Suchergebnisse

Under what conditions is the American public supportive of U.S. military intervention in foreign crises? We argue that the public assesses three key dimensions of an intervention: the motivation for an intervention, the form an intervention can take, and the tasks an intervention may be mandated to fulfill. Through a survey experiment, we test several hypotheses in the context of a potential U.S. military intervention in a civil war. Comparing different motivations, we find that the strategies (forms and mandates) matter much more for public support. Regardless of motivation, the American public is generally more supportive of multilateral forms of intervention and prefers mandates that focus on the protection of civilians and peaceful conflict resolution.

Recent international developments have introduced the possibility of war waged on behalf of people unable to defend themselves, and when the attacking parties' interests appear not to be at stake. Are purely military forms of "humanitarian intervention" sometimes morally required? Can such military missions be reconciled with the widely held belief in the moral distinction between killing and letting die? In exploring these questions, the two dominant paradigms in writing about war are considered: just war theory and utilitarianism. The moral centrality of intentions emerges through an explanation of the distinction often made between natural and man-made catastrophe. Ultimately, the alleged permissibility of the "collateral damage" to which military intervention gives rise implies the permissibility of pacifism, thus invalidating the claim that the resort to deadly force is sometimes morally obligatory.

In an era where the use of military intervention is being debated by governments and societies all around the globe, the potentially radicalizing impact of the specific form of intervention has remained chronically underexplored. The article addresses this lack of research, by examining the radicalizing effects of full-scale military engagement and the consequences of more limited, aerial intervention. In an effort to inform the contentious discussion around foreign military intervention, it draws examples from the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the more recent airstrikes employed through the US drone programme against Al-Qaeda and coalition strikes against the so-called Islamic State, illustrating the risks and outcomes of 'boots on the ground' versus engaging in more 'distant' warfare. It concludes that whilst other factors clearly play a role in an individual's journey towards extremism, intervention by a foreign power can encourage the process of radicalization, or 'de-pluralization' - the developing perception that there exists only one solution, extreme violence - to take place. However, it finds that the type of intervention plays a critical role in determining how individuals experience this process of de-pluralization; full-scale intervention can result in a lack of monitoring alongside frustrations (about lost sovereignty for example), a combination which paves the way for radical ideology. Conversely, airstrikes present those underneath with unequal and unassailable power that cannot be fairly fought, fuelling interest in exporting terrorism back to the intervening countries.

Hezbollah has been an important political and military actor in Lebanon and the Middle East since the mid-1980s. Its popularity grew especially after successfully deterring the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. With the emergence of the so-called Arab Spring, however, the party's popularity declined for many reasons. One of these was its military intervention in Syria on the side of the Syrian government. This event has been interpreted in various ways, sometimes explaining it as religiously-motivated decision, due to Hezbollah's strong affiliation to Shia Islam. This empirical research finds that, on the contrary, Hezbollah's intervention is politically rather than religiously motivated. The data presented here shows that Hezbollah politicizes certain aspects of the religious sensitivities in the region in order to mobilize troops, yet, a study of its military activities inside Syria indicates that Hezbollah actually follows its political and geostrategic interests.

Hezbollah has been an important political and military actor in Lebanon and the Middle East since the mid-1980s. Its popularity grew especially after successfully deterring the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. With the emergence of the so-called Arab Spring, however, the party's popularity declined for many reasons. One of these was its military intervention in Syria on the side of the Syrian government. This event has been interpreted in various ways, sometimes explaining it as religiously-motivated decision, due to Hezbollah's strong affiliation to Shia Islam. This empirical research finds that, on the contrary, Hezbollah's intervention is politically rather than religiously motivated. The data presented here shows that Hezbollah politicizes certain aspects of the religious sensitivities in the region in order to mobilize troops, yet, a study of its military activities inside Syria indicates that Hezbollah actually follows its political and geostrategic interests.

Foreign military intervention is one of the most common types of interstate military force used over recent decades. As war's costliness increases and the efficacy of economic sanctions and other foreign policy tools is increasingly questioned, it may become even more prevalent. Unfortunately, the field of international relations has little systematic understanding of the types of impacts such military ventures can have on target states in the developing world. In PCSE AR1 regressions of 106 developing countries from 1960 to 2002, we find that large scale foreign military interventions, which have over 1000 intervening troops, do not leave a significant imprint on governing institutions, economic growth rates, or physical quality of life in developing democracies. The same cannot be said for non-democratic states in the developing world. Hostile interventions can help to democratize non-democratic targets, while rival interventions lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.

The past decade has witnessed the emergence of numerous 'cosmopolitan' theories of humanitarian military intervention. These theories anticipate a more cosmopolitan future, where interventions will be authorized by new cosmopolitan institutions and carried out by reformed cosmopolitan militaries. The contention of my article is that despite the merits of these approaches, it is often difficult to discern whether and how cosmopolitan theories can inform assessments of interventions that take place in our non-cosmopolitan present. Through taking Jurgen Habermas's judgements of two recent interventions as a 'case study', I reflect on the considerations that might come into play when cosmopolitans attempt to translate their future-orientated theories into practical engagements with the world as it is. Adapted from the source document.

The collapse of the Cold War order led to a change in the geopolitical environment of the Russian Federation. The declarations of independence of the former Soviet republics and the emergence of the post-Soviet area had weakened the country's position. As a result, the Russian Federation has been perceiving this new area as a zone of its 'vital interests', and attaining and maintaining dominant position in those territories has been considered crucial for the state's security, its strength and position on the international arena. Russia has been pursuing its goals in the area through numerous reintegration attempts on political, military and economic levels. To achieve the main political goal, which is the control over the post-Soviet area, the Russian Federation has been also using military instruments. The focal point and purpose of this article is to show the internal and external causes of military intervention of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine.

NATO's Operation Unified Protector in Libya has fostered the illusions of politicians and military planners that it is possible for outside powers to support regime change without the need to embark on counterinsurgency or externally driven state-building, which have consumed foreign troops and civilian aid agencies for many years. Yet it would be premature, and even dangerous, to consider Libya as a model for future military interventions. Developments in this country are unique in some important ways and they do not refute the central lesson that the international community has had to learn previously: Outside powers that engage in regime change in the first place need to be prepared to deal with a potentially very messy post-war phase. The operation in Libya has demonstrated how limited NATO member states' willingness and ability to actually prepare (and pay) for such a contingency has become

This article considers the effects of humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) on conflict in the countries in which they have been used. Theoretically, neutral HMIs, in which interveners target all violent actors, are expected to have a pacifying effect on conflict intensity by increasing the cost of violence for all parties—while biased HMIs can escalate conflict intensity, by reducing the cost of violence and so encouraging the supported parties to become more violent. The empirical results show that neutral HMIs do seem to lead to lower conflict intensity in the targeted countries, relative to other conflict-affected countries. Anti-rebels HMIs are, observed to escalate conflict both in the short and the long run, while the evidence for anti-government HMIs is mixed.