Suchergebnisse

Paper is devoted to the analysis of impact of foreign trade and antitrust policies on development of competition and the position of domestic buyers of Russian metal products. It presents a stylized description of the development of the Russian metallurgy over 25-year period, considering the peculiarities of industry, which influence the problems of competition policy; paper describes the application of competition and foreign trade policies in the industry, taking into account relationships with industry structure. It illustrates the problem of trade-off between an increased competitiveness in world market and consumers protection within the country in relation to industries with the dominance of large exporters. The analysis revealed contradictions in pursued policy: approval of mergers that might restrict competition in the markets of metal products in Russia, and relatively high level of import protection are not consistent with regular investigations of violation of antitrust legislation by Russian metal producers, based on harm imposed to domestic consumers.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

The paper proposes to use regulatory competition theory in order to better understand the evolution of the EU member States' asylum legislation. It argues that regulatory competition theory can explain the rapid trend of legislative amendments from the mid-80's onwards, the progressive yet incomplete convergence of the EU member States' legislation, and the spiral of restrictions of legal norms originally enacted to protect asylum seekers. Competition among legal norms also explains EU Member States' reticence to collaborate and share the burden. The first argument of the paper is that a phenomenon of competition developed because Member States were convinced that generous asylum policies would be a pull factor for asylum seekers. They feared that regulatory arbitrage (i.e. asylum shopping) would lead asylum seekers to select their destination State on the basis of the level of protection offered. States have entered into a process of de-regulation and, because of their interdependence, national measures have become instruments of a general race to externalise. The result has turned out to be negative and corresponds to a « race-to-the-bottom ». This negative result can be observed at two levels : competition was detrimental to both asylum seekers and States; the rules enacted were suboptimal.The paper then explains why the first cooperation instruments introduced at the end of the 80's and onwards have failed to meet their objective. The effects of cooperation schemes like the Dublin Convention or burden sharing projects are negligible and there was no shift from costly and unilateral aylum policies towards fairer and more efficient collective action. It is an example of cooperation in the shadow of competition. Finally the paper evaluates the communautarisation of the competence to act in the field of asylum. It is unlikely to permit the emergence of a federal and centralised regulation able to change the nature of the game. In conclusion, the paper seeks to assess if a good combination of cooperation and competition is likely to produce « good » asylum policy in Europe andinvestigates the "co-opetition" model promoted by Esty and Gerardin.

Despite the observed frequency of firm lobbying, scholars attempting to explain this behavior have had little luck. Pushing away from theories that center on firm characteristics, this paper argues that firm lobbying can be best explained with a sociological model of competitive action. In particular, firms that perceive other firms to have influence on policy are more likely to lobby policy-makers. Since firms are both competitors in a free market and socially embedded actors, their belief in other firms' influence on policy pushes them to engage in similar behavior in order to increase profit and survive. I test this argument with a combination of quantitative analysis of survey responses from 7247 firms in 40 countries from the World Bank Enterprise Survey and seven qualitative interviews with key firms in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The results provide evidence for the hypothesis. This finding implies that scholars should not only take into account firm characteristics, but also explore the possible effects of how a firm's decision to lobby or not is influenced by its environment.

This paper explores the influence of wage and price staggering on monetary persistence. First, our analysis indicates that the degree of monetary persistence generated by wage vis-à-vis price staggering depends on the relative competitiveness of the labor and product markets. We show that the conventional wisdom that wage staggering can generate more persistence than price staggering does not necessarily hold. Second, this paper discusses weaknesses of the contract multiplier, which is generally used to compare persistence, and proposes the measure quantitative persistence. Third, we show that, for plausible parameter values, wage and price staggering are highly complementary in generating monetary persistence. Thus beyond understanding how they work in isolation, it is important to explore their interactions.

Abstract
This paper presents an agent-based model for the sharing economy, in the short-term accommodations market, where peers participating as suppliers and customers follow simple decision rules about sharing market participation, according to their heterogeneous characteristics. Simulations results show that, in the competition between the sharing economy and the traditional industry, low substitutability occurs between goods if consumers are differentiated in preferences. The main determinant for market performance in both sectors is the demand level, with minor influence of price setting and competition within and between markets.

Part I. Setting the stage -- Chapter 1. Introduction and motivation / Eelke de Jong -- Chapter 2. National culture in the three types of market economies / Eelke de Jong and Annemiek Schilpzand -- Part II. Economic ideas -- Chapter 3. The morality of the market process and the normative implications of catallactic competition / Rosolino A. Candela -- Chapter 4. Markets, morality, and human flourishing in the ordoliberal tradition / Roland Fritz and Nils Goldschmidt -- Chapter 5. The market in the hierarchical market tradition: the case of post-war French economic thought / Ivan Boldyrev -- Part III. Policy -- Chapter 6. Three varieties of labour markets: three varieties of human flourishing? / Lei Delsen -- Chapter 7. Do national financial systems still reflect national values? The case of the United States, Germany, and France / Eelke de Jong -- Chapter 8. Competition policy within the free, hierarchical and coordinated market tradition / Iwan Bos -- Chapter 9. Central bank independence and monetary policy in the US, Germany and France: have they converged? / Eelke de Jong -- Part IV. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 10. Conclusions and discussion / Eelke de Jong