Suchergebnisse

"This book is the first systematic, multi-country exploration of far-right newspeak. The contributors analyze the ways in which contemporary far-right politicians, intellectuals, and pundits use and abuse traditional liberal concepts and ideas to justify positions that threaten democratic institutions and liberal principles. They explore cases of both far-right and right-wing thought in eastern and western Europe, the United States, and Canada. Subjects include well-known figures, such as Marine Le Pen, Tucker Carlson, Peter Thiel, Nick Griffin, Thierry Baudet, Jordan Peterson, Russell Brand, and Viktor Orbán, and lesser-known names, such as the Czech politician Tomio Okamura and the internet personality "Raw Egg Nationalist". The contributors examine these figures' claims about hot-button issues, including immigration, Islam, race, Covid-19 policies, feminism, monetary policy, and free speech. The book demonstrates that mainstream politicians and intellectuals are at risk of losing control over the definitions of the very concepts, including equal rights, racial and ethnic diversity, and political tolerance, that undergird their vision of liberal democracy. It will be of interest to scholars, journalists, policy makers, political scientists, historians, political theorists, sociologists, and general audiences concerned about the sophisticated efforts of far-right and right-wing politicians and pundits to undermine the foundations of liberal democracy"--

"This conceptually synthetic and empirically rich book demonstrates the vulnerability of democratic settings to authoritarianism and populism. Six scholars from various professional fields explore here the metamorphosis of a political party into a centralized authoritarian system. Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party needed less than ten years to accomplish this transformation in Hungary. In 2010, after winning a majority that could make changes in the constitution - two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, they evolved and stabilized the system, which produced again the two-thirds majority in 2014 and 2018. The authors reveal how a democratic setting can be used as a device for political capture. They show how a political entity managed to penetrate almost all sub-fields of the economy to arrive at institutionalized corruption, and how the centralized power structure reproduces itself. With the help of a powerful empirical apparatus-among others analyses of more than 220,000 public tenders, redistributions of state subsidies, and the interconnectedness of those privileged with the political elite - the authors detail the functioning of a crony system and the network aspects of political connections in the rapid enrichment of politically-linked businesses. Their studies demonstrate the role of political capture in this redistribution and how this capture leads to a new social stratification"--

Introduction : the study of populism / Henrike Jensen, Bart van Klink and Ingeborg van der Geest -- The rhetorical stance of populism / David Zarefsky and Dima Mohammed -- On populism as a 'spectre' and an unmanageable concept / Massimo La Torre -- Identifying populist ideology in political discourse : a two-step corpus analysis / Henk Pander Maat -- The populist construction of 'one nation' in politics : the case of Turkey / Yeliz Demir -- The different faces of populism : discursive shifts under Obama and Trump / Carina van de Wetering -- Suggesting outsider status by behaving improperly : the linguistic realization of a populist rhetorical strategy in the Dutch parliament / Ton van Haaften and Maarten van Leeuwen -- Populism and parliamentary argumentation games / Bertjan Wolthius -- Low style the high way : rhetorical mainstreaming of populism / Lisa S. Villadsen -- The immediacy of populism and the unrest of democracy : a phenomenological inquiry into the public sphere / Luigi Corrias -- The promise and peril of designing a radical democratic populism / Laura M. Henderson -- The policy dimension of populism : a comparative approach of party system analysis / Oliver W. Lembcke -- Values in populism and argumentative counter-strategies : the case of Viktor Orbán / Marija Sniečkuté -- From fact-checking to rhetoric-checking : extending methods for evaluating populist discourse / H. José Plug and Jean H.M. Wagemans -- How to confront the populist challenge? / Bart van Klink and Ingeborg van der Geest.

Abstract
On 28 October 2018 the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro won the presidential elections in Brazil with 55% of the vote. This result has been viewed by many as yet another instance of the global rise of authoritarian populist leaders, grouping Bolsonaro alongside the likes of Hungary's Viktor Orbán, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, India's Narendra Modi, or Donald Trump in the USA – indeed, Bolsonaro has been dubbed the "Trump of the Tropics." The focus on Bolsonaro himself reflects the strong emphasis on executives in a rapidly expanding literature suggesting the emergence of a new form of would-be autocrat who is democratically elected but who hollows out democratic rule over time. However, this Article argues that, far beyond Bolsonaro, the Brazilian experience is an important case-study as it prompts reflection on three fundamental propositions. First, any analysis of liberal democracy as the perceived object of attack must be highly cognizant of the democratic "starting point" and history of a given state. Second, an excessive focus on executive-led assaults on democratic rule can impede fuller analysis of a broader suite of actors and factors relevant to the (declining) health of the democratic system. Third, authoritarianism is a more appropriate analytical lens than populism for identifying potential democratic threats, especially in the Brazilian context.

Populism has become the issue of comparative political science today. The rise and continuing success of populist parties is by now evident across Europe, despite persistent cross-national variations. Populist parties' electoral success and their participation in government have raised questions about their impact: not just on established party systems, but also on the systemic core of European democracies. In theory, this impact can be both beneficial for, as well as a challenge to democracy in general, and the tenets of liberal constitutional democracy in particular. The presence of populist parties has, in several cases, increased electoral turnout and public participation, which is generally seen as a positive effect when measuring the quality of democracy. However, populist parties' rise also points to negative effects. In addition to profoundly reshaping European party systems, they advocate what the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán calls "illiberal democracy". Both as an ideal and as an institutional practice when in government, the illiberal remaking of democracy implies eroding the separation of powers and subordinating constitutionally guaranteed individual civil and human rights to an alleged "general will" and a particular conception of "the people". The thematic issue explores the ideological supply, favorable conditions, political contexts and dynamics, as well as the impact of the populist surge in Europe in relation to the systemic consolidation of (il)liberal democracy on a theoretical and comparative empirical level.

Populism has become the issue of comparative political science today. The rise and continuing success of populist parties is by now evident across Europe, despite persistent cross-national variations. Populist parties' electoral success and their participation in government have raised questions about their impact: not just on established party systems, but also on the systemic core of European democracies. In theory, this impact can be both beneficial for, as well as a challenge to democracy in general, and the tenets of liberal constitutional democracy in particular. The presence of populist parties has, in several cases, increased electoral turnout and public participation, which is generally seen as a positive effect when measuring the quality of democracy. However, populist parties' rise also points to negative effects. In addition to profoundly reshaping European party systems, they advocate what the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán calls "illiberal democracy". Both as an ideal and as an institutional practice when in government, the illiberal remaking of democracy implies eroding the separation of powers and subordinating constitutionally guaranteed individual civil and human rights to an alleged "general will" and a particular conception of "the people". The thematic issue explores the ideological supply, favorable conditions, political contexts and dynamics, as well as the impact of the populist surge in Europe in relation to the systemic consolidation of (il)liberal democracy on a theoretical and comparative empirical level.

Après avoir passé deux décennies à étudier les transitions postcommunistes vers la démocratie enEurope centrale et orientale, les spécialistes de cette région se trouvent confrontés au processus inverse:la transition non démocratique. Le cas emblématique est celui de la Hongrie de Viktor Orban qu'unéditorial duMondea qualifiée «d'Etat autoritaire au cœur de l'Europe»1.Mais la Roumanie n'est pas en reste, où certains observateurs décrivent la crise politique de l'été2012 comme un «coup d'Etat rampant»2. L'eurodéputée roumaine Monica Macovei, ancienne ministrede la Justice affirme: « Il est temps que les Roumains regardent la vérité en face et qu'ils se mobilisentsinon la dictature et la tyrannie peuvent s'installer à tout moment»3.Même la République tchèque, dont les soubresauts de la vie politique font rarement la une desjournaux européens, traverse une passe difficile qui amène certains observateurs locaux à s'interrogersur la solidité de sa démocratie parlementaire4.On pourrait multiplier les exemples qui témoignent de la diversité des situations, mais qui permettentaussi de relativiser certains jugements trop alarmistes: la Pologne n'a-t-elle pas surmonté l'épisodeinquiétant du pouvoir aux mains du parti des frères Kaczynski (2005-2007)? Il reste que la situationéconomique et la crise européenne donnent au malaise de la démocratie dans les nouveaux membresde l'Union européenne un relief particulier, et interroge l'Union sur sa propre identité démocratique.

Après avoir passé deux décennies à étudier les transitions postcommunistes vers la démocratie enEurope centrale et orientale, les spécialistes de cette région se trouvent confrontés au processus inverse:la transition non démocratique. Le cas emblématique est celui de la Hongrie de Viktor Orban qu'unéditorial duMondea qualifiée «d'Etat autoritaire au cœur de l'Europe»1.Mais la Roumanie n'est pas en reste, où certains observateurs décrivent la crise politique de l'été2012 comme un «coup d'Etat rampant»2. L'eurodéputée roumaine Monica Macovei, ancienne ministrede la Justice affirme: « Il est temps que les Roumains regardent la vérité en face et qu'ils se mobilisentsinon la dictature et la tyrannie peuvent s'installer à tout moment»3.Même la République tchèque, dont les soubresauts de la vie politique font rarement la une desjournaux européens, traverse une passe difficile qui amène certains observateurs locaux à s'interrogersur la solidité de sa démocratie parlementaire4.On pourrait multiplier les exemples qui témoignent de la diversité des situations, mais qui permettentaussi de relativiser certains jugements trop alarmistes: la Pologne n'a-t-elle pas surmonté l'épisodeinquiétant du pouvoir aux mains du parti des frères Kaczynski (2005-2007)? Il reste que la situationéconomique et la crise européenne donnent au malaise de la démocratie dans les nouveaux membresde l'Union européenne un relief particulier, et interroge l'Union sur sa propre identité démocratique.

Après avoir passé deux décennies à étudier les transitions postcommunistes vers la démocratie enEurope centrale et orientale, les spécialistes de cette région se trouvent confrontés au processus inverse:la transition non démocratique. Le cas emblématique est celui de la Hongrie de Viktor Orban qu'unéditorial duMondea qualifiée «d'Etat autoritaire au cœur de l'Europe»1.Mais la Roumanie n'est pas en reste, où certains observateurs décrivent la crise politique de l'été2012 comme un «coup d'Etat rampant»2. L'eurodéputée roumaine Monica Macovei, ancienne ministrede la Justice affirme: « Il est temps que les Roumains regardent la vérité en face et qu'ils se mobilisentsinon la dictature et la tyrannie peuvent s'installer à tout moment»3.Même la République tchèque, dont les soubresauts de la vie politique font rarement la une desjournaux européens, traverse une passe difficile qui amène certains observateurs locaux à s'interrogersur la solidité de sa démocratie parlementaire4.On pourrait multiplier les exemples qui témoignent de la diversité des situations, mais qui permettentaussi de relativiser certains jugements trop alarmistes: la Pologne n'a-t-elle pas surmonté l'épisodeinquiétant du pouvoir aux mains du parti des frères Kaczynski (2005-2007)? Il reste que la situationéconomique et la crise européenne donnent au malaise de la démocratie dans les nouveaux membresde l'Union européenne un relief particulier, et interroge l'Union sur sa propre identité démocratique.

The political turn of 1998 in post-transition Hungary marked the beginning of a new era: the rise of the New Right. Fidesz, which used to be a liberal party during the regime change of 1989, later changed its political stance. Under the presidency of Viktor Orban, Fidesz became a centre-right party by adopting a mixed ideology that contained contradictory elements. The reason for Fidesz's electoral success in 1998 was that it responded to the social need for order and democratic consolidation after the turbulent years of political and economic transformation. However, the years when Fidesz governed Hungary (1998-2002) could be characterized by both conservative consolidation and populist mass mobilization. Voters could not fully understand why the rhetoric of 'second revolution' would lead to the consolidation of democracy. This sort of contradictory agenda-setting from above alienated the majority of voters in the 2002 elections so Fidesz was replaced by the returning MSZP-SZDSZ left-liberal coalition government. Despite two electoral losses (2002 and 2006), Fidesz created a second political culture, an alternative polity that established itself as the Hungarian version of the New Right, a mixture of populism, conservatism, and plebeian, redistributionist, economic nationalism. The emergence of the Hungarian New Right reinterpreted social conflicts, and sharpened political division in the society. Adapted from the source document.

The political turn of 1998 in post-transition Hungary marked the beginning of a new era: the rise of the New Right. Fidesz, which used to be a liberal party during the regime change of 1989, later changed its political stance. Under the presidency of Viktor Orban, Fidesz became a centre-right party by adopting a mixed ideology that contained contradictory elements. The reason for Fidesz's electoral success in 1998 was that it responded to the social need for order and democratic consolidation after the turbulent years of political and economic transformation. However, the years when Fidesz governed Hungary (1998-2002) could be characterized by both conservative consolidation and populist mass mobilization. Voters could not fully understand why the rhetoric of 'second revolution' would lead to the consolidation of democracy. This sort of contradictory agenda-setting from above alienated the majority of voters in the 2002 elections so Fidesz was replaced by the returning MSZP-SZDSZ left-liberal coalition government. Despite two electoral losses (2002 and 2006), Fidesz created a second political culture, an alternative polity that established itself as the Hungarian version of the New Right, a mixture of populism, conservatism, and plebeian, redistributionist, economic nationalism. The emergence of the Hungarian New Right reinterpreted social conflicts, and sharpened political division in the society. Adapted from the source document.

"In 2017, as Ben Rhodes was helping former president Barack Obama begin his next chapter, the legacy they worked to build for eight years was being taken apart. To understand what was happening in his own country, Rhodes decided to look outward, at the wider world. Over the next three years, he traveled to dozens of countries, meeting with politicians, dissidents, and activists confronting the same forces that produced the Trump presidency: spreading nationalism, authoritarianism, and disinformation. Along the way, he was spied on by former Mossad operatives and the Chinese government, met with Hong Kong protesters and Russian oppositionists, and found people from Europe to Asia to the United States struggling to reconcile their own identities with the crude nationalism of their leaders--all while pursuing new strategies to fight back. Equal parts memoir and reporting, 'After the Fall' is an ambitious and essential work of discovery. Throughout, Rhodes reflects on how the 2008 financial crisis completed a collapse of public confidence in America, globalization, and democracy itself, opening a door to the wave of strongman leaders who have transformed our world--men like Viktor Orban in Hungary, Vladimir Putin in Russia, and Xi Jinping in China. He wrestles with how peoples' yearning for identity and belonging has been weaponized by nationalists. And he learns from a diverse set of characters--from Obama to rebels to rising politicians--how we can choose a more hopeful story going forward"--