Suchergebnisse

As of January 2024, Italy has assumed the presidency of the G7, setting an ambitious agenda reflecting its domestic priorities and foreign policy interests. Alongside energy, migration and ongoing conflicts as top issues on the agenda, the presidency has made food security and sustainable food systems a priority, with particular attention to the needs of Africa.[1] This aligns with Italy's interest in the continent, exemplified by the recently launched Mattei Plan – an ambitious initiative meant to guide Italy's renewed partnership with African nations.[2]Addressing food security and sustainable food systems
The renewed focus on food security and sustainable food systems is a positive and necessary move. Food insecurity has been rising globally since 2017, driven by climate change, conflict, economic shocks and persistent poverty and inequality. This trend has been exacerbated by the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine with its ripple effect on food and fertiliser prices.[3] In 2022 alone, about 800 million people worldwide faced hunger,[4] with Africa being the continent where the food crisis is most severe.[5]
At the same time, food systems are major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and freshwater consumption.[6] They are also heavily impacted by climate change, which disrupts production and exacerbates food insecurity, especially in Africa. The critical need to transition to more sustainable food practices and adapt to the changing climate is evident.
With only six years left to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, coordinated international action is more urgent than ever. In this context, the Italian G7 presidency has a crucial opportunity to spearhead progress on global food security, build resilience and promote sustainable food systems.Setting the Italian G7 priorities
At the upcoming G7 Leaders' Summit in June, the Italian presidency will unveil the Apulia Food Systems Initiative (AFSI).[7] Although specifics are not yet fully disclosed, its title draws inspiration from precedents such as the 2009 G8 L'Aquila Food Security Initiative and the 2021 G20 Matera Declaration.[8] The AFSI prioritises Africa, recognising its vulnerability to food insecurity, underinvestment and climate change, while acknowledging its significant agricultural potential. Two main interrelated priorities will be at the core of the AFSI: (i) advancing efforts to address the food-climate nexus and (ii) scaling up finance and investments for food security and sustainable food systems.
Regarding the food-climate nexus, the AFSI will contribute to implementing the COP28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action,[9] endorsed by 159 Heads of State. The Declaration calls for scaled-up financial and technical support to align policies and investments to reduce carbon emissions from the food and agriculture sectors, while also building resilience and helping food producers adapt to climate change, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).[10] Italy pledged to channel 10 million euros over the next two years to a programme devoted to supporting the Declaration's implementation, co-led by the UAE, World Bank and FAO.[11] Additionally, President Meloni committed to using 70 per cent of Italy's 4.2 billion euro Climate Fund to finance adaptation and mitigation objectives in African countries through the Mattei Plan, utilising a mix of loans, grants and blended investments.[12] The commitment to bolstering adaptation action, including in the food and agriculture sectors, has also been reaffirmed at the G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministerial in April.[13]
As for the second priority area of finance and investment, the Italian presidency aims to promote innovative solutions to stimulate public, private and public-private investments to transform food systems and achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2, Zero Hunger. The food systems' finance gap is vast, with projections indicating an additional 350 billion US dollars needed annually by 2030.[14] However, this investment could yield significant returns, translating into annual net benefits of 5 to 10 trillion US dollars by reducing unaccounted health and environmental costs.[15]
The Italian public development bank, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, has led efforts to foster collective action among public development banks and development finance institutions from G7 countries. This resulted in a joint Statement of Intent highlighting the banks' ambition to increase operational cooperation on co-investment and risk mitigation initiatives and strengthen incentives to attract private sector capital to food-related projects.[16]
Given the limited fiscal space and high debt vulnerability of many LMICs in Africa,[17] the G7 leaders could significantly contribute to easing these constraints by exploring innovative solutions to debt relief such as debt swaps. Under this arrangement, sovereign debt could be forgiven in exchange for a country's commitment to allocate the freed-up funds towards investments in food security and sustainability. Similar approaches have proven effective in other sectors.[18]
Rechannelling special drawing rights (SDRs) – an international reserve asset issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that can be traded for hard currency – to bolster food security efforts is another crucial opportunity.[19] This move would inject much-needed liquidity into countries grappling with severe food crises, enabling them to invest in adaptation actions and support vulnerable populations. Regrettably, the Stresa Communiqué adopted by G7 Finance ministers falls short of seizing these opportunities: it lacks guiding principles for a new approach to debt and notably overlooks any mention of SDRs.[20]Aligning with African needs and priorities
Finance, investments and the food-climate nexus are critical areas for Africa's agri-food system transformation. However, the devil lies in the details.
First, while more finance is needed, it must reach the thousands of African small-scale farmers and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially women and youth, who struggle to access the financial resources they need to develop viable and more sustainable business models.[21] The G7 initiative needs to focus on creating a more supportive financial ecosystem for these actors by scaling up innovative de-risking strategies, developing products that meet their specific needs, building inclusive financial and business support services, and finding innovative ways to channel resources directly to the farmers and their organisations. Additionally, climate finance for food systems adaptation must increase dramatically, as only 1.7 per cent of global climate finance currently targets smallholder farmers.[22]
Moreover, focusing solely on investments poses a risk of leaving least-developed countries behind. G7 resources must also reach fragile and conflict-affected regions, not just those more attractive to private capital. These resources should go beyond emergency response and finance anticipatory actions to prevent future crises.
Second, supporting the integration of food and climate plans, as committed at COP28, is essential. For too long, these interconnected issues have remained in siloes.[23] However, guidance for implementing this commitment remains vague.[24] Concrete options for integrating these plans need to build on existing African and international policy processes. A key opportunity lies in the ongoing formulation of the next phase of the African Union's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) – the continent's main policy framework for agri-food systems transformation since 2003.[25] The revision of countries' climate plans – known as Nationally Determined Contributions – in 2025 presents another crucial opportunity to enhance ambitions for climate adaptation and mitigation in the agri-food sector.[26]
Moreover, while it is commendable that G7 countries prioritise support for the most vulnerable countries in addressing the food-climate nexus, it is important to recognise that this nexus and the imperative to transform food systems are equally relevant in G7 countries – with significant incoherencies existing between agricultural subsidies and climate commitments within G7 nations. Although politically sensitive, these inconsistencies must be acknowledged and addressed to ensure comprehensive and effective action on the transition to more sustainability.
Beyond finance and climate, other domains require attention. First, Africa urgently needs to reduce its import dependency to decrease its vulnerability to disruptions in global value chains and international price shocks.[27] This requires boosting intra-regional food trade through the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) through policies and investments in regional value chain development, infrastructure and improved processing, storage and market access.[28] In this regard, Italy's G7 presidency should connect the AFSI to its efforts to revitalise the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), for instance through flagship projects in selected corridors supporting industrialisation based on crop and livestock transformation.
Second, with low agricultural yields in Africa being a key constraint to more sustainability,[29] G7 countries should commit to strengthening Africa's fertiliser industry, investing in greener and organic fertilisers and promoting efficient fertiliser use. Investment in integrated soil and water management practices is also crucial for enhancing soil health, nutrient efficiency and climate resilience – as highlighted in the Nairobi Declaration recently endorsed at the Africa Fertiliser and Soil Health Summit.[30] Also, investing in research and innovation to promote the uptake of climate-resilient agricultural practices tailored to Africa's heterogeneous agricultural systems is key.
Third, food security initiatives in Africa should deliberately support the strengthening of social protection and safety nets to help food-insecure households build resilience in the face of recurrent food crises and afford healthy diets.[31]
Lastly, with almost two-thirds of African women employed in agrifood systems as food producers, agro-dealers, processors, distributors and traders, a transformation to sustainable food systems cannot be achieved without measures to promote gender equality and support women's empowerment.[32] Committing to support to the roll-out of the recently endorsed CFS' Voluntary Guidelines on Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment in the context of food security and nutrition, would offer G7 countries the opportunity to advance these interconnected agendas.[33]Key conditions for success
A true partnership approach is needed for the G7 initiative to achieve its goals. With the plethora of international initiatives in the food systems space, it is key to ensure Africa is in the driver's seat, with the AFSI building on existing continental, regional and national food- and climate-related policy processes and plans. Bottlenecks constraining the implementation of such plans need to be identified and addressed, and the capacities of institutions and actors to strategise, innovate, coordinate and regulate should be strengthened at all levels. This includes promoting horizontal and vertical coordination across governments and integrated policies across agriculture, water, environmental, trade, industrial and energy objectives. Mutual accountability, inclusivity and leveraging the voices of diverse stakeholders are also essential.
Building momentum and maintaining coalitions for change require strong leadership and coordination, addressing donor fragmentation and focusing on impactful initiatives while coordinating the deployment of bilateral and multilateral resources. This includes synergising efforts with the Brazilian G20 Presidency and its proposed Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty,[34] and ensuring continuity across global policy milestones such as COP29, the UN Food Systems Summit+4 and the South African G20 presidency leading up to COP30. This collaboration can pave the way for ambitious and long-lasting results towards more inclusive and resilient African agri-food systems.Cecilia D'Alessandro is the Deputy Head of the Sustainable Food Systems team at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), in Maastricht and Brussels. This commentary is part of a broader IAI project, "Climate mitigation, energy and food security goals within the Italian G7 Presidency", supported by the European Climate Foundation (ECF).[1] FAO, UNGA: FAO and the G7, UN Food Systems Summit+2 and COP28 Presidencies Join Hands to Position Agrifood Systems Transformation High on the International Agenda, 20 September 2023, https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/unga--fao-and-the-g7--un-food-systems-summit-2-and-cop28-presidencies-join-hands-to-position-agrifood-systems-transformation-high-on-the-international-agenda/en; and Italian Government, President Meloni's Speech at the United Nations Food Systems Summit, 24 July 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/23272.[2] Daniele Fattibene and Stefano Manservisi, "The Mattei Plan for Africa: A Turning Point for Italy's Development Cooperation Policy?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|10 (March 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18219.[3] Hanne Knaepen and Koen Dekeyser, "Russia's Invasion Leaves North Africa with a Food Crisis – What Can Europe Do?", in ECDPM Commentaries, 14 March 2022, https://ecdpm.org/work/russias-invasion-leaves-north-africa-food-crisis-what-can-europe-do.[4] FAO et al., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023, Rome, FAO, 2023, p. vii, https://doi.org/10.4060/CC3017EN.[5] Sevil Omer, "Africa Hunger Crisis: Facts, FAQs, How to Help", in World Vision, 16 April 2024, https://www.worldvision.org/?p=17548.[6] Massimo Crippa et al., "Food Systems Are Responsible for a Third of Global Anthropogenic GHG Emissions", in Nature Food, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 2021), p. 198-209, DOI 10.1038/s43016-021-00225-9.[7] Global Summitry Project website: G7 Italy 2024, Apulia Summit, https://globalsummitryproject.com/?p=3677.[8] G8 et al., L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security - L'Aquila Food Security Initiative, 10 July 2009, https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2009-g7-italy-leaders-leaders-language-laquila-joint-statement-on-global-food-security-laquila-food-security-initiative; G20, Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems, 29 June 2021, http://www.g20italy.org/italian-g20-presidency/ministerial-meetings/g20-foreign-affairs-and-development-ministers-meetings.html.[9] COP28, Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, 10 December 2023, https://www.cop28.com/en/food-and-agriculture.[10] Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Opening Remarks by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Edmondo Cirielli at UNGA78 Side Event co-organized by Italy "Catalysing Global Action for Sustainable and Resilient Agri-Food Systems Transformation to Accelerate the SDGs", 20 September 2023, https://italyun.esteri.it/en/?p=5406.[11] CGIAR, CGIAR Joins Global Commitments at COP28's Food, Agriculture and Water Day, 12 December 2023, https://www.cgiar.org/news-events/news/cgiar-joins-global-commitments-at-cop28s-food-agriculture-and-water-day.[12] "Meloni Pledges €100 Million, Global South Food Security Efforts at COP28", in Decode39, 1 December 2023, https://decode39.com/?p=8408.[13] G7, Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers' Meeting Communiqué, Turin, 29-30 April 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/G7-Climate-Energy-Environment-Ministerial-Communique_Final.pdf.[14] International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2022 Global Food Policy Report: Climate Change and Food Systems, Washington, IFPRI, 2022, https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896294257.[15] Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi et al., Global Policy Report: The Economics of the Food System Transformation, Food System Economics Commission, February 2024, p. 7, https://foodsystemeconomics.org/policy/global-policy-report.[16] Cassa Depositi e Prestiti et al., G7 Public Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions Statement of Intent. Leveraging the Role of G7 Development Finance in Addressing Global Challenges during the 2024 G7 Italian Presidency, 9 May 2024, https://www.cdp.it/resources/cms/documents/2024_G7_Development_Finance_Statement_of_Intent.pdf.[17] FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises, 2024 Global Report on Food Crises, May 2024, p. 168, https://www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024.[18] SDG2 Advocacy Hub, Unlocking Finance to End the Cycle of Food Crises, 10 April 2024, https://sdg2advocacyhub.org/?p=9676.[19] On the rechannelling of SDRs to promote investments in food systems see Francesco Rampa et al., "Using Special Drawing Rights for Climate-Resilient Food Systems and Food Security", in ECDPM Commentaries, 4 December 2023, https://ecdpm.org/work/using-special-drawing-rights-climate-resilient-food-systems-and-food-security; and San Bilal et al., "Rechannelling Special Drawing Rights for Food Security and Sustainable Food Systems", in ECDPM Briefing Notes, April 2024, https://ecdpm.org/work/rechannelling-special-drawing-rights-food-security-and-sustainable-food-systems.[20] G7, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Communiqué, Stresa, 23-25 May 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Stresa-Communique-25-May-2024.pdf.[21] Cecilia D'Alessandro, "Is Anyone Worried about the Farmer? Don't Just Express Worry in Words, Do Something about It", in ECDPM Commentaries, 30 October 2023, https://ecdpm.org/work/anyone-worried-about-farmer-dont-just-express-worry-words-do-something-about-it.[22] Daniela Chiriac and Baysa Naran, Examining the Climate Finance Gap for Small-Scale Agriculture, Climate Policy Initiative, November 2020, p. 4, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/?p=32593.[23] Thin Lei Win, "Food Systems Take the Stage at COP28: But Will Actions Match Rhetoric?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|68 (December 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17918.[24] Lauren Evans, "At COP 28, Countries Pledged to Transform Their Food Systems. Now What?", in Devex, 27 February 2024, https://www.devex.com/news/107121.[25] African Union, African Union Launches the 4th CAADP Biennial Review Report and Post-Malabo Roadmap, 20 March 2024, https://au.int/en/node/43649.[26] Haseeb Bakhtary et al., COP28 Agriculture, Food and Climate National Action Toolkit, Gland, WWF, 2023, https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cc9049en.[27] Francesco Rampa, "Russia's War against Ukraine Should Trigger Structural Solutions to Food Insecurity", in ECDPM Commentaries, 20 June 2022, https://ecdpm.org/work/russias-war-against-ukraine-should-trigger-structural-solutions-food-insecurity.[28] Poorva Karkare, "What It Would Take to Provide Structural Solutions to Food Insecurity in Africa", in ECDPM Commentaries, 4 July 2022, https://ecdpm.org/work/what-it-would-take-provide-structural-solutions-food-insecurity-africa.[29] Hannah Ritchie, "Increasing Agricultural Productivity across Sub-Saharan Africa Is One of the Most Important Problems this century" in Our World in Data, 4 April 2022, https://ourworldindata.org/africa-yields-problem.[30] African Union, Nairobi Declaration. Africa Fertilizer and Soil Health Summit, 9 May 2024, https://au.int/en/node/43771.[31] SDG2 Advocacy Hub, A Global Plan to End Food Crises and Transform Food Systems, April 2024, https://sdg2advocacyhub.org/?p=9667.[32] Katrin Glatzel et al., Bridging the Gap: Policy Innovations to Put Women at the Center of Food Systems Transformation in Africa, Malabo Montpellier Panel, June 2023, https://www.mamopanel.org/resources/reports-and-briefings/bridginggappolicyinnovations-put-women-center-f.[33] UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), Voluntary Guidelines on Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment in the Context of Food Security and Nutrition, 14 June 2023, https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/node/71037.[34] G20, Task Force for a Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, 2024, https://www.g20.org/en/tracks/sherpa-track/hunger-and-poverty.

The United States is waging an illegal war in Yemen, where major shipping routes along the country's coastlines have been disrupted by ongoing violence in the region.Despite widespread understanding in Washington that U.S. military operations in Yemen violate U.S. law, U.S. officials continue to insist that they must continue their military campaign, which they say is necessary to saving time and money on commercial shipping through the Middle East."The U.S. economy relies on open sea lanes," U.S. General Michael Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command, said at a March 7 Senate hearing, after being asked about the growing U.S. military presence in the Red Sea. "By our national security strategy, we will not allow a state or non-state actor to affect the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al Mandeb, or the Suez Canal."Since January 11, the United States has been directing airstrikes and other military operations in Yemen. U.S. military forces have been targeting the Houthis, a militant group that has been launching missiles and other attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.For months, the Houthis' attacks have disrupted commercial shipping. The Houthis have insisted that they will continue their attacks until Israel ends it military offensive in Gaza.Although some of the Houthis' attacks have caused casualties, the major concern in Washington has been the implications for the global economy. As U.S. officials have repeatedly noted, as much as 15 percent of global trade passes through the Red Sea, including 12 percent of the sea-based oil trade."The reason it's so important there is this," Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained earlier this year. "15 percent of commercial traffic is going through that strait every single day." That includes "30 percent of the world's container ships."Of particular concern to U.S. officials is the Bab al Mandeb, a narrow strait along the southwestern coast of Yemen that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. An estimated 8.8 million barrels of oil are shipped through the strait every day, making it one of the world's "strategic chokepoints," as Gen. Kurilla described it.Although the White House has insisted that President Biden has the legal authority to take military action against the Houthis, several members of Congress have refuted its claims. At a Senate hearing in February, several senators called attention to the War Powers Resolution, which establishes that the president cannot continue hostilities for longer than 60 days without approval from Congress.Regardless, Congress has failed to act, even now that the deadline has passed. March 12, the day that the White House was required to cease its military operations, "came, and went, in public silence," as the Associated Press reported.Even as the Biden administration and Congress move forward with an illegal war, there are alternatives to addressing the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping.As some U.S. officials have acknowledged, the ideal and perhaps most obvious alternative would be to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza. After all, the Houthis continue to insist that they will not end their attacks until Israel ends its siege of Gaza."I am very keen to see that there is a ceasefire in Gaza," U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen Timothy Lenderking said during a March 29 appearance on Washington Journal. "I do believe that we can use that moment to de-escalate some of these other crises, including the Red Sea. We must get to that moment."Absent a ceasefire, however, it remains possible for commercial ships to circumvent the Middle East. Data compiled by the International Monetary Fund indicates that maritime trade is being redirected around Africa. In other words, commercial ships are taking advantage of other options for reaching their destinations.The Biden administration has opposed both approaches, however. Not only has the administration continued to support Israel's military offensive in Gaza, despite its acknowledgment of the worsening "humanitarian catastrophe," as Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described it, but the administration remains unwilling to tolerate the longer shipping times that are associated with the route around Africa."If you're talking oil that comes through, we're seeing a diversion of that," Gen. Kurilla said at the March 7 Senate hearing. "It goes around the Cape of Good Hope. What that's going to do is bring products late to market and price increases as well."Indeed, the priority of U.S. officials is to keep the Red Sea open for shipping. Their determination to maintain faster shipping is leading them to move forward with a war in Yemen that they know is illegal, even as they come to recognize more sensible options.The first step in getting to a "just settlement" in Yemen "is the ceasefire in Gaza," Lenderking said. "I think we can use that diplomatically to de-escalate the situation in the Red Sea."This article has been republished with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.

Objetivo/contexto: El artículo analiza la relación entre el Estado y las élites financieras en Ecuador durante el gobierno de Rafael Correa (2007-2014), enmarcado en lo que se conoce como giro a la izquierda. Este gobierno emprendió una lucha descorporativizadora para desacoplar la gestión estatal de los intereses privados que habían capturado al Estado durante el ciclo neoliberal. Esto implicó dos movimientos simultáneos: quebrar la institucionalidad vigente en distintos ámbitos de política pública (educación, finanzas, salud, medios de comunicación, entre otros) regentados por actores de veto con intereses particulares y, al mismo tiempo, edificar una nueva institucionalidad capaz de responder a intereses y demandas más amplias, en una clave democrática e inclusiva. Metodología: La exploración empírica de este caso se efectuó con una metodología cualitativa basada en el análisis hemerográfico y normativo y el rastreo de procesos, lo cual permitió ofrecer evidencia sobre mecanismos de captura y descorporativización del Estado, en el marco de gobiernos cuyos adversarios predilectos son las élites económicas comprometidas con el neoliberalismo. Conclusiones: La reconfiguración institucional llevada adelante por la Revolución Ciudadana en el ámbito de las finanzas consiguió mayores márgenes de autonomía estatal, a través de nuevos diseños institucionales de organismos del sistema financiero, como las Juntas Monetaria y Bancaria, para evitar que los intereses privados de los banqueros permeen la gestión estatal. Originalidad: El texto aportó elementos para suplir el vacío que se encuentra en los estudios sobre élites en América Latina y su relación con el Estado, específicamente, acerca de los mecanismos de captura y "des-captura" de la gestión estatal. ; Objective/context: The article analyzes the relationship between the State and financial elites in Ecuador during the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2014), framed by what is known as the turn to the left. This government carried out a decorporatizing fight to delink state management from private interests that had captured the State during the neoliberal cycle. This entailed two simultaneous movements: breaking the institutionality in force in different spheres of public policy (education, finance, health, communications media, among others) governed by actors with veto powers and special interests and, at the same time, building a new institutionality capable of responding to wider interests and demands, within a democratic and inclusive spirit. Methodology: The empirical exploration of this case was performed with a qualitative methodology based on an analysis of the press and regulations and the tracking of processes, which allowed offering evidence regarding the mechanisms for the capture and decorporatization of the State, within the framework of governments whose favorite adversaries are the economic elites committed to neoliberalism. Conclusions: The institutional reconfiguration carried out by the Citizen's Revolution within the sphere of finance achieved greater margins of state autonomy, through new institutional designs of financial system bodies, such as the Monetary and Banking Boards, to keep the private interests of bankers from permeating state management. Originality: The text contributed elements to bridge the gap found in studies on elites in Latin America and their relationship with the State, specifically, regarding the mechanisms for the capture and "de-capture" of state management. ; Objetivo/contexto: este artigo analisa a relação entre o Estado e as elites financeiras no Equador durante o governo de Rafael Correa (2007-2014), delimitado no que se conhece como virada à esquerda. Esse governo empreendeu uma luta descorporativizadora para desatrelar a gestão estatal dos interesses privados que tinham capturado o Estado durante o ciclo neoliberal. Isso implicou dois movimentos simultâneos: quebrar a institucionalidade vigente em diferentes âmbitos de política pública (educação, finanças, saúde, meios de comunicação, entre outros) conduzidos por atores de veto com interesses particulares e, ao mesmo tempo, edificar uma nova institucionalidade capaz de responder a interesses e demandas mais amplas, de forma democrática e inclusiva. Metodologia: a exploração empírica desse caso foi efetuada com uma metodologia qualitativa baseada na análise hemerográfica e normativa, bem como rastreamento de processos, o que permite oferecer evidência sobre mecanismos de captura e descorporativização do Estado, no âmbito de governos cujos adversários prediletos são as elites econômicas comprometidas com o neoliberalismo. Conclusões: a reconfiguração institucional realizada pela Revolução Cidadã no contexto das finanças conseguiu maiores margens de autonomia estatal, por meio de novos desenhos institucionais de organismos do sistema financeiro, como as Direções Monetária e Bancária, para evitar que os interesses privados dos bancários permeassem a gestão estatal. Originalidade: este texto contribui com elementos para preencher a lacuna que se encontra nos estudos sobre elites na América Latina e sua relação com o Estado, em específico, sobre os mecanismos de captura e "des-captura" da gestão estatal. ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

Objetivo/contexto: El artículo analiza la relación entre el Estado y las élites financieras en Ecuador durante el gobierno de Rafael Correa (2007-2014), enmarcado en lo que se conoce como giro a la izquierda. Este gobierno emprendió una lucha descorporativizadora para desacoplar la gestión estatal de los intereses privados que habían capturado al Estado durante el ciclo neoliberal. Esto implicó dos movimientos simultáneos: quebrar la institucionalidad vigente en distintos ámbitos de política pública (educación, finanzas, salud, medios de comunicación, entre otros) regentados por actores de veto con intereses particulares y, al mismo tiempo, edificar una nueva institucionalidad capaz de responder a intereses y demandas más amplias, en una clave democrática e inclusiva. Metodología: La exploración empírica de este caso se efectuó con una metodología cualitativa basada en el análisis hemerográfico y normativo y el rastreo de procesos, lo cual permitió ofrecer evidencia sobre mecanismos de captura y descorporativización del Estado, en el marco de gobiernos cuyos adversarios predilectos son las élites económicas comprometidas con el neoliberalismo. Conclusiones: La reconfiguración institucional llevada adelante por la Revolución Ciudadana en el ámbito de las finanzas consiguió mayores márgenes de autonomía estatal, a través de nuevos diseños institucionales de organismos del sistema financiero, como las Juntas Monetaria y Bancaria, para evitar que los intereses privados de los banqueros permeen la gestión estatal. Originalidad: El texto aportó elementos para suplir el vacío que se encuentra en los estudios sobre élites en América Latina y su relación con el Estado, específicamente, acerca de los mecanismos de captura y "des-captura" de la gestión estatal. ; Objective/context: The article analyzes the relationship between the State and financial elites in Ecuador during the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2014), framed by what is known as the turn to the left. This government carried out a decorporatizing fight to delink state management from private interests that had captured the State during the neoliberal cycle. This entailed two simultaneous movements: breaking the institutionality in force in different spheres of public policy (education, finance, health, communications media, among others) governed by actors with veto powers and special interests and, at the same time, building a new institutionality capable of responding to wider interests and demands, within a democratic and inclusive spirit. Methodology: The empirical exploration of this case was performed with a qualitative methodology based on an analysis of the press and regulations and the tracking of processes, which allowed offering evidence regarding the mechanisms for the capture and decorporatization of the State, within the framework of governments whose favorite adversaries are the economic elites committed to neoliberalism. Conclusions: The institutional reconfiguration carried out by the Citizen's Revolution within the sphere of finance achieved greater margins of state autonomy, through new institutional designs of financial system bodies, such as the Monetary and Banking Boards, to keep the private interests of bankers from permeating state management. Originality: The text contributed elements to bridge the gap found in studies on elites in Latin America and their relationship with the State, specifically, regarding the mechanisms for the capture and "de-capture" of state management. ; Objetivo/contexto: este artigo analisa a relação entre o Estado e as elites financeiras no Equador durante o governo de Rafael Correa (2007-2014), delimitado no que se conhece como virada à esquerda. Esse governo empreendeu uma luta descorporativizadora para desatrelar a gestão estatal dos interesses privados que tinham capturado o Estado durante o ciclo neoliberal. Isso implicou dois movimentos simultâneos: quebrar a institucionalidade vigente em diferentes âmbitos de política pública (educação, finanças, saúde, meios de comunicação, entre outros) conduzidos por atores de veto com interesses particulares e, ao mesmo tempo, edificar uma nova institucionalidade capaz de responder a interesses e demandas mais amplas, de forma democrática e inclusiva. Metodologia: a exploração empírica desse caso foi efetuada com uma metodologia qualitativa baseada na análise hemerográfica e normativa, bem como rastreamento de processos, o que permite oferecer evidência sobre mecanismos de captura e descorporativização do Estado, no âmbito de governos cujos adversários prediletos são as elites econômicas comprometidas com o neoliberalismo. Conclusões: a reconfiguração institucional realizada pela Revolução Cidadã no contexto das finanças conseguiu maiores margens de autonomia estatal, por meio de novos desenhos institucionais de organismos do sistema financeiro, como as Direções Monetária e Bancária, para evitar que os interesses privados dos bancários permeassem a gestão estatal. Originalidade: este texto contribui com elementos para preencher a lacuna que se encontra nos estudos sobre elites na América Latina e sua relação com o Estado, em específico, sobre os mecanismos de captura e "des-captura" da gestão estatal. ; Fil: Stoessel, Soledad. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.

Introduction. The article analyzes the categories of "smart city" and "creative industries" as an innovative vector for the development of the region and obtain social and economic effect. The level of development of this problem is clarified among the theoretical and practical approaches, the experience of the European Union, America in the implementation and implementation of the concept of "smart city" is presented. An excursion of theoretical and methodological tools of the "creative industries" is made and their role in the strategy of development of "smart cities" of the region is outlined. The basic directions of realization of the concept of "smart cities" are defined. The practice of financing the European Union's leading cities in the concept of "smart cities" is explored, in particular for modernization, improvement of energy efficiency of buildings and transport networks, smart energy management and consumption, introduction of a new model of information and communication, development of the service sector. The purpose of the article. The originality of the study is related to the substantiation of theoretical hypotheses regarding the main directions of synthesis of creative industries, as the driving force behind the concept of "smart cities". The results of the analysis will bring Ukrainian cities closer to the European centers of information and cultural industries of the region. The role of prestigious industries in the concept of "smart cities" of Ukraine is considerable, but it can be realized under the following circumstances: psychological perception of cultural and social industries by creative economy measures; theoretical and practical studies of the topic of cultural innovation and "smart cities", which have been presented in literary sources; improving the symbiosis of lawmaking, financial levers, further mechanism for the development of "smart cities" and cultural and creative industries; increase of specialists of creative sphere, sufficiency of information and communication sources, etc., etc. Therefore, in the arena of inter-regional competition, a special place belongs to the concept of creating urban space, innovation, the consumption of creative ideas in the context of forming regions with "smart cities". In scientific articles, there is a growing popularity of the "smart city" category. Today, this expression is associated with the innovative development of the economy, the creation of prerequisites for the transformation of new knowledge in the practical plane of its implementation and ensure economic and social effect. The institutional basis for obtaining the status of smart cities is the social and creative industries, which are the vector of increasing the innovative potential of the city, and with the reduction of social pressure, transforming the appearance of cities and improving the economic and cultural sense of life of citizens. Results. The emergence of major changes in economic spheres of life are bold in nature, periodically favoring various spheres of economy, sociology, culture, urbanization. Changes also affect the creative approach of cities, as centers of economic life in the region and the state as a whole. This, in turn, influences the need to change the spectrum of regional policy, with the priority of attracting human resources solely with creative thinking and practical approaches to its implementation. Therefore, the social and creative industries should be identified in the positions of the main spheres in which they function in the process of reproduction through the circulation: production, distribution, exchange and consumption. Manufacturing, as the primary sphere of the cycle started, implies a combination of intellectual, innovative and social resources. Conclusions. Exchange determines the process of substitution of monetary compensation for intellectualization and realization of previously created creative results and services, distribution means distribution through various ways and channels of sale of goods and services of creative and social enterprise, and at the last stage of the cycle there is a direct consumption of useful services and services. At the same time, despite the fact that the creative industries, along with science and high technology, are the impetus for an innovative economy, the theoretical and practical studies of this problem are, to say the least, poorly understood. Therefore, creative economy, as a new vector of transformation for meso and macroeconomic systems, requires immediate investigation of this issue. ; В статті здійснено аналіз категорій «розумне місто» та «креативні індустрії», як інноваційного вектору розвитку регіону та отримання соціального та економічного ефекту. З'ясовано серед переліку теоретичних та практичних підходів рівень розробки даної проблеми, приведено досвід Європейського Союзу, Америки в імплементації та запровадженні концепції «розумне місто». Здійснено екскурс теоретично-методологічного інструментарію «креативних індустрій» та окреслено їх роль у стратегії розвитку «розумних міст» регіону. Визначено основні напрями реалізації концепції «розумних міст». Досліджено практику фінансування передових міст Європейського Союзу концепції «розумних міст», зокрема на модернізацію, підвищення енергоефективності споруд та транспортно-дорожніх мереж, розумного управління та споживання енергетикою, запровадження нової моделі інформаційно-комунікаційного спілкування, розвиток сфери обслуговування.

The paper is based on the results of the Joint OECD/UNECE Seminar on Implementation of the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) which was held in Geneva on February 21-22, 2018. The authors - the seminar participants, presented brief overview of the seminar agenda, its goals and objectives, and outlined the contents of their presentations on the current condition and prospects of introducing the SEEA into the Russian Federation official statistics. The paper highlights the significance of the document adopted in 2012 by the UN Statistical Commission - «System of EnvironmentalEconomic Accounting 2012. Central Framework». It is recognised as an international statistical standard and is applied in many countries of the world to describe the interaction between the economy and the environment, and the stocks and changes in stocks of environmental assets. It is noted that publication in 2017 of the revised official Russian translation of the SEEA Central Framework was especially significant, for its terminology is harmonised with the notions of the national legislation and coordinated with all the main institutions engaged in environmental issues. Considering an important role of natural resources in the Russian economy the authors identify the following priority areas of the SEEA implementation in our country: development of environmental assets accounts and resource productivity measurement. The paper characterises principal phases of a research and development programme on monetary evaluation of environmental assets and resource rent calculation method to be used in valuation of fossil mineral and energy resources on the basis of statistical survey that was launched in 2018. Significant attention is paid to considering the experience of the Research Institute «Cadaster» (city of Yaroslavl) in research and development of accounting and economic evaluation of natural resources and the damage to the environment that were conducted on the basis of the SEEA methodology. It is noted that insufficiency of comprehensive enough data sources poses a significant challenge in solving the outlined tasks. The paper presents the overall characteristic of the Cadaster Institute activities in ecosystem services assessment in the regions of Russia. Summing up, the authors determine the main tasks of the SEEA implementation in Russia that goes in line with the UNECE and OECD seminar recommendations: design of the SEEA architecture adapted to the Russian conditions; application of the SEEA methodology for addressing current issues of economic policy; introduction of new data sources and their harmonisation with the existing statistical standards and classifications; joining efforts of Rosstat, ministries and government agencies to promote knowledge on the SEEA methodology within a wide range of information users; creating the conditions for inter-agency cooperation. ; Статья подготовлена по итогам совместного семинара ОЭСР и ЕЭК ООН по проблемам реализации Системы природно-экономического учета (СПЭУ), который состоялся 21-22 февраля 2018 г. в Женеве. Авторы статьи - участники семинара - предоставили краткую информацию о программе семинара, его целях и задачах, а также изложили содержание своих докладов, посвященных современному состоянию и перспективам внедрения СПЭУ в официальный статистический учет Российской Федерации. В статье подчеркивается значение принятого в 2012 г. Статистической комиссией ООН документа - «Центральной основы Системы природно-экономического учета» (ЦО СПЭУ), который является международным статистическим стандартом и используется во многих странах мира для описания взаимодействия между экономикой и окружающей средой, а также запасов и изменений запасов активов окружающей среды. Как отмечается в статье, особое значение имеет публикация в 2017 г. обновленного официального перевода ЦО СПЭУ на русский язык, терминология которого гармонизирована с категориями национального законодательства и согласована со всеми основными заинтересованными организациями. С учетом значительной роли природно-ресурсного потенциала в экономике России выделены приоритетные направления внедрения СПЭУ в нашей стране: разработка счетов активов окружающей среды и оценка экономической продуктивности природных ресурсов. В статье рассмотрены основные этапы реализации программы научно-исследовательских работ, посвященной разработке комплексной стоимостной оценки основных активов окружающей природной среды, а также методика расчета ресурсной ренты для проведения стоимостной оценки минерально-сырьевых и топливно-энергетических ресурсов на основе обследования, начатого в 2018 г. Отдельное внимание уделено характеристике опыта исследований и практических разработок по учету и социально-экономической оценке природных ресурсов и нанесенного окружающей среде ущерба, проведенных на основе методологии СПЭУ научно- исследовательским проектным институтом «Кадастр» (г. Ярославль). Отмечается, что значительную проблему для решения указанных задач представляет недостаточная доступность и полнота исходных данных. Дается общая характеристика работ института «Кадастр» в области экономической оценки экосистемных услуг, предоставляемых в отдельных регионах России. Подводя итоги, авторы статьи определяют основные задачи внедрения СПЭУ в России, соответствующие рекомендациям семинара ОЭСР и ЕЭК ООН: разработка архитектуры СПЭУ, адаптированной к российским условиям; применение методологии СПЭУ при решении текущих вопросов экономической политики; использование новых источников данных и их гармонизация с существующими статистическими стандартами и классификациями; объединение усилий Росстата, министерств и ведомств с целью формирования знаний о СПЭУ у широкого круга пользователей информации; создание условий межведомственного сотрудничества.

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 외교학과, 2012. 2. 윤영관. ; 개발원조가 더욱 중요해지고, 투입되는 금액 또한 증가하면서 개발원조의 효과성에 대한 관심이 증대되고 있다. 본 논문 역시 이에 주목하여, 원조가 수원국의 경제발전에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 조건을 알아본다. 특히 수원국의 경제발전전략과 원조효과성과의 관계를 살피기 위해서 시장주도적인 경제발전전략을 채택한 방글라데시와 국가주도적인 경제발전전략을 채택한 보츠와나의 원조이용과 그 효과성을 비교하여 살펴보았다. 보츠와나 방글라데시 두 국가 모두 독립 당시에는 매우 가난하여 해외 원조에 의존하였다. 그러나 현재, 보츠와나는 1인당 국민소득이 7,000달러에 달하고 방글라데시의 국민소득은 600달러를 겨우 넘는다. 양국의 개발전략을 비교해보면, 국가주도의 경제개발전략을 택한 보츠와나 정부는 국가개발계획을 작성하고 이에 따라 경제를 관리하였다. 개발계획의 수립, 예산의 작성 등을 재정 및 개발계획부라는 한 개의 정부부서가 통제함으로써 효율적인 관리가 가능했다. 반면 방글라데시는 시장주도의 경제개발전략을 택했다. 1980년대와 1990년대 세계은행과 국제통화기금 등의 공여국의 영향으로 시장주도적인 개방형 경제구조를 위한 자유화, 민영화, 규제완화 조치가 본격적으로 시행되었다. 그러나 방글라데시는 시장 자체나 이를 뒷받침해줄 제도가 제대로 갖춰지지 않았기 때문에 개혁은 제대로 성공을 거두지 못했다. 양국의 원조의 이용 역시 달랐다. 보츠와나는 국가주도의 개발전략에 따라 원조를 이용하였다. 공여국은 국가개발계획을 참고하여 원조 분야와 사업을 결정함으로써 보츠와나 정부의 우선순위에 따른 원조를 하는 것이 가능했다. 반면 방글라데시의 원조는 방글라데시의 필요에 맞춰 이용되는 것이 아니라 공여국의 입장에 따라 이용되었다. 이에 따라 사업이 중간에 중단되거나, 원하는 목표를 이루지 못하는 경우가 생겼다. 그 결과 양국에 제공된 원조의 효과성에도 차이가 있었다. 보츠와나의 경우, 원조가 투자된 교육 분야나 보건, 교통 등의 분야에서는 예전에 비해 많은 발전이 이루어졌으며, 경제발전에 도움이 되었다는 평가를 받고 있다. 반면 방글라데시의 경우, 경제성장을 위해 필요한 부분에 원조를 투입하기 보다는 공여국의 개혁정책을 실시하기 위해 필요한 부분에 원조를 투자하였다. 시장의 발달을 위해 민간 금융 기관의 설립, 국영기업의 민영화 등에 투자된 원조는 공여국의 요구에 따라 성급하고 무리하게 투자된 것이었다. 이렇게 투자된 원조는 제대로 효과를 발휘하지 못하고 오히려 실업이나 채무 부담 증가 등 부작용을 발생시켰다. 국가주도적인 개발전략을 세우고 실행하면서 원조 역시 성공적으로 이용한 보츠와나와 공여국의 영향으로 시장주도적인 개발전략을 세우고 개혁을 시도하였으나 실패하고 개혁에 투입된 원조도 그 효과가 크지 않았던 방글라데시의 사례를 비교해본다면 무조건적으로 시장주도적 경제발전전략을 세우고 이에 따라 개혁을 실시하는 것은 수원국의 경제를 발전시키고 원조의 효과성을 제고하기 보다는 오히려 부작용을 불러올 수도 있는 것으로 보인다. 그보다는 수원국의 정부가 장기적인 안목을 갖고 국가주도적으로 경제발전전략을 정하고 이 과정에 통합하여 원조를 이용하는 것, 그리고 공여국은 최대한 그에 따라 원조를 지원하는 것이 원조의 효과성을 높이는 방법이라고 생각할 수 있다. ; As development aid becomes more important and the volume of it increases, more people develop interest on the effectiveness of aid. In this dissertation, I sought for the conditions to improve aid effectiveness. To find the conditions that positively influence the economy of a recipient country, I compare the development strategy and the use and the effectiveness of aid between Bangladesh and Botswana. Both Botswana and Bangladesh were so poor that they could not help depending on foreign development aid when they became independent. However, the GDP per capita of Botswana is almost 7,000 dollars now while Bangladesh's is barely 600 dollars. Bangladesh has selected a market-oriented economic development strategy and Botswana a state-led strategy. The Botswana government built the National Development Plan and managed their economy according to this. Because the Ministry of Finance and Development Plan controls the development plan, budget, and so on, it managed the economy efficiently. On the other hand, Bangladesh initiated reform policies to have an open market economy under the influence of donors. In the 1980s and 1990s, the policies for liberalization, privatization, and deregulation were placed guided by major donors, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, Bangladesh did not have the proper market and the institution to support it; therefore, its intended reforms did not succeed. The use of aid is also different in both countries. Botswana efficiently used aid according to a national development strategy. Donors could give aid to Botswana in alignment with its priorities because the donors decide an aid project in light of Botswana's development plan. In addition, aid was invested in education, health, and transportation in Botswana. There was improvement in those fields that contributed to economic development. The Bangladesh aid is used according to the opinions of its donors. The aid projects ceased consequently thereby deferring its set goals. Bangladesh invested aid to practice reform policies for a market-oriented economy. It invested aid impetuously on requests by donors for the establishment of private financial institutions and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. These aids could not help the country's economic development and produced side effects, such as unemployment and national debt. As we compare the two, we can infer that building a market-oriented development strategy and practicing reform policy unconditionally according to the purpose of donors do not render aid effective. It is rather more effective if the recipient country makes a long-term development plan, controls the economy, and uses aid according to its strategy. ; Master