Suchergebnisse

To what extent do Euroskeptic parties in Eastern and Central Europe have viable alternatives to the European Union and the broad basket of liberal policies promoted by the EU? In recent years, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has used his overwhelming parliamentary majorities to chart a partially new course, and this article inventories one aspect of this new course. The article asks whether Hungary can gain any potential benefits from closer links to China as a partial replacement for resources that might not be available (or that might be lost) from its more conventional European partners to the west. Orbán has often justified both radical constitutional change and economic nationalism as powerful medicines to push back against Hungary's vulnerability at the hands of its foreign and domestic enemies. In this context, China emerged as both a potential source of new revenue and rhetorical trope that seemed to fit in a broader Fidesz discourse of an "Eastern opening." This article makes a first attempt to separate rhetoric and reality. It first explores how the ongoing consolidation of illiberalism in Hungary has now also sparked a geopolitical repositioning through the "Eastern opening" during Fidesz's second term. Second, it seeks to understand the theoretical proposition that new sources of external funding—including FDI and government bond purchases—can help enable a state to execute such a broad geopolitical shift. To do so, it develops empirical material from the fascinating Hungarian efforts to position themselves as a major beneficiary of Chinese engagement with Europe. The article concludes that Orbán's policies have indeed been broadly consistent with his party's new rhetoric, but it also concludes that the amount of Chinese investment is, in aggregate, still modest to date.

In Sociology of Corruption, David Jancsics provides a fresh approach to the study of corruption in Hungary, which once seemed to be the most likely of the ex-communist bloc nations to catch up to the West and is, according to many experts and scholars, a country with a highly corrupt dynamic.Based on data from 2022, Hungary is now the most corrupt member state of the European Union. There is also a consensus among experts that a small clique of corrupt political actors has captured most Hungarian state institutions and a significant portion of the business sector. What fostered corruption in Hungary? What are the most typical forms of corruption in this country? What do Hungarians think about it? What is the role of prime minister Viktor Orbán in this? Sociology of Corruption proposes a novel sociological theory of corruption focusing on social status and relationships, network structures, and power dynamics as important explanatory factors of corrupt behavior. Although his focus is on Hungary, Jancsics's findings are applicable to other nations and cultural contexts

"Dániel Mikecz addresses in this study the tensions between oppositional civil society and party-political actors. As successive elections demonstrate the increasing confidence of the illiberal regime of Viktor Orbán, left and liberal parties of the opposition have faced a prolonged crisis in credibility. At the same time, the civil society has not been immobile, and bottom-up initiatives, social and political movements, and non-governmental organizations have gained momentum in the public sphere. The ruling power is also active in the extra-parliamentary political arena. Through national consultations, Peace Marches, and other means, Orbán's governing Fidesz party has mobilized voters outside of election campaigns and has implemented a so-called movement governance. The study offers a vivid examination of this top-down or astroturf mobilization of the regime. Mikecz identifies the different patterns of activism and creates a coherent typology. He describes in detail each kind of activism based on opinion surveys, protest surveys and content analysis. The categorization and comprehensive exploration of civil movements provide a deep understanding of the mechanisms of illiberal postcommunist regimes"--

"Daniel Mikecz addresses in this study the tensions between oppositional civil society and party-political actors. As successive elections demonstrate the increasing confidence of the illiberal regime of Viktor Orban, left and liberal parties of the opposition have faced a prolonged crisis in credibility. At the same time, the civil society has not been immobile, and bottom-up initiatives, social and political movements, and non-governmental organizations have gained momentum in the public sphere. The ruling power is also active in the extra-parliamentary political arena. Through national consultations, Peace Marches, and other means, Orban's governing Fidesz party has mobilized voters outside of election campaigns and has implemented a so-called movement governance. The study offers a vivid examination of this top-down or astroturf mobilization of the regime. Mikecz identifies the different patterns of activism and creates a coherent typology. He describes in detail each kind of activism based on opinion surveys, protest surveys and content analysis. The categorization and comprehensive exploration of civil movements provide a deep understanding of the mechanisms of illiberal postcommunist regimes"--

Dániel Mikecz addresses in this study the tensions between oppositional civil society and party-political actors. As successive elections demonstrate the increasing confidence of the illiberal regime of Viktor Orbán, left and liberal parties of the opposition have faced a prolonged crisis in credibility. At the same time, the civil society has not been immobile, and bottom-up initiatives, social and political movements, and non-governmental organizations have gained momentum in the public sphere. The ruling power is also active in the extra-parliamentary political arena. Through national consultations, Peace Marches, and other means, Orbán's governing Fidesz party has mobilized voters outside of election campaigns and has implemented a so-called movement governance. The study offers a vivid examination of this top-down or astroturf mobilization of the regime. Mikecz identifies the different patterns of activism and creates a coherent typology. He describes in detail each kind of activism based on opinion surveys, protest surveys and content analysis. The categorization and comprehensive exploration of civil movements provide a deep understanding of the mechanisms of illiberal postcommunist regimes

Klappentext: This ground-breaking textbook describes and explains the global manifestations of populism. It reviews controversies about its relationships with democracy in the distinct and interrelated histories of the Americas, Asia, and Europe. The volume surveys the similarities and differences between populism, nationalism, fascism, and populist uses of religion and the media. Global Populisms invites students and the general public to move beyond simplistic conceptualizations of populism as an external virus and as an irrational threat to democracy, or, alternatively, as the path to return power to the people. The book differentiates populists' correct critiques to inequalities, the loss of national sovereignty, and unresponsive politicians from its solutions. In the name of giving power to the people, populists in power from Hugo Chavez to Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, and Viktor Orban entered in war with the media, made rivals into existential enemies, and attempted to concentrate power in the hands of the president. Written in a clear and accessible style, this interdisciplinary volume will appeal to undergraduate students as well as to non-academic audiences with an interest in political science, sociology, history, and communication studies.

1. Party Leaders in Eastern Europe: Traits, Behaviors and Consequences (Sergiu Gherghina) -- 2. 'Deviating' Party Leadership Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Comparison of Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović (Jasmin Hasić) -- 3. The Fireman's Ball in Bulgaria? A comparison between Sergey Stanishev and Boyko Borisov (Petar Bankov) -- 4. Party Leaders in Croatia: Comparing Ivo Sanader and Zoran Milanović (Marko Kukec) -- 5. From Ideology to interest driven politics: Václav Klaus, Andrej Babiš and two eras of party leadership in the Czech Republic (Tomáš Cirhan and Petr Kopecký) -- 6. Different Styles, Similar Paths: Party Leadership in Georgia (Nanuli Silagadze) -- 7. Strong personalities' impact on Hungarian party politics: Viktor Orbán and Gábor Vona (Rudolf Metz and Dániel Oross) -- 8. A comparison of two Polish Party Leaders: Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk (Ben Stanley) -- 9. Party Leaders in Romania: Designated Successors or Tactical Players? (Clara Volintiru and Sergiu Gherghina) -- 10. Rising expectations and centralising power: Party Leaders in Serbia (Dušan Spasojević) -- 11. The Rise and Sustainability of Party Leaders in Slovakia: Robert Fico and Mikuláš Dzurinda (Miroslav Nemčok and Peter Spáč) -- 12. Conclusion: An Aggregate Comparison of Party Leaders in Eastern Europe (Sergiu Gherghina)

Abstract
There is a widespread belief among scholars and policy-makers that populism has fuelled a unilateralist backlash because of its emphasis on nationalism, popular sovereignty and identity politics. Although a few populist governments have indeed withdrawn from some international institutions, this 'disengagement hypothesis' needs to be scrutinized and unpacked. In this article, we develop a framework that distinguishes between four types of institutional disengagement—criticism, obstruction, extortion and exit—and show that populist governments use them in a fluid and tactical way to navigate between the radical and pragmatic imperatives of populist politics. Our comparative case-study of the Hungarian executive under Viktor Orbán (since 2010) and the Trump administration in the US (2017–2021) demonstrates that both governments have frequently used criticism, obstruction and extortion to disengage from international institutions but have only rarely exited from them. The article thus deepens our understanding of the impact of populism on both individual institutions and the multilateral order more broadly, and helps policy-makers develop strategies to counter the adverse effects of populism.

The global rise of populism has fuelled academic interest in how populism impacts international relations. The article argues that the post-Western international order as a context and its perceived opportunities strongly guide the foreign policy conduct of populist leaders regardless of their ideological background or geographical situation. The cases examined are Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Hungary under Viktor Orbán since 2010 (excluding his first term between 1998 and 2002). The research questions are as follows: (1) how does post-Westernism manifest itself in Chávista and Orbánist foreign policy and (2) what limitations do or did they face in terms of their post-Western foreign policies? The analysis is structured along three interrelated thematic lines of foreign policy making: populists' conflicts with traditional (Western) powers¸ populists' search for new partnerships in the non-Western world, and empowerment of regional institutions. Finally, the limitations of post-Westernism are explained on a comparative basis to highlight the contradictory features of populist foreign policy making in terms of loud short-term successes and silent long-term challenges.

The subject of the article is the functioning and role of investigative journalism in Hungary in the conditions of the tendency to move from liberal democracy towards autocracy, which has been observed for over two decades. This leads to the restriction of civil liberties in various areas of social life, including the sphere of activity of the independent media, which are obviously perceived by the rulers as an obstacle in appropriating the state and achieving goals contrary to the interests of citizens. Under the rule of Viktor Orbán, the leader of the Fidesz party, since 2010 a plan to monopolize the circulation of information and subordinate the media and advertising market to the ruling party has been consistently implemented. Internet sites of investigative journalism are the only enclaves of independent journalism, identified with the concept of the "fourth power." Three such portals were analyzed, pointing to their economic basis, the methods of conducting and the subject of their investigations, and the effectiveness in publicizing irregularities in the conduct of the rulers and businessmen associated with power.

In this article, the author analyzes the situation inside the Visegrad countries and the Visegrad group against the background of the rapid deterioration of the international situation and the unfolding military actions in Ukraine. The international crisis contributed to an increase in inflation in the countries, the growth of discontent among the population, which resulted almost everywhere in full-scale strikes and manifestations. Against this background, predictions about contradictions within the Visegrad Four – the oldest of the modern regional structures on the continent – and about its possible imminent collapse have intensified in the European press. Indeed, the long absence of meetings in the first half of the year and the demarches of the chairmen of the Czech Parliament gave ground to such conclusions, but politicians of another level – prime ministers and presidents – continued their meetings, joint consultations and exchange of views, that eventually helped them to clarify positions and contributed to the preservation of regional unity of the Visegrad countries. Especially important from this point of view was the November meeting of Prime Ministers Viktor Orban, Mateusz Morawiecki, Piotr Fiala and Eduard Heger in Kosice.

Este artigo busca analisar o significado da participação do Brasil na III Cúpula Demográfica de Budapeste. Esse encontro é derivado de uma série de eventos que ocorrem desde 2015, a partir da ascensão do governo de extrema-direita de Viktor Orbán. Com o objetivo de pensar o enfrentamento ao declínio populacional, a partir de estratégias anti-imigração e pró-família, o evento vem se posicionando como um contraponto às conferências da ONU. Enquanto percurso metodológico, partimos de pesquisa on-line e documental no site dos organizadores da cúpula e do governo brasileiro para, posteriormente, utilizarmos a análise crítica do discurso (ACD) para o pronunciamento da ministra Damares Alves durante o evento, com reflexão a partir dos estudos feministas pós-estruturalistas. O que se apura é uma inflexão do Brasil à agenda neoconservadora e antigênero, se associando a países de extrema-direita, fundamentalistas e contrários à defesa de direitos humanos. O discurso proferido instrumentaliza noções demográficas para camuflar suas perspectivas ideológicas em relação ao gênero, emprestando ares de discurso científico aos ataques aos direitos sexuais e reprodutivos e às noções de família não tradicionais.

Hungary Post-2010 has been ruled by Viktor Orbán and his right-wing Fidesz party and is generally regarded as a typical case of populist governance. Reforming the Penal Code was one of the first major policy changes initiated by Fidesz shortly after winning the 2010 elections. It introduced the 'three-strikes' principle into Hungarian penal policy which is considered a prime example of penal populism. It could be inferred that in the past decade Hungarian penal policy has been dominated by penal populism and punitive measures. This paper argues that reality is more nuanced and presents the concepts of penal populism and populist policy making, with a special focus on the Hungarian context. The article provides an overview of the most important penal policy measures in the past two decades and examines whether and how increased strictness of legislative acts influenced the sentencing practice. The paper highlights the related results of an empirical survey on public opinions about criminal law and ends with a case study exploration of the intersections of lowering the age limit of criminal responsibility and penal populism.

Figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former French National Front leader Marion Maréchal are seeking to establish what we call a new globalist illiberal order. The globalist illiberal agenda extends elements of the globalist project while reclaiming a radicalized view of Christian democracy. Europe's far-right views the global order as composed of strong nations who need to defend their sovereignty on 'cultural' issues while protecting their common Christian roots. We trace their project by focusing on two new institutions of higher education, Hungary's National University of Public Service Ludovika (Ludovika-UPS) and the Institut de sciences sociales, économiques et politiques (Institute of Social Sciences, Economics and Politics—ISSEP), based in France and Spain. Through these institutions, globalist illiberals aim to cultivate new leaders outside the liberal 'mainstream' and redefine the meaning of Christian democracy. We conclude that surging nationalism among mid- to small powers is not resulting in deglobalization but is fostering illiberal globalization, which has no place for those who do not fit in their exclusionary vision of Christian Europe.

Figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former French National Front leader Marion Maréchal are seeking to establish what we call a new globalist illiberal order. The globalist illiberal agenda extends elements of the globalist project while reclaiming a radicalized view of Christian democracy. Europe's far-right views the global order as composed of strong nations who need to defend their sovereignty on 'cultural' issues while protecting their common Christian roots. We trace their project by focusing on two new institutions of higher education, Hungary's National University of Public Service Ludovika (Ludovika-UPS) and the Institut de sciences sociales, économiques et politiques (Institute of Social Sciences, Economics and Politics—ISSEP), based in France and Spain. Through these institutions, globalist illiberals aim to cultivate new leaders outside the liberal 'mainstream' and redefine the meaning of Christian democracy. We conclude that surging nationalism among mid- to small powers is not resulting in deglobalization but is fostering illiberal globalization, which has no place for those who do not fit in their exclusionary vision of Christian Europe.