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Moral damages under international investment law have been extensively addressed in the literature. Notoriously, arbitral tribunals have subjected any claim for moral damages to a requirement unknown to general international law, that is exceptional circumstances. This practice is widely criticised in the field mainly due to the seeming inconsistency with general international law. This article challenges this view by arguing that a deviation from general international law does not – in and of itself – suffice to discard the tribunals' approach. This argument is based on the insight that general international law only deals with inter-State responsibility and is, thus, open to deviations from general international law in case of State responsibility vis-à-vis the individual. On that basis, the article explores possible legal bases for exceptional circumstances in international law. While it discards the idea that such a requirement for awarding moral damages is implicit in prior inter-State cases, the article rather argues that the arbitral practice witnesses the emergence of a new rule of customary international law applicable to the responsibility of a State vis-à-vis the individual. Thereby, the article seeks to contribute to the wider debate on the content and contours of State responsibility for claims of the individual.

By examining the relationship between international law and empire from early modernity to the present, this volume improves current understandings of the way international legal institutions, practices, and narratives have shaped imperial ideas about and structures of world governance

This book re-examines the law and practice of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and examines their use of provisional measures both for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and, where appropriate, for protecting individual rights.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Aim and Impetus of This Book -- 1.2 Structure -- 1.3 Terminology -- 1.3.1 Sex and Gender -- 1.3.2 Sexualized and Gender-Based Violence -- 1.3.3 Reproductive Violence -- 1.4 Theoretical and Methodological Background -- 1.4.1 International Criminal Law in the International Legal Order -- 1.4.2 Sources and Interpretation of International Criminal Law -- 1.4.3 Feminist Approaches to International Law -- References -- 2 The Foundation: Sexualized Violence in International Law -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Factual Background: Conflict-Related Sexualized Violence -- 2.2.1 Manifestations of Sexualized Violence in Conflict Situations -- 2.2.2 Effects of Conflict-Related Sexualized Violence -- 2.2.3 Causes of Conflict-Related Sexualized Violence -- 2.2.4 Narratives of Conflict-Related Sexualized Violence -- 2.2.5 Summary -- 2.3 International Humanitarian Law -- 2.3.1 Early Developments -- 2.3.2 The Hague and Geneva Conventions -- 2.3.3 Sexualized Violence and the Concept of "Honour" in International Humanitarian Law -- 2.3.4 Summary -- 2.4 International Criminal Law -- 2.4.1 Before World War II -- 2.4.2 Trials Post-World War II -- 2.4.3 The Cold War Period and Beyond -- 2.4.4 Statutes and Practice of the ad hoc Tribunals -- 2.4.5 The International Criminal Court -- 2.4.6 Other International and Hybrid Courts -- 2.4.7 Summary -- 2.5 International Human Rights Law -- 2.5.1 Human Rights Instruments Focusing on the Protection of Women -- 2.5.2 Soft Law on Sexualized Violence -- 2.6 Conclusion -- References -- 3 Historical Perspectives on Reproductive Violence in International Law -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Factual Background: Conflict-Related Reproductive Violence -- 3.2.1 Historical Overview on Reproductive Violence in Conflict Situations.

Preemption comes in many forms and what we think of it depends on the circumstances. One state may not strike another merely because the second might someday develop an ability and desire to attack it. Yet few would criticize a strike in the midst of an ongoing war against a second state's program to develop new types of weapons. Between these two examples lie countless fact patterns.In the end, each use offeree must find legitimacy in the facts and circumstances that the state believes have made it necessary. Each should be judged not on abstract concepts, but on the particular events that gave rise to it. While nations must not use preemption as a pretext for aggression, to be for or against preemption in the abstract is a mistake. The use of force preemptively is sometimes lawful and sometimes not.

From the end of the Edo period to the beginning of the Meiji period, there was almost no knowledge of international law in the government. I have examined, under these circumstances, how Japan accepted and applied modern international law through several events and national practices. I also discussed how international jurists were born, what role they played in the development of international law, and what influence they had on the subsequent development of modern international law in Japan.

This book discusses the multilayered legal structures concerning the regulation of crimes under international law. It covers both core crimes and other types of crime under international law, and examines relevant substantive and procedural rules alike. Pursuing such a comprehensive approach is essential to understanding the basic frameworks of international criminal law, since the varied perspectives on international crimes are connected to different systems of enforcement. Being aware of this interrelatedness is conducive to an in-depth examination of individual topics in both substantive and procedural aspects. On the basis of such an inquiry, this book concisely provides a systematic overview of international criminal law

Reviews Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism; Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works; Brian A. Lepard, Customary International Law. After a century of benign neglect, international theorizing has taken off. The three contributors to legal theory reviewed here can be placed along a linear spectrum with Posner at the extreme political science end, Lepard at the opposite international law end and Andrew Guzman holding up the middle.