darker aspects of Italy's recent past.

In recent years, historiography has addressed the building process of the Francoist regime through the analysis of the war experience of Rebel soldiers during the Spanish Civil War (1936-‍1939). This has produced two main interpretations: that coercion was the primary role played by the army, being the indoctrination significantly subordinated to it. And, consequently, that a relevant ideologisation experience among Rebel soldiers didn't take place. From this frame, the article aims to question these two ideas, arguing that there was indeed a process of ideologisation of Rebel soldiers in which, moreover, the army played a crucial role. Therefore, this allows to rethink the importance of the army's indoctrination policies. By analysing military sources concerning these policies at a general and divisional level, and incorporating soldiers' perspectives through their war diaries, I will delve into the forms and topics of this propaganda, arguing that the pragmatic approach, more than the ideological one, was ultimately what attracted combatants to the New State. Moreover, this interpretation would allow to understand how social support towards the dictatorship was built among war veterans, and more generally among the whole Spanish society. ; En los últimos años, la historiografía ha abordado el proceso constructivo del régimen franquista a través del estudio de la experiencia bélica de los combatientes sublevados durante la guerra civil española (1936-‍1939). Esto ha conducido a dos interpretaciones fundamentales: que la principal función del Ejército fue eminentemente coercitiva, y que el adoctrinamiento estaba subordinado a ella. Consecuentemente, no se dio una experiencia de ideologización significativa entre los combatientes rebeldes. Partiendo de este marco, el artículo busca cuestionar ambas ideas, sosteniendo que sí existió un proceso de ideologización de los soldados sublevados en el que además el Ejército tuvo un papel crucial, lo que permite reconsiderar la relevancia de sus políticas de adoctrinamiento. A través de un análisis de la documentación militar referida a estas políticas, tanto a nivel general como descendiendo a casos divisionales específicos, e incorporando también la perspectiva de los propios combatientes a través de sus diarios de guerra, se ahondará en las formas y temas de dicha propaganda, argumentando que fue la vía pragmática, más que la ideológica, la que favoreció la atracción de los combatientes hacia el nuevo Estado. Un enfoque que permitiría entender cómo se construyeron los apoyos sociales a la dictadura entre el colectivo de los excombatientes, y en general en el conjunto de la sociedad española.

El presente artículo se propone establecer un análisis comparado de dos films que entablan, de algún modo, un diálogo entre sí: Todo es ausencia (Rodolfo Kuhn, 1984) y En nombre de Dios (Patricio Guzmán, 1987). Se trata de dos documentales realizados por cineastas latinoamericanos exiliados para Tele­visión Española hacia la década de los ochenta, los cuales tematizan el vínculo que la Iglesia católica mantuvo con las cúpulas de poder y con la causa popular durante las dictaduras militares que afectaron a Argentina y Chile en las dé­cadas de los setenta y ochenta. En términos específicos, el artículo intentará analizar el tratamiento fílmico que estos documentales plantearon sobre la represión, las relaciones institucionales —especialmente las que vinculan a la Iglesia católica—, las modalidades de intervención sobre el espacio público y las tipologías de resistencia en ambos países vecinos. En especial, nos interesa­remos por el tipo de materiales de los que se nutre cada documental —testimo­nios, metraje de archivo, registro, etc— y su respectivo peso dramático. A partir de un recorrido por estos ejes de análisis, el presente artículo aspira a proponer una mirada comparada en torno a los modos de construcción y elaboración del pasado dictatorial en Argentina y en Chile.Palabras clave: cine, documental, dictadura, transición democrática, Chile, Argentina.Abstract The present article aims to establish a comparative analysis of two films which, in a way, partake in a dialogue: Todo es ausencia (Rodolfo Kuhn, 1984) and En nombre de Dios (Patricio Guzmán, 1987). These two documentaries, made by exiled Latin American filmmakers for Televisión Española during the 1980s, focus on the link held by the Catholic Church with the highest spheres of power, as well as with the «popular cause», during the military dictatorships that affected Argentina and Chile in the decades of 1970 and 1980. In specific terms, the article will attempt to analyze the cinematographic treatment that these documentaries offer about repression, institutional relations —especially those involving the Catholic Church—, modes of intervention in public spaces, and the typologies of resistance in these neighboring countries. In particular, we are interested in the kind of materials that nourish each documentary —testimonies, archive footage, film registers, etc. —and their respective dramatic effect. By way of tour through these analytical axes, the present article aspires to propose a comparative view around the modes of construction and elaboration of the dictatorial past in Argentina and Chile.Keywords: cinema, documentary, dictatorship, transition to democracy, Chile, Argentina.

SUMMARY This article gives a broad overview of the political economy of Chile since the military coup of 11 September 1973. Its main concern is with analysing the Chicago economic model being imposed in Chile, and how this become the dominant strategy after the coup. It argues that there is an intimate connection between the Chicago economic free market model being implemented in Chile and the repressive political dictatorship. The first part of the article looks at the relationship between the Chicago‐trained economists and the making of the coup. The second part analyses some of the key policy decisions taken and the relationship between economic and political changes. The third part explains and analyses the model itself, and exposes some of its main contradictions.RESUMEN El Nuevo Leviatán: la Escuela de Chicago y el régimen chileno 1973–80Este articulo entrega una amplia visión de la política económica chilena desde el golpe militar del 11 de septiembre de 1973. Concentra su atención en el análisis del modelo económico de Chicago impuesto en Chile y como éste se convierte en la estrategia dominante después del golpe de estado. Se argumenta la existencia de una íntima conexión entre el modelo libremercadista de Chicago implementado en Chile y la política represiva de la dictadura. La primera parte del artículo versa sobre las relaciones entre los economistas entrenados en Chicago y la preparación del golpe de estado. La segunda parte analiza algunas de las decisiones políticas claves que fueron tomadas y las relaciones entre los cambios económicos y políticos. La tercera parte explica y examina el modelo en si mismo, destacando algunas de sus principales contradicciones.RESUME La nouvelle menace: l'êcole de Chicago et le régime chilien 1973–80Cet article présente une vue générale de la politique économique du Chili depuis le coup d'Etat militaire du 11 septembre 1973. L'auteur se préoccupe surtout d'analyser le modèle économique de Chicago imposé au Chili, qui est devenu depuis lors la stratégie dominante. Il avance qu'il existe un lien étroit entre ce modèle et la dictature politique répressive. La première partie porte sur les rapports entre les économistes formés à Chicago et la préparation du coup. La deuxième partie analyse quelques‐unes des orientations prises et le rapport entre l'évolution économique et l'évolution politique. La troisième partie explique et analyse le modèle lui‐même, et expose ses principales contradictions.

Este trabajo propone continuar los estudios iniciados en otras instancias de investigación con el fin de explorar la literatura infanto-juvenil desde los estudios literarios y el impacto de la violencia política de las últimas dictaduras militares. El texto recorrerá las miradas del pasado a partir de la experiencia de dos autoras claves para la literatura infantil de Argentina y de Brasil, como son Graciela Montes y Ana María Machado. Por un lado, este estudio pretende profundizar en los modos en los que la violencia política de la última dictadura incidió en las prácticas intelectuales de estas autoras en los dos países. Esto nos permitirá establecer similitudes y diferencias entre ambos casos. Por otro lado, avanzaremos en el análisis de narrativas críticas entendidas como memorias fundamentales para la reconstrucción de las polémicas que definieron los principales planteos de la literatura para niños en los años noventa, dentro del contexto democrático. El posicionamiento crítico de las autoras con respecto a los movimientos de su campo y las características del contexto de cada país contribuye a profundizar en los modos desde los cuales la literatura participa de la infancia. ; This paper proposes to continue the studies initiated in other instances of research to explore the children's literature from literary studies and the impact of political violence in recent military dictatorships. The text looks last tour from the experience of two key authors of children's literature for Argentina and Brazil, such as Graciela Montes and Ana Maria Machado. First, this study aims to deepen the ways in which the political violence of the dictatorship fell upon the intellectual authors of these practices in the two countries. This will allow us to establish similarities and differences between the two cases. On the other hand, advance in the analysis of narrative reviews understood as fundamental memories for the reconstruction of the controversies that defined the main proposals of children's literature in the nineties, in a democratic context. The critical position of the authors regarding the movements of their field and the characteristics of the context of each country contributes to deeper modes from which literature participates childhood. ; Fil: Garcia, Laura Rafaela. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Tucumán. Instituto de Investigaciones sobre el Lenguaje y la Cultura. Universidad Nacional de Tucumán. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Cátedra de Literatura Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones sobre el Lenguaje y la Cultura; Argentina

    It may look as if Greece has beaten the record of political instability by calling a snap election only five weeks after the previous one. But the recent developments are, on the contrary, rather an instance of economic and political recovery and restored stability within the European Union. Greece was the
most damaged European country by the Great Recession generated nearly fifteen
years ago. Unemployment skyrocketed, per capita GDP decreased to 55% of the
previous level, emigration of young and qualified workers was massive.

In 2015, a
Memorandum of Understanding put under the control of the EU, the ECB, and the
IMF virtually all Greek policies on taxes, pensions, health care, control of
the banks, labor market, competition, energy, administration, justice against
corruption, and several others to be implemented "over many years". Greece
eluded a declaration of bankruptcy by accepting the EU's bailout and the reduction
of its autonomy to the election of the domestic rulers that would implement the
decisions of the European Empire.

Now, Greece has
repaid part of its debt ahead of schedule, it is being upgraded to welcome
foreign investments, and grows at an almost double rate than the European average.

There are some
similarities between Greece and Spain, including a long delay to recover the
levels of per capita GDP previous to the Recession and the low rates of
employed people out of the total population. But there are also significant
differences regarding the ways they democratized in the 1970s, in particular regarding
the party system and the types of leadership for the resolution of crises. I
warn the reader that, in the following, I am using "center" and "extreme" as geometric
relative positions along a political space, not as ideological references.

In Greece, the
military was removed from the government and democracy was restored under the
leadership of the center-right led by Konstantinos Karamanlis, a former prime
minister before the dictatorship who returned from exile and later on was also president
of the Republic. Since then, his party, New Democracy, now led by Kyriakos
Mitsotakis, has been in government more than half of the time, was back four
years ago, and has been reelected now.

In time, the
extreme left, organized as Syriza, appeared as an alternative to face the
crisis. Its government, led by Alexis Tsipras, called a referendum for "no" to
the EU bailout, which might have triggered Grexit, but then it canceled its
result.

On the other
extreme of the Mediterranean, in Portugal, the other country democratized in
the 1970s, the process was kind of symmetric. The initiative was pushed by
extreme left military officers of the Armed Forces Movement, which provided
several prime ministers and presidents, with the help of the Communist Party. This
left room for the main alternative to be located on the center-right, around a
member of the European People's Party that is as moderate as it calls itself
Social-Democrat.

The case of
Spain was different from both Greece and Portugal. The main actors in the first
stages of democratization were neither the center-right nor the extreme left. It
was the ex-Francoist right, which ended up as the People's Party, eventually alternating
in government with the center-left Socialist Party. In contrast with the other
two countries, the center-right failed once and again: Christian-democracy, Liberal
Union, Union of Democratic Center, Democratic and Social Center, Reformist
Party, Citizens. Currently, the Spanish People's Party is the most rightist
member of the European People's Party, according to eupoliticalbarometer.com,
to which the even more extreme Vox is annexed.

Certainly,
Greece is relatively less difficult to be governed than Spain because it is a
smaller country (one-fourth in population and one-sixth in GDP). It does not
have a vacate meseta or centrifugal peripheries. It suffered a much briefer
dictatorship, for only seven years. More than 50%of its citizens can speak
English, more than double the proportion of the paltry 22% in Spain, the lowest
in Europe.

Of course, all Greek
prime ministers have been English speakers, able to actively participate,
negotiate, and have some say at the European Council, as well as at the summits
of NATO and other organizations of paramount importance for the country's
governance (as have been all Portuguese prime ministers too). In contrast, only
two of the seven Spanish heads of government have been able to sustain a
conversation in English: the current one, Pedro Sanchez, and the brief Leopoldo
Calvo Sotelo. (I do not include Aznar because I have seen him in a one-hour
meeting in English).

In short: Greece's
economy was crushed by the Troika because it was a small and relatively poor
country. But its politics has achieved a more stable situation that is helping
its economic recovery.

Spain, in
contrast, is dickering. Europe cannot afford Spain's economic collapse because it
is too big to fail, and the subsequent restrictive effects on trade, foreign
investments, and emigration to other countries would be too disruptive. So, Spain,
which has about 10% of the EU's population, is allocated more than 20% of the EU's
Recovery Instrument (Next Generation EU). This is not a badge of pride, but
rather the opposite.

A consequence of
this overprotection is that, unlike in Greece, the Spanish politicians can
continue arguing more about where and to whom the funds are distributed than
about what they should be invested in, fighting among themselves, getting by,
and muddling through.

La Pirámide del Escudo se alza junto a la carretera de Burgos a Santander (N-623). Relacionada con los sacrarios militares en homenaje a los caídos italianos de la Primera Guerra Mundial construidos en época de Mussolini, el jerarca fascista está aún presente en el monumento burgalés, donde fueron enterrados los restos de cientos de combatientes trasalpinos caídos en la campaña del Norte del verano de 1937. El monumento, dedicado al general Antonio Sagardía y su 62 división de Olasagasti y Olano, instalado a la vera de la misma N-623, traza una proa de nave (o un águila) de resonancias futuristas. En Alcocero, muy cerca del puerto de la Brújula, se elevó otro monumento en homenaje a Emilio Mola, jefe del ejército del Norte, fallecido allí en accidente aéreo en junio de 1937. ; La Piràmide de l'Escut s'aixeca al costat de la carretera de Burgos a Santander (N-623). Relacionada amb els sagraris militars en homenatge als caiguts italians de la Primera Guerra Mundial construïts en època de Mussolini, el jerarca feixista encara és present en el monument burgalès, on van ser enterrades les restes de centenars de combatents transalpins caiguts en la campanya del Nord de l'estiu de 1937. El monument, dedicat al general Antonio Sagardía i la seva 62 divisió d'Olasagasti i Olano, instal·lat a la vora de la mateixa N-623, traça una proa de nau (o una àguila) de ressonàncies futuristes. A Alcocero, molt a prop del port de la Brújula, s'hi va aixecar un altre monument en homenatge a Emilio Mola, cap de l'exèrcit del Nord, mort allí en accident aeri el juny de 1937. ; The Pyramid of the Puerto del Escudo, or the Pyramid of the Italians, stands beside the road from Burgos to Santander (the N-623). Linked to the military ossuaries built in the time of Mussolini in homage to Italian war dead of the First World War, the fascist leader is still present in the Burgos monument, where the remains of hundreds of Italian fighters who fell in the Northern campaign of the summer of 1937 are buried. The monument by the architects Olasagasti and Olano is dedicated to Antonio Sagardía and his 62nd division. Located beside the N-623, it takes the form of a ship's prow (or an eagle) with futuristic resonances. In Alcocero, very close to La Brújula, another monument was built in homage to Emilio Mola, head of the Northern nationalist army, who died there in a plane crash in June 1937.