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I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Governments balance benefits of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long-term debt affects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that reflect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.

We examine the implications for optimal inflation of changes in the level and maturity of government debt under the assumption where fiscal and monetary policies co-ordinate, and in the case of an independent central bank following a Taylor rule. Under co-ordination, inflation persistence and volatility depend on the sign, size and maturity of debt. Higher debt leads to higher inflation and longer maturity leads to more persistent inflation although inflation plays a minor role in achieving fiscal sustainability. Under an independent monetary authority, inflation is higher, more volatile and more persistent and plays a significant role in achieving fiscal solvency. The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society. ; Marcet is grateful for support from DGES, Monfispol and Excellence Program if Banco de Espana. Faraglia and Scott gratefully acknowledge funding from the ESRC's World Economy and Finance Program. Oikonomou is grateful to HEC Montreal for funding ; Peer Reviewed

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Executive Summary -- Ch 1. A Decade of Debt -- I. Introduction -- II. Surges in Public Debt -- III. The Financial Crash-Sovereign Debt Crisis Sequence -- IV. Debt and Growth -- V. The Aftermath of High Debt: The 1930s and World War II -- VI. Conclusion -- Ch 2. Chartbook of Country Histories of Debt, Default, and Financial Crises -- I. Preamble -- II. Key to Figures and Methodology Notes -- III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes -- References -- About the Authors -- Index.

This study provides empirical evidence that the costs of austerity crucially depend on the level of private indebtedness. In particular, fiscal consolidations lead to severe contractions when implemented in high private debt states. Contrary, fiscal consolidations have no significant effect on economic activity when private debt is low. These results are robust to alternative definitions of private debt overhang, the composition of fiscal consolidations and controlling for the state of the business cycle and government debt overhang. I show that deterioration in household balance sheets is important to understand private debt-dependent effects of austerity.

1. Introduction : debts shared and imposed, political and gendered / Bernard Hours and Pepita Ould Ahmed -- 2. Paying what one owes. or carrying out one's obligations / Pepita Ould Ahmed -- 3. Debt : the price of what, exactly? / Bernard Hours -- 4. Incompatibility and complementarity of the Chicago plan and alternative monetary and financial mechanisms / Jean-Michel Servet and Tom Moerenhout -- 5. Why are poor people reluctant to borrow? : microcredit in rural Morocco / Jean-Yves Moisseron and Pepita Ould Ahmed -- 6. Debtors and creditors : constructions and deligitimization of powers in Mali / Francoise Bourdarias -- 7. The indebted state in Algeria : state demand, social conflict, and imaginary sources of power / Laurent Bazin -- 8. The imaginary debt of communism : political conflicts and historical legitimization in Romania / Antoine Heemeryck -- 9. Indebtedness and women's material, monetary, and imaginary debts in the era of globalized gender / Isabelle Guerin, Magalie Saussey, and Monique Selim -- 10. Debt, or, How to get one's neck out of the noose / Tassadit Yacine -- 11. Perceptions of debt and microcredit in Senegal / Eveline Baumann and Mouhamedoune Abdoulaye Fall -- 12. Conclusion : debt without end / Bernard Hours and Pepita Ould Ahmed.

International Debt Statistics (IDS) 2016 (formerly Global Development Finance) provides statistical tables showing the external debt of 125 developing countries that report public and publicly guaranteed external debt to the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System (DRS). It also includes tables of key debt ratios for individual reporting countries and the composition of external debt stocks and flows for individual reporting countries and regional and income groups, along with some graphical presentations. IDS 2016 draws on a database maintained by the World Bank External Debt (WBXD) system. Longer time series and more detailed data are available from the World Bank open databases, which contain more than 200 time series indicators, covering the years 1970 to 2014 for most reporting countries, and pipeline data for scheduled debt service payments on existing commitments to 2020. International Debt Statistics 2016 is unique in its coverage of the important trends and issues fundamental to the financing of the developing world. This report is an indispensable resource for governments, economists, investors, financial consultants, academics, bankers, and the entire development community. In addition, International Debt Statistics will showcase the broader spectrum of debt data collected and compiled by the World Bank. These include the high frequency, quarterly external debt database (QEDS) and the quarterly public sector database (QPSD) developed in partnership with the International Monetary Fund and launched by the World Bank.

International Debt Statistics (IDS) 2014 is a continuation of the World Bank???s publications Global Development Finance, Volume II (1997 through 2009) and the earlier World Debt Tables (1973 through 1996). IDS 2014 provides statistical tables showing the external debt of 128 developing countries that report public and publicly guaranteed external debt to the World Bank???s Debtor Reporting System (DRS). It also includes tables of key debt ratios for individual reporting countries and the composition of external debt stocks and flows for individual reporting countries and regional and income groups along with some graphical presentations. IDS 2014 draws on a database maintained by the World Bank External Debt (WBXD) system. Longer time series and more detailed data are available from the World Bank open databases, which contain more than 200 time series indicators, covering the years 1970 to 2012 for most reporting countries, and pipeline data for scheduled debt service payments on existing commitments to 2019. International Debt Statistics 2014 is unique in its coverage of the important trends and issues fundamental to the financing of the developing world. This report is an indispensable resource for governments, economists, investors, financial consultants, academics, bankers, and the entire development community. In addition, International Debt Statistics will showcase the broader spectrum of debt data collected and compiled by the World Bank. These include the high frequency, quarterly external debt database (QEDS) and the quarterly public sector database (QPSD) developed in partnership with the International Monetary Fund and launched by the World Bank.

Language -- "Debt" as equivocal -- Debitum -- Debt and sin -- Debt vs. duty, I -- Debt vs. duty, II -- Owing and owning -- Creditum, I -- Creditum, II -- : history -- What is the institution of debt? -- Ancient usury -- Productive and extractive usury -- The defence of usury -- Forced debts -- The taming of debt -- Usury and abusury -- : money -- What is money? -- The trick behind money -- The origins of money -- Debunking the myth of barter -- Money as debt -- Chartalism and Fiat money -- Government ious and taxes -- Bank deposits and "inside money" -- Monetary operations and the dominance of bank IOUs -- Fixed and floating exchange rates section four : political economy -- The monetary theory of production -- Debt, trust, and production -- Debt deflation and accidental abusury -- Government deficits -- Inflation, I -- Inflation, II -- What any housewife knows -- Lazy thinking and a new proposal -- Notes and replies to objections -- A note on the "labour market" and immigration -- A note on the foreign trade balance -- A note on marxism and the falling rate of profit -- Conclusion

Das 2012 in Kraft getretene Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen (ESUG) hat die Reorganisation von Unternehmen in der Insolvenz auf eine gänzlich neue Grundlage gestellt: Die weitgehende gesellschaftsrechtliche Neutralität der InsO wurde aufgegeben und die gesellschaftsrechtliche Organisationsstruktur einer Schuldnerin dem Haftungszugriff der Gläubiger unterworfen. In den gestaltenden Teil eines Insolvenzplanes können nun auch gesellschaftsrechtlich zulässige Maßnahmen aufgenommen werden und obstruierende Anteilseigner majorisiert werden. Am Beispiel des insolvenzrechtlichen Debt Equity Swap untersucht Patrick Schulz umfassend die sich aus der Verzahnung von Insolvenzrecht und Gesellschafts- sowie Kapitalmarktrecht ergebenden (Auslegungs-)Fragen und befürwortet ein weitgehendes »Primat des Insolvenzrechts« zur widerspruchsfreien Durchsetzung der sich aus § 199 S. 2 InsO ergebenden insolvenzrechtlichen Befriedigungshierarchie

This study provides empirical evidence that the costs of austerity crucially depend on the level of private indebtedness. In particular, fiscal consolidations lead to severe contractions when implemented in high private debt states. Contrary, fiscal consolidations have no significant effect on economic activity when private debt is low. These results are robust for alternative definitions of private debt overhang, the composition of fiscal consolidations and controlling for the state of the business cycle and government debt overhang. I show that deterioration in household balance sheets is important to understand private debt-dependent effects of austerity. ; In dieser Studie wird empirisch gezeigt, dass die realwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Austeritätsmaßnahmen maßgeblich von dem Niveau der privaten Verschuldung abhängen. In Zeiten hoher privater Verschuldung, führen fiskalische Konsolidierungen zu einem signifikanten Rückgang der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität. Ist die private Verschuldung dagegen gering, haben Konsolidierungen keinen nennenswerten realwirtschaftlichen Effekt. Diese Ergebnisse sind robust gegenüber alternativen Definitionen von privaten Verschuldungsregimen, der Komposition fiskalischer Konsolidierungen und wenn man zusätzlich für den Konjunkturzyklus und öffentliche Verschuldung kontrolliert. Ich zeige, dass private verschuldungsabhängige Konsolidierungseffekte durch eine Verschlechterung der privaten Haushaltsbilanz erklärt werden können.