Suchergebnisse

This chapter is focused on the problem of income inequalities in contemporary China which is one of the biggest developmental challenges for this country. First this part of the analysis includes general overview on studied problem putting emphasis on instrument for measuring income inequalities, and general drivers of this phenomenon. Second part is concentered on the nature of this problem in China since the late 1970s, when country has faced a period of rapid economic development. Chapter also points out attempts taken by the Chinese government to reduce income inequalities.

We investigated whether income gaps in voting turnout vary with country-level economic inequality, and whether this pattern differs between wealthier and less-wealthy countries. Moreover, we investigated whether the prevalence of clientelism was the underlying mechanism that accounts for the presumed negative interaction between relative income and economic inequality at lower levels of national wealth per capita. The harmonised PolPart dataset, combining cross-national surveys from 66 countries and 292 country-years, including 510,184 individuals, was analysed using multilevel logistic regression models. We found that the positive effect of relative income on voting was weaker at higher levels of economic inequality, independent of the level of national wealth. Although clientelism partially explains why economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout, it does not do so in the way we expected. It seems to decrease turnout of higher income groups, rather than increase turnout of lower income groups. Importantly, that economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout does not imply that economic inequality is positive for democratic representation, since economic inequality was found to depress the likelihood of voting for all income groups.

Focusing on the advanced political economies, this article critically reviews the recent scholarship on the evolution of top incomes over the past few decades. The existing literature shows that the determination of top incomes is complex, multifaceted and bound up with factors associated with both politics and economics. Technological change and globalization are vital sources of change in contemporary capitalism, but the continued diversity in top income shares across the advanced capitalist world suggests that these forces alone cannot account for the empirical patterns. Instead, there is compelling evidence that power and politics, including government policy, trade union and left party strength, institutions and financialization, all play a pivotal role in regulating distributive outcomes. It is argued that future research will require a plurality of methodological approaches in order to clarify the complex causal process that drives top-end income concentration.

Intro -- INCOME AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONPERSPECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS -- INCOME AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONPERSPECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 THE US INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY: TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- MEASURES OF INCOME -- MEASURES OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME -- EXPLAINING RECENT TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF US HOUSEHOLD INCOME -- INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONSOF INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS -- EXPLAINING CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN THEDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME -- INCOME MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES -- Intergenerational Mobility -- Cross-Country Comparisons of Intergenerational Mobility -- Intragenerational Mobility -- CONCLUDING REMARKS -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND THE MIDDLE CLASS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME -- THE MIDDLE CLASS -- Absolute Income -- Relative Income -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 FINANCE AND THE ECONOMY: OCCUPY WALL STREET IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE -- SUMMARY -- WHY OCCUPY WALL STREET? -- VIEWS OF FINANCE IN US HISTORY -- RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH -- Size of the Financial Industry -- Compensation -- Income Inequality -- Less Stable Financial System -- Costs of Financial Crises -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- Chapter 4 THE TREND IN FAMILY INCOME FROM 1979 TO 2010 -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- FAMILY INCOME: WHY IT MATTERS AND POLICIESTO IMPROVE IT -- DEFINITIONS USED IN THE REPORT -- THE TREND IN FAMILY INCOME -- Longer-Term Trends -- The Distribution of Family Income -- Annual Hours Worked -- The Level of Family Income -- All Families -- Married Couples -- Family Earnings Per Hour and Total Hours Worked -- Earnings Per Hour Worked All Families -- Married Couples -- Hours Worked -- All Families -- Married Couples -- The Separate Effects of Hourly Earnings and Hours Workedon Total Family Earnings

The idea of universal basic income (UBI) has taken on new life as people experience greater inequality and greater exploitation than ever before—combined with the recurrence of the historically-cyclical fear of mass unemployment driven by rapid advancements in automation technologies. But the idea of providing every person with a certain amount of money, regardless of their socioeconomic status or (in)ability to or (dis)interest in working, is far from universally-accepted by socialists. This essay offers replies to three common socialist criticisms of various basic income proposals, in an effort to defend the radical potential of UBI; a potential that is consonant with the fundamental goal of the socialist project—achieving a democratic, non-exploitative world beyond capitalism.

(unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled) -- (unlabled).