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Too often, our analyses of nonstate violent groups tend to black box the other aspects of what such groups do. Some groups choose to provide governance (in the form of goods of services) in addition to coordinating violence to achieve political goals. These different kinds of functions, whether violent or not, are all tied to the same underlying organizational structure. From this basic insight, we argue that groups that pursue both governance and violence will tend to have the following organizational structure: clear organizational agenda setting, command and control, and accountability mechanisms. This organizational structure will tend to produce a unique violence profile and allow for the provision of governance. In short, we point out the double-edged sword of organizational structure in terms of the outcomes that groups produce. Using several datasets, including the new Terrorist and Insurgent Organization Social Services dataset that accounts for the provision of social services, we show a preliminary association between violence and governance that demands future exploration. Thus, as a theory-building effort, our work demonstrates the importance of accounting for the diversity of activities that violent groups might pursue and offers evidence for how organizational structure shapes the possibility of pursuing different activities.

Western liberal governments increasingly seek to improve the performance of the public sector by spurring innovation. New Public Management reforms from the 1980s onward viewed strategic entrepreneurial leadership and public–private competition as key drivers of public innovation. By contrast, the current wave of New Public Governance reforms perceives collaboration between relevant and affected actors from the public and private sector as the primary vehicle of public innovation, and tends to see governance networks as potential arenas for collaborative innovation. The new focus on collaborative innovation in networks poses a fundamental challenge for public managers, elected politicians, and others aiming to metagovern governance networks. Hence, we claim that a specific metagovernance strategy is needed when the purpose of governance networks is to stimulate efficiency, effectiveness, and democratic legitimacy through innovation rather than incremental improvements. The article aims to sketch out the contours of such a strategy by comparing it with more traditional metagovernance strategies. The argument is illustrated by an empirical analysis of an example of collaborative innovation in Danish elderly care.