Suchergebnisse

India–US relationship oscillated unevenly due to the politics of the Cold War. Post-Cold War, both countries have taken gradual, positive steps towards each other. While President Bill Clinton established a tilt towards India during his second term, George Bush ushered a transformational shift in the relationship that led to the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and eventually to the path-breaking Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Since then relations have been steadily improving with the Obama presidency moving in the same direction. The joint incentives for New Delhi and Washington have ranged from counterterrorism, defence cooperation, cyber security, trade and economics, agriculture, education and science and technology cooperation. Apart from the interest of mutual gains, the relationship was further influenced by the enormous geopolitical changes unfolding in the region. The mutual concern over the 'peaceful rise' of China followed by its aggressive foreign policy and active military presence especially in the India Ocean region has created fresh opportunities to both. However, irrespective of the strategic potential of the relationship and the strong political will at both ends, Indo -US ties have their own share of irritants in several spheres. Recognizing the complex narrative of converging and diverging interests functioning under the ambit of strategic partnership, this article examines the constraints and imperatives, and the main determinants that drive the relationship in the post-9/11 era. Various triggers and catalysts in US' internal policy process apart from the geopolitical factors that led to the growing engagement with India are examined.

The regional cooperation process in South Asia had been triggered by failure of North–South Negotiations of the 1960s and 1970s; emergence of South–South Dialogues among the developing countries in the 1980s; urge to harnessing huge potentials of 'region-ness' and smaller countries' bid to create regional platform to deflect and minimize their perceptions about Indian 'hegemonic' practices. Since the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was launched in 1985, 18 summit meetings have taken place and its declarations are perfect official documents. However, in achievement front, there is little to demonstrate. Nothing much has percolated down to societies and communities. Dismal commitments, protracted India–Pakistan imbroglios, principle of 'unanimity' and dearth of coordination among national and sectoral focal points have stunted its growth. Besides fear of Indian domination, severe institutional weaknesses, poor alignment of the SAARC issues with national priorities, absence of monitoring and evaluation and deficiency in acceptable and visionary regional leadership have added to its laggardness. Activities are just initiated as summit rituals. Model and existing mechanisms that have been used to develop SAARC itself have very strong limitations. Unless the regional partners rethink about the innovative model and pragmatic modalities, the SAARC would remain moribund and decrepit. In such an atmosphere, the extra-regional forces will inevitably emerge as another pole of attraction.

This article seeks to explore the core interests of India at the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It argues that India joined this organization as a part of its broad strategy to engage with all the major powers. It foresaw significant geopolitical and economic dividends from its association with other emerging states in a multilateral forum. New Delhi actively participated in the BRICS summits and has contributed significantly to its agenda setting and institutionalization. The article also shows how the BRICS has departed from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and India's traditional policy towards the Global South. By entering into a privileged club, India seeks to upgrade its rank and status. Finally, the article discusses the way preponderance of China in this organization and its border conflicts with India have impacted the potential of the BRICS.

The long-standing traditional friendship between Vietnam and India was founded in the early decades of the twentieth century by Ho Chi Minh and Jawaharlal Nehru. Although diplomatic relations were established in 1972, the relationship has been termed now as 'comprehensive strategic partnership'. For India, Vietnam is an important pillar of its Look East Policy and Vietnam considers India a strategic partner in its foreign policy with big powers. The article outlines some of recommendations which can promote this partnership.

Energy transition is a strategic necessity for countries that are dependent on fossil fuel sources. Several factors demand this shift. First, the over-dependence on fossil fuels is one of the major reasons for the increasing energy-related emissions. Second, for the countries that are relying on overseas supply of fossil fuels, increasing import bill is a major economic burden. Third, the conventional hydrocarbon fuels, especially oil and gas resources, have been facing the various geopolitical vulnerabilities. The challenges that affect its production, transportation and supply lead to price volatility in the market, which directly affect the import-dependent economies. Transitioning to a mix of cleaner sources is critically important not only to reduce overseas dependency but also to curb energy-related emissions and vulnerability to price fluctuations. While geopolitical, economic and security reasons often termed as the major factors that catalyse the energy transition, concerns about climate change remain to be the cardinal element that drive the process in today's world. This article examines the role of India's climate change agenda as it takes the central stage in the energy transition process.