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AbstractThis article advances a theory on the power of international bureaucrats and bureaucracies in world politics. It argues that bureaucrats become powerful when they stage emotionally calibrated performances as "servants" before state principals and carve out space for action through "whispering," "propagating," cultivating patrons, and building coalitions in the backstage of official interaction. These "servant" performances involve what sociologist Arlie Hochschild calls "emotional labor"—the management of feelings in work performances. I develop a theory of emotional labor that suggests why international bureaucrats manage emotions as they perform as servants and why some bureaucrats with prized sociological profiles are empowered on the back of "confident" servant performances. In contrast to principal–agent, constructivist, and psychological accounts, this is a micro-sociological explanation for bureaucratic power. I evaluate this theory with an ethnography of the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—a "least likely" case for bureaucratic power under prevailing theorizations. I also demonstrate how the ASEAN case is a sharper instance of a more general phenomenon. This article advances the study of emotions and emotional labor, the role of social class in shaping competent practice, and the debate on the power of bureaucrats and international organizations in international relations.

This paper considers the politics of tolerance through the lens of Spinoza's philosophy of immanence. The contention is that Spinoza's philosophy of immanence provides us with a better conceptualization of the relationship between tolerance and power, and that it in so doing reinvigorates a theory of active tolerance that, for the most part, has been lost in contemporary democratic theory. Spinoza's philosophy of immanence does so because it animates a sensorial orientation to politics, one that heightens our attention to the affective components of political life, enabling us to better theorize how all modes of existence, including the so-called passive ones, harbor a degree of power that can be mobilized for purposes that go beyond the "non-practice" highlighted by advocates and critics of tolerance in contemporary democratic theory. The paper develops this argument with ongoing reference to Marcuse's critique of tolerance. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Four years after the start of the post-Mao era in China, civil-military relations are still in a state of flux. The warmth which characterized these relations in the aftermath of Mao's death and the downfall of his radical supporters—since vilified as the "Gang of Four"— has cooled off considerably. The harmony of the earlier period has given way to a more complex situation which contains elements of both cohesion and conflict. Although the elements of conflict have so far been firmly contained by overriding common interests shared by leaders of the party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), signs of strain have appeared in their relationship as a result of their inability to resolve several issues. The most divisive issue is the technological modernization of the PLA. The professional military have made major gains in other areas pertaining to military modernization, but the absence of agreement on this cardinal issue constitutes a source of simmering friction.

Pursuant to a decision taken at the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization, the second session met in Geneva from August 25 to September 15, 1948. The committee reached agreement on several organizational and procedural questions to be submitted to the first session of the ITO conference and established several subcommittees to work on substantive matters including relations with the International Court of Justice, economic development, administrative questions and technical matters.

Scholars of international relations generally invoke Hobbes as the quintessential theorist of international anarchy. David Armitage challenges this characterisation, arguing that Hobbes is regarded as a foundational figure in international relations theory in spite of as much as because of what he wrote on the subject. Thus, for Armitage, Hobbes is not the theorist of anarchy that he is made out to be. This article agrees with the general thrust of Armitage's critique while maintaining that it is still possible to imagine Hobbes as a theorist of anarchy. Hobbes is a theorist of anarchy, not in a political sense, but in a metaphysical sense. This conception of anarchy is a reflection of a comprehensive theological account of reality that is grounded in an omnipotent God. Any historical inquiry into the foundations of modern international thought must take account of theology, because theology defines the ultimate coordinates of reality in terms of which the concepts of international thought are intelligible. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]