Advocates of market-based education reform hypothesize that competition will cause traditional public schools to increase outreach efforts as they seek to market themselves. Advocates hope such efforts will result in more information on school activities & performance & thereby enhance accountability. We examine the effect of charter school competition on outreach efforts by a sample of 98 AZ district schools, finding that charter competition is associated with a short-term increase in outreach. Organizational structure influenced school response, with more decentralized district schools responding more readily to charter competition. Competition modestly increased information regarding schooling in the short run, although long-term implications are less clear. 3 Tables, 66 References. Adapted from the source document.
Abstract Telecommunications policy has come a long way from regulation of vertically integrated monopolies to the current state of competition. As competition becomes self-sustainable, will telecommunications policy in the form of industry-specific regulation go away or, if not, what form will it take? The economics literature suggests that the regulatory efficiency frontier is shifted by new technological and market developments, such as convergence of networks, fixed-mobile substitution (and integration) and next generation access networks. The frontier is also affected by the existing capital stock and other physical and institutional characteristics of a country. The insights from a review of the theoretical and empirical literature are applied to five policy areas. They are: (1) termination monopoly; (2) local bottleneck access; (3) net neutrality; (4) spectrum management; and (5) universal service. While in some of them, deregulation and a move to competition policy will soon be the efficient state of the art, regulation will remain efficient in others for some time. Deregulation will likely become efficient for one-way access and universal service, with the exception of some universal service policies in remote areas and for the poor. Termination will move to bill and keep with a duty to interconnect. In addition, some (more symmetric) regulation should persist for net neutrality in the form of transparency requirements, (quasi-) common carrier obligations and minimum quality standards. Also, spectrum management, while moving towards full-blown ownership rights, will continue to see regulators providing zoning and other services, particularly for unlicensed spectrum. All these assessments are premised on the success of making additional spectrum as the key resource available. They are also premised on the absence of a killer technology like P2P FTTH that potentially dominates all other technologies. What determines the endgame in telecommunications regulation? Although technical and market developments will dominantly shape the regulatory efficiency frontier, institutional and political economy factors have an additional and mostly slowing effect on policy changes.
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (generally referred to as the Medicare Modernization Act, or MMA) substantially expanded the federal Medicare program by creating the prescription drug benefit known as Part D. In fiscal year 2013, Medicare Part D covered 39 million people. The federal government spent 59 billion net of premiums on Part D in that year; after accounting for certain payments from states under the program, the net federal cost was 50 billion, which represented 10 percent of net federal spending for Medicare. This book discusses the cost tr
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Governments around the world have turned to higher education to sustain economic development and social welfare. This article uses the concept of the regulatory welfare state (RWS) to examine how state authorities in the United States and Germany have sought to spur structural changes in the education sector. I argue that policy-makers in both countries have pursued the goal of organizing competition among universities by combining fiscal and regulatory policies that strengthen universities' self-reliance, rivalry, and decentralized decision-making. The analysis shows that understanding cross-national patterns of institutional transformation requires putting countries' evolving regimes of state-university relations into historical perspective, and that states' shifting governance strategies are important drivers of higher education's contemporary reimagination. It also clarifies how regulatory approaches to welfare provision have fostered the re-composition of public infrastructures, raising pressing questions about the quality and scope of the welfare that regulatory approaches promote.
Competing in the international arena for skilled workers is crucial for Canada to foster its innovation and economic prosperity. Attracting and retaining skilled workers are among the most important challenges facing Canadian policy makers. The key objective of the paper is to assess how Canada is faring in this matter in comparison to key OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. The paper examines international mobility in terms of the stock and flow of high-skilled workers, assesses whether Canada attracts a "fair share" of internationally mobile skilled workers, and discusses immigration policies that influence a country's relative performance in attracting these workers from abroad.
There are many biases concerning the application of competition law in health care. Quality concerns can however be integrated into competition law analysis. The aim of this paper is to identify the links between the application of competition law in the European Union and the right to quality health care and to point out the problems that arise when integrating quality concerns in competition law analysis. Guidelines must be issued and competition authorities must work together with institutions that have expertise in the field of health care quality measurement in order to integrate these dimensions in competition practice.
Analyzes official record of three congressional hearings on air bags and compares it with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) rules, to examine the relation between how a social problem is defined and how policy is formulated; 1996-97; US.
It is commonplace to see political parties as fundamentally constrained by public opinion. By contrast, this paper argues that party competition amplifies mass ideological polarization over public policy. Specifically, the investigation concerns the relationship between mass-level ideology and ethnic exclusionism (the call for harsh immigration policies). As party competition intensifies, this relationship strengthens. The party competition thesis is tested by performing a comparative study of Denmark and Sweden. Unlike their Danish counterparts, Swedish political parties have, most of the time, refused to take opposed stands on immigration policy. In effect, the empirical data show that the individual-level association between self-reported ideology and ethnic exclusionism is considerably stronger in Denmark than in Sweden. To investigate the party competition effect in depth, both longitudinal analyses and a cross-sectional analysis are performed. Data cover the period 1990-2008.
This article assesses party effects on the performance of public services. A policy-seeking model, hypothesizing that left and right party control affects performance, and an instrumental model, where all parties strive to raise performance, are presented. The framework also suggests a mixed model in which party effects are contingent on party competition, with parties raising performance as increasing party competition places their control of government at increasing risk. These models are tested against panel data on English local governments' party control and public service performance. The results question the traditional account of left and right parties, showing a positive relationship between right-wing party control and performance that is contingent on a sufficiently high level of party competition. The findings suggest left–right models should be reframed for the contemporary context.
In this paper, we comment on the debate about guidelines for Art. 102 TFEU in the face of the challenges brought by digital ecosystems and abuse of dominance in related markets. We take the perspective of dynamic competition economics and derive four recommendations for the future enforcement of abuse control and related merger control: (i) we advocate to abandon the as-efficient-competitor standard embraced in the late 2000s, (ii) we emphasize the relevance on focusing on exploitative abuses as well as on exclusionary ones, (iii) we suggest to implement a concept of systemic market power as a guideline to enforcement, and (iv) we argue that the same enhanced market power standard should also be applied in the corresponding merger control. While going beyond pure guideline recommendations and focusing on a dynamic-economic view, we are convinced that these steps are necessary to move towards a more effective competition policy towards abuse of digital dominance.
