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Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath's book-in-progress, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, offers a radical alternative to the constitutional histories that emerged in the 1990s to defend the New Deal synthesis. Fishkin and Forbath's new constitutional history promises to recast the New Deal as a contingent and incomplete resolution of a centuries-long struggle to achieve the political-economic conditions that the Constitution requires – "requires" in the double sense of "demands" and "depends upon." This struggle is still ongoing and even accelerating, Fishkin and Forbath report, yet it has become increasingly "one-sided." First, the post-WWII economic boom dissipated, taking with it much of the middle class that the New Deal and Great Society legal orders had hoped to create. Then, conservative lawyers and politicians stepped up their attacks on the New Deal and Great Society's remaining achievements, trumpeting a constitutional political economy in which private property free of overweening public management is the pillar of constitutional democracy. Confronted by these dire conditions, legal liberals have forgotten how to fight back, rendered mute by the New Deal synthesis itself, which ironically and erroneously implied that political economy was no longer a matter of constitutional concern. Hoping to even the odds, Fishkin and Forbath offer liberals a grammar of egalitarian constitutional political economy – "the constitution of opportunity" – that was once spoken fluently and effectively by those Americans who argued that the Constitution prohibited oligarchic concentrations of wealth and mandated the political and judicial construction of a broad, inclusive middle class. By placing the discourse of political economy back at the center of constitutional debate, Fishkin and Forbath have – by any fair measure – done more than enough. Yet scholarly innovators tend to find the ranks of their critics swelled by those who have benefited most from their labor. This Essay is no exception to the oedipal rule. It argues that Fishkin and Forbath could go further still in integrating political economy and constitutional history. At times, their detailed analysis of the discourse of "constitutional political economy" comes at the expense of a more fully materialist account of the political-economic conditions and effects of that discourse. Such a discursive emphasis, in turn, risks an overly optimistic assessment of the past virtues and present utility of "the constitution of opportunity," the egalitarian dialect of constitutional political economy that Fishkin and Forbath commend to legal liberals today

IntroductionMarcel Morabito Part I: The responsibility of the national Executive power from the point of view of local territories Section 1: Theoretical Reflections Chapter 1: A European perspectiveMercedes Bresso Chapter 2: The responsibility of the national executive power in GermanyClaus Dieter Classen, Aurore Gaillet and Yoan Vilain Chapter 3: Is calling upon the courts a way to acknowledge the responsibility of the Executive?Virginie Donier Section 2: Regional Realities Chapter 4: The point of view of a state representativeLaurent Carrié Chapter 5: The point of view of an elected officialAndré Viola Conclusion: how do local actors participate in the strengthening or in the weakening of the holding to account of the Executive within modern democratic States?Stéphane Mouton Part II: National traditions and European culture Section 3: What impact do the traditions of the Member States have on the European practice of responsibility? Chapter 6: Are there common national traditions regarding the responsibility of the executive power?Luigi Lacchè Chapter 7: The accountability of the EU Commission as the EU's ExecutivePaolo Ponzano Chapter 8: Political accountability and role splitting of the Executive in EU Member StatesJacques Ziller Chapter 9: Political accountability within the European systemFabienne Peraldi-Leneuf Section 4: A common culture? National traditions, European challenges QuestionnaireJulien Padovani and Emilien Quinart Chapter 10: Parliamentarianism and accountability of the executive power on a European scale: the experience of the European ParliamentJuan Fernando López Aguilar Chapter 11: The scent of wild animalsSophie in't Veld Conclusion: On political responsibility and political control in the European Union Jean-Paul Jacqué Part III: Diversity of legal approaches Section 5: Democratic perspectives Chapter 12: The European convergence of the strengthening of the executive powerHanan Qazbir Chapter 13: Responsibility, accountability and legitimacy of executives: what role for the people?Audrey Bachert-Peretti Section 6: Disciplinary specificities Chapter 14: Administrative responsibility and responsibility of the ExecutiveHafida Belrhali Chapter 15: Understanding responsibility through the issues of the environment: towards a bilateral conception of responsibility?Malik Bozzo-Rey Chapter 16: A perspective on civil responsibilityJean-Baptiste Donnier Chapter 17: Responsibility of the Executive: cross-read approaches Amaia Errecart Chapter 18: The unique nature of political responsibilityCécile Guérin-Bargues Chapter19: Responsibility and sports: some remarks on a particular coupleClémentine Legendre Chapter 20: The difficulty of thinking about executive responsibility in a republic: a historical perspectiveFrançois Quastana Chapter 21: Of sheep and straw men: the accountability of the Executive from the perspective of political scienceOlivier Rozenberg Conclusion: For a common concept of 'responsibility' from a multidisciplinary perspectiveXavier Magnon Concluding Remarks: A kaleidoscopic approach to make (necessary) interdisciplinary communication possibleGuillaume Tusseau

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction. A Flawed Theory with Dangerous Consequences -- Sanctuary Cities -- Travel Ban -- China Trade Policy -- The Unitary Executive Theory: Overview -- Chapter 1. Presidential Power and the Unitary Executive Theory -- Literalist Theory -- Presidential Prerogative: "Life and Limb" Theory -- Stewardship Theory -- Origins of the Unitary Executive Theory -- Weak Versus Strong Theories -- Textual Elements of the Unitary Executive Theory -- Unitary Executive Advocates Versus Critics -- Chapter 2. Domestic Powers: Part I -- Discretionary and Ministerial Duties -- Discretionary Duties and the Limits of Presidential Control -- Presidential Power: Departments and Bureaus -- Executive Orders -- Federal Executive Clemency: The President's Power to Pardon -- Conclusion -- Chapter 3. Domestic Powers: Part II -- Appointments -- Myers v. United States: Removals and Statutory Qualifications -- Independent Counsel and the Removal Power -- Conclusion -- Chapter 4. Domestic Powers: Part III -- The Legislative Veto -- Presidents and Agency-Level Rulemaking -- Reining in the President's Czars -- Executive Privilege: Constitutional, Yet Limited -- Conclusion -- Chapter 5. Foreign Affairs Powers: Part I -- The Unitary Executive and the Commander-in-Chief Clause -- The Declare War Clause: A Hollow Legislative Power? -- Legal Obfuscation to Take Unitary Action -- An Emergency Presidential Power? -- "Sole Organ" Doctrine -- Conclusion -- Chapter 6. Foreign Affairs Powers: Part II -- Military Commissions and Habeas Corpus -- Foreign and Domestic Surveillance -- Torture -- Extraordinary Rendition -- State Secrets Privilege -- Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Domestic Powers -- Foreign Affairs Powers -- Our Model: How Government Should Function -- Going Forward -- Notes -- Index -- Back Cover.

Significant changes can be seen in government and administration in recent years. Internationalisation, economisation, the changed self-image of citizens and new forms of public management are at the forefront. The following article asks, from an administrative science perspective, whether, and if so how, the constitutional and administrative law of Switzerland reflects these changes. It shows that both in constitutional law and in particular in administrative organisation law, and in the Confederation's budgetary planning law, fundamental changes have taken place. Nevertheless, further research and needed legislation are in required if the law is to keep pace with the dynamic developments.

The current shutdown of the U.S. federal government is the longest in its history. It began on December 22, 2018, and at the time of writing (at 28 days), there is no end in sight. The two branches' disagreement lies ostensibly with border security. President Trump has demanded at least $5 billion to pay for a concrete, sea-to-sea border wall with Mexico. Democrats have offered a compromise of $1.6 billion towards border security, which Trump has rejected. Yet the disagreement is, to some extent, beside the point; the constitutional implications are also pressing. The present government shutdown represents a new step forward to the precipice on which Trump is taking America's constitutional democracy, which makes it distinctive for reasons not just of duration. First, this shutdown occurs alongside major regressions in America's constitutional democracy, as Trump continues to reject norms of mutual tolerance and restraint already in jeopardy prior to his appointment. Second, even if the shutdown may be thought to involve intransigent Democrats as well as an intransigent Trump, it is not symmetrical. And finally, the shutdown of government is now bound up in a shrewd escalation by Trump of the constitutional stakes.

The issue of whether a legislative body in a democratic society can bind itself on matters relating to the procedures by which the legislation is to be enacted, amended or repealed has, to this point, tended to dissolve into the question of which of two contending formulations of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty one prefers, Dicey's traditional formulation or the "new view" by Jennings and others. The author argues that, regardless of how one formulates it, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty provides an unsound basis upon which to resolve this issue, and that an alternative basis is therefore needed. That alternative basis, he contends, flows from the recognition that the courts are the ultimate arbiters of what the law is in a given society, and that, in this context, the power to determine what the law is carries with it the power to determine to a significant degree how it is that the society will govern itself. For this reason, the courts must ensure that in making such determinations, they take their guidance from, and give expression to, the values of the legal and political culture of that society. These values will include, but will not be limited to, the values reflected in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

Federal and state governments participate in and/or permit a variety of different types of killings. These include military operations, capital punishment, assisted suicide, abortion and self-defense or defense of others. In a pluralistic society, it is no surprise that there will be some members of the population who refuse to participate in some or all of these types of killings. The question of how governments should treat such refusals is older than the Republic itself. Since colonial times, the answer to this question has been driven largely by statutory protections, with the Constitution playing a smaller role, particularly since the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith. This Article offers a new answer to this very old question: a federal constitutional right not to kill, protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court's substantive due process cases suggest that certain unenumerated rights can qualify for constitutional protection when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and traditions." This Article reviews the government's historical ability to force unwilling citizens to participate in government-sanctioned killings across a variety of contexts, and concludes that the right not to kill passes the Court's stated tests, and does so even better than previously recognized rights. The right not to kill also fits squarely within the zone of individual decision making protected by the Court's decisions in Casey and Lawrence. Recognition of a constitutional right, of course, does not mean that the right can never be infringed. Rather, as with most rights, the constitutional right not to kill can presumably be trumped by a sufficiently compelling government interest and a narrowly tailored law. In the vast majority of cases, however, the government will not be able to meet this test, leaving individuals free to decide for themselves whether they are willing to participate in government-sanctioned killings.

Although the field of constitutional law has become increasingly comparative in recent years, its geographic focus has remained limited. South Asia, despite being the site of the world's largest democracy and a vibrant if turbulent constitutionalism, is one of the important neglected regions within the field. This book remedies this lack of attention by providing a detailed examination of constitutional law and practice in five South Asian countries: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Identifying a common theme of volatile change, it develops the concept of "unstable constitutionalism," studying the sources of instability alongside reactions and responses to it. By highlighting unique theoretical and practical questions in an underrepresented region, Unstable Constitutionalism constitutes an important step toward truly global constitutional scholarship. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1326/thumbnail.jpg