Suchergebnisse

'Vergleichende Studien zu Politiktransfer und Politikdiffusion haben für viele Bereiche eine beträchtliche Konvergenz von Politiken festgestellt. Das gilt insbesondere für die Umweltpolitik. Es ist jedoch noch wenig über die Mechanismen bekannt, die dieses Phänomen verursachen. In diesem theoretischen Beitrag werden drei Faktoren analysiert, die als wichtige internationale Antriebskräfte der zwischenstaatlichen Politikkonvergenz gelten: Regulierungswettbewerb, internationale Kooperation und Harmonisierung sowie transnationale Kommunikation und Policy-Lernen. Wir betrachten dabei nicht nur die jeweiligen isolierten Wirkungen der einzelnen Faktoren, sondern auch die Effekte ihrer Interaktion. Es wird gezeigt, dass die empirisch recht wahrscheinliche Interaktion dieser Mechanismen eine plausible Erklärung bietet für die Kluft zwischen der theoretischen Vorhersage eines 'race to the bottom' der umweltpolitischen Standards und dem Mangel an empirischen Belegen für ein solches Ergebnis.' (Autorenreferat)

AbstractWhile there is abundant theoretical or empirical research on fiscal competition in the form of tax or spending competition, little is known about public debt competition across local jurisdictions, which substantially contributes to growing public debt and, worse, a potential local government debt crisis in China. This study provides empirical evidence from China on spatial interactions of public debt across local governments. Using a provincial panel data set from 1999 to 2016, we found that provincial governments engage in strategic interactions via local public debt. These findings are robust across several model specifications. Further analysis found strong and direct evidence of the existence of yardstick competition among local governments on debt‐issuing behavior.

This paper analyses the functioning of the passing-on of price overcharges in damages actions for breaches of EU competition law and aims to give a critical appraisal of the present regulatory framework in Europe. In particular, this paper maintains that the European Directive 2014/104, in order to facilitate the claims of damages caused by the infringement of European competition rules and to provide full compensation for those damages, has adopted a complex set of rules placing the burden of proof on the party that has, assumedly, the best access to evidence on the relevant issue. Moreover, it is noted that these rules give a strict definition of the overcharge harm and of its diffusion through the market chain. In this connection, it is argued that the objectives of the Directive are partly compromised by the fact that this restrictive approach fails to take into consideration a number of other subjects who may potentially be damaged by the passing-on of the overcharge harm. Secondly, this paper maintains that the set of rules laid down by the Directive 2014/104 creates a system of presumptions, which, contrary to its intended purpose, is likely to discourage damages actions. Finally, this paper argues that actions by indirect purchasers based on the passing-on of the overcharge will still need to heavily rely on domestic civil law rules in particular on local principles of causation and evidence.

Scholars have proposed two distinct explanations for why policies diffuse across American states: (1) policymakers learn by observing the experiences of nearby states, and (2) states seek a competitive economic advantage over other states. The most common empirical approach for studying interstate influence is modeling an indicator of a state's policy choice as a function of its neighbors' policies, with each neighbor weighted equally. This can appropriately specify one form of learning model, but it does not adequately test for interstate competition: when a policy diffuses due to competition, states' responses to other states vary depending on the size and location of specific populations. We illustrate with two substantive applications how geographic information systems (GIS) can be used to test for interstate competition. We find that lottery adoptions diffuse due to competition—rather than to learning—but find no evidence of competition in state choices about welfare benefits. Our empirical approach can also be applied to competition among nations and local jurisdictions.

This study explores the impacts of contractual government funding and competitive tendering on voluntary organisations (VOs) providing homelessness services in Southampton, UK. Although service quality has arguably improved, the interview data suggest that implementing competitive tendering within the voluntary sector is not unproblematic. Three key issues are discussed: changing demands for expertise, increasing job insecurity, and tensions between competition and cooperation among VOs. The article argues that if VOs are to retain the distinctive qualities for which politicians have lauded them, procurement and monitoring procedures must be carefully attuned to the social relations and practices of the voluntary sector.

AbstractWe analyse a simple 'tariffs cum foreign competition' policy targeted at enhancing the competitive position of a domestic, developing country firm that competes with its developed country counterpart on the domestic market and that carries out an innovative (or imitative) effort. We evaluate this policy with respect to social welfare, type of oligopoly conduct, information requirement, time consistency and possibility of manipulative behaviour and conclude that the most robust policy setup is one in which the domestic government is unable to pre‐commit to the level of its policy. We also study how the unit cost heterogeneity of the domestic firm affects trade protection.

Analysis of regulatory strategy and reforms in the telecommunications and finance sectors of Great Britain and Japan. Study of national strategies among authorities competing in regulatory subsidy, regulatory laxity, favoring domestic competition, or maximizing consumer protection.

This study shows how interest group–party relations, parties' cross-cutting policy preferences, and competition with challenger parties shape the structure of issue competition on climate policy. It uses the 'most similar' cases of the UK and Ireland to show how differences in party systems influence the structure of issue competition. The study takes up the challenge of integrating salience and position in the conceptualisation of climate policy preferences. Empirically, it provides new evidence on factors influencing climate policy preferences and the party politics of climate change, focusing on interest groups, party ideology, and challenger parties. Further, it identifies similarities between the general literature on interest group influence on party preferences and the literature on interest groups in climate politics, and seeks to make connections between them.

The European Commission has recently begun to reflect on whether competition law is a barrier to the formation of collective labour agreements between industry and atypical workers. The policy focus to date has been on whether and how to extend the antitrust labour exemptions to certain classes of atypical worker. This paper shows how efforts in this direction in the Netherlands and Ireland have revealed that this is a tricky path to pursue. As a result, the paper proposes four additional approaches: three of these indicate that even if atypical workers are treated as undertakings and collective bargains between them and employers fall to be assessed under competition law, many agreements will unlikely have anticompetitive effects and for those that may do so, exemptions are possible. A fifth approach is that active antitrust enforcement against employers imposing unfair terms on atypical workers may function to solve some of the concerns that collective bargaining seeks to address.

This paper investigates imitative competition in a two‐stage game of strategic product choice in a vertically differentiated market. The innovator chooses its product strategy anticipating the subsequent entry of a rival firm. The rival firm chooses the degree to which it is profitable to differentiate its product from the innovator. It has the second mover advantage that its costs are lower the more closely it copies the innovator's product. But against this advantage is the drawback that the more similar the two products are, the more intense is the price competition between the two firms. The trade‐off between imitation and differentiation is affected by the degree of consumer heterogeneity in the market. Consumers differ by income. The relationship between the incentive to imitate and the distribution of income is important, particularly in evaluating the welfare effects of two different policy responses, patent policy and cooperative alliances.

Since 2014, Russian involvement in Africa has grown significantly. African leaders have been receptive to these overtures as a result of increasing concerns about growing Chinese dominance, retrenchment of the United States (US) and their interest in diversifying trading and security partners. Russia cultivates these relationships by relying on the legacy of the Soviet Union's support for anti-colonial and liberation movements, and focuses on strengthening diplomatic, military and economic collaborations. This analysis shows that:• Overall, Russia's strategy in Africa appears to involve a mix of arms sales, political support to authoritarian leaders and security collaborations – in exchange for mining rights, business opportunities and diplomatic support for Russia's foreign policy preferences. The offers of military assistance and political support, especially for authoritarian leaders, have opened doors to Russian firms and strengthened diplomatic relationships. The support of African allies has been especially important to Russia at the United Nations (UN), where African countries account for a quarter of all votes in the General Assembly.• Russian trade and investment in Africa has grown significantly, particularly in north Africa. Yet, Russia remains a minor economic player on the continent in comparison to China, India or the US. Russia's support for smaller states, especially those that have been internationally shunned, gives Moscow significant influence in those countries.• As of autumn 2019, Russia had concluded military cooperation agreements with 21 African countries and is negotiating the establishment of military bases in a number of states. It is also providing counter-terrorism training. Russia is currently the largest supplier of arms to the continent.• Russia is increasing efforts to influence elections. Its strategy focuses on shoring up authoritarian strongmen in unstable yet resource-rich states thus bolstering these regimes' ability to persist. These priorities are in stark contrast to popular opinion on the continent, which favours democracy.• Russia remains a relatively minor economic and political player on the continent, and European Union (EU) and US concerns that Russian expansion in Africa draws the continent into a broader geopolitical struggle between great powers are overstated.• Germany and the EU should counter Russian assistance to authoritarian leaders by bolstering support for good governance and civil society strengthening initiatives.