SAS v France: A Reality Check
In: Forthcoming in Nottingham Law Journal, 2016
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In: Forthcoming in Nottingham Law Journal, 2016
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In: European journal of international law, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 461-476
ISSN: 1464-3596
In: European journal of international law, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 461-476
ISSN: 1464-3596
In: 14 Or. Rev. Int'l L. 473
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In: 16 German Law Journal 169-178 (2015)
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The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its loose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of 'prescribed by law', 'necessary in a democratic society', 'public safety', 'public order, health or morals' and 'the rights and freedoms of others'. This article seeks to extract clear principles from the contradictory and confusing jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court's illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation. ; Wolność uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych zgodnie z art. 9 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka nie ma charakteru absolutnego, lecz może być poddana określonym ograniczeniom. Artykuł omawia istotę i zakres tych ograniczeń w świetle orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka poczynając od wyroku w sprawie Kokkinakis przeciwko Grecji. Zestawia brzmienie omawianego przepisu Konwencji z jego dość swobodną i niekonsekwentną interpretacją dokonywaną przez Trybunału w Strasburgu. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono następującym kryteriom: "przewidziane przez ustawę", "konieczne w społeczeństwie demokratycznym", "bezpieczeństwo publiczne", "porządek publiczny, zdrowie i moralność" oraz "prawa i wolności innych osób". Artykuł stawia sobie za cel wyprowadzenie czytelnych zasad z orzecznictwa, w którym nie brak sprzeczności i niejasności, wiążących się szczególnie z przyjmowaną przez Trybunał zwodniczą doktryny marginesu oceny.
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The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its loose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of 'prescribed by law', 'necessary in a democratic society', 'public safety', 'public order, health or morals' and 'the rights and freedoms of others'. This article seeks to extract clear principles from the contradictory and confusing jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court's illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation. ; Wolność uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych zgodnie z art. 9 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka nie ma charakteru absolutnego, lecz może być poddana określonym ograniczeniom. Artykuł omawia istotę i zakres tych ograniczeń w świetle orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka poczynając od wyroku w sprawie Kokkinakis przeciwko Grecji. Zestawia brzmienie omawianego przepisu Konwencji z jego dość swobodną i niekonsekwentną interpretacją dokonywaną przez Trybunału w Strasburgu. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono następującym kryteriom: "przewidziane przez ustawę", "konieczne w społeczeństwie demokratycznym", "bezpieczeństwo publiczne", "porządek publiczny, zdrowie i moralność" oraz "prawa i wolności innych osób". Artykuł stawia sobie za cel wyprowadzenie czytelnych zasad z orzecznictwa, w którym nie brak sprzeczności i niejasności, wiążących się szczególnie z przyjmowaną przez Trybunał zwodniczą doktryny marginesu oceny.
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In: http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/34356
Human rights reflect a determined effort to protect the dignity of each and every human being against abuse of power. This endeavour is as old as human history. What is relatively new is the international venture for the protection of human dignity through internationally accepted legal standards and generally accessible mechanisms for implementation. That mission got a major impetus with the founding of the United Nations in 1945. While the primary focus of the international project for the realisation of human rights used to be on ways and means of limiting and governing political power, other institutions than the state are coming within its range of attention, too, including those of the corporate world. Recently, a 'human rights approach' to poverty has gained a prominent place on the development agenda. When human rights are seen as not just legal resources but also political instruments, this means that power is to be regarded as legitimate only if international human rights standards are followed. Legitimacy, in other words, becomes the core concept, referring to the right institutions and principles, the right procedures and also normatively acceptable outcomes. Hence, rights-based approaches to overcome poverty imply efforts to address economic injustices as well, in the first place at the level of the global economy as such.
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In: Journal of human rights, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 291-306
ISSN: 1475-4843
In: 66 Duke Law Journal 1 (2016)
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In: The age of human rights journal, Heft 6, S. 24-41
ISSN: 2340-9592
In a context of progressive deterritorialization, the analysis of the judicial dialogue has certain profits when reformulating some aspects of a particular way of understanding the law, characterized by the principle of territoriality and by a theory of the sources of law in which the judge has a clearly secondary position in relation to the legislature and in which the sources are relevant since they are understood as explicit expression of a will. This paper describes the operability of the dialogue between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights which, horizontally and voluntarily, can help create a context of community in relation to the contents of human rights, based on the recognition of the value of judicial arguments and the judge's self-understanding as members of a hermeneutical community.
In: International Journal of Constitutional Law, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 732-740
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In: Routledge research in human rights law
"This book provides analysis and critique of the dual protection of human rights in Europe by assessing the developing legal relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The book offers a comprehensive consideration of the institutional framework, adjudicatory approaches, and the protection of material rights within the law of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It particularly explores the involvement and participation of stakeholders in the functioning of the EU and the ECtHR, and asks how well the new legal model of 'the EU under the ECtHR' compares to current EU law, the ECHR and general international law. Including contributions from leading scholars in the field, each chapter sets out specific case-studies that illustrate the tensions and synergies emergent from the EU-ECHR relationship. In so doing, the book highlights the overlap and dialectic between Europe's two primary international courts. The book will be of great interest to students and researchers of European Law and Human Rights"--
"As I'm writing this, Christians are brutally murdering Muslims in the Central African Republic; people in Syria are being bombed, starved, and tortured; and homosexuals still face the death penalty in Iran as well as long prison sentences in countries like Uganda and Nigeria and persecution by thugs in many countries. These atrocities and many other disturbing phenomena are often called "human rights violations." What gives them this status? That is a question about which there has been a surprising amount of disagreement among political philosophers."
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