Suchergebnisse

This study analyzes the European Union politics about tourism, in order to continue as the world's number 1 tourist destination. The European Union actions aim at promoting the development of sustainable, responsible and high-quality tourism. Spain has introduced these principles in its legislation and also the landing and touristic plans apply them. ; Este estudio analiza las respuestas de la Unión Europea a la globalización, para que Europa continúe como el primer destino turístico del mundo. Las acciones de la Unión Europea persiguen promover el desarrollo de un turismo sostenible, responsable y de calidad. España incorporado estos principios a su normativa interna y los hace realidad por medio de la planificación territorial y turística.This study analyzes the European Union politics about tourism, in order to continue as the world's number 1 tourist destination. The European Union actions aim at promoting the development of sustainable, responsible and high-quality tourism. Spain has introduced these principles in its legislation and also the landing and touristic plans apply them.

The article analyses the way narratives are constructed in EU external relations and their relation to policy practices. Five overarching narratives are identified: the EU as a security provider, the EU as a democratizer and spreader of 'good' norms, the EU as an actor that contributes to or assures global peace, the EU as an entity that contributes to the well-being of peoples around the world and finally the narrative of EU good neighbourliness. After a brief section that details the links between discourses, narratives and political practice, the article will systematically explore the five narratives. The rationale for this endeavour is based on the often huge discrepancy found between the ambitious goals set out in narratives and the poor policy track of the EU in its external relations. Continuous policy and discursive redefinition and reconsideration provide a dynamic context in which goals are renegotiated when political reality deviates from them. A clear pattern of downgrading ambitions when policy outcomes do not match them can be observed in the EU's external relations. Adapted from the source document.

This paper assesses the progress in EU product market integration by analyzing price differentials in a multivariate framework for 22 industrialised economies and almost 200 product categrories. We model changes in bilateral price similarities as a function of initial bilateral similarity levels, bilateral trade intensities, the bilateral correlation between expenditure shares and various variables reflecting EU membership, product category, the tradability of the product and the presence of non-tariff barriers throughout 1985-1999. The results suggest that price structures within the EU are more similar than among other OECD countries, especially for energy products and consumer goods. After correcting for factors such as catchingup and trade intensities, prices in the EU have almost consistently converged faster than in the rest of the OECD. Finally, we find that the countries in the so-called D-Mark area have witnessed a significantly stronger tendency for prices to converge than countries which have had relatively higher exchange rate fluctuations. This gives some foundation to hopes that monetary union will promote price convergence.

The author analyses how big business interests groups influence the both EU legislative and policy making process, and by doing so how they distort pluralistic concept of public policy networking at the supranational level of governance. The enormous financial resources available to multinational corporations provide them the use of 'front group' strategy or the 'third party' strategy, manipulative public relations tactics, and an insider position in the European Commission's consultative fora, which all lead to exclusion of grass root groups. The author concludes that big business influence on the EU decision-makers will have negative effects on democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions, and he thinks that an efficient institutional control over lobbying activities in Brussels is needed.

This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors' preferences and procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval. The study predicts smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, under the co-decision (consultation) procedure when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament (Commission) are closer to each other. More activity is expected under qualified majority voting in the Council than under unanimity. The results find support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009.

This article presents a stylized framework to rank languages in multilingual societies. We consider several ranking methods, reflecting principles such as minimal disenfranchisement, communicative benefits, or utilitarianism, as well as game-theory-based rankings referring to the Shapley Value. We use data from the Special Eurobarometer survey in order to apply these methods to rank languages within the European Union. Although the methods largely differ on their normative grounds, they lead to very close results.

This article presents a stylized framework to rank languages in multilingual societies. We consider several ranking methods, reflecting principles such as minimal disenfranchisement, communicative benefits, or utilitarianism, as well as game-theory-based rankings referring to the Shapley Value. We use data from the Special Eurobarometer survey in order to apply these methods to rank languages within the European Union. Although the methods largely differ on their normative grounds, they lead to very close results.