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Over the last 30 years, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 has emerged as one of the most influential instruments of modern international law. The Convention, which was adopted at the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980 and has meanwhile been ratified by more than 80 States.2 Yet, as it does not operate retroactively,3 the scope of application is growing only slowly and its practical importance stems, rather, from the fact that the Convention is widely considered a restatement of customary international law. As early as 1971 the International Court of Justice referred to the articles governing termination for breach of treaty as a codification of the existing law on the subject.4 Since then both international tribunals and national courts have more and more habitually relied on the material provisions of the Convention to ascertain traditional rules of the law of treaties.5

AbstractIntroductionAs adolescents and young people living with HIV (AYLH) age, they face a "transition cascade," a series of steps associated with transitions in their care as they become responsible for their own healthcare. In high‐income countries, this usually includes transfer from predominantly paediatric/adolescent to adult clinics. In sub‐Saharan Africa, paediatric HIV care is mostly provided in decentralized, non‐specialist primary care clinics, where "transition" may not necessarily include transfer of care but entails becoming more autonomous for one's HIV care. Using different age thresholds as proxies for when "transition" to autonomy might occur, we evaluated pre‐ and post‐transition outcomes among AYLH.MethodsWe included AYLH aged <16 years at enrolment, receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) within International epidemiology Databases to Evaluate AIDS Southern Africa (IeDEA‐SA) sites (2004 to 2017) with no history of transferring care. Using the ages of 16, 18, 20 and 22 years as proxies for "transition to autonomy," we compared the outcomes: no gap in care (≥2 clinic visits) and viral suppression (HIV‐RNA <400 copies/mL) in the 12 months before and after each age threshold. Using log‐binomial regression, we examined factors associated with no gap in care (retention) in the 12 months post‐transition.ResultsA total of 5516 AYLH from 16 sites were included at "transition" age 16 (transition‐16y), 3864 at 18 (transition‐18y), 1463 at 20 (transition‐20y) and 440 at 22 years (transition‐22y). At transition‐18y, in the 12 months pre‐ and post‐transition, 83% versus 74% of AYLH had no gap in care (difference 9.3 (95% confidence interval (CI) 7.8 to 10.9)); while 65% versus 62% were virally suppressed (difference 2.7 (−1.0 to 6.5%)). The strongest predictor of being retained post‐transition was having no gap in the preceding year, across all transition age thresholds (transition‐16y: adjusted risk ratio (aRR) 1.72; 95% CI (1.60 to 1.86); transition‐18y: aRR 1.76 (1.61 to 1.92); transition‐20y: aRR 1.75 (1.53 to 2.01); transition‐22y: aRR 1.47; (1.21 to 1.78)).ConclusionsAYLH with gaps in care need targeted support to prevent non‐retention as they take on greater responsibility for their healthcare. Interventions to increase virologic suppression rates are necessary for all AYLH ageing to adulthood.

Faced with a fundamental shift in America's China policy, Beijing should have a clear-eyed analysis of its choices and strategies. It is no longer feasible for China to hide its capabilities and bide its time. Instead, competition must be met with competition. Thus, China should rethink how to improve its competitive strength vis-à-vis the United States. Strength stems from not only economic and military power, but also international legitimacy. To bolster its international legitimacy, China should improve relations with its neighbors, enable the international community to have a larger share of its prosperity, articulate broadly appealing political values, and make its national identity more inclusive. These four steps are not confrontational, but they will make China a more formidable competitor vis-à-vis the United States.

Last December, Mohammed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), received the Nobel Peace Prize along with his organization. & yet, this diplomat who has fought for years against nuclear proliferation is hardly jumping for joy. The situation is critical, he explains in this exclusive interview. & this for several reasons: the international community will probably not stop Iran getting nuclear arms; the export control system can be thwarted using new technologies which significantly speed up proliferation; more & more states want to go nuclear; & the risk of terrorists getting hold of nuclear weapons continues to rise. Against this backdrop, it is crucial that the international community understand the danger. Alas, it seems not many are listening to Mohammed ElBaradei's warnings. Adapted from the source document.

In 2009 Taiwan became an observer to the World Health Assembly (WHA), the first time it had officially participated in a United Nations (UN)-affiliated body since 1971. Encouraged by this success, Taiwan has sought to replicate the WHA model for other UN bodies such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Unfortunately, this breakthrough has not yet paved the way for Taiwan's participation in more UN-affiliated bodies. This paper analyzes (1) the WHA model and the concept of meaningful participation; (2) the four parameters (title, status, where, and how) Taiwan needs to consider in order to apply the WHA model to the specialized agencies of the UN; and (3) Taiwan's options for the future. This paper argues that to maximize Taiwan's chances of UN participation, the approach will not only have to lake Mainland China's concerns into consideration, but also needs to be within the boundaries of the existing statutes and conventions without the need for a special exception to be made in Taiwan's favor. Hence, it is suggested that Taiwan should seek to join the ICAO, IMF WBG, WHO, and WMO with official governmental representation while simultaneously encouraging its civil society organizations (CSOs) to participate as non-governmental organization (NGO) observers in the FAO, ILO, IFAD, IMO, ITU, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WIPO, and UNWTO. It is hoped that this two-pronged approach will maximize and accelerate Taiwan s participation in the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Adapted from the source document.