Suchergebnisse

It has been known for several decades that a constantly growing asymmetry of the military power between the US and their NATO allies complicates transatlantic security relations. If allies cannot communicate in military terms, the risk of political split appears. Therefore one of the main priorities is the necessity to ensure that the allies are able to make their substantial military contribution. Lithuania also contributes to it by taking part in missions together with its allies. Missions are of military (using weapons, executing military operations and performing police functions) and civil character (providing help in case of natural disasters, sending humanitarian aid to voluntary soldiers). This paper focuses mainly on military missions. The subject of the paper: The participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The relevance of the topic: More and more often articles appear in Lithuania and abroad criticising the participation of the Western countries in peace missions, including Afghanistan; casualties, moral validity of these missions and heavy expenses are questioned; a more and more prevailing idea of Neorealism is mentioned. The goals of the paper: • To introduce the main trends of the theories of international relations; • To analyse the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions with reference to the theories; • To introduce a geopolitical context of the participation of Lithuania in foreign missions; • To review Lithuanian foreign military missions; • To discuss the perspectives of the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The method of work: The work is carried out using a descriptive analytical method, a comparative method and the analysis of scientific literature. The aim of the paper: This papers aims to review the participation of Lithuania in peace missions, to discuss its political and military aspects, paying the greatest attention to theoretical aspects. Among many existing theories of international relations, Neorealism and Constructivism are the most appropriate ones to explain the participation of Lithuania in international missions. Although the main conceptions of those theories are contradictory, in Lithuania's case they complement one another. Supporting the power of the US, Lithuania operates in the field of Neorealism theory as well as a common system of values in line with Western countries (especially the US) operates in the field of Constructivism and historic experience with Russia. Since the international system is anarchic, the dominant countries are those having the greatest power. Therefore Lithuania's support of the superpower is an entirely logical behaviour. Moreover, Lithuania is linked with the US by the common identity, which was formed by the US consistent denial of Lithuania's occupation in 1940 and 1944, supporting the restoration of independence and providing help for Lithuanian emigrants. Therefore in Lithuania's case both theories should be applied in analysing the support for the US and NATO and the participation in their foreign military missions. The examination of Lithuania's foreign military missions should not be restricted to the theories of international relations. The geopolitical context, which has a great influence on the country's behaviour, should be taken into consideration as well. The historical context of relations is connected with the current behaviour and the attitude towards such countries as Russia and it also has influence on choosing allies and the support to the policy they execute, including the military one. Attention should also be paid to the reliability of the potential allies and the reality of threats, for instance, whether a real conflict with Russia is possible. Russia should be the starting point since it is the main factor which influences the choice and behaviour of Lithuania. It is impossible to analyse Lithuania's international policy and its participation in missions without taking into consideration Russia, which is the greatest and most powerful neighbour. This country owns some of the biggest natural resources and one of the most powerful armies with the arsenal of almost 4000 nuclear heads. Therefore its influence on Lithuania cannot be neglected. Russian threat is not unreal. Its current behaviour might raise serious concerns. Russian military doctrine, issued in 2000, claims that the possibility of a military conflict with any country or a bloc of countries is very slight and no country is considered as its potential enemy. The main current threats to Russian security and its territorial integrity are international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and drug smuggling. Other threats are "territorial claims on Russian Federation" and "the expansion of military blocs and alliances which can endanger the security of Russian Federation". According to the military doctrine, Russia does not intend to fight with any country or a bloc of countries. However, it prepares for defence. At the press conference held at the end of January, Russian president Vladimir Putin once again noted that Russia has tested a new complex of ballistic missiles which is not owned by any other country. The warheads of those missiles can outfight any missile defence systems. The ballistic missiles have maneuvering heads. This can already be treated as the nuclear-weapon threat. Unconditional support of the US can be observed not only during the military missions, but also during military programs, such as the missile defence system and its dislocation in Europe. Lithuanian foreign policy has been traditionally oriented towards transatlantic relations and the consolidation of strategic partnership with the US. There is no doubt that such an attitude has been influenced by the US itself because currently it is the only power in the geopolitical arena which can influence Russia in the Baltic Sea region. The amplification of the US influence in the region, the neutralisation of new threats and a greater influence of Lithuania in foreign policy are the main factors that induce Lithuania to support Euro-Atlantism. Also, Lithuanian choice is influenced by the unwillingness to become the object of "exchange". It would become possible if the spheres of influence between Russia and the US or between the EU and Russia changed. It would be much more possible if the Lithuanian priority were Euro-continental security system. Inability to transform the EU and keep balance with Russia may lead Germany and France to the Russian zone of influence. It would be a threat to the independence of Lithuania. Because of these reasons Lithuania intends to limit its participation in ESDP. Officially it is stated as the intention to maintain transatlantic relations. However, it is not the only reason. ESDP is a step towards the federal model of the European Union which would limit the autonomy and decision-making of small countries. Lithuania is unwilling to become the province of the European Union, which, contrary to the NATO, is unable to provide security. Moreover, the participation in ESDP would require huge financial resources, which are allocated to NATO for the same purpose and therefore it is unreasonable to duplicate funds. There is also a problem of dual loyalty. Since the great EU countries and the US often come into conflict, it would become a problem to choose between NATO (the US) and ESDP (Germany, France). The participation of the US in the European defence system enables Lithuania to control political relations with other great countries – Germany and Russia. One more reason why Lithuania tends to support the US is that Germany and France neglect the concerns of small countries for the sake of their relations with Russia. Such behaviour is considered unreliable and therefore the priority is given to the US, since only trustworthy partners can remain in the security sphere. Before the Vilnius Ten supported the US in attacking Iraq, there was an opinion that after becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania as well as other post-socialist countries would give Europe a sense of freedom. This idea became very relevant during the G. W. Bush visit to Vilnius when he supported and guaranteed security to post-soviet states intending to become the members of NATO, saying "You are needed in NATO". The Vilnius Ten soon proved this necessity but the opinion of the countries which assigned billions for their integration into the European Union and were against the war in Iraq was neglected. Soon after the war in Iraq, the US Congress approved the list of new candidates for NATO. G. W. Bush noted in his speech that those members proved their necessity not only by words but also by their actions. However, until the invasion of Iraq, the tension between the US, its ally Great Britain and France, Germany and Russia was so strong that, according to the US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld, the Vilnius Ten position separated Europe into two parts - the Old and the New one. The reproach expressed by France that the Vilnius Ten lost a good opportunity to remain silent and German reaction towards the participation of Polish soldiers in a post-Hussein Iraq show that either France and Germany do not understand Central Europe or they simply seek for autocracy in the continental foreign policy and therefore a different position of "New Europe" countries is unhandy for them. Currently the dislocation of the US missile defence system is one of the leading issues in international meeting agenda. This issue is extremely important for Lithuania because its two strategic partners - the US and neighbouring Poland – are involved in it. Lithuania's position towards the missile defence system was, and still is, rather complicated. On the one hand, Lithuania must support its strategic allies and partners. On the other hand, it would worsen relations with Russia. A new defence project, National Missile Defence

It has been known for several decades that a constantly growing asymmetry of the military power between the US and their NATO allies complicates transatlantic security relations. If allies cannot communicate in military terms, the risk of political split appears. Therefore one of the main priorities is the necessity to ensure that the allies are able to make their substantial military contribution. Lithuania also contributes to it by taking part in missions together with its allies. Missions are of military (using weapons, executing military operations and performing police functions) and civil character (providing help in case of natural disasters, sending humanitarian aid to voluntary soldiers). This paper focuses mainly on military missions. The subject of the paper: The participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The relevance of the topic: More and more often articles appear in Lithuania and abroad criticising the participation of the Western countries in peace missions, including Afghanistan; casualties, moral validity of these missions and heavy expenses are questioned; a more and more prevailing idea of Neorealism is mentioned. The goals of the paper: • To introduce the main trends of the theories of international relations; • To analyse the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions with reference to the theories; • To introduce a geopolitical context of the participation of Lithuania in foreign missions; • To review Lithuanian foreign military missions; • To discuss the perspectives of the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The method of work: The work is carried out using a descriptive analytical method, a comparative method and the analysis of scientific literature. The aim of the paper: This papers aims to review the participation of Lithuania in peace missions, to discuss its political and military aspects, paying the greatest attention to theoretical aspects. Among many existing theories of international relations, Neorealism and Constructivism are the most appropriate ones to explain the participation of Lithuania in international missions. Although the main conceptions of those theories are contradictory, in Lithuania's case they complement one another. Supporting the power of the US, Lithuania operates in the field of Neorealism theory as well as a common system of values in line with Western countries (especially the US) operates in the field of Constructivism and historic experience with Russia. Since the international system is anarchic, the dominant countries are those having the greatest power. Therefore Lithuania's support of the superpower is an entirely logical behaviour. Moreover, Lithuania is linked with the US by the common identity, which was formed by the US consistent denial of Lithuania's occupation in 1940 and 1944, supporting the restoration of independence and providing help for Lithuanian emigrants. Therefore in Lithuania's case both theories should be applied in analysing the support for the US and NATO and the participation in their foreign military missions. The examination of Lithuania's foreign military missions should not be restricted to the theories of international relations. The geopolitical context, which has a great influence on the country's behaviour, should be taken into consideration as well. The historical context of relations is connected with the current behaviour and the attitude towards such countries as Russia and it also has influence on choosing allies and the support to the policy they execute, including the military one. Attention should also be paid to the reliability of the potential allies and the reality of threats, for instance, whether a real conflict with Russia is possible. Russia should be the starting point since it is the main factor which influences the choice and behaviour of Lithuania. It is impossible to analyse Lithuania's international policy and its participation in missions without taking into consideration Russia, which is the greatest and most powerful neighbour. This country owns some of the biggest natural resources and one of the most powerful armies with the arsenal of almost 4000 nuclear heads. Therefore its influence on Lithuania cannot be neglected. Russian threat is not unreal. Its current behaviour might raise serious concerns. Russian military doctrine, issued in 2000, claims that the possibility of a military conflict with any country or a bloc of countries is very slight and no country is considered as its potential enemy. The main current threats to Russian security and its territorial integrity are international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and drug smuggling. Other threats are "territorial claims on Russian Federation" and "the expansion of military blocs and alliances which can endanger the security of Russian Federation". According to the military doctrine, Russia does not intend to fight with any country or a bloc of countries. However, it prepares for defence. At the press conference held at the end of January, Russian president Vladimir Putin once again noted that Russia has tested a new complex of ballistic missiles which is not owned by any other country. The warheads of those missiles can outfight any missile defence systems. The ballistic missiles have maneuvering heads. This can already be treated as the nuclear-weapon threat. Unconditional support of the US can be observed not only during the military missions, but also during military programs, such as the missile defence system and its dislocation in Europe. Lithuanian foreign policy has been traditionally oriented towards transatlantic relations and the consolidation of strategic partnership with the US. There is no doubt that such an attitude has been influenced by the US itself because currently it is the only power in the geopolitical arena which can influence Russia in the Baltic Sea region. The amplification of the US influence in the region, the neutralisation of new threats and a greater influence of Lithuania in foreign policy are the main factors that induce Lithuania to support Euro-Atlantism. Also, Lithuanian choice is influenced by the unwillingness to become the object of "exchange". It would become possible if the spheres of influence between Russia and the US or between the EU and Russia changed. It would be much more possible if the Lithuanian priority were Euro-continental security system. Inability to transform the EU and keep balance with Russia may lead Germany and France to the Russian zone of influence. It would be a threat to the independence of Lithuania. Because of these reasons Lithuania intends to limit its participation in ESDP. Officially it is stated as the intention to maintain transatlantic relations. However, it is not the only reason. ESDP is a step towards the federal model of the European Union which would limit the autonomy and decision-making of small countries. Lithuania is unwilling to become the province of the European Union, which, contrary to the NATO, is unable to provide security. Moreover, the participation in ESDP would require huge financial resources, which are allocated to NATO for the same purpose and therefore it is unreasonable to duplicate funds. There is also a problem of dual loyalty. Since the great EU countries and the US often come into conflict, it would become a problem to choose between NATO (the US) and ESDP (Germany, France). The participation of the US in the European defence system enables Lithuania to control political relations with other great countries – Germany and Russia. One more reason why Lithuania tends to support the US is that Germany and France neglect the concerns of small countries for the sake of their relations with Russia. Such behaviour is considered unreliable and therefore the priority is given to the US, since only trustworthy partners can remain in the security sphere. Before the Vilnius Ten supported the US in attacking Iraq, there was an opinion that after becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania as well as other post-socialist countries would give Europe a sense of freedom. This idea became very relevant during the G. W. Bush visit to Vilnius when he supported and guaranteed security to post-soviet states intending to become the members of NATO, saying "You are needed in NATO". The Vilnius Ten soon proved this necessity but the opinion of the countries which assigned billions for their integration into the European Union and were against the war in Iraq was neglected. Soon after the war in Iraq, the US Congress approved the list of new candidates for NATO. G. W. Bush noted in his speech that those members proved their necessity not only by words but also by their actions. However, until the invasion of Iraq, the tension between the US, its ally Great Britain and France, Germany and Russia was so strong that, according to the US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld, the Vilnius Ten position separated Europe into two parts - the Old and the New one. The reproach expressed by France that the Vilnius Ten lost a good opportunity to remain silent and German reaction towards the participation of Polish soldiers in a post-Hussein Iraq show that either France and Germany do not understand Central Europe or they simply seek for autocracy in the continental foreign policy and therefore a different position of "New Europe" countries is unhandy for them. Currently the dislocation of the US missile defence system is one of the leading issues in international meeting agenda. This issue is extremely important for Lithuania because its two strategic partners - the US and neighbouring Poland – are involved in it. Lithuania's position towards the missile defence system was, and still is, rather complicated. On the one hand, Lithuania must support its strategic allies and partners. On the other hand, it would worsen relations with Russia. A new defence project, National Missile Defence

It has been known for several decades that a constantly growing asymmetry of the military power between the US and their NATO allies complicates transatlantic security relations. If allies cannot communicate in military terms, the risk of political split appears. Therefore one of the main priorities is the necessity to ensure that the allies are able to make their substantial military contribution. Lithuania also contributes to it by taking part in missions together with its allies. Missions are of military (using weapons, executing military operations and performing police functions) and civil character (providing help in case of natural disasters, sending humanitarian aid to voluntary soldiers). This paper focuses mainly on military missions. The subject of the paper: The participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The relevance of the topic: More and more often articles appear in Lithuania and abroad criticising the participation of the Western countries in peace missions, including Afghanistan; casualties, moral validity of these missions and heavy expenses are questioned; a more and more prevailing idea of Neorealism is mentioned. The goals of the paper: • To introduce the main trends of the theories of international relations; • To analyse the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions with reference to the theories; • To introduce a geopolitical context of the participation of Lithuania in foreign missions; • To review Lithuanian foreign military missions; • To discuss the perspectives of the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The method of work: The work is carried out using a descriptive analytical method, a comparative method and the analysis of scientific literature. The aim of the paper: This papers aims to review the participation of Lithuania in peace missions, to discuss its political and military aspects, paying the greatest attention to theoretical aspects. Among many existing theories of international relations, Neorealism and Constructivism are the most appropriate ones to explain the participation of Lithuania in international missions. Although the main conceptions of those theories are contradictory, in Lithuania's case they complement one another. Supporting the power of the US, Lithuania operates in the field of Neorealism theory as well as a common system of values in line with Western countries (especially the US) operates in the field of Constructivism and historic experience with Russia. Since the international system is anarchic, the dominant countries are those having the greatest power. Therefore Lithuania's support of the superpower is an entirely logical behaviour. Moreover, Lithuania is linked with the US by the common identity, which was formed by the US consistent denial of Lithuania's occupation in 1940 and 1944, supporting the restoration of independence and providing help for Lithuanian emigrants. Therefore in Lithuania's case both theories should be applied in analysing the support for the US and NATO and the participation in their foreign military missions. The examination of Lithuania's foreign military missions should not be restricted to the theories of international relations. The geopolitical context, which has a great influence on the country's behaviour, should be taken into consideration as well. The historical context of relations is connected with the current behaviour and the attitude towards such countries as Russia and it also has influence on choosing allies and the support to the policy they execute, including the military one. Attention should also be paid to the reliability of the potential allies and the reality of threats, for instance, whether a real conflict with Russia is possible. Russia should be the starting point since it is the main factor which influences the choice and behaviour of Lithuania. It is impossible to analyse Lithuania's international policy and its participation in missions without taking into consideration Russia, which is the greatest and most powerful neighbour. This country owns some of the biggest natural resources and one of the most powerful armies with the arsenal of almost 4000 nuclear heads. Therefore its influence on Lithuania cannot be neglected. Russian threat is not unreal. Its current behaviour might raise serious concerns. Russian military doctrine, issued in 2000, claims that the possibility of a military conflict with any country or a bloc of countries is very slight and no country is considered as its potential enemy. The main current threats to Russian security and its territorial integrity are international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and drug smuggling. Other threats are "territorial claims on Russian Federation" and "the expansion of military blocs and alliances which can endanger the security of Russian Federation". According to the military doctrine, Russia does not intend to fight with any country or a bloc of countries. However, it prepares for defence. At the press conference held at the end of January, Russian president Vladimir Putin once again noted that Russia has tested a new complex of ballistic missiles which is not owned by any other country. The warheads of those missiles can outfight any missile defence systems. The ballistic missiles have maneuvering heads. This can already be treated as the nuclear-weapon threat. Unconditional support of the US can be observed not only during the military missions, but also during military programs, such as the missile defence system and its dislocation in Europe. Lithuanian foreign policy has been traditionally oriented towards transatlantic relations and the consolidation of strategic partnership with the US. There is no doubt that such an attitude has been influenced by the US itself because currently it is the only power in the geopolitical arena which can influence Russia in the Baltic Sea region. The amplification of the US influence in the region, the neutralisation of new threats and a greater influence of Lithuania in foreign policy are the main factors that induce Lithuania to support Euro-Atlantism. Also, Lithuanian choice is influenced by the unwillingness to become the object of "exchange". It would become possible if the spheres of influence between Russia and the US or between the EU and Russia changed. It would be much more possible if the Lithuanian priority were Euro-continental security system. Inability to transform the EU and keep balance with Russia may lead Germany and France to the Russian zone of influence. It would be a threat to the independence of Lithuania. Because of these reasons Lithuania intends to limit its participation in ESDP. Officially it is stated as the intention to maintain transatlantic relations. However, it is not the only reason. ESDP is a step towards the federal model of the European Union which would limit the autonomy and decision-making of small countries. Lithuania is unwilling to become the province of the European Union, which, contrary to the NATO, is unable to provide security. Moreover, the participation in ESDP would require huge financial resources, which are allocated to NATO for the same purpose and therefore it is unreasonable to duplicate funds. There is also a problem of dual loyalty. Since the great EU countries and the US often come into conflict, it would become a problem to choose between NATO (the US) and ESDP (Germany, France). The participation of the US in the European defence system enables Lithuania to control political relations with other great countries – Germany and Russia. One more reason why Lithuania tends to support the US is that Germany and France neglect the concerns of small countries for the sake of their relations with Russia. Such behaviour is considered unreliable and therefore the priority is given to the US, since only trustworthy partners can remain in the security sphere. Before the Vilnius Ten supported the US in attacking Iraq, there was an opinion that after becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania as well as other post-socialist countries would give Europe a sense of freedom. This idea became very relevant during the G. W. Bush visit to Vilnius when he supported and guaranteed security to post-soviet states intending to become the members of NATO, saying "You are needed in NATO". The Vilnius Ten soon proved this necessity but the opinion of the countries which assigned billions for their integration into the European Union and were against the war in Iraq was neglected. Soon after the war in Iraq, the US Congress approved the list of new candidates for NATO. G. W. Bush noted in his speech that those members proved their necessity not only by words but also by their actions. However, until the invasion of Iraq, the tension between the US, its ally Great Britain and France, Germany and Russia was so strong that, according to the US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld, the Vilnius Ten position separated Europe into two parts - the Old and the New one. The reproach expressed by France that the Vilnius Ten lost a good opportunity to remain silent and German reaction towards the participation of Polish soldiers in a post-Hussein Iraq show that either France and Germany do not understand Central Europe or they simply seek for autocracy in the continental foreign policy and therefore a different position of "New Europe" countries is unhandy for them. Currently the dislocation of the US missile defence system is one of the leading issues in international meeting agenda. This issue is extremely important for Lithuania because its two strategic partners - the US and neighbouring Poland – are involved in it. Lithuania's position towards the missile defence system was, and still is, rather complicated. On the one hand, Lithuania must support its strategic allies and partners. On the other hand, it would worsen relations with Russia. A new defence project, National Missile Defence

Why countries colonize the lands of indigenous people Over the past few centuries, vast areas of the world have been violently colonized by settlers. But why did states like Australia and the United States stop settling frontier lands during the twentieth century? At the same time, why did states loudly committed to decolonization like Indonesia and China start settling the lands of such minorities as the West Papuans and Uyghurs? Settling for Less traces this bewildering historical reversal, explaining when and why indigenous peoples suffer displacement at the hands of settlers.Lachlan McNamee challenges the notion that settler colonialism can be explained by economics or racial ideologies. He tells a more complex story about state building and the conflicts of interest between indigenous peoples, states, and settlers. Drawing from a rich array of historical evidence, McNamee shows that states generally colonize frontier areas in response to security concerns. Elite schemes to populate contested frontiers with loyal settlers, however, often fail. As societies grow wealthier and cities increasingly become magnets for migration, states ultimately lose the power to settle frontier lands.Settling for Less uncovers the internal dynamics of settler colonialism and the diminishing power of colonizers in a rapidly urbanizing world. Contrasting successful and failed colonization projects in Australia, Indonesia, China, and beyond, this book demonstrates that economic development—by thwarting colonization—has proven a powerful force for indigenous self-determination

"Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation"Alexander Hamilton "The whole point of the doomsday machineis lost if you keep it a secret!!"Dr. Strangelove VI) El Interés Nacional y las políticas de poder La mayoría de los teóricos han recurrido al interés nacional como concepto ordenador y exegético del accionar de los estados en el concierto internacional. Alexander Wendt (1999: 242) reconoce que nadie puede negar que los estados actúan sobre la base de intereses nacionales, tal como ellos los perciben y los definen. Toda teoría de relaciones internacionales o de política exterior articula su entendimiento del relacionamiento de los estados en el S.I en referencia, precisa o difusa, al interés nacional. El interés nacional, como concepto teórico, cumple dos funciones, una normativa y una descriptiva. El rol normativo intenta aportar, en última instancia, un estándar a partir del cual juzgar la conducta de los estados, basándose principalmente en consideraciones éticas. Este es precisamente uno de los principales puntos que los realistas, y en particular el principal teórico del interés nacional, H. Morgenthau, criticarán. La función descriptiva trata sobre el componente empírico (lo que los estados hacen) del interés nacional (Nincic, 1999: 30). En otras palabras, la concepción del interés nacional oscila entre lo que debería ser y lo que efectivamente es (o ¿cuál es la política exterior implementada que defiende el interés nacional?). Si bien existe un consenso sobre la idea del interés nacional como motor de la acción del estado, esta unanimidad no se aplica a la definición sustantiva del término (función normativa) ni tampoco, en cierta medida, a su rol descriptivo. Esto tiene importantes consecuencias en la elaboración y conducción de la política exterior. Efectivamente, la política exterior, de ser racional, debe estar en sintonía con la idea que nos hacemos del interés nacional. En otras palabras, la política exterior debe apuntar siempre a defender el interés nacional. Sin embargo, este aspecto, o sea la visión descriptiva de lo que es el interés nacional (o de las políticas implementadas en su defensa) no siempre encuentra unanimidad, incluso dentro de una misma escuela teórica. En este sentido, es interesante estudiar el debate entre H. Morgenthau y Henry Kissinger en torno a la guerra de Vietnam y en qué medida la intervención americana se justificaba en defensa del interés nacional. Si Morgenthau, el principal teórico realista en materia de interés nacional criticaba la intervención, H. Kissinger, el principal policy maker realista, pensaba todo lo contrario (Zimmer, 2011). La noción o idea de interés nacional puede, y de hecho representa y vehicula distintos significados y justificaciones (morales, económicas, de seguridad, políticas, etc.) de la acción de los estados. El interés nacional recorre el mismo camino difuso que nociones tales como Nación y Comunidad. Al debate histórico de qué o quién representa la Nación (Greenfield, 1999: 48-49), el interés nacional obliga a una reflexión sobre los objetivos nacionales así como sobre el propósito y razón de ser del estado (el encargado de perseguir el interés nacional). Los primeros en preocuparse por la noción de interés nacional fueron los teóricos realistas clásicos, como Tucídides, Hobbes o Rousseau. Más recientemente, una perspectiva liberal y luego una visión constructivista, aún más cercana en el tiempo, han atacado la concepción realista del interés nacional, quebrantando aún más la idea de una lectura unívoca y monolítica de este concepto (Battistela, 2002: 143). El tratamiento que los realistas han dado al interés nacional, y en particular Morgenthau, ha sido fuertemente criticado por otras escuelas teóricas, particularmente los liberales y los constructivistas, pero igualmente los behavioristas. Estos últimos ven en la noción de interés nacional un concepto a nula operacionalización científica, incapaz de explicar el accionar y la continuidad de la política exterior de los estados. El interés nacional es, para los behavioristas, lo que la nación, y más precisamente el decisor en política exterior, decide que sea (Rosenau, 1968). El enfoque realista del interés nacional funcionaría más sobre la base de un axioma o suposición filosófica que a partir de un postulado científicamente verificable. En efecto, el realismo clásico asume que el mundo es y actúa de una determinada manera, y el interés nacional no es más que el accionar racional del estado en un contexto que no domina completamente (el control que el estado tenga en la escena internacional dependerá en gran parte del poder almacenado). Hobbes es uno de los primeros en articular la noción de interés nacional indisociablemente ligado a una visión de la seguridad del estado. La paz de Westfalia en 1648 representa el triunfo de la visión Hobbesiana, con la consolidación del estado como la unidad territorial de referencia (paradigma de la soberanía) así como con la creciente rivalidad entre los estados poderosos (Badie, 2001: 254). La concepción realista del interés nacional se desprende de dos de las premisas importante ya mencionadas del realismo: la naturaleza anárquica del sistema internacional y la relación conflictiva entre estados en el marco de dicho sistema. Por lo tanto, si el estado de anarquía conduce a la inseguridad general, el principal cometido del estado, entendido en términos de interés nacional, debe ser el de asegurar su seguridad. ¿Qué se entiende entonces por seguridad y cuáles son las cuestiones incompresibles que el estado no puede abandonar?. Los realistas definen estas cuestiones de manera relativamente vaga, pero es innegable la centralidad de las ideas de integridad territorial, independencia política e identidad cultural. ¿Cómo se alcanza, defiende o preserva el interés nacional? Principalmente a través del uso o la amenaza de la fuerza. Por lo tanto, para los realistas, el interés nacional se traduce casi exclusivamente en términos de poder (principalmente militar, aunque no exclusivamente), ya que la fuerza sería, en un contexto de anarquía y de conflicto, la única manera de disuadir o alcanzar los interéses de un estado. Hans Morgenthau (1961:5) así lo expone: "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power". Para los realistas, el interés nacional ha sido inmutable a lo largo de la historia y, producto de la naturaleza del sistema internacional (anarquía), de la naturaleza humana (para los realistas clásicos), y de la estructura (para los neorrealistas), destinado a permanecer así. Este es uno de los principales puntos de crítica de los liberales y en particular de los constructivistas, quienes avanzan que la difusión de valores, normas y códigos compartidos en el seno de la comunidad internacional han contribuido a modificar el comportamiento de los estados. En este punto, los realistas se encuentran en las antípodas del pensamiento liberal. El poder es, para los realistas, casi exclusivamente el único criterio que debe determinar la política exterior. Cualquier otro principio, en particular aquellos de orden moral, estarán subordinados a la búsqueda, preservación y fortalecimiento del poder (Tucker, 1952: 215). Para Morgenthau, la escena internacional se articula sobre la búsqueda de poder contra poder y no, como a menudo se ha instrumentalizado el conflicto, entre dos visiones del bien y el mal, de virtud o de vicio, de moralidad o inmoralidad. La descripción de interés nacional y poder que hace Morgenthau ha conducido a dos interpretaciones distintas de la noción de poder (Williams, 2004: 639-640). La primera reduce el realismo a una suerte de materialismo, donde el poder y el interés es definido en términos principalmente militares (el propio Morgenthau criticará está visión simplificadora). El segundo enfoque sería instrumentalista: si el poder es un medio necesario para alcanzar los intereses, entonces se transforma en un fin en sí. La búsqueda de poder, para los realistas, es entonces a la vez un fin y un medio para dicho fin ¿Por qué? Porque el mundo es anárquico debido a que los hombres buscan el poder (naturaleza humana o, como diría Morgenthau, un impulso bio-social) y al mismo tiempo deben buscar el poder justamente para protegerse de ese impulso natural. Por lo tanto, la búsqueda de poder como medio para un fin depende de la naturaleza del sistema (anarquía) mientras que la búsqueda del poder como un fin en sí debe encontrarse en las necesidades manifiestas de los miembros del sistema (Nincic, 1999:33). Se ha argumentado largamente que la naturaleza tautológica de esta definición (los estados buscan el poder porque están ontológicamente predeterminados a hacerlo), así como el supuesto inicial de que la búsqueda de poder es una necesidad primaria del ser humano, debilitan la posición realista y restan fuerza a sus postulados centrales. El interés nacional, bajo la óptica realista, es entonces por naturaleza egoísta y superior a los intereses privados sub-nacionales (Battistela, 2002: 145). Es egoísta porque los estados se encuentran en un sistema de self-help y de suma cero, donde las ganancias de un estado representan la pérdida de otro. Asimismo, los realistas defienden la idea del interés Nacional y no, como lo hacen los liberales, la idea que los estados pueden compartir intereses comunes (vitales) en el seno de una comunidad internacional. El interés nacional entendido en términos de seguridad es la matriz irreductible sobre la cual se sustenta todo proyecto de construcción nacional o comunitaria y no puede ser, por definición, compartido en el seno de una comunidad inter-nacional, inter-comunitaria o inter-estatal. Ya lo decía Morgenthau cuando criticaba la visión moral y cooperativa propuesta por el idealismo de W. Wilson: "It therefore follows that, despite the profound changes which have occurred in the world, it still remains true, as it has always been true, that a nation confronted with the hostile aspirations of other nations has one prime obligation – to take care of its own interests. The moral justification for this prime duty of all nations- for it is not only a moral right but also a moral obligation- arises from the fact that if this particular nation does not take care of its interests, nobody else will" (Morgenthau, 1952: 4). El interés nacional es igualmente superior a los intereses individuales o privados, porque sólo en la salvaguardia de la seguridad del estado, los demás intereses pueden ser perseguidos. Por lo tanto, como decía Raymond Aron (1984: 101), el interés nacional es irreductible a los intereses privados. Frente a la rigidez del concepto de interés nacional defendido por los realistas, los liberales han aportado una perspectiva diferente, planteando que el interés nacional es lo que una nación decide que sea. Este no se limita a cuestiones de seguridad, pero puede englobar igualmente intereses materiales o espirituales. El estado es, para los liberales, el encargado de llevar adelante los intereses individuales de la sociedad y no, como para los realistas, una entidad independiente con agenda propia. Para los liberales, el interés nacional está determinado por los valores internos de una sociedad, y no por las limitantes externas presentes en el sistema internacional (anarquía, estructura, relación de fuerzas, etc.). ¿Cómo se define entonces el interés nacional para los liberales? Principalmente a través de la negociación y la adopción de los intereses "mayoritarios". Los enfoques constructivistas, particularmente fecundos luego de la guerra fría, rechazan la idea de inmutabilidad presente en el realismo (critican la incapacidad de los realistas, clásicos o estructurales, para pensar el cambio). Si es cierto que los constructivistas comparten con los liberales la idea que el interés nacional no está predeterminado por condiciones "fijas" , ellos consideran, sin embargo, que los intereses se definen sobre la base de la identidad y las representaciones que los estados se hacen de ellos mismos, de los otros estados, del sistema internacional y del lugar que ocupan en él (y no, como en el liberalismo, a través de un proceso de negociación interna). Asimismo, el accionar de los estados, y sus intereses, se ven condicionados por el conjunto de normas y valores que, compartidas en un marco internacional, regulan y estructuran la vida política internacional. Para los constructivistas, todos los conceptos están sujetos a interpretaciones y sentidos cambiantes. Así, un concepto central como el de anarquía en el realismo puede ser comprendido bajo diferentes enfoques. Cuando los estados se consideran como enemigos en el plano internacional, podemos hablar de una anarquía hobbesiana. En el caso de estados que se consideran como rivales, se trataría de una anarquía lockiana. Por último, cuando los estados se ven como amigos, estaríamos en presencia de una anarquía kantiana. Sólo en el primer caso, central al realismo, el interés nacional puede ser definido en términos de seguridad y supervivencia. Como hemos visto, los autores neorrealistas focalizan su estudio en la interacción de los grandes poderes y en la polaridad del sistema internacional como factores explicativos de la ocurrencia de conflictos o guerras. Los neorrealistas, sin embargo, no parecen concernidos por las cuestiones relativas al cambio ni a la evolución del poder en el sistema internacional. Los realistas no se preguntan de dónde viene el poder, ni como los estados son capaces de emerger, consolidarse y descomponerse. Para ellos, tanto los actores como la estructura del sistema son variables consideradas como dadas o variables independientes. La única variable dependiente, o sea, el único proceso que los neorrealistas intentan explicar, es la guerra (Kratochwil, 1993). El foco del neorrealismo ha sido el de intentar explicar la fase de consolidación del poder en el sistema internacional en un reducido número de grandes potencias y como este sistema ha logrado evitar la unipolaridad (Cederman, 1994: 504). Entre las principales críticas que pueden hacerse a la noción del interés nacional defendida por los realistas, es posible citar la obsesión realista con las políticas de poder y el recurso sistemático y axiomático a la idea de anarquía. El primer punto refiere a que muchos estados pequeños o medianos no determinan ni implementan su política exterior en términos de poder ni, generalmente, tienen preocupaciones relacionadas a la seguridad. Inclusive las grandes potencias por momentos se apartan igualmente de esta lógica (como en el caso estadounidense bajo las presidencias de W. Wilson y J. Carter). Igualmente, ciertos teóricos realistas a menudo obvian que el concepto de poder es relativo al tipo de asunto en cuestión. El poder militar, o el poder económico, sólo son útiles en determinadas circunstancias. Es indudable que el poderío económico de Japón hace de este país una potencia capaz de influenciar el comportamiento de otros estados y eso, a pesar de no contar con un poderío militar importante. Los defensores de las políticas de poder argumentarán que la posición privilegiada de Japón en el comercio mundial es únicamente posible gracias al respaldo militar que su alianza con los Estados Unidos le otorga. No sólo esta apreciación niega de manera burda la dimensión económica presente en el sistema internacional, sino que condicionaría todo desarrollo posible a la expansión del poderío económico o a la concertación de alianzas defensivas. ¿Cómo explicar entonces los niveles de desarrollo de países como Suiza o Luxemburgo?. En segundo lugar, el concepto de anarquía derivado del estado de naturaleza Hobbesiano y que ha estructurado y condicionado el pensamiento realista, no es un absoluto empíricamente comprobable. Diferentes mecanismos de cooperación, coordinación y reciprocidad son posibles en un universo donde priman los actores egotistas (Nincic, 1999: 34-36). La respuesta a estas críticas, principalmente por parte de los neorrealistas, ha sido de argumentar que, si bien todos los estados son iguales, sólo cuentan en términos de poder y de estructura los grandes y poderosos. Para Waltz (1979:94), la estructura del sistema internacional (polaridad) y la naturaleza de éste (anarquía) dependen del número de grandes actores y la distribución de fuerzas entre estos. Si bien esta argumentación responde parcialmente a la segunda crítica, no así a la primera. Podemos mencionar igualmente que en la actualidad el concepto de Estado-Nación como unidad central de análisis del sistema internacional ha sido parcialmente puesto en jaque por los postulados liberales o constructivistas. Si, efectivamente, el Estado Nación no es más la única unidad de referencia, de subordinación o de pertenencia del individuo moderno, el postulado realista del estado unitario se resquebraja. En este sentido, resulta difícil justificar la idea del interés nacional en términos de defensa de la independencia política o cultural, ya que estas nociones tendrían crecientemente menos importancia para los individuos. Resulta imposible desprenderse de la idea que la concepción del mundo propuesta por los realistas es profundamente pesimista e impregnada de una desconfianza generalizada acerca la naturaleza humana (en el caso de los realistas clásicos) y que, gran parte de los supuestos realistas se sustentan en un "worst case scenario". En palabras de Wittner (1985:285): "Admittedly, people sometimes fail to live up to the level of cooperation and moral development encouraged by civilization, but most of the time, they do. Realism focuses upon the exception and turns it into the rule. Indeed, it transforms that exception into a normative principle of international behavior!". Los realistas responderán seguramente que el interés nacional último es el de defender la supervivencia e integridad física del estado y de sus ciudadanos y, ciertamente, en un mundo donde la amenaza del uso de las armas nucleares representa inequívocamente el fin absoluto, la posición realista no deja de presentar una argumentación válida (la ausencia de conflicto atómico en los últimos 60 años ahonda precisamente en el sentido del balance de poder defendido por los neorrealistas). El peor escenario posible, en un mundo nuclear, es efectivamente lo suficientemente aterrador para justificar el pesimismo realista. Los realistas no dicen que la guerra sea inevitable, la mayoría de sus teóricos han intentando buscar las causas de la guerra, sin por lo tanto entrar en consideraciones morales sobre el bien fundado de la acción de los estados. Al explicar como el mundo es, y no cómo debería ser, los realistas se despojan de consideraciones filosóficas que apartan al estadista de su verdadero objetivo: preservar la seguridad del estado. Es en este sentido que uno de los primeros realistas, Maquiavelo, consideraba que existen dos éticas diferentes. La primera, relativa a la salvación individual, debía ser regulada por las consideraciones morales y religiosas; y la segunda, en claro contraste con la primera, es la ética de la responsabilidad que tienen los gobernantes, obligados a llevar adelante ciertas acciones consideradas como "inmorales" en defensa del interés nacional (Viotti y Kauppi, 1993: 38). *Este artículo fue presentado en la 9° sesión el Seminario Interno de Discusión Teórica 2013, organizado por el Departamento de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad ORT Uruguay. Sobre el autorGermán Clulow es Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales por la Universidad ORT –Uruguay, Master en Ciencia Política por la Université de Genève – Suiza, y Master en Estudios de Desarrollo por el Instituto de Altos Estudios Internacionales y de Desarrollo (IHEID-The Graduate Institute) Ginebra, Suiza.

One can note that the issue of children rights has always been topical and while there is still plenty of complex topics to be studied, the author yet invites to return to the basics of the child's rights, and in particularly, to the need to protect the child's identity as a legal value. The purpose of the article, therefore, is to clarify the meaning of the child's right to identity enshrined in the international, and in particularly, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and according Latvian legislation. With the assistance of a descriptive method in conjunction with a historical method the article marks the historical events of the last quarter of the 20th century leading to formation and contemporary understanding of the right to identity. Historical remarks are followed with a smooth transition into the analysis of the international and Latvian legal framework. The used sources among others include a number of international, European and Latvian legal acts, as well as accessible interpretative manuals, monographs, comments, transcripts and other sources for a better understanding of the contents of the legislation. The named analysis has been performed with the use of legal comparative, systemic and analytical research methods. ; anastasija.jumakova@gmail.com ; Latvijas Universitāte (University of Latvia, Latvia) ; Besson S., Enforcing the Child's Right to Know her Origins: Contrasting Approaches under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights, "International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family" 2007, No. 21. ; Blair D.M.B., The Impact of Family Paradigms, Domestic Constitutions, and International Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person's Identities and Heritage: A Comparative Examination, "Michigan Journal of International Law" 2001, Vol. 22. ; Blauwhoff R.J., Foundational facts, relative truths: A comparative law study on children's right to know their genetic origins, Antwerp 2009. ; Cerda J.S., The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New Rights, "Human Rights Quarterly" 1990, vol. 12. ; Cohen C.P., Elasticity of Obligation and the Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, "Connecticut Journal of International Law" 1987, No. 71. ; Cohen C.P., Introductory Note to the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child. 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Jundzis et al, Rīga Latvijas Vēstnesis 2011. ; Heimerle N., International Law and Identity Rights for Adopted Children, "Adoption Quarterly" 2003, Vol. 7 (2). ; Hodgson D., The International Legal Protection of the Child's Right to a Legal Identity and the Problems of Statelessness, "International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family" 1993, Vol. 7 (2). ; Kovaļevska A., Personas tiesības uz savu attēlu, Valsts Cilvēktiesību birojs, 2005: http://providus.lv/article_files/1583/original/attel_tiesib.pdf?1332251075 (25.07.2020). ; Marshall J., Concealed Births, Adoption and Human Rights: Being Wary of Seeking to Open Windows into People's Soul, "Cambridge Law Journal" 2012, Vol. 71 (2). ; Marshall J., Personal freedom throughout Human Rights Law: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human rights. International Studies in Human Rights, 2009. ; McCombs T., Gonzalez J. S., Right to Identity, International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California, Berkeley School of Law 2007: http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2007/CP19277.PDF (26.07.2020). ; O'Donovan K., "Real" mothers for Abandoned Children, "Law and Society Review" 2002, Vol. 36, No.2. ; Parra-Aranguren G., Explanatory Report on the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention: https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=2279 (25.07.2020). ; Ronen Y., Redefining the Child's Right to Identity, "International Journal of Law and the Family" 2004, Vol. 18. ; Sants H.J., Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, "British Journal of Medical Psychology" 1964, Vol. 37. ; Scolnicov A., The Child's Right to Religious Freedom and Formation of Identity, "International Journal of Children's Rights" 2007, Vol. 15. ; Stewart G.A., Interpreting the Child's Right to Identity in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, "Family Law Quarterly" 1992-1993, Vol.26. ; van Bueren G., The International Law on the Rights of the Child, 1998. ; Wellisch E., Children Without Genealogy – A Problem of Adoption, "Mental Health" 1952, Vol. 13. ; Implementation Handbook For The Convention On The Rights Of The Child, United Nations Children's Fund 2007. ; Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, edited by P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak and others, Antwerpen – Oxford Intersentia 2006. ; Judgement of ECHR of 29 April 2002 (Application no. 2346/02) in the case of Pretty v. United Kingdom. ; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007cf98 (access: 26.07.2020). ; Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=69 (access: 25.07.2020). ; Convention on the Rights of the Child: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx (access: 25.07.2020). ; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx (access: 25.07.2020). ; Declaration of the Rights of the Child: http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/resources/child.asp (access: 25.07.2020). ; Universal Declaration of Human Rights: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (access: 25.07.2020). ; The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/289, 30.3.2010. ; European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised): https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680084823 (access: 26.07.2020). ; Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. OJ L 304, 30.9.2004. ; Latvijas Republikas Satversme : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1993. 1.jūlijs, Nr. 43. English translation: The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/57980-the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-latvia (access: 26.07.2020). ; Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likums : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1998. 19. jūlijs, Nr.199/200. English translation: Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/49096-law-on-the-protection-of-the-childrens-rights (access: 26.07.2020). ; Biometrijas datu apstrādes sistēmas likums : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2009. 10. jūnijs, Nr.90/4076. English translation: Biometric Data Processing System Law: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/193111-biometric-data-processing-system-law (access: 26.07.2020). ; Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 28. marts, Nr.11/112. English translation: Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights. ; Latvijas Republikas Civillikums : LR likums. Valdības Vēstnesis, 1937. gada 20. februāris, Nr. 41; Ziņotājs, 1993. 10. jūnijs, Nr. 22. English translation: The Civil law of the Republic of Latvia: https://likumi.lv/ta/id/90223-civillikums-pirma-dala-gimenes-tiesibas (access: 26.07.2020). ; Likuma "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā" 1. lasījums. Latvijas Republikas 7. Saeimas rudens sesijas vienpadsmitā sēde. Saeimas arhīvs: http://www.saeima.lv/steno/1999/st2810.html (access: 26.07.2020). English translation: The first of review of the law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights". Eleventh sitting of the autumn session of the 7th Parliament of the Republic of Latvia; ; Likuma "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā" 2. lasījums. Latvijas Republikas 7. Saeimas rudens sesijas deviņpadsmitā sēde. Saeimas arhīvs: http://www.saeima.lv/steno/1999/st1612.html (access: 26.07.2020). English translation: The second of review of the law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights". Nineteenth sitting of the autumn session of the 7th Saeima of the Republic of Latvia. ; Likuma "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā" 3. lasījums. Latvijas Republikas 7. Saeimas ziemas sesijas vienpadsmitā sēde. Saeimas arhīvs: http://www.saeima.lv/steno/2000/st0903.html (access: 26.07.2020). English translation: The third of review of the law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights". Eleventh Session of the 7th Saeima of the Republic of Latvia ; Saeimas Cilvēktiesību un sabiedrisko lietu komisijas 1999.gada 30. novembra projekts 2. lasījumam "Priekšlikumi likumprojektam "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā"": http://helios-web.saeima.lv/bin/lasa?LP0381_2 (access: 12.06.2019). English translation: Draft of the Human Rights and Public Affairs Commission of the Parliament of November 30, 1999 for the Second Review "Proposals for the draft law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Rights of the Child"". ; Explanatory Report on European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Treaty Office of Council of Europe: http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/058.htm (access: 26.07.2020). ; History of Argentina: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Argentina (access: 25.07.2020). ; Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disappearances/Pages/DisappearancesIndex.aspx (access: 25.07.2020). ; 19 ; 1 ; 223 ; 244

Apart from evoking accent-based stereotypes, non-native speech has been found to pose threat to intelligibility and overburden listeners with additional cognitive load which may evoke their irritation (Johansson 1975; Kelly 2000; Munro 2003; Lippi-Green 2012; Moyer 2013). The paper discusses the notion of communicative responsibility defined as speaker's effort to overcome the undesirable consequences of foreign accent for the sake of efficient conveyance of relevant message. Five religious lectures (amounting to 5hrs of audio-visual material) delivered in Polish-accented English are discussed with respect to the speaker's non-native pronunciation and his morally motivated effort to convey the message precisely despite phonetically deviant speech. The shortcomings of non-native pronunciation are anticipated and targeted by preventive strategies, such as disambiguation, frequent repetition and use of emphatic stress to highlight the most relevant information, eliciting direct feedback from the listeners, monitoring their non-verbal responses, as well as the employment of enhancing devices, such as gestures. ; agabryla@gmail.com ; Agnieszka Bryła-Cruz is an Adjunct Professor at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland. Her main research interests concern the role of linguistic and socio-linguistic factors in Second Language Acquisition, particularly pronunciation, and the perception of non-native accents by English native speakers. More recently, she has studied the role of phonetics in listening comprehension in a series of empirical studies. ; Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland ; Asher, J. & García, R. 1969. The optimal age to learn a foreign language. 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ABSTRACT The main objectives of this study is to determine the interactions between deposit interest rates, foreign exchange rates and stock market index (LQ45) in Indonesia pre and post crisis 2008. The data period before the crisis is October 2000 until November 2008. The data period after the crisis is December 2008 until December 2015. Descriptive quantitative analysis is used in this research. Descriptive analysis method is performed by using analytical table and graphic. Quantitative analysis method is performed by making a regression equation econometric model with time series method to describe the presence or absence of the influence of the independent variable towards the dependant variable. The result showed that during the pre crisis 2008, unidirectional causality existed from Deposit Interest Rates towards Foreign Exchange Rates, Stock Market Index (LQ45) towards Deposit Interest Rates, Deposit Interest Rates towards Stock Market Index(LQ45), and Stock Market Index (LQ45) towards Foreign Exchange Rates. The result post crisis 2008 showed that unidirectional causality existed from Foreign Exchange Rates towards Deposit Interest Rates, Deposit Interest Rates towards Foreign Exchange Rates, and Stock Market Index (LQ45) towards Foreign Exchange Rates. It is found that the direction of causality between the three variables tends to demonstrate a hit-and-run behavior and changes according to the lag selection. This implies that great caution should be taken when interpreting granger causality result. Keywords: Deposit Interest Rates, Foreign Exchange Rates, Stock Market Index, LQ45, Granger Causality and Subprime MortgageBIBLIOGRAPHY (2008, September 15). 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Um kulturelle Werte von Landschaft in Landschaftsplanungen stärker zu berücksichtigen wurden sie in dieser Arbeit als kulturelle Landschaftsfunktionen bestimmt, die sich in ein System aus Landschaftsfunktionen einordnen, wie es Landschaftsplanungen insgesamt zugrunde liegen kann. Neben bereits ausdifferenzierten naturhaushalterischen Landschaftsfunktionen umfasst es damit folgende kulturelle Landschaftsfunktionen: - bedeutungstragende und sinnstiftende Funktion - Handlungsfunktion - ästhetische und stimmungsstiftende Funktion - Kommunikationsfunktion - Wissensfunktion - Kontinuitätsfunktion - Gestaltungs- und Ausdrucksfunktion - Ordnungs- und Orientierungsfunktion Ihnen sind jeweils Teilfunktionen zugeordnet. Die kulturellen Funktionen stehen in einem hierarchischen Verhältnis zueinander. Übergeordnete kulturelle Funktionen sind die bedeutungstragende und sinnstiftende sowie die Handlungsfunktion. Die Funktionen können sich wechselseitig bedingen oder in Konkurrenz zueinander stehen. Nachdem Werte nicht aus der Landschaft, sondern nur aus der Gesellschaft bestimmt werden können, bildete die Untersuchung der gesellschaftlichen Konzepte hinter den zentralen Begriffen "Werte", "Raum und Landschaft" sowie "Kultur" eine Grundlage zu ihrer Bestimmung. Ein Schwerpunkt lag auf der Auswertung sozialwissenschaftlicher Theorien. Dabei wurde auch ein auf Planungstauglichkeit angelegtes Verständnis der zentralen Begriffe dieser Arbeit geschaffen. Gewählt wurde ein utilitaristischer und zweckrationaler Zugang zu Werten, ein anthropologischer Zugang zu Kultur und ein konstitutions- und handlungstheoretischer Zugang zu Raum und Landschaft; Landschaft wird als Spezifikation von Raum verstanden. Die andere Grundlage zur Bestimmung kultureller Werte bildete die Untersuchung von Entwicklungstrends, von sozialempirischen Untersuchungen sowie eine Untersuchung prosaischer Darstellungen. An die Ausprägung der kulturellen Funktionen sowie von Raum und Landschaft insgesamt wurden im Ergebnis der Untersuchungen Anforderungen in Form von Hypothesen formuliert, die den Zugang zu Raum und Landschaft weiter erklären. Sie haben den Charakter von Prinzipien, insofern Präferenzen in hohem Maße gebietsspezifisch sind. In der Planung gängige Wertmaßstäbe und Urteile werden damit zum Teil in Frage stellt, so die Hypothese eines ästhetisierenden Zugangs zu Landschaft. Andere werden spezifischer gefasst, so die Rolle von Elementen für die Konstitution oder die Rolle von Wissen und von Natürlichkeit für das Schönheitserleben einer Landschaft. Einige zentrale Hypothesen, die Anlass für diese Arbeit waren bzw. die aus dem theoretischen Teil der Untersuchung entwickelt wurden, konnten im sozialempirischen Teil nicht bestätigt werden. Dies gilt maßgeblich für die Zukunftsperspektive, die Landschaft enthält, die jedoch im Regelfall nicht gefragt ist. Wertgebend ist landschaftliche Kontinuität, die Geschichten erzählt, indem sie die Vergangenheit aufzeigt und Erinnerungen manifest macht. Nicht vollständig aufrecht erhalten werden konnte die im theoretischen Teil der Arbeit aufgebaute Hypothese, dass Landschaftsplanungen stärker gruppenspezifisch anzulegen sind. Verbleibt hier eine Überprüfung des Milieukonzepts auf landschaftsspezifische Fragestellungen, so zeigt sich andererseits relativ klar, dass Landschaft eher für das gruppenübergreifend Geteilte steht. Sie ist nicht Gegenstand eines Luxusgeschmacks, sondern Gemeingut. Klarer zu unterscheiden sind jedoch die Erwartungshaltungen aufgrund der Perspektive als Einheimischer oder Tourist. Für die Planung bedeutet das eine deutlichere Unterscheidung zwischen der Definition der landschaftlichen Eigenart und eines landschaftlichen Images. Beide können für die Konstruktion eines Leitbildes Maßstäbe setzten, wobei ein eigenartbasiertes Leitbild eher den Ansprüchen einer gemeinwohlorientierten Planung genügt, ein Image eher auch einem Bedürfnis nach Inszenierung nachkommt. Landschaftsplanungen sind darin zu stärken, produktiven Landnutzungen ein Landschaftsnutzungsinteresse gegenüberzustellen, das zumeist nichtproduktiver und immaterieller Art ist. Dieses Landschafts-nutzungsinteresse ist über die kulturellen Landschaftsfunktionen abgebildet. In Landschaftsplanungen sollten sie entsprechend differenziert betrachtet werden, um die unmittelbaren gesellschaftlichen Anforderungen an Landschaft umfänglich aufzubereiten und zur Verhandlung zu stellen. Sie materiellen klar benennbaren Interessen allein als Komplexparameter und übergreifende emotionale Bedeutungszuschreibungen gegenüber zu stellen, stärkt ihre Verhandlungsposition nicht. Gerade auch im Zuge eines zunehmenden Landnutzungsdrucks ist dies notwendig. Zu sondieren, welche Rolle einer jeden der kulturellen Funktionen für die künftige Entwicklung einer Landschaft zukommt, sollte darüber hinaus Bestandteil eines Planungsprozesses werden, insofern gerade auch dienende Funktionen für die Ausjustierung der Richtung der weiteren Entwicklung notwendig sind, die sich ansonsten schnell auf Fortschreibungen der Vergangenheit anhand einer expertenbasierten Vorstellung von der Eigenart einer Landschaft nach romantischem Ideal beschränken kann. Im Gegenzug wären auch die Landnutzungsinteressen einer gesellschaftlichen Aushandlung der Inanspruchnahme des Gemeinguts Landschaft besser zugänglich zu machen, indem sie beispielsweise fachplanerisch ebenso raumspezifisch und umfassend aufbereitet und der abwägenden Gesamtplanung zugänglich gemacht werden. Als Forderung betrifft das vor allen die Landwirtschaft. Einen konzeptionellen Anschluss finden die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit im Konzept der Ökosystemdienstleistungen. Es eröffnet den Zugang zu einer stärkeren Integration ökonomischer und insbesondere sozialempirischer Methoden in Landschaftsplanungen. Zur methodischen Stärkung von Landschafsplanungen, insbesondere für die raumspezifische Integration der gesellschaftlichen Aspekte, die es im Zusammenhang mit kulturellen Werten von Landschaft in Landschaftsplanungen stärker zu berücksichtigen gilt, wird darin in Ergänzung zu nutzerunabhängigen Methoden und explizit über partizipative Methoden hinaus ein großes Potenzial gesehen. Gefragt ist also ein Methodenmix, der sich auch vor dem Hintergrund einer inkonsistenten theoretischen Basis weniger an theoretischer Stringenz orientieren kann. Der interdisziplinäre Anspruch an Landschaftsplanungen steigt damit. Er kann sich im Ergebnis z. B. in einer Verräumlichung sozialer Dimensionen und der beschreibenden Erfassung der expliziten und impliziten Dimension landschaftlicher Werte beispielsweise in Storylines äußern. Einer stringenten Erfassung landschaftlicher Funktionen auch in ihrer kulturellen Dimension und einer methodischen Weiterentwicklung unbenommen bleibt es originäre planerische Herausforderung in jedem Einzelfall, mit dem Nichtfaktischen umzugehen. Eine Leitbildentwicklung unter diesen Vorzeichen kann erheblich von der Anwendung von Szenarien profitieren. Szenarien können auch den gesellschaftlichen Diskurs über die angestrebte Entwicklung unter Anerkennung der Variabilität, die Eigenart als zentraler planerischer Wertmaßstab innewohnt, stärken. In der Konsequenz können diese Ansätze zu einer Demokratisierung einer Landschaftsplanung beitragen, die stärker auf die Handlungs- und Lebensrealität der Menschen ausgerichtet und stärker als Aushandlungsinstanz über Verfügungsrechte verstanden werden sollte.:1 KONTEXT, AUFGABE UND VORGEHENSWEISE 6 1.1 ANLASS 6 1.2 AUSGANGSSITUATION 6 1.2.1 GESELLSCHAFTLICHE EINORDNUNG UND PLANUNGSVERSTÄNDNIS 6 1.2.2 ENTWICKLUNG DES THEMAS KULTURLANDSCHAFT IN DER FORSCHUNG UND IM PLANERISCHEN DISKURS 7 1.2.3 ÜBEREINKÜNFTE 10 1.2.4 DEFIZITE IN DER PLANUNGSPRAXIS 10 1.2.4.1 Inhalte 10 1.2.4.2 Begründungen 11 1.2.5 KONSEQUENZEN 12 1.3 AUFGABE 12 1.4 RAUMBEZUG UND INSTRUMENTELLER BEZUG 13 1.5 VORGEHENSWEISE 14 2 BEGRIFFE UND DEREN KONZEPTE 16 2.1 ZWECK UND VORGEHEN DER BEGRIFFSANALYSE 16 2.2 WERTE 16 2.2.1 PLANUNG UND WERTE 16 2.2.2 WERTEDISKURS IN PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE 18 2.2.2.1 der philosophische Diskurs zur Relativität von Werten 19 2.2.2.2 der philosophisch-soziologische Diskurs um die Werturteilsfreiheit der empirischen Wissenschaften 19 2.2.3 EINORDNUNG DIESER ARBEIT 23 2.2.3.1 Relativität und sachlicher Gehalt 25 2.2.3.2 Veränderbarkeit 26 2.2.3.3 Seinsollen 27 2.2.3.4 Fazit und Herausforderungen 28 2.3 LANDSCHAFT UND WERTE 29 2.3.1 VOM GUT ZUR FUNKTION 29 2.3.2 VON DER FUNKTION ZUM POTENZIAL 32 2.4 RAUM 32 2.4.1 AKTUELLE ENTWICKLUNGEN ZUM RAUMVERSTÄNDNIS 32 2.4.2 PHYSISCH-MATERIELLE RAUMKONZEPTE 33 2.4.2.1 Arten und Merkmale 33 2.4.2.2 Reflexion und Kritik 34 2.4.3 KONSTITUTIONS- UND HANDLUNGSTHEORETISCHE ANSÄTZE 35 2.4.3.1 Arten und Merkmale 35 2.4.3.2 Dualismus und Dualitäten 36 2.4.3.3 Kritik und Reflexion 39 2.4.4 VERGLEICH UND POSITIONIERUNG 41 2.4.4.1 Verbreitung von Raumkonzepten und gesellschaftliche Übereinkunft über ein Raumverständnis 41 2.4.4.2 Planerische Handhabe: Raum in dieser Arbeit 42 2.4.4.3 Zusammenfassung 45 2.5 LANDSCHAFT UND RAUM 45 2.5.1 ENTWICKLUNG DES BEGRIFFSVERSTÄNDNISSES VON LANDSCHAFT 46 2.5.1.1 Historische Bedeutungen 46 2.5.1.2 Physis versus Konstrukt 46 2.5.1.3 Gestalt versus Bild 47 2.5.1.4 Natur versus Kultur 47 2.5.2 VERSTÄNDNIS ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON LANDSCHAFT UND RAUM 48 2.5.2.1 Gestalt- und Schaffensaspekt 49 2.5.2.2 Zweckaspekt 49 2.6 KULTUR 50 2.6.1 ETYMOLOGIE 50 2.6.2 GEGENWÄRTIGES KULTURVERSTÄNDNIS 52 2.6.3 ANTONYME 53 2.6.4 DICHOTOMIEN UND BRÜCKEN AUSGEWÄHLTER KONZEPTE 54 2.6.4.1 Kultur im weiten oder im engen Sinne: Alltagskultur oder Kunst? 54 2.6.4.2 Eine mögliche Brücke zwischen einem weitem und einem engen Kulturverständnis: "KULTUR" als Voraussetzung und Aufgabe von "Kultur" 55 2.6.4.3 Vergangenheitsbezug und Zukunftsperspektive 56 2.6.4.4 Eine mögliche Brücke zwischen Vergangenheitsbezug und Zukunftsperspektive: Kultur als Vervollkommnung 58 2.6.4.5 Andere Dichotomien 61 2.6.4.6 Kultur und Religion 62 2.6.5 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: KULTUR IN DIESER ARBEIT 63 2.6.5.1 Einordnung und Grundverständnis 63 2.6.5.2 Merkmale 64 2.7 LANDSCHAFT UND KULTUR: ANSÄTZE ZU EINER SYSTEMATIK 65 2.7.1 VORGEHENSWEISE 66 2.7.2 SYSTEMATIK 66 2.7.3 METHODISCHE KONSEQUENZEN 70 2.8 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND KRITIK 72 3 ERWARTUNGSHALTUNGEN UND PRÄFERENZEN 74 3.1 VORGEHENSWEISE 74 3.1.1 AUSWAHL UND AUSWERTUNG SOZIALEMPIRISCHER UNTERSUCHUNGEN 74 3.1.2 GRENZEN DER UNTERSUCHUNG 75 3.1.3 UNTERSUCHUNG VON ENTWICKLUNGSTRENDS 76 3.1.4 UNTERSUCHUNG VON BELLETRISTIK 77 3.1.5 AUFBAU 77 3.2 ZUKUNFTSSTUDIEN. TRIEBKRÄFTE GESELLSCHAFTLICHER ENTWICKLUNGEN UND GESELLSCHAFTLICHE ENTWICKLUNGSTRENDS 78 3.2.1 GLOBALISIERUNG UND GLOKALISIERUNG 78 3.2.2 MOBILITÄT 79 3.2.3 DEMOGRAFISCHER WANDEL 81 3.2.4 WERTE UND WANDEL 82 3.2.4.1 Individualität, Pluralität und Gemeinschaftlichkeit 83 3.2.4.2 traditionelle Werte und postmaterialistische Einstellungen 84 3.2.5 LEBENSSTANDARD UND BILDUNG 86 3.2.6 ENTINSTITUTIONALISIERUNG UND ENGAGEMENT 87 3.2.7 ZEIT UND FREIZEIT 88 3.2.8 LANDSCHAFT, RAUM UND ORT 90 3.2.9 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG, SCHLUSSFOLGERUNGEN UND AUSBLICK 93 3.2.9.1 Trends 93 3.2.9.2 Bedarfe 94 3.3 SOZIALEMPIRISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN: PRÄFERENZEN 96 3.3.1 LANDSCHAFTSWAHRNEHMUNG UND ALLGEMEINE ANFORDERUNGEN AN LANDSCHAFT 96 3.3.1.1 Landschaftswahrnehmung 96 3.3.1.2 allgemeine Anforderungen an Landschaft als Bestandteil der Lebensqualität 98 3.3.2 DIE BEDEUTUNGSTRAGENDE UND SINNSTIFTENDE FUNKTION 99 3.3.2.1 Vorüberlegungen und Forschungsfragen 99 3.3.2.2 Bedarf nach Heimat und ihre Dimensionen 100 3.3.2.3 räumliche Dimensionen 102 3.3.2.4 zeitliche Orientierung 108 3.3.2.5 Verräumlichung zeitlicher Dimensionen 111 3.3.2.6 soziale Dimensionen 113 3.3.2.7 Kritik am Konzept und Ablehnung von Heimat 114 3.3.2.8 Merkmale von Raum und Landschaft als Heimat 116 3.3.2.9 landschaftliche Prägung 123 3.3.2.10 Zusammenfassung 126 3.3.3 DIE KONTINUITÄTSFUNKTION 130 3.3.3.1 Vorüberlegungen und Forschungsfragen 130 3.3.3.2 Ergebnisse aus sozialempirischen Untersuchungen und Schlussfolgerungen 131 3.3.3.3 Gruppenspezifik 133 3.3.3.4 Zusammenfassung 133 3.3.4 DIE ORDNUNGS- UND ORIENTIERUNGSFUNKTION 134 3.3.5 DIE WISSENSFUNKTION 136 3.3.5.1 Vorüberlegungen und Forschungsfragen 136 3.3.5.2 Kritik des Aussagegehalts der vorliegenden Untersuchungen 137 3.3.5.3 gesuchte Kenntnis 138 3.3.5.4 Wissen der Menschen über ihre Landschaft und die Abhängigkeit von der Nutzung 140 3.3.5.5 andere Faktoren, welche die Landschaftskenntnis beeinflussen 141 3.3.5.6 Wunsch nach mehr Kenntnis 143 3.3.5.7 Wirkung von Wissen auf die Wertschätzung von Landschaft 145 3.3.5.8 Zusammenfassung 146 3.3.6 DIE GESTALTUNGS- UND AUSDRUCKSFUNKTION 150 3.3.6.1 Vorüberlegungen und Forschungsfragen 150 3.3.6.2 Wahrnehmung und Beurteilung von Landschaftsveränderungen 152 3.3.6.3 gewünschte Veränderungen 157 3.3.6.4 Gruppenspezifik 158 3.3.6.5 Zusammenfassung 159 3.3.7 DIE ÄSTHETISCHE UND STIMMUNGSSTIFTENDE FUNKTION 160 3.3.7.1 Vorüberlegungen und Forschungsfragen 160 3.3.7.2 Ästhetik und Identität. Zwischen dem Schönen und dem Eigenen 161 3.3.7.3 Ästhetik und Handlungsbezug. Zwischen dem Schönen und dem Nützlichen 163 3.3.7.4 Natur und Schönheit 172 3.3.7.5 wie eine schöne Landschaft aussieht 176 3.3.7.6 Merkmale, die eine Landschaft unattraktiv machen 189 3.3.7.7 Einflussfaktoren 190 3.3.7.8 Zusammenfassung 192 3.3.8 DIE HANDLUNGSFUNKTION 198 3.3.8.1 Vorüberlegungen und Forschungsfragen 198 3.3.8.2 Bedeutung von Landschaft für die Arbeit 199 3.3.8.3 Bedeutung von Landschaft für die Erholung 199 3.3.8.4 Formen landschaftsbezogener Erholung 203 3.3.8.5 Anforderungen an die Landschaft 207 3.3.8.6 Gruppenspezifik 208 3.3.8.7 Zusammenfassung 212 3.3.9 DIE KOMMUNIKATIONSFUNKTION 213 3.3.9.1 Vorüberlegungen und Forschungsfragen 213 3.3.9.2 Partizipation und Engagement 214 3.3.9.3 Kommunikation und Interaktion 218 3.3.9.4 Zusammenfassung 219 3.4 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND AUSBLICK 221 4 REFLEXION UND KONSEQUENZEN 222 4.1 INHALTE 222 4.1.1 ÜBERGREIFENDE HYPOTHESEN 222 4.1.1.1 Aneignung, Diskurs und Kommunikation 222 4.1.1.2 Vergangenheitsorientierung und Gestaltungswunsch 223 4.1.1.3 vom Diskurs zum Handeln 226 4.1.1.4 Nutzbarkeit, Eigenart und Schönheit 227 4.1.1.5 Ästhetische Merkmale 229 4.1.1.6 Wissen 230 4.1.1.7 Natur und Kultur 230 4.1.1.8 Heimat 231 4.1.2 KULTURELLE FUNKTIONEN 231 4.1.2.1 Charakterisierung der Funktionen 231 4.1.2.2 Hierarchien und Interdependenzen. 235 4.2 METHODISCHE KONSEQUENZEN 236 4.2.1 ZUR AUSGESTALTUNG DES PLANUNGSPROZESSES UND ZUR ROLLE SOZIALEMPIRISCHER UNTERSUCHUNGEN 238 4.2.1.1 Potenziale sozialempirischer Methoden 238 4.2.1.2 Defizite der verschiedenen Methodenkomplexe 239 4.2.1.3 Kombination 241 4.2.1.4 Weiterentwicklung der Bestandteile 243 4.2.1.5 Leitbildentwicklung 247 4.2.1.6 räumlicher Bezug 249 4.2.1.7 Schlussfolgerungen 251 4.2.2 GRUPPENSPEZIFIK 252 4.2.2.1 Einflussfaktoren 252 4.2.2.2 Kritik monofaktorieller Klassifizierungen 257 4.2.2.3 mehrfaktorielle Klassifizierungen 260 4.2.2.4 eigene Differenzierung 263 4.2.2.5 Zielgruppen 266 4.2.2.6 Zusammenfassung 267 4.3 KONZEPTIONELLE UND INSTRUMENTELLE KONSEQUENZEN 267 4.3.1 ÖKOSYSTEMDIENSTLEISTUNGEN 267 4.3.1.1 das Konzept 267 4.3.1.2 Landschaftsfunktionen und Ökosystemdienstleistungen 268 4.3.2 INSTRUMENTELLE UMSETZUNG 270 4.3.2.1 Raum- und Landschaftsplanung 270 4.3.2.2 Landschaftsplanung und Landnutzungsplanung 271 4.4 WEITERFÜHRENDER FORSCHUNGSBEDARF 272 5 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND AUSBLICK 275 6 LITERATUR 277 7 ABBILDUNGEN 299 8 TABELLEN 302 9 ANHANG 303 9.1 ANHANG 1: WERTE UND WERTSYSTEME IM PHILOSOPHISCHEN UND SOZIOLOGISCHEN DISKURS: EINE ÜBERSICHT 304 9.1.1 WERTLEHRE/ WERTEHTIK, WERTPHILOSOPHIE, WERTIRRATIONALISMUS 304 9.1.2 VERANTWORTUNGSETHIKEN: METAPHYSISCHE WERTLEHRE, TELEOLOGISCHE UND RELIGIÖSE KONZEPTE 305 9.1.2.1 metaphysische Wertlehren 305 9.1.2.2 Naturteleologie 305 9.1.3 UNIVERSALISTISCHE PRINZIPIENETHIKEN 306 9.1.3.1 Utilitarismus 306 9.1.4 ABSCHWÄCHUNG DER STRIKTEN DICHOTOMIE ZWISCHEN SEIN UND SOLLEN 307 9.1.5 WERTRELATIVISMUS 307 9.1.6 (NEU-)POSITIVISMUS, WERTSUBJEKTIVISMUS, WERTINDIVIDUALISMUS: 307 9.1.6.1 Positivismus 308 9.1.6.2 Wertsubjektivismus 308 9.2 ANHANG 2: KONNOTATIONEN IM ANTHROPOLOGISCHEN KULTURBEGRIFF NACH KROEBER UND KLUCKHOHN (1952) 309 9.3 ANHANG 3: EAGLETONS "KULTUR" UND "KULTUR" IM VERGLEICH 310 9.4 ANHANG 4: ERKENNTNISSE ZU KULTURELLEN FUNKTIONEN VON RAUM UND LANDSCHAFT AUS DER BEGRIFFSANALYSE 311 9.4.1 BEDEUTUNGSTRAGENDE UND SINNSTIFTENDE FUNKTION 311 9.4.2 GESTALTUNGS- UND AUSDRUCKSFUNKTION 313 9.4.3 ORDNUNGS- UND ORIENTIERUNGSFUNKTION 315 9.4.4 KONTINUITÄTSFUNKTION 315 9.4.5 WISSENSFUNKTION 316 9.4.6 ÄSTHETISCHE UND STIMMUNGSSTIFTENDE FUNKTION 317 9.4.7 KOMMUNIKATIONSFUNKTION 317 9.4.8 HANDLUNGSFUNKTION 318 9.5 ANHANG 5: AUSGEWERTETE EMPIRISCHE SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUM LANDSCHAFTSBEWUSSTSEIN UND ZU ERWARTUNGSHALTUNGEN AN LANDSCHAFT. ÜBERSICHT UND KERNAUSSAGEN 319 9.6 ANHANG 6: FACETTEN DES HEIMATEMPFINDENS DER AUTOREN IN GROPP ET AL. (2004) 339 9.7 ANHANG 7: ANSPRÜCHE AUSGEWÄHLTER FREIZEITAKTIVITÄTEN AN LANDSCHAFT 343 9.8 ANHANG 8: LANDSCHAFTSELEMENTE UND LANDSCHAFTSBESTANDTEILE, DIE "GEFALLEN" 347 9.9 ANHANG 9: TRADITIONELLE UND POSTMATERIELLE WERTORIENTIERUNGEN IM VERGLEICH 350

Samuel D. Bond (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") is an assistant professor at the College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology. He received his Ph.D. from the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. Professor Bond's research focuses primarily on judgment and decision making in consumer settings. In prior work, he has examined confirmatory processing during the decision process and prescriptive methods for mitigating the effects of irrelevant context. More recently, he has been involved in various projects related to objectives-based decision making, focusing on impediments to the generation or elicitation of objectives. In other work, Professor Bond is exploring the interplay of intuitive and reason-based approaches to information processing and preference formation, and he is examining the ways in which descriptions of an experience can alter consumer forecasts, experience, and memory. Professor Bond teaches courses in marketing management and consumer behavior at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Address: College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30308-0520; sam.bond@mgt.gatech.edu . Kurt A. Carlson (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") was born in Kenosha, Wisconsin. He has a B.S. and M.S. in agricultural and applied economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. He has worked for the Wisconsin Center for Dairy Research and Wisconsin Milk Marketing Board, and most recently he was on the faculty at Duke University from 2001 to 2009. Dr. Carlson is an assistant professor at Georgetown University. Dr. Carlson's research focuses on the intersection of economics and psychology, with a specific emphasis on individual decision processes. Though much of his research explores consumer decision making, he also studies how voters, jurors, and managers make decisions. His research has been published in several top journals in marketing, psychology, and management. Dr. Carlson teaches courses on market intelligence, consumer behavior, and marketing management. Address: McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, 578 Hariri Building, Washington, DC 20057; kc377@georgetown.edu . Michel Denuit (" Bivariate Stochastic Dominance and Substitute Risk-(In)dependent Utilities ") is a professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), Institut de Statistique, Biostatistique et Sciences Actuarielles. He has done extensive research in the area of actuarial risk theory, especially in stochastic inequalities and dominance relations. Address: Institut de Statistique, Biostatistique et Sciences Actuarielles (ISBA), Université Catholique de Louvain, 20 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; michel.denuit@uclouvain.be . Louis Eeckhoudt (" Bivariate Stochastic Dominance and Substitute Risk-(In)dependent Utilities ") received a Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University in 1970. Since then and until his retirement in 2004 he taught economics at the Catholic Faculties of Mons, Belgium. He now holds a research position at IÉSEG School of Management (Lille, France) and is also a research associate with CORE (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium). His work deals mostly with the economics of risk and the analysis of risk attitudes. Address: IÉSEG, 3 Rue de la Digue, F-59000 Lille, France; louis.eeckhoudt@fucam.ac.be . Charles M. Harvey (" Cardinal Scales for Health Evaluation ") is a retired professor from the Department of Decision and Information Sciences at the University of Houston. He received his Ph.D. in pure mathematics at Stanford University. Soon afterward, he changed his research interests to applied mathematics, and a decade later— after writing the textbook Operations Research, published by North-Holland in 1979—he focused on decision analysis. His research has been primarily in the development of prescriptive models in which preferences are shown to satisfy certain conditions if and only if they are represented by functions having a certain structure. Sections 4–7 of the present paper present models of this type. He is a proponent of new theory that is applicable. He has taught at six universities and has held nonteaching positions at the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis. Address: 5902 NW Pinewood Place, Corvallis, OR 97330; cmharvey1@earthlink.net . Ralph L. Keeney (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") is a research professor at Duke University, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, North Carolina. Professor Keeney's areas of expertise are decision analysis, risk analysis, and management decision-making. He is an authority on decision making with multiple objectives. His experience includes corporate management problems, risk analyses, public policy, large-scale siting studies (e.g., airports, power plants), and environmental studies. Dr. Keeney has been a consultant for several organizations including Fair Isaac, Seagate Technology, American Express, British Columbia Hydro, Pacific Gas and Electric, Kaiser Permanente, GTE, Hunton & Williams, the Electric Power Research Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Energy. Address: Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, P.O. Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120; keeney@duke.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editor… ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from UCLA. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) and is now on the Scientific Advisory Committee for the USC Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorist Events. Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; lrkeller@uci.edu . Alen Nosić (" How Riskily Do I Invest? The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, and Overconfidence ") recently completed his Ph.D. at the University of Mannheim in the area of behavioral finance. In his current research he focuses on determinants of risk-taking behavior in investment decisions and on the question of which factors drive changes in risk-taking behavior over time. Address: Chair of Business Administration, University of Mannheim, L 5, 2, 68131 Mannheim, Germany; alennosic@yahoo.de . Lars Peter Østerdal (" Cardinal Scales for Health Evaluation ") is a professor in the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Copenhagen in 2004. His research interests include health economics, welfare economics, and game theory. His current research focuses on rationing methods and cost-sharing methods, pricing in networks, quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) models, stochastic dominance theory, and studies of childhood poverty in Mozambique and Vietnam. He teaches courses in health economics, game theory, and general microeconomics. Address: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark; lars.p.osterdal@econ.ku.dk . Bjørn Sandvik (" Sensitivity Analysis of Risk Tolerance ") is an associate professor of economics at the University of Bergen and holds a Ph.D. from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. He teaches finance and does research in finance and public economics. Address: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgate 14, N-5007 Bergen, Norway; bjorn.sandvik@econ.uib.no . Lars Thorlund-Petersen (" Sensitivity Analysis of Risk Tolerance ") is the Sparebanken Nord-Norge Professor of Financial Economics at the Bodø Graduate School of Business, Norway. He teaches courses in decision analysis and game theory. His research interests include game theory and strategic behavior of agents in the presence of incentive systems determined, for example, by specific cost-sharing or rationing rules. He investigates decisions under uncertainty, with emphasis on risk preferences, utility functions, and stochastic dominance. He received his Ph.D. in mathematical economics from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Address: Bodø Graduate School of Business, Mørkvedtraakket, N-8049 Bodø, Norway; lars.thorlund-petersen@hibo.no . Martin Weber (" How Riskily Do I Invest? The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, and Overconfidence ") holds a chair for Banking and Finance at the University of Mannheim. Born in 1952, he studied mathematics and business administration and received his Ph.D. as well as his Habilitation for Business Administration from the University of Aachen. He spent about three years as a visiting scholar at UCLA, the Wharton School, Stanford University, and the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. His main interests lie in the area of banking, behavioral finance, and its psychological foundations. He is the author of numerous publications in these areas and coauthor of textbooks on decision analysis and banking. He served as director (1997–2002) and deputy director (2003–2008) for the Sonderforschungsbereich 504 of the German National Science Foundation (rationality, decision making, and economic modelling), and he serves on the editorial board of various national and international journals. Dr. Weber was dean of the Faculty for Business Administration, University of Mannheim from April 2004 to March 2006, is a member of the German Academy of Natural Scientists Leopoldina, and is a member of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. He was awarded an honorary doctoral degree by the University of Münster in June 2007. Address: Chair of Business Administration, University of Mannheim, L 5, 2, 68131 Mannheim, Germany; weber@bank.bwl.uni-mannheim.de .

{B}INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS - ICSU{/B}{P} {B}{P} Science International Newsletter No. 67 pril 1998{P} {/B} ISSN 1011-6257{P} April 1998{P} {B} Code Number:NL98001 {BR} Sizes of Files: {BR} Text: 55k {BR} No associated graphics files {/B}{P} {B} ABOUT ICSU{/B}{P} {B}Members of the ICSU General Committee for the period 1996-1999:{P} {/B} Officers{br} Representatives of International Scientific Union Member (with year appointed){br} Representatives of National Scientific Members (with year elected) {B}{P} EDITORIAL{/B}{P} The role of ICSU in a rapidly changing world{P} As you know from previous issues of {I}Science international, {/I}an assessment of the International Council for Scientific Unions by an international group of distinguished scientists was completed in 1996. The aim of this assessment was to see how ICSU should evolve in a rapidly changing world.{P} {B}TROPICAL CYCLONE DISASTERS{P} {/B} Sir James Lighthill, SC-IDNDR{P} In the Joint ICSU/WAAO project on Tropical Cyclone Disasters it has been well appreciated that ICSU's contribution can most appropriately be concentrated on oceanographic and air-sea-interaction aspects of Tropical Cyclone Disasters, in ways that will complement the in-depth expertise of WMO in meteorological and hydrographic aspects and on effective delivery of forecasts and warnings. Accordingly, during the 1997 preparations for the WMO/ICSU 4th International Workshop on Tropical Cyclones (Haiku, China, 21 to 30 April 1998), ICSU representatives readily consented to provide the preliminary discussion document related to air-sea interactions. {P} {B}DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED GLOBAL OBSERVING STRATEGY{P} {/B} Sophie Boyer-King{p} Over the past few months, major steps have been made towards the development of an Integrated Observing Strategy (IGOS).{P} {B} NEWS ON DIVERSITAS ACTIVITIES{P} {/B} OECD Megascience Forum on Global Scale Issues{P} Strengthening the Interaction Between Science and Policy Making{P} Diversitas was invited to participate in a Workshop on Global-Scale issues, sponsored by the {I}OECD, {/I}which brought together scientists and policymakers to critically examine the role of the scientific community in providing analysis and advice on global scale issues to government officials and other decision-makers. {P} {B}CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY{P} Articles meeting{P} {/B}{P} The Convention on Biodiversity's (CBD) scientific and technical and technological advisory body (SBSTTA) periodically reviews selected issues following instructions from the Conference of Parties to the Convention. DIVERSITAS, through a Memorandum of Cooperation, offers its expertise to the Convention, and this meeting to assess the Articles of the CBD is a part of the collaborative process.{P} {B}Convenors meeting{P} Biodiversity Dynamics: Challenges for the Future{P} {/B} The purpose of this meeting which immediately follows the Convention on Biological Diversity Articles meeting, is to bring together the convenors and the Scientific Steering Committee members of DIVERSITAS, to discuss the overall programme and to give update statements on each of the Programme Elements.{P} {B} NEWS FROM REGIONAL SECRETARIATS OF COSTED{P} {/B} Veena Ravichandran, Senior Scientific Officer, COSTED{P} {B}Arab region{P} {/B}The COSTED Regional Secretariat in the Arab region operates under the able stewardship of Professor Wajih M Owais, Dean, Faculty of Science, Yarmouk University in Irbid, Jordan.{P} {B}Information dissemination{br} {/B}The Secretariat is considering the publication of a regional newsletter to circulate information on Science and Technology developments pertinent to the region and to provide greater visibility to COSTED in the region. {P} {B}Operation{br} {/B}The members of the regional Programme Advisory Board assist in the development of regional projects which are then selected for consideration under the COSTED regional programme and submission to other agencies for funding.{P} {B}Western and Central Africa{P} {/B}Professor Marian E. Addy, who heads the Biochemistry Department at the University of Ghana in Legon is the Secretary of this Regional COSTED Secretariat covering the Western and Central African region.{P} {B}Networking Natural Products Research{br} {/B}Although not quite finalised yet, this secretariat has initiated activities towards the formation of a network of natural products research scientists in the Western African sub-region. {P} {b}Central secretariat{P} COSTED-USIU Course on "Technology Management"{/b}{br} In response to the direction from the Executive Committee encouraging COSTED to undertake appropriate activities in Technology Management, the Central Secretariat conceived a four week intensive course on Technology Management in co-operation with the United States International University in San Diego, USA. {P} {B}COSTED Occasional Paper Series{br} {/B}COSTED is charged with the responsibility of influencing public policy in science and technology. Towards this end a new activity has been initiated by the Central Secretariat which involves the publication of a monograph series called the "COSTED Occasional Papers", aimed at influencing public policy for science and addressing emerging and enduring issues in science and technology which have a particular importance for developing countries. {P} {B}COSTED REGIONAL SECRETARIES MEET AT CHENNAI{P} {/B} Regional Secretaries of COSTED met at Chennai during Feb. 1617, 1998 at a meeting, the first of its kind. The meeting was convened by the Scientific Secretary with the primary purpose of formulating major Pan-COSTED programmes.{P} {B}CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ARAB REGION{P} {/B}February 25-26 1998, Cairo, Egypt{P} The above conference was organised with the primary objective of enhancing the awareness and preparedness of the Arab countries in coping with the challenges posed by the new Intellectual Property Regime and taking advantage of the opportunities presented therein.{P} {B}COSTED PUBLICATIONS{P} {/B} Concepts in Biotechnology.{br} Regional Land Cover Changes, Sustainable Agriculture and their Interactions with Global Change.{P} {B} JOURNAL PUBLISHING IN LATIN AMERICA{P} {/B} Ana Maria Cetto, ICSU Press{P} A Second International Workshop on Scientific Publications in Latin America was held in Guadalaiara in November ]997, as a follow-up to the First Workshop held three years earlier (see Science International No. 59, March 1995). {P} {b}THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOM{P} K. Evers, Executive Secretary, SCRES{P} {/b}This is a Swedish Radio 40-minute programme in which a panel of three scientists and/or philosophers discuss a chosen topic. Kathinka Evers, Executive Secretary of ICSU Standing Committee on Responsibility and Ethics in Science (SCRES) participated in two such programmes, endeavouring to make ICSU/SCRES more publicly known.{P} {B}EU DATABASE DIRECTIVE RAISES HACKLES{P} {/B}Controversial European Legislation aimed at protecting the rights of database owners went into effect last week, and scientists around the world are worried that publishers will use it to make access to data too expensive for cash-strapped academics. {B}{P} IUPAC PLANS LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND PROPOSES OPERATIONAL CHANGE{/B}{P} Edwin D. Backer, Secretary General, IUPAC{P} With the major changes that have occurred worldwide in chemistry and the chemical industry, the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry has found it essential examine its activities and delineate its role as the organization principally responsible for promotion of the chemical sciences internationally. Following a series of meetings to obtain input from leaders in chemistry on four continents, IUPAC has redefined its mission and established goals and strategies to guide its approach to the shaping of the chemical sciences and the service of chemistry in a rapidly changing world.{P} {B}NEW ACTING GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (IUBMB){P} {/B} IUBMB is happy to announce the appointment of the new Acting General Secretary of IUBMB. Dr. Francis Vella. A native of Malta, he was educated at St. Joseph Convent, Sliema, Malta Lyceuin, and Royal University of Malta. Graduated B.Sc. (1949)and MD (1952). He distinguished himself as a medical student.{P} {B}28TH BIENNIAL CONGRESS OF IAHR{P} {/B} In 1999, the 18th Biennial Congress of the International Association for Hydraulic Research (IAHR) will take place in Graz, Austria.{P} {B} INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR MATHEMATICAL GEOLOGY CONFERENCE{P} {/B} The Annual Conference of the International Association for Mathematical Geology will be held from 5-9 October 1998 in Naples, Italy.{P} {B}NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND FRONTIERS IN DRUG RESEARCH{br} Cyprus, 4-8 May 1998{P} {/B} This conference addresses emerging technologies in drug discovery with special attention to their impact on the chemical and biochemical sciences. The sessions structure have been designed to present both background and futures in each topic addressed and to provide optimal opportunity for discussion.{P} {B}CALENDAR{/B}{P} APRIL 1998{P} 23-25 ICSU Vienna (Austria) ICSU General Committee and Extraordinary General Assembly Board Meeting{P} 27 INASP Oxford (U.K.) Board Meeting{P} MAY 1998{P} 14-15 CSFS Paris (France), Committee Meeting{P} 20-21 ICSU Paris (France), Standing Finance Committee{P} 21-25 ICSTI Loch Lomond (Scotland, UK), General Assembly{P} 14-20 SCOPE Piscataway, NJ (USA), Xth General Assembly{P} 15-26 COSTED San Diego (USA), COSTED-USIU Training Course on Technology Management (Part II){P} {/body} {/html}

When Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in France this week, the world's conflicts were top of mind. Press reports tended to fixate on whether French President Emmanuel Macron could press Xi to distance himself from Russia. But ultimately, the leaders' focus drifted farther south.In a wide-ranging joint statement, Xi and Macron "expressed their opposition to an Israeli offensive on Rafah," called for an "immediate and sustainable ceasefire," railed against the possibility of regional escalation, and even endorsed the idea of a worldwide truce to coincide with this summer's Olympic Games in Paris.The statement reflected a remarkable shift in China's diplomatic approach to the world — or, perhaps more precisely, a remarkable shift in how powerful states now treat Beijing. After decades of playing a secondary role in world politics, China is now getting used to the great power treatment, making itself visible wherever diplomacy is happening.Examples abound: Last year, China sent shockwaves through Washington when it oversaw the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a major step in reducing tensions between two of the most hostile powers in the Middle East. And, as the war in Ukraine drags on, China has dispatched a special envoy to push for negotiations, securing high-level meetings with officials on both sides of the conflict.Beijing has even taken on a larger role in that most sensitive of issues: the Israel-Palestine conflict. China hosted Fatah and Hamas — the leading Palestinian factions — for reconciliation talks last week, and observers expect that this mediation role could continue in the coming months and years.From Washington, this can all look a bit frightening. After three decades of unipolarity, many U.S. policymakers still cling to the idea that America and its allies are the sole guarantors of international peace. A rising China, in the minds of many, must mean a falling U.S.But experts say that a deep breath is in order. Despite these latest moves, Beijing still has a ways to go before it surpasses Washington in its ability to shape geopolitics. As China grows into its new role, there are no shortage of opportunities for cooperation on issues that matter deeply to each country, especially in places where the U.S. is no longer seen as a credible go-between. There may even be openings to influence Beijing's approach to the world in ways that gel better with U.S. interests.China's growing role in diplomacy is thus not a threat but an opportunity. The question remains: Will the U.S. seize it?Three cheers for stabilityAbove all, China and the U.S. share one essential goal in the Middle East: stability. Students of contemporary politics will note that neither side has done a particularly good job of securing that goal in recent years. But limited cooperation could help provide a path forward for the region.China has long professed support for the liberation of Palestine through a two-state solution, a goal that it sees as crucial to solving the problems that plague the Middle East. In the early days of the war between Israel and Hamas, Chinese officials walked a tightrope by maintaining trade ties with Israel while refusing to condemn Hamas. But it carefully avoided any direct involvement in the conflict.Now, China appears to be taking a more active role, expanding its criticism of Israel's actions in Gaza in what many experts view as an attempt to curry favor with the Global South through a topic in which the U.S. has taken a distinctly unpopular stance.The Beijing talks, however, signal more room for cooperation. Hamas and Fatah have for years failed to bridge the rupture created by their brief civil war that lasted between 2006 and 2007. After convening in Beijing last month, the groups thanked China for its efforts "to help strengthen Palestinian internal unity and reached an agreement on ideas for future dialogue," according to China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian.The direct impact of China bringing the factions to the negotiating table should not be overstated, according to Dawn Murphy, a professor at the U.S. National War College. When Beijing mediates, it prefers to act as more of a convener than a direct party to the talks, Murphy told RS. Think Qatar, but a lot bigger."The way in which [China] sees itself as contributing is by bringing the parties together, providing a platform for discussion and serving as a more neutral actor that has legitimacy in the eyes of all of the actors involved," Murphy said. In this sense, China is very much unlike the U.S. Washington has long made clear that it supports Fatah over Hamas, which much of the West views as a terrorist group. But Beijing's stubborn neutrality gives it the legitimacy to host credible talks that could promote reconciliation and help pave the way for a two-state solution in the longer term.China's commitment to neutrality is a reflection of its broader diplomatic strategy of maintaining balanced relations without getting directly involved in its partners' domestic politics. China is very averse to risking its own credibility, preferring to avoid siding with any particular state in a conflict, as Murphy noted.China and countries in the Middle East have significant economic relations that have only deepened over time through partnerships in energy, security and technology. Beijing is the biggest purchaser of Saudi Arabian oil and is also one of Israel's primary trading partners. It is also willing to engage with the Middle East in ways the U.S. won't: China sells military technology to Saudi Arabia that the U.S. heavily restricts, and provides heavily-sanctioned Iran with much-needed capital and trade partnerships, according to veteran journalist James Dorsey.Dorsey, who has written a book about China's role in the Middle East, notes that these partnerships help ensure that states in the region won't act against Chinese interests. Most Middle Eastern states have stayed out of the Taiwan issue and have not condemned the ongoing human rights abuses occurring in China's Xinjiang region. "That's one Chinese objective, and they've been very successful in that," Dorsey told RS.But that doesn't mean that China is all-powerful. For all of Beijing's rhetoric, it has not been able to alter the course of the current conflict wracking Gaza, Dorsey noted. When you look at negotiation processes for a ceasefire today between Israel and Hamas, as well as discussions about what the post-war world will look like, "China is not in the room."Murphy says it's in the U.S. interest to not dismiss China's desire to resolve these conflicts, citing the Iran-Saudi normalization deal that China helped broker. While negotiations were well underway before China got involved, the outcome of the talks was one that all parties, including the U.S., benefited from. China is in a unique position to seek further detente in the region, Murphy says. Because it has positive relations with every country in the Middle East, as well as legitimacy in the eyes of their rulers, Beijing could theoretically facilitate negotiations between most of the region's states.Indeed, the Biden administration has acknowledged this in limited ways, as Ali Wyne of the International Crisis Group told RS. "Growing instability in the Middle East benefits neither the United States nor China, so U.S. and Chinese efforts in the region need not be zero-sum," Wyne said. "[I]n recent months, the Biden administration has stated that it would welcome China's help in preventing the conflict between Israel and Hamas from metastasizing into a regional conflagration."Dorsey, for his part, warns that China's facilitation has not yielded concrete results thus far. China has also failed to show a willingness to take risks by taking more tangible action, Christopher Chivvis of the Carnegie Endowment told RS."China has demonstrated that its willingness to make sacrifices to try to bring peace and stability to the region is pretty limited," Chivvis said. For example, China doesn't encourage restraint from Iran despite the leverage its relationship with the country provides.If China could match its actions more with its rhetoric, it would serve both Beijing and Washington, Chivvis said. "It would be in China's interest to try to demonstrate that it's willing to actually pay some costs in order to deal with some of the global challenges that are out there," he argued.The Ukraine problemIn Europe, China has had less room to maneuver. Despite its efforts to push for peace negotiations, Beijing has faced strong criticism from the West in recent months for allegedly supplying tech that supports Russia's military invasion in Ukraine.
As Chivvis told RS, China has tried to walk a fine line between its close ties with Russia and its need to maintain access to European markets and capital. Close trade ties with Europe allow China's domestic economy to grow at a pace that promotes stability at home, Chivvis noted.
This careful balance has been hard to maintain amid China's indirect support for Russia's war. Relations with Europe have been further strained as Chinese goods flood EU markets and price out European producers.
But some steps in the right direction are being taken. This week, during Xi's multi-stop visit to Europe, he and Macron surprised observers when they agreed to back a worldwide truce during this year's Olympics — a pause that could serve as a jumping off point for peace talks in Ukraine.
"French officials hope Xi's endorsement is a sign that he could use his influence to persuade Russia to reach a truce when President Vladimir Putin travels to China later this month," Reuters reported. The French also said Xi made clear that "Beijing did not intend to supply weapons to Moscow and that it was ready to look into the issue of dual-use materials that enabled Russia's war effort."
As China's military and economic partnerships grow, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have provided China with an opening to increase its diplomatic efforts, according to Wyne of ICG. Nonetheless, Beijing "does not presently seem positioned to make breakthroughs." Chivvis agrees, saying that significant cooperation between the U.S and China is a long way off given the contentious state of relations between the two powers.
But there's no denying one obvious truth: It would be far easier to solve the Ukraine war with China's help than without it. It's now up to the U.S. to decide whether it's willing to face that fact.

The Battle of Kulikovo on September 8, 1380 is rightfully considered one of the most renowned battles of Russian military history. That day, the Russian army under the command of the Grand Duke of Moscow and Vladimir, Dmitry Ivanovich, infl icted a crushing defeat on the army of the powerful Horde temnik and the uncrowned ruler of a large part of the Golden Horde Mamai. In the following decades, through the efforts of several generations of Russian scribes, the "Kulikovo myth" was created, which has been refl ected in the works, chronicles and literary sources of the "Kulikovo cycle". This myth has had a tremendous infl uence onthe subsequent tradition of studying the Battle of Kulikovo and the campaign of 1380 in Russian historical literature. In this paper, the author proposes to take a new look, with due account of the new trends and methods of studying Russian military affairs of the late Middle Ages - early modern times, at one of the components of this "myth" - the estimates of the "numerous" number of Russian troops which exist in scientifi c and especially popular literature, who gave battle to the Horde that day. Based on the available direct and indirect evidence, the author comes to a conclusion that Dmitry Ivanovich's regiments on the Kulikovo fi eld amounted to about 10-12 thousand horse soldiers. ; Куликовская битва 8 сентября 1380 г. по праву считается одним из известнейших сражений русской военной истории. В тот день русская рать под началом великого князя московского и владимирского Дмитрия Ивановича нанесло сокрушительное поражение войску могущественного ордынского темника и некоронованного властителя немалой части Золотой Орды Мамая. В последующие десятилетия усилиями нескольких поколений русских книжников сложился «куликовский миф», нашедший свое отражение в произведениях, летописных и литературных, «куликовского цикла». Этот миф оказал колоссальное влияние на последующую традицию изучения Куликовской битвы и кампании 1380 г. в отечественной исторической литературе. В данной статье автор предлагает взглянуть с учетом новых тенденций и методик в изучении русского венного дела эпохи позднего Средневековья – раннего Нового времени на одну из составляющих этого «мифа» – бытующие в научной и в особенности в популярной литературе «тьмочисленные» оценки численности русского войска, давшего в тот день бой ордынцам. На основе имеющихся прямых и косвенных свидетельств автор приходит к выводу, что полки Дмитрия Ивановича на Куликовом поле насчитывали порядка 10-12 тыс. конных воинов. Библиографические ссылки Азбелев С.Н. Численность и состав войск на Куликово поле // Древняя Русь. Вопросы медиевистики. 2015. № 4(62). 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En los últimos años se han sucedido un número significativo de reuniones del G-20 y ninguna de ellas pudo se calificada de particularmente armoniosa. Nada de sorprendente hay en ello, en última instancia, las reuniones internacionales de este tipo se justifican por la existencia de conflictos reales y, muchas veces, altamente significativos. Aunque hay un público siempre listo para criticar estas convocatorias -(sea porque las asimilan tontamente a una forma de "inacción" política, sea porque entienden, en código populista, que son "gastos" que los ciudadanos no deben pagar)-, lo cierto es que las reuniones internacionales, multi o bilaterales, forman parte de la fisiología normal de la vida política internacional, en su versión más civilizada, la diplomacia. Dicho esto, no es menos cierto que la reunión del G-20 que acaba de concluir en San Petersburgo, donde concurrieron las 20 potencias más relevantes del planeta, más un número muy grande de países "invitados" y de instituciones altamente relevantes, no solamente fue relativamente tensa, en los hechos terminó con resultados muy pobres y fundamentalmente relacionados a temas secundarios de la agenda. Además, por la vía de los hechos, concluyó con la consolidación de una profunda división, aparentemente "tripartita", entre los asistentes en lo que hace al problema medular que marca a fuego la actual coyuntura internacional: la crisis en Siria. Aunque es cierto que los dos grandes líderes enfrentados, Barack Obama y Vladimir Putin, hicieron equilibrios laboriosos para sostener un clima de cordialidad mínima, no es menos cierto que un agudo periodista ruso dio en el clavo cuando dijo: "Este G-20 tuvo lugar porque lo salvó el Parlamento británico con su voto contra Cameron": era obvio que Putin no hubiese podido recibir a Barack Obama y a las potencias occidentales ya en vías de lanzar el castigo contra Siria. En todo caso el documento de clausura de la Conferencia aporta, en primer lugar, información sobre algunos vagos acuerdos en temas relativos a la importancia que los asistentes le dan al tema de retomar el crecimiento económico -(aún no claramente restablecido en las economías desarrolladas y cada vez más balbuceante en los países emergentes)-, insistiendo, mediante el recurso a una retórica ya más que desgastada, en la necesidad de crear empleos bien remunerados, productivos y de calidad, en especial para la población joven. En segundo lugar, la declaración final tiene, sin embargo, un poco más de concreción en lo que hace a la voluntad de impulsar la coordinación internacional en el combate al fraude y a la evasión fiscal y una mención a comenzar a regular el sector bancario "gris", lo que requerirá el montaje de un sistema internacional "automático" (¿?) de intercambio de datos fiscales que debería estar operativo hacia finales del año 2015. Que este punto haya sido tratado y aprobado en San Petersburgo, en Rusia, no deja de ser tragicómico. Todos sabemos que en todas partes "se cuecen habas", y que se pueden encontrar irregularidades en todo tiempo y lugar, pero si hay un país que no respeta nada parecido a algún tipo de regulación financiera internacional, si hay una clase empresarial corrupta y filo mafiosa en el mundo que utiliza sistemáticamente el crimen organizado para fines empresariales, esa es la clase de los "nuevos ricos rusos", criados a la sombra del poder, por ahora interminable, de la troika Putin, Medveded y Gazprom. En consecuencia, de este segundo punto, sólo cabe esperar que la oligarquía rusa (y, más discretamente, los jerarcas del Partido "Comunista" chino y de muchos otros países emergentes) continúen sus conocidas andanzas mientras impulsan declaraciones "anticorrupción" cuyos efectos se aplican, casi exclusivamente, a los países menos poderosos. En tercer lugar, se hizo referencia a algunos aspectos monetarios que también agitan la coyuntura. La previsible modificación de la política expansiva y de tasas de interés bajas de la Reserva Federal de los EE.UU., que está en buena medida detrás de la balbuceante salida de la recesión de muchas economías en la actualidad, preocupa a casi todos los ministros de Hacienda de las economías más significativas. En otros términos, mientras que, como veremos en el punto siguiente, en materia política y militar soberbios y principistas presidentes, celosos defensores de soberanías nacionales a veces muy poco dignas, entienden que los EE.UU. no deben auto-adjudicarse un papel de relieve en la toma de decisiones de la Comunidad Internacional, en materia financiera los ministros de economía de esos mismos países suplican que la previsible alza de tasas de interés que prepara el Reserva Federal les sea previamente comunicada y "calibrada con prudencia", -(como si la decisión de subir su tasa de interés no fuese una decisión soberana de los EE.UU.)-, porque saben que, en muchos casos, cuando llegue ese momento, se acabará la fiesta y las posibilidades de jugar a ser potencias emergentes, salvo en uno o dos casos, pasarán a mejor vida. Pero el ya mencionado bloqueo de la reunión se transformó en una verdadera fractura política en lo que concierne al tema álgido de la agenda: la guerra civil en Siria, el uso de armas químicas casi seguramente por parte del régimen de Bachar el-Assad y la voluntad abiertamente exhibida por los EE.UU. y Francia de proceder a una intervención punitiva en ese país por el uso de armas químicas y las masacres sistemáticas que el Assad lleva a cabo sobre su propia población. Con el campo occidental, y con la necesidad urgente de castigar al régimen alauita, se alinearon, además de los dos mencionados, Arabia Saudita, Australia, Canadá, Corea del Sur, Italia, Japón, el Reino Unido, Turquía y España. A este grupo vino a agregarse, algo sorpresivamente y a último momento, Alemania, llevando a 12 el número de países que entiende que algo debe de hacerse y rápido. Pero, aunque estos 12 países son altamente relevantes cada uno de por sí, y todavía más tomados en conjunto, aún así este resultado para Barack Obama era un resultado más bien pobre porque, a su vez, Rusia y China, lograron también un bloque en una postura exactamente contraria. Es obvio que Rusia y China, que tienen totalmente paralizado el funcionamiento del Consejo de Seguridad desde hace mas de dos años -(en última instancia, bñoquean el funcionamiento del único instrumento que puede introducir algún elemento de juridicidad en el terreno internacional)-, se apresuraron a construir inmediatamente una "coalición" contraria a todo castigo a Siria, con el apoyo de estados cuyas políticas exteriores, en su mayoría, recurren sistemáticamente al terrorismo, como Irán, y a los emergentes "segundones" de la firma "BRICS" (Brasil y Sudáfrica) que, convencidos de que sí importan internacionalmente, no pierden oportunidad de aliarse con Irán algunos, con Zimbabwe otros, terminando así enrolados con las peores compañías y renegando de sus mejores tradiciones. Es importante destacar que hubo en San Petersburgo una tercera posición, integrada por una decena de países que se aferraron a la muy respetable postura de abstenerse y no tomar partido en un tema cuya complejidad el lector conoce ampliamente, y ello respondiendo a una profusa diversidad de razones nacionales que no hacen al tema analizado en esta nota editorial. En reunión posterior, llevada a cabo inmediatamente después de concluida la conferencia del G-20, el sábado 7, en Vilnius, Lituania, entre John Kerry y los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de los 28 países de la Unión Europea, algunos nuevos pasos se dieron en el sentido de hacer avanzar las diferentes propuestas que entienden que es necesario sancionar de alguna manera al régimen de Bachar el-Assad. Hacia la tarde de ese mismo sábado, Catherine Ashton anunciaba un acuerdo generalizado entre todas las partes pero, expresado en términos tan meticulosamente medidos que su eficacia quedó parcialmente erosionada. Los EE.UU. y la UE acordaron que había "fuertes presunciones" de que el utilizador de las armas químicas el 21 de agosto había sido el régimen sirio, que debería esperarse el informe final de los inspectores de las Naciones Unidas que concurrieron al lugar de los hechos y que, sobre esta base, recién se decidirían las características de la "fuerte respuesta" que la actitud del gobierno sirio eventualmente merecía. Es de hacer notar que en Lituania, además de Francia, Dinamarca reclamó abiertamente -(y por primera vez)- que se procediese a castigar militarmente a Siria. Aunque el resultado final de la reunión de Vilnius fue más bien proclive a la postura estadounidense, su efecto fue marginal y solamente confortó en algo al Presidente Hollande que hubo de sentirse algo menos solitario en el seno de la Unión Europea. En paralelo, mientras la OTAN toma fuertes y activas medidas de defensa abierta de su principal socio en la región, Turquía reclama, no solamente la intervención sino, también, el ataque directo al régimen de el-Assad y su derrocamiento. La OTAN, según las declaraciones de Rasmussen, sin alinearse con la posición turca, piensa que los ataques con armas químicas no pueden quedar impunes. En resumen, la diplomacia he llegado a un "impasse" del que no parece poder desembarazarse fácilmente. Seguramente, Obama deberá emprender inmediatamente el laborioso camino de obtener la luz verde de su propio Congreso y quizás, durante ese forzado interludio, algo permita destrabar el bloqueo que se hereda de San Petersburgo. En todo caso, algo de eso parece estar en marcha. En vísperas del cierre de nuestra edición, los EE.UU. procederán a un voto preparatorio, y esencialmente procedimental, en el Senado el día miércoles 11. Ante esta perspectiva, Moscú, en la madrugada del martes 10, propuso intentar de convencer al régimen de Bachar el-Assad de entregar la totalidad de su arsenal de armas químicas a la Comunidad internacional. Todo esto parece particularmente difuso y poco realizable en plazos razonables. Evidentemente, esta triste historia está lejos de ver el final.

Vastos y diversos son los ejemplos populistas a lo largo de la historia, así como también lo son los conceptos y características que se han creado alrededor de este movimiento El primer error que se comete a la hora de su denominación surge cuando muchos analistas hablan de "Populismos democráticos" o de "democracias populistas", esta es una clara contradicción, ambos regímenes no pueden coexistir. Aunque muchas veces se puede encontrar cierta comunión en algunos aspectos, es necesario decir que de una u otra manera la "democracia perfecta" no tiene ninguna conexión con el "populismo perfecto" y viceversa.Si tuviéramos que englobar al Populismo dentro de uno de los tres grandes regímenes que hemos desarrollado podemos decir que se alejan bastante de los totalitarismos, que están innegablemente relacionados con la democracia, pero que se ubican enteramente dentro de los regímenes autoritarios.Si analizamos un poco mas en profundidad esta última situación, podemos observar que ambos responden a una lógica similar: carecen de una definición universalmente aceptada, son definidas negativamente y generalmente surgen como degeneraciones de la democracia.El mencionado debilitamiento de la democracia parece ser el punto de convergencia para el surgimiento de estas corrientes populistas. América Latina es un verdadero paradigma de esta situación, ya que el siglo pasado desplegó, en mayor o menor medida numerosos ejemplos populistas que encontraron el camino hacia el gobierno en factores como la crisis ante el crash del 29, el surgimiento y consolidación de las masas como actores políticos, las demandas insatisfechas y fundamentalmente el debilitamiento de las instituciones. En este sentido se desprende una lógica fundamental de estos regímenes: se ubican por fuera de la discusión entre izquierda y derecha, son fenómenos anti-liberales y muchas veces anti-comunistas.Siguiendo el análisis es necesario soslayar que no responden o no se fundamentan en una ideología previa, con cada régimen se crea una nueva legalidad. Esta construcción del concepto de "legalidad sustantiva" es uno de los primeros síntomas del distanciamiento con la democracia.Básicamente los regímenes populistas crean su propio régimen jurídico, el cual dispone lo que sea necesario en virtud de los intereses políticos del gobierno. Lo que se traduce inevitablemente en la desaparición de legitimidad jurídica antes establecida, lo que como consecuencia lesiona la esfera de libertad de la ciudadanía.Ejemplos de regímenes populistasHay una clara tendencia a relacionar regímenes populistas con gobiernos latinoamericanos. Esto lamentablemente es irrefutable, la historia del siglo XX nos presenta los ejemplos, entre otros, del PRI mexicano, del Peronismo en Argentina y de Vargas en Brasil. Sumado a esto la historia parece "repetirse" en el comienzo del siglo XXI, con el Chavismo en Venezuela, con Correa en Ecuador y con la Bolivia de Evo Morales.Hay que hacer una salvedad al momento de decir que la historia populista vuelve a repetirse, ya que la heterogeneidad de estos movimientos y los distintos contextos a los que se enfrentaron, no nos permiten hacer una generalización.Para marcar esta diferenciación entre los populismos clásicos latinoamericanos y los "neo-populismos" actuales recurrimos al trabajo presentado por Hector Leis y Eduardo Viola, "El dilema de América del Sur en el siglo XXI". El cual señala que, la historia del populismo latinoamericano "apareció asociada al apoyo de las grandes masas de la población, pero nunca fue pensado como una herramienta para la construcción de las bases de la democracia política" mientras que ahora "el populismo aparece construyendo la democracia, haciendo ingresar a los excluidos en el sistema político democrático" pero no necesariamente creando ciudadanía.Una comparación necesariaPara continuar con la caracterización de estos regímenes y para ampliar el espectro populista por fuera de América Latina me parece interesante hacer una pequeña comparación entre los medios utilizados por Chávez en Venezuela y Putin en Rusia.El caso de Chávez no deja dudas, es el paradigma de los populismos en la región. El caso de Putin es un poco mas difuso, claramente se inscribe dentro de los regímenes autoritarios, y como desarrollaremos a continuación, presenta muchos rasgos populistas.Tomaremos como punto de partida el trabajo presentado en Letras Internacionales, "Reflexiones sobre el populismo político en la democracia" por Sebastián Bidegain en el cual se señala que el populismo niega la política en tres instancias.1. "es contrario a la democracia por su constitución"No es necesario aclarar mucho sobre una Venezuela gobernada por un Chávez militar que intento llegar al poder por medio de un golpe de Estado en 1992 y con clara orientación antidemocrática. Y que en estos más de 12 años de gobierno ha modificado y creado las instituciones necesarias para consolidar la "revolución bolivariana".El régimen ruso de Vladimir Putin, ex agente de la KGB, tampoco se distingue por sus características democráticas. En 1999 llega al poder tras la renuncia del anterior presidente (Boris Yeltsin) y en 2000 se consolida como presidente de la potencia rusa y desde entonces sobran los cuestionamientos en cuanto a la legitimidad de su gobierno y sobre todo en la forma en que se han desarrollado las consultas populares.2. "limita o restringe la acción de los partidos tradicionales y de la oposición"Tanto Venezuela como Rusia nos muestran innumerables ejemplos de esta situación de hostigamiento y persecución de la oposición.Putin en períodos anteriores a las elecciones se ha encargado de poner infinitas trabas a sus opositores, medidas que van desde las sanciones a las manifestaciones públicas, o la limitación a la creación de nuevos movimientos sindicales, hasta llegar finalmente al encarcelamiento o el exilio de potenciales y serios competidores.Chávez ha creado un régimen que abarca todo, que hizo llegar la revolución hasta las autoridades electorales; situación que provocó la retirada de la oposición de 2006. Como no podía ser de otra manera, también ha restringido la posibilidad de hacer campañas electorales y son incontables las amenazas a los "oligarcas e imperialistas" culpables de todos los males venezolanos.3. "niega la prudente administración del tiempo político"Un rasgo importante de estos regímenes son las promesas populares, que intentan encantar a las masas, "al pueblo" y de esta manera buscar la forma de permanecer en el poder por largos periodos de tiempo.Nuevamente tanto Rusia como Venezuela han consolidado este escenario.Chávez logró plebiscitar la reelección indefinida y si el cáncer lo permite, seguirá siendo el dueño de Venezuela por el tiempo que lo desee.Putin, en principio, ha sido un poco mas sutil para perpetuarse en el poder. Luego de gobernar hasta 2008, propone a Dimitri Medvedev como su sucesor, ubicándose Putin como Primer Ministro (lo que le permitió seguir siendo quien mueve los hilos en el gobierno). En este período se amplía el mandato presidencial de 4 a 6 años. Este año Putin, retomó "oficialmente" el poder y por lo tanto es extremadamente posible que se mantenga hasta 2024.Otros rasgos populistas presentes en ambos regímenesLa institucionalización de la corrupción y la aparición del clientelismo político son otros de los tantos puntos comunes entre el régimen ruso y el venezolano. Ambos han creado una nueva clase empresarial, súper poderosa y en estrecha relación con el gobierno. Por ejemplo, en Rusia solo siete personas tienen el 40% del PBI del país y son los principales socios de las empresas estatales. En el caso de Chávez, se encarga de financiar nuevos "empresarios populares".Otro gran factor común entre ambos regímenes es el discurso anti-elitista y anti-imperialista. A nivel externo se oponen claramente a Estados Unidos (pese a la estrecha relación comercial que ambos gobiernos mantienen con la potencia estadounidense). Generalmente lo acusan de ser el culpable de todos los males a los que se enfrentan sus países. A nivel interno se encargan de perseguir a ciertos sectores de la sociedad, mientras Chávez habla de "neutralizar los planes de una burguesía desesperada. una burguesía que se apoderó del país y traicionó el proyecto de Bolívar". Putin se encarga de encarcelar a empresarios súper millonarios que han presentado ciertas diferencias con su régimen.A nivel económico, como no podía ser de otra manera, los mencionados regímenes son claramente intervensionistas. Putin y sus miembros más cercanos tienen importantes acciones en las principales empresas estatales. El caso de Chávez es bastante menos discreto, ya que se encarga de nacionalizar y expropiar cualquier tipo de empresa. También hay que mencionar que ambos gobernantes constantemente hablan de la redistribución de los recursos donde aplican grandes planes populares "buscando reducir las desigualdades", lo cierto es que siempre son aplicados en situaciones coyunturales claves, por ejemplo en momentos de crisis o elecciones.Es fundamental entender que este tipo de regímenes no tiene otro tiempo que el presente, por lo tanto, están dispuestos a hacer y prometer lo que sea para mantenerse en el poder. Ni siquiera importa fundir al país para lograr una reelección o para mantener al "pueblo" conforme.A modo de reflexión final, es necesario destacar que, aunque en teoría la Venezuela de Chávez y la Rusia de Putin presenten innumerables rasgos comunes, se diferencian en una gran característica:Chávez ha consolidado su régimen, ha logrado abarcar todos los ámbitos relevantes en su país, donde es el principal eslabón, hasta el punto que parece inimaginable la posibilidad de un Chavismo sin Chávez.Putin, como hemos observado es claramente populista, la cuestión es que su socio Dimitri Medvedev no se acercó tanto a este tipo de gobierno, lo que implicó un cierto retroceso en la consolidación del régimen populista. De todas formas, yo creo que, en lo que seguramente serán 12 años de gobierno, Putin se acercara más y más a este tipo de gobierno.BIBLIOGRAFÍA:• Populismo, recursos naturales y debilidad institucional. Letras Internacionales. Pedro Isern.• América Latina: La democracia en cuestión. Javier Bonilla• El dilema de América Latina en el siglo XXI. Héctor Leis y Eduardo Viola.• http://www.abc.es/20120304/internacional/rc-putin-rusia-201203040214.html• http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=38030 Sobre el autorEstudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales.Depto. de Estudios Internacionales.FACS. Universidad ORT Uruguay.