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This paper explores the interface between central banks and cryptocurrencies. Focusing on the European Central Bank (ECB), it identifies the potential threats that the rise of cryptocurrencies would pose to the basic and ancillary tasks of the ECB, in particular, its monetary policy operations and the exercise of its supervisory functions over credit institutions and payment systems. The paper finds that cryptocurrencies can potentially have both direct – through their potential impact on the price stability and monetary policy, and central banks' monopoly over issuing base money – and indirect effects on central banks, mainly through the institutions and systems that fall under the ECB's scope of competence. To address the challenges posed by cryptocurrencies, the ECB may take both legal (including supervisory and oversight) measures and non-legal (or technical) measures. With respect to technical measures, the ECB - to the extent falling within the scope of its competence - may focus on improving the efficiency of existing payment systems and addressing the existing frictions in market infrastructures to indirectly affect the cryptocurrency markets. Alternatively, it can venture into issuing Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). Regarding legal measures, central banks could envisage regulating cryptocurrencies either directly or indirectly. However, as the most significant potential impact of cryptocurrencies on central banks is likely to be indirect through the impact of cryptocurrencies on the banking and payment systems, and given the limitations on the ECB's mandate and its regulatory and supervisory tools, it is apposite for the ECB to consider using indirect strategies and tools to influence cryptocurrency markets. This indirect approach can be implemented through the ECB's existing supervisory and oversight powers over the banking and payment systems. This paper specifies the direct and indirect measures and assesses their merits in addressing the concerns about cryptocurrencies.

The aim of this thesis, composed of four academic papers, is to apply empirical and theoreticalanalyses to study the involvement of central banks in financial stability-confidence in the financial system's ability to facilitate allocation of economic resources, manage risks, and withstand shocks -and to discuss their recent macroprudential responsibilities. The global financial crisis (GFC) shitied the perspective of financial regulation - rules that financial institutions have to comply with in order to ensure effective risk management and to with stand financial shocks - and supervision - ensuring that financial institutions follow these rules - from a microprudential perspective based on the resilience of individual institutions to amacroprudential (henceforth · "MaP") perspective. The MaP perspective takes into account the interactions of financial institutions, the externalities related to their decisions, and also the effects of the financial cycle on central bank policy and financial stability. This thesis analyses the policy mix of monctary and macroprudential policies which both have an impact on price stability and financial conditions and which operate through common or overlapping channels. A particular focus is given to the role of MaP policy in heterogeneous monetary union such as the Eurozone- where countries are experience in different macroeconomic conditions - in terms of financial and macroeconomic stabilisation. Since a single interest rate is unlikely to fit circumstances in all countries, MaP policy could compensate the Jack of autonomous monetary policy in each country as both policies share many transmission channels. This enhances the optimality's degree of the currency area. ; L'objectif de cette thèse, composée de quatre articles empiriques et théoriques, est d'étudier l'implication des banques centrales dans la stabilité financière - définie comme un état stable et élevé de confiance dans la capacité du système financier à faciliter l'allocation des ressources économiques, gérer les risques, et à résister aux chocs - et de discuter de leurs nouvelles responsabilités macroprudentielles. La crise financière mondiale a fait évoluer la régulation et la supervision financières d'une perspective microprudentielle basée sur la résilience des institutions prises individuellement à une perspective macroprudentielle qui prend en compte les interactions entre les institutions financières, les externalités liées à leurs décisions, et aussi les effets du cycle financier sur le cycle économique et sur la stabilité financière. Cette thèse analyse le policy-mix des politiques monétaire - ciblant le cycle économique –et macroprudentielle -ciblant le cycle financier -ayant toutes les deux un impact sur la stabilité des prix et les conditions financières. En effet, ces politiques fonctionnent grâce à des canaux de transmission dont certains sont communs. Une attention particulière est accordée, au-delà la politique macroprudentielle dans union monétaire hétérogène comme la zone euro - où les pays connaissent des conditions macroéconomiques différenciées - en termes de stabilisation financière et macroéconomique. Partant du constat qu'un taux d'intérêt unique est adapté à la moyenne de la zone mais pas aux besoins de chacun des pays, la politique macroprudentielle pourrait compenser l'absence de politique monétaire autonome dans chaque pays. Cela améliorerait le degré d'optimalité de la zone monétaire.

In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances). [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

TWO RECENT STUDIES USE HISTORY AND THEORY TO EXAMINE THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE PROVISION OF MONEY. SUCH PROPOSALS WOULD END THE CENTRAL BANK MONOPOLY OVER NOTE ISSUE AND REPLACE IT WITH NOTE ISSUES BY COMPETING BANKS. SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS WOULD BE DISPENSED WITH. ACCORDINGLY, THE PROPOSALS WOULD FREE BANKS FROM ALL REGULATIONS ON ENTRY, DISCLOSURE, GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS, AND THE PRODUCTS THEY MAY OFFER TO CUSTOMERS. MONETARY AND BANKING ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE LEFT TO THE MARKET. UNFORTUNATELY, THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SPEAK AS LOUDLY IN FAVOR OF FREE BANKING AS ITS PROPONENTS CLAIM.