Suchergebnisse

Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax incidence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative-statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common determinants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional margin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, impeding the identification of incidence from the four estimated reduced-form effects. Assigning consensual values to the unidentified parameters, we find that the incidence share born by firm-owners is closer to 25% than 40%.

Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax incidence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative-statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common determinants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional margin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, impeding the identification of incidence from the four estimated reduced-form effects. Assigning consensual values to the unidentified parameters, we find that the incidence share born by firm-owners is closer to 25% than 40%.

Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax incidence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative-statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common determinants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional margin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, impeding the identification of incidence from the four estimated reduced-form effects. Assigning consensual values to the unidentified parameters, we find that the incidence share born by firm-owners is closer to 25% than 40%.

Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax incidence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative-statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common determinants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional margin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, impeding the identification of incidence from the four estimated reduced-form effects. Assigning consensual values to the unidentified parameters, we find that the incidence share born by firm-owners is closer to 25% than 40%.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched its first theme bond (water) for sustainable development in 2010, in response to a growing demand among its investor base to highlight key initiatives. Since launching the water bond, ADB has expanded its theme bond offerings to include health, gender, and, most recently in 2021, education bonds.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched its first theme bond (water) for sustainable development in 2010, in response to a growing demand among its investor base to highlight key initiatives. Since launching the water bond, ADB has expanded its theme bond offerings to include health, gender, and, most recently in 2021, education bonds.

The ASEAN+3 Bond Market Guide series provides member-specific information on the investment climate, rules, laws, opportunities, and characteristics of local bond markets in Asia and the Pacific. It aims to help bond market issues, investors, and financial intermediaries understand the local context and encourage greater participation in the region's rapidly developing bond markets. This edition focuses on updates in the bond market in Indonesia since the publication of the ASEAN+3 Bond Market Guide for Indonesia in 2017.

The ASEAN+3 Bond Market Guide series provides member-specific information on the investment climate, rules, laws, opportunities, and characteristics of local bond markets in Asia and the Pacific. It aims to help bond market issues, investors, and financial intermediaries understand the local context and encourage greater participation in the region's rapidly developing bond markets. This edition focuses on updates in the bond market in Thailand since the publication of the ASEAN+3 Bond Market Guide for Thailand in 2016.

Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax incidence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative-statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common determinants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional margin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, impeding the identification of incidence from reduced-form estimates. Assigning consensual values to the unidentified parameters, we find that the incidence share born by firm-owners is closer to 25% than the 40% initially reported. The null associated with the "conventional view" that the share on workers is 1 and that on firm owners is 0 is still rejected.

This paper evaluates the effect of decentralization on innovation at the provincial level in Italy. We exploit quasi-natural experiments associated with three waves of reforms occurred in 1992, 2001 and 2004, to establish 8, 4, and 3 new provinces, respectively. Using a difference-indifference estimation approach, we find evidence of a significant detrimental effect of (further) decentralization on innovation for Northern and Central Italian provinces. We suggest a potential mechanism that may explain the reduction in innovation associated with the aforementioned reforms. We argue that this finding can be rationalized with the costs imposed by the \mafia transplantation" phenomenon, as we find that the new provinces that were more exposed to \mafiosi in confino" reduced their innovation output more extensively. We perform a number of robustness checks that corroborate our main findings.

This paper evaluates the effect of decentralization on innovation at the provincial level in Italy. We exploit quasi-natural experiments associated with three waves of reforms occurred in 1992, 2001 and 2004, to establish 8, 4, and 3 new provinces, respectively. Using a difference-indifference estimation approach, we find evidence of a significant detrimental effect of (further) decentralization on innovation for Northern and Central Italian provinces. We suggest a potential mechanism that may explain the reduction in innovation associated with the aforementioned reforms. We argue that this finding can be rationalized with the costs imposed by the \mafia transplantation" phenomenon, as we find that the new provinces that were more exposed to \mafiosi in confino" reduced their innovation output more extensively. We perform a number of robustness checks that corroborate our main findings.

This paper evaluates the effect of decentralization on innovation at the provincial level in Italy. We exploit quasi-natural experiments associated with three waves of reforms occurred in 1992, 2001 and 2004, to establish 8, 4, and 3 new provinces, respectively. Using a difference-indifference estimation approach, we find evidence of a significant detrimental effect of (further) decentralization on innovation for Northern and Central Italian provinces. We suggest a potential mechanism that may explain the reduction in innovation associated with the aforementioned reforms. We argue that this finding can be rationalized with the costs imposed by the \mafia transplantation" phenomenon, as we find that the new provinces that were more exposed to \mafiosi in confino" reduced their innovation output more extensively. We perform a number of robustness checks that corroborate our main findings.