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Canada Post's lettermail volumes are plummeting, largely due to the explosion of electronic communication, with no evident sign of stabilizing. E-commerce parcel deliveries are on the rise, but not nearly at the rate necessary to offset the decline in lettermail, and there are many private courier companies competing for that business. Meanwhile, even as the number of Canadian home addresses continues to increase, Canada Post's plan to end the remnants of door-to-door home delivery, had to be halted in light of the new Liberal government's promise to maintain the service. The extraordinary disruption that electronic media has caused to the model of stateowned postal services, with their mandate to provide universal delivery, may seem dire. And the threat is indeed urgent. But there are solutions to help Canada Post remain healthy in reforms that have occurred to postal systems elsewhere. This does not necessarily mean immediate privatization (although that has been achieved with some success in Europe): The burden of universal service obligations in a country as expansive and minimally populated as Canada is, could make it difficult for the government to realize appropriate value in selling Canada Post. But if the Liberal government intends to help Canada Post endure in this environment, it should allow the corporation to introduce some basic elements of competition and marketbased reform. The reality is that most Canadian mail today is sent by large firms to customers and other businesses. And most mail is delivered in urban areas, where delivery costs are lowest. But because Canada Post is required to charge identical prices to all customers, urban households essentially help subsidize the postage costs of big business and rural recipients. This need not be the case: Canada Post would be more successful if it could charge varying rates (capped at a maximum) based on the type of sender, volume, and the mail's destination. One could also imagine scenarios where recipients pay an annual fee for different levels of service, paying extra for door-to-door delivery for example. Canada Post currently allows its clients to compete with it for the sortation of mail (offering discounts for firms willing to pre-sort mail), and there is much more room for competition in the collection, transport and sorting of mail. Already, it is likely that Canada Post has too many sorting facilities, given the advent of new sorting technologies; outsourcing certain upstream operations could help it further reduce its infrastructure and labour costs. There is also a case to be made for Canada Post reducing its delivery frequency and delivery times, especially in higher-cost rural areas. Surveys indicate that Canadians would be fine with that. Allowing competition in delivery, on the other hand, comes with risks of rivals willing to snap up delivery routes in dense urban networks, leaving Canada Post with an even less profitable model in being left to deliver its (and competitors') products in only high-cost areas. This can be offset, however, by requiring competitors to assume some of the incumbent's universal service obligations, or at least paying a tax to compensate Canada Post for its obligations. Ensuring these reforms remain compatible with the financial viability of the incumbent would be helped by setting up an independent regulator to ensure the maintenance of a level playing field and to separate the influence of politics from decision-making. In the current era, however, the idea that universal service obligations should be exclusive to mail carriers seems antiquated. It is only rational that the independent regulator be charged with overseeing that universal service obligations are shared between telecom services and mail services.

Transparency in insurance law attaches to the rights and duties of the parties, the relationships between insurers, insurance intermediaries such as agents and brokers, insurance supervisory law and insurance dispute resolution procedures. Regarding the rights and duties of the insurer and the prospective policyholder, it requires insurers to disclose precontractual information in a timely manner that is clear, understandable, legible and unambiguous. Transparency as a value is incredibly important in insurance contracts. This contribution focuses exclusively on the insurer's duty of disclosure during precontractual negotiations. Although the insured's duty of disclosure has enjoyed more attention in the past, the duty clearly applies to the insurance proposer as well as the insurer. The purpose of this contribution is to evaluate the nature and extent of the insurer's transparency duties as informed by both common and statutory laws.The insurer's duty is derived primarily from the statutory rights of access to information in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the Promotion of Access to Information Act. It is furthermore supported by specific insurance consumer protection law found in the detailed provisions on mandatory disclosures in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, the Long-term Insurance Act, the Short-term Insurance Act and, finally, the Policyholder Protection Rules issued in accordance with these acts. Strict rules on advertising can be found in the General Code of Conduct issued under the FAIS Act.The Act furthermore specifically targets the activities of insurance intermediaries in precontractual disclosures. The fact that insurance products and services have been exempted from the scope of the Consumer Protection Act from 28 February 2014 should not diminish the insured's right to rely on universal consumer protection principles as envisaged by South African insurance legislation. The insurer's duty to disclose is in the last instance also derived from the common law duty not to make misrepresentations by commission or omission. When negotiating an insurance contract, the insurer's duty to speak is not based on a general requirement of bona fides, but is recognised as an ex lege duty due to the involuntary reliance of the prospective insured on information supplied by insurers in the market. A lack of transparency should lead to the insurer's accountability. A failure to disclose material information or a disclosure of false information that goes to the root of the matter and that induces the prospective policyholder to buy the insurance product is recognised as an actionable misrepresentation. Statutory provisions do not diminish the common-law duty not to make misrepresentations, but provide details of the nature and extent of the information duty to provide clarity and legal certainty in the determination of the standards of transparency required in law. In addition, statutes provide for enforcement actions by regulators, orders that could affect the licence of the insurer and provide for punishable offences and penalties. In terms of common law, a misrepresentation by omission or commission renders the insurance contract wholly or in part voidable. The policyholder may decide to rescind the contract and claim restitution. He may also, in conjunction with rescission, or as an alternative when deciding to maintain the contract, claim delictual damages or even constitutional damages when judged by a court of law as appropriate relief. Statutory remedies include a monetary award by the Insurance Ombud. Even though such an award is capped at R800 000, it is submitted that it is preferred to a civil law damages claim.

Die Arbeit untersucht die Einflussfaktoren, die am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts und bis heute dazu geführt haben, dass das flache Dach die Architektur so nachhaltig prägt, wie das gegenwärtig der Fall ist. Neben den architektonischen Aspekten, die das Erscheinungsbild eines Gebäudes wesentlich beeinflussen, wie der Übergang von der Fassade zum Dach, werden die technischen Aspekte der Material- und Konstruktionsentwicklung behandelt Darüber hinaus sind es sowohl gesellschaftspolitische als auch ökonomische und ökologische Rahmenbedingungen, die die Planung und Ausführung von Flachdächern beeinflussen. Soweit zum Verständnis des Themas erforderlich, wird auf diese Faktoren eingegangen. Für die Untersuchung werden ausgewählte zeittypische Beispiele herangezogen, die die Entwicklung des flachen Daches dokumentieren. Dies erfolgt unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wohnungs-baus, da unabhängig von Stilfragen sowohl nach dem 1. Weltkrieg als auch nach dem 2. Weltkrieg vor allen Dingen Wohnraum benötigt wurde, so dass der Wohn- und Siedlungsbau die Architektur bis in die 70er Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts maßgeblich geprägt hat. Das Flachdach als flächenärmste Überspannung der Außenwände wurde zum Standard und allein durch die Multiplikation zum Erkennungsmerkmal der neuen Architektur. Parallel dazu setzten auch Solitärbauten Maßstäbe für das "Neue Bauen". So ist das Bauhaus zum Synonym der deutschen Moderne geworden, untrennbar verbunden mit dem Flachdach als oberen Abschluss des kubischen Baukörpers. Nach dem 2. Weltkrieg erfolgte eine bewusste Anknüpfung an die Architekturtradition der Weimarer Republik, sozusagen als Gegenmodell zu der Zeit von 1933-45, wo Flachdächer auf Wohngebäuden unerwünscht waren. Exkurse zu Gebäuden, die entweder durch ihre Architektur, durch den Einsatz neuartiger Materialien und Verarbeitungstechniken oder im Hinblick auf Zusatzfunktionen richtungs-weisend für die "Flachdacharchitektur" waren und sind, ergänzen diese Betrachtung. Auch die Paral-lelentwicklung in der ehemaligen DDR wird behandelt. Mit Hilfe von Bauakten, zeitgenössischer Literatur sowie aktueller Fachliteratur wird der Frage nach Entstehung, Entwicklung und Neuerungen der verschiedenen Konstruktionsarten und Materialien nachgegangen und Rückschlüsse für die Gegenwart und die Zukunft gezogen, als Grundlage für eine anforderungsgerechte und nachhaltige Planung, insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der klimatischen Veränderungen, der Energieverknappung sowie der Ressourcenschonung durch nachträgliche Ver-dichtung der Innenstädte. ; The thesis investigates the factors from the beginning of the 20th century to today which have led to the lasting impact the flat roof has had on architecture to this day. It deals not only with the architectural aspects which significantly affect the appearance of a building, such as the transition from façade to roof, but also with the technical developmental aspects of material and design. Socio-political, economic and ecological parameters also have a bearing on the planning and design of flat roofs. These factors will be looked at insofar as they aid understanding of the subject. Examples which were typical of their time and which document the evolution of the flat roof were selected for use in the study. Special attention is paid to housing construction because, regardless of style considerations, there was a shortage of housing in particular after both world wars, with the result that residential and housing-estate building dominated architecture until into the 1970s. The flat roof as a means of crowning the exterior walls which comprised the smallest possible area not only became standard, but also the distinguishing characteristic of the new style of architecture by sheer force of pervasiveness. At the same time, solitary buildings were also a defining feature of the "Neues Bauen" (New Building) movement. Thus "Bauhaus" became synonymous with the German Modern style, intrinsically linked with the flat roof which capped the cubic structure. A conscious return to the architectural traditions of the Weimar Republic followed the Second World War, as a backlash, so to speak, against the 1933-45 period, when flat roofs on residential building were out of favour. This is amplified by discursions into buildings which had and have a determining effect on the direction of "flat roof architecture", either through their architecture, the use of novel materials and installation techniques or in terms of additional functions. Concurrent developments in the former GDR are also examined. With the aid of construction documents, contemporary literature and current specialist literature, the thesis looks into the issue of emergence, development and changes in the various methods of construction and materials and draws conclusions as to current events and the future, as a basis for sustainable planning in line with requirements, in particular in the context of climate change, energy shortages, and the conservation of resources by increasing inner-city density.

There's been a lot of talk about "yield curve control" (YCC) as of late. I found the recent exchange between Joe Weisenthal and David Beckworth (with many others chiming in) very interesting:I normally enjoy Joe's hot takes, but this one... yikes. It is a good example, in my view, of why relying too heavily on the "money view" (i.e.liquidity preference view) of interest rates can cause one to miss the forest for the trees. Let me explain...1/n https://t.co/EjUltLb4dF— David Beckworth (@DavidBeckworth) August 9, 2020

A number of us gathered on Zoom to discuss the subject. What follows is my own take on YCC and some of the issues involved. If you're interested in joining in on a future Zoom discussion, let me know.  One thing I learned from the people I talked to is that my notion of YCC seemed to differ from the way they were thinking about it. Most people seem to have in mind the idea of YCC as a form of interest-rate peg, only with the fixed peg applying to interest rates at all maturities, for example, in the manner of Fed policy over the period 1942-47 and 1948-51.In contrast, I view YCC as a state-contingent policy that pegs (or sets a narrow corridor for) rates at all maturities. The slope of the curve may be held fixed, with policy determining the level shifts in the yield curve (so, basically an extension of the Taylor rule applied to interest rates at all maturities). Or policy could also change the shape of the curve, making it steeper or flatter (so, basically replicating "Operation Twist" type interventions). Let me distinguish this notion of YCC by labeling it RBYCC (rule-based YCC).What is the rationale for RBYCC? The RB part has the standard rationale. But what's the point of YCC then? The way I look at things is as follows. For some odd reason, the Treasury finances the deficit by issuing U.S. Treasury Securities (USTs) with different maturities. These securities are nominally risk-free. But if they all constitute risk-free claims to cash (reserves), then why do/should these objects sell at different prices? And even if there is some "preferred habit" force at work, why doesn't the treasury exploit the apparent arbitrage opportunity, selling securities that trade at a premium (typically bills) and repurchasing securities that trade at a discount (typically bonds). Indeed, why even issue securities that the market discounts (a polite way of saying hates) in the first place? (I offer one rationale here: Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk).If by "liquidity" we mean the ability to convert a security in reserves (or bills), then it is clear that the liquidity of USTs is a policy choice. It would be a simple matter for the Fed and/or Treasury to set up a standing facility prepared to buy/sell USTs of any maturity on par with reserves, for example. This policy would have the effect of eliminating discounts across all securities. If you don't like this policy, then you'll have to explain why it's a good idea for government securities to trade at discounts relative to each other. To me, this is like saying a $10 bill should be discounted relative to two $5 bills. (Note: I am not saying such an argument does not exist--indeed, my paper above makes one such argument.)The effect of RBYCC would be to render all USTs equivalent to reserves (which itself leads to the question of why deficits can't be financed entirely with interest-bearing reserves). The same would be true of YCC with a fixed pattern of discounts, as in the U.S. from 1942-47. This much was recognized by Friedman and Schwartz in their Monetary History when they wrote "The support program converted all securities into the equivalent of money" (pg. 563). In theory, this type of policy should work as well or better than simply targeting the short rate. It eliminates the liquidity premia on government debt (i.e., it satiates liquidity demand) and it permits the usual sort of Taylor rule to stabilize the economy.As mentioned above, however, most people probably think of YCC as a peg-like policy. One argument against interest rate pegs is that they induce instability. The U.S. experience over 1942-47 and 1948-51 is widely interpreted as having promoted excess inflationary pressure. Let me briefly review those episodes here. At the time, the Fed set the short rate at 3/8% and capped a long rate at 2.5%. Measured inflation remained low, thanks to wartime wage and price controls. Interestingly, the 2.5% cap seemed non-binding. It is likely that long yields remained low because investors expected the Fed to keep the short rate low for the indefinite future. We know that at the time, investors were selling bills to the Fed and acquiring higher-yielding bonds to exploit the apparent arbitrage opportunity (see Chaurushiya and Kuttner, 2004). Inflation only took off once wage and price controls were lifted in 1946. While this burst of inflation was likely only temporary, a concern over inflation led the Fed to raise the short rate to 1% in late 1947 when inflation had already declined from 20% to 10%. Inflation then stabilized for about a year at 8%, before declining sharply to 2.75% in 1948. At this time, the economy went into a recession, lasting until the last quarter of 1949. The inflation rate fell below zero in May 1949 and stayed below zero until July 1950 (so, well over a year of deflation). Let me summarize this episode. Under this YCC policy,
inflation fell from a peak of 20% in March of 1947 to about 10% in November of
1947 with the bill rate still pegged at 3/8%. Then, with the rate hike pegged
at 1%, inflation continued to fall rapidly, hitting a low of negative 3% in August of 1949 (near the end
of the recession). It took until June 1950 for inflation to rise to 0%. Inflation
then began to rise rapidly after June 1950 – the month the United States
entered the Korean War. The Treasury wanted to keep interest rates low to
facilitate war finance. The Fed favored high interest rates to combat
inflationary pressures created by the war. Inflation peaked in early 1951 at
9.5%. Chaurushiya and Kuttner, 2004 write:"It
became abundantly clear during this period that the interest rate caps were
hampering the Fed's ability to achieve its monetary policy objectives and, in
particular, its efforts to contain rapidly rising inflationary pressures."This experiment in YCC ended with the Treasury Accord in March 1951. And the narrative that YCC is is inconsistent with inflation control was born.My own interpretation of these events and of the efficacy of YCC is as follows. First, it seems a bit of stretch to "blame" inflation over this episode as the consequence of YCC. For most of the 1942-51 period, the U.S. was at or recovering from war. Wars are known to place great fiscal strain on governments and financing a war effort with higher-than-normal inflation is likely desirable from the perspective of optimal public finance policy. That is, the U.S. would have likely experienced higher-than-normal inflation under any reasonable interest rate policy. I interpret the interest rate hike in 1947 as an example of how RBYCC can work to control inflation. In this example, the short rate was increased to 1% and the long-rate remained capped at 2.5%, in effect flattening the yield curve. The disinflationary impact of this rate hike seems evident in the data above. So, it seems clear that RBYCC can be used to control inflation, even if it seems to have been employed rather clumsily in 1947. As usual, looking forward to your comments/criticisms, which can be left below. 

Foundation for the Defense of Democracies CEO Mark Dubowitz shared a graphic on the X platform this week purporting to place blame on President Biden for Iran's increasing stockpile of high enriched uranium — material that can be used in nuclear weapons — when in reality it's Dubowitz, his organization and their allies in the Trump administration that are largely responsible. "Facts are stubborn things," Dubowitz said before showing the graphic. "Iran's nuclear expansion has occurred under the Biden administration's failed Iran policy of maximum concessions."

It's unclear what "maximum concessions" Dubowitz is referring to, but facts are indeed stubborn things and the reality is that this graphic is nowhere near close to providing the full picture of how we got to where we are today with Iran's nuclear program. In fact, Iran's nuclear expansion actually began before Biden took office after President Trump withdrew from the Iran deal (or JCPOA, as the nuclear agreement is known) in 2018. While Iran's program has grown since Biden took office in the absence of any re-agreed upon limits, it would still largely be frozen where it was in 2015 had Trump remained in the deal.So let's look at the stubborn facts: Under the terms of the 2015 deal, Iran limited its uranium enrichment purification to 3.6% — or the amount needed for civilian energy purposes — and capped its stockpile of low enriched uranium to no more than 300 kg. In July 2019, or approximately one year after Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran began to increase its stockpile of low enriched uranium above that 300 kg limit and announced that it was enriching to 4.5%, or slightly closer to the 90% needed for nuclear weapons. Dubowitz's graph does not provide this information.In other words, "Iran's nuclear expansion" as Dubowitz put it, began during the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" campaign that Dubowitz and FDD played a major role in crafting. FDD also played an outsized role in pushing Trump to withdraw from the JCPOA.So Dubowitz ignores this fact entirely and instead misleadingly focuses on Iran's enrichment of uranium to 20% and 60% purity, or near weapons-grade. But here again, what Dubowitz's graph doesn't show is that Iran began enriching uranium to 20% before Biden came into office, a move the U.S. intelligence community has attributed to the assassination of a top Iranian nuclear scientist in November, 2020. After that, the U.S. Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment states, Iran "accelerated the expansion of its nuclear program [and] stated that it is no longer constrained by any JCPOA limits." Another stubborn fact that Dubowitz omits is that by November 2020, Iran had increased its stockpile of low enriched uranium by 12 times the limit allowed by the JCPOA and shortened its break out time — or the time that Iran would need to produce the materials for one nuclear weapon — from one year under the JCPOA terms to between three to four months. There are a myriad other ways in which Iran expanded its nuclear program after Trump withdrew and before Biden took office, including using more advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium and other measures which you can read about here.The bottom line is that this is another one of Dubowitz's brazen attempts to absolve himself and his organization from the responsibility for the failures of withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal and the subsequent "maximum pressure" campaign that failed to bring Tehran to its knees and eliminate its nuclear program (and perhaps even foment regime change). Despite this, and the many other wildly false or misleading claims Dubowitz makes regarding Iran (and Israel), many major U.S. media outlets continue to use him as a source on these issues. Perhaps that's why, in part, we shouldn't be surprised that Iran is closer to a nuclear weapon than it's ever been and U.S.-Iran tensions remain high with no sense of de-escalation in sight.

RESUMO: Auckland tem sido pioneira na implementação de modelos de Intervenção Precoce em Psicose. No entanto, esta organização do serviço não mudou nos últimos 19 anos. Segundo os dados obtidos da utilização do serviço, no período de 1996 -2012 foram atendidos 997 doentes, que tinham um número médio de 89 contactos (IQR: 36-184), com uma duração média de 62 horas de contactos (IQR: 24-136). Estes doentes passaram um número médio de 338 dias (IQR: 93-757) em contacto com o programa. 517 doentes (52%) não necessitaram de internamento no hospital, e os que foram internados, ficaram uma mediana de 124 dias no hospital (IQR: 40-380). Os doentes asiáticos tiveram um aumento de 50% de probabilidade de serem internados no hospital. Este relatório inclui 15 recomendações para orientar as reformas para o serviço e, nomeadamente, delinear a importância de uma visão organizacional e dos seus componentes-chave. As recomendações incluem o reforço da gestão e da liderança numa estrutura de equipe mais integrada, com recursos dedicados a melhorar a consciencialização da comunidade, a educação e deteção precoce, bem como a capacidade de receber referenciações diretas. Os Indicadores Chave de Desempenho devem ser estabelecidos, mas os Exames de Estado Mental em risco, devem ser removidos. Auckland deve manter a faixa etária alvo atual. A duração do serviço deve ser aumentada para um mínimo de três anos, com a opção de aumentá-la para cinco anos. A proporção de gestor de cuidados para os doentes deve ser preconizada em 1:15, enquanto o pessoal de apoio não-clínico deve ser aumentado. Os psiquiatras devem ter uma carga de trabalho de cerca de 80 doentes por equivalente de tempo completo. Um serviço local de prestação de cuidados deve ser desenvolvido com, nomeadamente, intervenções culturais para responder às necessidades da população multicultural de Auckland. A capacidade de investigação deve ser incorporada no Serviço de Intervenção Precoce em Psicoses. Qualquer alteração deverá envolver contacto com todas as partes interessadas, e a Administração Regional de Saúde deve comprometer-se em tempo, recursos humanos e políticos para apoiar e facilitar a mudança do sistema, investindo de forma significativa para melhor servir a comunidade Auckland. --- ABSTRACT: Auckland has been pioneering in the adoption of Early Intervention in Psychosis models but the design of the service has not changed in 19 years. In service utilisation data from 997 patients seen from 1996 -2012, patients had a median number of 89 contacts (IQR: 36-184), with a median duration of 62 hours of contact (IQR: 24-136). Patients spent a median number of 338 days (IQR: 93-757) in contact with the program. 517 patients (52%) did not require admission to hospital, and those who did spent a median of 124 days in hospital (IQR: 40-380). Asian patients had a 50% increased chance of being admitted to hospital. This report includes 15 recommendations to guide reforms to the service, including outlining the importance of vision and key components. It recommends strengthened managerial leadership and a more integrated team structure with dedicated resources for improved community awareness, education and early detection as well as the capacity to take direct referrals. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) should be established but At Risk Mental States should be excluded. Auckland should maintain the current target age range. The duration of service should be increased to a minimum of three years, with the option to extend this to five years. The ratio of care co-ordinator to patients should be capped at 1:15 whilst non-clinical supporting staff should be increased. Psychiatrists should have a caseload of about 80 per FTE. A local Service Delivery framework should be developed, as should cultural interventions to meet the needs of the multicultural population of Auckland. Research capacity should be incorporated into the fabric of Early Intervention in Psychosis Services. Any changes should involve consultation with all stakeholders, and the DHB should commit to investing time, human and political resources to support and facilitate meaningful system change to best serve the Auckland community.

In many ways, the frequent calls from politicians to implement rent controls are remarkable; insofar as, despite their repeated failure to solve the rental crisis, they are still being consistently proposed as the solution. In Scotland, where temporary rent controls have predictably driven down the availability of private properties by 20% and raised rents on new tenancies by 14%, the SNP have doubled down on their failure and is seeking to ban rent increases for up to five years. When rent controls have been tried elsewhere the results have been identical. Take Berlin, where the 2020 rent caps which fixed rents at below market rates were accompanied by decreases in supply five times as large as reductions in prices. Equally in Stockholm rent controls have resulted in a shortfall of 27,000 apartments. As a result the average queue for a rental apartment in the capital is 11.3 years. Unfortunately Sadiq Khan's most recent proposal for solving the housing crisis is likely to be just as much a failure in London as it has been everywhere else. His plan is to deliver 6,000 new homes in which rents would be capped at a third of local salaries. He has also urged the government to delegate him the power to freeze rents across the capital. If granted this would cause serious issues for an already troubled housing market. Considering that policymakers are continuing to tout rent controls as the answer to our housing crisis, it's worth once again explaining why they inevitably hurt the very tenants that they are meant to support.The answer  lies with one of the key insights of economics, incentives matter. Changing the incentives presented to the seller of a good will have an impact on the buyer and vise-versa. Rent controls have significant negative impacts on the incentives of landlords to operate in the rental market, and therefore generate adverse consequences for tenantsThe impacts on sellers in the housing market are two-fold. Firstly, capping prices will weaken the incentive to rent out, encouraging landlords to sell properties and invest in other more profitable asset classes such as stocks or bonds. YouGov polling has shown 37 per cent of landlords would reduce the number of properties they let if an external agency like a council was given authority to set rents both during and between tenancies. Properties from this sell off tend to be sold to new those intending to live in the properties as unlike landlords they are unaffected by the rent caps. This will inevitably create shortages in the rental market, as demonstrated by decline in rental properties available following the rent cap policy in Scotland. Secondly, it reduces the incentive to invest into the production of new housing. Developers and landlords know that their properties will be struck by rent controls, which will prevent them from generating adequate revenue to justify investment in new development. This will limit growth in the supply of housing, in the long run worsening the housing shortage. There have been various examples of this effect, in 2023 Get Living paused its £200 million plan to build 1500 new homes due to the Scottish Government's rent control policy. As the Scottish LandLords association stated, "The rent control proposals, as has been seen in places like Ireland which has similar measures, will see reduced investment and more landlords leaving the sector, leading to higher costs for tenants."These combined effects mean that rent controls, aimed at keeping rents low for tenants will only result in a reduction in the supply of housing, creating housing shortages and preventing development. The Greater London Authority's target for affordable housing starts by 2026 is between 23,900 and 27,100 per year, but by February only 4% have been started - just 874 new houses. As for the £4.8 billion "Building Council Homes for Londoners" program, council house building starts since last May has been precisely zero. Without allowing for greater development significant increases in rents are inevitable, rent controls do not offer a genuine solution to this challenge. Unsurprisingly the solution to the London housing crisis is less- not more government- regulation. Deregulating planning leading to greater investment into property development would expand the supply of housing, reducing rent prices without creating property shortages.

Raba Kistner Environmental, Inc. (RKEI), was contracted by CPS Energy (CPSE) to conduct cultural resources investigations for the CPSE Broadway-Jones Gas Main Replacement Project in northeastern San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas. The project involved the excavation of a 630 foot (192 meter [m]) trench for the relocation of a gas main within the 10th Street and Avenue B right-of-ways (ROWs). A cultural resources review conducted by the CPSE Archaeologist determined that the project had the potential to encounter a possible desague, or lateral, of the Acequia Madre. Furthermore, close proximity to the San Antonio River, located 150 feet (46 m) to the northwest, increased the probability of encountering prehistoric cultural deposits. Based on this information, the CPSE Archaeologist determined that cultural resources monitoring would be required for all 630 feet (192 m) of excavations associated with the project. Given that the project took place within a publicly owned ROW and because CPSE is a political subdivision of the State of Texas, the project was subject to review under the jurisdiction of Chapter 35 of the Unified Development Code (UDC) of the City of San Antonio (COSA), as well as the Antiquities Code of Texas (ACT). Rhiana D. Ward served as Principal Investigator and Project Manager for the duration of the project, and all field work was conducted by Project Archaeologist Chris Matthews. Cultural resources monitoring investigations for the Broadway-Jones Gas Main Replacement Project were conducted on February 7-8, 19-23, and 25, 2019. Disturbed soils were observed throughout most of the 10th Street ROW, as well as a majority of the Avenue B ROW. However, two features were recorded at the northeastern end of the APE, within the Avenue B ROW. No intact deposits of cultural deposits were observed. Feature 1, recorded as archaeological site 41BX2308, is a limestone feature, approximately 286 feet (87 m) northeast of the 10th Street – Avenue B intersection. A restricted 1852 overlay map provided by the COSA Office of Historic Preservation depicts a possible lateral of the Acequia Madre as intersecting the APE, approximately 20 feet (6 m) southwest of Feature 1. It is possible that Feature 1 represents the remnants of the desague, however, the small section of exposed alignment does not provide enough supporting evidence to definitively associate the feature to the projected lateral ditch. Furthermore, although the limestone material and rough cut construction of the stones suggests an early construction, no cultural materials were observed that would support a temporal age range for the feature. Additional work may be warranted for any future ground disturbing activities anticipated within the vicinity of site 41BX2308 in order to determine the horizontal extent of the feature, and to provide additional information as to the function and temporal affiliation of the site. Based on the current investigations, RKEI recommends site 41BX2308 as eligibility undetermined for designation to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) or as a State Antiquities Landmark (SAL). Feature 2, recorded as archaeological site 41BX2309, likely represents a remnant of the 1887 Texas Transportation Company Railroad rail bed. The feature consisted of two metal I-beam rails set on top of an aggregate concrete slab and capped with a separate layer of angular aggregate that likely represents the dismantling of the Texas Transportation Company Railroad in the early 2000s. No further work is recommended for site 41BX2309, and RKEI recommends the site as not eligible for designation to the NRHP or as a SAL. RKEI made a reasonable and good faith effort to identify cultural resources within the given APE. As such, RKEI recommends no further archaeological investigations for the current APE. However, should additions be made to the APE, additional cultural resources investigations may be required. The project adhered to a temporally diagnostic artifact collection only policy. No artifacts were collected during the course of the investigations, thus, no artifacts will be curated at the completion of the project. All field records generated by this project will be permanently curated at the Center for Archaeological Research at the University of Texas at San Antonio.

At the request of Trihydro Corporation, SWCA conducted a cultural resources investigation of the 3.2-mile (5.1 kilometer [km]) Green Valley Special Utility District (GVSUD) Weil Road Fill Line Project area (Project) located in the extra-territorial jurisdictions of the Cities of Santa Clara and Cibolo, Guadalupe County, Texas. The Project alignment traverses privately owned land and existing roadways between the Canyon Regional Water Authority (CRWA) Wagner Booster Pump Station at 1084 West FM 78 in Cibolo, and the GVSUD Booster Pump Station at Weil Road in Marion. The southern terminus of the Project alignment is located approximately 2.5 miles (4.02 km) west of Cibolo and approximately 2.75 miles (4.43 km) east of Marion. Due to the receipt of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Development (RD) of Texas federal funding, the Project must comply with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and its implementing regulations (36 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 800). Additionally, the Project involves political subdivisions of the State of Texas (CRWA and GVSUD) and the Antiquities Code of Texas (ACT) applies as the Project's activities will involve more than 5 acres / 5,000 cubic yards of land disturbance, or potentially affect known archaeological sites. Investigations included a background and historic map review, and an intensive pedestrian survey with shovel testing within the Project alignment. The background literature review determined one previously conducted cultural resources investigation intersects the Project area near its southern terminus, site 41GU64, a prehistoric lithic quarry that SWCA revisited during the investigation. The site was recorded in 2000 by a Texas Historical Commission (THC) archaeological steward and the assemblage was reported to comprise burned rock, tested chert cobbles, bifaces, hand axes, and polyhedral cores. The SWCA revisit of site 41GU64 within the Project area found it consists of a very low frequency of prehistoric lithic artifacts. Shovel tests encountered no subsurface cultural materials and no cultural features or temporally diagnostics were encountered on the ground surface within this portion of the site. Due to the paucity of cultural materials, lack of temporally diagnostic artifacts or features, and lack of buried cultural materials SWCA assesses the portion of site 41GU64 within the Project area as not eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) or designation as a State Antiquities Landmark (SAL). Newly recorded site 41GU199 is a low-density, mid-twentieth-century, historic-age site comprised of an Aermotor windmill, pump shed, cement-capped well, and a historic-age artifact scatter constrained to the ground surface within a drainage. All aboveground features are located outside of the Project area and will not be impacted by Project construction activities. Overall, the observed artifacts are confined to the surface, have likely been displaced from their original context, and represent common trash and debris. The windmill and pump shed are common elements on the mid-twentieth-century landscape, do not possess significant architectural value, and cannot be associated with significant themes in American history. The windmill, pump shed, and well are located outside the Project construction area. Additionally, the site archaeological component lacks integrity, as the artifacts (N= 7) are solely within a disturbed context (drainage channel). Based on these factors the overall research potential of 41GU199 is low. As such, the portion of the site within the Project area is assessed not eligible for the NRHP and no further work is recommended. SWCA also identified one historic-age isolated artifact find during pedestrian survey of the Project area. IF01 consists of the solarized base of a mid-twentieth-century Ball brand jar found on the ground surface. This cultural resource does not meet the criteria for designation as an archaeological site and no further work is warranted. In accordance with 33 CFR 800.4, SWCA has made a reasonable and good faith effort to identify cultural resources properties within the Project area. No properties were identified that may meet the criteria for listing in the NRHP according to 36 CFR 60.4, or for designation as an SAL according to 13 Texas Administrative Code 26.10. SWCA requests THC concur with a determination of No Historic Properties Affected for the undertaking and that no additional cultural resources investigations are warranted within the Project area, as currently defined.

The government of Turkey actively promotes public-private partnership (PPP) models in infrastructure projects. The risks associated with PPP agreements have the potential of incurring a heavy fiscal burden on the state through contingent liabilities, including government guarantees. It is therefore important to distribute risk among contract parties, according to the risk-management capacities of each. Therefore, PPP project agreements including government guarantees must be well-structured and managed by all the responsible government institutions. In the context of BuildOperate-Transfer (BOT) projects, governments are expected to cover political and force majeure risks. Government also guarantees take-up of project output. In Turkey, however, the government also assumes responsibility for risks more usually assumed by the private sector, including financial, construction, and availability risk. This situation can create serious fiscal problems if the associated contingent liabilities are realized. The study, first presents an overview of the legal and institutional frameworks relevant to BOT projects in Turkey, focusing on the explicit contingent liabilities and associated risks. The focus of the study is the minimum-traffic government guarantees to reduce the demand risk in toll-road projects. Three guarantee types, namely plain guarantee, guarantees capped at a certain portion of the investment cost, and guarantees with a ceiling on the income of the project company, will be evaluated and compared by Monte Carlo simulation. This study first aims to illustrate the methods of modelling various guarantee types as real options in a BOT project. Another important objective is to calculate guarantee values in the case of a toll-road BOT project, using real option pricing and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The study also comes up with one suggested criterion for finding the optimum levels of various minimum-traffic guarantees for a given project. Additionally, the study introduces a criterion for measuring the risk reduction capacity of guarantee types tested in the case illustration. Taking into account the findings and the results of the study, some practical policy recommendations are provided for the government on the evaluation, monitoring, and management of similar contingent liabilities and risks in line with international best practice. Keywords: Public-private partnerships, contingent liabilities, risk analysis infrastructure, Turkey. ; Öz: Türk hükümeti, kamu-özel iĢbirliklerini (KÖĠ) etkin Ģekilde tesvik etmektedir. KÖĠ proje sözlesmeleri, hükümet garantileri de dahil kosullu yükümlülükler sebebiyle, devlete ağır mali yük getirme riskini içinde barındırmaktadır. Bu nedenle, riski, ortaklara her ikisinin de risk yönetim kabiliyetlerini esas alarak dağıtmak önem arz etmektedir. Bu çerçevede, içinde hükümet garantilerini de bulunduran KÖĠ proje sözlesmeleri, sorumlu hükümet kurumları tarafından iyi düzenlenmeli ve idare edilmelidir. Yap-islet-devret (YĠD) projeleri kapsamında, hükümetlerden siyasi ve mücbir sebep risklerini almaları yanında üretilen mal veya hizmete olan talebi de garanti etmeleri beklenir. Ne var ki, Türkiye'de, hükümet sayılan riskler yanında, genellikle özel sektör tarafından üstlenilmesi beklenen, finansal, insaat ve emre amadelik risklerini de üstlenmektedir. Bu duruma bağlı kosullu yükümlülüklerin gerçeklesmesi halinde ciddi mali sorunlar doğabilecektir. Bu çalısma, açık kosullu yükümlülükleri ve bağlı riskler temelinde, öncelikle Türkiye'deki YĠD projelerine iliĢkin yasal ve kurumsal çerçeveyi sunacaktır. Bu çalısmanın temel odağı, paralı otoyol projelerindeki talep riskini azaltmak için hükümetçe özel sektöre sağlanan minimum trafik garantileridir. Yalın, yatırım maliyetinin belli bir oranında üstten sınırlı ve proje Ģirketinin toplam gelirlerinin sınırlandığı üç ayrı garanti Ģekli Monte Carlo simulasyonu kullanılarak incelenecek ve karsılastırılacaktır. Bu çalısmada öncelikle böyle bir YĠD projesindeki değisik garanti sekillerinin reel opsiyonlar olarak modellenmesi gösterilecektir. Çalısmanın baska bir önemli amacı, bir paralı yol YĠD projesinde, değiĢik garantilerin değerlerinin reel opsiyon fiyatlandırması ve Sermaye Varlıkları Fiyatlandırma Modeli (CAPM) kullanılarak hesaplanmasıdır. Çalısma ayrıca değisik garanti sekillerinin optimum seviyelerini saptamak için de bir ölçüt önermektedir. Buna ek olarak, çalısma, örnek olay incelemesine konu olan garanti sekillerinin risk azaltma kabiliyetlerini belirlemek için de bir ölçüt ortaya koymaktadır. Çalısmanın bulgularını ve sonuçlarını göz önünde bulundurarak, hükümete benzer kosullu yükümlülüklerin ve ilgili risklerin değerlendirilmesi, izlenmesi ve yönetilmesi alanlarında, uluslararası uygulamalarla paralel, kullanıslı politika önerileri getirilmektedir. Anahtar kelimeler: Kamu-Özel isbirlikleri, kosullu yükümlülükler, risk analizi altyapı, Türkiye. ; Doctor of Philosophy in Banking and Finance. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Eastern Mediterranean University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Dept. of Banking and Finance, 2016. Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Glenn P. Jenkins.

Romina Boccia and Dominik Lett


The federal government will spend $6.3 trillion in 2023, 27 percent is discretionary and 73 percent is mandatory. Discretionary spending refers to federal programs that receive funding through annual appropriations. Less than half of discretionary spending is for defense. More than half is for nondefense activities including education, infrastructure, scientific research, and other programs. If Congress does not pass annual appropriations bills before October 1st (the beginning of the federal fiscal year), the government undergoes a partial "shutdown" where non‐​essential functions are halted until Congress enacts new funding bills. Congress may also enact a continuing resolution (CR) which temporarily continues the previous fiscal year's level of funding. In contrast, mandatory spending refers to federal programs that are funded outside of annual appropriations, including Social Security, Medicare, and food stamps (SNAP). Mandatory program spending is typically ongoing, continuing from year to year, unless Congress changes the law. This fact sheet lays out key details legislators and the public should know about discretionary spending.

Discretionary spending accounts for less than one third of all federal spending, that's $1.7 trillion in 2023 or 6.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Discretionary spending will reach $2.4 trillion or 6 percent of GDP by 2033 according to projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).


Discretionary spending will consume one quarter of the U.S. government's projected $9.8 trillion total budget in 2033.


Discretionary spending is declining as a share of the overall budget, primarily due to the growth of major mandatory entitlement spending like Social Security and Medicare.


Between 1973 and 2023, discretionary spending's budgetary share fell from 53 percent to 28 percent of total federal spending.


Compared to the size of the economy, discretionary spending is declining from 9.6 percent of GDP in 1973 to 6 percent of the GDP in 2023.


For every American household, the United States will spend about $13,000 in discretionary spending in 2023.



Discretionary spending can be divided into two main categories: defense and nondefense.

Discretionary spending is allocated as budget authority and disbursed as outlays. Timing differences explain discrepancies between annual budget authority and discretionary outlays or spending.


The federal government will spend $792 billion on defense discretionary programs in 2023.


Nondefense includes everything from transportation to education to agriculture. See the graph below for a breakdown of nondefense spending in fiscal year 2023.


The United States will spend $919 billion on nondefense discretionary programs in 2023.


Since 1973, nondefense discretionary spending has grown 75 percent faster than defense.


As a share of the United States' economic output, defense spending has fallen from 9 percent of GDP in 1962 to 3 percent of GDP in 2023. Nondefense spending has grown from 3 percent of GDP to 4 percent of GDP over the same period.


By 2033, the United States is projected to spend $1.1 trillion on defense and $1.3 trillion on nondefense.


Congress also distributes added funds through supplemental appropriations. Supplemental appropriations are in addition to regular discretionary appropriations and distinct from mandatory spending. Supplemental appropriations are not subject to discretionary spending limits.


Over the last five years, Congress has spent $1 trillion through supplemental discretionary appropriations. If mandatory spending provisions were included, pandemic‐​related legislation cost many trillions more.














Discretionary spending limits encourage budgetary discipline.

The Budget Control Act of 2011 capped discretionary spending between 2012 and 2021.


For the first six years, discretionary spending declined and then remained flat in real terms.


Since then, discretionary spending has risen significantly, largely due to emergency spending in response to COVID-19 which was not subject to the top‐​line spending cap.

The Fiscal Responsibility Act limits discretionary spending for two years, at $1,590 billion for FY24 and $1,606 billion for FY25.

Because the discretionary budget is annual, funding priorities are more sensitive to recent political trends and national events. Interest groups and matters that catch constituents' attention influence short‐​term legislative outcomes.


Republican conferences in the House and Senate banned parochial funding requests (earmarks or so‐​called congressionally directed spending) in early 2011.


Earmarks bypass merit‐​based formulas and competitive award processes, in favor of politically directed spending and are more likely to lead to a misallocation of resources. Rent seeking from interest groups also consumes legislators' time and taxpayer dollars.


Earmark spending increased from $9 billion in 2022 to $15 billion in 2023.


Further reading:
How a Better Budget Control Act Would Limit Spending and Control Debt "Congress should consider a Better Budget Control Act at the debt limit this year to reduce inflationary pressures and take steps toward avoiding a future fiscal crisis."
Dollar‐​for‐​Dollar, Parity, and Negotiating at the Debt Limit "Congress should budget based on fiscal realities and in accordance with national priorities, instead of basing decisions on catchy, yet misguided, tag lines."
Download a printable PDF version of this fact sheet here.

There is a recurrent discussion about the small size of the
U.S. House of Representatives in comparison with most democratic assemblies. A
few days ago, Danielle Allen from Harvard made a good case for increasing the
size of the House within a framework of democracy renovation (The Washington Post,
March 1). She argues that, as the U.S. House has the highest ratio of population per seat
of any OECD country, the representatives are much removed from their
constituents. My point is that the federal structure of the very large United
States and its multiple channels for people's participation may allow for a
functional explanation of a relatively small House that may not work for more
centralized nations.

From a worldwide perspective, it
has been found that the best approximation for the size of the democratic national
assembly in number of seats is to take the cube root of the population, as
initially formulated by Rein Taagepera. For most countries, the number of
inhabitants amounts to millions, so the cube root must be in the hundreds (that
is, some figures with six zeros can be transformed into figures with two
zeros). For example, as Mexico has about 122mn inhabitants, the cube root of
this number closely approaches the 500 seats of its Chamber of Deputies. In
Italy, with 59mn people, the Chamber of Deputies was oversized but it was
recently reduced via referendum from 630 to 400 seats, which fits the cube root
law.

According to this standard, the
U.S. House of Representatives is undersized. During the nineteenth century, the
size of the House regularly increased every ten years to account for population
growth according to the decennial census. But despite the further increase in
the country's population, the House has remained frozen since it was fixed at
435 seats in 1911. At that moment this was an almost exact fit with the cube
root of the population. A 1929 Act capped the size of the House until now.

Some studies suggest that the
discussion in the House at that time reflected the fear of third-party growth,
namely the Progressive Party and its left-wing cousins. Much less compellingly,
it was also argued that the room for plenary meetings on Capitol Hill would be
too small for much larger gatherings.

A larger assembly would certainly
create more competitive districts and would facilitate the election of more
representatives from minority parties and groups. However, in the complex
political structure of the federal United States, other institutional devices,
especially broad decentralization into a high number of states, have
compensated for the federal House's small size and its restrictive political
consequences.

The trade-off between federalism and
multipartyism comes from a long history. If in a large country, multiple
territorial governments are established, as it was from the very beginning in
the United States, much political action tends to focus on those local
institutions; it is then less likely that multiple political parties are formed
at the federal level, and as a consequence, there is less pressure to adopt a
large assembly and an electoral system favoring national representation of multiple
political parties.

The effect is extreme in this
country, which, with 50 states, is the most decentralized in the world. The
very high number of states somehow compensates for small federal representation.
A logical inference is that an increase in the size of the House would make it more
inclusive, with more diverse partisan affiliations, which would push for a
stronger federal government. Some issues that are now mainly debated and
decided by the state legislatures would be channeled to Congress as territorial
demands by the additional state representatives in Washington.

The trade-off can also be observed
from the inverse extreme case. In the oldest British democracy, the assembly
size has also been frozen for a long period, but on the other direction: the
House of Commons, with 650 seats, is largely oversized regarding the country's
population and the cube root law. Not by chance, the United Kingdom is the most
centralized large democracy, where most territorial tensions are channeled
toward London. Right now, there are ten parties in the House of Commons, six of
them based in Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland. Not surprisingly, the House
room is too small and many MPs have to stand up during its plenary sessions.

The main point is that in a
long-durable democracy, the trade-off between the size of the national assembly
and territorial decentralization must keep a consistently bounded relationship.
It is not possible to alter significantly an institution without affecting the
balance of the other.

---

See also my article:

"Equilibrium Institutions: The Federal-Proportional Trade-Off"
- click

Page 1 The title sheet depicts the picture of a hooded executioner (labeled "Young," presumably Alan Young of the English Department) holding an axe over a pile of men, including President Jensen. Dee Andros, in a football jersey, is leaping onto the pile. One man in the pile is making the "peace" sign with his hand. The page is formatted like No. 9 with a fist, half white and half black, next to "the SCAB SHEET." Page 2 "Sit-ins WILL CONTINUE" A human rights rally is described, as well as further injustices needing to be addressed by the university. "Dee's Bird" An account is given of four OSU students giving Dee Andros the "peace" sign, after which Andros replied with an obscene gesture. The article is capped by a caricature of Andros with the caption: "WATCH THE BIRDIE!" Page 3 "Interview With Chicago Conspirator" John Froines, a professor at the University of Oregon and a member of the "Chicago 8," a group accused of illegally crossing state lines to incite a riot (at the Democratic National Convention), gives his views on city planning. "Hazing" The practice of hazing is criticized, while the university is accused of looking the other way, despite its anti-hazing regulations. "Meddling" The English Department is accused of attempting to prevent two activists from speaking at a university event. "Jocks Vote Down Pumpkin" OSU's football team is reported to have voted 73-15 in favor of accepting facial hair. An earlier Scab Sheet article reported that Andros would let his team vote and abide by its decision. The vote allegedly occurred while Andros was not present, and it also endorsed the Human Rights Commission Report on the Milton Case. Rumors are also fueled that the "fat man may soon resign." Page 4 "OREGON STATE GOTHIC" A caricature imitating the painting "American Gothic," the "Judy" and "Harold" are standing in front of the Memorial Union. "Dean Chick" is standing on the MU steps saying "HAROLD!!", and Judy is saying "I think Mother is calling, dear." The bottom of the page is captioned with "THIS IS BRITTON COUNTRY." The caption also appears on a button on Harold's lapel. Harold represents ASOSU President Harold Britton. Dean Chick refers to Britton's mentor, Dean of Students Robert Chick. Page 5 "SCANDAL IN BRITTON'S GOVERNMENT" Harold Britton is accused of attaining his office as ASOSU President unethically, and appointing cabinet members in an untraditional and dishonest manor, as well as using his position to reward those who helped him gain the presidency or who promise to remain silent over corruption. "MINORITY AFFAIRS DISBANDED BLACK STUDENTS SOLD OUT" The Minority Affairs Committee is reported to have allegedly recommended its own dissolution due to the lack of black students in the committee. The disbanding is viewed by the Scab Sheet as the end of any hope of a black studies program at OSU. [Note: When reading this article, note that the second and third columns are in the wrong order.] Page 6 "A RADICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY" An analysis of the university determines that the present system is flawed (particularly in that it employs administrators), and does not support education. The supporting of research is criticized, as is the political roles of the administration. A picture in the article may possibly depict the Black Student Union walkout. "HUMAN RIGHTS FOR HERTAN OR STRIKE!" In an editorial, Jensen and Andros are labeled as "mothers" in apparent attempt at being derogatory. Further strikes are predicted, and change is urged for the university, insisting upon increased human rights. Page 7 "OSU Black Panther day" The Black Panther Party gives ten demands for the Black Community in the United States. These demands include both monetary and idealistic requests. Page 8 - books "Notes from the New Underground" An anthology is promoted which addresses the depictions of the "younger generation." It appears to support movements demanding change. The new Beatles album is also praised, as well as selections from the musical "Hair." The Portland radio station KPFM is also recommended. Page 9 "PUPPET GOVERNMENT TAKES OFFICE (under police protection)" The newly elected ASOSU government is accused of being a "puppet government" and is accused of gaining power illegally. [no title] A caricature depicts well-dressed individuals labeled "Student Senate" enjoying dinner and tea while bodies lie before them, labeled "Student Body Elections." A lady is holding a book titled "Etiquette." Page 10 "FREE HERTAN" The plight of trackman Bob Hertan details the athlete's suspension due to sideburns, mustache, and long hair. The Scab Sheet reaffirms its calls for the resignation of Dee Andros, but also adds track coach Berny Wagner to its demands. "Barometer LIES" The Scab Sheet accuses the Barometer of lying in an apparent war of words between the rival papers. Page 11 [no title] The Junior Carnival on May 23 and 24 is advertised. The fonts and design of the advertisement depict a "psychedelic" theme.

Shreveport Democrats' plan to have the city's
electorate dump Republican Mayor Tom Arceneaux
is fully afoot as they play
Russian roulette with the city's water and sewerage system.

The city remains under a consent decree that will
demand hundreds of millions in spending to satisfy. Currently, $310.6
million worth of expenditures deemed critical need completion – most of
which the city doesn't have.

It doesn't because of voter hesitancy triggered by
the untrustworthy
performance that featured many questionable spending choices of Democrat
former Mayor Adrian Perkins, who on three occasions proposed large bond issues
that included requests to fund water and sewerage. Out of around $600 million
proposed, all of which involved property tax increases, only a $70.65 million estimated
amount that ended up tacking on 2.5 mils for
public safety made it onto the ballot and gained voter approval.

Meanwhile, the funding well for water and sewerage
threatens to run dry. Such operations are set up so that users pay, but legally
the city can apportion the cost to all property owners. However, users
already have experienced a series of increases. In 2013 in response to the
decree, the city decided that over a two-year span commencing in 2015 sewer rates
would go up 14 percent, then that and water rates would increase 6 percent in
2020, rise 2 percent more for water in 2021, and a year later would be capped
by 4 percent more there and 2 percent more for sewer.

Still, this doesn't appear to be enough. So,
Arceneaux has proposed a two-prong strategy of another bond issue including of
three items that altogether total $256 million one of $82 million for water and
sewerage, and an
increase in rates again, of 10 percent. Last month, the city launched a
road show to gather citizen input and inform them about it.

Except that the City Council, composed of a 5-2
majority of Democrats, dragged its heels on the rate hike. Twice it delayed in February
authorizing that, although last week it did cue up the three bond ballot items
just in time to make the Apr. 27 election.

Democrat Councilors Tabatha Taylor
and James Green
voted against that, and also declared they would provide minimal rhetorical
assistance to mobilize electoral support for the measures. They had backed
reliably the measures Perkins had put forward, including for water and sewerage,
as well as generally Perkins and his initiatives. Green expanded upon his vote
and intended actions, noting that his apathy was not different from that of
Republican councilors on past items, inferring particularly Grayson Boucher who
was on the Council then and now who gave vocal support to the measure that
passed then but not for the others ultimately rejected.

This he attributed to racism – Perkins is black,
Arceneaux is white – falling back on the increasingly patterned behavior of he
and Taylor and Democrat Councilor Alan Jackson,
all of whom are black, to cite
systemic racism as the cause whenever a non-black disagrees with their policy preferences.
This card they had played when Green illegally gave raises to Council employees
and Boucher and Republican Jim Taliaferro,
along with Democrats Ursula Bowman
and Gary Brooks,
united to call for an investigation that nailed Green. Far more likely, tepid
Republican support over the previous bond votes came from suspicion over Perkins'
general laxity about finances – such as not
vetting all available sources for funding before asking for tax increases –
and his shiftiness that led to legal actions and Legislative Auditor rebukes.

Regardless, a political motive clearly presents
itself. Councilors with an eye towards denying Arceneaux a second term can feel
safe in supporting or ignoring a bond issue, because if voters approve the
water and sewerage measure at least the people will have voted it onto
themselves. But they can posture over the rate hikes, because to approve these
puts the spotlight on them and to reject these makes Arceneaux look like the
bad guy for bringing up the idea.

Plus, they get to take shots at Arceneaux for
things Perkins left undone. In the prior
administrative council meeting to the regular meeting that turned down the
rate hikes but approved the bond vote, the issue of overbilling for services
reemerged. A few years ago, the city settled
multi-million dollar class action claims about this, and the lawyer who had
led this battle alleged this still was going on. Green and Taylor particularly
cast aspersions that Arceneaux's administration was negligent on this – except
that the lawyer said he had notified the Perkins Administration in 2021 about
this and nothing was done.

Ironically, the hold that Council Democrats have
placed on rate increases they say comes from concerns that the city's program
helping lower-income families pay water bills can't do enough received a major shot
in the arm as a result of the overbilling settlement, where class members who
couldn't be located had their shares requisitioned for this purpose. How long recalcitrant
councilors stick to that story remains to be seen.

For in their ideal world, they will drag this out
as long as possible – which perhaps is why Green and Taylor talked of the bond
vote to come in the fall rather than spring – in order to have maximal time to paint
Arceneaux as a tax- and rate-raiser with Democrat councilors as a check against
his trying in this manner to impoverish the people, regardless of whether the
city's water and sewerage system receives its badly-needed and legally-required
fixes. Like it or not, decades of neglect have led the city to this point, and
resolution might be swifter and more effective if the Council majority, and
especially those members of it prone to playing the race card, would dial down the
politicking focused too much on political futures.

Given the bad hand Louisiana's Constitution dealt
him, Republican Gov. Jeff Landry did
his best and largely
successfully to fix problems created in the past few years with the state's
Industrial Tax Exemption Program.

ITEP reflects a constitutional power defined by
the mostly gubernatorial-appointed Board
of Commerce and Industry and the Department of Economic Development which
allows it to exempt manufacturing firms from property taxes from value added to
property used for discrete projects that create new or expand operations.
However, the Constitution vests the final power in the hand of the governor
whether to approve whatever emerges, so he can create the conditions for
acceptance through an executive order, in essence saying that unless requests
forwarded to him meet standards he articulates, he won't approve these.

Historically, such supervision was minimal,
leading to almost any project within the constitutional boundaries meeting
approval, until Landry's predecessor Democrat John Bel Edwards radically
changed the rules, and for the worse. Understanding the negative impact begins
with acknowledging that ITEP exists because of Louisiana's
confiscatory property tax rates insofar as these apply to business.

Because of the nation's highest homestead
exemption (plus a myriad of other smaller breaks), the state's rates are
artificially high because homeowning families, the majority of voters, don't pay
that but a reduced rate or nothing on all but municipal taxes if they live in
one. Instead, it is foisted on businesses, especially industrial concerns which
pay one of the highest per capita burdens in the country. The best
solution as to what to do with ITEP would be to get
rid of it entirely, but that would require an extensive overhaul of the
state's taxing regime that would take an entire term to accomplish.

So, ITEP then ideally serves as a palliative for
too-high property taxation of large business investment. Unfortunately, in two
iterations, Edwards changed this to making it a
mechanism holding out the possibility of redistributing wealth, or even
pursuing social justice aims. Three changes in particular opened the doors to
this noxious combination.

First, he gave three or four (depending on whether
a municipality was involved) kinds of local governments a veto power over an
application. Second, this veto power was particular to the local government
involved. Third, he insisted that application demonstrate the project's
completion would create jobs.

Together, these created a catastrophic situation
for economic development, beginning with the complexity introduced. If Board
approval came, then each of the three or four local governments got a crack at
it, which in a small of number cases produced split decisions, creating
bureaucratic complexity both within the tax collector (sheriff) and the
business, where the latter served as a disincentive to invest.

In even fewer cases, they all vetoed the idea, which
provided an even greater disincentive. In fact, advocacy literature disguised
as quality and honest research even admitted tangentially that the new policy discouraged
applications even as it trumpeted that few rejections occurred. But you can't
turn down something if it never gets submitted, either out of fear it'll be
wasted effort or simply not even contemplated because of the new rules, and you
can't reap the economic benefits of these projects never undertaken.

But the worst of all was the job creation
requirement, which betrays both a fundamental misunderstanding of economic development
and its use a cudgel to further political careers and special interest agendas.
Political hacks and courthouse gangs liked the idea because then they could
draw a direct line to their approval and a claim their actions put people to
work.

Worse still, they could use that as a bargaining
tool to further agendas inimical to economic development, if not the well-being
of the community as a whole. A classic
example came from the Orleans Parish School Board, which issued its own set
of criteria for project approval that focused heavily on wealth redistribution and
pandering to special interest agendas, rather than focus on policy that would create
a rising tide to lift all boats.

Job creation is a potentially desired output from
a tax break decision. But economic development is far more than that, and can
be exclusive of that. The outstanding exhibit of why job creation can't be the
end-all-be-all of tax policy is the state's Motion
Picture Investors tax credit, which costs $13,300 per (mostly part-time)
job created, and doesn't even return a quarter on the dollar of this to taxpayers.
You don't have to create any jobs to make a decision where forgoing tax dollars
boosts productivity and tax revenues that ripple through the entire local economy.

Wisely, Landry recognized these flaws and corrected
them. He simplified the local review process to include for every decision just
the chief executive or first among equals from a parish, school district,
sheriff's office (the sheriff or designee), and, when needed, mayor to vote
collectively on the matter.

Better, he made this a nonbinding advisory opinion,
so local governments no longer can throw up extraneous requirements. Best of
all, he removed the job creation criteria and made the final decision – if
approved by the Board with local input – his on the basis of overall economic development
that recognizes the state's punitive property tax structure for manufacturing
concerns needs rebalancing to encourage capital investment.

He kept a provision that wouldn't make exemptions retroactively
applied and only for meaningful spending that could boost productivity. He also
capped the break at 80 percent – including the option to go to 100 might have been
better – for five years, plus as many more renewed once.

This is a far better use of ITEP, if we must have
it, that will focus on aiding all participants in the state and local economies
rather than select special interests. Landry continues to mean business that
the state, after years of indifference if not hostility to this idea from Edwards,
is open for business.