Suchergebnisse

In this paper, we present a vision for IMF surveillance that seeks to produce a more accountable, transparent, and independent surveillance process. First, to make surveillance more focused, the IMF's assessment should be principles-based; that is, the Fund should assess the overall coherence of exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and financial policies, with a view to analyzing their effects on external stability. Second, the IMF should have a governance structure that increases incentives to support candid, transparent assessments of surveillance. In practice, this entails a different role for the Executive Board: the Board will set out the Fund's strategic framework for surveillance; the Managing Director and the staff will conduct surveillance. These reforms clarify the roles and responsibilities of the IMF and its member countries in the surveillance process. Also, our proposed reforms aim at making surveillance more even-handed and objective. We believe that this principles-based approach can bolster the credibility and legitimacy of surveillance, giving the Fund greater influence on the economic policies of members. Adapted from the source document.