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Realist and liberal theories of international politics both assume that the essential parameters of international politics are fixed, though they differ as to the character of these parameters. We deploy decision psychology and discourse analysis to show how the seemingly limited choices of actors can and do affect these parameters. Thus realism and liberalism are poor guides to action, for they rest on empirical misconception and faulty logic. Intelligent international action is reflexive in that it attends to the world that actions help constitute, as well as take effect within. We show how actors can and do engage in reflexive action, and how they might do so more consciously and effectively. There are substantial implications for how states and other actors ought to behave in the post-Cold War world. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

"In Lissabon wurde am 4. Juli 2007, gleich zu Begin der portugiesischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, eine umfassende strategische Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und Brasilien vereinbart. Der südamerikanischen Führungsmacht wird damit ein vergleichbarer Status wie China, Indien und Russland eingeräumt. Eine Woche zuvor hatte der venezolanische Präsident Hugo Chávez Russland, Weißrussland und den Iran bereist, um die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen auszubauen sowie erneut Waffenkäufe zu tätigen. Gleichzeitig drohte Chávez, das südamerikanische Integrationsbündnis Mercosur wieder zu verlassen, dem er gerade beigetreten war; während er gleichzeitig für sein eigenes Integrationsprojekt Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas (ALBA) warb. Während Lateinamerika in der politischen Publizistik teilweise als Verlierer der Globalisierung abgeschrieben wird, gibt es Anzeichen für eine Neuverortung und einen größeren Einfluss Lateinamerikas - oder einzelner Staaten der Region - in der internationalen Politik. Zugleich ist es innerhalb Lateinamerikas zu Machtverschiebungen und neuen politischen Allianzen gekommen. Dabei spielt die Verfügung über Energierohstoffe als Machtressource eine wichtige Rolle. Es ist heute schwieriger geworden, festzustellen, wer verbindlich für Lateinamerika spricht und wer die geeigneten Ansprechpartner für externe Akteure sind. In Lateinamerika zeichnen sich die Konturen einer zukünftigen multipolaren Weltordnung ab. Lateinamerika ist politisch und ökonomisch stärker fragmentiert und gespalten als noch zu Beginn der Dekade. Zugleich hat Lateinamerika an Handlungsspielraum in der internationalen Politik gewonnen. Die internationalen Finanzinstitutionen wie die Weltbank und der Internationale Währungsfonds (IWF), aber auch die USA und die EU haben in den vergangen Jahren an Einfluss in Lateinamerika verloren, demgegenüber haben aufstrebende oder wieder aufstrebende Mächte wie China oder Russland an Einfluss gewonnen. Die EU reagiert nun - wenn auch mit Verzögerungen - auf die Veränderungen Lateinamerika." (Autorenreferat)

How do leaders communicate during domestic crises? We provide the first global analysis of world leader communication on social media during social unrest. We develop a theory of leaders' digital communication strategies, building on the diversionary theory of foreign policy, as well as research on the role of democratic institutions in explaining elite responsiveness. To test our theory, we construct a new dataset that characterizes leader communication through social media posts published by any head of state or government on Twitter or Facebook, employing a combination of automated translation and supervised machine learning methods. Our findings show that leaders increase their social media activity and shift the topic from domestic to foreign policy issues during moments of social unrest, which is consistent with a conscious strategy to divert public attention when their position could be at risk. These effects are larger in democracies and in particular in the run-up to elections, which we attribute to incentives created by democratic institutions. Our results demonstrate how social media provide meaningful comparative insight into leaders' political behavior in the digital age.

Research across several disciplines has focused on the intersection between the international and the urban to shed light on transformations in global politics. Recently, this intersection has become the focus of critical International Relations scholars. Despite transversal interest, disciplinary boundaries often limit the scope of academic debate. In the interest of developing a transdisciplinary research agenda, this review article charts three different ways that scholars have theorised the relationship between the international, the urban, and the political across disciplines. A review of five recently published books, situated within a broader study of the literature, serves to do this.

Cover -- Half-Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Tables, Figures and Boxes -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Is Senatorial Leadership even possible? The Deadlock of the American Upper Chamber -- 3 The Office Holder: John Boehner as Speaker of the US House of Representatives -- 4 Tony Blair's Leadership Style in Foreign Policy: Hubris Without Constraints? -- 5 From Dewar to Salmond: The Scottish First Ministers and the Establishment of their Leadership

Since 1965, Britain's major political parties have radically, and repeatedly, changed the ways in which they choose their leaders. Building on a recent comparative study of party leadership selection in the five principal Anglophone ('Westminster') parliamentary democracies (Cross and Blais, 2012a), this article first outlines a theoretical framework that purports to explain why the major parties in three of those countries, including Britain, have adopted such reform. It then examines why five major British parties have done so since 1965. It argues that, while Cross and Blais' study makes a significant contribution to our knowledge and understanding of processes of party leadership selection reform in Anglophone parliamentary democracies, it has limited explanatory power when applied to changes enacted by the major parties in modern and contemporary Britain. Instead, the adoption of such reform in the British context is ultimately best understood and explained by examining both the internal politics and external circumstances of individual parties.

"International organizations (IOs) are essential and controversial actors in global governance, working on just about every imaginable issue that states cannot easily address individually. The Second Edition of International Organizations in World Politics offers a comprehensive overview of major IOs and regional organizations and their role in global governance. Tamar Gutner presents a variety of theoretical approaches to analyzing the roles and impact of large IOs, including the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, and examines their historical development, governance structure, activities, and performance. For each IO, a detailed case study illuminates the constraints and challenges it faces in areas of contemporary global challenges like conflict resolution, development, the environment, trade, and financial crisis. The Second Edition includes updated coverage of IOs' responses to major world issues like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and other geopolitical tensions"--

The author describes the contemporary situation in the theory and practice of international politics in the field of nuclear weapons. The first part of the paper deals with past results in the process of proliferation and the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, as well as the contemporary nuclear policies of great powers. The second part presents different theoretical approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons - realism, liberalism and the so-called critical or alternative approaches. The author expects that the process of nuclear proliferation will be continued - it will be gradual, controlled and directed by great powers and the USA, in particular.

It is widely agreed that domestic and international politics are rooted in very different types of order, but this insight is deeply flawed. The potential similarity of domestic and international order can best be seen at historical turning points when the organization of the order is up for grabs — internationally, these moments tend to come after major wars. This article argues that at these moments, order formation has taken the form of constitution building, where basic limits are sought on the exercise of power and the scope of politics. Constitutions are compromises or gambits whereby a hegemonic or leading state agrees to limit its power — that is, it agrees to operate within an institutionalized political process according to a set of rules and principles — in exchange for the agreement of secondary states to do so as well. Moreover, the domestic structures of the contracting states will matter — states that are similar will be better able to convey assurances and democratic states will be most likely to solve the commitment problems necessary to construct constitutional orders.

Recent scholars have broadened the study of transnational relations, once limited to political economy, to include contentious international politics. This is a refreshing trend, but most of them leap directly from globalization or some other such process to transnational social movements and thence to a global civil society. In addition, they have so far failed to distinguish among movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational networks and do not adequately specify their relations with states and international institutions. In particular, few mechanisms are proposed to link domestic actors to transnational ones and to states and international institutions. This paper argues that mass-based transnational social movements are hard to construct, are difficult to maintain, and have very different relations to states and international institutions than more routinized international NGOs or activist networks. These latter forms may be encouraged both by states and international institutions and by the growth of a cosmopolitan class of transnational activists. Rather than being the antipodes of transnational contention, international institutions offer resources, opportunities, and incentives for the formation of actors in transnational politics. If transnational social movements form, it will be through a second-stage process of domestication of international conflict.