After the Second World War, the effervescence which characterized Africa was partly due to men and women trained in western education and called intellectuals. Indeed, they advocated for significant changes within the colonial empires. Talking about African intellectuals at that time, is to refer to those who used their knowledge as a weapon against any kind of structural domination as well as the concepts and ideas related to that. It is in this wake that Alioune Diop (1910-1980) is situated. He is, may be, one of the less known but one of the most important African intellectuals of the 20th century, due to his commitment that still has impact on Africa today.The initiatives of Alioune Diop as African intellectual aimed to promote the African cultural renascence by valorizing the African identity and legacy, and by considering some positive aspects of the encounter between Africa and the West. In order to achieve this goal, he brought together intellectuals from Africa and African Diaspora, and provided them with an important tool in producing and disseminating knowledge, in a context which was a particular difficult one. Indeed, he founded Présence Africaine as an intellectual review in 1947, also as the first francophone publishing house in 1949, and then as an intellectual movement. He also initiated dialogue between African intellectuals and western intellectuals mainly regrouped within the European Society of Culture (SEC). In the wake of the African cultural renascence, Alioune Diop committed himself in reconciling the 'African identity' namely what African peoples possessed and expressed in their way of life and 'Christianity'. The dissertation particularly considers Catholicism, as a westernized expression of Christianity imported from Europe and presented as incompatible with the African way of life, from the very beginning of the Christian mission of the 19th century in Africa. For this Christian mission, it was impossible to be Christian and African rooted in his cultural identity at the same time. So, many African Christians got westernized and rejected their values, as inconsistent to Christianity. The PhD dissertation which encompasses intellectual history, religious history, political history and art history, by focusing on Alioune Diop, emphasizes the importance of the intellectual biography ("biographie intellectuelle"), as a method of approach and investigation in African history. In the particular context of the 20th century in Africa which witnessed an important development of knowledge as resulting from the commitment of the African intellectuals, this method is relevant in studying African personalities. The intellectual biography of Alioune Diop not only shows his contribution, but also the influence of his intellectual journey in contemporary Africa. In order to demonstrate the importance of the intellectual biography of Alioune Diop in understanding the way the conflicting concepts and realities "African identity" and "Catholicism" needed to be reconciled, the dissertation has dealt with many archives. One of its originality has been the archives of "Présence Africaine" exploited for the first time. The dissertation suggests that there is another side of the commitment of Alioune Diop, less known but which is however a key of comprehension of his initiatives: Christian religion. Indeed, he was also interested in religions, especially Christianity he considered as able to contribute in overcoming the challenges posed to Africa especially after the Second World War as well as in restoring the African dignity. Therefore, a particular attention was paid to Christianity in the events he initiated and organized. Besides, his own experience was marked by religion, for he was firstly Muslim and then became Catholic Christian. For Alioune Diop, it was necessary that Africans overcome the conflict introduced between this religion and Africa by European missionaries.With regard to Catholicism in particular, as a part of the western identity and whose sense means universal, it was important for it to meet the requirements of dialogue not only because the universal is not conceivable without dialogue, but also because the political context of Africa at that time called for that. Indeed, the fight for freedom and independence following the Second World War would have precluded the development of Catholicism if remained opposed to African identity. Therefore, Alioune Diop acted in order to create the possibility of dialogue and reconciliation between African identity and Catholicism, through congresses, conferences, workshops, and many other reflections he initiated. Thus, "African identity and Catholicism", in the intellectual journey of Alioune Diop underlines the necessity to bring together the African reality and the positive aspects of the western legacy, in order to build a real independent Africa which needed both contributions. This also implies the deconstruction of all the categories related to domination, complex of superiority, or rejection of the features of being African, within Catholicism. The dissertation also emphasizes the different transformations of the Catholicism in Africa, as resulting from the initiatives of Alioune Diop, in which many other African intellectuals took part. The current movement of "africanization" of Christianity and particularly Catholicism is mainly a part of the intellectual legacy of Alioune Diop who proposed another way to be Christian in Africa, by being African Christian without the necessity to change the paradigm of being oneself. The dissertation points out the fact that the intellectual initiatives of Alioune Diop in this particular domain need to be continued, since even today the problem of identity remains very important in Africa. Therefore, Africans have to rethink constantly the categories which could entangle the necessity of a permanent dialogue between Africa and its legacy. ; Le XIXe siècle en Afrique noire était non seulement marqué par la l'initiative de la colonisation occidentale, mais aussi par la mission de christianisation. A partir de ce moment jusqu'à la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, l'identité africaine signifiée par un mode de vie particulier était définie en opposition aux valeurs chrétiennes. Il était donc impossible d'être chrétien et Africain en même temps. C'est ainsi que beaucoup d'Africains chrétiens s'occidentalisèrent et rejetèrent leurs coutumes considérées comme les œuvres du démon. Dans le contexte colonial, ceci était considéré comme normal.Après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, les intellectuels africains initièrent beaucoup de mouvements pour affirmer l'identité africaine: ce fut le commencement de l'émancipation culturelle et politique. Un de ces mouvements fut la Société Africaine de Culture, un mouvement intellectuel fondé par Alioune Diop et se situant dans le prolongement de Présence Africaine qui avait déjà rassemblé des intellectuels africains, antillais et européens. Alioune Diop devint alors le leader de l'émancipation culturelle de l'Afrique.En se consacrant à la figure d'Alioune Diop, la thèse souligne l'importance de la biographie intellectuelle, comme méthode de réflexion en histoire africaine. Elle y est présentée comme une approche qui permet de saisir des aspects qui peuvent échapper à l'intérêt accordé aux événements. Une autre caractéristique de cette réflexion est la place accordée à des archives non organisées et aux interviews dans un travail scientifique. La thèse soutient donc qu'il y a une dimension de l'engagement d'Alioune Diop qui, bien que moins connue, constitue une clé de compréhension de sa vie et de son œuvre. Cet intellectuel africain était en effet attentif à la religion et tout particulièrement au christianisme. Il considérait cette religion comme une réalité qui en Afrique pouvait soutenir le changement de nombreuses situations, pour permettre à ses peuples de trouver leur place dans le monde moderne. Ainsi, dans tous les événements qu'il organisa, la religion chrétienne eut une place particulière. Comme le combat d'Alioune Diop consistait à restaurer la dignité africaine au moyen de la culture, le catholicisme, en tant qu'une expression du christianisme alors portée par la culture occidentale essentiellement, avait une place importante dans ses réflexions. La thèse soutient que l'émancipation de l'identité africaine était aussi une émancipation du christianisme en contexte africain, et donc du catholicisme. Elle démontre que le catholicisme dans sa situation actuelle, comme religion africaine, est largement tributaire de l'engagement d'Alioune Diop et des intellectuels qu'il était parvenu à rassembler autour de lui. Cependant, dans le but de comprendre ceci, certaines questions apparaissent importantes: quel est l'exacte contribution d'Alioune Diop dans la correction des dérives de la rencontre entre identité africaine et catholicisme? Comment s'exprime cette rencontre dans un contexte postcolonial? Quels éléments donnent une signification à l'africanisation du catholicisme au XXe siècle? Toutes ces questions structurent l'orientation de ce travail et ouvrent à de nombreux aspects de l'identité africaine à travers d'importants événements comme les deux congrès des écrivains et artistes noirs (Paris et Rome), les deux festivals mondiaux des arts nègres (Dakar et Lagos), les colloques organisés par Alioune Diop avec d'autres intellectuels africains. Il y a aussi une mise en exergue de certaines questions en rapport avec la religion chrétienne: parmi elles, les plus importantes sont: l'œcuménisme, le dialogue entre les religions de l'Afrique en rapport avec la personnalité africaine et l'héritage colonial et postcolonial.
The "ethnic contraption of Nigerian state" was a natural creation ; but exploited by the British through colonisation ; and then propagated by the ethnic nationalities therein through the internally entrenched mindsets. The divergence in political mindset derives from her multi-ethnic composition ; which created a non solid but soluble political environment. This environment so created and the actors in it ; both active and non active attract the attention of scholars who want to probe the continuing poor returns in the democratic adventures of the country. I probed into the fundamental issues responsible for her poor runs on the democratic tracks and the premise was based on the perspectives of people within the three ethnic groups under study ; as well as through the exploratory works of Donald L Horowitz ; and Clifford Geertz which I call the Horowitz- Geertz framework. A strong ethno-political mindset among the three nationalities of Igbo ; Yoruba ; and Hausa-Fulani stood as the nucleus of this study. The mindset is evident in their political philosophies ; their membership of the registered political parties ; their open and discreet political rivalry ; and their pattern of political argument. I found also that the political philosophies of the various personalities in the first republic of 1960-1965 ; and the second republic of 1979-1983 still dominate the present democratic process ; from 1999 to 2011 ; though with minimal difference noticeable only in the personalities within the political parties. I found that some of the major political parties still draw their bulk of supporters or members from the ethnic groups where the parties are formed ; particularly in the Yorubaland and the Igboland. Parties are ethnically based and so won elections within the three ethnic regions. I found as well that the people from these three ethnic groups viewed their political rivalry as normal. Just as the people believed that they are members of their ethnic groups first ; and Nigeria identity as a matter of coincidence. I found that the issue of ethnic mindset is both internally as well as externally influenced. This contributed to the persistent violent ethnic influenced crises among the three ethnic groups under review. I found also that lack of good governance created deep resentment and distrust of the political class by the masses. I established that the negative ethnic mindset and other internally entrenched contingencies combined to sustain the ethnic divide among the three nationalities ; and thereby impede the success of democracy in the country. From 1999 up until 2011 ; development performances by the elected officials are state specific. Unlike in the pre-independence era and also during the first republic of 1960-1965 ; where development was purely regional dependent ; and rivalry among the three ethnic groups was based on developmental performance. In spite of the inheritance of the same colonial political legacy by the three ethnic nationalities of Igbo ; Yoruba ; and Hausa-Fulani ; the discovered political apprehension within the groups ; detailed how ethnic mindset makes nonsense of democratic politics in the country ; and constitute the basis for the poor run that has held down democratic politics in Nigeria. I found also that the political philosophies of the various personalities in the first republic of 1960-1965 ; and the second republic of 1979-1983 still dominate the present democratic process ; from 1999 to 2011 ; though with minimal difference noticeable only in the personalities within the political parties. I found that some of the major political parties still draw their bulk of supporters or members from the ethnic groups where the parties are formed ; particularly in the Yorubaland and the Igboland. Parties are ethnically based and so won elections within the three ethnic regions. I found as well that the people from these three ethnic groups viewed their political rivalry as normal. Just as the people believed that they are members of their ethnic groups first ; and Nigeria identity as a matter of coincidence. I found that the issue of ethnic mindset is both internally as well as externally influenced. This contributed to the persistent violent ethnic influenced crises among the three ethnic groups under review. I found also that lack of good governance created deep resentment and distrust of the political class by the masses. I established that the negative ethnic mindset and other internally entrenched contingencies combined to sustain the ethnic divide among the three nationalities ; and thereby impede the success of democracy in the country. From 1999 up until 2011 ; development performances by the elected officials are state specific. Unlike in the pre-independence era and also during the first republic of 1960-1965 ; where development was purely regional dependent ; and rivalry among the three ethnic groups was based on developmental performance. In spite of the inheritance of the same colonial political legacy by the three ethnic nationalities of Igbo ; Yoruba ; and Hausa-Fulani ; the discovered political apprehension within the groups ; detailed how ethnic mindset makes nonsense of democratic politics in the country ; and constitute the basis for the poor run that has held down democratic politics in Nigeria. I found also that the political philosophies of the various personalities in the first republic of 1960-1965 ; and the second republic of 1979-1983 still dominate the present democratic process ; from 1999 to 2011 ; though with minimal difference noticeable only in the personalities within the political parties. I found that some of the major political parties still draw their bulk of supporters or members from the ethnic groups where the parties are formed ; particularly in the Yorubaland and the Igboland. Parties are ethnically based and so won elections within the three ethnic regions. I found as well that the people from these three ethnic groups viewed their political rivalry as normal. Just as the people believed that they are members of their ethnic groups first ; and Nigeria identity as a matter of coincidence. I found that the issue of ethnic mindset is both internally as well as externally influenced. This contributed to the persistent violent ethnic influenced crises among the three ethnic groups under review. I found also that lack of good governance created deep resentment and distrust of the political class by the masses. I established that the negative ethnic mindset and other internally entrenched contingencies combined to sustain the ethnic divide among the three nationalities ; and thereby impede the success of democracy in the country. From 1999 up until 2011 ; development performances by the elected officials are state specific. Unlike in the pre-independence era and also during the first republic of 1960-1965 ; where development was purely regional dependent ; and rivalry among the three ethnic groups was based on developmental performance. In spite of the inheritance of the same colonial political legacy by the three ethnic nationalities of Igbo ; Yoruba ; and Hausa-Fulani ; the discovered political apprehension within the groups ; detailed how ethnic mindset makes nonsense of democratic politics in the country ; and constitute the basis for the poor run that has held down democratic politics in Nigeria. I found also that the political philosophies of the various personalities in the first republic of 1960-1965 ; and the second republic of 1979-1983 still dominate the present democratic process ; from 1999 to 2011 ; though with minimal difference noticeable only in the personalities within the political parties. I found that some of the major political parties still draw their bulk of supporters or members from the ethnic groups where the parties are formed ; particularly in the Yorubaland and the Igboland. Parties are ethnically based and so won elections within the three ethnic regions. I found as well that the people from these three ethnic groups viewed their political rivalry as normal. Just as the people believed that they are members of their ethnic groups first ; and Nigeria identity as a matter of coincidence. I found that the issue of ethnic mindset is both internally as well as externally influenced. This contributed to the persistent violent ethnic influenced crises among the three ethnic groups under review. I found also that lack of good governance created deep resentment and distrust of the political class by the masses. I established that the negative ethnic mindset and other internally entrenched contingencies combined to sustain the ethnic divide among the three nationalities ; and thereby impede the success of democracy in the country. From 1999 up until 2011 ; development performances by the elected officials are state specific. Unlike in the pre-independence era and also during the first republic of 1960-1965 ; where development was purely regional dependent ; and rivalry among the three ethnic groups was based on developmental performance. In spite of the inheritance of the same colonial political legacy by the three ethnic nationalities of Igbo ; Yoruba ; and Hausa-Fulani ; the discovered political apprehension within the groups ; detailed how ethnic mindset makes nonsense of democratic politics in the country ; and constitute the basis for the poor run that has held down democratic politics in Nigeria.
Acid rock drainage (ARD) is defined as acidic waste-water contaminated with sulphate and heavy metals which is generated through the oxidation of sulphidic ores in the presence of water and oxygen. Mining activities accelerate this process by bringing these ores to the surface where they are further crushed and, eventually end up in waste rock dumps and tailing impoundments where they continue to generate ARD into perpetuity. Active mining operations are mandated to prevent the discharge of ARD into the environment. This ARD is commonly remediated by expensive yet highly effective active treatment strategies such as high-density sludge processes and reverse osmosis. South Africa has an extensive history of gold and coal mining which has left abandoned mine workings with associated waste rock dumps throughout northern and eastern parts of the country. As many of these mines have long been abandoned, the responsibility to mitigate the environmental impact of the generated ARD lies solely with government. Although these diffuse sites often generate smaller volumes of less aggressive ARD compared to that generated through mine water rebound, the sheer number and the continual ARD generation from these sites is a severe threat to South Africa's already poor water security. Biological sulphate reduction (BSR) has long been considered an attractive option for the longterm remediation of these low-volume sources of ARD – but its implementation has shown mixed success. BSR is a process catalysed through the innate metabolism of sulphate-reducing bacteria (SRB) which coexist within complex microbial communities. SRB themselves are a highly diverse group of anaerobic microorganisms which use sulphate as a terminal electron acceptor. The sulphide and bicarbonate produced during BSR can be used to precipitate heavy metals and aid in the neutralisation of the ARD, respectively. The implementation of BSR is, therefore, a comprehensive remediation strategy for diffuse sources of ARD. The study of BSR, using various reactor configurations and operating conditions shows much promise. However, the microbial ecology of the complex communities within BSR systems, and their links to the performance of BSR processes, has received far less attention in published literature. This is not a result of underappreciation of the role microbial communities but rather a historical lack of tools, specifically high-throughput techniques, available to assess complex microbial consortia. It is asserted that the success of a sustainable BSR process developed for the long-term remediation of ARD requires an in-depth understanding the microbial communities associated with this process. The identification of the microorganisms which are key to the process, thosewhich threaten the stability of the community and the optimal growth conditions of these microorganisms, can be used to inform how these bioreactors are designed and operated. This study investigated the performance and microbial ecology of several continuous BSR reactors using culture-independent metagenomic sequencing approaches. The performance and microbial ecology of these reactors were evaluated at a range of hydraulic residence times (HRT) over the course of approximately 1000 days of continuous operation, from five- through to one-day(s). The tested reactor configurations included a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR), an up-flow anaerobic packed bed reactor (UAPBR) and a linear flow channel reactor (LFCR) that were each operated in duplicate and supplemented with either lactate or acetate as an electron donor. The different reactor configurations and supplied electron donors, as well as the varied applied HRT, generated a range of microenvironments which were hypothesised to lead to the divergence of the initial microbial community of the inoculum and generate numerous distinct microbial communities throughout and across the reactor systems. 16S rRNA gene amplicon sequencing was used to assess the microbial community structure of the numerous populations across the reactor systems and monitor how these communities responded to the change in the applied HRT. Genome-resolved metagenomics was employed in parallel to recover the genomes of all predominant microorganisms identified through gene amplicon sequencing. This allowed the interrogation of the composition of the respective microbial communities as well as the genetic potential of each microorganism and encompassing the communities represented within specific reactor environments. The CSTRs were selected as these systems are characterised as well-mixed, support solely suspended biomass and kinetic equilibriums are achieved rapidly. This allows the performance of these reactors to be predictable and provides a benchmark to which the LFCRs and UAPBRs could be compared. The lactate-supplemented CSTR performed largely as anticipated based on available literature, demonstrating a maintained sulphate conversion of approximately 55% over the course of the study. The reactor achieved a maximum observed volumetric sulphate reduction rate (VSRR) of 17 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT. The system supported a low SRB diversity, constituted almost entirely by a Desulfomicrobium and two Desulfovibrio operational taxonomic units (OTUs). The acetate-supplemented CSTR was able to maintain sulphate reducing performance at HRT where complete washout of SRB had been predicted based on literature. This reactor exhibited a maximum VSRR of 10.8 mg/ℓ.h at a 1.5-day HRT and was dominated by the same Desulfovibrio and Desulfomicrobium observed in the lactate-supplemented CSTR, along with several other SRB genera at lower abundance. The LFCRs demonstrated an approximately ten-fold greater biomass retention than the corresponding CSTRs. This was facilitated through the incorporation of carbon microfibres, whichfacilitated microbial colonisation and biofilm formation within the reactors. Surprisingly, the lactate-supplemented LFCR, underperformed compared to the lactate-supplemented CSTR, achieving a maximum VSRR of 14.8 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT. This reduced performance, in spite of the enhanced biomass retention, was concluded to result from the out-competition of lactateoxidising SRB in the reactor by Veillonella and Enterobacter OTUs. The acetate-supplemented LFCR exhibited a period of underperformance before recovering and subsequently demonstrated a maximum VSRR of 17.1 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT. Evaluations of the microbial communities of this system during the HRT study revealed a dramatic shift in the SRB communities from being dominated by Desulfatitalea and Desulfovibrio to being dominated predominantly by Desulfomicrobium and Desulfobacter. The UAPBRs are governed by plug-flow which resulted in the generation of gradients of decreasing substrates and increasing products throughout the height of the reactors. This, as hypothesised, resulted in the stratification of the microbial communities throughout the height of these reactors. This allowed many associations to be made between specific microorganisms and their ideal growth environments. Both UAPBRs demonstrated competitive sulphate reducing performance. The lactate-supplemented UAPBR proved especially successful as this system was able to maintain >95% sulphate conversion at one-day HRT, corresponding with a VSRR of 40.1 mg/ℓ.h. The performance of this reactor was attributed to the significant quantity of retained biomass and the successful harbouring of lactate-oxidising SRB towards the inlet zone of the reactor as well as propionate- and acetate-oxidising SRB towards the effluent zones of the reactor. The acetatesupplemented UAPBR exhibited a maximum VSRR of 23.2 mg/ℓ.h at a one-day HRT and a maximum sulphate conversion of 79% at a 2.3-day HRT. The stratification of the microbial communities within the acetate-supplemented UAPBR was less pronounced than the lactatesupplemented UAPBR, as a result of the fewer available volatile fatty acid species. However, the stratification which was observed in this system could be used to postulate the growth kinetics associated with the identified SRB – a Desulfobulbus was associated with rapid acetate oxidation in the inlet zone while a Desulfatitalea and a Desulfosarcina could be implicated in sulphate scavenging in the effluent zone of this reactor. This proved particularly valuable for elucidating the roles of these same SRB in the well-mixed reactor systems. Genome-resolved metagenomics was employed to recover the genomes of the microorganisms identified in these systems and determine the metabolic potential of these microorganisms. Hydrogen-evolving hydrogenase genes were found to be widespread in genomes not capable of sulphate reduction. In contrast, hydrogen-consuming hydrogenases as well as autotrophic gene pathways were common amongst SRB genomes. The ubiquity of hydrogenase genes in these environments indicated that inter-species hydrogen transfer was an important feature within thesemicrobial communities. The dual consumption of both acetate and hydrogen was concluded to have facilitated the maintained sulphate reducing performance of the acetate-supplemented reactor systems at short HRT where system failure had been predicted. Indices of replication (iRep) were used to estimate the instantaneous growth rates of the microorganisms from metagenomic shotgun sequencing datasets. This revealed that, at a four-day HRT, the microorganisms within the biofilms were comparably active to planktonic microorganisms. This, together with the dynamic changes in the composition of these biofilms during the HRT study, suggests these biofilms are even more active and competitive than previously thought. The combined use of next-generation gene amplicon sequencing and genome-resolved metagenomics has given unprecedented insights into the microbial communities of BSR reactor systems. Using this approach, it was possible to uncover a seldom discussed form of hydrogen cycling within BSR systems and has shown that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach when inoculating BSR reactors. The SRB within these systems were often highly specialised to particular environments, specific electron donors and each showed differing growth kinetics. The success of long-term, semi-passive BSR reactor systems would benefit greatly from the tailoring of SRB inoculums informed by the chosen reactor configuration and operating conditions. The outcomes of the kinetic reactor experiments have led to several recommendations for the design and operation of these systems.
In this article I provide a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the approach developed by Jason W. Moore in the field of International Relations, known as "World-Ecology". Through this perspective I analyze the agreements that are negotiated between core and semi-periphery states, and the periphery states in the African continent in the field of trade, migration, security and employment.Recent studies analysed the agreements negotiated between the core, semi-periphery and periphery states from very different perspectives. For example, from an economic point of view, previous research has highlighted the link between migration and development or analysed the increasing dependence on the migrant workforce in some specific sectors in the global center. Other studies opted for a more "social" standpoint and analysed the process of integration of migrant-origin workforce from periphery states in the socio-economic fabric of core states. A third group of studies focused on the repercussions that security agreements have on regular and irregular migrants coming from periphery states. Other scholars have investigated the environmental impact of the appropriation of raw materials and energy following (dis)agreements between core, semi-periphery, and periphery states.All these contributions help to shed light on the core-periphery relations from different angles. Yet, Moore's World-Ecology perspective can help us go beyond the intrinsic limitations of these "compartmentalised" approaches and activate a holistic re-reading of these core-periphery relations in the field of migration, trade, security and employment. In this article, I focus on these agreements to demonstrate how this perspective can be used to theorise those strategic and dialectical bundles of human and extra-human relations that are at the foundation of the global capitalist civilisation.As I will show, core-periphery state agreements provide the structure through which patterns and relationships of power and production within nature can be co-produced, exerting continuous pressure on human and extra-human nature to keep it cheap. Moore refers in this regard to the "Four Cheaps": labour, food, energy, and raw materials, and the tendency of capitalism to appropriate them with as little capital as possible, or even better free of charge in order to generate surplus value and an ecological surplus. Core-periphery state agreements serve to extend the zone of appropriation and set up new streams of the Four Cheaps. Core-periphery state agreements are the Janus face of capitalism: if on the one hand they exert pressure to keep nature cheap, on the other hand, the same dynamics of negotiation inherent in these agreements progressively leads to the exhaustion of capitalism's Cheap Nature strategy.Core-periphery state agreements include, for example, the temporal migration programs signed between the European Union and the periphery states in Africa with the explicit aim of providing cheap labour to specific sectors (e.g. social care) in the global centre that would otherwise need higher remuneration and much better working conditions to motivate core states' autochthonous labour power. These programs also result in promoting a specific type of migrant-origin labour force: temporal, circular, vulnerable, and therefore cheap. In turn, the promotion of this type of migration solidifies hierarchical and dualistic constructions within the labour market. Moore's World-Ecology perspective can also be used to place emphasis on the link between migration, cheap labour, and the production of cheap food. The function of labour reserves, which in the past was covered by slaves and colonized labour, is today entrusted to migrants from the global periphery.This article also analyses the trade agreements between core, semi-periphery and periphery states for their role in securing cheap energy and raw materials. Core-periphery trade (dis)agreements are primarily power relations that mobilize and recombine human and extra-human natures, and that have as their purpose the endless accumulation and production of global spaces of appropriation. The packages of trade agreements signed between the core, semi-periphery and periphery states are also closely linked to security measures. Security is not a by-product of these agreements, but rather a constitutive element of the negotiations, through which interlocking agencies of capital, science, and political power together release new sources of free or low-cost human and extra-human natures for capital accumulation. Going beyond the consideration that the proliferation of fences of razor wire and walls around the globe is a valid indicator of the flourishing state experienced by the security industry in the current phase of capitalism, once we embrace the World-Ecology perspective we can see how the security agreements between core, semi-periphery and periphery state alter extra-human and human nature. In fact, securitarian measures are inserted in pre-existing geographical patterns and social structures (re)producing clusters of nature hierarchized according to historical-geographical specificities, and patterns of race, gender, and class. Here I think for example about the categories of Arabised North Africa (e.g. the Maghreb) vs the rest of "Black" Africa or the category of "illegal" migrant vs "legal" migrant, which are solidified through the security "deals" struck between core, semi-periphery states and periphery states. In addition to its introduction and conclusions, this article has three sections. The first section establishes the main features of Moore's World-Ecology perspective that will be developed throughout the article. In the second section, the article isolates four broad reasons that help us understand how and why agreements between core, semi-periphery and periphery countries can accelerate the decline of the ecological surplus and presents the main argument around which the article revolves: while in the past, appropriation practices combined with the global market and technological innovations ensured rapid global expansions, based on the identification, codification, and rationalization of the Cheap Natures, notably through the practices of colonisation and slavery,today this "advantage" is no longer available. Moreover, the identification, appropriation and mobilization of uncapitalised nature must undergo long, tedious, and above all expensive core-periphery negotiations, which ultimately take the form of agreement packages that include measures in the field of trade, migration, security, and employment. The third section further develops this argument by applying it to the concrete case of the African periphery countries. In the concluding remarks, the article highlights the dual characters of the core, semi-periphery and periphery state agreements and reflects on the nature of the ongoing crisis.The core-periphery agreements analysed in this article are certainly a display of capitalism's adaptive power, yet at the same time core-(semi)periphery negotiations accelerate the crisis of modernity-in-nature by exhausting the Cheap Nature, making everything less cheap, and at fast speed, as evidenced by the last commodity supercycle and the one on the horizon. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the fragilities of the global capitalist economy and woken up post-capitalist imaginaries. However, as of today it is an open question as to whether we are facing a developmental crisis of capitalism, which can be solved within the boundaries of the neoliberal order through new rounds of accumulation and commodification, or we are witnessing instead the beginning of an epochal crisis marked by an irreversible decline of capitalism's capacity to restructure itself as the mode of organisation of human and extra-human nature. ; El artículo busca tres objetivos: 1) contribuir al debate en curso en el marco de la propuesta de la ecología-mundo, centrándose en el caso de los acuerdos suscritos entre los estados del centro global, de la semiperiferia y los estados de la periferia; 2) proporcionar una visión de cómo y por qué los acuerdos en las áreas de comercio, migración, seguridad y empleo que se suscriben entre los estados del centro, de la semiperiferia y los estados de la periferia global contribuyen a acelerar la caída del excedente ecológico; y por último, 3) volver a centrar la atención en el continente africano, haciendo hincapié en su papel central en el desarrollo y crisis de la economía capitalista global. La perspectiva desarrollada por Moore rechaza el dualismo cartesiano de "Naturaleza" y "Sociedad" y, por tanto, trasciende la narrativa del capitalismo y el medio ambiente tan predominante en la actualidad, proponiendo en su lugar una relación creativa y dialéctica de unidad fundamental entre la naturaleza humana y la extrahumana, oikeios. De ello se desprende que la crisis del capitalismo, ya sea evolutiva o epocal, no se origina en la convergencia de crisis ontológicamente distintas e independientes, la económica (sociedad) y la medioambiental (naturaleza), sino que expresa la esencia misma del capitalismo. En este sentido, los acuerdos comerciales, de inmigración, de seguridad y de empleo entre los estados del centro, las semiperiferias y los estados de la periferia encarnan la misma esencia antagonista del capitalismo: la tendencia a la acumulación incesante de capital y la caída del excedente ecológico. En este artículo exploramos que si, por un lado, los acuerdos estipulados entre los estados del centro, las semiperiferias y los estados de la periferia representan una forma de apropiarse del "trabajo" barato y gratuito de naturalezas humanas y extrahumanas para ponerlos al servicio del proceso de acumulación capitalista, estos acuerdos, por su propia construcción y sus dinámicas de negociación, aceleran, por otro lado, la caída del excedente ecológico, lo que se hace visible en el aumento de los precios de los bienes primarios a través del continuo agotamiento de las naturalezas humanas y extrahumanas no capitalizadas o infracapitalizadas. El texto, además de introducción y conclusiones, consta de tres apartados. En el primero se establecen las principales características de la perspectiva de la ecología-mundo de Moore, que se desarrollarán a lo largo del artículo. En el segundo apartado se aíslan las cuatro grandes razones que nos ayudan a entender cómo y por qué los acuerdos entre estados del centro, de la semiperiferia y los estados de la periferia pueden acelerar la caída del excedente ecológico. En el tercero se desarrolla el argumento principal del artículo, aplicándolo al caso concreto de los acuerdos estipulados entre algunos estados del centro, de la semiperiferia y los estados de la periferia africana.
1. L'enjeu de la recherche Le but principal de la thèse est l'analyse de l'apport du De regno de Synésios de Cyrène à la transmission de l'idéologie politique antique aux Ve et VIe siècles de l'époque byzantine. Il s'agit, avant tout, de définir l'idéologie politique de Synésios, dans le cadre de sa paideia alexandrine néoplatonicienne et chrétienne ; puis, de déterminer l'apport de son ouvrage à la formation de l'idéologie impériale et de la rhétorique politique du Ve siècle et de l'âge de Justinien. Afin de déterminer le rôle du De regno de Synésios dans la transmission de ces topoi, on veut analyser les rapports entre cet ouvrage et les œuvres les plus représentatives de la littérature politique des Ve-VIe siècles : le Panégyrique pour l'empereur Anastase de Procope de Gaza , la Scheda Regia d'Agapetus le Diacre , l'anonyme dialogue philosophique Sur la Science politique dédié à Justinien et le traité Des magistratures de l'Etat romain de Jean le Lydien . 2. L'état de la recherche 2.1. Le débat sur la valeur historique et la chronologie de l'œuvre Les premières notes chronologiques au De regno, dans le cadre d'une reconstruction générale de la chronologie des opuscula de Synésios, sont dues à Otto Seeck (op. cit.), qui datait le De regno des années 399-402. L'intérêt pour les aspects historiques et politiques de l'œuvre est dominant dans la critique italienne des années 1920-1940, à cause de l'utilisation idéologique de la figure de Synésios pendant la colonisation italienne de la Libye. La première monographie sur l'activité politique de Synésios remonte à 1938, de claire inspiration fasciste, rédigée par Giulio Bettini ; en 1944 est publiée l' édition critique du De regno, par Nicola Terzaghi . Cette édition constitue la base pour les études suivantes. Pendant la deuxième partie du XXe siècle, l'approche historique est encore prévalente, comme on peut le voir dans les pages consacrées au De regno dans la monographie de 1951 de Christian Lacombrade et dans son introduction à l'édition du De regno datant de la même année. On doit attendre les années 1970 pour relever un renouvellement de l'intérêt pour l'œuvre. En 1973, Antonio Garzya publie une traduction italienne du De regno, intégrée dans son édition des opera omnia de Synésios de 1989, avec quelques notes de commentaire. Dans les années 1980 la critique recommence à interroger spécifiquement cet ouvrage du Cyrénéen, encore selon une perspective chronologique. On débat de la question de la datation du De regno. La querelle oppose ceux qui le datent des années 399-402 (Denis Roques , suivi par Antonio Garzya ) et ceux qui proposent une datation plus haute, dans les années 397-400 . Le débat se développe sur la base d'une différente interprétation des témoignages autobiographiques sur l'ambassade à Constantinople que l'on trouve dans le corpus même de Synésios : (Syn., De regn. 3 Terzaghi) l'occasion du don de l'aurum coronarium ; (Syn., Ep. 61 Garzya-Roques) un tremblement de terre cause la fin du séjour constantinopolitain de Synésios ; (Syn., Hymn. I 428 – 433 Terzaghi ; De insomn. 14 Terzaghi) : le séjour de Synésios à Constantinople dure trois années. En plus de l'intérêt purement chronologique, pendant les mêmes années, se développe la recherche sur la valeur plus généralement historique et idéologique du De regno dans ses rapports avec le contexte de la semi-barbare cour constantinopolitaine et de la Cyrénaïque tardive . Dans ces contributions ne manquent pas quelques sporadiques références aux aspects littéraires du De regno. Beaucoup d'importance est, par contre, donnée à la forme rhétorique du discours dans l'introduction à la dernière édition critique du De regno (pp. 26-35), publiée par Jacques Lamoureux et Noël Aujoulat en 2008 . 3. L'idéologie impériale de Synésios de Cyrène dans le Discours sur la Royauté Le De regno s'inscrit dans la tradition de la littérature antique sur la royauté, qui a fleuri dans les milieux académiques et stoïciens, que nous connaissons par des auteurs comme Plutarque, Dion Chrysostome, Thémistios, mais qu'illustraient aussi des auteurs perdus comme Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthenidas. Son auteur avait également une connaissance approfondie des théories monarchiques judaïques, transmises en particulier par Philon. Le Cyrénaïque ne semble pas non plus étranger aux polémiques théologiques dont il a sans doute été le contemporain : la connaissance directe de Jean Chrysostome et le voisinage des patriarches d'Alexandrie ont dû contribuer à la formation d'un néoplatonisme chrétien singulier, qui s'épanouira dans les années de la maturité et de l'épiscopat. Synésios dérive de la philosophie politique d'Eusèbe, nourrie de topoi issus de Dion Chrysostome et Thémistios, une conception de l'Empire comme don de la divinité au βασιλεύς. Celui-ci est tenu de préserver ce don à travers l'ἄσκησις continue de sa propre vertu. Une autre pierre angulaire de l'idéologie impériale sinésienne est la supériorité du νόμος sur la manière dont le βασιλεύς conduit sa propre vie. La vie de l'Empereur, qui a valeur exemplaire pour ses sujets, est elle-même le reflet de l'Idée d'une loi transcendante, respectueuse de l'ordre cosmique et providentiel. L'idée de l'Empereur comme νόμος ἔμψυχος n'est formulée qu'implicitement par Synésios, alors que l'idée du souverain μιμητὴς τοῦ θεοῦ, sur laquelle la première se fonde, est tout à fait explicite. Imitateur de Dieu, le souverain est son homonyme. Il partage ses attributs, mais pas sa nature. Les vertus que le souverain doit démontrer, φρόνησις e ῥώμη, sont tout à fait classiques, de même que les attributs de la royauté, à savoir bonté, piété et autarcie, dont la possession est garantie au souverain par la relation d'homonymie qui le relie à la divinité. Ces vertus ont une valeur universelle mais pas absolue, dans la mesure où elles existent seulement selon une relation de cause à effet entre la divinité et l'objet qui en expérimente les qualités. Sur cette justification du principe de l'ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ, l'influence de la métaphysique aristotélicienne est évidente avec l'ontologie du premier principe, auquel Synésios fait une allusion efficace et directe, tout en la conjuguant avec l'idée néoplatonicienne de la divinité surabondante et dispensatrice de bienfaits. Dans le De regno, le thème de l'autarcie du souverain est investi d'une force particulière grâce à la théorie platonicienne de l'âme complexe. L'autarcie constitue le fondement du bon gouvernement, dans la mesure où le roi est celui qui parvient à réunir sous l'égide de la raison le peuple agité, esclave de ses propres passions (De regn. 10). L'esthétique de la royauté joue un rôle paradigmatique et fonctionnel dans la transmission de l'eusychia divine au monde. L'exemplarité de la vie du souverain exige qu'il communie avec l'ensemble de la vie sociale, que ce soit avec les fonctionnaires qu'il a choisis, à travers la φιλία comme vertu, ou avec l'armée, par le biais de l'ἔρος que fait naître au sein des troupes la vision du souverain comme membre d'une seule et même famille. Un autre aspect important de la théorie politique sinésienne est la conception unitaire de l'Empire, dont témoigne le recours fréquent à l'adresse conjointe à Arcadius et à son frère Honorius, expression unique d'une institution universelle dont la division entre la partie orientale et la partie occidentale est seulement administrative. Chargé de faire la paix comme la guerre, conformément aux topoi du genre du logos basilikòs, le souverain aura pour tâche primordiale de maintenir sa vertu philanthropique, l'amour du genre humain. La valeur de psychagogie que revêt la philanthropie impériale, et dont dépend le salut de l'État, est elle-même un dérivé de la philosophie comme vertu suprême, et traditionnellement attachée à la royautén (Syn., De regn. 29). La définition de l'Empereur comme philosophe drapé dans la pourpre, formulée par Thémistios, n'est pas reprise dans la royauté sinésienne en raison d'une opposition vigoureuse au luxe d'inspiration cynique que l'on trouve chez Synésios. En revanche, l'amour de la philosophie et du cursus de la paideia classique devient chez lui la cause et la fin de la royauté. 4. L'influence du De regno de Synésios sur l'idéologie impériale byzantine des Ve et VIe siècles L'analyse des rapports entre le De regno de Synésios et le Panégyrique pour l'Empereur Anastase de Procope de Gaza, la Scheda Regia d'Agapet le Diacre, l'anonyme dialogue Sur la Science politique et le traité Sur les magistratures de l'état romain de Jean le Lydien nous a permis de tracer des pistes de l'influence de la théorie politique de Synésios sur le developpement de l'idéologie politique suivante, sourtout pour ce qui concerne les topoi du roi loi vivante et imitateur de Dieu. L'examen approfondi que nous avons réalisé au sujet du De regno de Synésios nous permet de considérer que cette œuvre occupe une place centrale dans l'histoire des idées politiques byzantines, et qu'elle marque le passage d'une idéologie de la royauté comprise et représentée selon les topoi de facture classique et hellénistique à une théorie politique qui enrichit ces topoi d'arguments métaphysiques et ontologiques néo-platoniciens d'un côté, de l'autre d'éléments moraux, universalistes et eschatologiques de plus en plus chrétiens. Sur le genre de discours auquel il appartient, le De regno de Synésios semble avoir exercé une influence importante, y compris sur la définition de la finalité de la littérature Περὶ βασιλείας : la pluralité des formes rhétoriques analysées (le panégyrique, le speculum principis en forme d'acrostiche, le dialogue philosophique, le traité) traduit la recherche d'une forme d'expression qui puisse véhiculer un contenu philosophique et instituer un rapport de type pédagogique entre l'auteur et son destinataire. Il est difficile de dire avec certitude dans quels milieux culturels et géographiques le De regno a circulé entre le Ve et VIe siècles. Il est toutefois certain que les auteurs qui se réfèreront au De regno ont tous été en lien avec le courant du néo-platonisme chrétien. Alexandrie, Gaza, Constantinople, Antioche ou Beyrouth deviennent à cette époque des centres de propagation d'une nouvelle culture réunissant dans de nombreuses créations les apports de l'hellénisme, de la tradition politique romaine et de la morale chrétienne. Le De regno de Synésios constitue un apport remarquable à cette nouvelle culture et constitue l'une des œuvres les plus représentatives de la Spätantike.
It is well established that bacteria are the first organisms to adhere and colonize both abiotic and biotic surfaces. Their subsequent multiplication and production of exopolymeric substances (EPS) bring to biofilm formation which is believed to influence the settlement of following colonisers starting biofouling process on surfaces. Biofilm and fouling often have a deleterious effect on colonized surfaces and materials. They explicate a complex and various range of processes on abitic surfaces that cause physical damages, chemical alterations, loss of functionality and discolouration of surfaces, generating tremendous environmental and economical harm for human society. The control of the deleterious biofilm and the following fouling is today a great challenge. Currently, we have two choices: to remove biofilm by traditional methods or to research new effective antifouling approaches. Traditional techniques consist mainly in the application of biocides, however this practice has several disadvantages. In fact, traditional biocides are not generally specifically target against detrimental microorganisms and they are often potentially toxic both for humans and the environment. In addition, biological matter released by their use can offer a favourable substratum for subsequent colonisations. Others problems concern the development of resistance in target pest populations and the low biodegradability of these chemicals. Moreover, biocides are not always effective at low concentrations because life inside the biofilm leads to increased resistance to antimicrobial products up to 1000-fold compared to planktonic cells. Finally, current legislation in UE and USA regulates the use of biocides and lately several products have been withdrawn from the market. New antifouling strategies need to be effective, economic, safe for the public and to pose negligible risk to human health and the environment. In the last years new strategies able to control biofilm growth have been proposed as alternative to traditional active substances. However, several years will be required to set up and test satisfactory methods, so, these novel strategies can be only a long term solution. In the meantime, as short term solution, it is vital to study methods for a more sustainable use of traditional antimicrobial agents. Therefore, the aims of the PhD project here presented were: 1) to use biocides for the removal of deleterious biofilm from relevant abiotic surfaces in the most sustainable way; 2) to exploit the ability of a new promising inorganic compound, the photocatalytic titanium dioxide, as an innovative non-toxic antifouling system to control biofilm formation on abiotic surfaces. The study reported in the chapter 3 addresses the first aim. Generally, broad-range biocides are used to remove alterative biofilms from historical and artistic surfaces. In order to obtain a use as sustainable as possible of antimicrobial agents, the strategy has been to identify alterative microorganisms so as to use a suitable biocidal product which targets specifically the biodeteriogen agents. In this work, for the first time, an integrated biotechnological system that enables the cleaning of cultural heritage stone affected by both biological and chemical alteration process was used. The study was conducted on alterations found on two stone sculptures decorating the courtyard of the Buonconsiglio Castle in Trento (Italy). Stone, especially if exposed to the weather, is subject to chemical, physical and aesthetical deterioration. In this regard, pollution and environmental parameters play an important role since they are most responsible of deterioration process. Samples from altered and unaltered areas were characterized using stereomicroscope, cross-section observations and Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) analyses. Results reveled that stone was an oolitic limestone and changes were both discolorations ascribed to biological agents and chemical alteration represented by black crusts composed mainly by gypsum with a small amount of calcite, nitrate and silicates. Cultural and biomolecular methods were adopted to study microbial biofilm from powders samples. The cultural analyses proved that heterotrophic bacteria, fungi and prokaryotic and eukaryotic algae were present on surfaces and that in some samples the counts were quite high (up to 7 logCFU/g for bacteria and up to 6 logCFU/g for fungi). Denaturing gradient gel electrophoresis (DGGE) and sequencing from total DNA extracted allowed to identify taxa of microorganisms causing discolorations: they were Cyanobacteria, Chlorophyta green algae (Myrmecia and Friedmannia), Streptophyta green algae (Klebsormidium), microcolonial black fungi (Alternaria and Cladosporium) and other species of fungi able to deposit melanin in the cell wall (Verticillium). Fluorescent in situ hybridisation (FISH) highlighted that the Cyanobacteria generally were dominant (more than 60%) among the other prokaryotics belonging to the Bacteria domain. In this case, in order to remove the discolourations, despite the initial purpose to use a product that targeted only the small population of harmful microorganisms, we were forced to choose the biocide BIOTIN N (constituted by a mixture of tributyltin naphthenate (20% w/v) and didecyl dimethyl ammonium chloride (35% w/v)) with a broad spectrum of activity due to the taxonomical variety of the biodeteriogens. The same traditional and biomolecular methods were carried out on the samples collected after the cleaning to verify the removal of alterative microorganisms. Treatment with the biocide resulted in a decrease of the bacterial load (up to five orders of magnitude), and neither culturable fungi nor culturable prokaryotic and eukaryotic algae grew. Indeed the DGGE profiles showed far fewer bands than before treatment and proved that Cyanobacteria and most of the green algae and dematiaceous fungi had been efficiently removed. Chemical alterations were removed by a biocleaning treatment, an innovative, efficient and highly selective bioremediation technology, alternative to the use of chemicals, that uses viable cells of sulphate-reducing bacteria able to remove sulphates from stone ornamental surfaces. In this work for the first time this approach was applied on limestone. Sulphate-reducing bacteria have been Desulfovibrio vulgaris subsp. vulgaris (ATCC 29579). The treatment consisted in three 12-h applications for a total duration of 36 h. Comparison of the results of the chemical analyses performed before and after the biocleaning proved that gypsum, nitrates and silicates were almost completely removed. In addition, both optical evidence and FTIR analysis showed that the limestone substratum was preserved. In general, the cases of biofilms with large taxonomical variety (as the biofilms on the sculptures from Buonconsiglio Castle in Trento) are very frequent. Therefore, due to the side-effects of biocides, the development of alternative strategies for the prevention and control of deleterious biofilm becomes imperative. They must allow to protect materials from biodeterioration, and thus preserve their usefulness for as long as possible. In addition, new approaches must be safe for human beings and the environment. The study reported in the chapter 4 refers to this second aim of the project. The ability of photoactivated titanium dioxide (TiO2), a promising alternative to biocide for the biofilm control and prevention, was investigated. The biocidal activity of TiO2 against planktonic cells thanks to its strong photocatalytic properties has been reported since 1985. TiO2 per se is non-toxic, as the tests in rats prove, and has been approved by the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in human food, drugs, cosmetics and food contact materials. Moreover, it is considered an environmentally friendly photocatalyst, it is relatively inexpensive, chemically stable and effective under weak solar irradiation in ambient atmospheric environment. Few attention was dedicated to study the potential of photocatalytic TiO2 against the bacterial biofilm so far. The aim was to investigate the ability of photocatalytic TiO2 as a new non-toxic antifouling nanotechnology to deter and prevent the attachment and biofilm formation of selected bacteria on TiO2-coated surfaces. Aeroxide P25 (Degussa) was employed as source of TiO2. The effects of both photocatalyst nanopowder suspensions (3g/l concentration) and thin TiO2-film applied on glass coverslides by sol-gel method were valued. During the experiments TiO2 was photoactivated by a lamp emitting radiation over a UV-A wavelength range with light intensity similar to outdoor solar irradiation (between 3000 and 500 μW/cm2). An efficient protocol for the photoactivation of TiO2 was set up degrading the dye rhodamine B. Thus activity was investigated on Bacillus cereus-group sp. (Gram-positive) and P. stutzeri and P. aeruginosa (Gram-negative) planktonic cells. The results proved that photoactivated TiO2 provoked a significant decrease of CFU/ml. Biocidal activities of nanopowder suspension in demineralised water in Bacillus sp., P. stutzeri and P. aeruginosa were respectively 1-log reduction after 24 h, 2-log reduction after 30 min and 1-log reduction after 2 h compared to non-photoactivated TiO2. TiO2 thin film also produced a complete disinfection of P. aeruginosa planktonic cells in 24 h. Finally, the activity of photoactivated TiO2 was investigated on P. aeruginosa biofilm at various formation steps both at the solid-liquid and at the solid-air interface. It was proved that neither TiO2 nanopowder nor photocatalytic film showed any biocidal activity on P. aeruginosa biofilm at all the interfaces investigated. The experiments have demonstrated that the lack of cell inactivation by photocatalytic action on biofilm was not due to 1) the presence of phosphates that could block active sites on the catalyst surface, 2) scavenge oxidative radicals produced at the surface, nor to insufficient presence of O2 at the TiO2 surface, which maintains charge transfer in photocatalytic reactions, 3) biofilm growth that screens UV-A light, deactivating TiO2, 4) insufficient build-up of photocatalytically-generated reactive species necessary for cell inactivation. In addition, confocal laser scanning microscope analysis demonstrated that not even exopolysaccharides produced by biofilm cells were the cause of fail inhibition since almost absent in the very young tested biofilms. The only possible explanation for these findings was that the cells, when live in sessile form, invoke a genetic response that imparts them an increased resistance to oxidative stress generated by photoactivated TiO2. In conclusion, the studies reported here have demonstrated that: a) Biotechnologies could facilitate a more sustainable use of biocides addressing the choice toward a suitable product that targets only the biodeteriogen microorganisms. b) The biocleaning treatment is an effective technology, alternative to use of chemicals, to remove selectively sulphates from stone. c) The photocatalytic TiO2 is not a good candidate to develop an effective technology that is alternative to traditional biocides for the control of deleterious biofilm. Further studies with other promising environmentally-friendly compounds may provide new ways to move forward in the search and to pursue the goal of an efficient surface coating methods able to prevent biofilm formation or, at least, to interfere with their inconvenient increased resistance to biocides, respecting the human health and environment. The research for new non-toxic antifouling strategies continues.
Die vorliegende Arbeit zeigt einerseits überblicksartig, gleichzeitig aber auch ins Detail gehend, vor allem die kartographische Entwicklung von Namibia von den Anfängen im 18. Jh. bis zur Unabhängigkeit im Jahr 1990. Dabei werden neben der eigentlichen Kartographie auch die wichtigsten damit im Zusammenhang stehenden Entwicklungen der Forschungsreisen, des Vermessungswesens, der allgemeinen Verwaltung des Landes und der Organisation des Karten- und Vermessungswesens im Gebiet des heutigen Namibia, im Deutschen Reich und in Südafrika dargestellt. Diese Ausweitung des Themas erwies sich als notwendig, um die Hintergründe und das geschichtliche und politische Umfeld mancher kartographischen Entwicklung deutlich und verständlich machen zu können. Damit liegt erstmals eine umfassende Dokumentation über die Kartographie von Namibia vor. Die Gliederung der Arbeit in die drei großen Zeitabschnitte der vorkolonialen, der deutschen Kolonial- und der südafrikanischen Mandatszeit ermöglicht die genaue Differenzierung von politischen und verwaltungstechnischen Abhängigkeiten bei der Kartenherstellung. Allerdings muss auch berücksichtigt werden, dass unterschiedliche Entwicklungsstadien nicht nur vom Herrschaftsträger abhängig waren. Der Vergleich zu anderen Kolonien des südlichen und zentralen Afrika, aber auch der weiterreichende Blick auf alle europäischen Afrikakolonien zeigt, dass Fortschritte im jeweiligen Karten- und Vermessungswesen neben der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Wertschätzung der Kolonie und der Macht des Mutterlandes (Deutschland, Portugal, Großbritannien, Frankreich) vor allem auch von der Größe, der Lage, der sehr verschiedenartigen Natur und dem Klima des entsprechenden Gebietes bestimmt wurden. Im Gegensatz zu der relativ langsamen, aber kontinuierlichen Entwicklung der Vermessungsmethoden und der kartographischen Darstellung in Europa sind in den Kolonien eher ruckartige Veränderungen zu verzeichnen, die mit dem Import der europäischen Methoden und Instrumente in infrastrukturell unterentwickelte Gebiete einhergingen. Die Entwicklung afrikanischer und im Besonderen südwestafrikanischer Karten zeigt drei Phasen: Zunächst erfolgte die Aufnahme der Küsten während der Entdeckungsreisen des 15. und 16. Jhs. und durch spezielle Forschungsreisen vor allem im 17. und beginnenden 18. Jh. Die Erforschung und kartographische Darstellung des Landesinnern begann dagegen zögernd erst Ende des 18. und Anfang des 19. Jhs. In SWA ist der Grund dafür vor allem in den schlechten Zugangsmöglichkeiten auf Grund der Wüstengebiete zu suchen. Träger dieser Aufnahmen waren hauptsächlich Missionare und Forschungsreisende. Innerhalb der nächsten 100 Jahre konnte in Südwestafrika ein grobes topographisches Grundwissen aufgebaut werden, das zur Orientierung im Land meist ausreichte. Mit der Eroberung Afrikas durch europäische Kolonialmächte Ende des 19. Jhs. begann die dritte Phase. Diese war in Südwestafrika durch die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft bestimmt und ist vor allem geprägt durch die Suche nach geeigneten Aufnahmemethoden und Darstellungswegen, um die riesigen, teilweise menschenleeren Gegenden in wirtschaftlich verantwortbarer, aber auch militärisch und verwaltungstechnisch nutzbarer Form kartographisch darzustellen. Ihren Höhepunkt erreicht diese Phase jedoch erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in Südwestafrika sogar erst in den 1970er Jahren mit dem Einsatz moderner Aufnahmetechniken. In gleichen Phasen vollzog sich auch der Übergang von Kontinentkarten über lineare Routenaufnahmen mit stark wechselnden Maßstäben hin zu flächendeckenden topographischen Abbildungen. Mit diesen Veränderungen war auch eine Wandlung des Aussagewertes der Karten verbunden. Wie in Europa war die Kartenherstellung in Südwestafrika seit 1904 vor allem durch das Militär und dessen Bedürfnisse geprägt. Damit besaß das Land gegenüber den anderen deutschen Afrikakolonien eine Sonderstellung. Im Gegensatz zu den anderen deutschen Kolonien, aber in Anlehnung an das landschaftlich und klimatisch vergleichbare Südafrika wurde seit dem Hererokrieg 1904 eine großzügige und möglichst flächendeckende geodätische Vermessung durch Triangulation durchgeführt. Dagegen lagen die Katastervermessung und alle damit in Zusammenhang stehenden Arbeiten wie im Deutschen Reich in den Händen der zivilen Behörden. Allerdings war die Trennung der Aufgaben, bedingt durch die alleinige Zuständigkeit der Zivilverwaltung für alle Vermessungs- und Kartierungsangelegenheiten in Südwestafrika vor 1904, nicht ganz so deutlich wie im Deutschen Reich. Die dadurch bedingten regelmäßigen Kompetenzstreitigkeiten und die mangelnde Anerkennung der Arbeiten der Gegenseite verursachten die Behinderung zügiger Fortschritte in der Kartenherstellung sowie erhebliche zusätzliche Kosten. Die Koordinierung und Organisation der Arbeiten in Südwestafrika während der deutschen Kolonialzeit zeigt deutliche Mängel. Trotzdem kann das kartographisch Erreichte als positiv bewertet werden. Natürlich können aus heutiger Perspektive verschiedene Entscheidungen und Vorgehensweisen kritisiert werden. Für die damalige Zeit, die vorhandenen Mittel, Instrumente und Methoden, die Anzahl des Personals und im Wissen um die infrastrukturellen und Lebensbedingungen sind die erzielten Ergebnisse, ob das die Einzelkarten, räumlich definierte Kartenwerke oder solche des ganzen Landes betrifft, eine große Leistung. Das zeigt sich umso mehr im Vergleich zu den Nachbarstaaten, von denen beim Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges keines so zahlreiche und gute Kartenmaterialien vorweisen konnte. Aber auch während der südafrikanischen Mandatszeit seit 1920 waren die Kompetenzen und Zuständigkeiten nicht eindeutig geregelt. Zunächst besaß Südwestafrika eine Sonderstellung gegenüber den Provinzen der Südafrikanischen Union, indem das Vermessungsamt in Windhuk für alle Vermessungs- und Kartierungsarbeiten des Landes zuständig war. Damit war das Mandatsgebiet in gewisser Weise aber auch von den methodischen und technischen Fortschritten, vor allem des Trigsurvey, abgekoppelt. Andererseits nutzte man diese Unabhängigkeit in Windhuk für eigene Wege, vor allem beim Druck der Karten in Southampton. Spätestens seit dem Beginn der Herstellung der landesweiten Kartenwerke in den Maßstäben 1:50 000, 1:250 000 und kleiner in den 1960er Jahren wurden die kartographischen Arbeiten dann aber von Südafrika bestimmt und kontrolliert. Trotz dieser Probleme lässt sich sowohl für die deutsche Kolonialzeit als auch für die südafrikanische Mandatszeit eine Vielzahl guter und von unterschiedlichen Autoren stammender Karten als Einzelwerke, als Beilage zu diversen Berichten oder als Kartenwerke feststellen. Flächendeckende Triangulationen stellen daneben eine bedeutende Entwicklung für die lagerichtige Wiedergabe der Topographie auf der Karte dar. Dass die deutsche Kolonialzeit in der vorliegenden Arbeit ein starkes Übergewicht gegenüber den anderen beiden Zeitabschnitten aufweist, liegt auch an den zahlreichen Aktivitäten und Produkten dieser Zeit, vor allem aber an der Quellenlage, die für die Zeit zwischen 1890 und 1915 qualitativ und quantitativ wesentlich umfangreicher ist, als beispielsweise für die Zeit nach 1920. ; This work gives an overview over the cartographic development of Namibia from the beginnings in the early 18th century up to the independence of the country in 1990. At the same time there is also a detailed view to the cartography, the maps and map series possible. Besides the most important developments of the large expeditions, the surveying, the general administration and the organization of the surveying and mapping in the area of today's Namibia are shown. Additionally also the most important developments of surveying and mapping in the German Empire and in South Africa are presented because of there relevance for some historical and political decisions in relation to the surveying and mapping of Namibia. For the first time this work presents a comprehensive documentation about the cartography and the map-products of Namibia. Such a work does not exist for any of the neighbour countries in Southern Africa. The work is structured into three main periods, the Precolonial time up to 1884, the time of the German colony German South West Africa between 1884 and 1915/20 and the time of the South African mandatory power between 1920 and 1990. These periods allow to show in detail the different political and administrative obediences for the map making. But not only the colonial power (Germany, Great Britain, France, Portugal) is responsible for different developments. In comparison especially with other countries of Southern Africa but also with countries all over Africa it could be shown that advances in surveying and mapping also depend on the dimension, the location, the different nature, relief and the climate of an area. In contrast to the mostly slow but continuous development of the surveying methods and the cartographic design in Europe the colonies show steplike changes. This is because of the import of the European methods and instruments into areas with very low infrastructure. The development of the South West African cartography shows three main phases. During the age of discoveries in the 15th and 16th centuries but also through special expeditions in the 17th and the beginning 18th centuries the coasts were surveyed and mapped. The exploration and mapping of the inner parts of the country began late (end of 18th century) and slowly. The main reason for this are the large coastal deserts and the large waterless areas that made travelling very difficult and dangerous. The first travellers in South West Africa were missionaries and researchers. Within the next about 100 years the travellers could map an approximate topographic structure of the land. This was more or less satisfactory for an overview and the safe travelling in the country. The third phase began with the European, here German colonisation at the end of the 19th century. This phase began with the search for useful recording and mapping methods. Especially the huge but deserted areas of the colony had to be mapped in an economic arguable but also for the military and the administration usable way. The culmination of this phase was reached only after World War II, in South West Africa even only in the 1970th. At this time the modern recording methods allowed an area-wide and economic surveying and mapping of the whole country. In the same phases one can also see the change-over from maps of the continent via linear maps as results of route-mappings to area-wide topographic map series. As in Europe the surveying and mapping of German South West Africa since 1904 was affected by the military and its techniques and demands. This gave the land an exceptional position in comparison to the other German colonies. Like in the scenic and climatic similar South Africa the military survey section built up a large and area-wide geodetic survey by triangulation since the Herero-War in 1904. On the other hand the cadastral survey was in the hands of the civil administration as it was in the German Empire. But the separation of the duties and responsibilities was not that clear and precise like in Germany because the civil land surveyors were responsible for all works in the colony prior 1904 and did not wanted to give up all charges. The constant questions of authority and the partly lack of acceptance of the works of the other side caused a lot of additional costs and the relatively slow mapping progress. The coordination and organization of the surveying and mapping of the German colony South West Africa shows obvious failings. Even so the mapping of the colony can be evaluated positive. For that time, the possibilities, instruments and methods, for the small number of employees and with the knowledge of the infrastructure and the living conditions the results are quite good. Many beautiful and high quality single maps and maps series of special area and for the whole country are known. This is much more astonishing as none of the neighbour countries could reach such an high standard up to the beginning of World War I. During the time of the South African mandatory power the competences and responsibilities of the surveying and mapping were also not clearly defined. After World War I but up to the 1950th South West Africa had an exceptional position compared to the South African provinces. The surveying office in Windhuk was responsible for all surveyings and mappings in South West Africa. For this the country was partly cutted from the latest methodic and technic developments of the South African Trigsurvey. On the other hand Windhuk could use his independence for own ways. For this the SWA-maps produced in the 1930th were printed in Southampton and not at the South African Government Printer in Pretoria and show a much better printing quality than the South African maps of that time. At the latest with the beginning of the production process of the map series in 1:50 000, 1:250 000 and smaller in the 1960th the mapping process of South West Africa/Namibia was fully controlled and affected by the South African Trigsurvey. Despite a lot of problems there are both for the Precolonial period, for the German and for the South African time a lot of good maps from many different authors and for different objections produced known. An analysis of the geometric accuracy of four maps, made between 1879 and 1980 (Chapter 6) shows additionally the high importance of area-wide triangulations for high quality maps. The reason for the overweight of the German colonial time in this work depends on the one side on the many maps and other cartographic products and activities of that time but on the other side it depends also on the high quantity and quality of resources about surveying and mapping in the German time.
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Bertrand Badie sur le moment Trump, la science de la souffrance, et les RI entre puissance et faiblesse
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La discipline de RI se focalise traditionnellement sur l'enjeu de pouvoir entre états. Mais, s'interroge Bertrand Badie, est-ce que cela veut dire que notre discipline est basée sur la négation de notre humanité ? Un géant dans les RI françaises, Badie a œuvré pour remplacer le pouvoir et pour mettre la souffrance au cœur de l'analyse de l'international, en appliquant des idées sociologiques sur une réalité véritablement globale. Dans ce Talk, Badie, entre autres, défie la centralité de l'idée de pouvoir, qui a peu de sens dans un monde où la plupart de l'agenda international est défini par des défis qu'émanent de la faiblesse ; défend la centralité de la souffrance pour une discipline de RI plus adaptée ; et utilise ces idées de base pour contextualiser le Moment Trump.
Quel est selon vous actuellement le plus grand défi ou débat dans le domaine des Relations Internationales ? Quelle est votre position vis-à-vis de cet ou ces enjeu(x) ?
Incontestablement, c'est la question du changement. C'est à dire que le moment est venu de conceptualiser, et au-delà même, de théoriser le changement qui s'effectue dans les Relations Internationales (RI). On a toujours le sentiment qu'on vit une période de changement, mais concernant les RI nous avons plusieurs repères qui montrent l'effectivité du changement. J'en vois au moins trois.
Le premier, c'est la nature inclusive du système international. Pour la première fois dans l'Histoire de l'humanité le système international couvre la quasi-totalité de l'humanité, alors que le système Westphalien était un système Européen dans lequel les Etats-Unis sont entrés pour en faire un système, je dirais, euro-nord-américain.
Deuxième élément, et plusieurs ouvrages déjà ont permis de le montrer, il y a une mutation profonde de la nature du conflit. La guerre était autrefois, dans le modèle Westphalien, une affaire de compétition de puissance. Aujourd'hui on a le sentiment que la faiblesse remplace la puissance, c'est à dire la puissance n'est plus explicative des situations belligènes, que l'on doit trouver davantage dans les manifestations de faiblesse : que ce soit les « collapsing states », c'est à dire le déchirement des Nations souvent mal ou hâtivement construites ou encore la déliquescence des liens sociaux. Cette nouvelle conflictualité vient complètement bouleverser la donne internationale et constitue un deuxième marqueur de transformation.
Le troisième axe, c'est ce que j'appellerais la mobilité. Tout notre système international reposait sur l'idée de territoire et de frontière, sur l'idée de fixité marquant de manière très précise les compétences des Etats. L'Etat renvoie au territoire, comme la définition donnée par Max Weber l'indique très clairement, alors qu'aujourd'hui le territoire est défié par toute une série de mobilités, c'est à dire de flux transnationaux : qu'il s'agisse de flux commerciaux, de flux d'informations ou de flux humains à travers notamment toutes les diverses formes de migrations.
Donc voilà au moins trois indicateurs objectifs d'une transformation profonde de la nature même des RI qui m'incitent d'abord à parler plus volontiers désormais de « relations intersociales » plus que de « relations interétatiques ». Les relations entre Etats ne saturent plus le jeu mondial et ça amène à considérer que toute notre théorie des RI reposait sur le modèle Westphalien tel qu'il est issu de la paix de Westphalie, tel qu'il a été confirmé par l'accomplissement du travail de construction des Etats-Nations et tel qu'il a dominé l'actualité internationale jusqu'à la chute du Mur. Jusqu'à la chute du Mur, ce qui ne relevait pas de l'Europe et des Etats-Unis, et de l'Amérique du Nord disons plus exactement, était nommé périphérique, ce qui en dit long. Aujourd'hui la périphérie est centrale au moins du point de vue de la conflictualité, donc il faut abandonner notre grammaire Westphalienne et construire un nouveau guide d'analyse des RI qui tienne compte de ces mutations. Supprimer notre grammaire Westphalienne des RI, c'est remettre en cause notre théorie classique des RI et c'est remettre en cause aussi les modèles pratiques d'action en politique internationale, c'est à dire l'ordinaire de la diplomatie.
Comment est-ce que vous êtes arrivé dans votre pensée autour les Relations Internationales ?
Vous savez souvent quand on écrit, quand on travaille, on est d'abord influencé par son insatisfaction. C'est à dire que la théorie classique Westphalienne des RI, comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure, ne me satisfaisait pas parce que j'avais l'impression qu'elle focalisait sur des évènements qui n'avaient plus l'importance qu'on continuait à leur prêter, par exemple la course aux armement, les relations entre puissances ou les négociations diplomatiques traditionnelles alors que je voyais, peut-être est-ce là l'élément déclenchant, que l'essentiel des souffrances dans le monde venait d'espaces que ne couvrait pas réellement la théorie des RI.
J'ai toujours dit à mes étudiants que les RI c'était la science des souffrances humaines. Ces souffrances bien sûr elles existent chez nous, elles existent en Europe, elles existent en Amérique du Nord, elles existent partout dans le monde mais l'essentiel des souffrances se situe hors champ westphalien et du coup l'analyse classique des RI en donnait une image tout d'abord marginale et déformée. L'Afrique ou le Moyen Orient vus au prisme du système Westphalien avaient une allure aplatie qui ne correspondait en rien à l'extraordinaire richesse, en bien et en mal, de ces régions du monde. Je considérais aussi que dans un monde où 6 à 9 millions d'individus meurent de faim chaque année, les grands agendas des RI classiques étaient dérisoires. Même le terrorisme, auquel on donne tant d'importance, a des scores dérisoires par rapport à ceux de l'insécurité alimentaire.
Mes trois derniers livres sont trois cris de révolte contre la théorie classique des RI. La diplomatie de connivence est un livre dans lequel j'ai essayé de montrer qu'en réalité le jeu des puissances était un jeu beaucoup plus intégré qu'on ne le dit et renvoyant souvent à de fausses conflictualités. Il y a bien un club, et c'est ça que j'essayais de décrire, un club de puissants.
Le Temps des humiliés était là pour mettre en scène justement ce que la théorie classique ne savait pas exprimer, c'est à dire la domination vue du côté des dominés, l'humiliation vue du côté des humiliés, la violence vue du côté des désespérés. Même si on regarde des puissances aussi accomplies que la Chine aujourd'hui, première ex aequo avec les Etats-Unis en PIB, il faut bien admettre que la mémoire de l'humiliation constitue pour la Chine une source énorme d'inspiration et d'élaboration de son actuelle politique étrangère.
Et puis, dans mon dernier livre Nous ne sommes plus seuls au monde, là le cri était encore plus direct, c'est à dire nous sommes en train d'écrire les RI qui concernent un gros milliard d'êtres humains en oubliant tous les autres et aujourd'hui ce ne sont pas ces vieilles puissances qui font l'agenda international. Il est écrit à l'initiative du petit, du faible, du dominé, avec bien entendu des recours à des formes de violences extrêmes, mais qu'il faut essayer d'analyser et de comprendre, donc totalement renverser la théorie des RI.
Il ne faut pas oublier que l'essentiel de la théorie des RI nous a été livré par les Etats-Unis triomphants en 1945. Le fameux « power politics » qui domine la théorie classique des RI, inaugurée par Morgenthau et porté par tellement d'autres, mettait en scène ce qui était vrai à l'époque, c'est à dire la capacité de la puissance américaine de nous délivrer du monstre nazi. Aujourd'hui l'enjeu il est tout autre, et c'est d'ailleurs significatif que deux des plus grands politistes internationalistes américains, Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9) et Ned Lebow (TheoryTalk #53), aient écrit le premier un livre qui s'appelle After hegemony et le second Goodbye hegemony. Et bien justement, moi ce qui m'intéresse c'est de voir ce qu'il y a après l'hégémonie.
Une question maintenant pour les étudiants qui aspireraient à se spécialiser dans le domaine des RI : quels conseils ?
D'abord je leur conseillerais de débaptiser leur science, comme je le disais tout à l'heure, et de l'appeler relations intersociales, c'est à dire que l'avenir de ce que nous nous appelons les Relations Internationales se trouve dans la capacité de comprendre les interactions extrêmement riches, multiples et diversifiées qui s'opèrent entre les sociétés du monde. Ce qui ne veut pas dire de complètement abandonner la piste des Etats, mais replacer les Etats au milieu de cette multiplicité d'acteurs pour constater souvent l'impuissance de ces États face à ces acteurs nouveaux. Ce serait mon premier conseil.
Mon deuxième conseil c'est regarder devant eux et non derrière eux, c'est à dire ne pas se laisser dominer par le modèle westphalien et essayer de bâtir ce dont nous avons besoin parce que presque rien n'a été fait encore aujourd'hui pour bâtir ce modèle post-westphalien, méta-westphalien. Au-delà de la puissance il y a des choses que l'on identifie encore mal et qui sont le moteur des RI. De ce point de vue-là, l'aide de la sociologie est particulièrement précieuse car si nous sommes dans des relations intersociales, évidemment, la sociologie a un rôle très important à jouer. J'ai considéré, dans ma contribution au The return of the theorists que Durkheim est une source très importante d'inspiration pour comprendre le monde aujourd'hui. Voilà un auteur à étudier et à appliquer aux RI.
Le troisième conseil que je leur donnerais c'est de ne pas oublier qu'effectivement les « RI » ou les relations intersociales sont les sciences de la souffrance humaine. Il faut savoir remettre la souffrance au centre de la réflexion. On a trop perdu de temps à analyser la puissance, il est temps maintenant de se mettre du côté de la souffrance. Pourquoi ? D'abord parce que éthiquement c'est meilleur, peut-être pourra-t-on en tirer alors des enseignements pratiques ? Mais aussi pour une deuxième raison, c'est que dans les nouvelles RI la souffrance est plus proactive que la puissance, ce qui n'est pas forcément optimiste mais qui permet notamment de mieux s'interroger sur les formes nouvelles de conflictualité. Hélas ce n'est plus avec des canons que l'on écrit l'agenda international, mais c'est avec des larmes. C'est peut-être là qu'il y a un effort important à consentir sur le plan de la réflexion.
Dans Le temps des humiliés, vous proposez une lecture durkheimienne des RI dont l'accent est surtout mis sur le « grievance » qui s'oppose à une autre logique : celle du « greed ». Que pensez-vous de ce parallèle ?
« Greed » on peut le traduire par accaparement, captation. En réalité vous avez raison, l'idée de grievance, de récrimination, le mot est parfait aussi en français, est une idée très structurante du jeu international. On ne l'a pas vu venir pour deux raisons. D'abord parce que notre analyse classique des RI supposait une unité de temps, comme si le temps africain, le temps chinois, le temps indien et le temps européen étaient identiques. Or ceci est complètement faux parce que nous dans notre culture européenne nous n'avons pas compris qu'avant Westphalie il y avait des modèles politiques, des histoires qui avaient profondément marqué les peuples qui les avaient alors façonnés. Pensez que la Chine c'est 4000 ans d'empire, pensez que l'Afrique avant la colonisation c'était des royaumes, des empires, des civilisations, un art, des productions artistiques. Pensez que l'Inde aussi est multimillénaire. Le temps Westphalien est venu totalement nier et écraser cette temporalité, cette historicité, presque sur un mode négationniste, c'est à dire que dans l'esprit de ceux qui étaient porteurs du modèle Westphalien seul ce modèle associé à la Renaissance et au Siècle des Lumières et à la Raison avec un grand R avait vocation à formater le monde. Or, c'était un pari insensé, un pari pour lequel nos ancêtres Européens qui l'ont mené avaient des excuses parce qu'à l'époque on connaissait mal ces Histoires, à l'époque on n'avait pas cette connaissance de l'autre et de l'altérité donc on a réglé ça au plus simple, c'est à dire à partir de la négation de l'altérité. Or les RI c'est au contraire l'accomplissement de l'altérité. Donc, inévitablement tous ceux qui se sont vus nier dans leur historicité sur plusieurs siècles et même plusieurs millénaires ont accumulé un ressentiment de récrimination, de grievance particulièrement fort.
Le deuxième élément c'est que tout ceci s'est opéré dans un contexte de déséquilibre des ressources de puissance, lié à différents facteurs qui faisaient qu'effectivement à un moment donné du temps les puissances occidentales étaient mieux armées au sens propre, au sens figuré, que les autres sociétés. Donc cette négation de l'altérité a été aggravée par l'imposition d'un système multilatéral de force qui s'est traduit de la pire des façons, c'est à dire à partir d'une hiérarchie proclamée des cultures, donc voilà il y avait comme disait Jules Ferry, en France au XIXe siècle, les « races », « Nous avons l'obligation d'éduquer les races inférieures ». C'est le début d'une Histoire, c'est le début de l'Histoire de l'humiliation et comme au même moment la mondialisation venait à se faire, cette humiliation est devenue le nerf de la vie international. Un nerf qui a été utilisé autant par les puissants, qui en ont fait un instrument, c'est à dire où on va humilier les autres pour mieux les dominer (guerres de l'Opium, la colonisation) et en même temps un nerf qui a irrigué la réaction mobilisatrice de ce monde extra-westphalien qui pour exister a eu besoin de s'affirmer contre ceux qui les humiliaient. Donc vous voyez c'est vraiment la trame des nouvelles RI. Dans mon esprit c'est devenu un paradigme, ça explique tout même si d'autres facteurs continuent à expliquer parallèlement.
Et pour apprécier cela on a besoin d'une approche sociologique, ce que pour moi a deux fonctions. Ces deux fonctions il faut les avoir en tête toutes les deux pour bien comprendre ce qu'elle veut dire. La première c'est une fonction intemporelle, c'est à dire considérer que partout et de tout temps le politique est un produit social, donc ne peut pas être compris hors de la société, ce qui n'était pas forcément la posture de certains et même de, je dirais, la majorité des analystes qui croyaient de manière excessive à une autonomie du politique et de l'Etat. La deuxième composante de cette approche sociologique est une composante temporelle historique. Ce que je vous disais tout à l'heure : avec la mondialisation le social a beaucoup progressé en propre par rapport au politique et les relations intersociales, ayant grandi, on a besoin d'une approche sociologique pour les comprendre.
Est-ce que vous pensez que « le moment Trump » constitue une rupture fondamentale avec la conduite des RI ?
Trump en soi peut-être pas, ce qu'il représente certainement. C'est à dire si on regarde les Etats-Unis on voit, depuis le changement de millénaire, trois modèles se succéder. Vous avez eu au lendemain du 11 Septembre un temps néo-conservateur où la mondialisation était considérée par les dirigeants Américains comme un moyen ou peut-être une chance d'universaliser le modèle américain de gré ou de force. De force comme ce fut le cas par exemple en Irak en 2003. Ce modèle a échoué.
Cela a amené un deuxième modèle qui est, je dirais, un modèle libéral, néo-libéral, incarné par Obama qui tirant les leçons de l'échec du néo-conservatisme, a eu le courage de remettre en cause l'hypothèse jugée jusque-là indiscutable d'un leadership américain et considéré que les Etats-Unis ne pouvaient gagner aujourd'hui qu'à travers le soft power ou le smart power ou le libre échangisme. C'est la raison pour laquelle Obama se faisait très peu interventionniste et misait beaucoup sur le TTIP, sur tous ces accords transrégionaux.
Avec Trump est arrivé un troisième modèle, que j'appellerais néo-nationaliste, qui considère la mondialisation mais de façon différente. La mondialisation est ramenée dans son esprit à une chance donnée de satisfaire les intérêts nationaux américains, l'idée de « national interest » rejaillit après ce long temps de vision globalisante. Ca ne veut pas dire qu'on n'est pas interventionniste. Ce qui s'est passé en Syrie le démontre. Ça veut dire qu'on interviendra non pas en fonction des besoins de la mondialisation mais en fonction des intérêts des Etats-Unis. Il s'agit de montrer l'image des Etats-Unis forts, puissants et d'autre part de servir les intérêts concrets du peuple américain et de la nation américaine.
Ce modèle néo-nationaliste n'est pas porté par Trump tout seul, c'est la raison pour laquelle je disais qu'il ne faut pas prendre Trump isolément. On le retrouve exactement de la même manière chez Poutine. On le retrouve chez quantité d'autres dirigeants du monde, comme par exemple Erdogan ou Duterte ou Victor Orbán, donc des personnages aussi différents, ou le Maréchal Sissi en Egypte.
On le retrouve dans des postures : le Brexit en Grande-Bretagne, ce néo-populisme de droite en Europe : Mme Le Pen, Mr Wilders, voire un certain néo-populisme de gauche comme Mélenchon en France. Bref il est dans l'air du temps, c'est presque un effet de mode et il constitue peut-être une double rupture dans les RI.
D'abord parce que depuis l'avènement de la mondialisation, les années 70 disons en gros même si la mondialisation n'est pas née à un jour précis, on avait un peu laissé de côté l'idée d'intérêt national pour raisonner en termes de biens collectifs. Là c'est un abandon des biens collectifs et un retour vers l'intérêt national. On le voit bien, l'un des actes de Trump a été de dire que la COP21 de Paris doit être reconsidérée. Et puis c'est une certaine forme aussi de réhabilitation de la force, qui redevient le langage des RI.
Voilà deux bonnes raisons d'abord de compléter notre science positive pour comprendre cette nouvelle tentation mais aussi pour s'en inquiéter. Vous savez l'internationaliste ce n'est pas quelqu'un de neutre, c'est aussi quelqu'un qui doit mettre sa science au service de l'action et de la définition des politiques publiques. Aller à l'encontre de l'idée de biens communs, c'est à dire à nouveau jeter un doute sur l'idée de sécurité humaine, de sécurité environnementale, de sécurité alimentaire, de sécurité sanitaire c'est extrêmement dangereux car ce n'est jamais la composition des intérêts et des égoïsmes nationaux qui fera une politique globalement cohérente. C'est le faible qui en pâtira le premier.
La deuxième raison c'est ce paradoxe à un moment où l'on voit que la puissance est de plus en plus impuissante, j'ai fait tout un livre là-dessus, de réhabiliter la force. Or regardez, ne serait-ce que depuis 1989, où la force a-t-elle triomphé sur le plan des RI ? Où donc le plus fort a gagné la bataille qui lui a permis de résoudre le problème à son avantage ou conformément à ses objectifs ? Jamais. Ni en Somalie, ni en Afghanistan, ni en Irak, ni en Syrie, ni en Palestine. Nulle part. Ni au Sahel, ni en République Démocratique du Congo. Nulle part. Donc je suis un peu inquiet, effectivement, de cette réhabilitation naïve et ringarde de la force.
Peut-on considérer que l'idée de la mondialisation, ou plutôt de l'ambition intégratrice, aurait échoué ? Devrait-on enterrer l'idée d'intégration régionale ou mondiale ?
Je n'aime pas les enterrements, ce n'est pas un terme que j'emploierai, mais votre question est très pertinente. Pendant près de vingt ans j'ai enseigné que l'intégration régionale c'était l'échelon intermédiaire et réaliste entre le temps des nations et le temps de la globalisation, c'est à dire j'ai longtemps cru que l'intégration régionale était l'antichambre d'une gouvernance globale du monde.
J'ai longtemps cru que ce qui n'était pas possible à l'échelle mondiale, à un gouvernement mondial, pouvait l'être au niveau régional et déjà simplifier de beaucoup la carte du monde et donc de progresser vers cette adhésion au collectif que commande la mondialisation. Or non seulement l'Europe est en échec, vous avez raison de le dire, mais toutes les constructions régionales dans le monde sont en échec. Alors Mr. Trump bouscule ouvertement le NAFTA ALENA, le MERCOSUR est en panne chaque Etat qui le compose a des récriminations à son encontre, on pourrait continuer l'énumération… Toutes les formes d'intégration que Chavez avait mis en place autour de son idéal bolivarien n'existent plus, l'Afrique ne progresse que très très très lentement en matière d'intégration régionale : l'Union du Maghreb Arabe, qui est quand même un dispositif essentiel, a totalement échoué. Donc effectivement la conjoncture n'est pas bonne.
Pour l'Europe le phénomène est double : d'une part il y a cet échec très grave du départ de la Grande Bretagne de l'Europe et puis il y a un malaise général du modèle européen. Alors, le départ de la Grande Bretagne c'est très grave parce que c'est très rare si vous regardez l'Histoire contemporaine des RI qu'un Etat claque la porte d'une organisation régionale ou mondiale. C'est arrivé avec l'Indonésie aux Nations Unies en 1964, ça n'a duré que 19 mois. C'est arrivé pour le Maroc au sein de l'Union Africaine et le Maroc est actuellement en voie de réintégration. Donc ce fait Britannique claque comme un coup de tonnerre, aggravé par le fait que paradoxalement ce n'est pas tant sur l'idée d'intégration régionale que les Britanniques ont voté contre l'UE. C'est beaucoup plus dans un réflexe anti-migratoire, xénophobe, nationaliste (correspondant à cet élan de nationalisme que je décrivais tout à l'heure) et donc ce qui est dramatique c'est que l'on voit bien que cet ère du temps nationaliste vient réellement attaquer les principes même de l'intégration régionale.
Alors je disais que pour l'Europe il y a des problèmes internes encore plus profonds que la défection Britannique, j'en vois au moins deux.
D'abord il y a un échec démocratique de l'Europe, c'est à dire l'Europe n'a pas su faire coïncider les espaces d'élection et les espaces de décisions, le peuple vote au niveau national et les décisions se prennent à Bruxelles. Du coup, le contrôle démocratique sur les décisions est extrêmement faible. Comment résoudre cette équation ? Et là la panne est complète car personne ne propose de solutions.
L'autre élément à mon avis composant de cette crise, c'est que l'Europe a été construite avec succès au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale de manière progressive sur le maître mot d'association et effectivement, Durkheim l'a montré, la logique d'intégration associative fait sens. C'est à dire l'union fait la force et l'union a fait la force en son temps en Europe pour empêcher la guerre premièrement, c'est à dire une troisième guerre européenne au XXe siècle, et deuxièmement pour favoriser la reconstruction de pays européens dont l'économie s'était totalement effondrée. Ce temps-là est terminé et la faute de l'Europe c'est de ne pas avoir su se contextualiser, c'est à dire réagir aux contextes nouveaux.
Rendant à nouveau hommage à Durkheim qui avait vu juste, Durkheim avait dit il y a deux façons de construire le lien social : autour de l'association et autour de la solidarité. Je pense que le temps de l'association est terminé, on doit entrer dans le temps de la solidarité, c'est à dire la solidarité consiste à dire non pas « Nous Allemands nous nous associons à la Grèce » mais « Nous Allemands sommes solidaires de la Grèce car nous savons que si la Grèce s'effondre, à terme, nous en subirons les conséquences ». Donc cette idée d'unité fondamentale est une idée qui a été un peu snobée, abandonnée par les Européens et maintenant ils se trouvent dans une situation de paralysie complète.
Est-ce que la période de décolonisation laisse encore des traces au niveau des RI contemporaines ?
Ah totalement, totalement. Je dirais d'abord parce que c'est un événement majeur des RI, qui a quand même fait passer le monde de 51 Etats Souverains membres des Nations Unies en 1945 à 193 aujourd'hui mais surtout, circonstance très aggravante, c'est que cette décolonisation a été complètement ratée et que l'échec de la décolonisation pèse énormément sur les RI.
Elle a été ratée parce que la décolonisation a conduit à copier le modèle étatique occidental dans les pays qui accédaient à l'indépendance, alors que ce modèle n'était pas forcément adapté, ce qui a provoqué une prolifération de failed States, et ces collapsed States ont eu un effet effroyable sur les RI.
Deuxièmement parce que la décolonisation aurait dû conduire à un enrichissement et en tous les cas à une modification substantielle du multilatéralisme en créant de nouvelles institutions capables de prendre en charge les défis nouveaux issus de la décolonisation. Or, à part la création de la CNUCED en 1964 et du PNUD en 1965, il y a eu très peu d'innovations sur le plan de la gouvernance mondiale. Donc la gouvernance mondiale reste dominée par ce que j'appelais tout à l'heure le club, c'est à dire les puissances du Nord et ceci est très dysfonctionnel dans la gestion des crises contemporaines. Puis enfin parce que les anciennes puissances coloniales sont amenées à trouver des formes nouvelles de domination qui ont en quelques sorte compliqué le jeu international. Donc effectivement la décolonisation c'est l'ordinaire des crises que rencontre le système international aujourd'hui.
Question finale : quel autre souci vous inquiète dans les RI contemporaines ?
J'ai trouvé que votre questionnement était très pertinent parce qu'il permettait de toucher aux thèmes que je tiens pour essentiels. Maintenant, si vous voulez, le grand problème qui moi m'inquiète c'est le formidable décalage qu'il y a entre les analystes et les acteurs. Je ne dis pas que les analystes ont tout compris, loin de là, mais je crois que les analystes sont très conscients de ces transformations. Si vous prenez les grands auteurs comme James Rosenau, Ned Lebow, comme Robert Keohane, juste quelques-uns il y en aurait beaucoup d'autres, ils ont tous apporté une pierre à la reconstruction de l'édifice des RI.
Moi ce qui me frappe, c'est l'autisme des acteurs politiques, c'est à dire ils se croient encore à l'époque du Congrès de Vienne et ça c'est source de tension absolument extraordinaire. Donc tant que ce parfum de changement n'aura pas touché les acteurs politiques, peut-être que Barack Obama était le premier à commencer à entrer dans ce jeu et puis la parenthèse s'est refermée, tant donc qu'il n'y aura pas ce mouvement vers la découverte d'un nouveau monde, peut-être aussi en intégrant dans notre réflexion sur l'international des partenaires comme la Chine, ce n'est quand même pas normal que cette Chine si puissante n'ait d'autre choix finalement que de se rallier au paradigme et au modèle d'action propre à la diplomatie occidentale, tant qu'on n'aura pas fait cet effort là et bien on sera encore dans la négation de l'humain, et c'est ça le problème essentiel aujourd'hui, c'est que nous n'arrivons pas à comprendre qu'au bout de tout ça il y a une seule unité qui est l'être humain.
J'ai eu la chance de visiter 105 pays et partout j'ai rencontré les mêmes hommes et les mêmes femmes, avec leurs souffrances, avec leurs bonheurs, leurs malheurs, leurs joies, leurs peines, leurs besoins qui étaient partout absolument identiques. Tant qu'on n'aura pas compris cela, et bien je crois que l'on vivra dans un monde qui est en contradiction totale avec ce qu'il est vraiment et essentiellement. On vivra dans un monde d'artifice et donc dans un monde de violence.
Lire plus
· Lire Badie's Printemps Arabe : un commencement (SER Études 2011) ici (pdf)
· Lire Badie's Pour une sociologie historique de la négotiation (préface de Négociations internationales) ici (pdf)
En la arena educativa, uno de los focos de tensión irresuelto en la actualidad es el propio de las relaciones entre la escuela pública y la escuela privada. Los partidarios de cada opción participan en un debate apasionado con posiciones sustentadas básicamente en argumentos religiosos, políticos y sociales y ello, ante la carencia de estudios que posibiliten el conocimiento de la génesis y desarrollo de la escuela privada y permitan su tratamiento propiamente educativo. En consecuencia se ha determinado seguir el devenir histórico de la conformación de un sistema de instrucción nacional público y privado junto con el concepto de libertad de enseñanza, garante entre otros de la libertad de creación de centros, al menos desde el liberalismo doceañista hasta los albores de la Guerra Civil en un triángulo matriz cuyos vértices quedan determinados en cada momento histórico por ia ideología gubernamental, la todopoderosa actuación de la Iglesia católica y las siempre escasas partidas económicas dedicadas a la instrucción. El trabajo sigue la metodología de la investigación histórica tradicional procurando interpretar los hechos acaecidos basándose en documentos históricos. El punto de partida no puede ser otro que el R.D. de 1 de julio de 1902 documento que conforma un instrumento de inspección estatal de escuelas privadas que tradicionalmente habían quedado fuera de su control y la documentación consiguiente de más de un centenar de centros educativos que solicitan los trámites de apertura y funcionamiento dirigidos a la Universidad Literaria de Sevilla. Ellos son una fuente de información primigenia acerca de los cuadros de enseñanza (asignaturas, gabinetes y material científico) y documentos de filiación (certificados de buena conducta y residencia )entre otros, además de las condiciones de moralidad e higiene en que se desenvolvían .imprescindibles en la autorización del establecimiento. En esos momentos históricos , la necesaria reforma educativa en cuanto a leyes educativas, planes de estudios, contenidos.etc, cede paso al pulso, estatista de una parte; confesional de otra, por el control político e ideológico de la escuela. A comienzos del s. XX la ciudad de Huelva alcanza elevados índices demográficos y económicos debidos en buena parte a la actividad minera. Así, las necesidades de la población se traducen, bajo la premisa de la mejora de los servicios públicos, a veces en manos privadas, en una mayor demanda de agua, mercados de abastos y escuelas, entre otros. En 1901 el Gobernador civil propondrá al Consistorio una profunda reforma en el abastecimiento de aguas . Urge trazar una red apropiada que provea de agua potable a la población. A este problema se le une poco después, en el verano, las obras de la nueva plaza de abastos que quedarán paralizadas debido a problemas en el ensamblaje metálico de la cubierta .En lo referente a las escuelas, no pocas veces los planteamientos educativos quedarán en un segundo plano, advirtiéndose principalmente el coste que suponen las subvenciones, gratificaciones, construcciones, pago de haberes. en un mapa escolar variopinto donde toman acomodo la escuela pública - nacional, la católica, 1a escuela laica y un colegio. Otro de los problemas que preocupa ai consistorio es el de la mendicidad de oficio, que será estudiado en la Comisión de Beneficencia y el abaratamiento de los artículos de primera necesidad, aspectos de una sociedad en rápido crecimiento. El estudio de la escuela primaria privada requiere el establecimiento de cortes cronológicos. En el primero, que abarca desde principios de siglo hasta 1923 se hace patente el desarrollo "autónomo" de los colegios religiosos aprovechando los pactos con la Iglesia, las confrontaciones políticas, los beneficiosos procedimientos administrativos , al menos en lo relativo a la titulación^ la desidia que acompañaba estos temas. Con Primo de Rivera, el restablecimiento del R.D. de i de julio de 1902 y la proliferación de escuelas y colegios de congregaciones e institutos religiosos. El planteamiento novedoso de la escuela unificada de manos de la República y su programa laico y secular izad or culminará con disposiciones que dictarán la supresión de subvenciones a colegios religiosos, la incautación de sus edificios y la desaparición de algunos colegios. La escuela no oficial de Huelva forma un mosaico complejo y variado. Junto a la escuela de la mina surgida a partir de 1873 con la llegada de capitales extranjeros para la explotación de los criaderos de minerales y a escuela evangélica, tan ligada a ella y algunas pocas escuelas privadas no confesionales .laicas y racionalistas toleradas y vigiladas de cerca , ya en la capital, ya en la provincia, por los servidores de la Iglesia católica. Junto a unos pocos colegios para hijos de obreros, los colegios de primera y segunda enseñanza, garantes de una educación de calidad para la pujante clase media y los colegios y escuelas de órdenes, institutos y congregaciones religiosas, que se asientan en la capital y en desarrolladas localidades provinciales para ofertar junto a una educación de calidad otra de caridad para los más desfavorecidos. Queda patente la importancia de la escuela católica > parte medular del sistema educativo y ello por un doble motivo; por el número creciente de escuelas y colegios establecidos, y por la colonización creciente de sus enseñanzas en el currículo , sin olvidar el papel inspector que ejercen en el resto de escuelas, Restan las escuelas particulares, las más numerosas, las que se encuentran diseminadas por toda la geografía onubense, de corte mayoritariamente femenino si se atiende a la dirección y clientela y que subsiste a duras penas con exiguos pagos o cicateras subvenciones de los ayuntamientos a cambio de matricular a un determinado número de alumnos pobres, aliviando así las sonrojantes listas de matriculación escolar. El mapa escolar ha de completarse con la labor educativa y social de Manuel Siurot en sus Escuelas del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús, transmisor de las enseñanzas de Manjón y !a Escuela Francesa , verdadero referente educativo capitalino que perdura actualmente, Finaliza este trabajo reparando en los protagonistas inmediatos del hecho educativo: el profesorado y el alumnado. Dividido el periodo acotado en cuatro décadas , se estudian en cada una las titulaciones y obligaciones de maestros y maestras, haciendo referencia a los planes de estudio y, cuando los datos lo permiten, reparar en aspectos tales como el estado civil, procedencia, edad y número de maestros y maestras, así como la oferta educativa y los niveles de asistencia en las escuelas públicas, privadas, de patronato y subvencionadas, aspectos que permiten caracterizar la escuela en el periodo mencionado. Esta es nuestra contribución al conocimiento de la escuela privada, conocimiento modesto tanto por la dimensión local como por el estudio de una documentación que refleja parcialmente la realidad, pues si bien es cierto que hemos seguido fielmente todos los documentos de los archivos mencionados, también es cierto que por el camino se han quedado cientos de escuelas "amigas" que quedan fuera de control aunque aún perduren en la memoria. Queda abierta una vía para futuras investigaciones. ; In the educational arena, one of the tension focal points still unresolved at present Is the one belonging to the relationship between the state school and the private (Independent) school. Supporters of each option take part in a passionate debate with positions essentially sustained by religious, political and social arguments due to the lack of studies that make possible the understanding of the genesis and development of the private (independent) school and enable their proper educational treatment. Consequently, it has been determined to follow the historical development of configuration of a national state and private education system together with the concept of academic freedom, guarantor of, among others, the freedom of establishment of centres, at least from the doceanista liberalism to the dawn of the Civil War in a matrix triangle whose vertices are determined in each historical period by the governmental ideology, the powerful action of the Catholic Church and the always scarce economic funds devoted to instruction. The study follows the methodology of traditional historical research trying to interpret the events based on historical documents. The starting point can not be other than the Royal Decree of 1st July 1902, a document that functions as a state inspection instrument of private (independent) schools that had traditionally been beyond its control and the consequent documentation of more than a hundred education centres applying for the opening and operation procedures directed to the Literary University of Seville. They are a primal source of information with regards to teaching charts (subjects, offices and scientific equipment) and affiliation documents (certificates of good behaviour and residence) among others, including the morality and hygiene conditions where they were working, essential for the approval of the establishment. In those historical moments, the necessary educational reform in terms of education laws, curricula, contents.etc, gives way to the arm wrestle, state-controlled on the one hand, confessional on the other, for the political and ideological control of the school. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the city of Huelva reaches high demographic and economic indices largely due to the mining activity. Thus, the population necessities are translated, under the premise of improving public services, sometimes in private hands, in a higher demand for water, food markets and schools among others. In 1901 the Civil Governor will propose to the City Council a major remodelling of the water supply, it urges to design an appropriate network for providing drinking water to the population. This concern is joined shortly after, in summertime, by the building work of the new food market that will be paralysed due to problems with the metallic structure of the roof. With regards to schools, not rarely educational approaches will remain in the background, noticing mainly the costs involving subsidies, school fees, building work, salary payments.in a diverse school map that accomodates the state elementary school - the national, the Catholic, the secular school and a secondary school. Other problems that concern the City Council are the proffesional begging, which will be studied by the Charity Committee, and the price reduction of prime necessity goods, aspects of a society in rapid growth, The study of the private elementary school requires the establishment of chronological frames. In the first one, spanning from the beginning of the century until 1923, is patent the "autonomous" development of religious schools taking advantage of pacts with the Church, political confrontations, beneficial administrative procedures, at least in terms of qualifications, or the apathy that accompanied these issues. With Primo de Rivera, the restoration of the Royal Decree of 1st July 1902 and the proliferation of elementary and secondary schools of religious congregations and religious high schools. The original approach of the unified school thanks to the Republic and its lay and secular plan will culminate in provisions that will dictate the abolition of subsidies to religious schools, the seizure of their buildings and the dissapearance of some schools. The non-official school of Huelva forms a complex and varied mosaic. Together with the school of the mine emerged from 1873 with the arriving of foreign capital for the exploitation of mineral farms and the Evangelical school, so bound to it and a few non-religious private schools, secular and rationalist tolerated and closely monitored, in the capital and the province, by the servants of the Catholic Church. Together with a few schools for the children of labourers, primary and secondary schools, guarantors of a quality education for the burgeoning middle class and elementary and secondary schools of religious orders, high schools and religious congregations, that establish themselves in the capital and in developed provincial localities to offer besides a quality education, a charity one for the most deprived people, it becomes clear the importance of the Catholic school, core of the education system and this is obvious for two reasons: because of the growing number of established primary and secondary schools, and the growing colonisation of their teachings in the curriculum, not forgetting the inspector role they play in the other schools. It remains to mention private home-schools, the most numerous ones, which are scattered throughout the geography of Huelva, mainly for girls if we look into their management and customers, and that hardly survive with meagre payments or stingy subsidies from Town Councils in exchange of enrolling a certain number of poor pupils, relieving in that way the embarrasing school enrolment lists. The school map should be completed with the educational and social work of Manuel Siurot in his schools of the Sagrado Corazón de Jesús, transmitter of the Manjon and French School pedagogies, real capital educational model that currently endures. This paper finishes noticing the immediate leading figures in the educational process: teachers and pupils. Dividing the chosen period in four decades, the qualifications and duties of teachers are estudied in each of them, referencing to the curricuium and, when data allows it, notice aspects such as marital status, origin, age and number of teachers as well as the educational provision and attendance standards of state schools, private (independent) schoois, sponsored schools and subsidised schools, ail aspects that allow to picture the school in the mentioned period of time. This is our contribution to the knowledge of the private (independent) school, modest knowledge for both the local dimension and the study of documentation that reflects the reality only partially, even if we have accurateily followed all the documents of the mentioned archives, it is also true that we had left behind hundred of private "child-friendly" schools (escuelas "amigas3) outside our matter of study even if they still endure in our memory, An avenue for future research remains open.
The African agricultural sector has been neglected by development aid during the last fifty years. It has not undertaken a green revolution, as it happened in Asia. The continent has a great potential for agricultural production but yields and technology adoption are still very low. Moreover many recent threats to food security represent a challenge for future development in Africa. Demographic growth, increase in commodity prices and price volatility, land use pressure and climate change are probably the most latent threats. In such context, it is necessary to develop new patterns of development for African agriculture. Those patterns should draw the consequences from past policies, which either relied on large investments and in favouring a development of the same nature that the one observed in rich or emerging economies. It seems that improving institutions and the environment to foster the evolution of African agriculture would be more adapted than previous strategies that consist in applying the same methods employed in the past. Food security can be achieved by improving rural households' income. Those households is composed by a vast majority of smallholders, for which agricultural production is a major resource for living. The necessary transition for stimulating production in remote areas seem to rely on fostering technology adoption and improve incentives for investments that would increase the productivity or the value added to smallholder production. We study two major organisational changes that are the reforms of cotton sector market structure in sub-Saharan Africa and index-based insurances. In both cases the point is to look at the potential of every organisation choice, reduce vulnerability and its effect, in particular the poverty trap phenomenon. The final objective is improve long run yield by foster investments, in spite of the risks borne by farmers and the tied budget constraint, consequence of the absence of financial (especially credit) markets. The cotton sectors inherited from the institutions of the colonial era, characterised by the concentration in cotton purchasing activities, often made by a parastatal at the national level. Those institutions contributed to generalise cotton production and to the diffusion of new technologies and agricultural practices, especially thanks to the distribution of quality inputs on credit, with future cotton production as collateral. Cotton production and technology adoption were also probably driven by the existence of a minimum guaranteed price set at the beginning of the cultivation season, the investments in infrastructures, research and extension services at the same national level. However, the concentration of the purchasing of cotton also poses some problems, reducing the bargaining power of producers and the proximity of the cotton. We look at the productivity response to cotton sector reforms that took place since 1985 in sub-Saharan Africa using the data from 16 cotton producers on the 1961-2008 period. We compare the performance of those countries with regard to their institutional choices. We first put into perspective the role of pre-reform investments before showing that if reforms may increase yields it could be to the cost of a shrinking area cultivated with cotton. In a second part we study the potential use of meteorological indices to smooth consumption over time and space. Such insurance policies are able to allow quick indemnifications for farmers enduring meteorological shocks. The realisation of the index is independent from the action of the principal and the agent, limiting moral hazard issues and the need for costly damage assessment arising from information asymmetry in traditional insurance contracts. Those insurance however suffer from the limited correlation between the index and the observed yield. We will study the potential of meteorological indices to limit the risk growers face in millet cultivation in Niger and cotton cultivation in Cameroon. We study, in particular, the index choice, the calibration of insurance contract parameters, the necessity of observing the sowing date and the level of basis risk. The large spatial variability of rainfall over the sudano-sahelian zone is a good reason to use such insurance, it however also explain the high level of basis risk of a given index that is observed using a network of rain gauges, itself installed at a cost. We discuss in both cases the relative importance of basis risk and the potential of such insurance to pool yield, and compare them to other risks, such as intra-village yield and price shocks. ; Ce travail de thèse présente l'analyse de deux changements organisationnels dans le cas du secteur agricole en Afrique Subsaharienne. Ce travail est composé de cinq chapitres qui peuvent être regroupés en deux parties distinctes. Dans le premier cas il s'agit de la comparaison et de l'estimation de l'impact de réformes institutionnelles au sein du secteur coton en Afrique Sub-Saharienne. Dans le second, de l'étude ex ante d'une innovation organisationnelle récente: les assurances fondées sur des indices météorologiques au sein de la zone soudano-sahélienne. Dans les deux cas ces analyses tentent de répondre à un besoin d'orientation les politiques visant au développement du secteur agricole en Afrique de l'Ouest et plus particulièrement à la question de l'accès au marché du crédit et de l'assurance pour les producteurs, nécessaire pour dépasser le stade de l'agriculture de subsistance (de Janvry et Sadoulet, 2011). Dans le premier chapitre, je passe en revue les réformes des filières cotonnières qui ont eu lieu en Afrique Sub-Saharienne. Je construis trois indices synthétiques de libéralisation: la présence de capitaux privés et le degré de concurrence entre égreneurs ainsi que la flexibilité des prix au cours de la campagne. Ceci nous permet de construire et de valider la base de données utilisée dans le second chapitre. Nous montrons d'abord que les deux vagues de réformes ont été très différentes. La première concerne les pays anglophones, dont le secteur cotonnier a été libéralisé entre 1985 et 1995. La seconde (après 1995) concerne les pays francophones d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre. Nous montrons que ces dernières reposent plus sur une régulation de la filière, conservant de nombreuses caractéristiques des filières intégrées issue de la colonisation, contrairement aux réformes de la première vague de libéralisation. Tout d'abord, la concurrence établie n'est pas réelle puisque l'on voit l'installation de monopsones territoriaux d'égreneurs: les pays étant, dans la plupart des cas, divisés en zones d'opération pour chacun d'eux. Ensuite, les prix d'achat du coton sont encore fixés au semis et garantis jusque la récolte, absorbant les variations intra-saisonnières du prix international. Finalement on observe une rémanence du secteur privé, bien que des parts des sociétés cotonnières soient cédées au privé. Dans un second chapitre nous étudions l'impact de ces réformes sur la performance du secteur du coton dans les 16 principaux producteurs d'Afriques Sub-Saharienne en 2008. Nous utilisons pour cela des données de panel, issu de la FAO, appariées sur la période 1961-2008 à des données météorologiques mensuelles en grille (CRU TS3.1) considérées sur la période de croissance du coton, ce pour chaque année et chaque pays. Chaque cellule de la grille étant pondérée par la densité des surfaces cultivées en coton sur l'ensemble des territoires nationaux. Nous comparons les pays n'ayant pas réformé aux pays ayant régulé, installé une concurrence faible ou encore une concurrence forte. Nous montrons que les réformes menant à une régulation et à une forte concurrence ont un impact significatif sur les surfaces cultivées et les rendements. Ces résultats semblent validés par une estimation du potentiel biais de sélection, source limité d'endogéneité et robustes aux deux spécifications choisies: la première exploitant la dimension dynamique du panel (méthode des moments généralisés, dite GMM) et la seconde étant une analyse en différence de différences (moindres carrés avec effets fixes). Nous montrons d'abord que les réformes tendent à augmenter les rendements, hormis les réformes menant vers un faible niveau de concurrence, pour lequel l'effet des réformes n'est pas significatif. Les pays ayant régulé leur secteur cotonniers ont vu une croissance des surfaces semées en coton après les réformes. Les réformes menant à une forte compétition ont en revanche eu un impact négatif sur les surfaces cultivées, ce qui tend à valider l'approche institutionnelle qui suppose que le crédit aux intrants au semis, sans autre garantie que le coton récolté en fin de campagne, nécessite une relation de coordination qui est mise à mal par la concurrence. De même, comme le montre la littérature sur le sujet (Brambilla et Porto, 2011), il est possible qu'un effet de sélection ait opéré dans ces secteurs les plus concurrentiels, menant à limiter le nombre de producteurs cultivant du coton, aux dépend des producteurs les moins productifs, n'ayant pas accès aux marchés du crédit et de l'assurance. Dans le troisième chapitre nous réalisons une revue de la littérature sur les assurances indi- cielles, recensant les expériences dans les pays en développement, les méthodes sous-jacentes et les questions de recherche qui en découlent. Nous étudions finalement dans les chapitre 4 et 5 le potentiel de telles assurances dans deux cas spécifiques: le mil au Sud-Ouest du Niger et le coton au Nord du Cameroun. Ces assurances constituent une alternative intéressante aux assurances agricoles traditionnelles, coûteuses en raison de l'asymétrie d'information qui les caractérisent et de la nécessité de constater les dommages effectifs. Dans les deux cas nous montrons d'abord qu'accroître la complexité des indices pour mieux appréhender l'impact de la pluviométrie sur les rendements ne semble pas nécessaire. Les résultats, robustes à la cross-validation, corrigeant l'effet de la sur-identification (over-fitting) montre en effets que les gains de l'assurance sont relativement limités, mais surtout qu'il ne sont pas accrus par l'utilisation d'indices plus sophistiqués. Nous montrons aussi, dans le cas du mil, que la prise en compte de la forte variation des rendements au sein du même village est significative et qu'elle joue un rôle important dans le cas d'une fonction utilité concave. Les parcelles cultivées étant situées à moins de 3 kilomètres de la station météorologique, ce risque de base est bien dû à la présence de chocs idiosyncratiques (maladies, ravageurs.) ou à l'hétérogénéité des agents et des parcelles et non à un choc météorologique. Ce résultat tend à montrer que l'existence de ce risque de base résiduel, peut limiter la demande pour ce type d'assurance, en présence d'aversion pour le risque. Il s'inscrit dans la suite des travaux de Clarke (2011) qui montre que l'absence d'indemnisation, en cas de mauvais rendements, peut rendre l'assurance désavantageuse du fait du paiement de la prime (ce que j'appelle une erreur de type I). Ces résultats doivent être interprétés à la lumière du faible intérêt des producteurs pour ce genre de produits observés dans les récentes, mais néanmoins nombreuses, études ex post. Finalement, toujours dans ce premier cas, l'utilisation de données sur des parcelles fertilisées permet de montrer que ces résultats ne sont pas radicalement modifiés par la prise en compte d'une potentielle intensification des cultures, rendant pourtant la culture de mil plus risquée, et donc l'assurance plus intéressante. Dans le second cas, le coton, nous utilisons d'abord une expérimentation de terrain mettant en œuvre des jeux de loteries (inspiré de Holt et Laury, 2002), pour estimer la distribution des paramètres d'aversion pour le risque des producteurs. Nous montrons d'abord que, dans ce cas, l'effet de l'imparfaite corrélation des rendements et de l'indice météorologique choisi sur le gain en équivalent certain des producteurs, est significatif. C'est en particulier le cas dans les zones les plus humides ou montrant un climat spécifique. Contrairement au cas du mil au Niger, assurer les producteurs de coton semble nécessiter l'observation de la date de semis, dont le simulation ne semble pas nécessaire ou inadéquate vu les contraintes institutionnelles du secteur (comme par exemple les retards de livraison de graines et d'intrants). Nous remarquons ensuite que l'échelle d'étude étant plus importante dans le cas du coton au Cameroun, l'assurance risque de mener à des péréquations non désirées, par exemple des zone les plus humides envers les zones plus arides. Finalement nous observons, dans le cas du coton au Cameroun, que le gain apporté par la stabilisation des rendements est similaire, voire inférieur, à celui apporté par la stabilisation intra-saisonnière des prix qui a lieu aujourd'hui dans la filière Camerounaise intégrée (la Sodecoton détenant le monopole d'achat du coton graine au Cameroun). En effet, en annonçant le prix de vente au moment du semis, la société offre implicitement aux producteurs une assurance contre les variations du prix international au cours de la campagne. J'ai donc montré certaines limites intrinsèques aux mécanismes d'assurance fondés sur des indices météorologiques, en dépit de l'appréhension de la forte variabilité spatiale qui caractérise le climat soudano-sahélien au sein duquel les deux terrains se situent. Nous disposons en effet, dans les deux cas, d'une densité de stations météorologiques unique dans la région permettant de limiter le risque de base spatial. Ces résultats ne prennent toutefois pas en compte les effets indirects de l'assurance qui, lorsqu'elle est offerte conjointement avec un crédit aux intrants, peut baisser le prix de ce dernier, en limitant la probabilité de défaut en cas de sécheresse. J'ai par ailleurs aussi montré l'importance de l'accès au crédit pour les producteurs de coton ainsi que l'intérêt de la couverture contre le risque de variation du prix international dans le cas des cultures de rentes.
The African agricultural sector has been neglected by development aid during the last fifty years. It has not undertaken a green revolution, as it happened in Asia. The continent has a great potential for agricultural production but yields and technology adoption are still very low. Moreover many recent threats to food security represent a challenge for future development in Africa. Demographic growth, increase in commodity prices and price volatility, land use pressure and climate change are probably the most latent threats. In such context, it is necessary to develop new patterns of development for African agriculture. Those patterns should draw the consequences from past policies, which either relied on large investments and in favouring a development of the same nature that the one observed in rich or emerging economies. It seems that improving institutions and the environment to foster the evolution of African agriculture would be more adapted than previous strategies that consist in applying the same methods employed in the past. Food security can be achieved by improving rural households' income. Those households is composed by a vast majority of smallholders, for which agricultural production is a major resource for living. The necessary transition for stimulating production in remote areas seem to rely on fostering technology adoption and improve incentives for investments that would increase the productivity or the value added to smallholder production. We study two major organisational changes that are the reforms of cotton sector market structure in sub-Saharan Africa and index-based insurances. In both cases the point is to look at the potential of every organisation choice, reduce vulnerability and its effect, in particular the poverty trap phenomenon. The final objective is improve long run yield by foster investments, in spite of the risks borne by farmers and the tied budget constraint, consequence of the absence of financial (especially credit) markets. The cotton sectors inherited from the institutions of the colonial era, characterised by the concentration in cotton purchasing activities, often made by a parastatal at the national level. Those institutions contributed to generalise cotton production and to the diffusion of new technologies and agricultural practices, especially thanks to the distribution of quality inputs on credit, with future cotton production as collateral. Cotton production and technology adoption were also probably driven by the existence of a minimum guaranteed price set at the beginning of the cultivation season, the investments in infrastructures, research and extension services at the same national level. However, the concentration of the purchasing of cotton also poses some problems, reducing the bargaining power of producers and the proximity of the cotton. We look at the productivity response to cotton sector reforms that took place since 1985 in sub-Saharan Africa using the data from 16 cotton producers on the 1961-2008 period. We compare the performance of those countries with regard to their institutional choices. We first put into perspective the role of pre-reform investments before showing that if reforms may increase yields it could be to the cost of a shrinking area cultivated with cotton. In a second part we study the potential use of meteorological indices to smooth consumption over time and space. Such insurance policies are able to allow quick indemnifications for farmers enduring meteorological shocks. The realisation of the index is independent from the action of the principal and the agent, limiting moral hazard issues and the need for costly damage assessment arising from information asymmetry in traditional insurance contracts. Those insurance however suffer from the limited correlation between the index and the observed yield. We will study the potential of meteorological indices to limit the risk growers face in millet cultivation in Niger and cotton cultivation in Cameroon. We study, in particular, the index choice, the calibration of insurance contract parameters, the necessity of observing the sowing date and the level of basis risk. The large spatial variability of rainfall over the sudano-sahelian zone is a good reason to use such insurance, it however also explain the high level of basis risk of a given index that is observed using a network of rain gauges, itself installed at a cost. We discuss in both cases the relative importance of basis risk and the potential of such insurance to pool yield, and compare them to other risks, such as intra-village yield and price shocks. ; Ce travail de thèse présente l'analyse de deux changements organisationnels dans le cas du secteur agricole en Afrique Subsaharienne. Ce travail est composé de cinq chapitres qui peuvent être regroupés en deux parties distinctes. Dans le premier cas il s'agit de la comparaison et de l'estimation de l'impact de réformes institutionnelles au sein du secteur coton en Afrique Sub-Saharienne. Dans le second, de l'étude ex ante d'une innovation organisationnelle récente: les assurances fondées sur des indices météorologiques au sein de la zone soudano-sahélienne. Dans les deux cas ces analyses tentent de répondre à un besoin d'orientation les politiques visant au développement du secteur agricole en Afrique de l'Ouest et plus particulièrement à la question de l'accès au marché du crédit et de l'assurance pour les producteurs, nécessaire pour dépasser le stade de l'agriculture de subsistance (de Janvry et Sadoulet, 2011). Dans le premier chapitre, je passe en revue les réformes des filières cotonnières qui ont eu lieu en Afrique Sub-Saharienne. Je construis trois indices synthétiques de libéralisation: la présence de capitaux privés et le degré de concurrence entre égreneurs ainsi que la flexibilité des prix au cours de la campagne. Ceci nous permet de construire et de valider la base de données utilisée dans le second chapitre. Nous montrons d'abord que les deux vagues de réformes ont été très différentes. La première concerne les pays anglophones, dont le secteur cotonnier a été libéralisé entre 1985 et 1995. La seconde (après 1995) concerne les pays francophones d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre. Nous montrons que ces dernières reposent plus sur une régulation de la filière, conservant de nombreuses caractéristiques des filières intégrées issue de la colonisation, contrairement aux réformes de la première vague de libéralisation. Tout d'abord, la concurrence établie n'est pas réelle puisque l'on voit l'installation de monopsones territoriaux d'égreneurs: les pays étant, dans la plupart des cas, divisés en zones d'opération pour chacun d'eux. Ensuite, les prix d'achat du coton sont encore fixés au semis et garantis jusque la récolte, absorbant les variations intra-saisonnières du prix international. Finalement on observe une rémanence du secteur privé, bien que des parts des sociétés cotonnières soient cédées au privé. Dans un second chapitre nous étudions l'impact de ces réformes sur la performance du secteur du coton dans les 16 principaux producteurs d'Afriques Sub-Saharienne en 2008. Nous utilisons pour cela des données de panel, issu de la FAO, appariées sur la période 1961-2008 à des données météorologiques mensuelles en grille (CRU TS3.1) considérées sur la période de croissance du coton, ce pour chaque année et chaque pays. Chaque cellule de la grille étant pondérée par la densité des surfaces cultivées en coton sur l'ensemble des territoires nationaux. Nous comparons les pays n'ayant pas réformé aux pays ayant régulé, installé une concurrence faible ou encore une concurrence forte. Nous montrons que les réformes menant à une régulation et à une forte concurrence ont un impact significatif sur les surfaces cultivées et les rendements. Ces résultats semblent validés par une estimation du potentiel biais de sélection, source limité d'endogéneité et robustes aux deux spécifications choisies: la première exploitant la dimension dynamique du panel (méthode des moments généralisés, dite GMM) et la seconde étant une analyse en différence de différences (moindres carrés avec effets fixes). Nous montrons d'abord que les réformes tendent à augmenter les rendements, hormis les réformes menant vers un faible niveau de concurrence, pour lequel l'effet des réformes n'est pas significatif. Les pays ayant régulé leur secteur cotonniers ont vu une croissance des surfaces semées en coton après les réformes. Les réformes menant à une forte compétition ont en revanche eu un impact négatif sur les surfaces cultivées, ce qui tend à valider l'approche institutionnelle qui suppose que le crédit aux intrants au semis, sans autre garantie que le coton récolté en fin de campagne, nécessite une relation de coordination qui est mise à mal par la concurrence. De même, comme le montre la littérature sur le sujet (Brambilla et Porto, 2011), il est possible qu'un effet de sélection ait opéré dans ces secteurs les plus concurrentiels, menant à limiter le nombre de producteurs cultivant du coton, aux dépend des producteurs les moins productifs, n'ayant pas accès aux marchés du crédit et de l'assurance. Dans le troisième chapitre nous réalisons une revue de la littérature sur les assurances indi- cielles, recensant les expériences dans les pays en développement, les méthodes sous-jacentes et les questions de recherche qui en découlent. Nous étudions finalement dans les chapitre 4 et 5 le potentiel de telles assurances dans deux cas spécifiques: le mil au Sud-Ouest du Niger et le coton au Nord du Cameroun. Ces assurances constituent une alternative intéressante aux assurances agricoles traditionnelles, coûteuses en raison de l'asymétrie d'information qui les caractérisent et de la nécessité de constater les dommages effectifs. Dans les deux cas nous montrons d'abord qu'accroître la complexité des indices pour mieux appréhender l'impact de la pluviométrie sur les rendements ne semble pas nécessaire. Les résultats, robustes à la cross-validation, corrigeant l'effet de la sur-identification (over-fitting) montre en effets que les gains de l'assurance sont relativement limités, mais surtout qu'il ne sont pas accrus par l'utilisation d'indices plus sophistiqués. Nous montrons aussi, dans le cas du mil, que la prise en compte de la forte variation des rendements au sein du même village est significative et qu'elle joue un rôle important dans le cas d'une fonction utilité concave. Les parcelles cultivées étant situées à moins de 3 kilomètres de la station météorologique, ce risque de base est bien dû à la présence de chocs idiosyncratiques (maladies, ravageurs.) ou à l'hétérogénéité des agents et des parcelles et non à un choc météorologique. Ce résultat tend à montrer que l'existence de ce risque de base résiduel, peut limiter la demande pour ce type d'assurance, en présence d'aversion pour le risque. Il s'inscrit dans la suite des travaux de Clarke (2011) qui montre que l'absence d'indemnisation, en cas de mauvais rendements, peut rendre l'assurance désavantageuse du fait du paiement de la prime (ce que j'appelle une erreur de type I). Ces résultats doivent être interprétés à la lumière du faible intérêt des producteurs pour ce genre de produits observés dans les récentes, mais néanmoins nombreuses, études ex post. Finalement, toujours dans ce premier cas, l'utilisation de données sur des parcelles fertilisées permet de montrer que ces résultats ne sont pas radicalement modifiés par la prise en compte d'une potentielle intensification des cultures, rendant pourtant la culture de mil plus risquée, et donc l'assurance plus intéressante. Dans le second cas, le coton, nous utilisons d'abord une expérimentation de terrain mettant en œuvre des jeux de loteries (inspiré de Holt et Laury, 2002), pour estimer la distribution des paramètres d'aversion pour le risque des producteurs. Nous montrons d'abord que, dans ce cas, l'effet de l'imparfaite corrélation des rendements et de l'indice météorologique choisi sur le gain en équivalent certain des producteurs, est significatif. C'est en particulier le cas dans les zones les plus humides ou montrant un climat spécifique. Contrairement au cas du mil au Niger, assurer les producteurs de coton semble nécessiter l'observation de la date de semis, dont le simulation ne semble pas nécessaire ou inadéquate vu les contraintes institutionnelles du secteur (comme par exemple les retards de livraison de graines et d'intrants). Nous remarquons ensuite que l'échelle d'étude étant plus importante dans le cas du coton au Cameroun, l'assurance risque de mener à des péréquations non désirées, par exemple des zone les plus humides envers les zones plus arides. Finalement nous observons, dans le cas du coton au Cameroun, que le gain apporté par la stabilisation des rendements est similaire, voire inférieur, à celui apporté par la stabilisation intra-saisonnière des prix qui a lieu aujourd'hui dans la filière Camerounaise intégrée (la Sodecoton détenant le monopole d'achat du coton graine au Cameroun). En effet, en annonçant le prix de vente au moment du semis, la société offre implicitement aux producteurs une assurance contre les variations du prix international au cours de la campagne. J'ai donc montré certaines limites intrinsèques aux mécanismes d'assurance fondés sur des indices météorologiques, en dépit de l'appréhension de la forte variabilité spatiale qui caractérise le climat soudano-sahélien au sein duquel les deux terrains se situent. Nous disposons en effet, dans les deux cas, d'une densité de stations météorologiques unique dans la région permettant de limiter le risque de base spatial. Ces résultats ne prennent toutefois pas en compte les effets indirects de l'assurance qui, lorsqu'elle est offerte conjointement avec un crédit aux intrants, peut baisser le prix de ce dernier, en limitant la probabilité de défaut en cas de sécheresse. J'ai par ailleurs aussi montré l'importance de l'accès au crédit pour les producteurs de coton ainsi que l'intérêt de la couverture contre le risque de variation du prix international dans le cas des cultures de rentes.
The African agricultural sector has been neglected by development aid during the last fifty years. It has not undertaken a green revolution, as it happened in Asia. The continent has a great potential for agricultural production but yields and technology adoption are still very low. Moreover many recent threats to food security represent a challenge for future development in Africa. Demographic growth, increase in commodity prices and price volatility, land use pressure and climate change are probably the most latent threats. In such context, it is necessary to develop new patterns of development for African agriculture. Those patterns should draw the consequences from past policies, which either relied on large investments and in favouring a development of the same nature that the one observed in rich or emerging economies. It seems that improving institutions and the environment to foster the evolution of African agriculture would be more adapted than previous strategies that consist in applying the same methods employed in the past. Food security can be achieved by improving rural households' income. Those households is composed by a vast majority of smallholders, for which agricultural production is a major resource for living. The necessary transition for stimulating production in remote areas seem to rely on fostering technology adoption and improve incentives for investments that would increase the productivity or the value added to smallholder production. We study two major organisational changes that are the reforms of cotton sector market structure in sub-Saharan Africa and index-based insurances. In both cases the point is to look at the potential of every organisation choice, reduce vulnerability and its effect, in particular the poverty trap phenomenon. The final objective is improve long run yield by foster investments, in spite of the risks borne by farmers and the tied budget constraint, consequence of the absence of financial (especially credit) markets. The cotton sectors inherited from the institutions of the colonial era, characterised by the concentration in cotton purchasing activities, often made by a parastatal at the national level. Those institutions contributed to generalise cotton production and to the diffusion of new technologies and agricultural practices, especially thanks to the distribution of quality inputs on credit, with future cotton production as collateral. Cotton production and technology adoption were also probably driven by the existence of a minimum guaranteed price set at the beginning of the cultivation season, the investments in infrastructures, research and extension services at the same national level. However, the concentration of the purchasing of cotton also poses some problems, reducing the bargaining power of producers and the proximity of the cotton. We look at the productivity response to cotton sector reforms that took place since 1985 in sub-Saharan Africa using the data from 16 cotton producers on the 1961-2008 period. We compare the performance of those countries with regard to their institutional choices. We first put into perspective the role of pre-reform investments before showing that if reforms may increase yields it could be to the cost of a shrinking area cultivated with cotton. In a second part we study the potential use of meteorological indices to smooth consumption over time and space. Such insurance policies are able to allow quick indemnifications for farmers enduring meteorological shocks. The realisation of the index is independent from the action of the principal and the agent, limiting moral hazard issues and the need for costly damage assessment arising from information asymmetry in traditional insurance contracts. Those insurance however suffer from the limited correlation between the index and the observed yield. We will study the potential of meteorological indices to limit the risk growers face in millet cultivation in Niger and cotton cultivation in Cameroon. We study, in particular, the index choice, the calibration of insurance contract parameters, the necessity of observing the sowing date and the level of basis risk. The large spatial variability of rainfall over the sudano-sahelian zone is a good reason to use such insurance, it however also explain the high level of basis risk of a given index that is observed using a network of rain gauges, itself installed at a cost. We discuss in both cases the relative importance of basis risk and the potential of such insurance to pool yield, and compare them to other risks, such as intra-village yield and price shocks. ; Ce travail de thèse présente l'analyse de deux changements organisationnels dans le cas du secteur agricole en Afrique Subsaharienne. Ce travail est composé de cinq chapitres qui peuvent être regroupés en deux parties distinctes. Dans le premier cas il s'agit de la comparaison et de l'estimation de l'impact de réformes institutionnelles au sein du secteur coton en Afrique Sub-Saharienne. Dans le second, de l'étude ex ante d'une innovation organisationnelle récente: les assurances fondées sur des indices météorologiques au sein de la zone soudano-sahélienne. Dans les deux cas ces analyses tentent de répondre à un besoin d'orientation les politiques visant au développement du secteur agricole en Afrique de l'Ouest et plus particulièrement à la question de l'accès au marché du crédit et de l'assurance pour les producteurs, nécessaire pour dépasser le stade de l'agriculture de subsistance (de Janvry et Sadoulet, 2011). Dans le premier chapitre, je passe en revue les réformes des filières cotonnières qui ont eu lieu en Afrique Sub-Saharienne. Je construis trois indices synthétiques de libéralisation: la présence de capitaux privés et le degré de concurrence entre égreneurs ainsi que la flexibilité des prix au cours de la campagne. Ceci nous permet de construire et de valider la base de données utilisée dans le second chapitre. Nous montrons d'abord que les deux vagues de réformes ont été très différentes. La première concerne les pays anglophones, dont le secteur cotonnier a été libéralisé entre 1985 et 1995. La seconde (après 1995) concerne les pays francophones d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre. Nous montrons que ces dernières reposent plus sur une régulation de la filière, conservant de nombreuses caractéristiques des filières intégrées issue de la colonisation, contrairement aux réformes de la première vague de libéralisation. Tout d'abord, la concurrence établie n'est pas réelle puisque l'on voit l'installation de monopsones territoriaux d'égreneurs: les pays étant, dans la plupart des cas, divisés en zones d'opération pour chacun d'eux. Ensuite, les prix d'achat du coton sont encore fixés au semis et garantis jusque la récolte, absorbant les variations intra-saisonnières du prix international. Finalement on observe une rémanence du secteur privé, bien que des parts des sociétés cotonnières soient cédées au privé. Dans un second chapitre nous étudions l'impact de ces réformes sur la performance du secteur du coton dans les 16 principaux producteurs d'Afriques Sub-Saharienne en 2008. Nous utilisons pour cela des données de panel, issu de la FAO, appariées sur la période 1961-2008 à des données météorologiques mensuelles en grille (CRU TS3.1) considérées sur la période de croissance du coton, ce pour chaque année et chaque pays. Chaque cellule de la grille étant pondérée par la densité des surfaces cultivées en coton sur l'ensemble des territoires nationaux. Nous comparons les pays n'ayant pas réformé aux pays ayant régulé, installé une concurrence faible ou encore une concurrence forte. Nous montrons que les réformes menant à une régulation et à une forte concurrence ont un impact significatif sur les surfaces cultivées et les rendements. Ces résultats semblent validés par une estimation du potentiel biais de sélection, source limité d'endogéneité et robustes aux deux spécifications choisies: la première exploitant la dimension dynamique du panel (méthode des moments généralisés, dite GMM) et la seconde étant une analyse en différence de différences (moindres carrés avec effets fixes). Nous montrons d'abord que les réformes tendent à augmenter les rendements, hormis les réformes menant vers un faible niveau de concurrence, pour lequel l'effet des réformes n'est pas significatif. Les pays ayant régulé leur secteur cotonniers ont vu une croissance des surfaces semées en coton après les réformes. Les réformes menant à une forte compétition ont en revanche eu un impact négatif sur les surfaces cultivées, ce qui tend à valider l'approche institutionnelle qui suppose que le crédit aux intrants au semis, sans autre garantie que le coton récolté en fin de campagne, nécessite une relation de coordination qui est mise à mal par la concurrence. De même, comme le montre la littérature sur le sujet (Brambilla et Porto, 2011), il est possible qu'un effet de sélection ait opéré dans ces secteurs les plus concurrentiels, menant à limiter le nombre de producteurs cultivant du coton, aux dépend des producteurs les moins productifs, n'ayant pas accès aux marchés du crédit et de l'assurance. Dans le troisième chapitre nous réalisons une revue de la littérature sur les assurances indi- cielles, recensant les expériences dans les pays en développement, les méthodes sous-jacentes et les questions de recherche qui en découlent. Nous étudions finalement dans les chapitre 4 et 5 le potentiel de telles assurances dans deux cas spécifiques: le mil au Sud-Ouest du Niger et le coton au Nord du Cameroun. Ces assurances constituent une alternative intéressante aux assurances agricoles traditionnelles, coûteuses en raison de l'asymétrie d'information qui les caractérisent et de la nécessité de constater les dommages effectifs. Dans les deux cas nous montrons d'abord qu'accroître la complexité des indices pour mieux appréhender l'impact de la pluviométrie sur les rendements ne semble pas nécessaire. Les résultats, robustes à la cross-validation, corrigeant l'effet de la sur-identification (over-fitting) montre en effets que les gains de l'assurance sont relativement limités, mais surtout qu'il ne sont pas accrus par l'utilisation d'indices plus sophistiqués. Nous montrons aussi, dans le cas du mil, que la prise en compte de la forte variation des rendements au sein du même village est significative et qu'elle joue un rôle important dans le cas d'une fonction utilité concave. Les parcelles cultivées étant situées à moins de 3 kilomètres de la station météorologique, ce risque de base est bien dû à la présence de chocs idiosyncratiques (maladies, ravageurs.) ou à l'hétérogénéité des agents et des parcelles et non à un choc météorologique. Ce résultat tend à montrer que l'existence de ce risque de base résiduel, peut limiter la demande pour ce type d'assurance, en présence d'aversion pour le risque. Il s'inscrit dans la suite des travaux de Clarke (2011) qui montre que l'absence d'indemnisation, en cas de mauvais rendements, peut rendre l'assurance désavantageuse du fait du paiement de la prime (ce que j'appelle une erreur de type I). Ces résultats doivent être interprétés à la lumière du faible intérêt des producteurs pour ce genre de produits observés dans les récentes, mais néanmoins nombreuses, études ex post. Finalement, toujours dans ce premier cas, l'utilisation de données sur des parcelles fertilisées permet de montrer que ces résultats ne sont pas radicalement modifiés par la prise en compte d'une potentielle intensification des cultures, rendant pourtant la culture de mil plus risquée, et donc l'assurance plus intéressante. Dans le second cas, le coton, nous utilisons d'abord une expérimentation de terrain mettant en œuvre des jeux de loteries (inspiré de Holt et Laury, 2002), pour estimer la distribution des paramètres d'aversion pour le risque des producteurs. Nous montrons d'abord que, dans ce cas, l'effet de l'imparfaite corrélation des rendements et de l'indice météorologique choisi sur le gain en équivalent certain des producteurs, est significatif. C'est en particulier le cas dans les zones les plus humides ou montrant un climat spécifique. Contrairement au cas du mil au Niger, assurer les producteurs de coton semble nécessiter l'observation de la date de semis, dont le simulation ne semble pas nécessaire ou inadéquate vu les contraintes institutionnelles du secteur (comme par exemple les retards de livraison de graines et d'intrants). Nous remarquons ensuite que l'échelle d'étude étant plus importante dans le cas du coton au Cameroun, l'assurance risque de mener à des péréquations non désirées, par exemple des zone les plus humides envers les zones plus arides. Finalement nous observons, dans le cas du coton au Cameroun, que le gain apporté par la stabilisation des rendements est similaire, voire inférieur, à celui apporté par la stabilisation intra-saisonnière des prix qui a lieu aujourd'hui dans la filière Camerounaise intégrée (la Sodecoton détenant le monopole d'achat du coton graine au Cameroun). En effet, en annonçant le prix de vente au moment du semis, la société offre implicitement aux producteurs une assurance contre les variations du prix international au cours de la campagne. J'ai donc montré certaines limites intrinsèques aux mécanismes d'assurance fondés sur des indices météorologiques, en dépit de l'appréhension de la forte variabilité spatiale qui caractérise le climat soudano-sahélien au sein duquel les deux terrains se situent. Nous disposons en effet, dans les deux cas, d'une densité de stations météorologiques unique dans la région permettant de limiter le risque de base spatial. Ces résultats ne prennent toutefois pas en compte les effets indirects de l'assurance qui, lorsqu'elle est offerte conjointement avec un crédit aux intrants, peut baisser le prix de ce dernier, en limitant la probabilité de défaut en cas de sécheresse. J'ai par ailleurs aussi montré l'importance de l'accès au crédit pour les producteurs de coton ainsi que l'intérêt de la couverture contre le risque de variation du prix international dans le cas des cultures de rentes.
Background of the research This study intends to analyses the involuntary resettlement of an indigenous Dayak community due to the implementation of the Bakun Dam Project in Sarawak, Malaysia. The significance of this research is that it raises important questions on the impact of development imposed by the state government of Sarawak on the indigenous people who have been regarded as in need of change and to be brought closer to urbanization vis-à-vis modernization through resettlement. Involuntary resettlement due to development projects or infrastructure improvements is not a singular phenomenon and in this context it is often argued that development projects provide employment to the local population and enforce development. However, a dam project also displaces local people from their homes and traditional livelihood. This research focuses on the forced displacement of the indigenous communities at Sg. Asap resettlement because of the implementation of the Bakun Hydro-electric Project (BHP). It is viewed as an involuntary resettlement as the indigenous communities who were residing within the area of the planned BHP had no choice but to move to the resettlement. Their villages and native lands were claimed by the state government for the implementation for the BHP. Thus, the whole problem is focused on the question of why is the resettlement that is promised as a development program for the people by the state government of Sarawak being regarded as forced displacement. In this research, forced displacement is observed at three different levels. First, prior to resettlement, potential settlers are faced with the critical decision of abandoning their homes and livelihoods, causing emotional distress. Secondly, after moving to the new settlement, settlers are often confronted with inadequate compensation for their loss of natural resources, social heritage and land, adding misery to their already distressed situation. Thirdly, resettling people into an area without any supportive resources, i.e. resources whose, purpose is to improve the lives of the settlers compared to their previous situation, fails to accomplish the very purpose of such resettlement. Research objectives and Questions This research utilizes Michael Cornea's analysis, the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model (2000), which brings to the main objective of this research that is to examine the outcomes of involuntary resettlement of the indigenous people. This research compares the situation confronted by the settlers in Sg. Asap resettlement to that definition of "involuntary population resettlement" advanced by Michael Cernea (1998). In this definition, there are two sets of distinct but related processes: displacement of people and dismantling of their patterns of economic and social organization, and resettlement at a different location and reconstruction of their livelihood and social networks. Other than that, the objectives of this research are: to observe if involuntary resettlement planned for meeting the labor needs for the oil palm estates is a catalyst for socio-economic development for settlers. And for policy recommendations, the sub-objectives are: •To subsequently evaluate the problems of accessing resources. •To study to what extent the involuntary resettlement has affecting the social and power structures. •To show the level of changes in social and power structure influencing livelihood strategies. •To examine the most effective network that has provided the people a platform to generate their livelihood. This research details the process and impact of the forced and involuntary displacement faced by the settlers. Factors highlighted include the indigenous people's coping mechanism and strategy in dealing with various issues related to land rights and usage, disagreement and differences in the new social structure, competition over limited natural resources and changing power structure and relations. Issues such as the problems within the household because of the changing family structure and changing role of elderly, men and women in the domestic unit are also highlighted in this research. Most important, this research focuses not only at the displacement issue but also illustrates how settlers rebuild and restructure their life and livelihood. Therefore, based on important concepts, livelihood, coping strategies and power structure, research questions raised are: 1.How do settlers cope with the fact of being involuntarily resettled and what do they do to deal with unanticipated consequences of the social changes that occur? 2.How do settlers manage the new social structure, conflict over limited resources and changing power structures and relations within their own community? 3.Which strategies currently used by these settlers have the potential to build a sustainable livelihood in the new settlement? Theoretical background This research takes the approach of regarding resettlement first and foremost as a catalyst for social change. However, resettlement in the context of 'force' or 'involuntary,' certainly does not ensure positive changes. Dessalegn (1989) defined resettlement in a different context: land settlement, colonisation, or transmigration, all referring to the phenomenon of people distribution, either planned or 'spontaneous'. Accordingly, 'resettlement as in Ethiopia implies moving people or people moving to new locations; colonization as in Latin America implies opening up or reclaiming lands for utilization; and transmigration is favoured by those writing on the Indonesian experience and the word suggests cross-ocean or cross island relocation' (Dessalegn, 1989:668). Palmer refers to resettlement as 'a planned and controlled transfer of population from one area to another' (1979:149). Tadros (1979:122), in analyzing resettlement schemes in Egypt, applied the United Nations definition of human settlement as: 'development of viable communities on new or unused land through the introduction of people' and further defined resettlement in two models: spontaneous and paternalistic. The spontaneous model leaves full scope for individual initiatives, and no support is provided by national or international organisations. No attention is paid to the proper place and function of the settlement within the national context. In the paternalistic model, technical support such as education, tools, equipment and other assistance is provided to the settlers (Tadros, 1979:122). The above definitions can be used in a different fashion for this research, thus the term 'forced' or 'involuntary resettlement'. In reality, despite the good intentions for developing communities, resettlement can also 'under develop' communities in the sense that such communities face greater hardship compared to life before resettlement. To this extent, the working definition of 'resettlement' in this research is a poorly planned resettlement through a forced, involuntary relocation of communities onto unused land that is inadequate for communities to develop a productive and fully functional socio-economic system. This research has adapted the concepts proposed by Michael Cernea (1998), looking at involuntary resettlement in general. The concept of involuntary resettlement (in this research also termed as forced resettlement), which is the comprehensive concept most often used in the current social science literature, integrates 'displacement' and 'resettlement' into one single term, in which the emphasis on involuntariness directly connotes the forced displacement. The usual description of 'involuntary population resettlement' consists, as mentioned earlier, of two sets of distinct but related processes: displacement of people and the dismantling of their patterns of economic and social organization, and resettlement at a different location with reconstruction of their livelihood and social networks. Resettlement refers to the process of the physical relocation of those displaced, and to their socio-economic re-establishment as family/household micro-units and as larger communities. Displacement implies not only physical eviction from a dwelling, but also the expropriation of productive lands and other assets to make possible an alternative use of the space. This is not just an economic transaction or a simple substitution of property with monetary compensation. Involuntary displacement is a process of unravelling established human communities, existing patterns of social organization, production systems and networks of social services. Overall, forced displacement of communities causes an economic crisis for most or all of those affected, entails sudden social disarticulation, and sometimes triggers a political crisis as well (Cernea, 1998:2-3). This research investigates the implications of resettlement and the reconstruction of the livelihood of the affected settlers. Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model (IRR) provides important variables to explore these issues further. Several important variables in the IRR model are utilised to create an independent framework for this research, and is explained in the following section. As Cernea explained, the IRR is a model of impoverishment risks during displacement, and of counteractions to match the basic risks where the multifaceted process of impoverishment was deconstructed into its fundamental components. The components are: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property assets, and community disarticulation. This analytical deconstruction facilitates understanding of how these sub-processes interlink, influence, and amplify each other. Reconstruction, then, is the reversal of the impoverishment processes, and can be understood and accomplished along the same variables, considered in a holistic, integrated way (Cernea, 2000:5; 2003:40). IRR focuses on the social and economic contact of both segments of the process: the forced displacement and the re-establishment. The model captures processes that are simultaneous, but also reflects the movement in time from the destitution of displacement to recovery resettlement (Cernea, 2000:18). There are three fundamental concepts at the core of the model: risk, impoverishment and reconstruction. Each is further split into sets of specifying notions or components (as mentioned above) that reflect another dimension, or another variable of impoverishment or reconstruction (for example, landlessness, marginalisation, morbidity or social disarticulation). These variables are interlinked and influence each other; some play a primary role while others play a derivative role in either impoverishment or reconstruction (largely as a function of given circumstances). The conceptual framework captures the disparity between potential and actual risk. All forced displacements are prone to major socio-economic risks, but they are not fatally condemned to succumb to them. Cernea further explains that in this framework the concept of risk, as stated by Giddens (1990), is to indicate the possibility that a certain course of action will trigger future injurious effects – losses and destruction. Following Luhman (1993), the concept of risk is posited as a counter-concept to security: the higher the risk, the lower the security of displaced populations (Cernea, 2000:19). The model's dual emphasis – on risks to be prevented and on reconstruction strategies to be implemented – facilitates its operational use as a guide for action. Like other models, its components can be influenced and 'manipulated' through informed planning to diminish the impact of one or several components, as given conditions require or permit. That requires considering these variables as a system, in their mutual connections, and not as a set of separate elements. The model is also flexible as a conceptual template, allowing for the integration of other dimensions, when relevant, and for adapting to changing circumstances (Cernea, 2000:20). This model can be linked with other conceptual frameworks, to achieve complementary perspectives and additional knowledge (Cernea, 2000:21). There are four distinct, but interlinked, functions that the risks and reconstruction model performs: A predictive (warning and planning) function A diagnostic (explanatory and assessment) function A problem-solution function, in guiding and measuring resettlers´ reestablishment A research function, in formulating hypotheses and conducting theory-led field investigations For this research, the function falls under the third function, the problem-resolution. As Cernea explained, the problem-resolution capacity results from the model's analytical incisiveness and its explicit action orientation. The IRR model is formulated with an awareness of the social actors in resettlement, their interaction, communication, and ability to contribute to resolution. The model becomes a compass for strategies to reconstruct settlers´ livelihoods (Cernea, 2000:22). The IRR model clearly points out the results of social change and social disorganisation caused by involuntary resettlement. For the purpose of analysis, the two major variables used for the framework are: loss of access to common property assets and; social and community disarticulation, give a crucial foundation to exhibit the implications of forced displacement. Both of the major variables have been linked to understand the problems that are occurring in the community and households (shown as dependent variables - the coping mechanisms, the way settlers manage risks and the type of resources that people engage to strategise their livelihood). Each component respectively points out the results of change caused by involuntary resettlement i.e. competition over forest resources, state land and living space, and; dismantling of traditional power structure, communal structure and family structure. Although the central theme of the theoretical framework is forced displacement, the framework is expanded to the investigation of coping mechanisms, power structure and relations, and the way settlers strategize their livelihood. The research framework has aimed clearly at the impact of involuntary resettlement which is concluded in this research as causing the changes and social disorganization in the social structure of the settlers. However, the framework also extends to another level for the investigation of the strategies of rebuilding and restructuring of settlers. Main research findings With regard to the perspective to develop the indigenous people through resettlement program, as shown in this research, there are more losses than gains being achieved especially on the settlers' side. What they have left behind (history, livelihood, rights and identity) at their natural environment cannot be retrieved, and uncompensated. And it is also a fact, as proven in this research that the uncompensated losses continue to be the sole grievances of settlers and the factor of causing continuous displacement amongst settlers. This research concludes that as much as the involuntary resettlement has brought many new challenges to the Kenyah-Badeng, many of these challenges are beyond their capability to manage. The underlying problem is settlers were not actively involved in designing their future in the new settlement from the very beginning the project was proposed. The settlers were receiving diminutive information about the resettlement program, and very limited public platform for them to participate or to voice out their concerns and suggestions before its implementation. The factor that causes their continuous displacement is the non-existence of natural resources and land (other than the three acres given to them as part of the compensation) for them to generate income (remember that most of them are farmers without any skill useful to work in non-agricultural activities). Their life in the former village was hard but they were free to explore as much resources as possible, and they owned their native land. In the resettlement, they are as much strangers to the place as to the way of life they are faced with at the new settlement. In other words, settlers simply do not know how to behave appropriately in radically changed social situations because they are not equipped with necessary living tools. The study of the displacement of the Kenyah-Badengs is concluded in three important aspects as follows: Power structure and relations - In power structure and relations, kinship has always been an important aspect that became the reference for any struggle over leadership issue. Kinship is viewed on a larger scale that includes not only blood relation, but also aspects such as others who came from the same root, indicating that kinship in that term was very much related to sharing of the same history of settlement, migration and culture. It has been proposed that kinship was one crucial aspect that binds this community together, but not likely to be true at the new settlement. The power structure in the Kenyah-Badeng community at the resettlement stand as a separate system, failed to bind the people together, no orders from the leader and not accepting orders by the people. However, they carry out the norm of being as peaceful community, as they have always been. Coping through family network – Because of the failure of power structure and relations, the Kenyah-Badeng become family/household oriented in their livelihood strategies. The family network proves to be the most important coping mechanism for such challenging social environment. The family network provides a platform for its members to generate income, employment, social and moral support, education, and security in general. Livelihood strategies – With the absence of promised resources, settlers are faced with many problems with regards to economic aspects at the new settlement. Their agriculture knowledge is insufficient to success them for employment in town. They mainly work on their allocated three acres of land with other problems tagged along as the lands are located at sloppy and slumps area, as well as faced with low grade soil. For their agriculture productions, they are faced with marketing problem because of the established sellers who refused to allow them to get into the network. This research also humbly suggesting an alternative for settlers to improve their livelihood based on the available resources at the resettlement with the assistance of the state government, at least to initiate strategies for marketing. Settlers need "retooling" in many aspects of agriculture knowledge as that is what they have known best to build their livelihood. Government agencies should assist in terms of skill training related to effective methods to produce quality agriculture productions on their three acres of land. Horticulture should be encouraged on their three acres plot and this method has been carried out by the settlers in their swidden agriculture (slash and burns) at their former village areas. At the new settlement, the prospect of horticulture on pesticide free and organic food can be very encouraging. Methods The information and data for this research were obtained through formal and informal interviews, household survey, household in-depth interviews, and secondary data from available sources in prints, documents and internet. Questions for the interviews were formulated first based only on the research questions. At the field site, questions were expanded and added after numerous trial interviews with key informants to improve the questions before the real interviews were conducted. There were 55 household surveys, and from this survey, 20 households were selected randomly for the household in-depth interviews. The head of households were both male and female. Outline of the thesis This research is organized in chapters as the following summary: Chapter 1 provides the background information of the research area i.e. descriptively introduces Belaga, the region where Bakun Hydroelectric Project (BHEP) was implemented, the implementation of BHEP and the reaction of the local inhabitants. The resettlement in Sg. Asap, and the composition of the settlers are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 2 touches the historical perspective of the Kenyah-Badeng focuses on their livelihoods at Long Geng, their former village before they resettled at Sg. Asap. This chapter also includes a brief history of their migration and settlement to Long Geng, and also the political structure in Long Geng. Chapter 3 discusses the power structure and relations of the Kenyah-Badeng. This chapter draws on the first stage of displacement i.e. processes of losing common property and space with prominent issues such as compensation, land rights and the expected involvement of local leaders in the whole process of the resettlement as highlights of the discussion. Brief history of land legislation in Sarawak based on the interpretation of Native Customary Land and native's rights over ancestral land based on literature reviews is illustrated in this chapter. The purpose of this illustration is to understand the background and general problems of land identification within the Kenyah-Badeng community prior to payment of compensation. Chapter 4 focuses on the discussion of the coping mechanisms employed by the settlers in handling crucial issues pertaining to their livelihood at the resettlement. In fact, this chapter continues the discussion of the stages of displacement highlighting the other two stages by discussing in-depth the situation of "loss of access to common property and space" and "social and community disarticulation". The headings of objectives outlined by State Planning Unit, Sarawak in the development plan of the resettlement are utilized as the base to explain the cause of the displacement and to illustrate the reality at present life of the Kenyah-Badeng. Chapter 5 focuses on the livelihood strategy in which family network is important as the platform for pooling resources. Departing from forced displacement, this chapter illustrates the emergence of coping reaction amongst the settlers by analyzing the family network discovered within the households interviewed in this research. Chapter 6 highlights the changing livelihood of the settlers highlighting the significant of wage employment where remittance is crucial to support their family who are living at the resettlement. The current perspective of settlers towards education and their willingness to invest into their children's education is also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 7 summarizes the research findings and concludes the research.
This essay continues with a discussion concerning the intersection between indigenous technological adoption/adaptation and the range of perspectives with respect to local communities' use of technology in general. Analytical instruments will be presented at the end of this article. First, however, the reader will have the opportunity to examine the 'views' of outsiders with respect to the debate surrounding sustainability, environmental management and territorial ordering. Responses to an on-line survey concerning the above issues together with my own comments, will add to the discussion. ; Gestión ambiental; Ordenamiento Territorial; Sostenibilidad; TIC; Usos ; 1 TECHNOLOGY IN NORTHWEST AMAZONIA (NWA) VIEWS OF VIEWS: SUSTAINABILITY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND TERRITORIAL ORDERING A contribution to a Political Ecology for Northwest Amazonia1 This essay continues with a discussion concerning the intersection between indigenous technological adoption/adaptation and the range of perspectives with respect to local communities' use of technology in general2. Analytical instruments will be presented at the end of this article. First, however, the reader will have the opportunity to examine the 'views' of outsiders with respect to the debate surrounding sustainability, environmental management and territorial ordering. Responses to an on-line survey concerning the above issues together with my own comments, will add to the discussion. Aims Initially there were two aims behind the construction of a website. One of was to overcome impediments to my personal mobility and direct access3. ICT facilitated communications with other interested people and helped solicit their views on indigenous management of the forest and their opinions with respect to the process of territorial ordering in Amazonia. The other aim was to serve the process of opening up political opportunities for NWA's inhabitants. Grassroots organisations all around the globe were (and are) establishing links through ICT. The indigenous peoples of Amazonia may attempt the same and this experience could, in the future, be an instrument of education for NWA. The introduction of such technology among indigenous peoples, if possible, will have impacts, which will to be judged as positive or negative, depending of the political interests of the observer and the moment of observation. It is argued here, that despite there being no indisputable positive or negative effects of technological transfer, it would be contrary to indigenous people's rights to self-determination to prevent the promotion of ICT among them. We wish to question conservative forces: if governments, corporations, NGOs and even international drug dealers and terrorist groups are using ICT to fortify their political positions, why should indigenous peoples be denied access to it? The access (or lack of it) of grassroots organisations to ICT facilitates (or impedes) the 1 The author wishes to thank: Jim Connor and Mark Bennett of Imperial College, the former for his advice on the use of Arcview-GIS and the latter for helping to write the cgi-script form for the website. Thanks are also due to: Stuart Peters from the University of Surrey for training in Web- Page design; Adriana Rico from Páginas.Net for valuable advice during the design process and Alvaro Ocampo for a detailed critique of Kumoro.com before it went live. I also wish to thank the Board of Puerto Rastrojo Foundation, which gave me permission to use their vegetation map as a base for the Yaigojé vegetation map that appears on the web-site. Finally thanks to all the people that took the time to fill out the on-line survey. Their contributions made this chapter possible. 2 This discussion was introduced in "Technology in Northwest Amazonia: Sketches from Inside" (Forero 2002b). 3 A restriction of one of the scholarships the author was granted as well as guerrilla incursions at the time, prevented the author from going back to NWA. 2 development of their rights to be informed (and educated) in accordance with the actual historical context of a globalising corporate economy and cultural hybridisation. For indigenous peoples, as well as for other ethnic minorities, financial resources to set up ICT are extremely limited compared to those of corporations, governments and even NGOs. The establishment of an ICT network for indigenous peoples' organisations in NWA remains a Utopia. But without a Utopian vision there is no aim for social mobilisation; this is something that was underlined by responses to the on-line survey. Fieldwork in NWA involved the author in the territorial ordering process, helping with the formation of indigenous people's organisations, and getting involved in communities' economic and educational projects. My work in NWA can thus be characterised as participatory action research (PAR) and one way of continuing to engage in PAR without going back to the field was to set up a website, wait for an opportunity to share my experience with the people of NWA and promote projects that would allow them to take over the website and use it for their own projects4. Deconstruction of an Internet generated discourse Elsewhere the author has dealt with descriptions and deconstructions of discourses of indigenous and institutional organisations, be they NGOs, churches, governmental or international. This process of deconstruction has included the author's own work among indigenous organisations and NGOs, which was one of the aims of "Indigenous knowledge and the scientific mind: activism or colonialism?" (Forero 2002a). I wish to explain the inclusion of governmental and non-governmental organisations within the category 'institutional'. There are great differences as well as important coincidences in governmental actions and the work of NGOs in developing countries due to the limited nature and poor quality of State-driven action in such nations. E.g. in Colombia, COAMA, the largest NGO network in NWA, has been involved in the political administrative reforms, and served as a consultant in matters of education, health and sustainable production. Furthermore, COAMA staff accompanied indigenous peoples in all these processes and without their intervention it is doubtful that many of the indigenous political organisations of Amazonia would ever have succeeded in their quest for legal recognition5. NGOs and governmental institutions may pursue similar political aims and share administrative structures. Inasmuch as small organisations are successful, (and usually this success is a result of strong personal commitment to a cause and personal knowledge of all members of the organisation), they tend to obtain more funds, which in turn forces them to become increasingly bureaucratic. As 4 At the time of writing (May 2002) the author was preparing to visit NWA at the invitation of indigenous leaders, including the Co-ordinator of an education committee who wanted to discuss the roll of ICT in education. 5 See Forero, Laborde et al. 1998 and the interview with the director of COAMA Martín von Hildebrand, in The Ecologist 2002 (Vol. 32 No.1-February). 3 organisations grow, individual members have fewer opportunities to get to know each other personally and maintain an accordance of principles, aims and political means. This is not to say that NGOs are condemned to be inefficient bureaucratic institutions, (which is not uncommon among developing countries' governmental institutions). But it is important to draw attention to the risk that when resources are pumping in and recruitment is growing there is more chance of becoming detached from grassroots sensibilities with respect to issues and less chance of correctly interpreting local developmental idioms. Views of Indigenous Environmental Management The design, production and publishing of a website on the development of a political ecology for NWA, taking the Yaigojé Resguardo as a study case, may seem a very simple task with little impact. But it proved to be a very delicate matter that involved exhausting work. The production of a map of the Yaigojé Resguardo, (which was to be included on the website) has been explained elsewhere, although it is worth mentioning something about the methodology involved. The author accompanied shamans (who were selected by indigenous leaders from the Apaporis) on several trips in which all the recognised sacred places of the Apaporis River and some of its tributaries where identified. The shamans learn the names of the places during their training. These names are recited in myths, chants and spells. The shamans carry, as they say, the map within themselves. It is impressive to see these men point to a place and give its name without hesitation. It is like this even when they have never been in that place before. It is impressive that this orally transmitted geography corresponds so precisely to the physical aspects that start to become relevant for people who, like the author, have different epistemological instruments for their interpretations of the world. While visiting the sacred places shamans spoke of trips they had made previously. In the case of shamanistic trips, visits did not actually involve physical journeys, but what were referred to as trips en pensamiento, en espíritu (in thought, in spirit). While accompanying them I recorded the geographical co-ordinates using a satellite guided geographical positioning system (GPS). The geographical co-ordinates thus generated were converted to plane co-ordinates and a map was generated using AUTOCAD software. Translations, drawings and reflections about this map-making process are included in a MSc thesis of the University of Warwick (Forero 1999). The work I will describe now, although partially derived from my work with the shamans is distinct in character and intention from that reported in Forero (1999). The use of technological gadgetry allowed me partially to reflect the Tukano world in a way that non-indigenous people could understand. And although this was a significant and, I believe, useful undertaking the real knowledge of the territory lies within the shamans with whom I worked. The fact that the 'indigenous territorial' aspects of the website are illustrated with maps is a by-product of the technology. A more significant value of the work (and the reason behind the shamans' wish to become involved in mapping) is that the maps were going to provide evidence for the legal process through which the ACIYA 4 indigenous organisation would claim rights over lands outside the recognised Resguardo Indigenous Reserve (Forero, Laborde et al. 1998). This work was successful and an extension to the Resguardo was indeed granted. Work on the website began by making a provisional outline of the desired end product. The original plan included six pages: Introduction (Home), vegetation map, traditional territorial map, discussion (an introduction to the political ecology of the Yaigojé Resguardo), bibliography (for those looking for references to NWA and the Yaigojé in particular), and a questionnaire that would generate the information from which this chapter has been developed6. The contrasting discourses obtained from the questionnaires Although I shall refer to percentages in this section, there is no intention of making any predictions based on statistical analyses. Neither is it suggested that the analysis of questionnaires can provide an objective account of outsiders' opinions with respect to the politics of the environment and people of NWA. The following notes are not representative in that sense and such was never the intention of the exercise. What is intended is that the reader gets an insight into the perceptions of survey respondents. What is important in a qualitative data analysis, like this, is to present differential tendencies. If discourses are constituents of reality then the confusing scenario of political confrontation in NWA should be linked to the visions and perspectives of all of us, including the views of people that have never been in Amazonia but nonetheless hold an opinion. And, if there is a marked difference between indigenous and exogenous perspectives with respect to sustainability and environmental management in Amazonia, which relates to whether people have visited NWA or not, this should be reflected in the answers to the surveys. The information generated from the on-line survey was collected between May and December of 2001. Eight hundred invitations were sent through e-mail. They were sent mainly to academics and organisations working on indigenous issues, conservation or sustainable development in NWA. One of these invitations reached COLNODO7 and the ICT network asked if we wished to submit the website in a weekly contest for the best new website, which we did and subsequently won! This meant that COLNODO subscribers were notified and invited to visit the site. But we have no idea how many hits were derived from COLNODO invitation. What we know is that during these 8 months we received 51 completed survey forms. This is a 6.4% response rate to the original 800 invitations8. 6 The survey form is in Appendix 1and, a summary of the technical work involved in the construction of the web-site is in Appendix 2. 7 "COLNODO is a Colombian communications network serving organizations dedicated to community development. It is operated by the non-profit organization called Colombian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations for Email Communication" (http://www.colnodo.org.co/summary_english.html). For a critical review of COLNODO work the interested reader could consult Gómez, R. 1998. 8 This response rate is rather low relative to postal questionnaire surveys, but we are unable to assess it relative other on-line surveys. 5 For the purposes of the analysis respondents (R) were divided into two groups: those claiming to have visited NWA (VA – 29% of R) and those claiming not to have visited the region (NVA – 71% of R). With respect to occupation, 68% of R come from the academic sector, including five anthropologists (almost 10% of R) all of whom had visited NWA. In contrast, although there were the same number of environmental managers as anthropologists answering the questionnaire, none had visited NWA. With respect to gender, the percentage of male (53%) and female (47%) respondents is similar across both VA and NVA groups. In terms of age, there were four groups: 1) 18 to 24, 2) 25 to 34, 3) 35 to 50, and 4) over 50. For R the percentages were: 8%, 47%, 35% and 10% respectively. The majority of respondents belong to the second group, between 25 to 34 years of age. However with respect to age groups the composition of VA and NVA groups differs: 56% of the NVA group belong to this second age cohort (25-34), while the majority of the VA group (47%) is between 35 and 50. Additionally, 13% of the VA group are over 50. 61% of the NVA group are between 18 and 34 years of age, while 60% of those that have visited Amazonia are over 35. A comparison of age among the survey respondents thus shows that those that have visited Amazonia (VA) tend to be older than those that have not (NVA). To distinguish among the views held by survey respondents we have to present the responses to each of the questions of the survey. We have made some associations of responses with the intention of outlining the different tendencies that we identify, but the reader might identify others. Before we do so a word about the view of respondents with respect to the website itself should be said. Website evaluation An evaluation of the web-site made by users was included in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to rate the site between four categories: poor, fair, good and excellent. These categories were chosen as follows: 0, 2, 32 and 15 respectively. Two of the respondents did not offer a rating for the site. Additionally, respondents had the opportunity to suggest improvements. Some respondents suggested changes in design: modification of fonts and colours (some changes had already taken place). There were those who asked for more pictures, a photo album, more links and the construction of a chat room. With respect to the content, some wanted more ethnographic data, another more on political ecology, others asked for better visibility of the maps, while others called for additional links to related sites, and/or more information in general. One suggestion was to make the website less personalised, while another expressed interest in knowing more about the author's research project. Others asked for an enhanced bibliography. Some changes had already taken place by the time these comments were analysed but further changes are still being undertaken at the time of writing. With respect to the questionnaire, two people suggested larger windows to facilitate vision and to be able to comment largely, in contrast, another suggested encouraging more 'yes/no' responses. An important suggestion was: "Perhaps it is now appropriate to include some questions on communication 6 and information flows" (S52). Although not sought explicitly, information was gathered with respect to the use of ICT in the territorial ordering process of Amazonia. One of the respondents suggested that in future the website should be used by indigenous peoples of the Yaigojé. This has been the intention of the author, which has made a visit to Yaigojé (summer 2002) with intention to advance in that direction. Access to ICT for the indigenous peoples of the Yaigojé Resguardo is very limited but present. Future modification of the site will respond to indigenous peoples' feedback. During the visit few indigenous people gave their opinions on the website but several discussions on the roll of ICT in developmental processes took place9. Q1 - Are development and sustainability compatible? A clear response to Question 1 was that this depends on the definition of both terms: "It is impossible to answer this question as it is, as both terms are open to interpretation… " (S26). The question could have been and was read as: Is sustainable development attainable? Respondent S26 continued: "I think sustainable development is possible but hard to achieve in an environment of often conflicting interests and values (economic vs. environmental vs. cultural.)… " One respondent (S22) did not answer this particular question, and two others seemed to be confused (S38 and S41). Forty respondents (78% of R) answered that they were or could be compatible, although there are differences in the way they perceived this compatibility. Development first There were few respondents that failed to question the meaning of 'development' as concept or practice: the developmental project. These responses somehow postulated that certain environmental concerns should be acknowledged and dealt with in order for the development processes to continue: "Yes… . Development as the integration of western technologies or increase of income per capita, can be carefully done by implementing appropriate technologies into the productive activities of the communities. Sustainability defined as a continuous productivity level over the long term." (S2); "Yes. It is only a question of integration of environmental considerations in all we do and adjustment of behaviours accordingly." (S12); "Yes, because there can never be sustainability without development. People have, first to develop for them to have a sense of sustainability." (S13); "Yes, I do. The point is how you can reach a determinate "state" of development without undermining financial, ecological and human capacities in a determinate site (or taking into account their characteristics)." (S40) SD: human - environmental security There were others that perceived the compatibility or the possibility of sustainable development as the chance to diminish human/environmental security risks: "Yes of course in the long run - otherwise life is not possible." (S18); 9 The author is currently preparing a report that will summarise some of these discussions. 7 "Yes. Both are necessary for the survival of the area." (S21); "Si. Solo las acciones en el hoy nos pueden garantizar acciones en el mañana. (Yes. Only by taking action now we can guarantee we could act tomorrow)." (S23); "Yes, development should always be sustainable otherwise there are costs that are not taken into account. i.e. cost of pollution" (S39); "We don't have any choice. We have to make development and sustainability compatible as it's the only way we can survive and at the same time preserve the earth for future generations." (S42) Pessimism, in the sense that without SD life will no longer be possible, was to be repeated in the responses to all of the survey questions. Sustainability is an aim The majority of the respondents that believed development and sustainability to be compatible or capable of becoming compatible, were also of the opinion that the goal of sustainable development had not yet been achieved. Some of them discussed requisite conditions for achieving sustainability. They either underlined the importance of accepting sustainability as a guiding principle for development policy and interventions or/(and) exemplified ways in which sustainable practices might be instituted: "They have to be. I think they are because they have to be. I am optimistic that eventually it will be seen as natural to have sustainable development, but the problem is when this attitude kicks in." (S3) "Depends on how you define the two terms. If you mean that human quality of life can improve while maintaining the natural resource base, I think this is possible but very difficult to achieve." (S5) "Yes, but development in qualitative and not in quantitative terms." (S8) "Yes… there can be sustainable development in an ecological sense of the word - which means installing 'best ecological practice' in planning development." (S24) "No solo lo creo sino que estoy seguro que ambos pueden ser compatibles. Un desarrollo sin considerar ciertos indicadores de sustentabilidad/ sotenibilidad no es posible o viceversa. Uno y otro deberan de ir al parejo tratando de limar los conflictos que a menudo surgen cuando se pretende no un desarrollo pero un crecimiento economico sin considerar la parte social/cultural o ecologica. (Not only I believe that the two can be compatible, I am certain. Development without considering certain indicators of sustainability is impossible or vice versa. Both should go hand in hand, trying to solve the social, cultural and ecological problems that often arise when economic growth rather than sustainable development is the goal)." (S 25) "Sim, no alto rio Negro onde trabalho a ideia e essa: implementar um programa regional de desenvolvimento indedgena sustentado. (Yes, in the Upper Black River, where I work, the idea is precisely to implement a regional programme for sustainable indigenous development)" (S29) "Yes they are. The problem is with the material and energy growth and its compatibility with some environmental standards, like critical thresholds and so on." (S35) "Yes. The only way is by avoiding rapid over-development and having good planning."(S37) ".El concepto de desarrollo sostenible lo veo mucho mas como algo a lo que se quiere llegar, es una nocion implementada por parte de las politicas gubernamentales y ong's donde lo que se 8 procura con estos es el aprovechamiento al maximo de los recursos con un minimo impacto ambiental y social. (I see the concept of sustainable development as goal towards which we heading. It is an idea implemented through governmental and non-governmental policies which aim at maximum exploitation of resources with a minimum of environmental and social impacts)." (S48) "Yes, because they represent the best option to keep for human life." (S51) The need for local definitions Among the respondents that considered sustainability and development compatible if certain conditions were met, there is group of responses that emphasised the need for local definitions of 'sustainability' and 'development', or 'sustainable development': "They can be compatible providing that development is targeted at the right level i.e. small scale and in-keeping with the natural resources and environment." (S5) "Depende de las condiciones y del desarrollo para quién? Por lo tanto el desarrollo es sostenible si es buscado y logrado por la misma comunidad local (It depends on the conditions and on the question 'Development for whom'? Development can only be sustainable if it is sought and implemented by the local community itself)" (S20) "Yes but mainly if made through indigenous methodologies in their territories in Amazonia" (S27) "Yes. There is work done in northern Scandinavia where the "sammi" (lapps) have been given economical support and encouraged to create their own parliament. They have programs protecting their way of life, language and customs. The Norwegian broadcasting company NRK sends news in the language and coastal dialects. All this, at least for Norwegian sammi (lapps) has been key factors in late developments where communities have developed economically achieving great sustainability, contributing, not only to their well being, but to the sustainability of the inhospitable sub-artic regions." (S31) "Yes - but only if there is an 'appropriate' deployment of tools, techniques and processes of development in line with local community needs." (S52) Semantics and the economic imperative Interestingly, one respondent was very pessimistic about the possibilities for sustainable development even when it was sought and pursued at the local level. This respondent brought into the equation the idea that people are driven by monetary benefits to deplete their environment, even though they know that such practices are unsustainable: "To a certain degree, yes. I think that monetary considerations will always outweigh humanitarian concerns and it is very hard to convince people who are seeking a living from sometimes-meagre resources that it is in their own good to give consideration to long-term sustainable use of their resources. It is usually easier and cheaper to move on to the next area when one area has been depleted." (S17) This last argument derives from a rationality that considers poor people to be collaborators in their own misery. In this particular response there was no questioning of the developmental project or the social structures within which people are stimulated to act regardless of the future; but it did address 'monetary considerations' as the driving force. 9 Those responses that argued that the concepts are incompatible claimed an intrinsic contradiction in "sustainable development": "Development of any kind cannot sustain anything." (S4). Instead of blaming the people (needy or not), the proponents of incompatibility pointed their fingers at 'the system'; contemporary capitalist structures, the current developmental project and the prevailing economic model are seen as unavoidably contrary to sustainable practices: "No because development is premised upon economic gain, and capitalism is inherently unsustainable" (S10); "The problem with sustainability is that the economic model is not compatible with social, economic and ecological aspects at the same time and proportion. The neo-liberal model promotes the economic aspect leaving as secondary the social and ecological." (S19); "No, because development does not imply a recognition of limits or the necessity to preserve the natural and human resources used to achieve it. It is an economic concept, which has bases in the apparently unlimited uses of resources… " (S47); "… Si lo entemos [desarrollo] como crecimiento economico, por supuesto que no son compatibles. Ya que el crecimiento economico, tal y como lo plantean los economistas, excluye de raiz criterios sociales, culturales y ambientales requeridos para la sustentabilidad." (If we understand development as economic growth, of course they [sustainability and development] are not compatible. This is because economic growth, as economist have brought it up, excludes from its bases the environmental, cultural and social requirements of sustainability)" (S34) S.D. inconsistent with the present There are less radical rejections of the compatibility, which do not portray sustainable development as a contradiction itself but rather as inconsistent with current economic and ecological trends. The point such respondents make is that the necessary conditions for sustainable development are currently, rather than inherently unattainable: "… The current model of industrial development, where 'development' means material economic growth, is unlikely to be sustainable on a long term basis for the majority of the world population." (S1) "Present development of our world is clearly not sustainable" (S33) "Yes, they are compatible. But in a different social and economic order, not in the one the world is living now… " (S36) "Yes, if we change the way development is understood, for instance, development is associated to living styles resembling to those Europe and USA have, which are a lot related to consumption. But we could live in a healthier and more compatible way with our environment if we change our pattern of consumption and the generalised idea of development nowadays, it would be turning it into "only use what I need and get from nature, exclusively this, not until I just can't get anymore from it", 'cause I over pressed the place, to obtain more benefits. So, at last, this could be possible but in the long term, I hope not when there's nothing left to do." (S45) 10 Greening politics Some responses expressed doubts about the compatibility of sustainability and development. These doubts arise from the apparent use of "sustainability" as a green rhetoric, the aim of which is the continuation of projects that degrade the environment or human rights: ". usually development translates into cutting down natural habitats without regard to "sustaining" cultures" (S32); "In theory 'yes' but much depends on the definition of the terms and societies' acceptance of equal human rights and obligations to others." (S7) "Los conceptos de desarrollo y de sostenibilidad resultan ser bastantes amplios y ambiguos. En la mayoria de los casos cuando se plantean proyectos de desarrollo se trata de relacionarlos directamente con proyectos que resulten ser favorables para el medio ambiente. Como si un concepto llevara implicito otro, sin embargo creo que lo que se esta haciendo desde hace algunos años es precisamente disfrazar los proyectos de desarrollo para que sean aprobados bajo el nombre de mantenimiento del medio ambiente." (The concepts of sustainability and development are very ambiguous. In the majority of cases, there is an attempt to portray development projects as environmentally friendly[, a]s if one concept implied the other. However, I believe that what has been happening for the last few years is a camouflaging of development projects, in order to get them approved under the heading of environmental management) (S48). Reflections on responses to Q110: If "all development is not 'absolute' but will have a beginning and an end" (S24) then, "[d]evelopment of any kind cannot sustain anything." (S4). The impossibility of re-establishing high quality energy after it has been transform into low quality energy (or entropy) is a characteristic feature of closed systems, this would leave us with a world in decline where there is no possibility of sustaining anything. It could be argued that this is the case, as we cannot even guarantee perpetual solar energy flow. But this is perhaps taking the concept of sustainability too far, leaving us with no possibility for discussion. The central political discussion arising from the different responses revolves around the contradiction between those arguments of compatibility that leave the development project unquestioned and those that reject any possibility of compatibility because of a profound questioning of development. Between the two, the picture is blurred, undefined, open and elusive. There does not appear to be any significant correspondence between the two opposite groups of respondents in relation to whether they have been in Amazonia or not. Three out of five of the respondents claiming that there is absolutely no compatibility between development and sustainability have been in Amazonia; but so have two out of four of the respondents that left the development project unquestioned. However, it may be of some significance that none of those that accepted 'sustainable development' are related to social sciences. Those respondents with academic backgrounds in the social sciences all fit into groups 10 A schematic summary can be found in Table 1, Appendix 3. 11 that see sustainable development as a principle, something to be defined locally or as a reformist greening of politics. None of them were found in the group arguing for absolute incompatibility. The middle ground, where the picture is most blurred, came from the majority of respondents by whom it was argued that sustainable development may be possible but that they were unsure about how it might be achieved. Although these responses varied from those expressing suspiciousness (those pointing out the rhetoric of sustainability) to hope: "They have to be. I think they are because they have to be". This acceptance of a possibility of sustainable development, despite the semantic contradiction and current political rhetorical manipulation of the term, reflects a process of thinking and acting that is deeply rooted in Utopian beliefs. This 'sustainability' will happen in the future, in another time, when local communities take control of their lives and their resources, when environmental protection is taken seriously, when today's actions reflect our responsibility toward the future, etc. According to one of the respondents even continuous increases in productivity will be possible, when the proper technology has been developed. Q2 - Is there a relationship between indigenous reserves (IR) and protected areas (PA)? In Colombia IR are called "Resguardos Indígenas" or "Resguardos de Tierras". The term resguardo, literally means protection. Its meaning is not too different from that given to natural conservation areas of different grades: áreas protegidas, protected areas (PA). Both, IR and PA, emphasise the need for an area to be specially protected. Some of the respondents of this question pointed out an implicit relationship between IR and PA perhaps departing of this meaning: "… In a general sense, indigenous reserves are protected areas; they are protected from outside influence for the benefit of the indigenous people… " (S1); "Yes there are relationships. Both have natural systems and environmental quality that requires some level of conservation and protection" (S9); "Yes , for obvious reason. Because the protected reserves are a birth child of indigenous reserves and because we do not want to lose the nature environment the relationship should be maintained." (S13); "Yes, indigenous reserves are protected areas" (S28) As in the case of Q1 (Do you think that development and sustainability are compatible?) some respondents pointed out that it would depend on what we understand by the two terms: "Depends on the sort of protected area or what we mean with protected area… " (S25). "There could be" (S38); "It could be, but I am not sure" (S46); "… this has to be context specific" (S1). Five respondents simply said "yes" (S37, S18, S22, S43, S50) and one simply said "no" (S15). However many of the respondents did go on to qualify the relationship in some way. 12 Harmony or the need for it Some of the affirmative responses portrayed indigenous peoples as the guardians of the environment while others offered concrete examples of this viewpoint: "Si. Las culturas indigenas han demostrado que sus culturas han vivido armonicamente con su entorno durante miles de años" (Yes. Indigenous peoples have demonstrated that their cultures have lived in harmony with their environment during millennia). (S23); "Empirical evidence through statistical analysis has shown (particularly in Colombia in the north west region of the Sierra Nevada) that there is a direct relation between conservation and indigenous reserves. So, the answer is "yes, I do think so". (S40) There were those that referred to the need for a harmonic relationship because: 1) the environment should be protected for the benefit of indigenous peoples: "… indigenous reserves are related with spaces or areas that the government leaves for indigenous people and protected areas are where the local authorities or government provide the ($) resources in order to protect them" (S19); "Existe una relación, historica y cultural, respecto a su territorio, esto debe ser respetado y protegido para las mismas comunidades indigenas" (There is an historic and cultural relationship with respect to their territories. This should be respected and protected by indigenous communities for their own sake (S20). 2) the protection is fundamental for biodiversity conservation: "… Podria ser que se proteja un area porque existe cierta flora o fauna que esta en peligro de extincion. Por ejemplo, muchos animales que viven en la selva solo se aparean una vez al año en cierta temporada y si estos son interrumpidos por presencia humana su decendencia podria verse aun mas en peligro de extincion… " (It may be that an area is protected because there are endangered flora or fauna. For example, there are many rainforest animals that mate once a year or seasonally; if they are interrupted by human activities their progeny could be further endangered) (S25); "… development there should be restricted for the sake of conservation" (S33) 3) sustainable practices could be developed based on indigenous peoples' experiences: "Yes. By protecting areas where almost all indigenous people are more and more confined, there will be a way to preserve indigenous experiences in order for these experiences to contribute to a sustainable development." (S11). Utopia There were also those sorts of answers that reflected a feeling of hope or a sense of Utopia, in which a harmonic, positive relationship was acknowledged as desirable but not yet achieved: "I imagine IR to equate with PA in some way. Perhaps naively. IR is implicitly protected from external development forces, but not necessarily internal." (S3); "There can be. If people are continuing a way of life that has been sustainable in the past and are able to develop sustainably (… ) there is no reason why both should not coexist." (S6); "Most indigenous reserves must be also protected areas. How to effectively do it? I don't know." (S36); "In countries with mindless and irresponsible politicians and business people, it should be mandatory that 'indigenous reserves' must be synonymous with 'protected areas'. (S42) 13 Contamination and cultural imposition Some respondents signalled the risk of contamination, this is of indigenous peoples being influenced by a mestizo culture and therefore driven to break the presumed harmonic relationship with the natural environment. This may be seen as a lost opportunity, that of the rest of humanity to learn from indigenous experiences or, that of given indigenous people to assert managerial control: "Yes, as indigenous populations tend to live in harmony with nature these areas tend to require protection from the outside world. (S12); "… I also think it is difficult to put it into practice since indigenous people want to be part of the economic system and therefore there is a risk of depletion. Anyway who is better to protect certain areas than the people who have lived there for hundred of years!!!" (S39); "Yes, in fact, so far as I know, many of our indigenous people live in these protected areas, where most of them have been able to live in a sustainable way, I say most of them, because others are affected by the mestizo men that live nearby or want to get something from that place due to its economic importance, affecting these natural areas." (S45) It was pointed out that both types of jurisdiction, IR and PA, derived from a cultural-historical process, in which self-determination was not accounted for: "Yes, a very imperialistic one - especially in the Americas (including Canada). It is an old regressive link between the two, in the 60s and 70s this paternalistic viewpoint saw indigenous culture as static --which is wrong!" (S24); "Yes, they both seem to be defined by the ruling 'white' government." (S26) A respondent that had visited Amazonia (VA) added that there is resistance to this imposition, at least as far as indigenous peoples of Colombia are concerned: "yes-especially when indigenous management systems are practised in spite of the models of dominant society in Colombia" (S27). Similarly, another VA respondent suggested that in Colombia there are no friendly relationships between IR and PA: "It depends from country to country, but in Colombia no" (S10)! Analytical responses The analysis provided by some of the respondents tended to localise the relationship: to put it into the historical process. The analysis underlined the main problem for a "non-confrontational" relationship between IR and PA regimes. As they are designations that came about without public participation and from a rationality that is especially alien to indigenous peoples, when IRs and PAs overlap, competition for management arises. These type of answers either acknowledged that the relationship happens through overlap, or mentioned the difficulties of hitting indigenous rights and conservation target simultaneously: "Freedom of choice for all people, in terms of lifestyle, cultural heritage can translate into giving management control to indigenous people in protected areas. However the balance between sustainable economic development for indigenous people and at the same time protecting the environment is a difficult topic to discuss at a macro level. Individual environmental and socio-cultural circumstances need to be fully accounted for and explicitly articulated." (S7) "Yo creo que existe una relacion estrecha entre reservas indigenas y areas protegidas alrededor del mundo. Ya que estas dos figuras juridicas en muchos casos (p.e. Colombia) se encuentran translapadas." (I believe there is a close relationship between indigenous reserves and protected areas around the world. It derives from the fact that in many cases these two jurisdictions overlap) (S34). 14 "There is a relationship when they overlap, which I think happens often." (S44) "Los resguardos y las reservas indigenas han tenido la tendencia a considerarse y definirse como areas protegidas, sin embargo me parece importante tener en cuenta que al establecer los limites territoriales entre los resguardos quedan zonas intermedias que no pertenecen necesariamente a algun resguardo, y esto hace de un modo u otro que tambien se presenten roces con diferentes actores. Por la misma razon que al no estar circunscrito en un resguardo aparentemente se consideraría como un area no protegida… " (It has been the tendency to consider the resguardos and indigenous reserves as protected areas. However, I think it is worth considering that when the resguardo boundaries are established, there are zones in-between not ascribed to any resguardo. And this makes it somehow possible for different [political] actors to get confrontational. This happens as a consequence of the non-ascription of the in-between zone, which is not considered as protected area… ) (S48) However it came about and assuming that both jurisdictions are somehow competing, some respondents argued that IR should be more effective, as it gives responsibility to the people for their own lives: "Yes, although I think indigenous reserves serve to protect the environment/area better. This is because they are protected by local people who value the resources and use them in a traditional and more sustainable way. Protected areas can be designated/run by Governments and this can remove the responsibility from the indigenous peoples." (S5); "Yes. I think that indigenous reserves do offer more protection than protected areas because it gives local people more incentive to use sustainable practices. They can see it being in their own interests" (S17) In contrast, one respondent argued: "Maybe there is, but I don't believe in reserves" (S35). And a second respondent (VA) added that poverty have driven indigenous peoples to behave unsustainably: "I think it is possible. However, some indigenous areas are completely degraded because they are selling their natural resources to survive." (S53). This response (S53) is related to one of those made to Q1: "To a certain degree, yes. I think that monetary considerations will always outweigh humanitarian concerns and it is very hard to convince people who are seeking a living from sometimes meagre resources that it is in their own good to give consideration to long-term sustainable use of their resources. It is usually easier and cheaper to move on to the next area when one area has been depleted." (S17) Both answers (Q1-S17, Q2-S53) echo a neo-Malthusian argument. It implies that a 'tragedy of the commons' is happening in Amazonia and elsewhere as result of overpopulation. The politics involved "No. Indigenous reserves and protected areas (for nature conservation) are two different political land use strategies. If the government is assigning an Indian reserve then they should respect the use the indigenous people are making of the terrain according to traditional use or to improved technologies. Areas for Nature conservation must be treated separately and with a different priority. We cannot make the indians responsible for the disappearing of the diversity. The government has to be responsible by applying appropriate conservation and management regimes" (S2) This response makes an argument for the need to differentiate between IR and PA as diverse political strategies that pursue different aims. The first would aim to 15 comply with Indigenous Peoples Rights, particularly that of self-determination. The second political strategy would aim at biodiversity conservation. The respondent acknowledges indigenous social change as indigenous management depends on both, tradition and technological improvement. Interestingly, the analysis provided does not try to conceal the confrontational nature of the relationship; nor does it neither place much hope in conciliation. On the contrary, it advocates for a distinction. If there is some hope or sense of utopia in the response it comes from solutions provided by technological improvement. Which is something this particular respondent had already stressed in Q1: "… . Development as the integration of western technologies or increase of income per capita, can be carefully done by implementing appropriate technologies into the productive activities of the communities. Sustainability defined as a continuous productivity level in the long term." (S2) Non-conclusive comment-Q211 Nowadays, the establishment or enlargement of IRs (Resguardos in Colombia) and PAs requires the interested proponents to follow long protocols, the fulfilment of precise administrative procedures and of legal conditions. One aim of the process is to allow different stakeholders to participate and to assure the fulfilment of fundamental rights to all citizens in equal conditions. In Colombia, like in many other parts of the developing world, when the "juridical figures" were established these procedures were not necessary, therefore, many IRs and PAs were established without participation of all interested parties. It is not surprising that some of the respondents refer to the confrontation or competition of regimes that began with their imposition. It could be of some significance that none of the respondents that claimed the need to harmonise IR and PA have been in Amazonia. In contrast, the two respondents that pointed out that these two regimes are conflicting in Colombia have been there. The analytical response that called for clear differentiation between the two also came from the group of people that had visited Amazonia (VA). From the set of answers given to Q2 it is clear that different and contrasting narratives ascribed to with respect to environmental management. For some of the respondents indigenous peoples are guardians of the environment, victims of colonialism or in risk of a cultural contamination that will force them to adopt maladaptive strategies that would threaten conservation strategies. For others, indigenous reserves are untrustworthy designations: the environment should be preserved against development and human intervention, be it indigenous or otherwise. Therefore indigenous peoples should not be in charge of environmental management. Yet, another political perspective is derived from hopes of compatibility between the two regimes, which although pursuing different aims are seen as relevant for environmental and human security at the same time. Thus, the third perspective could be characterised as dialectic or iterative. From this (last) perspective indigenous experience could help the development of conservation strategies; and, 11 Schematic summary: Table 2, Appendix 3. 16 at the same time, the revision of environmental and conservation management strategies could be vital for the survival of indigenous peoples. Hope or Utopian visions also have a place here: the development of technology is seen as a key component for adequate environmental management. Technological improvement would allow both compliance with indigenous peoples' rights and biodiversity conservation. We are sketching a continuum from our comment on Q1, suggesting that the narrative of conciliation 'reflects a process of thinking and acting that is deeply rooted in utopia'. Q3 - Do you think that the concepts of protected areas (PA), indigenous reserves (IR) and sustainable development (SD) are useful for environmental management today? Two respondents say that the concepts should be context specific: "Yes, but which of them is useful depends on context… " (S1). "As I said before, all these terms have to be defined properly in the first place before they can be applied." (S2). There were two respondents that simply said 'yes' (S14, S22), while one answered: "yes, if it works" (S4). S4's response suggests that concepts are instruments, and not surprisingly many answers referred to the "applicability" of these three concepts. Environmental indians and contamination risk Some respondents reiterated the idea, already expressed in Q1 and Q2, that indigenous peoples are practitioners of SD or conservation managers: "… Indigenous reserves are important because they allow the preservation of a way of living in sympathy with the environment long gone in most areas… " (S12); "Claro que si. Las culturas indigenas son un ejemplo de convivencia y explotacion sostenible del entorno en que viven" (Yes of course. Indigenous cultures are an example of coexistence with the environment they live in and of sustainable exploitation.) (S23); "Yes because indigenous people are the 'shepherds' of the landscape and they have a first-hand understanding and experience (handed down from previous generations) of ecosystem processes. Sometimes indigenous customs and habits reflect an understanding of nature's processes that can be exemplary in the planning of management plans… "(S41) One response re-enforced an idea presented in Q2, that indigenous sustainable practices are in risk as the younger generations begin to adopt western lifestyles: "… , but this knowledge is also in danger [endangered],… , shamanism is related in many cases to the management of the natural resources, but I have listened to the indigenous people from the community that I'm working in, that they're not interested in receiving this knowledge from their parents, and day by they they're a lot like us in their agricultural practices." (S45) Principles as instruments Various responses made reference to certain conditions that would have to be fulfilled in order for the concepts to be useful. This perspective, where the concepts are understood as political instruments, could be useful if a 'real' or 'truth-value' definition of them were accomplished. This truth-value would come from using the political instrumentality of a concept only if it were to reflect a set of principles such as intergenerational equity, empowerment, and participation. 17 And, in the case of participation, special emphasis were given to the incorporation of indigenous people, their knowledge and ways of dealing with the environment: "The concept of protected areas will only be successful if indigenous peoples are involved, therefore this would seem to indicate that indigenous reserves would be the best way forward of the two" (S5) "… indigenous reserves need to be redefined according to the wishes of the people who will be living in them,… (S6); "… If sustainable development means development with the means which exist and with the participation of the people concerned… " (S11); Yes. Exercising indigenous knowledge should not be limited to reserves but integrated into the management plans along with scientific knowledge more widely. (S26); "Yes… Any protected area, etc. must actively incorporate the participation of indigenous people" (S41) The idea of intergenerational equity is attached to that of resource reserve for the developmental process: "Yes… The sustainable development concept relating to the obligation of the present generation to leave enough natural assets and capital for future generations to enjoy at least the same quality of life we enjoy today must be at the heart of environmental management activities." (S12) "Yes, because the natural environment that we believe is endangered should be protected as a reference in future years to come and because of this a sense of environmental management is very important as the same environment becomes a resource for development" (S13) "Yes. We need to protect the area and its people and provide for sustainable development. (S21) "… pero estoy cierto que las areas protegidas independentemente del interes en prervarlas desempeñan un papel importante en el manejo de ambientes naturales para la captura de CO2, conservación de recursos biogenéticos/biodiversidad/ y como elementos de estudio para futuras generaciones… " (… but I am certain that, independently of the interest in preserving them, protected areas play a roll in the management of natural environment for CO2 sequestration, conservation of biodiversity/genetic resources and as study subjects for future generations (S25) "yes, otherwise development will go against our own endurance. I think we have to consider the possibility that we are not the most powerful force in this world." (S38) Risk and Protection Following this idea is that of concepts (as political instruments) being useful if they could provide and enforce protection (S13, S21 above). In this case either the environment is seen at risk (endangered species or ecosystems) or both indigenous peoples and their environments: "Yes. Protected areas are important as pools of natural resources not affected by human activity. Indigenous reserves are important because they allow the preservation of a way of living in sympathy [tune] with the environment long gone in most areas." (S12); "I think they are vital. Until everyone has a responsible attitude to environmental control certain protections have to be enforced." (S17) Some of the responses expressing a need for environmental protection have a sense of impending catastrophe: "Yes, but they are loaded concepts so we have to be careful in using them… sustainable development is the only way we will survive, but is usually glibly applied." (S6); "in a limited sense perhaps.but what we need to accomplish is protection of all that there is left, without cutting and taking land around the so called protected area. stop the modernisation process wherever it has not already reached into" (S32); "Yes, because they are the only source to preserve life on earth." (S51) 18 Protection but of cultural diversity: "… They may contribute to 'capturing' and saving fragile cultures and 'unknown' languages." (S31) Although acknowledging the need for protection, some respondents made it explicit that IRs were not effective, as the policies derived from such concepts (regimes) would increase risk instead of attenuating it: "… in terms of indigenous groups if they become circumscribed to a specific protected area then this will prevent persistence of nomadic lifestyles etc. and as a result the protected area may become 'unsustainable' as people are becoming circumscribed to a specific reserve. I guess this also answers the question on indigenous reserves, however, the indigenous reserves of N. America should be used as an example of the problems of tying people to such reserves,… " (S10) "… 'indigenous reserves' are not so useful - most of indigenous social problems have been caused by the colonisers, and are being reproduced through generations. Keeping indigenous people enclosed in such areas, and introducing paternalistic rules and laws is not healthy for any society. It instils racism in a society, and will not ensure that indigenous practices of environmental management will be maintained - that depends on the indigenous group and how they choose to manage their environment… " (S24) The need for integration and its impediments Some emphasis was put on the idea that there is or should be a link between the concepts (political instruments): "Yes all concepts are useful as they each permit different aspects of the economic/ecology debate to enter into the wider public arena. Ultimately for there to be sustainable solutions to environmental problems there needs to be a holistic approach adopted… " (S7) "… environmental development will not be meaningful without taking into account the interrelation between 'indigenous reserves' and 'sustainable development'" (S11) "Yes, because all areas are linked with each other very closely" (S18). "Yes. Exercising indigenous knowledge should not be limited to reserves but integrated into the management plans along with scientific knowledge more widely." (S26) "… Lo que creo es que tanto las reservas indigenas, como las areas protegidas deberian orientarse hacia un desarrollo sostenible. Bien sea que estas dos figuras se translapen o no. Si entendemos el desarrollo sostenible como un proceso que involucra criterios sociales, culturales, economicos, y ambientales." (… What I do believe is that indigenous reserves as well as protected areas should direct their attention towards sustainable development, whether or not the entities [juridical regimes] overlap. If we understand sustainable development as a process that involves social, cultural, economic and environmental criteria.) (S34) However, quiet a few responses pointed out the problems that prevent this integration from taking place: 1) Incompatibility of interests between IR and PA: "… Protected areas are useful, but they raise the debate as to whether one should protect an area and exclude people from it so that a certain species/ archaeological site/community can survive or whether people should have access… " (S10); "It is quite difficult to harmonies those concepts, specifically among indigenous people. They are convinced that 'sustainable development' is an imperialist concept, and the first idea they have -as far as they hear the concept- is that they are going to be exploited by others… " (S40) 2) The prevalence of economic efficiency and profit at the expense of anything else: 19 "… El desarrollo sustentable que ha sido cada vez mas un objetivo importante en varios paises del mundo. Pero encontrar los balances correctos ha sido y es dificil, particulrmente cuando las sociedades y gobiernos estan sometidos a un proceso de globalizacion y de efeicientizacion economica. He ahi los conflictos permanentes de lograr un desarrollo verdaderamente sustentable que considere no solo los aspectos economicos, pero politicos, cultrales, sociales y ecologicos o ambientales. (Sustainable development has become an increasingly important objective in several countries around the world. But to find the correct balances has been and continues to be difficult; in particular as a result of societies and governments being subjected to economic efficiency within the globalisation process. There are permanent conflicts in the way of obtaining a real sustainable development that involve not only the economic aspects, but also the social, cultural, ecological and environmental criteria " (S25). "… too many people think of 'sustainable' as meaning economic sustainability and not environmental sustainability." (S30). "… While protected areas and indigenous reserves serve to maintain environmental quality, the concept of sustainable development is often disregarded for the sake of profits and globalisation." (S33) 3) Political manipulation: "I think there have been problems with these concepts for two reasons: First, they mean different thing for different people, second, they have been used and to serve particular interests. There are several and opposite definitions of 'sustainable development' and it's a difficult concept. 'Indigenous reserve', used as a general concept does not describe usefully the complex realities and 'protected areas' have been used to serve particular interests over time so I think it is seen suspiciously by a lot of people." (S44) "I think so, but these concepts are used a lot by politicians, and then the meaning can be manipulated". (S46) "… The big problem is not related to the concepts alone, it is related to the way in which these are applied according with particular interests and purposes. Many times the terms are used by different groups or organisations in order to pretend to be environmental friendly or responsible, when the real purposes reveal an opposite target or interest." (S47) "… Muy seguaramente estos términos se manejan como deben ser en el plano académico teórico, mas no ocurre lo mismo en el ambito práctico donde lo que prevalece son los interese de los diferentes actores que trabajan en este campo, lo que lleva inevitablemente a que se presenten situaciones de tension entre estos y se deje de lado el objetivo primordial en cuanto a la conservación y le manejo ambiental" (For sure, theoretically and within the academic circles these concepts are managed as they should be. Although, in the practical scenario privilege is given to the particular interests of those different [political] actors who work in this field. Thus, it is unavoidable that tensions will arise between these [political actors], which leave aside the fundamental aim of environmental management and conservation) (S48) 4) Semantics, the concepts mean too many things to too many different political actors (S44 above): "… 'Sustainable development' is not so useful for environmental management, as the concept is too contested - it means too many different things to different people." (S24); "As I said, the problem is that there are many definitions of those terms and it makes it difficult to determine if they are useful in one place compared to other places" (S50) Dynamism The perspective of 'dynamism' reflects a perception of mutating meanings as an advantage. Under this perspective 'contested' means 'in change', which is seen as part of a learning process, which is in tune with the idea of local definition of concepts (emphasised above): "Ultimately for there to be sustainable solutions to environmental problems there needs to be a holistic approach adopted, where people can better appreciate that their lifestyle has much in 20 common with others - even if they are in an OECD country and cannot appreciate the day to day lifestyle of someone in a less developed country. … . Therefore the concepts listed can provide an opportunity to raise the awareness of the majority of the world's people." "Yes, there is plenty that can be learned from these three concepts and also applied" (S37) "A lot, I believe there are a lot of things we can learn from them, specially in this field of study,." (S45) "If these concepts are [understood or interpreted] under a dynamic and changing world (attached to contexts), which mean that there is not a unique definition or way to apply them, I think they are still useful for environmental management." [original: understanding or interpreting… ] (S47) The need for new concepts-Q3 Contradicting narratives can be appreciated through the reading of these responses. There is a group of respondents that are uncritical of the concepts or the policies derived from them (like S37, S45 above and): "Yes, they are important to efficient environmental management" (S28); "Yes. An understanding of the mechanism of these terminologies is essential for effective environmental management … " (S9). Another group could be made out of those responses that reflect suspicion or are definitely critical of the concepts (S10, S24, S25, S30, S33, S40, S44, S46, S47, S48, S50 above). And, besides the group of respondents that express conditionality or hope (see above), there is a group of responses that, while critical of the concepts, acknowledge that at present they are all we have: "… which of them is useful depends on context… If an ethnic group is to be allowed to determine the course of events within its own territory, then the territory must be reserved for them until such time as they develop complete autonomy or decide to integrate more closely with wider society. Sustainable development may seem a rather broad, unspecific term, but it does at least draw attention to the unsustainability of conventional development… " (S1) "… The concept of sustainable development is gradually getting better developed and, even if it is not strictly attainable, gives decision-makers something to work towards… (S5) "I don't agree with the concept of SD as it is a contradiction in terms, but at present there are few better alternatives… " (S10) One respondent actually moved forward in the critique, pointing out that the concepts were built on preconceptions and identifying the need to generate new concepts that would integrate the useless categorical divide of nature and society: "I think they are old fashioned, and generated by the Anglo-Saxon culture. We should move towards an increased compatibility between human activities and nature, making it therefore not necessary to talk about reserves, or natural areas." (S35) Non-conclusive comment-Q312: The majority if not the totality of respondents took 'concepts' as 'politics'. They discussed the history of these politics, their adequacy and sufficiency. It is very interesting that while the conduct through which political ideas become policies is supposed to be complex, it is obvious for the respondents that there is more than theoretical debate going on in the process of policy making. There is a prevailing, sometimes automatic or non-reflexive awareness that narratives pursue the aims that drive the policies and politics that are transforming the environment. 12 Schematic summary: table 3, Appendix 3. 21 In continuity with the results of Q2, only 1 out of five respondents of those who argued for the need to integrate the concepts had been in Amazon; while the two respondents that argued the case of 'incompatibility of interests' had been there. Of those which suggested that these concepts –political strategies- are useful for environmental protection or that this is the last chance –catastrophism- for life, none had visited Amazonia. It may be of some significance that none of the five respondents that suggested that IR might be a better strategy than PA have been in Amazonia, while one person of the two that argued that IRs are ineffective had been there. The responses correspond to several narratives that can be identified. One of them is that of 'confidence in science and trust in political instrumentality' derived from the (traditional definitions of) concepts outlined. Another narrative is that of 'natives as heroes and outsiders as villains', which is reflected in the suspiciousness of concepts based in untested assumptions and in mistrust of the governmental policies derived from them. In summary there is a status-quo narrative and a counter narrative. Yet a third type of narrative could be identified, that of 'critical understanding'. Q4 – Should environmental managers (EM) get involved in the territorial ordering process (TOP) of the Amazon? One of the respondents simply answered yes (S4). One was unsure (S52), perhaps suspicious? One considered the question was tricky (S32), and three of them put the question into question. Two of these responses asked for the term 'environmental manager' to be defined: "Difficult to answer. Define the roles, mandate and empowerment of the environmental manager… " (S31); "What do you mean by environmental managers?." (S6). The third one was more critical: "this sentence is colonialist as if indigenous peoples of Amazonia were not in fact environmental managers" (S27). With a similar intent, one respondent argued that indigenous people were better-qualified environmental mangers: "Las comunidades indigenas han sido las mejores administradoras del territorio ancestral, eso debe ser respetado y replicado en zonas donde la intervención humana 'civilizada' ha afectado las condiciones ambientales. (Indigenous communities have been the best managers of ancestral territories, this should be respected and should be replicated in areas where 'civilised' human intervention has affected environmental conditions) (S20)" The response of Indigenous peoples as better managers had been expressed in Q1, Q2 and Q3. Another three responses reinforced the ideas of catastrophism, the need for urgent environmental protection and to stop development (S32, S33, S42). Perspectives EMs are the ones: "Definitely" (S12); " … They have in many cases a better view for the long-run." (S18); 22 Yes. Who else is better suited to do so?" (S21); "Environmental Managers should get involved. They are best able to ensure protection of ecosystem" (S28); "Por supuesto que si. Ya que el ordenamiento territorial de un territorio (en este caso de la Amazonia) debe tener como objetivos el desarrollo sostenible." (Definitely. Territorial ordering (of the Amazon in this case) should have sustainable development as an objective) (S34); "Because they are the ones that can understand the balance that must exist between economic development, traditional culture and environment." (S36); " They should, how can they do whithout?" (S46) "Yes, because they can contribute to better territorial ordering in the region" (S53) EMs and scientists figure out the solutions and take the decisions: "Deben estar involucradas todas las personas del planeta, pero con mas razon los 'decision makers', que a fin de cuentas, toman las acciones concretas sobre nuestro futuro medioambiental. (All people from the planet should get involved, but the 'decision makers' have more reason to be there, after all they are the ones that take the concrete actions in respect to our environmental future) (S23); "Yes, but along with some other scientists, not only because of the importance of the Amazon from a global point of view, but specially for the importance for the people living there." (S35); "Yes, always considering multiple disciplines result in a better understanding and so better solutions." (S38) But taking into account the other opinions: "Yes, although indigenous peoples will also play a major part and without them any agreements between Governments and environmental managers will not work… " (S5); "Not always, because it is necessary to take into consideration lay people's opinions too." (53) Indigenous peoples direct EMs: "If they are asked to do so by indigenous peoples, I see no problem with this." (S1); "Territorial ordering should be primarily decided upon by the indigenous groups that inhabit them, … ultimately decisions need to come from the bottom upwards" (S10); "… The indigenous people should be in charge of the program at the ultimate level" (S14). " They should but they should make sure they respect the opinion of indigenous people and they should be very discreet in their approach and aim for cooperation." (S41) EMs have equal rights to participate as other stakeholders: " Of course. All actors should be involved in the process… It doesn't mean that they have to take decisions but they can evaluate the circumstances under different and also important perspectives." (S2); "What do you mean by environmental managers? But yes, I think they also have a stake in the fate of the Amazon, and have a right to make their voices heard. (S6); " Involvement - yes but only in collaboration and co-operation with the Amazonian people and those in the higher levels of bureaucracy and policy making … Environmental managers can make significant contributions in this area, given their depth of understanding of the issues (relative to the general public)" (S7); "Deveriam estar envolvidos no processo de re-ordenamento territorial, junto com edndios, ribeirinhos etc" (they should be involved in the territorial ordering process together with indigenous peoples, riverine inhabitants, etc." (S29); " I think they should be involved as advisors and technical support but I support the idea of a non-technical management, where decisions are taken by the different stakeholders based on the technical advice and the social, cultural and economic factors." (S44) 23 But this intervention should be avoided within indigenous territories: "Not in indigenous reserves or territories which historically have been managed by indigenous communities. In other areas, should be taking part in dialogue of knowledge between cultures, people, communities, scientists and decision makers from private and government sectors, to order process on the amazon area." [Original text:… historically has been management by… ](S47) The apolitical EM: "Yes, but not for political reasons. It should be for the cause of sustainable use of our natural environment which is our heritage." (S9); " … Generally though I think that environmentalists like missionaries before them should not get involved in political processes as this can have a very negative reaction within the local community." (S17) "Yes, their knowledge will hopefully be of use in the ordering process" (S37) The political participation of EMs: "Yes, to counteract the interference of other external actors but hopefully to work with the indigenous people respecting their values and practices, not independently." (S26) EMs as facilitators of the dialog between IK and WS: "… without them [indigenous peoples] any agreements between Governments and environmental managers will not work. Environmental Managers should facilitate discussion… " (S5); "Territorial ordering should be primarily decided upon by the indigenous groups that inhabit them, environmental managers roles here should be as referees to help in the co-ordination of the process, but ultimately decisions need to come from the bottom upwards." (S10); "It's necessary for people involved in this field of study, that had already gained a conscience, and that are able to understand that we have to work with indigenous, not from our usual management vision, but theirs, trying to see the world like they do. In this way could be easier, perhaps to understand and give convincing and why not scientific arguments to the authorities (or people in charge of handling these affairs) about the different way they have already distributed their territory, which [in] most of the case (if not all) doesn't have our political distribution. (I.E, those groups that live between Colombia and Brazil boundaries) they don't have the same division of territories, because of this, they must be managed in a way more in concordance to their political organisation." (S45) Capacity, ability and quality of EMs: "Depends who the environmental managers are - if they are from the area and have a passion for the area, then why not. If they are drafted in from outside, and seen as the 'outside experts' then probably not - it usually causes friction within the area."(S24) "Define the roles, mandate and empowerment of the environmental manager. They may fall into different categories, of which I may name at least 4: 1. The conflictive manager. Created by a lobbying body. A good example is the body (forget the name) that is in charge of the Everglades in Florida. Their work is tainted by conflict of interest: the provision of water to cities and sugar cane farmers, at the same time maintaining the 'wet lands' as an ecosystem and controlling flooding! 2. The romantic. Exemplified by rich Europeans or North-Americans. Wanting to keep habitats, they may buy some land and resort to eco-tourism in order to keep their sustainability. I believe there are some German managed 'eco' destinations in Ecuador. Driven by an alternative way of life, they may not 'manage' the environment as they should. 3. The bureaucrat. A member of a government agency or NGO that may not be aware of local needs, responding always to policies made from a distance. Current legislation may be a hinder. "Los paisas", developed and colonised what is today Risaralda, Quindio, Caldas and 24 parts of Choco in Colombia, by using legislation that enabled them to cut and clear big forest areas to be claimed afterwards, creating the concept of the "colono". A colonisation process I witnessed in Caquetá some years ago. 4. The "grass roots" manager. Perhaps, the type who knows best the ecosystem and the power relationships that develop around it by the people involved with it. Usually their voice is not heard, mainly because of the threat they represent to some landowners or 'colonos'. If the law regarding claiming land that has been cleared is still existing, managing the environment is going to be a great task. One shall not forget that the 'colono' phenomenon represents one of the many socio-economical problems a nation like Colombia faces. … Management work usually develops around a policy. Trust among all participants is primordial. There ought to be some kind of legal-economical framework that will ease management work. If this is in place and all conflicts of interest reduced, then the territorial ordering process of Amazonia may become real." (S 31) Political risks, EMs tough job: "Yes, however the pressures on the person might be extreme. It would be preferable to have both on-site environmental managers and use some respected external managers as reference." (S15); "Yes, but bearing in mind that you should work with politicians and many kinds of 'parasitic' people which are thinking every day in the short term. It means that environmental managers are not enough for sustainable management and use of natural resource: their analytical models as well as their technical capacity is necessary, but they cannot work isolated, they require to work with others, despite the fact that 'the others' could (and should) think in a different way." (S40) Summarising-Q413 Like in the responses to Q1, Q2 and Q3, we can identify different and often contradictory perspectives. There were those that argued that environmental managers14 are the best qualified for the task and appeared somewhat perplexed by the question. Within that group there were those responses that assumed that decisions were taken by environmental managers or should be taken by them, although two expressed that others' opinion should be considered to a lesser extent. In the other direction were the responses that questioned intervention by EMs and considered it useful only when the decision-making process was led by indigenous peoples themselves. Yet, a third group was of the opinion that EMs should get involve in the same conditions that other stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples but, one respondent suggested they should not intervene in the management of indigenous peoples' territories at all. 13 See also Table 4, Appendix 3. 14 Called EMs in the survey to differentiate them from other experts and indigenous peoples. As it has been explained elsewhere (See "The march of the Manikins: Agroforestry practices and Spiritual dancing in Northwest Amazonia) indigenous peoples management of the environment departs from a different rationality and uses different instruments. What indigenous people from Northwest Amazonia call "management of the world" is not only a set of shamanistic practices but a way of living that combines social aims, aesthetic values, religious believes, and economic practices in a distinctive manner. Although acknowledging indigenous peoples from Northwest Amazonia are in fact environmental managers, the author has stressed that their "management of the world" incorporates many things, some of them of tremendous importance for environmental management more generally. 25 The other contrasting perspectives concerned the character of the intervention. While one group of responses were of the opinion that EMs should not get involved in politics, but have a technical approach, others thought that they should get involved to contrast and balance the political interests of other groups. A third group emerged, which advocated the intervention of environmental managers as conciliators and facilitators. Related to this roll of managers as advisers there was a group of responses showing concern with the capacity, ability and quality of environmental managers and, the possible risks that they have to face. Non-conclusive comment-Q4: As in responses to questions one, two and three, we can trace arguments and contra-arguments. One set of respondents portrays EMs as heroes. In this scenario they face a tough job, they are well trained, better able and indispensable for the process of territorial ordering; their politically risky job in which they have to make the decisions would be fundamental for diminishing environmental risk and even saving life on earth. (As in Q2 and Q3 none of those arguing conservation/catastrophism had been in Amazonia). A counter narrative is that provided by respondents arguing that EMs' participation should be directed by indigenous peoples (IP) or that the projects should be led mainly by natives, and that EMs should not intervene in the management of indigenous territories: in this case the heroes are indigenous peoples. A second counter narrative seems to be reflected by some of the respondents. In this scenario, EMs like IP should have equal rights to participate as different stakeholders, in this case decisions would come from a rational process in which dialog between cultures would take place. The participation of EMs would not be limited by their status/power but by their capacity, ability and their roll as facilitators or conciliators. Discussion European colonisation of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Australasia from the late fifteenth century onwards, gave a tremendous boost to the volume of global transactions involving natural resources. Over the long run, trade in these resources, and in an increasingly diverse array of environmental services, has been expanding ever since. However, much of what is called globalisation in the twenty first century has more to do with developments in information technology since the late 1900s. The increasing speed of communications media and information transfer have proved fundamental in economic restructuring and the transformation of the world into a largely urban space (Castells 1996). In the globalised, twenty first century, local political decisions have little chance of being autarchic; international policy advisors inform local stakeholders about what is considered adequate or legal in accordance with international treaties, foreign protocols and political compromises. The local politics of environmental management is the concern of everybody: corporations, governments, international, regional and national NGOs, all of which compete for access to information and expansion of their scope of power in the political arena (Ambrose-Oji, Allmark et al. 2002). During the 1990s, and especially after the Río Earth Summit in 1992, one of the main topics of discussion was management of the global environment (Sachs 26 1993). Global targets for sustainable development were established at Río and similar processes were set in train at regional, national and local scales all over the world, following the guidelines set out in one of the policy documents agreed at Río: "Agenda 21". The official discourse that emerged from the Río process was replicated and many of the assumptions that informed the original discourse have been accorded a quasi-factual status by many people all over the globe (Sevilla_Guzmán and Woodgate 1997). The official discourse on globalisation emphasised the need for environmental management at supranational levels. At the same time, counter-discourse or anti-globalisation narratives have emerged. These emphasise the rights of indigenous people and local political actors to manage natural resources independently, in ways that allow them to make their own livelihood decisions and establish resource-use regimes that can provide the environmental goods and services that people need15. The management of the environment has always motivated debate and often led to confrontation. One of the main arguments of conservative conservationists concerns the 'vulnerability' of rainforest environments, and thus the need for their protection. Since the 1980s the problem of deforestation of tropical rainforests has been a global issue with special emphasis in South East Asia, the Congo basin and Amazonia (Adger, Benjaminsen et al. 2001). In a 1998 analysis of 'rainforest' web-sites, Stott revealed four metawords within the conservation rhetoric: orientalism (the exotic other), climax (harmony), old age (ancient, undisturbed) and vulnerability (Stott 1999). Metawords such as these become key rhetorical devices so that even research and development project proposals tend to employ them, thus replicating assumptions that are no longer questioned. How is this metalanguage produced? What are the bases of its principal cannons? And why is it that semantic analysis tends to remain the preserve of scientists – or is it something that is also dealt with at a local level? Narratives can be traced back in time. Equilibrium disturbance (climax rupture) and environmental fragility (vulnerability) both played parts in Hardin's 1968 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1998). The neo-Malthusian discourse of environmental catastrophe as a result of an increasing population (of 'poor people') lies at the heart of Hardin's tragedy. The conservative conservationist perspective on the management of the rainforest is based on mistrust of systems of environmental management in which property rights (over life and resources) are not yet marketable. From a conservative political perspective responsible environmental action can only be achieved through the clarification of property rights to allow the unfettered action of free markets for the negotiation of such rights. It is assumed that the tragedy of the commons is happening or will happen in rainforest contexts where private property rights are not yet the rule and where societies still practise communal environmental management regimes based on indigenous knowledge rationalities in which nature and society form an ontological continuum. For conservatives only free markets for environmental rights, good and services can guarantee sustainable development. Neo-Malthusian 15 The discourses that emphasise on the need of eco-efficiency, economic transnationalization and planetary ecological management, were named by Sachs as contest and astronauts' perspectives. And the counter-discourse arising from the desempowered communities of the South as the home perspective (Sachs 1977). 27 and neo-liberal assumptions are fundamental to this perspective on sustainable development. With the aim of promoting Agenda 21 at local, national and regional levels, a complex and sophisticated process of institutionalisation was embarked upon. Amazonia did not escape this process; governmental officials or conservationist NGOs replicated the dominant conservationist discourse at the local level in NWA16. This official discourse of deforestation with its main initiative of protection of the environment from people has been labelled 'hegemonic' (Stott and Dullivan 2000) or 'neo-Malthusian' and 'managerial' (Adger, Benjaminsen et al. 2001). It should come as no surprise then that counter narratives have developed in Amazonia (and elsewhere), for many of which the principal intention is to contradict the conservative policies derived from this hegemonic discourse. The rights of indigenous people to define the course of their lives: their rights to manage natural resources and the environmental services used or supplied by the Amazonian environment have been key issues in these significant counter-claims against the official Amazonian territorial ordering politics and policies, which have involved environmental management that has been designed elsewhere. This counter-narrative pursues the principle and right of self-determination against the interests of political initiatives for global environmental management. The counter-narrative was not just a reaction to neo-liberal, neo-Malthisian conservative politics and conservation policies during the 1980s and '90s, however. In Latin America, all indigenous peoples' rebellions against the European empires were motivated by a call to reconstruct pre-colonial socio-cultural orders returning to territorial orders where the management of 'agroforestry' was undifferentiated from the sacred (Varese 1996:124-25). In modern, post-colonial states, indigenous peoples continued to struggle for the recognition of their territories. In today's NWA this struggle is related to governmental and conservationists policies of environmental management and the presence of armed groups opposed to political resolution of territorial ordering. Many of the Protected Areas (PAs) of NWA were created at a time when no legal procedure was established for public intervention in the designation of such areas. The official titles of the PA or IR (Resguardos in Colombia) have not prevented non-native invasion of lands or the expansion of illegal crop production inside either PAs or IRs. Conservationists and indigenous peoples alike have vacillated between alliances with, and the rejection of, the armed groups in charge of illegal crop production, depending on the political gains to be made and the risks involved in rejecting the proposals or achieving an alliance. The armed groups, on their part, have sought political alliances when such co-operation could benefit their military capacity or improve the managerial efficiency of their enterprises.17 16 With respect to the territorial ordering process, the Colombian Amazon controversy is discussed in Forero 1999, 2000; Forero, Laborde et al. 1998. 17 See Forero 2000, "Territoriality and Governance in the Colombian Amazon". 28 As far as local inhabitants were concerned, rainforest conservation policies arrived in NWA from another space and time. The legal establishment of protected areas took no account of the opinions or desires of the peoples already inhabiting NWA. Indigenous agro-ecosystems and the livelihood strategies of more recent colonisers were both ignored. The ideology expressed through legal frameworks was that of protection of the environment from people. The villains were local inhabitants and the regulations to be enforced were those of expelling people from the 'conservation' areas and maintaining their exclusion. The dominant discourse made no distinction between complex indigenous agro-ecosystems and the less sophisticated livelihood strategies being developed by recent immigrants. All of them were labelled as "slash and burn" agriculture (Myers 1980). Yet it has become increasingly apparent over the last thirty years that slash and burn is just an aspect of indigenous environmental management in Amazonia, which combines agricultural production, fish and game management, ritual prescriptions, and aesthetic developments18. It has even been suggested that movement towards "short cropping/long-fallow" cultivation patterns within indigenous Amazonian agro-ecosystems was an strategic response to alien invasion of territories and the introduction of metal axes (Denevan 2001: 115-31). Today, most ethnoscientists find it self-evident that the concepts of "chagras" (gardens) and "rastrojos" (abandoned gardens) are far too simplified to reflect the structure of cultivations over the short-, medium- and long-terms, in accordance with local knowledge of agro-ecological variation. It is obvious that indigenous environmental management has transformed Amazonian ecosystems for millennia; this was already evident to many of the nineteenth century European explorers19. Even the most knowledgeable people in the industrialised world have no precise idea of how 'vulnerable' rainforest is and few have accurate knowledge about the political conditions facing indigenous peoples or other human inhabitants of the Amazonian rainforest. With respect to NWA, even the most determined researcher would have problems accessing this information. It is often said that the rainforests of Amazonia are the 'lungs of the planet' (S.33), a metaphor used to emphasise the region's role in the carbon cycle, especially the absorption of CO2. This is somewhat ironic given that our own lungs actually consume oxygen and release CO2 during respiration. Indigenous people have been portrayed as villains or victims depending on the observer and the moment of observation. When portrayed as victims the picture is something like this: the wise guardians of the rainforest are obliged by violence to sell their natural resources or abandon their noble environmental practices. The role of violence in the functioning of extractive economies has been well documented. Violent coercion has been the dominant system in NWA for more than a century. Although indigenous people are no longer sold, 'debt-peonage' systems still dominate and exploit poor indigenous and immigrant inhabitants of 18 See Forero 2001, " The march of the Manikins: Agroforestry Practices and Spiritual Dancing in Northwest Amazonia". 19 See Forero 2002a, " Indigenous Knowledge and the Scientific Mind: Activism or Colonialism". 29 NWA. These people are employed for the harvesting, transport and commercialisation of coca base, cocaine and, the functioning of 'extractive economies' in general (Gómez, A. 1999). But there has been an indigenous response. This has sometimes taken the form of open rebellion and sometimes that of making strategic and tactical alliances in an attempt to obtain or preserve political power, to secure the acquisition of merchandise or simply to survive20. The counter-hegemonic narratives that we mentioned above have been labelled 'populist discourse': making it explicit that the victims are the indians and the villains the international organisations, sometimes allied to transnational corporations (like oil drilling companies) and the dependent and often corrupted governments that collaborate with these international organisations (Adger, Benjaminsen et al. 2001: 687). For NWA there are reports that seem to corroborate these arguments; e.g. indigenous peoples and environmental campaigners have protested jointly in Ecuador and Brazil against the construction of massive pipelines planned to cross through both IRs and PAs in both countries. The pipeline construction projects in both countries have arisen following collaboration between national governments and international oil exploration companies and have provoked public feelings of outrage (Weinberg 2001)21 . " [In NWA] Governments, multilateral lenders, multinational corporations, private banks and other institutions may not be counting on the convenient disappearance of indigenous peoples who get in the way of their ambitious development plans, but they often act as if they are." (Rabben 1998:122) "We who live in indigenous communities are surviving in the midst of a war imposed upon us by different factions and by the very same Colombian state that historically abandoned the countryside and permitted our lands to be invaded by waves of colonizers. Today we are caught in the crossfire, menaced by killings and displacement, while the State manifests its presence in the air with planes that slowly kill our plants and animals, our subsistence crops, and our people." (Organizacion Zonal Indigena del Putumayo_ OZIP 2002) However, is it possible to claim that there is a policy of 'ethnic cleansing' for NWA? From one side the whole issue of national sovereignty has been put into question; the expansion of Plan Andino (formerly Plan Colombia), the USA's anti-drug strategy for Latin America, exemplifies the delicate situation in which some of the Latin American countries have entered the twenty first century. The military component Plan Andino is aimed to support economic measures, the famous and indeed infamous structural adjustment plans that have provoked strikes and rebellions22. Additionally, even if there were an official policy of ethnic cleansing, South American States, given their size and power, would find it difficult to implement 20 See "Indigenous Knowledge and the Scientific Mind: Activism or Colonialism" (Forero 2002a), and "Technology in Northwest Amazonia: Sketches from Inside" (Forero 2002b). 21 For recent (March 2002) press releases on this issue see www.amazonwatch.org and www.americas.org 22 See Forero and Woodgate 2002, "The semantics of 'Human Security' in Northwest Amazonia: between indigenous peoples''Management of the World' and the USA's State Security Policy for Latin America". 30 it. The poor, be they indigenous peoples or colonisers are in the middle of a territorial war linked to international networks of criminality; they have been displaced, kidnapped or killed regardless of their claims of neutrality. In the case of Colombia, although some military authorities have been linked to some of the worst of the paramilitaries' atrocities, it has not been proved that the State itself has a policy of ethnic cleansing. In the case of Brazil, in 1996 the national executive proclaimed Decree 1775, instructing a right to contravene which, contrary to 169 WTO international agreement on Indigenous Peoples' rights, gave other stakeholders the opportunity to challenge Indigenous property rights. Paramilitary groups associated with illegal evictions of indigenous peoples in Brazilian Amazonia have long sought such a 'charter'. At the same time, the decree left the definition of indigenous land rights to the will of the executive power itself (Ministry of Justice). But, as in the case of Colombia, it cannot be proved that there is a policy of ethnic cleansing. It has been suggested in the non-conclusive comments on the survey results, that many people's responses echoed hegemonic and populist narratives. Indigenous peoples were portrayed as heroes or victims, as well as scientists and environmental managers. However, quiet a few of responses cannot be associated with either populist or hegemonic narratives. There is a group of responses that reflect critical thinking and are willing to challenge such simplistic dichotomies. Thus, the concept of sustainable development has been questioned, suspiciousness of western, scientific and technological solutions was expressed, and there was little willingness to give environmental managers carte blanche to prescribe whatever measures they might see fit. Interestingly, this last group, while acknowledging the need for: new concepts and adequate guidelines for environmental management, and the difficulty of achieving conservation targets while complying with indigenous peoples rights, still consider the concepts of SD, PA and IR as useful or the politics derived from them as desirable. What is interesting is that the responses to this survey, which were made by outsiders (respondents were not inhabitants of Amazonia), reflect a tendency to picture the conflict over territory in ways that do not correspond to either of the two main narratives. We can say that inasmuch as outsiders see possibilities for political action outside hegemonic or populist approaches, so Amazonian insiders are organising and negotiating regardless of whether their political discourse echoes either conservative or counter-hegemonic politics of territorial ordering. As no significant statistical analysis could be derived from the survey it would be difficult to speak of tendencies. At first sight it seems that adherence to hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, utopic or conciliatory narratives reflects each respondent's intellectual background more than his or her witnessing of the situation of peoples and forests in Amazonia. However, certain coincidences among the responses to each question might be representative: - For Q1-SD, two out of four of the respondents that accepted the imperative of SD without question have been in Amazon, none of them is a social scientist (SS) though and the other two were environmental managers. None of the SSs 31 that had visited the region argued for complete incompatibility between sustainability and development. Instead, SSs were part of a third group acknowledging that the concept of SD might be of some use, given certain conditions. - For Q2 – the relationship between IRs and PAs, not one of those who argued for the need to harmonise the two concepts (5), or those that emphasised SD as a desirable aim that has not yet been reached (4), or those or that argued that IRs are better than PAs (2) had been to the Amazon (in total 21 % of respondents). Respondents that had visited Amazonia (VA) were among those that acknowledged a relationship between IRs and PAs and that the relationship can be both complementary and competitive. Two respondents from the VA group argued that a complementary relationship was not possible in Colombia and one of them pointed out that being political strategies with different aims they should be kept differentiated in order to avoid conflict. This result might indicate that people that have been in Amazonia are more aware of the problems of territorial ordering caused by the imposition of regimes based in alien concepts. - For Q3 – on the usefulness of the concepts, none the five respondents arguing that IRs might be better that PAs had been in Amazonia, while one of the two that argued that IRs are ineffective had visited. Only one out of five respondents that argued for the need to integrate the concepts had been in Amazonia, while both those that argued for an incompatibility of interests have. This result seems to confirm that people who have visited the area are more conscious of the problems caused when policies formulated elsewhere are imported to Amazonia. Conclusions All technological adoption/adaptation has diverse effects in the life and development of society. People living within the society that is adopting them, and the outsiders that are analysing cultural change perceive these effects in different ways. The assessments of 'usefulness' or 'risk' a society makes when adapting/adopting technologies are linked to the conscious and subconscious present and future scenarios into which the society places itself alongside other societies. If the rest of the world wishes to respect Amazonian indigenous peoples' rights of self-determination, they should not intervene in ordering processes of indigenous territories. The problem is that indigenous ways of dealing with the world might not be compatible with the ideas that foreigners have with respect to Amazonia, its peoples and its future. And, for good or bad, fairly or unfairly, each group has a way of intervening and exercising a certain amount of power to modify the global political agenda for the governance of Amazonia in function of their own particular interests. Replication of narratives is a common strategy used by all groups aiming to make alliances and enhance their power. However, the responses analysed here seem to indicate that a large group of people (at least from the academic sector) is 32 unhappy with the assumptions behind either populists or hegemonic discourses with respect to rainforest management, and seeking new ways of environmental policy making. This group of people acknowledged that political conflict has derived from policy formulated elsewhere, and derived from an epistemology alien to local inhabitants. There are varied political groups competing for the governance of Amazonia. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) facilitates analysis and political action. It is expected that better-informed indigenous peoples would be in a better position to make decisions with respect to the governance of Amazonia. At the present time, the indigenous peoples of Amazonia have very limited and precarious access to ICT. Thus, their perspectives on territorial ordering are less likely to be represented than those such as conservation agencies, multinational developers, insurgent and mafiosi groups, all of which have far superior access to ICT. 33 Appendix 1 PRIVACY POLICY: Email addresses will be used only to send out materials related to this survey. Aggregate survey results may be distributed, but all personal data will be kept strictly confidential. No information about individual users will be disclosed to third parties. 34 Appendix 2 Summary of Web-site technical work The most demanding work was designing the pages that would contain indigenous territorial maps. CAD versions of the map would have to be transformed into image files suitable for Web use. In order to do this ArcView- GIS (Geographical Information Systems) software was needed. A picture of the map could be easily generated in ArcView-GIS and to certain extent, editing and colouring could enhance some features. But such a map or, more precisely, such a picture of the bi-dimensional representation of the Tukano territory remained inadequate for publication in WebPages. "The pics were to heavy" (I would learn the ICT design jargon), meaning that the memory used to storage, loading and unloading of these pictures was vast. Besides dividing the map and generating pictures of several areas, these pictures needed transforming to make them 'lighter'. This meant that the pictures had to be edited and the storage format had to be changed in terms of the colour pallet and resolution (a maximum of 72 dpi). Most importantly, the pictures should look better! An early version of PhotoImpactTM was used to change the colours and other features as well as to design the icons that would be used to identify the hypertext links between pages. However, the software was not appropriate for the task and the 'pics' were still too heavy. The design was poor, too rigid, with inappropriate colours and, worst of all the 'weight' of the maps would not allow for easy loading of the images by potential users. To change the maps (pics) again, PhotoshopTM was used, while major design transformations were achieved using FireworksTM software. For the actual montage and edition of the whole web-site Dreamweaver3TM was used. A similar process was followed to generate the vegetation map, which was adapted from one of the Amazonian Vegetation maps generated by Puerto Rastrojo. The introduction to a political ecology taking as a case study the Yaigojé Resguardo, was originally a single text (like in the preliminary version) but following the advice of critical reviewers, this page was divided into six parts. 35 Appendix 3 Table 1 Q1- Do you think that 'development' and 'sustainability' are compatible? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Unquestioning the developmental project 2 1 PhD Student Biology 12 1 Environmental Engineer 13 1 Environmental Engineer 40 1 Project Co-ordinator (SD) Yes, to diminish environmental risk 18 1 Student 21 1 Taxation 23 1 Designer 39 1 Postgraduate Student 42 1 Biologist Sustainable Development is an aim to be 3 1 Epidemiologist reached 5 1 Civil Servant 8 1 Accountant 24 1 Student 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 29 1 Anthropologist 35 1 Lecturer 37 1 Postgraduate Student 48 1 Anthropologist 51 1 Postgraduate Student Compatible if defined locally 5 1 Civil Servant 20 1 Lecturer: Ecotourism 27 1 Anthropologist 31 1 Postgraduate Student 52 1 Lecturer: IT & Development Possible but risk of economic imperative 17 1 Unemployed Incompatible a) Contradiction in terms 24 1 Student 4 1 PhD St. Environmental genetics b) Financial economic imperative 10 1 Student 19 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 34 1 PhD Student: Environmental Manager 47 1 PhD Student SD inconsistent at present time 1 1 Lecturer: Env. Sociology 33 1 PhD Student 36 1 Research Engineer 45 1 EM SD is green rhetoric 7 1 Student 32 1 Teacher 48 1 Anthropologist 36 Table 2 Q2 - Do you think there is any relation between 'indigenous reserves' (IR) and 'protected areas' (PA)? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Yes 37 1 Postgraduate Student 18 1 Student 22 1 Anthropologist 43 1 Anthropologist 50 1 PhD Student No 15 1 Consultant: Health & Safety Need to harmonise IR and PA to protect a) For (IP) Indigenous Peoples' benefit 19 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 20 1 Lecturer: Ecoturism b) Protection of Biodiversity 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 33 1 PhD Student c) SD based on IP experiences 11 1 Consultant: Rural Development. SD as Utopia 3 1 Epidemiologist 6 1 Lecturer Ecology Env. Management 36 1 Research Engineer 42 1 Biologist IR and PA are different political strategies 2 1 PhD Student - Biologist IR and PA are colonisation strategies 10 1 Student 24 1 Student 26 1 Student Indigenous resistance to IR/PA strategies 48 1 Anthropologist IR and PA overlapped 7 1 Student 34 1 PhD St. Environmental Management 44 1 Postgraduate Student Environmental Indian 23 1 Designer 40 1 Project Co-ordinator (SD) Environmental Indians contaminated 12 1 Environmental Engineer by mestizo culture 39 1 Postgraduate Student 45 1 Environmental Manager IR are Inefficient 35 1 Lecturer 53 1 Journalist IR more effective that PA 5 1 Civil Servant 17 1 Unemployed 37 Table 3 Q3 - Do you think that the concepts of 'protected areas' (PA), 'indigenous reserves' (IR) and SD are useful for environmental management today? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Depends on the context 1 1 Lecturer: Env. Sociology 2 1 PhD St. Biologist Yes 4 1 PhD St. Env. Genetics 14 1 Economist 22 1 Anthropologist Indigenous Environmental 12 1 Environmental Engineer 23 1 Designer 41 1 PhD Student Indigenous Environmental in contamination risk 45 1 EM Concepts: Principles and instruments a) Participation: IR better than PA 5 1 Civil Servant 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 11 1 Consultant: Rural Development RD 26 1 Student 41 1 PhD Student b) Intergenerational Equity: resource reserve 12 1 Environmental Engineer for Development 13 1 Agriculturist 21 1 Taxation 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Dvnt. 38 1 Gardener (MSc) Risk and Protection a)Environmental Protection (EP) 12 1 Environmental Engineer 17 1 Unemployed EP and catastrophism 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 32 1 Teacher 51 1 Postgraduate Student b) Of cultural diversity 31 1 Postgraduate Student IR as ineffective 10 1 Student 24 1 Student Integration of concepts or the need for it 7 1 Student 11 1 Consultant RD 18 1 Student 26 1 Student 34 1 PhD Student Env. Mgment. Difficulties for integration a) Incompatibility of interests 10 1 Student 40 1 Project co-ordinator (SD) b) Financial economic effectiveness' imperative 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture Devent. 30 1 Postgraduate Student 33 1 PhD Student c) Political manipulation 44 1 Post. St. Environment 46 1 Lecturer 38 47 1 PhD Student 48 1 Anthropologist d) Semiotic blur 24 1 Student 50 1 PhD Student Education: Dynamism of the concepts 37 1 Postgraduate Student 45 1 Environmental Manager 47 1 PhD Student 39 Table 4 Q4 - Should or should not environmental managers (EM) get involved in territorial ordering process in Amazon? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Yes 4 1 PhD St. Evolutionary Genetics In fact they are 22 1 Anthropologist Unsure 52 1 Lecturer: IT & Development 32 1 Teacher Question into Question 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 31 1 Postgraduate St Indigenous Peoples as EM 27 1 Anthropologist Yes, for Env. protection (catastrophism) 32 1 Teacher 33 1 PhD Student 42 1 Biologist Yes, EM are the ones (better able that IP) 12 1 Environmental Engineer 18 1 Student 21 1 Taxation 28 1 Lecturer 34 1 PhD student 36 1 Research Engineer 46 1 Lecturer 53 1 Journalist EM provide solutions/ take decisions 23 1 Designer 35 1 Lecturer 38 1 Gardener Yes but listening to others 5 1 Civil Servant 53 1 Journalist If Indigenous Peoples direct EM or projects 1 1 Lecturer: Env. Sociology 10 1 Student 14 1 Economist 41 1 PhD Student EM have equal rights to other stakeholders 2 1 PhD St. Biology 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 7 1 Student 29 1 Anthropologist 44 1 Post. 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2006/2007 ; Inventario dei luoghi di culto della zona falisco-capenate. Sunto. La raccolta delle fonti relative alla vita religiosa della zona falisco-capenate è stata finalizzata, in primo luogo, all'individuazione di luoghi di culto sicuramente identificabili come tali. Dove questo non fosse stato possibile, soprattutto in presenza di documenti epigrafici isolati e di provenienza non sempre determinabile, si è comunque registrata la presenza del culto. Attraverso la documentazione raccolta si intende cercare di delineare una storia dei culti dell'area considerata, a partire dalle prime attestazioni fino all'età imperiale. La zona presa in esame, inserita nella Regio VII Etruria nel quadro dell'organizzazione territoriale dell'Italia augustea, è compresa entro i confini naturali del lago di Bracciano e del lago di Vico a ovest, del corso del Tevere a est, mentre i limiti settentrionale e meridionale possono essere segnati, rispettivamente, dai rilievi dei Monti Cimini e dei Monti Sabatini. I centri esaminati sono quelli di Lucus Feroniae, Capena, Falerii Veteres, Falerii Novi, Narce, Sutri e Nepi. La comunità capenate occupava la parte orientale del territorio, un'area pianeggiante, dominata a nord dal massiccio del monte Soratte, e delimitata a est dall'ansa del Tevere. Il suo fulcro era costituito dall'abitato di Capena, l'odierno colle della Civitucola, cui facevano capo una serie di piccoli insediamenti, ancora poco indagati, dislocati in posizione strategica sul Tevere, o in corrispondenza di assi stradali di collegamento al fiume. Il principale di essi risulta essere localizzabile nel sito della moderna Nazzano, occupato stabilmente a partire dall'VIII sec. a.C., e posto in corrispondenza dell'abitato sabino di Campo del Pozzo, sull'altra sponda del Tevere. Il comparto falisco si articola, invece, attraverso una paesaggio di aspre colline tufacee, incentrato attorno al bacino idrografico del torrente Treia, affluente del Tevere, che percorre il territorio in direzione longitudinale. Lungo il corso del fiume si svilupparono i due più antichi e importanti centri falisci di Falerii Veteres e Narce, un sito nel quale la più recente tradizione di studi tende a riconoscere, sempre più convincentemente, la Fescennium nota dalle fonti, l'altro abitato falisco, oltre a Falerii, di cui sia tramandato il nome; lungo affluenti del Treia sono ubicate Nepi e Falerii Novi. Pur nella specificità culturale progressivamente assunta da Falisci e Capenati, la collocazione geografica del territorio da essi occupato lo rende naturalmente permeabile a influenze etrusche e sabine, rilevabili attraverso la documentazione archeologica, e rintracciabili in alcune notizie delle fonti antiche, rivalutate dalla più recente tradizione di studi. Una posizione differente era, invece, maturata dopo le prime indagini condotte nella regione, tra la fine dell''800 e l'inizio del '900, che avevano portato a enfatizzare i caratteri culturali specifici delle popolazioni locali, sottolineando la sostanziale autonomia di queste rispetto agli Etruschi, soprattutto sulla base delle strette analogie tra la lingua falisca e la latina. Tale percezione fu dominante fino alla seconda metà degli anni '60 del '900, quando la pubblicazione dei primi dati sulle necropoli veienti mise in luce gli stretti rapporti con le aree falisca e capenate, tra l'VIII e il VII sec. a.C. Gli studi sul popolamento dell'Etruria protostorica condotti a partire dagli anni '80 del '900 hanno sempre più focalizzato l'attenzione su un coinvolgimento di Veio nel popolamento dell'area compresa tra i Monti Cimini e Sabatini e il Tevere nella prima età del Ferro, trovando conferma anche dalle recenti analisi dei corredi delle principali necropoli falische, che hanno evidenziato, nell'VIII e all'inizio del VII sec. a.C., importanti parallelismi con usi funerari veienti, ma anche aspetti specifici della cultura locale. Il corpus di iscrizioni etrusche proveniente dalle necropoli di Narce dimostra, per tutto il VII e VI sec. a.C., la continuità stanziale di etruscofoni, che utilizzano un sistema scrittorio di tipo meridionale, riconducibile a Veio, di cui Narce sembra costituire un avamposto in territorio falisco. Già dall'inizio del VII sec. a.C., tuttavia, si fanno evidenti i segni di una più specifica caratterizzazione culturale delle aree falisca e capenate, anche attraverso la diffusione di un idioma falisco, affine a quello latino, documentato epigraficamente per il VII e VI sec. a.C. soprattutto a Falerii Veteres. Un ulteriore elemento di contatto culturale col mondo latino è rappresentato, in questo centro, dal rituale funerario delle inumazioni infantili in area di abitato. Tale uso, che trova numerosi confronti nel Latium vetus, mentre risulta estraneo all'Etruria, è documentato a Civita Castellana, in località lo Scasato, da due sepolture di bambini, databili tra la fine dell'VIII e la prima metà del VII sec. a.C. A Capena sono state rilevate, a partire dal VII sec. a.C., notevoli influenze dall'area sabina, soprattutto attraverso la documentazione archeologica fornita dalle necropoli, mentre, da un punto di vista linguistico, un influsso del versante orientale del Tevere è stato colto, in particolare, attraverso un'analisi del nucleo più nutrito delle iscrizioni epicorie, che risale al IV-III sec. a.C. La ricettività nei confronti degli apporti delle popolazioni limitrofe e la capacità di elaborazioni originali, attestate archeologicamente sin dalle fasi più antiche della storia dei popoli falisco e capenate, possono offrire un supporto documentario alla percezione che già gli scrittori antichi avevano dell'ethnos falisco, trovando riscontro, in particolare, nelle tradizioni che definivano i Falisci come Etruschi, oppure come ethnos particolare, caratterizzato da una propria specificità anche linguistica, un dato, quest'ultimo, che tradisce il ricordo di contatti col mondo latino. Un terzo filone antiquario, che si intreccia a quello dell'origine etrusca, rivendica ai Falisci un'ascendenza ellenica, e più propriamente, argiva, e sembra, invece, frutto di un'elaborazione erudita maturata in un momento successivo. La notizia dell'origine argiva risale, per tradizione indiretta, alle Origines di Catone, e si collega a quella della fondazione di Falerii da parte dell'eroe Halesus, figlio di Agamennone, che avrebbe abbandonato la casa paterna dopo l'uccisione del padre. Ovidio e Dionigi di Alicarnasso attribuiscono all'eroe greco l'istituzione del culto di Giunone a Falerii, il cui originario carattere argivo sarebbe conservato nel rito celebrato in occasione della festa annuale per la dea. L'importanza accordata al culto di Giunone nell'ambito di tale tradizione ha portato a ipotizzare che questa possa essersi sviluppata proprio a partire dal dato religioso della presenza a Falerii di una divinità assimilabile alla Hera di Argo. Dall'esame linguistico del nome del fondatore, il quale non ha combattuto a Troia e non ha avuto alcun ruolo nel mondo ellenico, si è concluso che dovesse trattarsi di un eroe locale, e che la formazione dell'eponimo sia precedente alla metà del IV sec. a.C., quando è documentata l'affermazione del rotacismo in ambiente falisco. L'elaborazione della leggenda di Halesus deve essere collocata, dunque, in un momento precedente a questa data, che, si è pensato, possa coincidere con la presenza a Falerii di maestranze elleniche o ellenizzate, attive nel campo della ceramografia e della coroplastica, a partire dalla fine del V sec. a.C. Questa tradizione si collega a quella sull'origine etrusca attraverso la notizia di Servio, secondo cui Halesus sarebbe il progenitore del re di Veio Morrius. Il ricordo di una discendenza dalla città etrusca è comune anche a Capena, dove, secondo una notizia di Catone, riportata da Servio, i luci Capeni erano stati fondati da giovani veienti, inviati da un re Properzio, nel cui nome, peraltro, è stata ravvisata un'origine non etrusca, ma italico-orientale. A livello storico, l'accostamento tra Veio, Falisci e Capenati sarà documentato dalle fonti attraverso la costante presenza dei due popoli, al fianco della città etrusca, nel corso degli scontri con Roma tra la seconda metà del V e l'inizio del IV sec. a.C. Di tale complesso sistema di influenze partecipa anche la sfera religiosa dell'area in esame. È interessante notare, a questo proposito, che la massima divinità maschile del pantheon falisco-capenate, il dio del Monte Soratte, Soranus Apollo, costituisca l'esatto corrispettivo dell'etrusco Śuri, come da tempo dimostrato da Giovanni Colonna. La particolarità del culto del Soratte, tuttavia, è determinata dalla cerimonia annua degli Hirpi Sorani, che camminavano indenni sui carboni ardenti e il cui nome, nel racconto eziologico sull'origine del rito, tramandato da Servio, è spiegato in relazione a hirpus, il termine sabino per indicare il lupo, in perfetta coerenza col carattere "di frontiera" di questo territorio. Di origine sabina è la divinità venerata nell'unico grande santuario noto nell'agro capenate, il Lucus Feroniae. La diffusione del culto a partire dalla Sabina, già sostenuta da Varrone, è largamente accolta dalla critica recente, sia sulla base dell'analisi linguistica del nome della dea, sia per la presenza, in Sabina, dei centri principali del culto (Trebula Mutuesca, Amiternum), da cui questo si irradia, oltre che presso Capena, in Umbria e in area volsca. Le attestazioni di Feronia in altre zone, come la Sardegna, il territorio lunense, Aquileia, Pesaro sono generalmente da collegare con episodi di colonizzazione romana. Il carattere esplicitamente emporico del Lucus Feroniae, affermato da Dionigi di Alicarnasso e Livio, che lo descrivono come un luogo di mercato frequentato da Sabini, Etruschi e Romani già dall'epoca di Tullo Ostilio, rende perfettamente conto della varietà di frequentazioni e di influenze, che caratterizzano il santuario almeno dall'età arcaica. Pur in assenza di documentazione archeologica relativa alle fasi più antiche, sembra del tutto affidabile la notizia della vitalità del culto capenate già in età regia. Feronia, infatti, a Terracina, risulta associata a Iuppiter Anxur, divinità eponima della città volsca, il che sembra far risalire l'introduzione del suo culto all'inizio della presenza volsca nella Pianura Pontina, cioè ai primi decenni del V sec. a.C., fornendo, inoltre, un possibile indizio di una provenienza settentrionale, da area sabina, dell'ethnos volsco. È ipotizzabile, dunque, che la dea fosse venerata nel santuario tiberino, prospiciente la Sabina, ben avanti il suo arrivo nel Lazio tirrenico. Al di là della semplice frequentazione del luogo di culto e del mercato, un ruolo di primo piano rivestito dalla componente sabina presso il Lucus Feroniae, in epoca arcaica, sembra suggerito dall'episodio del rapimento dei mercanti romani, riferito da Dionigi di Alicarnasso. I rapitori sabini compiono una ritorsione nei confronti dei Romani, che avevano trattenuto alcuni di loro presso l'Asylum, tra il Capitolium e l'Arx, il che fa pensare che i Sabini esercitassero una sorta di protettorato sul santuario tiberino, e avessero, su di esso, una capacità di controllo analoga a quella che i Romani avevano sull'Asylum romuleo. La vocazione emporica del Lucus Feroniae è naturalmente legata alla sua collocazione topografica, nel punto in cui i percorsi sabini di transumanza a breve raggio attraversano il Tevere, tra i due grandi centri sabini di Poggio Sommavilla e Colle del Forno, per dirigersi verso la costa meridionale dell'Etruria. La dislocazione presso il punto di arrivo dei principali tratturi dell'area appenninica, popolata da genti sabelliche, è, peraltro, una caratteristica comune ai più antichi luoghi di culto di Feronia, come Trebula Mutuesca e Terracina, che condividono col Lucus Feroniae capenate anche la collocazione all'estremità di un territorio etnicamente omogeneo. È stato osservato come, in questi santuari, l'attività emporica marittima si intrecciasse con quella legata allo scambio del bestiame, e, nell'ottica di un'apertura verso l'economia pastorale dei Sardi, è stata inquadrata la fondazione romana, nel 386 a.C., di una Pheronia polis in Sardegna, presso Posada. Da questa località proviene, inoltre, una statuetta bronzea, databile tra la fine del V e i primi decenni del IV sec. a.C., raffigurante un Ercole di tipo italico, divinità di cui è noto il legame con la sfera dello scambio, anche in rapporto agli armenti. L'epoca dell'apoikia sarda ha portato a ipotizzare un collegamento col Lucus Feroniae capenate, dato che già tra il 389 e il 387 a.C. nel territorio di Capena erano stanziati coloni romani, misti a disertori Veienti, Capenati e Falisci. La filiazione del culto sardo da quello tiberino sembra, inoltre, perfettamente compatibile con le pur scarne attestazioni relative a una presenza di Ercole nel santuario capenate. A questo proposito è interessante notare che su una Heraklesschale, ancora sostanzialmente inedita, proveniente dalla stipe del santuario, il dio è rappresentato con la leonté e la clava nella mano sinistra, e lo scyphus di legno nella mano destra. Questi due ultimi attributi di Ercole erano conservati nel sacello presso l'Ara Maxima del Foro Boario, a Roma, e lo scyphus, usato dal pretore urbano per libare nel corso del sacrificio annuale presso l'ara, compare anche nella statua di culto di Alba Fucens, nella quale, per vari motivi, si è proposto di riconoscere una replica del simulacro del santuario del Foro Boario. Il richiamo iconografico a questi elementi, in un santuario-mercato ubicato lungo percorsi di transumanza, come era il Lucus Feroniae, non sembra casuale, ma potrebbe, in un certo senso, evocare il culto dell'Ara Maxima, e, in particolare, un aspetto fondamentale di esso, rappresentato dal collegamento con le Salinae ai piedi dell'Aventino. Queste, ubicate presso la porta Trigemina, e dunque prossime all'Ara Maxima, erano il luogo di deposito del sale proveniente dalle saline ostiensi, e destinato alla Sabina, e, in generale, alle popolazioni dell'interno dell'Italia centrale, dedite a un'economia pastorale. L'Ercole del Foro Boario, che tutelava le attività economiche collegate allo scambio del bestiame, sovrintendeva anche all'approvvigionamento del sale, e in questo senso va spiegato anche l'epiteto di Salarius, attestato per il dio ad Alba Fucens, dove, come è stato visto, il santuario di Ercole aveva la funzione di forum pecuarium. La dislocazione di santuari-mercati lungo i tratturi garantiva, dunque, ai pastori, dietro necessario compenso, la possibilità di rifornirsi di sale, e lo stesso doveva verificarsi presso il Lucus Feroniae. Questo sembra confermato dal fatto che, come è stato di recente dimostrato, la via lungo cui sorge il santuario, l'attuale strada provinciale Tiberina, vada, in realtà, identificata con la via Campana in agro falisco, menzionata da Vitruvio, in relazione a una fonte letale per uccelli e piccoli rettili. Il nome della via va spiegato, infatti, in relazione al punto di arrivo, costituito dal Campus Salinarum alla foce del Tevere, dove erano le saline. Nel comparto falisco, l'analisi della documentazione relativa ai luoghi di culto ha evidenziato una più marcata influenza di Veio rispetto all'area capenate. Questa risulta particolarmente rilevante in un centro come Narce, segnato, sin dall'inizio della sua storia, da una netta impronta veiente, e il cui declino coinciderà con gli anni della conquista della città etrusca. Per limitarci alla sfera del sacro, già da un primo esame dei materiali rinvenuti nel santuario suburbano di Monte Li Santi-Le Rote, di cui si attende la pubblicazione integrale, è stata segnalata, dall'inizio del V sec. a.C., epoca in cui comincia la frequentazione dell'area sacra, la presenza di prototipi veienti, che sono all'origine di una produzione locale di piccole terrecotte figurate. A un modello veiente sono riconducibili le cisterne a cielo aperto, che affiancavano l'edificio templare in almeno due dei principali santuari di Falerii Veteres, quello di Vignale e quello dello Scasato I, da identificare entrambi come sedi di un culto di Apollo. Più problematico risulta, invece, l'accostamento ad esse degli apprestamenti idrici rinvenuti presso un'area sacra urbana, recentemente individuata presso la moderna via Gramsci, nella parte meridionale del pianoro di Civita Castellana, e solo da una vecchia notizia d'archivio della Soprintendenza sappiamo di un'analoga cisterna rinvenuta presso Corchiano all'inizio del '900. Nei casi meglio documentati di Vignale e dello Scasato, tali impianti idrici risultano coevi alla fase più antica del santuario, e rispondono a uno schema che, a Veio, ricorre presso il santuario di Apollo al Portonaccio, presso il tempio a oikos di Piazza d'Armi, nel santuario di Menerva presso Porta Caere, e nel santuario in località Casale Pian Roseto. Non è facile determinare l'esatto valore da attribuire, di volta in volta, a tali cisterne, ma l'enfasi topografica ad esse accordata nell'ambito dei santuari non pare permetta di prescindere da un collegamento con pratiche rituali. Per gli impianti di Falerii si è pensato a un collegamento col santuario del Portonaccio, anche sulla base della corrispondenza cultuale incentrata sulla figura di Apollo, e la piscina è stata spiegata, dunque, in relazione a rituali di purificazione, legati a un culto oracolare. Dopo la sconfitta di Veio Falerii si trovò non solo a tener testa a Roma sul piano militare, ma dovette dimostrarsi non inferiore anche per prestigio e capacità autorappresentativa, essendo l'altro grande centro della basse valle del Tevere. Questo aspetto è stato colto, in particolare, sulla base della decorazione templare della città falisca, che conosce, intorno al secondo-terzo decennio del IV sec. a.C., un rinnovamento generalizzato, dovuto alla nascita di un'importante scuola coroplastica, la cui attività si riconosce anche nel frammento isolato di rilievo fittile rappresentante una Nike, da Fabrica di Roma. Una diversa reazione alla presa di Veio è attestata per l'altro importante centro falisco, quello di Narce, anche attraverso la documentazione fornita dal santuario di Monte Li Santi-Le Rote. Il luogo di culto continua a essere frequentato anche dopo la crisi dell'insediamento urbano, riscontrata attraverso una consistente contrazione delle necropoli a partire dal IV sec. a.C., ma nella prima metà del III sec. a.C. è attestata una contrazione del culto in vari settori del santuario, contestualmente all'introduzione di nuove categorie di ex-voto, quali i votivi anatomici, i bambini in fasce, le terrecotte raffiguranti animali. Questi mutamenti sono stati messi in relazione con la vittoria romana sui Falisci nel 293 a.C., mentre un secondo momento di contrazione del culto sembra coincidere con la definitiva conquista romana del 241 a.C. Dall'inizio del III sec. a.C. anche nei depositi di Falerii vengono introdotti nuovi tipi di votivi, cui si è fatto cenno precedentemente, e, come anche nel santuario di Monte Li Santi-Le Rote, si registra la presenza di monetazione di zecca urbana, che entra a far parte delle offerte. Tale dato diventa ancora più eloquente, se si considera l'assenza di monetazione locale nei contesti di epoca preromana, che sembra tradire l'indifferenza delle popolazioni falische verso tale tipo di offerta. È evidente, dunque, anche per Falerii, un'influenza del mercato romano dopo gli eventi bellici che segnarono la vittoria di Spurio Carvilio sui Falisci. La città, tuttavia, sembra fronteggiare la crisi, tanto da non mettere in pericolo le sue istituzioni, come dimostrano le dediche falische poste, nel Santuario dei Sassi Caduti, a Mercurio, dagli efiles, l'unica carica attestata per la città. Del resto, anche con la costruzione del nuovo centro di Falerii Novi, la documentazione relativa alla sfera religiosa attesta la conservazione, a livello pubblico, della lingua e della grafia falisca, tramite la dedica a Menerva posta dal pretore della città, nella seconda metà del III sec. a.C. (CIL XI 3081). Quanto sappiamo sui culti di età repubblicana di Capena e del suo territorio si limita al santuario di Lucus Feroniae, dove praticamente quasi tutti i materiali e le fonti epigrafiche sono inquadrabili nel corso del III sec. a.C., e a un paio di dediche di III sec. a.C. La capitolazione di Capena subito dopo la presa di Veio (395 a.C.) rende, in questa fase, la presenza romana ormai stabile da circa un secolo, dunque non sorprende che le iscrizioni sacre utilizzino un formulario specificamente latino, anche con attestazioni piuttosto precoci di espressioni che diventeranno correnti nel corso del II sec. a.C. Uno dei primi esempi attestati di abbreviazione alle sole iniziali della formula di dedica d(onum) d(edit) me(rito) è in CIL I², 2435, provenente dalla necropoli capenate delle Saliere. La documentazione archeologica più antica riguardo alla vita religiosa dell'area presa in esame proviene da Falerii Veteres. In ordine cronologico, la prima divinità attestata epigraficamente è Apollo, il cui nome compare inciso in falisco su un frammento di ceramica attica dei primi decenni del V sec. a.C. dal santuario di Vignale. È notevole che si tratti in assoluto della più antica attestazione conosciuta del nome latinizzato del dio, che indica la sua precoce assimilazione nel pantheon falisco, dove, già da quest'epoca, bisogna riconoscere come avvenuta l'identificazione con Apollo del locale Soranus. Il culto del dio del Soratte, attestato per via epigrafica solo in età imperiale, attraverso due dediche a Soranus Apollo, può essere coerentemente collocato tra le più antiche manifestazioni religiose del comprensorio falisco-capenate, e probabilmente la sede cultuale del Monte Soratte doveva fungere da tramite tra le due aree. Nel territorio falisco la presenza del dio lascia tracce più consistenti, attraverso la duplicazione del culto di Apollo a Falerii Veteres, e una dedica di età repubblicana da Falerii Novi, mentre sembra affievolirsi in area capenate, dove ne resta traccia solo in due dediche ad Apollo della prima età imperiale da Civitella S. Paolo, e in una controversa notizia di Strabone, che, apparentemente per errore, ubica al Lucus Feroniae le cerimonie in onore di Sorano, che si svolgevano, invece, sul Soratte. Anche questa notizia, tuttavia, si inserisce in un sistema di corrispondenze cultuali, che associa a una dea ctonia, della fertilità, un paredro di tipo "apollineo", cioè una divinità maschile, giovanile, con aspetti inferi e mantici. Non sembra casuale, in questo contesto, che il santuario per cui è attestata una più antica frequentazione a Falerii Veteres sia quello di Giunone Curite, una divinità che sembra rispondere allo schema di dea matronale e guerriera (era una Giunone armata, ma anche protettrice delle matrone) per la quale, pure, è attestata l'associazione cultuale con un giovane dio, della stessa tipologia di Sorano. Anche se non sono attestati direttamente rapporti tra Iuno Curitis e Sorano Apollo non sembra da trascurare il dato che l'unica statuetta di Apollo liricine, di IV sec. a.C., rinvenuta a Falerii Veteres provenga proprio dal santuario della dea; inoltre quando essa fu evocata a Roma dopo la presa di Falerii nel 241 a.C., insieme al suo tempio, in Campo, fu costruito quello di Iuppiter Fulgur, una divinità parimenti evocata dal centro falisco, e per la quale, pure, si possono istituire dei parallelismi con Soranus, attraverso l'assimilazione con Veiove. Nell'agro falisco, come in quello capenate, le più antiche attestazioni cultuali si riferiscano, dunque, a una coppia di divinità che, pur nelle differenze maturate in aspetti specifici del culto, sembra rispondere a esigenze cultuali piuttosto omogenee. Con l'età imperiale, infine, il panorama dei culti della zona considerata sembra diventare più omogeneo, inserendosi, peraltro, in una tendenza piuttosto generale. La manifestazione più appariscente è costituita, naturalmente, dal culto imperiale, attestato molto presto in Etruria meridionale. Da Nepi proviene la più antica testimonianza nota in Etruria, costituita da una dedica in onore di Augusto da parte di quattro Magistri Augustales (CIL XI, 3200). L'iscrizione è databile al 12 a.C., anno della fondazione del collegio di Nepi, e dell'istituzione, a Roma, del culto del Genius di Augusto e dei Lares Augusti, venerati nei compita dei vici della città. Altri esempi di una piuttosto precoce diffusione del culto imperiale vengono da Falerii Novi (CIL XI, 3083, databile tra il 2 a.C. e il 14 d.C.; CIL XI, 3076, età augustea); da Lucus Feroniae, dove intorno al 31 d.C. è attestato per la prima volta l'uso della formula in honorem domus divinae (AE 1978, n. 295). Il fatto che la diffusione del culto imperiale in agro falisco-capenate avvenga praticamente negli stessi anni che a Roma, sembra legato anche ai rapporti che legarono Augusto e la dinastia giulio-claudia a questo territorio. Dopo Anzio veterani di Ottaviano ottennero terre nell'Etruria meridionale, lungo il corso del Tevere, e non è un caso che l'Augusteo di Lucus Feroniae, l'unico in Etruria meridionale, che sia noto, oltre che epigraficamente, anche attraverso i suoi resti, sia stato eretto tra il 14 e il 20 d.C. da due membri della gens senatoria, filoagustea, dei Volusii Saturnini. Augusto stesso e membri della dinastia parteciparono direttamente alla vita civile dei centri della regione: Augusto fu pater municipii a Falerii Novi, Tiberio e Druso Maggiore furono patroni della colonia a Lucus Feroniae, tra l'11 e il 9 a.C. Inoltre la presenza, nel territorio capenate, di liberti imperiali incaricati dell'amministrazione del patrimonio dell'imperatore, fa pensare all'esistenza di fundi imperiali. La documentazione di età imperiale è costituita, inoltre, da una serie di iscrizioni che difficilmente possono farci risalire a specifici luoghi di culto, e dalle quali, in molti casi, si evince soprattutto una richiesta di salute e di fertilità alla divinità, come avveniva in età repubblicana, tra il IV e il II sec. a.C., attraverso l'offerta nei santuari di votivi anatomici. Sono note anche alcune attestazioni di culti orientali (Mater Deum e Iside, anche associate, da Falerii Novi e dal suo territorio; una dedica alla Mater Deum da Nazzano, in territorio capenate), che rientrano nell'ambito della devozione privata, tranne nel caso del sacerdozio di Iside a Mater Deum attestato a Falerii Novi. ; Inventaire des lieux de culte de la zone falisco-capenate. Résumé. Le recueil des sources historiques relatives à la vie religieuse de la zone falisco-capenate a eut comme but, tout d'abord, la localisation des lieux de culte identifiables avec certitude comme tels. Lorsque cela s'est avéré impossible, particulièrement en présence de documents épigraphiques isolés et d'origine incertaine, on a tout de même enregistré l'existence du culte. On veut reconstruire, au moyen de la documentation récoltée, une histoire des cultes de la zone considérée depuis les premières apparitions jusqu'à l'âge impérial. La zone considérée, insérée dans la Regio VII Etruria dans le cadre de l'organisation territoriale de l'Italie augustéenne, est comprise dans les limites naturelles du lac de Bracciano et du lac de Vico à l'ouest, du cours du Tibre à l'est, tandis que les limites septentrionale et méridionale sont délimitées, respectivement, par les reliefs des Monts Cimini et des Monts Sabatini. Les centres examinés sont ceux de Lucus Feroniae, Capena, Falerii Veteres, Falerii Novi, Narce, Sutri et Nepi. La communauté capenate occupait la partie orientale du territoire, un zone de plaine, dominée au nord par le massif du Mont Soratte, et délimitée à l'est par l'anse du Tibre. Son centre était constitué par l'habitat de Capena, l'actuel Col de la Civitucola, dont dépendaient une série de petits sites, encore peu étudiés, disséminés en position stratégique sur le Tibre, ou en correspondance d'axes routiers de liaison au fleuve. Le principal de ces derniers est localisé sur le site de l'actuelle Nazzano, occupé de manière permanente à partir du VIIIème siècle av. J.-C., et situé en correspondance de l'habitat sabin de Campo del Pozzo, sur l'autre rive du Tibre. La zone falisque s'articule, par contre, sur un paysage d'âpres collines de tuf, disposées autour du bassin hydrographique du torrent Treia, affluent du Tibre, qui parcourt le territoire en direction longitudinale. Le long du cours d'eau se développèrent les deux plus antiques et importants centres falisques de Falerii Veteres et Narce, un site que les plus récentes recherches tendent à reconnaître, et de manière toujours plus convaincante, comme la Fescennium connue dans les sources historiques, le deuxième habitat falisque, outre à Falerii, dont on reporte le nom; le long d'affluents du Treia sont situées Nepi et Falerii Novi. Malgré la spécificité culturelle progressivement développée par falisques et capenates, la situation géographique du territoire occupé le rend naturellement perméable aux influences étrusques et sabines, aspect relevé par la documentation archéologique et par quelques informations dans les sources antiques, réévaluée par les plus récentes études. Une position différente s'était par contre imposée après les premières recherches effectuées dans la région entre la fin du XIXème et le début du XXème siècle : celles-ci avaient mis l'accent sur les caractères culturels spécifiques des populations locales, en soulignant la substantielle autonomie de ces populations par rapport aux Etrusques, surtout sur la base des grandes similitudes entre les langues falisque et latine. Une telle perception fut dominante jusqu'à la deuxième moitié des années Soixante du Vingtième siècle, lorsque la publication des premières données sur les nécropoles de Véies mirent en lumière les rapports étroits avec les zones falisque et capenate entre le VIIIème et le VIIème siècle av. J.-C. Les études sur le peuplement de l'Etrurie protohistorique, conduites à partir des années '80 du XXème siècle ont focalisé l'attention sur une implication de Véies dans le peuplement de la zone comprise entre les Monts Cimini et Sabatini d'une part et le Tibre d'autre part, et cela au début de l'Âge du Fer, études confirmées par les récentes analyses des trousseaux des principales nécropoles falisques, qui ont prouvé qu'il existait au VIIIème et au début du VIIème siècle av. J.-C. d'importants parallèles avec les habitudes funéraires de Véies, bien que certains aspects spécifiques de la culture locale y fussent conservés. Le corpus d'inscriptions étrusques provenant de la nécropole de Narce démontre, pour tout le VII et le VIème siècle ac. J.-C., la présence continue de populations parlant la langue étrusque, qui utilisent un système d'écriture de type méridional, reconductible à Véies, dont Narce semble avoir constitué un avant-poste en territoire falisque. Déjà au début du VIIème siècle av. J.-C. cependant, on remarque les signes évidents d'une plus spécifique caractérisation culturelle des zones falisques et capenates, et cela au travers, entre autre, de la diffusion d'un idiome falisque, semblable au latin, documenté par des épigraphes au VIIème et au VIème siècle av. J.-C., surtout à Falerii Veteres. Ultérieur élément de contact culturel avec le monde latin est représenté, dans ce centre, par le rituel funéraire des inhumations infantiles dans la zone habitée. Une telle habitude, qui trouve de nombreuses comparaisons dans le Latium vetus, est étrangère à l'Etrurie, alors qu'elle est documentée à Cività Castellana, en localité «lo Scasato», par deux sépultures d'enfants datables entre la fin du VIIIème siècle et la première moitié du VIIème siècle av. J.-C. A Capena a été remarqué, à partir du VIIème siècle av. J.-C., une grande influence provenant de l'aire sabine, surtout à travers la documentation archéologique fournie par les nécropoles, tandis que du point de vue linguistique un influence du versant oriental du Tibre a été remarquée, en particulier par une analyse du noyau plus consistant des inscriptions relatifs aux nouveaux-nés, qui remonte au IV – IIIème siècle av. J.-C. La réceptivité vis-à-vis des nouveautés des populations limitrophes et la capacité d'élaborations originales, prouvées archéologiquement déjà depuis les phases les plus antiques de l'histoire des peuples falisques et capenates, peuvent offrir une aide documentaire à la perception que les écrivains antiques avaient de l'ethnos falisque, en trouvant un équivalent dans les traditions qui définissaient les Falisques comme des Etrusques, ou bien comme un peuple à soi, caractérisé par une spécificité propre, aussi linguistique. Cette dernière donnée trahit la mémoire de contacts avec le monde latin. Un troisième filon antique, qui se mêle à celui d'origine étrusque, revendique pour les falisques une ascendance grecque, plus précisément de l'Argolide et semble le fruit d'une construction d'érudits élaborée successivement. L'information de l'origine argolide remonte, par tradition indirecte, aux Origines de Caton, et se relie à celle de la fondation de Falerii de la part du héros Halesus, fils d'Agamemnon, qui aurait abandonné la maison paternelle après l'assassinat de son père. Ovide et Denys d'Halicarnasse attribuent au héros grec l'institution du culte de Junon à Falerii, dont le caractère originel argolide serait conservé dans le rite célébré en occasion de la fête annuelle de la déesse. L'importance accordée au culte de Junon au sein d'une telle tradition a amené à supposer que celui-ci se soit développé précisément à partir de la donnée religieuse de la présence à Falerii d'une divinité semblable à Héra d'Argos. Grâce à l'examen linguistique du nom du fondateur, qui n'a pas combattu à Troie et qui n'a eut aucun rôle dans le monde grec, on a conclu qu'il devait s'agir d'un héros local, et que la formation de l'éponyme ait été précédent à la moitié du IVème siècle av. J.-C., lorsque l'affirmation du rhotacisme est documenté dans la culture falisque. L'élaboration de la légende de Halesus doit donc être située à un moment précédent cette date qui, comme on l'a pensé, puisse coïncider avec la présence à Falerii d'artistes grecs ou hellénisés, actifs dans la céramographie et dans la choroplastique, à partir de la fin du Vème siècle av. J.-C. Cette tradition se relie à celle sur l'origine étrusque, par l'information de Servius, selon lequel Halesus serait le grand-père du roi de Véies Morrius. Le souvenir d'une descendance de la ville étrusque est commune aussi a Capena où, d'après une nouvelle de Caton, rapportée par Servius, les luci Capeni avaient été fondés par des jeunes de Véies, envoyés par un roi Properce, dans le nom duquel a été identifié une origine non étrusque, mais bien italico-orientale. Du point de vue historique, le rapprochement entre Véies, falisques et capenates sera documenté dans les sources par la présence constante des deux peuples au flanc de la ville étrusque au cours des luttes contre Rome entre la deuxième moitié du Vème et le début du IVème siècle av. J.-C. D'un tel système complexe d'influences participe aussi la sphère religieuse de la zone en question. Il est intéressant de noter, à ce propos, que la principale divinité masculine du panthéon falisco-capenate, le dieu du Mont Soratte, Soranus Apollon, constitue le correspondant exact de l'étrusque Śuri, comme l'a démontré Giovanni Colonna. La particularité du culte de Soratte, toutefois, est déterminée par la cérémonie annuelle des Hirpi Sorani, qui marchaient indemnes sur des charbons ardents et dont le nom, dans le récit étiologique sur l'origine du rite transmis par Servius, est expliqué en relation à hirpus, le nom sabin pour «loup», parfaitement cohérent avec la caractéristique frontalière de ce territoire. D'origine sabine est aussi la divinité vénérée dans le seul grand sanctuaire connu dans le territoire capenate, le Lucus Feroniae. La diffusion du culte à partir de la Sabine, version soutenue déjà par Varron, est largement acceptée par la critique récente, sur la base d'une part de l'analyse linguistique du nom de la déesse et d'autre part vu la présence sur le territoire sabin des principaux centres de culte (Trebula Mutuesca, Aminternum), d'où ceux-ci se diffusent, outre à Capena, vers l'Ombrie et le territoire volsque. Les attestations de Feronia dans d'autres zones, comme en Sardaigne, en territoire de Luni, à Aquilée et à Pesaro sont généralement à mettre en relation avec des épisodes de colonisation romaine. Le caractère explicitement commercial du Lucus Feroniae, affirmé par Denys d'Halicarnasse et par Tite-Live, qui le décrivent comme un lieu de marché fréquenté par les sabins, les étrusques et les romains déjà à l'époque de Tullius Ostilius, rend parfaitement compte de la variété des fréquentations et des influences qui caractérisent le sanctuaire à partir de l'Âge archaïque. Bien que n'ayant pas de documentation archéologique relative aux phases les plus antiques, l'information sur la vitalité du culte capenate déjà à l'époque royale semble fiable. Feronia, en effet, est couplée, à Terracina, à Iuppiter Anxur, divinité éponyme de la ville volsque, ce qui semble faire remonter l'introduction de son culte au début de la présence volsque dans la plaine pontine, c'est-à-dire vers les premières décennies du Vème siècle av. J.-C. Cela fournit, en plus, un indice possible d'une provenance septentrionale de l'ethnos volsque depuis la zone sabine. Il est donc envisageable que la déesse ait été adorée dans le sanctuaire tibérien, en face de la Sabine, bien avant son arrivée dans le Latium tyrrhénien. Au-delà de la simple fréquentation du lieu de culte et du marché, un rôle de premier plan joué par l'élément sabin pour le Lucus Feroniae en époque archaïque semble suggéré par l'épisode de l'enlèvement de marchants romains relaté par Denys d'Halicarnasse. Les ravisseurs sabins effectuent une rétorsion contre les romains, qui avaient enfermé certains des leurs sur l'Asylum, entre le Capitole et l'Arx, ce qui fait penser que les sabins exerçaient une sorte de protectorat sur le sanctuaire tibérien et qu'ils avaient sur celui-ci une capacité de contrôle semblable à celui que les romains avaient sur l'Asylum romuléen. La vocation commerciale du Lucus Feroniae est naturellement liée à son emplacement topographique, à l'endroit où les parcours sabins de transhumance à courte distance traversent le Tibre, entre les deux grands centres sabins de Poggio Sommavilla et Colle del Forno, pour se diriger vers la côte méridionale de l'Etrurie. La dislocation près du lieu d'arrivée des principaux sentiers de la zone apennine, habitée de peuplades sabelliques, est, en outre, une caractéristique commune aux plus anciens lieux de culte de Feronia, comme par exemple Trebula Mutuesca et Terracina, qui partagent avec le Lucus Feroniae capenate l'emplacement à l'extrémité d'un territoire ethniquement homogène. Il a été observé combien, dans ces sanctuaires, l'activité commerciale maritime était liée à l'échange du bétail et il faut prendre en compte l'ouverture à l'économie pastorale sarde pour comprendre la fondation romaine en 386 av. J.-C. d'une Pheronia polis en Sardaigne, près de Posada. De cette localité provient, en outre, une statuette en bronze, datable entre la fin du Vème et les premières décennies du IVème siècle av. J.-C., qui représente un Hercule de type italique, divinité dont on connaît le lien avec la sphère de l'échange, et surtout son rapport avec les troupeaux. L'époque de l'apoikia sarde a amené à envisager une relation avec le Lucus Feroniae capenate, vu que déjà entre 389 et le 387 av. J.-C. dans le territoire de Capena des colons romains s'étaient établis, unis à des déserteurs provenant de Véies, Capena et Falerii. La filiation du culte sarde à partir du culte tibérien semble, en outre, parfaitement compatible avec les rares attestations relatives à une présence d'Hercule dans le sanctuaire capenate. A ce sujet il est intéressant de remarquer que sur une Heraklesschale, encore inédite, provenant du dépôt votif du sanctuaire, le dieu est représenté avec la leonté et la massue dans la main gauche, et le skyphos en bois dans la main droite. Ces deux derniers attributs d'Hercule étaient conservés dans le sacellum près de l'Ara Maxima du Forum boarium, à Rome, et le skyphos, utilisé par le préteur urbain pour faire les libations au cours du sacrifice annuel auprès de l'Ara, apparaît aussi dans la statue de culte d'Alba Fucens, dans laquelle, en raison de nombreuses similitudes, on a proposé de reconnaître une réplique du simulacre du sanctuaire du Forum boarium. La répétition iconographique de ces éléments dans un sanctuaire-marché situé le long des voies de la transhumance, comme était le Lucus Feroniae, ne semble pas un hasard et pourrait d'ailleurs, dans un certain sens, évoquer le culte de l'Ara Maxima et en particulier un aspect fondamental de celui-ci, représenté par la liaison avec les Salinae aux pieds de l'Aventin. Celles-ci, situées près de la porta Trigemina, et donc proches de l'Ara Maxima, étaient le lieu de dépôt du sel provenant des salines d'Ostie destiné à la Sabine, et en général aux populations établies à l'intérieur de l'Italie centrale et vouées à l'économie pastorale. L'Hercule du Forum boarium, qui protégeait les activités économiques liées aux échanges de bétail, gouvernait aussi à l'approvisionnement du sel, et c'est en ce sens que doit aussi s'expliquer l'épithète de Salarius, attesté pour le dieu à Alba Fucens où, comme on l'a vu, le sanctuaire d'Hercule avait la fonction de forum pecuarium. La dislocation de sanctuaires-marchés le long des voies de transhumance garantissait donc aux pasteurs, après compensation nécessaire, la possibilité de se pourvoir en sel, et la même chose devait advenir au Lucus Feroniae. Ceci semble confirmé par le fait que, comme il a été démontré récemment, la route le long de laquelle se dresse le sanctuaire, l'actuelle route provinciale Tiberina, doive en réalité être identifiée comme la via Campana en territoire falisque, mentionné par Vitruve, en relation avec une source mortelle pour les oiseaux et les petits reptiles. Le nom de la route s'explique, en effet, en relation à son point d'arrivée, le Campus Salinarum situé à l'embouchure du Tibre, où se trouvaient les salines. Dans la zone falisque, l'analyse de la documentation relative aux lieux de culte a mis en évidence une influence majeure de Véies par rapport à la zone capenate. Cela résulte particulièrement important dans un centre comme Narce, marqué, depuis le début de son histoire, par une nette influence de Véies, et dont le déclin coïncidera avec les années de la conquête de la ville étrusque. Pour nous limiter à la sphère du sacré, déjà à partir d'un premier examen du matériel retrouvé dans le sanctuaire suburbain de Monte Li Santi – Le Rote, dont on attend la publication intégrale, on a signalé, à partir du Vème siècle av. J.-C., époque à laquelle commence la fréquentation de l'aire sacrée, la présence de prototypes provenant de Véies, qui sont à l'origine d'une production locale de petites terre cuites figurées. A un modèle de Véies sont reconductibles les citernes à ciel ouvert, qui flanquaient l'édifice templier dans au moins deux des principaux sanctuaires de Falerii Veteres, celui de Vignale et celui de Scasato I, tous deux à identifier comme lieux de culte dédiés à Apollon. Plus difficile est par contre le rapprochement de celles-ci aux citernes fermées retrouvées proche d'une aire sacré urbaine, récemment identifiée dans la moderne rue Gramsci, dans la partie méridionale du plateau de Civita Castellana, tandis que c'est seulement grâce à une vieille note des archives de la Surintendance que nous savons de l'existence d'une citerne semblable retrouvée près de Corchiano au début du Vingtième siècle. Dans les cas mieux documentés de Vignale et de Scasato, de tels systèmes hydrauliques résultent contemporains à la phase la plus antique du sanctuaire, et correspondent à un schéma qui revient à Véies dans le sanctuaire d'Apollon au Portonaccio, proche du temple à oikos de la Piazza d'Armi, dans le sanctuaire de Menerva près de la Porta Caere, ainsi que dans le sanctuaire situé en localité Casale Pian Roseto. Il n'est pas facile de déterminer la valeur exacte à attribuer, selon les cas, à de telles citernes, mais l'emphase topographique qu'on leur accorde dans le cadre des sanctuaires ne semble pas permettre de pouvoir exclure une relation avec les pratiques rituelles. Pour le site de Falerii on a pensé à une relation avec le sanctuaire de Portonaccio, entre autre sur la base d'une correspondance des cultes centrée sur la figure d'Apollon, et la piscine a ainsi été expliquée en relation à des rituels de purification liés à un culte oraculaire. Après la défaite de Véies, Falerii dut faire face non seulement à Rome du point de vue militaire, mais elle dut aussi se montrer non inférieure par prestige et capacité d'autoreprésentation, étant l'autre grand centre de la basse vallée du Tibre. Cet aspect a été noté, en particulier, sur la base de la décoration des temples de la ville falisque, qui connaît vers la deuxième – troisième décennie du IVème siècle av. J.-C. un renouveau général dû à la naissance d'une importante école choroplastique, dont l'activité se reconnaît aussi dans le fragment isolé de relief d'argile représentant une Nike, provenant de Fabrica di Roma. Une autre réaction à la prise de Véies est attestée dans l'autre important centre falisque, celui de Narce, aussi grâce à la documentation fournie par le sanctuaire de Monte Li Santi – Le Rote. Le lieu de culte continue à être fréquenté après la crise de la ville, comme le démontre une consistante contraction des nécropoles à partir du IVème siècle av. J.-C., mais dans la première moitié du IIIème siècle une ultérieure réduction du culte est prouvée dans de nombreux secteurs du sanctuaire, en parallèle à l'introduction de nouvelles catégories d'ex-voto, comme les ex-voto anatomiques, les nouveaux-nés enveloppés dans des bandes, les terre cuites représentant des animaux. Ces changements ont été mis en relation avec la victoire romaine sur les Falisques en 293 av. J.-C., alors qu'un deuxième moment de contraction du culte semble coïncider avec la définitive conquête romaine de 241 av. J.-C. Depuis le début du IIIème siècle av. J.-C., on assiste aussi dans les dépôts votifs de Falerii à l'introduction de nouveaux types d'ex-voto, dont on a parlé précédemment, et, comme pour le sanctuaire de Monte Li Santi – Le Rote, on enregistre la présence de pièces de monnaie romaines, qui commencent à constituer des offrandes. Une telle donnée devient encore plus éloquente lorsqu'on considère l'absence de monnaies locales dans les contextes préromains, qui semble trahir l'indifférence des populations falisques envers un tel type d'offrande. Il est donc évident aussi pour Falerii une influence du marché romain après les évènements belliqueux qui marquèrent la victoire de Spurius Carvilius sur les Falisques. La ville semble toutefois réussir à affronter la crise, au point de ne pas mettre en danger ses institutions, comme le démontrent les dédicaces falisques adressées à Mercure, dans le Sanctuaire dei Sassi Caduti, par les efiles, seuls magistrats attestés en ville. Par ailleurs, aussi avec la construction du nouveau centre de Falerii Novi, la documentation relative à la sphère religieuse prouve la conservation, au niveau public, de la langue et de la graphie falisque, par exemple dans la dédicace à Menerva effectuée par le préteur de la ville, pendant la deuxième moitié du IIIème siècle av. J.-C. (CIL XI 3081). Ce que nous savons sur les cultes de l'époque républicaine se limite au sanctuaire de Lucus Feroniae, où pratiquement tout le matériel et les sources épigraphiques peuvent être situés durant le IIIème siècle av. J.-C., et à deux dédicaces du IIIème siècle av. J.-C. La capitulation de Capena immédiatement après la chute de Véies (395 av. J.-C.) rend, à cette période, la présence romaine stable depuis environ déjà un siècle, et on ne se surprend donc pas du fait que les inscriptions sacrées utilisent un formulaire spécifiquement latin, avec même une présence plutôt précoce d'expressions qui deviendront courante au cours du IIème siècle av. J.-C. Un des premiers exemples attestés d'abréviations aux seules initiales de la formule de dédicace d(onum) d(edit) me(rito) se trouve dans CIL I, 2435, et provient de la nécropole capenate de Saliere. La plus antique documentation archéologique sur la vie religieuse de la zone prise en examen provient de Falerii Veteres. En ordre chronologique, la première divinité présente épigraphiquement est Apollon, dont le nom apparaît gravé en langue falisque sur un fragment de céramique attique remontant aux premières décennies du Vème siècle av. J.-C., qui provient du sanctuaire de Vignale. Il est intéressant de noter qu'il s'agit dans l'absolu de la plus antique attestation connue du nom latinisé du dieu, ce qui indique son assimilation précoce dans le pantheon falisque où, déjà à partir de cette époque, il faut reconnaître comme déjà effectuée l'identification entre Apollon et le dieu local Soranus. Le culte du dieu de Soratte, attesté épigraphiquement seulement à l'époque impériale, à travers deux dédicaces à Soranus Apollo, peut être situé de manière cohérente parmi les plus antiques manifestations religieuses du territoire falisco-capenate, et probablement le centre du culte du Mont Soratte devait servir de point de jonction entre les deux zones. Dans le territoire falisque la présence du dieu laisse des traces plus consistantes, à travers la duplication du culte d'Apollon à Falerii Veteres et une dédicace d'époque républicaine venant de Falerii Novi, tandis qu'elle semble s'affaiblir dans l'aire capenate, où on en trouve trace seulement dans deux dédicaces à Apollon, datant de la première époque impériale à Civitella S. Paolo, et dans un passage controversé de Strabon qui, apparemment par erreur, situe au Lucus Feroniae les cérémonies en l'honneur de Sorano, qui étaient au contraire célébrées sur le Mont Soratte. Cette information toutefois s'insère dans un système de correspondances cultuelles qui, associées à une déesse chtonienne, de la fertilité, et à un parèdre de type « apollinien », c'est-à-dire une divinité masculine, jeune, d'aspect infernal et mantique. Ce n'est pas un hasard, dans ce contexte, que le sanctuaire pour lequel est attestée une plus antique fréquentation à Falerii Veteres soit celui de Iuno Curitis, une divinité qui semble répondre au schéma de déesse matronale et guerrière (il s'agissait d'une Junon armée, mais aussi protectrice des matrones) pour laquelle, en outre, on a la preuve de l'association cultuelle avec un jeune dieu, de la même typologie que celle présente à Sorano. Même si on n'a pas d'attestations directes de l'existence de rapports entre Iuno Curitis et Sorano Apollo, il semble qu'il ne faille pas délaisser le fait que l'unique statuette d'Apollon jouant de la lyre, du IVème siècle av. J.-C., retrouvée à Falerii Veteres provienne justement du sanctuaire de la déesse; en outre lorsqu'elle fut évoquée à Rome après la prise de Falerii en 241 av. J.-C., en même temps que son temple situé in Campo, un autre temple fut construit, celui de Iuppiter Fulgur, une divinité du centre falisque pareillement évoquée, et pour laquelle on peut établir des parallèles avec Soranus, au travers de l'assimilation avec Veiove. Dans le territoire falisque comme dans celui capenate, les plus anciennes attestations cultuelles se réfèrent donc à un couple de divinités qui, tout en ayant des différences dans des aspects spécifiques du culte, semblent répondre à des exigences cultuelles plutôt homogènes. Durant l'époque impériale, enfin, le panorama des cultes de la zone considérée semble devenir plus homogène, en suivant par ailleurs une tendance générale. La manifestation plus évidente est formée, naturellement, par le culte impérial, présent très tôt en Etrurie méridionale. Le plus antique témoignage du culte impérial connu en Etrurie provient de Nepi, et il est constitué d'une dédicace en l'honneur d'Auguste de la part de quatre Magistri Augustales (CIL XI, 3200). L'inscription est datable à 12 av. J.-C., année de la fondation du collège de Nepi et de l'institution à Rome du culte du Genius d'Auguste ainsi que des Lares Augusti, vénérés dans les compita des vici de la ville. D'autres exemples d'une diffusion plutôt précoce du culte impérial viennent de Falerii Novi (CIL XI, 3083, datable entre 2 av. J.-C. et l'an 14 ; CIL XI, 3076, époque augustéenne); de Lucus Feroniae, où vers 31 av. J.-C. l'usage de la formule in honorem domus divinae (AE 1978, n. 295) est documenté pour la première fois. Le fait que la diffusion du culte impérial dans le territoire falisco-capenate ait commencé pratiquement dans les mêmes années qu'à Rome semble aussi lié aux rapports qu'eurent Auguste et la dynastie julio-claudienne avec ce territoire. Après Anzio les vétérans d'Octave obtinrent des terres en Etrurie méridionale, le long du cours du Tibre, et ce n'est pas un hasard si l'Augusteum de Lucus Feroniae, le seul en Etrurie méridionale connu outre que de manière épigraphique aussi grâce à ses vestiges, ait été érigé entre 14 et 20 apr. J.-C. par deux membres de la gens sénatoriale, filo-augustéenne, des Volusii Saturnini. Auguste lui-même et des membres de la dynastie participèrent directement à la vie civile des centres de la région: Auguste fut pater municipii à Falerii Novi, Tibère et Druse Majeur furent les patrons de la colonie à Lucus Feroniae, entre 11 et 9 av. J.-C. La présence, en outre, d'affranchis impériaux sur le territoire capenate, chargés de l'administration du patrimoine de l'empereur, fait penser à l'existence de fundi impériaux. La documentation d'époque impériale est formée d'une série d'inscriptions qui difficilement peuvent nous faire remonter à des lieux de cultes bien précis, et desquelles dans de nombreux cas, on déduit surtout une demande de santé et de fertilité à la divinité, comme il était fréquent à l'époque républicaine, entre le IV et le IIème siècle av- J.-C., qui s'exprime au moyen d'offrandes d'ex-voto anatomiques dans les sanctuaires. On connaît aussi quelques attestations de cultes orientaux (Mater Deum et Isis, parfois associées, provenant de Falerii Novi et de son territoire ; une dédicace à la Mater Deum de Nazzano, en territoire capenate), qui entrent dans le cadre d'une dévotion privée, sauf dans le cas du sacerdoce d'Isis à Mater Deum présent à Falerii Novi. ; The list of documentary sources concerning the religious life of the falisco-capenate area aim at findings the places of worship that can be identified with certainty. Whenever this has not been possible we have signalled the worship anyway. Through these documents we intend to reconstruct the history of the cults of the area examined, from its beginning to imperial age. The examined area, included in the Regio VII Etruria of the territorial organisation of Augustean Italy, is enclosed within the natural limits of the Bracciano lake and Vico lake at west, of the Tiber at east; the northern and southern limits are marked, respectively, by the Cimini mounts and Sabatini mounts. The sites considered are Lucus Feroniae, Capena, Falerii Veteres, Falerii Novi, Narce, Sutrium et Nepet. ; XIX Ciclo ; 1977
