In the article was given the N. Berdyaev's interpretation of Marxism transformation specifics in historical practice of Russian society. The relevance of this study lies in the analyzing of undeniable importance: how Western ideological doctrines are transformed by non-Western societies in accordance with their value orientations, internal attitudes, and needs.The sources for this work writing were, first of all, the numerous works of N. Berdyaev himself, devoted to the problems of history and historical eschatology, personal freedom, and the spiritual determination of social revolutions. The subject of analysis was also the political and philosophical "Silver Age" works, devoted to revolutionary topics of the late XIX – early XX century. A number of provisions from domestic and foreign works on the problems of revolutionary modernity and "post-modernity" were also attracted. This article also includes author's thoughts published on pages of a number of domestic scientific journals.N. Berdyaev defined the Russian revolution as a revolution of unique conditions and unique content. And only "very changed, transformed Marxism" could respond to these "unique conditions and contents". The main claim of Leninism was to become the new activist Marxist philosophy of the " proletarian revolutions era". He relied on the thesis of Marx and Engels that a "jump from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom" would necessarily occur.Lenin and the Russian Communists managed to convince themselves that for them this time of the "big jump" had already come. They felt within themselves the strength and ability to change the whole world with the help of "extreme" revolutionary activity,. We observe something similar later on with the example of the Maoist "big jump".According to this super-activist intention, Bolshevik theory is trying to give a new interpretation to dialectical materialism. The main category here is the category of self-movement. The properties of the spirit are transferred to matter – freedom, activity, mind. The activity of the proletariat forms the economy, processes of the environment in his own way. This is the philosophy of activism and titanism which have to inherent to the proletarian mind.Orthodox and at the same time activist Soviet philosophy, Berdyaev defined as the philosophy of social titanism. Philosophical work should be "built into" labor, in social construction, should serve it. Absolute truth is recognized only in activity, in struggle, in labor efforts. The titanic exaltation of revolutionary will presupposes the existence of a real world.Leninism also claimed a new understanding of freedom. Here, freedom is not understood as freedom of choice, but as an active change of life, as an act that is carried out not by an individual, but by a social person, after he made a choice. Berdyaev indicates that the individual does not have freedom from the social collective, he does not have a personal conscience and personal consciousness. The freedom of the individual lies in exceptional fitness for the collective. But if the personality has adapted and merged with the collective, then he receives tremendous freedom and tremendous power in relation to the rest of the world.Communist moral consciousness is torn by the contradiction between the attitude to the past and the present, on the one hand, and attitude to the future, on the other. There is no one humanity yet. There are classes of exploiters and exploited. Therefore, there can be no single morality. But in the future, after the world communist revolution, when the classes disappear, and a single humanity would be formed – then an integral universal human morality will arise. According to N. Berdyaev, Russian communism, if wee look at it deeper, is a deformation of the Russian idea, which took ugly forms in the atmosphere of World War I and social decay.The general historical conclusion of Berdyaev is quite pessimistic. It is very consonant with our political experience: "A revolutionary myth always contains an unconscious deception, and at the same time it is impossible without a revolutionary myth . In this sense, it will never be realized within the framework of this world, in the kingdom of Caesar". ; У статті проаналізовано інтерпретацію М. Бердяєвим особливостей трансформації марксизму в історичній практиці російського суспільства. Аналізується те, як марксизм, трансформований у більшовицьку ідеологію та філософію, вплинув на суспільну свідомість і саму організацію російського суспільства. Актуальність даного дослідження полягає в безперечній необхідності аналізу того, як західні ідеологічні доктрини трансформуються незахідними суспільствами відповідно до їхніх ціннісних орієнтацій, внутрішніх установок і потреб. Це певною мірою дозволяє зрозуміти те які сенси вкладають політичні еліти незахідних спільнот в поширені на Заході поняття, такі як «революція», «демократія», «свобода» і т. д. і як вони відповідно до цих сенсів вибудовують свою внутрішню та зовнішню політику. У цьому плані великий інтерес представляє герменевтичне тлумачення робіт відомого соціального і політичного філософа М. Бердяєва.Джерелами для написання цієї роботи стали, передусім, численні твори самого М. Бердяєва, присвячені проблемам історії та історичної есхатології, свободи особистості, духовної детермінації соціальних революцій, та різнобічні політико-філософські твори «срібного століття» кінця ХІХ – початку ХХ ст. Також в науковий обіг був залучений ряд положень з вітчизняних і зарубіжних робіт з проблематики революційної «сучасності та пост-сучасності». В основу цієї статті увійшли також авторські роздуми, опубліковані на сторінках низки вітчизняних наукових журналів.У викладі доводиться, що російську революцію М. Бердяєв розцінював ії як революцію унікальних умов і унікального змісту. І цим «унікальним умовам і змісту» мог відповідати тільки дуже змінений, трансформований марксизм. Головна претензія ленінізму зводилася до того, щоб стати новою активістською марксистською філософією епохи пролетарських революцій. Він спирався на тезу Маркса і Енгельса про те, що обов'язково відбудеться "стрибок з царства необхідності у царство свободи".Ленін і російські комуністи зуміли переконати себе у тому, що для них цей час "великого стрибка" вже наступив. Вони почувають у собі силу і здатність за допомогою "екстремальної" революційної активності змінити увесь світ. Щось подібне ми спостерігаємо і пізніше на прикладі маоістського "великого стрибка".Відповідно до цієї супер-активістської інтенції більшовицька теорія намагається дати нове тлумачення діалектичному матеріалізму. Основною категорією тут стає категорія само-руху. На матерію переносяться властивості духу – свобода, активність, розум. Активність пролетаріату переробляє середовище і по-своєму формує економіку. Це і є філософія активізму, якої притаманний прометеївській, титанічний пафос.Борючись проти ідеалізму, більшовики, приховано прагнули надати матерії характеру активного духу. Ортодоксальну і разом з тим активістську радянську філософію Бердяєв визначав також як філософію соціального титанізму. Філософська робота повинна бути "вмонтована" в працю, в соціальне будівництво, повинна його обслуговувати. Титанічна екзальтація революційної волі припускає існування реального світу, над яким відбувається акт його зміни.Ленінізм також заявляв про нове розуміння свободи. Тут свобода розуміється не як свобода вибору, а як активна зміна життя, як акт, який здійснюється не індивідуальною, а соціальною людиною, після того як нею зроблений вибір. Особистість не має свободи щодо соціального колективу, вона не має особистої совісті та особистої свідомості. Її свобода полягає у винятковій пристосованості до колективу. Але особистість, що пристосувалася і злилася з колективом, одержує величезну свободу і величезну силу стосовно всього іншого світу. На цьому більшовики будували свою стратегію "нової людини".Комуністична моральна свідомість роздирається протиріччям між ставленням до минулого та сьогодення, з одного боку, і до майбутнього – з іншого. Єдиного людства ще немає. Є класи експлуататорів і експлуатованих. Тому не може бути і єдиної моралі. Але в майбутньому, після світової комуністичної революції, коли зникнуть класи, утвориться єдине людство – тоді виникне і єдина загальнолюдська мораль. Російський комунізм, вважає М. Бердяєв, якщо глянути на нього глибше, є деформацією російської ідеї, що прийняла в атмосфері війни і соціального розкладання потворні форми.Загальноісторичний висновок Бердяєва має досить песимістичний і вельми співзвучний нашому політичному досвіду характер: "Революційний міф завжди містить у собі несвідомий обман, і разом з тим без революційного міфу не можна. В цьому сенсі він ніколи не буде здійснений у межах цього світу, в царстві Кесаря".
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John M. Hobson on Eurocentrism, Historical Sociology and the Curious Case of Postcolonialism
International Relations, it is widely recognized, is a Western discipline, albeit one that claims to speak for global conditions. What does that mean are these regional origins in and by themselves a stake in power politics? This Eurocentrism is often taken as a point of departure for denouncing mainstream approaches by self-proclaimed critical and postcolonialist approaches to IR. John Hobson stages a more radical attack on Eurocentrism, in which western critical theories, too, are complicit in the perpetuation of a dominantly western outlook. In this extensive Talk, Hobson, among others, expounds his understanding of Eurocentrism, discusses the imperative to historicize IR, and sketches the outline of possible venues of emancipation from our provincial predicament.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
In my view, there are two principal inter-related challenges that face IR. The first is the need to deal with the critique that the discipline is constructed on Eurocentric foundations. This matters both for critical and conventional IR. The latter insists that it works according to value-free positivistic/scientifistic principles. But if it is skewed by an underlying Western-centric bias, as I have contended in my work, then the positivist mantra turns out to constitute a smokescreen or veil behind which lies the dark Eurocentric face of conventional IR. And of course, if Eurocentrism in various forms infects much of critical IR, then it jeopardizes its critical credentials and risks falling back into problem-solving theory. For these reasons, then, I feel that the critique of Eurocentric IR and international political economy (IPE) poses nothing short of an intellectually existential challenge to these disciplines.
The second inter-related challenge is that if we accept that the discipline is essentially Eurocentric then we need to reconstruct IR's foundations on a non-Eurocentric basis and then advance an alternative non-Eurocentric research agenda and empirical analysis of the international system and the global political economy. This is a straightforward challenge vis-à-vis conventional IR/IPE theory but it is more problematic so far as critical IR/IPE is concerned (which is why my answer is somewhat extended). The more postmodern wing of the discipline would view with inherent skepticism any attempt to reconstruct some kind of (albeit alternative) grand narrative. And the postmodern postcolonialists would likely concur. It is at this point that the thorniest issue emerges in the context of postcolonial IR theory. For however hard this is to say, I feel that simply proclaiming the Eurocentric foundations of the discipline does not hole its constituent theories deep beneath the waterline; a claim that abrades with the view of most postcolonialists who view Eurocentrism as inherently illegitimate either because it renders it imperialist (which I view as problematic since there are significant strands of anti-imperialist Eurocentrism and scientific racism) or because they conflate Eurocentrism with the unacceptable politics of (scientific) racism (which I also find problematic notwithstanding the point that there are all manner of overlaps and synergies between these two generic Western-centric discourses, all of which is explained in my 2012 book, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics). The key point—one which will undoubtedly get me into a lot of trouble with postcolonialists—is that I feel we need to recognize that in the end Eurocentric IR (and IPE) theory constitutes a stand-point approach, just like any other, and its merits or de-merits can ultimately only be evaluated against the empirical record, past and present (notwithstanding the points that I find Eurocentrism to be deeply biased and that what I find so deeply galling about it is its dismissive 'put-down' modus operandi of all things non-Western, wherein all non-Western achievements are dismissed outright, alongside the simultaneous (re)presentation of everything that the West does as progressive and/or pioneering).
So the second principal challenge facing the discipline—one which will no less get me into trouble with many postmodern/poststructuralist thinkers—is the need to reconstruct an alternative non-Eurocentric set of disciplinary foundations, which can then generate fresh empirical narratives of the international system and the global political economy. For my view is that only by offering an alternative research agenda and empirical analysis of the world economy can IR and IPE be set free from their extant Eurocentric straitjackets and the Sisyphean prison within which they remain confined, wherein IR and IPE scholars simply re-present or recycle tired old Eurocentric mantras and tropes in new clothing ad infinitum. For if nothing else, the absence of an alternative reconstruction and empirical analysis means that IR and IPE scholars are most likely simply to default to, or retreat back into, their Eurocentric comfort zone. Accordingly, then, the battle between Eurocentrism and non-Eurocentrism needs to be taken to the empirical field and away from the high and rarified intellectually mountainous terrain of metanarratival sparring contests.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
Another way of asking this question would be: what influenced you to become a non-Eurocentric thinker? I get asked this question a lot, especially by non-white people. A good deal of this is related to my life-experience, much of which is sub-conscious of course and both too personal and too detailed to openly reflect upon here (sorry!) More objectively, the initial impetus came around 1999 when I came across a book on Max Weber by the well-respected Weberian scholar, Bryan Turner, in which he argued inter alia that Weber's sociology had Orientalist properties; none of which had occurred to me before. Following this up further I became convinced that Weber was indeed Eurocentric, as was Marx. More importantly, I came to see this as a huge problem that infected not just Marx and Weber but pretty much all of historical sociology (which was reinforced in my mind when I came to read James Blaut's books, The Colonizer's Model of the World (find it here), and Eight Eurocentric Historians). So I set out to develop an alternative non-Eurocentric approach to world history and historical sociology as a counter (which resulted in my 2004 book, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation).
Two further key IR texts that I became aware of were L.H.M. Ling's seminal 2002 book, Postcolonial International Relations and Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney's equally brilliant 2004 book International Relations and the Problem of Difference, both of which led me to explore further the Eurocentric nature of IR and later IPE. But it would be remiss of me not to mention the influence of Albert Paolini; a wonderful colleague whom I had the pleasure to know at La Trobe University in Melbourne back in the early 1990s before his exceedingly unfortunate and premature death (and who, I must say, was way ahead of the game compared to me in terms of developing the critique of Eurocentrism in IR (see his book, Navigating Modernity (1997)). However, it would be unfair to the many others who have influenced me in countless ways to single out only these books and writers, though I hope you'll forgive me for not mentioning them so as to avoid providing yet another overly extended answer!
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
This is an excellent but very challenging question and I want to try and make a succinct answer (though I shall build on it in some of the answers I will provide later on). The essential argument I make about 'thinking inter-culturally' is that while the more liberal side of the discipline thinks that its cosmopolitanism does just this, its Eurocentrism actually prevents it from fulfilling this. Because ultimately, cosmopolitanism wants to impose a Western standard of civilization upon the world, thereby advancing cultural monism rather than cultural pluralism. And this is merely the loudest expression of a spectre that haunts much of the discipline. But I guess that in the end, to achieve genuine cultural pluralism and to think inter-culturally requires us to take seriously how other non-Western peoples think of what their cultures comprise and what it means to them, and how their societies and states work along such lines. Dismissing them, as Eurocentrism always does, as inferior, backward and regressive denies this requirement outright. Interestingly, my great grandfather, J.A. Hobson flirted with this idea in his book, Imperialism: A Study (though this has largely escaped the notice of most people since few have read the more important second part of that book where all this is considered). But this is merely a first step, for as I will explain later on in the interview, ultimately thinking inter-culturally requires an analysis of the dialogical inter-connections and mutual co-constitutive relations between West and non-West which, in turn, presupposes not merely the presence of Western agency but also that of non-Western agency in the making of world politics and the global political economy.
All of which is clearly a massive challenge and I am certainly not advocating that the discipline of IR engage in deep ethnographical study and that it should morph into anthropology. And in any case I think that there are things we can do more generally to transcend Eurocentrism while learning more about the other side of the Eurocentric frontier without going to this extreme. I shall talk about such conceptual moves later on in this interview. One such theoretical move that I talk about later is the need to engage historical sociology (albeit from a non-Eurocentric perspective) or, more precisely global historical sociology. Again, though, I'm not advocating that the discipline should morph into historical sociology. And I'm aware that one of the biggest obstacles to IR making inroads into historical sociology is the sheer size of the task that this requires. It has always come naturally to me because that is where I came from before I joined the IR academic community. But there is quite a bit of historical sociology of IR out there now so I do think it possible for new PhD students to enter this fold. All of this said, though, I'm unsure if I have answered your question adequately.
The west is often seen as the source of globalization and innovation, which have historically radiated outwards in a process without seeming endpoint. What is wrong with this picture, and, perhaps more interestingly, why does it remain so pervasive?
In essence I believe this familiar picture—one which is embraced by conventional and many critical IR/IPE and globalization theorists—is wrong because this linear Western narrative brackets out all the many inputs that the non-West has made (which returns me to the point made a moment ago concerning the dialogical relations that have long existed between West and non-West). In my aforementioned 2004 book I argued that the West did not rise to modernity as a result of its own exceptional rational institutions and culture but was significantly enabled by many non-Western achievements and inventions which were borrowed and sometimes appropriated by the West. In short, without the Rest there might be no modern West. Moreover, while the West has been the principal actor in globalization since 1945, the globalization that preceded it (i.e., between 1492 and c.1830) was non-Western-led (as was the process of Afro-Eurasian regionalization that occurred between c.600 and 1492 out of which post-1492 globalization emerged). And even after 1945 I believe that non-Western actors have played various roles in shaping both globalization and the West, all of which are elided in the standard Eurocentric linear Western narrative of globalization.
But why has this image remained so persistent? This is potentially a massive question though it is a very important one for sure. Conventional theorists are most likely to disagree outright with my alternative picture in part because they are entirely comfortable with the notion that the 'West is best' and that the West single-handedly created capitalism, the sovereign inter-state system and the global economy. Critical theorists are rather more problematic to summarize here. But one that springs to mind is the type of argument that Immanuel Wallerstein (Theory Talk #13) made in a1997 article, in which he insisted that it be an imperative to hold the West accountable for everything that goes on in the world economy so that we can prosecute its crimes against the world. Arguments that bring non-Western agency in, as I seek to do, he dismisses as deflecting focus away from the West and thereby diluting the nature of the crimes that the West has imparted and therefore serves merely to weaken the case for the critical prosecution. I fundamentally disagree with him for reasons that I shan't go into here (but will touch upon below). But in my view it is (or should be) a key debate-in-the-making not least because I suspect that many other critical theorists might agree with him and, more importantly, because it brings fundamentally into question of what Eurocentrism is and of what the antidote to it comprises. Either way, though, critical theorists, at least in my view, often buy into the Western linear narrative, albeit not by celebrating the West but by critiquing it. All of which means that both conventional and many critical IR scholars effectively maintain the hegemony of Eurocentrism in the discipline though for diametrically opposed reasons; and which, at the risk of sounding paranoid, suggests a deeply subliminal conspiracy against the introduction of non-Eurocentrism.
Nevertheless one final but rather obvious point remains. For the biggest reason why Eurocentrism persists is because it makes Westerners feel good about themselves. And at the risk of sounding like sour grapes (notwithstanding very decent sales for my non-Eurocentric books), I have been struck by the fact that there seems to be an insatiable appetite—particularly among the Western public readership—for high profile Eurocentric books that celebrate and glorify Western civilization; though, to be brutally frank, many of these rarely add anything new to that which has been said countless times in the last 50 years, if not 200—notwithstanding Ricardo Duchesne's recent avowedly Eurocentric book The Uniqueness of Western Civilization as constituting a rare exception in this regard. All of which means that writing non-Eurocentric books is unlikely to get your name onto the bestseller list (though granted, the same is true for many of the Eurocentric books that have been written!)
International theory and political theory originates mainly from Europe, but makes universal claims about the nature of politics. How does international theory betray its situated roots and how do these roots matter for how we should think about theory?
I'm not sure that I can answer this question in the space allowed but I'll try and get to the broad-brush take-home point. I guess that when thinking about modern IR theory we can find those theorists who in effect advocate a normative Western imperialist posture even if they claim to be doing otherwise. Robert Gilpin's work on hegemonic stability theory is perhaps the clearest example in this respect. Anglo-Saxon hegemony, he claims, is non-imperialist because it always seeks to help the rest of the world, not exploit it. But the exercise of hegemony, it turns out, returns us to the old 19th century trope of the civilizing mission where Western practices and principles are transferred and imposed on non-Western societies in order to culturally convert them along Western lines. And this in turn issues from the assumption that the British and American interests are not selfish but are universal. This mantra is there too in Robert Keohane's (Theory Talk #9) book, After Hegemony, where cultural conversion of non-Western societies to a neoliberal standard of civilization by the international financial institutions through structural adjustment is approved of; an argument that is developed much more expansively in his later work on humanitarian intervention. And this trope forms the basis of cosmopolitan humanitarian interventionist theory more generally, where state reconstruction, which is imposed once military intervention has finished, is all about re-creating Western political and economic institutions across the world. I don't doubt for a moment the sincerity of the arguments that these authors make. But they can make them only because they believe that the Western interest is truly the universal. In such ways, then, IR betrays its roots.
Ultimately, Western IR theory constructs a hierarchical conception of the world with the West standing atop and from there we receive an image of a procession or sliding scale of gradated sovereignties in the non-Western world. For much of IR theory that has neo-imperialist normative underpinnings, it is this construction which legitimizes Western intervention in the non-Western world, thereby reproducing the legal conception of the (imperialist) standard of civilization that underpinned late 19th century positive law. Nevertheless, there has been a significant strand of anti-imperialist Eurocentrism within international theory (and before it a strand of anti-imperialist scientific racism, as in the likes of Charles HenryPearson and LothropStoddard). But once again, as we find in Samuel Huntington's famous 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations—which comprises a modern equivalent of Lothrop Stoddard's Eugenicist texts, The Rising Tideof Color (1920) and Clashing Tides of Color (1935)—the West is held up as the highest expression of civilization, with non-Western societies viewed as socially inferior such that the West's mandate is not to imperially intervene across the world but to renew its uniquely Western civilized culture in the face of regressive and rampant non-Western regions and countries (particularly Middle Eastern Islam and Confucian China). Hedley Bull's anti-imperialist English School argument provides a complementary variant here because, he argues, it is the refusal of non-Western states to become Western wherein the source of the (unacceptable) instability of the global international society ultimately stems. All of which, as you allude to in your question, rests on the conflation of the Western interest with the universal. It is for this reason, then, that the cardinal principle of critical non-Eurocentrism comprises the need to undertake deep (self) reflexivity and to remain constantly vigilant to Eurocentric slippages.
In turn, this returns me to the point I made before: that IR theory does not think inter-culturally because it denies the validity of non-Western cultures. Because it does so, then it ultimately denies the full sovereignty of non-Western states. For one of the trappings of sovereignty is what Gerry Simpson usefully refers to as 'existential equality', or 'cultural self-determination'. It seems clear to me that the majority of IR theory effectively denies the sovereignty of non-Western states because it rejects cultural pluralism and hence cultural self-determination as a function of its intolerant Eurocentric monism. The biggest ironies that emerge here, however, are two-fold; or what I call the twin self-delusions of IR. First, while conventional IR theory proclaims its positivist, value free credentials that sit comfortably with cultural pluralist tolerance, nevertheless as I argued in my answer to your first question, this positivist mantra turns out to constitute a smokescreen or veil behind which lies the face of intolerant Eurocentric cultural monism. And second, it means that while IR proclaims that its subject matter comprises the objective analysis of the international system which focuses on anarchy and the sovereign state, nevertheless it turns out that what it is really all about is narrating an analysis of Western hierarchy and the 'hyper-sovereignty' of Western states versus the 'conditional sovereignty/gradated sovereignty' of non-Western states.
Linking your work to Lizée's as a critique of extrapolating 'universals' on the basis of narrow (Western) experiences, Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44) wrote as follows: 'Perhaps the cure for the disease that Hobson and Lizée diagnose is a rethinking of what "theory" means beyond empirical generalizations, so that future international theorists can avoid the sins of the past.' What is your conception of what theory is or should be?
As noted already, I am all in favor of developing non-Eurocentric theory. To sketch this out in the most generic terms I begin with the proposition that Eurocentric IR/IPE theory is monological, producing a reductive narrative in which only the West talks and acts. It is essentially a 'winner/loser' paradigm that proclaims the non-West as the loser or is always on the receiving end of that which the West does, thereby ensuring that central analytical focus is accorded to the hyper-agency of the Western winner. And its conception of agency is based on having predominant power. We find this problem particularly within much of critical IR theory, where because the West is dominant so it qualifies as having (hyper) agency while the subordinate position of the non-West means that it has little or no agency. In turn, particularly within conventional IR and IPE we encounter a substantialist ontology, where the West is thought to occupy a distinct and autonomous domain. From there everything else follows. And even in parts of critical IR and IPE where relationalism holds greater sway we often find that the West still occupies the center of intellectual gravity in the world.
My preference is for a fully relationalist approach which replaces the monologism of Eurocentrism and its reification of the West with the aforementioned conception of dialogism that brings the non-West into the discussion while simultaneously focusing on the mutually constitutive relations between Western and non-Western actors. It also allows for the agency of the non-West alongside the West's agency (even though clearly after c.1830 the West has been the dominant actor). This in effect replaces Eurocentrism's either/or problematique with a both/and logic, enabling us to reveal a space in which non-Western agency plays important roles without losing focus of Western agency, even when it takes a dominant form as it did after c.1830. In this way then, to reply to Wallerstein's argument discussed earlier, one does not have to dilute the critique of the West when bringing non-Western agency in for both can be situated alongside each other. While I could of course say much more here, these conceptual moves are paramount to me and inform the basis of my empirical work on the international system and the global political economy.
All in all, IR theory needs to take a fully global conception of agency much more seriously; structuralist theory in its many guises is necessary but is ultimately insufficient since it diminishes or dismisses outright the prospect or existence of non-Western agency. Moreover, I seek to blend materialism and non-materialism, which means that neither constructivism nor poststructuralism can quite get us over the line. Even so, blending materialism and non-materialism is not an especially hard task to achieve though IR's preferred ontologically reductionist stance certainly makes this a counter-intuitive proposition.
You combine historical sociology with international relations. What promises does this interdisciplinary approach hold? Why do we need historical sociologies of IR?
Following on from my previous answer I argue that a relationalist non-Eurocentric historical sociology of IR is able to problematize the entities that IR takes for granted—states, anarchy (as well as societies and civilizations)—in order to reveal them, to quote from the marvelous introduction that Julian Go and George Lawson have written for their forthcoming edited volume Global Historical Sociology, as 'entities in motion'. Indeed such entities are never quite complete but change through time. Here it is worth quoting Go and Lawson further, where they argue that
'social forms are "entities-in-motion": they are produced, reproduced, and breakdown through the agency of historically situated actors. Such entities-in-motion, whether they are states, empires, or civilizations often appear to be static entities with certain pre-determined identities and interests. But the relational premise, and perhaps promise, of GHS is its attempt to denaturalize such entities by holding them up to historical scrutiny'.
It is precisely this global historical sociological problematique that underpins the approach that I develop in a forthcoming book, provisionally entitled Reorient International Political Economy where inter alia, I show how many of the major processes of the global economy are never complete but are constantly mutating as they are shaped by the multiple interactions of Western and non-Western actors. To take the origins of capitalism or globalization as an example, I show how these have taken not a Western linear trajectory but a highly discontinuous path as West and non-West have interacted in complex ways.
A good number of IR historical sociologists have focused specifically on particular historical issues—especially that of the rise of the sovereign state in Europe. Such analyses have in my view proven to be extremely valuable because they allow us to puncture some of the myths that surround 'Westphalia' that populate standard or conventional IR reportage (particularly that found in undergraduate text-books). But ultimately I feel that the greatest worth of the historical sociology of IR project lies in using history (understood in historical-sociological terms rather than according to traditional historians' precepts) as a means of problematizing our understanding of the present international system and global political economy. Thus, for me, historical sociology is ultimately important because it can disrupt our understanding and explanations of the present. And I believe that this kind of inter-disciplinarity can bear considerable fruit (notwithstanding the difficulty that this task poses for IR scholars).
You famously criticized IR's Eurocentrism and argued for the need for inter-cultural thinking. What is inter-cultural thinking and how can it benefit IR?
As I already discussed what inter-cultural thinking is a bit before, I shall consider how it might benefit IR and indeed the world in various ways. First, if the rise of the West into modernity owes much of this achievement to the help provided by non-Western ideas, institutions and technologies, then acknowledging this debt could go a long way to healing the wounds that the West has inflicted upon the non-West's sense of self-esteem. Moreover, the hubristic claim ushered in by Eurocentrism, that the West made it to the top all by itself and that the very societies which helped it get there are then immediately denounced as inferior and uncivilized, significantly furnishes the West with the imperialist mandate to intervene and remake non-Western societies in the image of the West. So in essence, the help that the once-more advanced non-Western societies that the West benefited from is rewarded by 150 years of imperial punishment! Of course, IR scholars do not really study the rise of the West, but it is implicit in so much of what they write about. So acknowledging this debt could challenge the West's self-appointed mandate to remake the world in its own image as well as problematize many of the historical assumptions that lie either explicitly or implicitly within IR.
Second, and flowing on from the previous point, thinking inter-culturally means recognizing the manifold roles that the non-West has played in shaping the rise of Western capitalism and the sovereign state system as well as the global economy, as I have just argued, but also appreciating their societies and cultures on their own terms rather than simply dismissing them as unfit for purpose in the modern world. Less Western Messianism and Western hubris, more global understanding and empathy, is ultimately what I'm calling for. But none of this is possible while Eurocentrism remains the go-to modus operandi of IR and IPE. And this is important for IR not least because significant parts of it have informed Western policy, most especially US foreign policy.
Third, a key benefit that inter-cultural thinking could bring to IR is that while the discipline presumes that it furnishes objective analyses of the international system, the upshot of my claim that the discipline is founded on Eurocentrism is that all the discipline is really doing is finding ways to reaffirm the importance of Western civilization in world politics, defending it and often celebrating it, rather than learning or discovering new things about the world and world politics. I believe that only a non-Eurocentric approach can deliver that which IR thinks it's doing already but isn't.
You've said that 'what makes an argument [institutionally] Eurocentric…lies with the nature of the categories that are deployed to understand development. And these ultimately comprise the perceived degree of 'rationality' that is embodied within the political, economic, ideological, and social institutions of a given society.' In order to think inter-culturally, does IR needs new conceptions of rationality, or standards other than rationality altogether?
What an extremely interesting and perceptive question which has really got me thinking! Again, it's something that I've been aware of in the recesses of my mind but have never really thought through. Certainly the essence of Eurocentrism lies in the reification of Western rationality (or what Max Weber called Zweckrationalität) and its simultaneous denial to non-Western societies. But what with all the revelations that have happened in Britain in the last decade, where a seemingly never ending series of fraudulent practices have been uncovered within British public life—whether it be MPs' expenses scandals, banking scandals, newspaper scandals and the like—then one really wonders about the extent to which the West operates according to the properties of Zweck-rationality that Weber proclaimed it to have. Corruption and fraud happen in the West but clearly they are much more hidden than in those instances where it occurs in non-Western countries (notwithstanding the revelations mentioned a moment ago). But if one were to open the lid of many large Western companies, for example, and delve inside one might well find all sorts of 'rationality-compromising' or 'rationality-denial' practices going on. To mention just two obvious examples: first, promotions are often tainted by personal linkages rather than always founded on merit; and second, managers often mark out and protect their own personal position/territory even when it (frequently) goes against the 'rational' interests of the said organization.
To return to your question, then, one could conclude that many Western institutions are far less rational than Eurocentrism proclaims, which in turn would challenge the foundations of Eurocentrism. Of course, corruption and fraud are not unique to the West, but it is the West that proclaims its unique 'rational standard of civilization'. Whether, therefore, we need to abandon the term (Zweck) rationality on the grounds that it is an impossibly conceived ideal type remains the question. Right now I don't have an answer though I'll be happy to mull over this in the coming years.
You've written that engaging with the East 'creates a genuinely global history' and articulate a 'dream wherein the peoples of the Earth can finally sit down at the table of global humanity and communicate as equal partners'. Do you consciously operate with an 'ontology' of 'peoples' and 'civilizations' as opposed to 'individuals'? How do you conceive of the relationship between global humanity and plural peoplehood? Is there an underlying philosophical or anthropological view that you are drawing on in these and similar passages?
Certainly I prefer to think of peoples and even of civilizations rather than individuals and states, though I'll confess right now that dealing theoretically with civilizations and articulating them as units of analysis is extraordinarily challenging. At the moment I leave this side of things to better people than me, such as Peter Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15) and his recentpioneering work on civilizations. The term 'global humanity' concerns me insofar as it is often a politically-loaded term, particularly within cosmopolitanism, where its underbelly comprises the desire to define a single civilizational identity (i.e., a Western one) for 'global humanity'. In essence, cosmopolitanism effectively advances the conception of a 'provincial (i.e., Western) humanity' that masquerades as the global. So I prefer the notion of plural peoplehood, so as to allow for difference. I wouldn't say that I am operating according to a particular philosophical view although it strikes me that such a notion is embodied in Johann Gottfried Herder's work which, on that dimension at least, I am attracted to. But to be honest, this is generally something that I have not explored though it is something that I've thought that I'd like to research for a future book (notwithstanding the point that I'll need to finish the book that I have started first!).
In your reply toErik Ringmar, you draw on psychoanalytic metaphors to discuss the benefits of overcoming Eurocentrism, writing that, 'Eurocentrism leads to the repression and sublimation of the Other in the Self. Thus, doing away with Eurocentrism can end the socio-psychological angst and alienation that necessarily occurs through such sublimation.' How do you envision what we now call the West (or Europe) after its socio-psychological transformation? What does a world after angst and alienation look like? Is it possible, and is that the goal you think IR theory should aim at?
Another massively challenging and fascinating question, let me have a go. Since you raised the issue of socio-psychological/psycho-analytical theory (though it is something that I am no expert on), it has always struck me that Eurocentrism itself is not simply a construct designed to advance Western power and Western capitalist interests in the world. This seems too mechanistic. For recall that it was a series of largely independent sojourners, travel-writers, novelists, journalists and others rather than capitalists who played such an important role in constructing Eurocentrism. Something more seems to be at play. One can think of the battles between 'Mods and Rockers' or Skinheads and heavy metal fans in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, who detested each other simply because they held different identities and prized different cultural values. Most importantly, I feel, the constant need to denounce, put down and dismiss the Other as inferior seems reminiscent of those kinds of people we sometimes meet who, in constantly putting down others to falsely elevate themselves to a position of superiority, ultimately reveals merely their own insecurities. The same issues, of course, underpin racism and Eurocentrism. The West rose to prominence in my view as a late-developer and having got to the top it very quickly came to view its duty as one of punishing all others for being different – all done, of course, in the name of helping or civilizing the very 'global humanity' that had done so much to help the West rise to the top in the first place! And to want to culturally convert everyone in the world according to the Western standard of civilization seems to be symptomatic of a deeply insecure mindset. A secure person or society for that matter does not feel threatened by, but openly embraces, difference.
Can we move beyond this stand-off given that such a mentality has been hard-wired within Western culture for at least three centuries? And ten if you count the sometimes terse relations between Europe and Middle Eastern Islam that emerged after 1095! We need to move beyond an identity that is based only on putting others down. It's 'bad karma' and, like all bad karma, damages the Western self, not just the non-Western other. But to transcend this identity-formation process requires us to do away with logocentrism; clearly a very big task. Nevertheless, that is exactly what my writings are all about. And it is something that I think IR theory needs to strive to achieve. Because IR theory is to an extent performative then I live in the hope, at least, that such a mentality might, just might somehow seep into international public life, though if it were to happen I strongly suspect that I would not be around to see it. Still, your question—what would a world beyond Eurocentrism look like?—though very important is nevertheless perhaps too difficult to answer without seeming like a hopeless idealist… other than to say that it could be rather better than the current one.
You write that 'IPE should aim to be an über-discipline, drawing on a wide range of disciplines in order to craft a knowledge base that refuses to become lost in disciplinary over-specialization and the depressing academic narcissism of disciplinary methodological differentiation and exclusion.' Why do you prefer that IPE should be the überdiscipline, instead of IR (or something else altogether), with IPE as a subset?
My degree was in Political Economy, my Masters in Political Sociology and my PhD in Historical Sociology and (International) Political Economy. Despite the fact that the majority of my academic career to date has been in IR research, I have always returned at various points to my old haunting ground, IPE (as I have most recently). I have always found IR a little alienating for its reification of politics, divorced from political economy. I'm not a Marxist, but I share in the view that political economy, if not always directly underpinning developments and events in the international system is, however, never far away.
The quote that you took for this question came from the end of my 2-part article that came out in the 20th anniversary edition of Review of International Political Economy. This was partly responding to Benjamin Cohen's (Theory Talk #17) 2008 seminal book, International Political Economy: A Intellectual History. One of the challenges that I issued to my IPE readership, echoing Cohen, is the need for IPE to return to 'thinking big' (in large part as a reaction to the massive contraction of the discipline's boundaries that has been effected by third wave American IPE, which labors under the intellectual hegemony of Open Economy Politics). In that context, then, I argued that IPE needs to expand its boundaries outwards not only to allow big or macro-scale issues to return to the discipline's research agenda but also to incorporate insight from other disciplines. For in my view IPE has the potential to blend the insights of many other disciplines that can in turn transcend the sometimes myopic or tunnel-vision-based nature of their particular constituent specialisms.
One of the implications of 'thinking big' is that IPE should be able to cover much of that which IR does… and more. Like Susan Strange, who expressed her exasperation with IR for its exclusion of politico-economic matters, so I feel that the solution lies not with IR colonizing IPE (which is not likely for the foreseeable future!) but with IPE expanding its currently narrow remit. If it could achieve this it could become the 'über-discipline', or the 'master discipline', of the Social Sciences, notwithstanding the point that my postcolonial and feminist friends will no doubt upbraid me for using such terrible terms!
Final question. Beyond the East outside the West, Greece is now being remade as the 'East' within the West, with a range of measures applied to it that had hitherto been the preserve for the 'East' or Global South. How can your work help to make sense of the stakes?
Your question reminds me of a similar one that I was asked in an interview for Cumhurieyet Strateji Magazine concerning Turkey's ongoing efforts to join the EU, the essence of my answer comprising: 'be careful what you wish for'. One of the things that I have felt uneasy about is the way, as I see it (and I might not be quite right in saying this), that European Studies (as a sub-discipline) sometimes appears as rather self-affirming, thereby reflecting the core self-congratulatory modus operandi of the EU. I am not anti-European or in any way ashamed to be Western (as some of my critics might think). But I'm deeply uneasy about the EU project, specifically in terms of its desire to expand outwards, not to mention inwards as we are seeing in the case of Greece today. For this has the whiff of the old civilizing mission that had supposedly been put to rest back at the time of the origins of the European Economic Community. Although Greece is a member of the EU (notwithstanding its non-European roots), it seems clear that what is going on today is a process of intensified internal colonization under the hegemony of Germany, wherein Greece is subjected to the German standard of civilization. All of which brings into question the self-glorification of the self-proclaimed 'socially progressive' EU project. And to return to my discussion of Turkey I recognize that candidate countries have their reasons for wanting to join the EU. But I guess that what my work is ultimately about is restoring a sense of dignity to non-Western peoples, in the absence of which they will continue to self-deprecate and live in angst in the long cold shadow of the West. All of which brings me back to the answers I made to quite a few of the earlier questions. So I would like to close by saying how much I have enjoyed answering your extremely well-informed questions and to thank you most sincerely for inviting me to address them.
Professor Hobson gained his PhD from the LSE (1991), joined the University of Sheffield as Reader and is currently Professor of Politics and International Relations. Previously he taught at La Trobe University, Melbourne (1991–97) and the University of Sydney (1997–2004). His main research interest concerns the area of inter-civilizational relations and everyday political economy in the context of globalization, past and present. His work is principally involved in carrying forward the critique of Eurocentrism in World History/Historical Sociology, and International Relations.
Related links
Faculty Profile at the University of Sheffield Read Hobson's The Postcolonial Paradox of Eastern Agency (Perceptions 2014) here (pdf) Read Hobson's Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? (Review of International Studies 2007) here (pdf)
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This study surveys the historical geography of suburban landscapes built and abandoned over the course of the United States' long twentieth century. Diverse thinkers and actors, it shows, have understood the edges of the American metropolis to be laboratories of a sort, experimental sites where the forms of a reordered city might be glimpsed in microcosm and put on display. Suburbs have also served as laboratories where questions of landscape's animacy — not what landscape means, the focus of a generation of scholarship in cultural geography, but what landscape does — came vividly to the fore, provoking much debate and speculation. Drawing on archival sources, visual materials, maps, plans, and field study of the built environment, this work recasts debates that have long been central to cultural geography, geographic thought, urban and suburban studies, and the intellectual histories of planning and urbanism. It argues that both the modal techniques planners and builders came to prescribe for the post–World War II suburb and the most noticeable programs since predicated on redressing suburbia's perceived failures can find their roots in prewar debates, ontological in character, on the "life" proper to landscape, indeed to matter itself. Both tendencies, the study argues furthermore, established the terms by which Americans since have considered the possibility of giving life form by way of its environment — and assessed the threats presented by built environments deemed formless.This work makes its intervention in three stages. It first assembles a new intellectual history of American planning around questions of the suburbanization of industry and the decentralization of urban form. During the Progressive Era, planners, architects, industrialists, realtors, and a host of reformers held industrial suburbs, more than strictly residential ones, to be the key to remedying urban "congestion." In ways that existing histories have not realized, these actors also articulated a distinctive ontology of suburban landscape as an animate participant in life and work. This was not an environmental determinism, as most geographers would have it, but rather a multiform theory of the milieu that was indebted to broader vitalist and materialist currents in social thought. Numerous social scientists, life scientists, and philosophers, too, contribute to this history. In juxtaposing their thought with that of the first generation of self-identified scientific planners, this study explores ongoing tensions between formalist and anti-formalist, rationalist and vitalist, organismic and non-organismic tendencies lending structure to how certain Americans have made sense of how landscape matters. Many maneuvers central to contemporary "new" materialisms, "object-oriented" ontologies, and "non-representational" theories in geography and its neighboring disciplines are, in fact, quite old. To couple them with questions of landscape, one does well to revisit the decentralist debates taking place at the turn of the twentieth century.The analysis then scales down empirically to the San Francisco Bay Region, where premiums on a decentralized metropolitan form, as well as notions of the environment's "influence," have particularly deep roots. It turns most especially to the Carquinez Strait, a peculiar, imperfectly visible vector of suburbanization east of the bay, to which industrial flight was early, intense, relatively coordinated, and financed remotely by capitalists in San Francisco and, to some extent, Oakland. From the late nineteenth century on, the Carquinez became a repository for only the most noxious functions expelled from denser urban centers, as well as a site of considerable experimentation in sorting, buffering, and enclosing the "whole" new towns employers composed adjacent to their workplaces between 1880 and 1930. In surprising, sometimes unsettling ways, planners and industrialists also theorized the affordances of ambient climate and unbuilt environment to industrial work. A prehistory of the post–World War II suburb must consider the portable models and morphologies worked out in these and other "suburbs of last resort."As the narrative moves into the postwar period, its conceptual focus pivots from questions of suburban order to suburban ruin. Since the 1970s, the Carquinez has been marked by landscapes of abandonment: decapitalized workplaces, decommissioned military installations, and, lately, overgrown pockets of the post-2008 residential foreclosure crisis. Suburbs and peripheries are increasingly the loci of American privation, but there is still a tendency among analysts to narrate urban "decline" in ways that privilege denser centers, deploying metaphors of the rotting core rather than the fraying edge, and granting visibility and salience to some landscapes of decay at the expense of others. "Suburbs of Last Resort" establishes a prehistory in this sense as well. It argues that concepts of inbuilt suburban "formlessness," which intensified in Northern California in the 1950s and 1960s, have rendered working-class suburbs, even or especially in times of their abandonment, peculiarly invisible. Such notions, too, have roots in prewar debates. The study closes by tracing a countervailing intellectual history, complementary to the more affirmative account of prescriptions for suburban form, of attempts to ontologize — and to denigrate — newly built suburbs as their own species of "ruins." It has been precisely when their form is ambiguous or abandoned that suburban landscapes have seemed most animate: "contagious" in their putative spread, productive of manifold anxieties, and provocative of new forms of reflection and action.
In summary, a "moulüe fever" has been sweeping across China since the beginning of the period of "Reform and Opening Up" in 1978. This fever was unleashed by Major General LI Bingyan's fortuitous discovery of a copy of a five hundred year-old military treatise on the Chinese 36 stratagems, which had been marked by the PLA for internal use only. Working as a journalist for the PLA Daily at the time, he requested and received permission to publicize the contents of these 36 stratagems in his newspaper column. Due to the overwhelmingly positive reception of his newspaper articles, he soon thereafter collected and published them under the title "The 36 Stratagems in a New Edition" in 1981. This book, which has sold over two million legal copies, remains the world's best-selling work on the subject. Around that time, LI Bingyan began developing his theory that Western military science had the tendency to stress the use of technology and force whereas traditional Chinese military science focused primarily on "moulüe". This led him to the idea of creating a new military discipline with the special characteristics of Eastern military science: the science of military "moulüe". After analyzing the available Western translations for "moulüe", and comparing several modern Chinese definitions of the term, including those of LI Bingyan himself, I came to the conclusion that "adversarial dynamic supraplanning" (or just "supraplanning") is the best approximation for the Chinese "moulüe". Meanwhile, these same efforts to discover the essence of "moulüe" by analyzing LI Bingyan's definitions of the term, and those of other Chinese experts, led me to the following definition of the term: "the principles of thinking and planning, and the orthodox and unorthodox methods that derive from those principles, which one uses both before and during confrontations in order to strengthen oneself and weaken one's enemies in the most economical manner." In 1983, LI Bingyan first proposed the creation of "the science of military supraplanning" in the foreword to his book "The Adaptive Supraplanning of Military Experts", which sold over half a million copies. In this book, he collected, explained, and analyzed 73 maxims from "Sunzi's Art of War", "The Methods of SIMA", "Straw Hut Planning", "Wuzi's Art of War", and various other ancient Chinese military and historical texts. These maxims were categorized into the following seven parts: "Attacking with Supraplanning", "Making Estimations and Plans in the Temple", "Encouraging the Troops", "The Art of Trickery", "Using the Unorthodox", "Adapting to Change", and "Using Agents". By translating, annotating, and analyzing excerpts from the first five of these seven parts, which include 55 of the book's 73 maxims, I have been able to demonstrate that these maxims are either supraplanning principles or supraplanning methods that conform to the definition of "military supraplanning" (junshi moulüe) as: "the principles of thinking and planning, and the orthodox and unorthodox methods that derive from those principles, which one uses both before and during military confrontations in order to strengthen oneself and weaken one's enemies in the most economical manner". I have also shown that the supraplanning methods are not limited to deception and trickery, though both play an important role in military supraplanning. Furthermore, many of the maxims are not methods at all, but rather abstract principles of thinking and planning, which LI Bingyan believes can aid the commander in achieving his goals. With this book, LI Bingyan laid the foundation for the PLA's new science of military supraplanning that was recognized as an official discipline of military science in 2001 by the CMC under Chairman JIANG Zemin. Although later books by LI Bingyan and other PLA experts have used slightly different categories and replaced certain supraplanning principles and methods with others, they all follow and expand upon the original model of LI Bingyan's book "The Adaptive Supraplanning of Military Experts". In my dialectical analysis, I have emphasized the key role played by both naïve military dialectics and dialectical materialism in the science of military supraplanning. Many of the supraplanning principles and methods chosen by LI Bingyan from ancient military texts are dialectical in nature. For example, LI Bingyan writes that military supraplanning depends on successfully resolving "[…] the dialectical relationships of the contradictions between attacking and defending, the unorthodox and the orthodox, and emptiness and fullness." I have shown how especially this last contradiction between "emptiness and fullness" is central to the supraplanning methods of "The Art of Trickery". However, this focus on naïve military dialectics is not done at the expense of the more modern Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism. Indeed, LI Bingyan and other PLA experts view MAO Zedong's military dialectics, which they believe to be a more scientific version of the naïve military dialectics of Sunzi and other ancient Chinese philosophers, as essential to understanding and applying the modern science of military supraplanning. In my political analysis, I examined the PLA's so-called "principal contradiction of army building", which determines the main focus of its activities, in order to discover why the CMC may have decided in 2001 to designate the science of military supraplanning as an official discipline. I argue that the CMC's principal contradiction of army building at the time, or "the contradiction of the nonconformity of our army's level of modernization with the need to win a partial war under the conditions of modern technology, and especially high technology", indicates that it must have viewed the science of military supraplanning as a cheap force multiplier that could help the PLA fulfill its "need to win a partial war" against a technologically superior enemy. By examining what LI Bingyan and other official Chinese sources consider to be the "principal contradiction of the world", I came to the conclusion that they expect this "technologically superior enemy" to be "US hegemonism". In my comparative analysis, I have established that the Greco-Roman "strategemata", US MILDEC, and the US operational art are all similar in some respects to the modern Chinese science of military supraplanning. However, they are each far too limited in scope to be considered a complete equivalent. While a few Western specialists have recently become aware of the "moulüe fever" that has been sweeping across China for the past three decades, it has not yet spread nearly as far in the West. If LI Bingyan is right that Western military science has had the tendency to focus on technology and force whereas traditional Chinese military science has emphasized the importance of supraplanning, it is to be expected that the West's military technology is superior, but its level of military supraplanning inferior to that of China. However, while China's military has been making rapid progress in closing its technological gap with the West, it has also made every effort to maintain its lead in military supraplanning by officially recognizing it as a discipline of military science to be taught at its military academies. Perhaps this introduction to the modern Chinese science of military supraplanning can make a small contribution towards helping the West close its "supraplanning gap" with China. ; Seit Beginn der "Periode der Reform und Öffnung" im Jahr 1978 herrscht in China ein sogenanntes "moulüe-Fieber", das von Generalmajor LI Bingyans Buch "Die 36 Strategeme in moderner Bearbeitung" ausgelöst wurde. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt begann LI Bingyan seine Theorie zu entwickeln, wonach die westliche Militärwissenschaft sich auf Technologie und Gewalt konzentriert während die traditionelle chinesische Militärwissenschaft sich eher mit "moulüe" befasst. Bald danach kam er auf die Idee, ein neues militärwissenschaftliches Lehrfach mit chinesischen Besonderheiten zu kreieren: die militärische "moulüe"-Wissenschaft. Nachdem ich die vorhandenen westlichen Übersetzungen von "moulüe" und die verschiedenen chinesischen Definitionen des Wortes analysierte, kam ich zum Schluss, dass das Wort "supraplanning" ("Supraplanung" auf Deutsch) das beste englische Äquivalent für "moulüe" ist. Im Jahre 1983 hat LI Bingyan im Vorwort seines zweiten Buches "Die adaptive Supraplanung von Militärexperten" die Schaffung einer neuen "Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung" zum ersten Mal öffentlich vorgeschlagen. In diesem Buch hat er 73 Maximen aus verschiedenen alten chinesischen militärischen und historischen Texten gesammelt, erklärt, und analysiert. Durch die Übersetzung, Erläuterung, und Analyse von Auszügen aus fünf der sieben Teile dieses Buches, also 55 der 73 Maximen, konnte ich aufzeigen, dass diese Maximen entweder Supraplanungsprinzipien oder Supraplanungsmethoden sind, die man sowohl vor als auch während Militärkonfrontationen anwenden kann, um so ökonomisch wie möglich sich selbst bzw. Freunde zu stärken und Feinde zu schwächen. Die Supraplanungsmethoden beschränken sich nicht auf List und Täuschung, obschon beide eine wichtige Rolle in der Supraplanung spielen, und viele der Maximen sind gar keine Methoden, sondern abstrakte Denk- und Planungsprinzipien. Mit diesem Buch legte LI Bingyan den Grundstein für die neue Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung, welche schliesslich im Jahr 2001 von der Zentralen Militärkommission unter JIANG Zemin als militärwissenschaftliches Lehrfach offiziell anerkannt wurde. In meiner dialektischen Analyse habe ich betont, dass sowohl die urtümliche militärische Dialektik als auch der dialektische Materialismus eine Schlüsselrolle in der modernen Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung spielen. Viele der Supraplanungsprinzipien und Supraplanungsmethoden, die LI Bingyan von den alten Militärtexten ausgewählt hat, sind naturgemäss dialektisch. Aber die Kenntnis von MAO Zedongs Militärdialektik, welche vom marxistisch-leninistischen dialektischen Materialismus beeinflusst wurde, ist auch erforderlich für das Verständnis von LI Bingyans Meinung über die Theorie und Praxis der modernen Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung. In meiner politischen Analyse habe ich den sogenannten "Hauptwiderspruch des Armeeaufbaus" untersucht, der die Hauptaufgabe der Volksbefreiungsarmee bestimmt, um herauszufinden, weshalb die Zentrale Militärkommission 2001 entschieden hat, die Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung als offizielles Lehrfach anzuerkennen. Ich habe dargelegt, dass die Zentrale Militärkommission die Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung wohl als kosteneffektive Kampfkraftverstärkung interpretiert hat, die der Volksbefreiungsarmee verhelfen könnte, ihr Bedürfnis, einen begrenzten Krieg gegen einen technologisch überlegenen Feind zu gewinnen, zu erfüllen. Ferner habe ich aufgezeigt, dass mit "technologisch überlegener Feind" die USA gemeint sind, denen LI Bingyan ein Welthegemonismus-Komplott vorwirft. In meiner komparativen Analyse habe ich festgestellt, dass die griechisch-römischen "strategemata", sowie die "MILDEC" (militärische Täuschung) und "operational art" (operative Führung) des US-Militärs zwar bestimmte Eigenschaften der chinesischen Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung teilen, jedoch nicht als äquivalent betrachtet werden können. Obwohl das chinesische "moulüe-Fieber" bereits von einigen westlichen Experten wahrgenommen wurde, hat es sich im Westen noch nicht weit verbreiten können. Wenn LI Bingyan Recht hat, dass die westliche Militärwissenschaft sich auf Technologie und Gewalt konzentriert, wogegen die traditionelle chinesische Militärwissenschaft sich eher mit der Supraplanung befasst, ist es zu erwarten, dass der Westen im Bereich Militärtechnologie China überlegen, aber im Bereich der militärischen Supraplanung unterlegen ist. Während die Chinesen rapide Fortschritte in der Beseitigung ihrer militärtechnologischen Rückständigkeit gemacht haben, haben sie aber mit der Anerkennung der Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung als offizielles Fach auch ihre Führung in der militärischen Supraplanung befestigt. Vielleicht kann die vorliegende Einführung in die moderne chinesische Wissenschaft der militärischen Supraplanung einen kleinen Beitrag zur Aufholung der supraplanerischen Rückständigkeit im Westen leisten.
[spa] El presente trabajo establece los siguientes puntos fundamentales: 1) que la elaboración ontológica galileana del concepto metafísico de una naturaleza independiente y de un pensamiento automático y objetivo de las cosas ha revolucionado de una manera histórica la cultura institucional y popular de los siglos XVI y XVII, orientando un nuevo horizonte de sentido; 2) que en su totalidad la revolución de Galileo tuvo su primer y crucial desarrollo en la propagación, académica y urbana, de una mera opinión, que, en un momento dado, se convirtió, en un primer momento en convicción política y luego en saber social; 3) que el galileismo, basado en el consenso que fue capaz de determinar en tomo suyo, llegó a organizar la lucha política de los innovadores contra las autoridades tradicionales en el campo de la ciencia; 4) que el alcance político-filosófico de la ciencia galileana del movimiento se remonta al valor performativo de sus palabras y a lo tecnológico de sus objetos; que, sobre todo después de la síntesis newtoniana, el galileísmo se ha convertido en el símbolo de la modernidad clásica no tanto sobre la base de sus descubrimientos, en parte erróneos, sino por causa de la definición físico-matemática de la naturaleza y por la elección decisiva del objeto técnico como organon del conocimiento. La presente tesis se estructura en tres capítulos que a través de los textos mismos se cortocircuitan en torno al mito científico galileano de la independencia de la naturaleza con respecto a Dios, a la salida de Dios de la escena del mundo y a la concepción de la historia como un avance tecnológico del conocimiento, tres concepciones fundamentales de las que la filosofía experimental no puede prescindir. A través de esta operación, la primera parte del primer capítulo, propondrá una mirada sobre el joven Galileo; es decir, sobre la primera fase de su pensamiento. Observaremos aquí que Galileo, aun manteniendo a grandes rasgos su peripatetismo hasta el 1602/1604, empezó a sentir a partir de 1590/1595 una cierta impaciencia y disgusto ante la autoridad de Aristóteles; que lo llevaron lenta pero firmemente a despegarse de manera crítica de la ontología tradicional, integrando progresivamente la astronomía de Copérnico con una nueva concepción del movimiento y de la estructura de la materia derivada del estudio simultáneo sobre la estática e hidrostática de Arquímedes y el atomismo democríteo. En los primeros pasos de los Juvenilia, del De motu, de las Mecaniche y, sobre todo, en el periodo comprendido entre 1602/07, mostraremos que, independientemente de la construcción del telescopio, Galilei esbozó ya las piedras angulares de la física sublunar en un sistema heliocéntrico. En la segunda parte del primer capítulo hemos llamado la atención sobre el período de incubación del Sidereus Nuncius, en el que Galileo pasó de la elaboración de un realismo platónico a la elaboración de un realismo telescópico, con el que fue finalmente posible para él ver con sus propios ojos lo que antes de 1610 era sólo una cuestión de opinión y simpatía. En el segundo capítulo, analizamos, a partir de lo dicho anteriormente, el cambio en la filosofía experimental sucesivo al 1616, es decir, desde su fase crítica a la controversia, a través de las obras de la madurez. En el tercer capítulo hemos dado una mayor contextualización a lo que hemos expuesto en los dos primeros capítulos y, a través de las obras publicadas por los peripatéticos contra la filosofía de Galileo, acentuamo los efectos políticos de la verdad con la que Galileo, en la disputa contra los aristotélicos, trazó los contornos finales de la Nueva ciencia y con ellos la "modernidad clásica". ; [eng] In order to start a genealogy of the strong sciences demonstrates the following points: 1) the Galileian metaphysical concepts of the nature's independence and of technological object, revolutionized historically the European culture of the XVI-XVII centuries and opened a new horizon of sense; 2) the development of the galileian nature's philosophy from mere opinion to public conviction and from political conviction to scientific knowledge; 3) the galileism by common consent organized and identified political struggle of the innovators against the traditional authorities on science; 4) they political and philosophical importance of the galileian science is due to the performative and technological value of its words and objects; galileism, expecially after the Newtonian synthesis, became the symbol of the classical modernity not because of his discoveries but thanks to the physical-mathematical definition of the nature and to the revaluation of the technical object as instrument (organon) for knowledge. Thesis is structured of three chapters that, on the basis of the literary sources, show how Galileo invented the nature's scientific mith of independence from history knowledge and the concept of knowledge's history as progress. In the first chapter was possible discover the Galileo's thought beyond the traditional approaches and studied the juvenile works, where we observe that the young Galileo, despite being an Aristotelian until 1602/1604, already from 1590/1595 started to express intolerance to Aristotele's authority. This intolerance led him away critically from the traditional ontology in Juvenilia, in De motu and Mecaniche and, specially between 1602 and 1607, integrated Copernico's astronomy with Archimedean hydrostatic and democritean materialism and defined the principles of his new physic in a heliocentric system. In the second half of the first chapter, Galileo moved from platonic realism to telescopic realism that allowed him to see with his own eyes what, before 1616, was only a opinion and sympathy. In the second chapter we analyzed the turning of exsperimental philosophy after 1615, from the critical phase to the polemic one. In the third chapter through the historical analysis of the peripatetic's works, we pointed out the political of Galileo's philosophy and how Galileo outlined the modernity.
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Halloween in Houston The Following is a response to Vardoulakis book Spinoza, The Epicurean that I gave at SPEP. I previously blogged about the book. One of the many merits of Dimitris Vardoulakis' Spinoza, the Epicurean: Authority and Utility in Materialism is that it focuses on the question of obedience as central to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Obedience is what differentiates revelation from knowledge, scripture from philosophy, action from belief. On one side, the first of these terms, there is obedience, that which falls under the control the state, and on the other freedom, the domain of philosophy. However, such an assertion would suggest obedience is a simple matter, that the line between obedience and freedom can be sharply drawn. Vardoulakis suggests that obedience must be understood through a dialectic of authority and freedom. As Vardoulakis describes this dialectic: Authority requires obedience whereas the drive to calculate our utility presupposes that we make our own practical judgements. Thus, under certain conditions, when authority takes over and suspends our judgements the result is political submission. But, also, under different conditions, we may calculate that it is to our utility to let someone else—for instance, someone with more knowledge or expertise—calculate our utility on our behalf. We can show the same interdependence by starting with utility: it is impossible to conceive of the human in terms of the calculation of utility without admitting that obedience, and hence authority, are necessary in certain circumstances. There is no such a thing as pure reason in human action. There is no human immune to obedience. Vardoulakis formulation is striking in two parts, first, as I have already indicated, in suggesting that the division between obedience and freedom, authority and utility, is not easy to draw, as one necessarily spills over into the other, but more importantly in suggesting that this relation is necessarily dialectical. This is the second major contribution of Vardoulakis' book, in arguing not for a dialectic reading of Spinoza but for a specifically Spinozist dialectic. The idea of a dialectic in Spinoza is a necessarily vexed one. Much of the current turn to Spinoza in contemporary thought, especially that of Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri, have promoted Spinoza as an alternative to the dialectic. It is a matter of deciding between affirmation and negation, Spinoza and Hegel. However, Pierre Macherey in the closing of Hegel or Spinoza, puts forward the notion that Spinoza offers a non-teleological dialectic. As Macherey writes, outlining the fundamental problems of this dialectic, What is or what would be a dialectic that functioned in the absence of all guarantees, in an absolutely causal manner, without a prior orientation that would establish within it, from beginning, the principle of absolute negativity, without the promise that all the contradictions in which it engages are by rights resolved, because they carry within them the conditions of their resolution? The contemporary turn to Spinoza is itself split, without a necessary conditions of a guarantee, between those who see Spinoza as opposed to the dialectic, to negativity and contradiction, and those that see in Spinoza not the nondialectical other of the dialectic, but its dialectical correction, a surprising one since, as Macherey argues, in this case the correction comes before the deviation, Spinoza before Hegel. Spinoza makes possible a dialectic without telos or resolution, a materialist dialectic. Vardoulakis' declaration of the dialectic of authority and utility is most productively read against the backdrop of this turn to a Spinozist dialectic, or a dialectic in Spinoza, which is to say along with Pierre Macherey and Etienne Balibar as his central interlocutors. (I say Balibar and Macherey, but for the purpose of this response I am going to focus on the former, but Macherey's Sagesse ou Ignorance would seem to have its own dialectic of obedience). As I will argue, in each case what is examined dialectically is obedience itself, or, what we could call, following contemporary philosophy, subjection. That subjection is dialectical can be glimpsed from Spinoza's well known formulation that the masses fight for "servitude as if it was salvation," the formulation suggests that subjection must be thought not just as something passively endured but something actively strived for, we need to see subjection in activity and activity in subjection. In this way a dialectical reading overcomes the limitations of those interpretations which have apparently found in Spinoza only a theory of subjection, of ideology, or of subversion, of affirmative transformation.. The most obvious of the former would be Louis Althusser, for whom the Spinozist theory of the imagination, with its focus on the subject, is the basis of ideological interpellation. It also overcomes the limitations of those, such as Deleuze and Negri, who find in Spinoza the affirmation of a constitutive and transformative power. Reading Spinoza dialectically means recognize that the very terms of opposition, subjection and constitution, negation and affirmation, must be thought of as thoroughly intertwined. Spinoza is neither a thinker of pure subjection, of the imagination, or first kind of knowledge as ideology, but nor is he the thinker of constituent power or affirmative lines of flight. He is neither of these things, or perhaps both of these things, because subjection and its opposite, lines of flight or constitutive power, are neither of these things. We are always dealing with both, and with both intertwined, that is part of what it means to read Spinoza dialectically. What do we mean by dialectic? In some sense a definition of the dialectic would seem to be, well undialectical, but beyond such an objection, which is both always tempting and always disappointing, I think that we can offer a basic formulation of at least a few common aspects. First, such a dialectic involves both a unity and a contradiction of opposites, but one without a third term or necessary resolution. Authority and Utility do not resolve themselves into some sublation through the authority of utility itself in a kind of enlightened democracy. However, this does not mean that such a dialectic is entirely static. The rejection of a general resolution, of a third term, means that the resolution of these tensions can only be thought in their historical specificity. Spinoza's historical study of Moses is not an illustration of a general principle but specific instances of what in a concrete situation, a political dialectic. As Balibar argues, "Spinoza's definition can be considered dialectical in the sense that the passage from the abstract to the concrete, as the development of the initial formula's contradictions, arises from a historical study." Spinoza's engagement with the singular case in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is necessary because the contradictions of utility and authority only resolve themselves in a specific situation. The existing historical situation is not just a contradictory unity of authority and utility, but also reason and imagination. Etienne Balibar has made this particular dialectic central to his understanding of Spinoza. Spinoza reflects on the intersections of imagination and reason, affect and intellect, in the constitution of the collective and the individual in at least two places. The first is in terms of the general definition of ambition. Ambition is the affective constitution of society, the desire that others love what I love, that others live according to my temperament [ingenium]. As such it is inseparable from the imagination, from the imaginary constitution of the other's desire and love. In and through ambition we constitute the image of the other, of 'men' [homines] in general, the generic image of others that functions as a guide for our actions and desires (EIIIP29). It is no longer the love or hatred of this or that individual, or collection of individuals that orients an individual's actions, but a generic idea, a kind of 'society effect.' There are two limits to this affective constitution of ambition. First, at the level of sociality, and the conceptual grasp of social relations, 'men' is a universal. For Spinoza all universals stem from the human body's finitude, it is affected by so many images that it can no longer grasp the singular differences (EIIP40S). What is left then is a generic idea that is produced by the inability to imagine all the myriad things, a universal that is always tainted by some particular content: some will imagine man as a rational animal, while others will think of a featherless biped. The 'men' who we strive to act like, whose image governs our loves and hates, is a fiction, an unstable universal that is imagined differently by different individuals. It is as much a condition of discord as harmony. Second, there is a problem at the level of the object of this sociality, that which we want others to love or hate. We desire that others love what we love, the love (or hatred) we feel is strengthened by the idea that others love what we love. This ambition becomes a source of conflict especially if the object that we desire is subject to the rule of scarcity, and thus cannot be possessed by all equally. Ambition is thus internally conflicted. As Spinoza writes, 'those who love are not of one mind in their love—while they rejoice to sing the praises of the thing they love, they fear to be believed' (EIVP37S1). The constitution of society through ambition is inherently contradictory, the very things that draw people together, the desire to love as others love and to have others love what I love, divide them as well. As conflicted as this sociality is, it is a sociality, which is to say that the ambivalence of ambition are not a remnant of the state of nature, but are a product of sociality itself. Society, or, as Spinoza puts it, the city, is not exclusively founded on the ambivalent sociality of the passions. It is also founded on reason, on the powers of the intellect. It is the same conatus, the same striving, underlying reason and ambition. In each case there is a striving to make the temperament of the individual coincide with others, to constitute a collective temperament that would reflect the individual. However, the essential difference is in how this relation to the other and the object is constituted. The rational constitution of the state is based on the recognition that it is more useful to live with others. This idea of man is not the idea of men constituted through the imagination, it is not the universal idea, but the utility of sociality relations. It is not the desire that others live as I live, or that I coordinate my love and hates with others, but mankind can accomplish more collectively than individually (EIVP35S). As Spinoza famously writes, 'nothing is more useful to man than man' (EIVP37S2). This idea of man does not produce the ambivalence that determines the affect of ambition. Individuals guided by reason actually agree with each other, add and assist each other, rather than strive to orient their actions around an impossible object of what the others want. Moreover, reason as an object of desire is truly common, not only can it be shared by all, but its worth increases with the number of people who participate in it (EIVP36). Reason is not scarce, not finite, and is actually increased by others thinking the same thing. Men under the guidance of reason can overcome the contradictions of ambition and actually desire that others desire what they desire. These two different foundations of the city, these two different genesis of sociality, one based on the affect of ambition and the other based on reason, are not two different options: there is not a city of affects and a city of reason supplanting each other as two different phases, two different orders. Spinoza's text presents them as two different demonstrations of the same thing, suggesting the coexistence of these two different constitutions of society. As Balibar writes, 'Sociability is therefore the unity of a real agreement and an imaginary ambivalence, both of which have real effects.' We are always dealing with both affects, with ambition, and reason, with a city founded on a projection of our ideas of man, and a city founded on our rational utility. While there is no telos, no necessary progression by which the city founded on reason, a democracy, necessarily displaces a city founded on founded on superstition and affects, that does no meant that the relation is entirely static. The particular combination of reason and affects defines the nature of a given city, and its particular history. There is no more one generic essence of the city's striving than there is an essence of man's singular striving. The striving, the particular relations that constitute the city, the collective, must be thought from the singular case, from the specific way it is affected and determined. There is thus a history, but this history must be thought from the singular case, from the particular way in which any given city combines ambition and reason, affects and knowledge. For Balibar this is not just a reading of Spinoza, but could be understood to be a general thesis about politics in general, which is always situated between reason, on the fundamental thesis that "nothing is more useful to man than man," that we benefit from living in a society, from the way in which living among others makes our lives better than a solitary life. This fact is true of any society which has an irreducible dimension of utility. At the same time every society is founded on an imaginary institution, an image of what it means to be in a city, what it means to be human. Every city is both rational and imagined, and this contradictory unity of these two scenes exists in each specific case. As much as it is possible to push the city to become more rational, which is to say less exclusive and hierarchal, it is never possible to dispense with the other scene entirely. This limit acts back on political philosophy itself, as Balibar argues any attempt to think through the relation of Spinoza and Marx must necessarily recognize the limit of each to think the other scene. As Balibar writes, It would be easy to conclude that Marx is basically unaware of the "other scene" of politics, the scene of communitarian affiliation, and therefore unaware of symbolic violence as well (although he names it or has bequeathed us with the word ideology, one of the aptest names for it); and to conclude that Spinoza, for his part, basically ignores the irreducible level of economic antagonism (doubtless because, at the economic level, where conatus can perhaps be conceived of as a "productive force," Spinoza is basically an optimist and a utilitarian" (Balibar 2015: 12) The dialectic of imagination and reason means that any philosophy that focuses on reason, on individual or collective interest as the basis of politics, must necessarily contend with imaginary identifications, and any politics of the imagination, or imagined communities, must necessarily contend with the rational basis of any social relation. It is possible to map these two dialectics onto each other, to argue that reason is utility and vice versa, since nothing is more useful to man than man, and, at the same time, that authority is constituted in an through the imagination, since authority, that which cannot be contested often passes through the theological, which is to say superstition which is founded upon the imagination. However, what I would like to suggest is that we see the dialectic of utility and authority and that of imagination and reason as two fundamentally different dialectics, which intersect without necessarily reflecting each other. This is in part because, as Vardoulakis argues, authority cannot be neatly mapped onto the imagination even as it passes through it especially in those forms inflected by religion and superstition. Authority exists in part because humanity does not always recognize what is useful, namely that a political order which combines the efforts of each, is useful. For those who do not recognized the utility of society, or more to the point, those who do not recognize it in the moment, since we see the better and do the worse from time to time, we are all social and anti-social, authority provides another foundation for society. Authority is a necessary supplement to the rational basis of society, and as such it could be described as a rational irrationality, or a-rationality. Authority which is outside of reason because it cannot be contested by reason has a rational basis, or to put it more succinctly, sometimes there is a utility to authority. However, at the exact moment that such a claim can be made, a claim that would unite two into one through the expansive sense of utility, they come asunder because if authority is useful, a necessary supplement to the rational understanding of society, than it can be evaluated in terms of its utility. This is what Negri identifies as the historical criticism of religion. Religion, it is argued, played its part in sustaining and bringing together the human community during a period in which it could not govern itself, as in the case of Moses leading his people out of slavery, but it is no longer useful, creating conflict rather than accord, and functioning as a fetter on the powers and forces of society. Any attempt to unify authority and utility into one term, make authority useful or utility itself authority, necessarily fails, producing its opposite. The two dialectics could also be differentiated in terms of their specific foundations. Imagination and reason are grounded on an anthropological basis, on humanities capacity to affect and be affected. The two images of humanity, the one defined by utility and rationality is an concept of humanity, while the other, that of the imagined community is an image, and like all images it is defined by the bodies inability to hold multiple images together. All images of humanity, or of a common community, are necessarily shaped by particular images of society. In contrast to this, authority is less an anthropological fact than a particular institution, it is artificial, or more to the point it is an attempt to contend with the artificial ground of any social order. This is why there is an appeal to the theological in those moments of foundation. As much as the two dialectics overlap, as reason and utility are two different expressions of the same thing, and imagination and authority pass through the same relation to the past, they cannot be said to be the same thing, the political or institutional cannot be reduced to the anthropological and vice versa. The two different dialectical reflect the fundamental fact that any given political order is at once an effect of anthropology, stemming from human reason and imagination, but exceeds it in that any political order cannot be reduced to imagination and reason. This brings us to what could be considered the third moment of the spinozist dialectic, one that pushes it furthest from a Hegelian understanding, if the first is to be found in the unity of opposites, a basic criteria for a dialectic, and the second in the non-teleology, or, to say the same thing differently in the historical specificity of its resolution, then the third moment is in the necessary overdetermination of the dialectic itself. There is never anything like a contradiction, or even a central contradiction, which would be able to encompass the totality of the historical moment. It is not a matter of a dialectic of authority and utility, of reason and imagination, or of affect and concept, to add another figure but of the necessary overdetermination of any dialectic, as reason and imagination, utility and authority intersect with and complicate each other. This is only to name the two we have briefly considered here, we could also consider the dialectic of desire and the affects which have been explored by Frédéric Lordon. The merit of Vardoulakis book is not just that he has given us a new contradiction, that of authority and utility, which remain outside of the scope of most discussions of Spinoza, but that in insisting on the dialectical dimension of that relation he offers a way to not only encompass the others, but brings us that closer to thinking together Spinoza and dialectical thought.
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Theory Talk #75: Tarak Barkawi on IR after the West, and why the best work in IR is often found at its marginsIn this Talk, Tarak Barkawi discusses the importance of the archive and real-world experiences, at a time of growing institutional constraints. He reflects on the growing rationalization and "schoolification" of the academy, a disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized within a university audit culture, and the future of IR in a post-COVID world. He also discusses IR's contorted relationship to the archive, and explore future sites of critical innovation and inquiry, including the value of knowledge production outside of the academy. PDF version of this TalkSo what is, or should be, according to you, the biggest challenge, or principal debate in critical social sciences and history?Right now, despite thinking about it, I don't have an answer to that question. Had you asked me five years ago, I would have said, without hesitation, Eurocentrism. There's a line in Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe where he remarks that Europe has already been provincialized by history, but we still needed to provincialize it intellectually in the social sciences. Both sides of this equation have intensified in recent years. Amid a pandemic, in the wreckage of neoliberalism, in the wake of financial crisis, the defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, the events of the Trump Presidency, and the return of the far right, the West feels fundamentally reduced in stature. The academy, meanwhile, has moved on from the postcolonial to the decolonial with its focus on alternative epistemologies, about which I am more ambivalent intellectually and politically. Western states and societies are powerful and rich, their freedoms attractive, and most of them will rebound. But what does it mean for the social sciences and other Western intellectual traditions which trace their heritage to the European Enlightenments that the West may no longer be 'the West', no longer the metropole of a global order more or less controlled by its leading states? What kind of implications does the disassembling of the West in world history have for social and political inquiry? I don't have an answer to that. Speaking more specifically about IR, we are dealing now with conservative appropriations of Eurocentrism, with the rise of other civilizational IRs (Chinese, European, Indian). These kinds of moves, like the decolonial one, foreground ultimately incommensurable systems of knowing and valuing, at best, and at worst are Eurocentrism with the signs reversed, usually to China. I do not think what we should be doing right now in the academy is having Chinese social sciences, Islamic social sciences, Indian social sciences, and so on. But that's definitely one way in which the collapse of the West is playing out intellectually. How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?By the time you get to my age you have a lot of debt, mostly to students, to old teachers and supervisors, and to colleagues and friends. University scholars tend not to have very exciting lives, so I don't have much to offer in the way of events. But I can give you an experience that I do keep revisiting when I reflect on the directions I've taken and the things I've been interested in. When I was in high school, I took a university course taught by Daniel Ellsberg, of the Pentagon Papers. As many will know, before he became involved in the Vietnam War, and later in opposing it, he worked on game theory and nuclear strategy. I grew up in Southern California, in Orange County, and there was a program that let you take courses at the University of California, Irvine. I took one on the history of the Roman Empire and then a pair of courses on nuclear weapons that culminated with one taught by Ellsberg himself. I actually had no idea who he was but the topic interested me. Nuclear war was in the air in the early 1980s. Activist graduate students taught the preparatory course. They were good teachers and I learned all about the history and politics of nuclear weapons. But I also came to realize that these teachers were trying to shape (what I would now call) my political subjectivity. Sometimes they were ham handed, like the old ball bearings in the tin can trick: turn the lights out in the room, and put one ball bearing in the can for each nuclear warhead in the world, in 1945 this many; in 1955 this many; and so on. In retrospect, that's where I got hooked on the idea of graduate school. I was aware that Ellsberg was regarded as an important personage. He taught in a large lecture hall. At every session, a kind of loyal corps of new and old activists turned out, many in some version of '60s attire. The father of a high school friend was desperate to get Ellsberg's autograph, and sent his son along with me to the lecture one night to get it. It was political instruction of the first order to figure out that this suburban dad had been a physics PhD at Berkley in the late '60s and early '70s, demonstrating against the Vietnam War. But now he worked for a major aerospace defense contractor. He had a hot tub in his backyard. Meanwhile, Ellsberg cancelled class one week because he'd been arrested demonstrating at a major arms fair in Los Angeles. "We stopped the arms race for a few hours," he told the class after. I schooled myself on who Ellsberg was and Vietnam, the Cold War, and much else came into view. Meanwhile, he gave a master class in nuclear weapons and foreign policy, cheekily naming his course after Kissinger's book, I later came to appreciate. I learned about RAND, the utility of madness for making nuclear threats, and how close we'd come to nuclear war since 1945. My high school had actually been built to double as a fallout shelter, at a time when civil defense was taken seriously as an aspect of a credible threat of second strike. It was low slung, stoutly built, with high iron fences that could be closed to create a cantonment. We were not far from Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station and a range of other likely targets. All of this sank in as I progressed in these courses. Then one day at a strip mall bookstore, I discovered Noam Chomsky's US foreign policy books and never looked back. At Cambridge, I caught the tail end of the old Centre of International Studies, originally started by an intelligence historian and explicitly multi-disciplinary. It had, in my time, historians, lawyers, area studies, development studies, political theory and history of thought, and IR scholars and political scientists. Boundaries certainly existed out there in the disciplines. But there weren't substantial institutional obstacles to thinking across them, while interdisciplinary environments gave you lots of local resources (i.e. colleagues and students) for thinking and reading creatively. What would a student need to become a kind of specialist in your kind of area or field or to understand the world in a global way? Lots of history, especially other peoples' histories; to experience what it's like to see the world from a different place than where you grew up, so that the foreign is not an abstraction to you. I think another route that can create very interesting scholars is to have a practitioner career first, in development, the military, a diplomatic corps, NGOs, whatever. Even only five years doing something like that not only teaches people how the world works, it is intellectually fecund, creative. People just out of operational posts are often full of ideas, and can access interesting resources for research, like professional networks. How, in your view, should IR responding to the shifting geopolitical landscape? The fate I think we want to avoid is carrying on with what Stanley Hoffmann called the "American social science": the IR invented out of imperial crisis and world war by Anglo-American officials, foundations and thinkers. Very broadly speaking, and with variations, this was a new world combination of realism and positivism. This discipline was intended as the intellectual counterpart to the American-centered world order, designed, among other things, to disappear the question of race in the century of the global color line. The way it conceived the national/international world obscured how US world power worked in practice. That power operated in and through formally sovereign, independent states—an empire by invitation, in the somewhat rosy view of Geir Lundestad—trialed in Latin America and well suited to a decolonizing world. It was an anti-colonial imperium. Political science divided up this world between IR and comparative politics. This kind of IR is cortically connected to the American-centered world fading away before our eyes. It is a kind of zombie discipline where we teach students about world politics as if we were still sitting with the great power peacemakers of 1919 and 1944-45. It is still studying how to make states cooperate under a hegemon or how to make credible deterrence threats in various circumstances. Interestingly, I think one of the ways the collapse of US power is shaping the discipline was identified by Walt and Mearsheimer in their 2013 article on the decline of theory in IR. In the US especially but not only, IR is increasingly indistinguishable from political science as a universal positivist enterprise mostly interested in applying highly evolved, quantitative or experimental approaches to more or less minor questions. Go too far down this road and IR disappears as a distinct disciplinary space, it becomes just a subject matter, a site of empiricist inquiry. Instead, the best work in IR mostly occurs on the edges of the discipline. IR often serves as cover for diverse and interdisciplinary work on transboundary relations. Those relations fall outside the core objects of analysis of the main social science and humanities disciplines but are IR's distinctive focus. The mainstream, inter-paradigm discipline, for me, has never been a convincing social science of the international and is not something I teach or think much about these days. But the classical inheritances of the discipline help IR retain significant historical, philosophical and normative dimensions. Add in a pluralist disposition towards methodology, and IR can be a unique intellectual space capable of producing scholars and scholarship that operate across disciplines. The new materialism, or political ecology, is one area in which this is really happening right now. IR is also a receptive home for debating the questions thrown up by the decolonial turn. These are two big themes in contemporary intellectual life, in and beyond the academy. IR potentially offers distinct perspectives on them which can push debates forward in unexpected ways, in part because we retain a focus on the political and the state, which too easily drop out of sight in global turns in other disciplines. In exchange, topics like the new materialism and the decolonial offer IR the chance to connect with world politics in these new times, after the American century. In my view, and it is not one that I think is widely shared, IR should become the "studies" discipline that centers on the transboundary. How do we re-imagine IR as the interdisciplinary site for the study of transboundary relations as a distinct social and political space? That's a question of general interest in a global world, but one which few traditions of thought are as well-equipped to reflect on and push forward as we are.That's an interesting and forceful critique which also brings us back to a common thread throughout your work: questions of power and knowledge and specifically the relation between power and knowledge in IR and social science. I'm interested in exploring this point further, because so much of your critique has been centered on how profoundly Eurocentric IR is and as a product of Western power. Well, IR's development as a discipline has been closely tied to Western state power. It would seem that it has to change, given the shifts underway in the world. It's like Wile E. Coyote in the Road Runner cartoons - he's run off the cliff. His legs are still moving, but he hasn't dropped, yet. That said, there's no singularly determinate relation between power and the historical development of intellectual traditions. Who knows what kind of new ideas and re-imagining of IR's concepts we might see? As I say, I think one reflection of these changes is that we're already seeing North American IR start to fade into universal quantitative social science. As Hoffmann observed, part of IR's appeal was that the Americans were running the world, that's why you started a social science concerned with things like bipolarity and deterrence, and with analyzing the foreign policy of a great power and its interests and conflicts around the world. Nowadays the Americans are at a late Roman stage of imperial decline. Thinking from the command posts of US foreign policy doesn't look so attractive or convincing when Emperor Nero is running the show, or something altogether darker is waiting in the wings. IR is supposed to be in command of world politics, analyzing them from on high. But what I've seen over the course of my education and career is the way world politics commands IR. The end of the Cold War torpedoed many careers and projects; the 1990s created corps of scholars concerned with development, civil war and humanitarian intervention; in the 2000s, we produced terrorism experts (and critical terrorism studies) and counterinsurgency specialists and critics, along with many scholars concerned in one way or another with Islam. What I have always found fascinating, and deeply indicative, about IR is the relative absence until relatively recently of serious inquiry into power/knowledge relations or the sociology of knowledge. In 1998 when Ole Waever goes to look at some of these questions, he notes how little there was to work from then, before Oren, Vitalis, Guilhot and others published. It's an astounding observation. In area studies, in anthropology, in the history of science, in development studies, in all of these areas of inquiry so closely entangled with imperial and state power, there are long-running, well developed traditions of inquiry into power/knowledge relations. It's a well-recognized area of inquiry, not some fringe activity, and it's heavily empirical, primary sourced based, as well as interesting conceptually. In recent decades you've seen really significant work come out about the role of the Second World War in the development of game theory, and its continuing entwinement with the nuclear contest of the Cold War. I'm thinking here of S.M. Amadae, Paul Erickson, and Philip Mirowski among others. The knowledge forms the American social science used to study world politics were part and parcel of world politics, they were internal to histories of geopolitics rather than in command of them. Of course, for a social science that models itself on natural science, with methodologies that produce so-called objective knowledge, the idea that scientific knowledge itself is historical and power-ridden, well, you can't really make sense of that. You'd be put in the incoherent position of studying it objectively, as it were, with the same tools. IR arises from the terminal crisis of the British Empire; its political presuppositions and much else were fundamentally shaped by the worldwide anti-communist project of the US Cold War state; and it removed race as a term of inquiry into world politics during the century of the global color line. All this, and but for Hoffmann's essay, IR has no tradition of power/knowledge inquiry into its own house until recently? It's not credible intellectually. Anthropologists should be brought in to teach us how to do this kind of thing. You've been at the forefront of the notion of historical IR, and in investigating the relationship between history and theory – why is history important for IR?Well, I think I'd start with the question of what do we mean when we say history? For mainstream social science, it means facts in the past against which to test theories and explanations. For critical IR scholars, it usually means historicism, as that term is understood in social theory: social phenomena are historical, shaped by time and place. Class, state, race, nation, empire, war, these are all different in different contexts. While I think this is a very significant insight and one that I agree with, on its own it tends to imply that historical knowledge is available, that it can be found by reading historians. In fact, for both empiricism and historicism there is a presumption that you can pretty reliably find out what happened in the past. For me, this ignores a second kind of historicism, the historicism of history writing itself, the historiographical. The questions historians ask, how they inquire into them, the particular archives they use, the ways in which they construct meaning and significance in their narratives, the questions they don't ask, that about which they are silent, all of these, shape history writing, the history that we know about. The upshot is that the past is not stable; it keeps changing as these two meanings of historicism intertwine. We understand the Haitian revolution now, or the indigenous peoples of the Americas, entirely differently than we did just a few decades ago.That raises another twist to this problem. Many IR scholars access history through reading historians or through synthetic accounts; they encounter history by and large through secondary sources. One consequence is that they are often a generation or more behind university historians. Think of how Gaddis, for instance, remains a go to authority on the history of the Cold War in IR. In other disciplines, from the 1980s on, there was a historical turn that took scholars into the archives. Anthropologists and literary scholars used historians' tools to answers their own questions. The result was not just a bunch of history books, but entirely new readings of core questions. The classic example is the historical Shakespeare that Stephen Greenblatt found in the archives, rather than the one whose texts had been read by generations of students in English departments. My point here is that working in archives was conceptually, theoretically significant for these disciplines and the subjects they studied. For example, historical anthropology has given us new perspectives on imperialism. While there is some archival work in IR of course, especially in disciplinary history, it is not central to disciplinary debates and the purpose is usually theory testing in which the past appears as merely a bag of facts. In sum, when I say history and theory, I don't just mean thinking historically. I mean actually doing history, being an historian—which means archives—and in so doing becoming a better theorist. Could you expand on these points by telling us about your recent work on military history? I think that military history is particularly interesting because it is a site where war is reproduced and shaped. Military history participates in that which it purports only to study. Popular military histories shape the identities of publics. Staff college versions are about learning lessons and fighting war better the next time. People who grow up wanting to be soldiers often read about them in history books. So our historical knowledge of war, and war as a social and historical process, are wrapped up together. I hope some sense of the promise of power/knowledge studies for larger questions comes through here. I'm saying that part of what war is as a social phenomenon is history writing about it. It's in this kind of context that the fact that a great deal of military history is actually written by veterans, often of the very campaigns of which they write, becomes interesting. Battle produces its own historians. This is a tradition that goes back to European antiquity, soldiers and commanders returning to write histories, the histories, of the wars they fought in. So this question of veterans' history writing is in constitutive relations with warfare, and with the West and its nations and armies. My shorthand for the particular area of this I want to look into is what I call "White men's military histories". That is, Western military history in the modern era is racialized, not just about enemies but about the White identities constructed in and through it. And I want to look at the way this is done in campaigns against racialized others, particularly situations where defeats and reverses were inflicted on the Westerners. How were such events and experiences made sense of historically? How were they mediated in and through military history? I think defeats are particularly productive, incitements to discourse and sense making. To think about these questions, I want to look at the place of veterans in the production of military histories, as authors, sources, communities of interpretation. My sandbox is the tumultuous first year of the Korean War, where US forces suffered publically-evident reverses and risked being pushed into the sea. In a variety of ways, veterans shape military history, through their questions, their grievances, their struggles over reputation, their memories. This happens at many different sites and scales, including official and popular histories, and the networks of veterans behind them as well as other, independently published works. Over the course of veterans' lives, their war throws up questions and issues that become the subject of sometimes dueling and contradictory accounts. Through their history writing, they connect their war experience to Western traditions of battle historiography. They make their war speak to other wars. This is what military history is, and how it can come to produce and reproduce practices of war-making, at least in Anglo-American context. Of course, much of this history writing, like narrations of experience generally, reflects dominant ideologies, in this case discourses of the US Cold War in Asia. But counter-historians are also to be found among soldiers. The shocks and tragic absurdities of any given war produce research questions of their own. At risk of mixing metaphors, the veterans know where the skeletons are buried. They bear resentments and grievances about how their war was conducted that become research topics, and they often have the networks and wherewithal to produce informed and systematic accounts. So as well as reproducing hegemonic discourses, soldier historians are also interesting as a new critical resource for understanding war.This shouldn't be that surprising. In other areas of inquiry, amateur and practitioner scholars have often been a source of critical innovation. LGBTQ history starts outside the academy, among activists who turned their apartments into archives. Much of what we now call postcolonial scholarship also began outside the academy, among colonized intellectuals involved in anti-imperial struggles. Let me close this off by going back to the archive. There are really rich sources for this kind of project. Military historians of all kinds leave behind papers full of their research materials and correspondence. The commanders and others they wrote about often waged extended epistolary campaigns concerned with correcting and shaping the historical record. But more than this, by situating archival sources alongside what later became researched and published histories, what drops out and what goes in to military history comes into view. What is silenced, and what is given voice? We can then see how the violent and forlorn episodes of war are turned into narrated events with military meaning. What is the process by which war experience becomes military history?Given the interdisciplinary nature of your work, what field you place yourself in? And are there any problems have you encountered when writing and thinking across scholarly boundaries?In my head I live in a kind of idealized interdisciplinary war studies, and my field is the intersection of war and empire. Sort of Michael Howard meets Critical Theory and Frantz Fanon. This has given me a particular voice in critical IR broadly conceived, and a distinctive place from which to engage the discipline. The mostly UK departments I've been in have been broadly hospitable places in practice for interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching, so long as you published rather than perished. Of course, interdisciplinary is a complicated word. It is one thing to be multi-disciplinary, to publish in the core journals of more than one discipline and to be recognized and read by scholars in more than one discipline. But work that falls between disciplinary centers, which takes up questions and offers answers recognized centrally by no discipline, that's something harder to deal with. I thought after Soldiers of Empire won prizes in two disciplines that I'd have an easier time getting funding for the project I described earlier in the interview. But I've gotten nowhere, despite years of applications to a variety of US, UK, and European funders. Of course, this may be because it is a bad project! My point, though, is that disciplines necessarily, and even rightly, privilege work that speaks to central questions; that's the work that naturally takes on significance in disciplinary contexts, as in many grant or scholarship panels. I think another point here is the nature of the times. Understandably, no one is particularly interested right now in White men's military histories. What I think has really empowered disciplines during my time in the UK academy has been the intersection with audit culture and university management. Repeated waves of rationalization have washed over the UK academy, which have emphasized discipline as a unit of measurement and management even as departments themselves were often "schoolified" into more or less odd combinations of disciplines. Schoolification helped to break down old solidarities and identities, while audit culture needed something on which to base its measures. The great victory of neoliberalism over the academy is evident in the way it is just accepted now that performance has to be assessed by various public criteria. This is where top disciplinary journals enter the picture, as unquestionable (and quantifiable) indicators of excellence. Interdisciplinary journals don't have the same recognition, constituency, or obvious significance. To put it in IR terms, Environment and Planning D or Comparative Studies in Society and History, to take two top journals that interdisciplinary IR types publish in, will never have the same weight as, say, ISQ or APSR. That that seems natural is an indicator of change—when I started, RIS—traditionally welcoming of interdisciplinary scholarship—was seen as just as good a place to publish as any US journal. Now RIS is perceived as merely a "national" journal while ISQ and APSR are "international" or world-class. This kind of thing has consequences for careers and the make-up of departments. What I'm drawing attention to is not so much an intellectual or academic debate; scholars always disagree on what good scholarship is, which is how it is supposed to be. It is rather the combination of discipline with the suffocating culture of petty management that pervades so much of British life. Get your disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized in an audit culture environment, and you can really expand. For example, the professionalization of methods training in the UK has worked as a kind of Trojan Horse for quantitative and positivist approaches within disciplines. In IR, in the potted geographic lingo we use, that has meant more US style work. Disappearing is the idea of IR as an "inter-discipline," where departments have multi-disciplinary identities like I described above. The US idea that IR is part of political science is much more the common sense now than it was in the UK. Another dimension of the eclipse of interdisciplinary IR has been the rise of quantitative European political science, boosted by large, multiyear grants from the ERC and national research councils. It's pretty crazy, strategically speaking, for the UK to establish a civilizational scale where you're always behind the US or its European counterparts. You'll never do North American IR as well as the North Americans do, especially given the disparity in resources. You'll always be trending second or third tier. The British do like to beat themselves up. Meanwhile, making US political science journals the practical standard for "international excellence" threatens to make the environment toxic for the very scholarship that has made British IR distinctive and attractive globally. The upshot of that will be another wave of émigré scholars, which the British academy's crises and reform initiatives produce from time to time. Think of the generation of UK IR scholars who decamped to Australia, an academy poised to prosper in the post-covid world (if the government there can get its vaccination program on track) and a major site right now of really innovative IR scholarship. To return to what you mentioned earlier regarding the hesitancy to go to the archives, this is also mirrored in a hesitancy to do serious ethnography, I think as well. Or there's this "doing ethnography" that involves a three-day field trip. This kind of sweet-shop 'pick and mix' has come to characterize some methodologies, because of these constraints that you highlight…A lot of what I'm talking about has happened within universities, it's not externally imposed or a direct consequence of the various government-run assessment exercises. Academics, eagerly assisted by university managers, have done a lot of this to themselves and their students. The implications can be far reaching for the kind of scholarship that departments foster, from PhDs on up. More and more of the UK PhD is taken up with research methods courses, largely oriented around positivism even if they have critical components. Already this gives a directionality to ideas. The advantage of the traditional UK PhD—working on your own with a supervisor to produce a piece of research—has been intellectual freedom, even when the supervisor wasn't doing their job properly. It's not great, but the possibility for creative, innovative, even field changing scholarship was retained. PhD students weren't disciplined, so to speak. What happens now is that PhD students are subject to a very strict four year deadline, often only partially funded, their universities caring mainly about timely completion not placement and preparation for a scholarly career, a classic case of the measurement displacing the substantive value. The formal coursework they get is methods driven. You can supervise interdisciplinary PhD research in this kind of environment, but it's not easy and poses real risks and creates myriad obstacles for the student. A strange consequence of this, as many of my master's students will tell you, is that I often advise them to consider US PhDs, just in other disciplines. That way, they get the benefit of rigorous PhD level coursework beyond methods. They can do so in disciplines like history or anthropology that are currently receptive both to the critical and the transnational/transboundary. That is not a great outcome for UK IR, even if it may be for critically-minded students. Outside of a very few institutions and scattered individuals, US political science, of course, has largely cleansed itself of the critical and alternative approaches that had started to flower in the glasnost era of the 1990s. That is not something we should be seeking to emulate in the UK.So yes, there's much to say here, about how the four year PhD has materially shaped scholarship in the UK. There is generally very little funding for field work. Universities worried about liability have put all kinds of obstacles in the way of students trying to get to field work sites. Requirements like insisting that students be in residence for their fourth year in order to write up and submit on time further limit the possibilities for field work. The upshot is to make the PhD dissertation more a library exercise or to favor the kind of quantitative, data science work that fits more easily into these time constraints and structures. Again, quite obviously, power sculpts knowledge. It becomes simply impossible, within the PhD, to do the kinds of things associated with serious qualitative scholarship, like learn languages, spend long time periods in field sites and to visit them more than once, to develop real networks there. Over time this shapes the academy, often in unintended ways. I think this is one of the reasons that IR in the UK has been so theoretic in character—what else can people do but read books, think and write in this kind of environment? As I say, the other kind of thing they can do is quantitative work, which takes us right back to the fate Walt and Mearsheimer sensed befalling IR as political science. Watch for IR and Data Science joint degrees as the next step in this evolution. Political Science in the US starts teaching methods at the freshman level. They get them young. We have discussed the rather grim state of affairs for the future of critical social science scholarship, at least in the UK and US. To conclude – what prospects for hope in the future are there?Well, if I had a public relations consultant pack, this is the point at which it would advise talking about children and the power of science to save us. I think the environment for universities, political, financial, and otherwise may get considerably more difficult. Little is untouchable in Western public life right now, it is only a question of when and in what ways they will come for us. The nationalist and far-right turns in Western politics feed off transgressing boundaries. There's no reason to suspect universities will be immune from this, and they haven't been. In the UK, as a consequence of Brexit, we are having to nationalise, and de-European-ise our scholarships and admissions processes. We are administratively enacting the surrender of cosmopolitan achievements in world politics and in academic life. This is not a plot but in no small measure the outcome of democratic will, registered in the large majority Boris Johnson's Conservatives won at the last general election. It will have far reaching consequences for UK university life. This is all pretty scary if you think, as I do, that we are nearer the beginning then the end of the rise of the right. Covid will supercharge some of these processes of de-globalization. I can already see an unholy alliance forming of university managers and introvert academics who will want to keep in place various dimensions of the online academic life that has taken shape since spring 2020. Often this will be justified by reference to environmental concerns and by the increased, if degraded, access that online events make possible. We are going to have a serious fight on our hands to retain our travel budgets at anywhere near pre-pandemic levels. I'm hoping that this generation of students, subjected to online education, will become warriors for in-person teaching. All of this said, it's hard to imagine a more interesting time to be teaching, thinking and writing about world politics. Politics quite evidently retains its capacity to turn the world upside down. Had you told US citizens where they would be on January 6th, 2021 in 2016, they would have called you alarmist if not outlandish. I think we're in for more moments like that. Tarak Barkawi is a professor of International Relations at LSE. He uses interdisciplinary approaches to imperial and military archives to re-imagine relations between war, armed forces and society in modern times. He has written on the pivotal place of armed force in globalization, imperialism, and modernization, and on the neglected significance of war in social and political theory and in histories of empire. His most recent book, Soldiers of Empire, examined the multicultural armies of British Asia in the Second World War, reconceiving Indian and British soldiers in cosmopolitan rather than national terms. Currently, he is working on the Korean War and the American experience of military defeat at the hands of those regarded as racially inferior. This new project explores soldiers' history writing as a site for war's constitutive presence in society and politics.PDF version of this Talk
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Nicholas Onuf on the Evolution of Social Constructivsm, Turns in IR, and a Discipline of Our Making
Can we really go on speaking about International Relations as a 'discipline'? Even if social constructivism is often presented as a robust theoretical cornerstone of the discipline, one of the thinkers that established this theoretical position challenges the existence of IR. Surely, Nicholas Onuf argues, we have a disciplinary machinery—institutions, journals, conferences and so forth—but these form an apparatus built around a substantive void—in his words, 'a discipline without an 'about''. In this Talk, Nicholas Onuf—among others—weaves an appraisal of disciplinary boundaries through a discussion of social constructivism's birth and growth, tells the material turn to get serious and provides a bleak assessment of IR's subservient relation to political order.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is (or should be), according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
In my view, the biggest challenge for IR is making good on claims (I'd say pretensions) that IR is a discipline in its own right. Such claims presume that IR has a reasonably well-bounded subject matter and a body of theory uniquely suited to that subject matter. For 25 years I have been saying that IR fails miserably in meeting this challenge. Much less do we acknowledge the challenge—there is no debate. As it is, we have institutionalized a so-called discipline (journals, conferences, workshops, PhD programs) that reaches far beyond (lower case) international relations. In short: a discipline without an 'about.' Were we to acknowledge the challenge, we might be content to say: Forget disciplines, it's all about 'the social' and social theory belongs to us—too. Or we might say, it's all about 'the political,' and legal, political and social theory also belong to us. I'm not sure there's much difference. I am sure that it's not enough to say our 'about' is 'the international.' And I have said as much publicly, though intemperate terms that I instantly regretted.
Given such a negative assessment of IR, you might wonder why I stuck with it all these years. Why didn't I just call myself a social theorist and (try to) publish in the few journals in which theorists gets a hearing? Actually, I did try a few times, to no avail (just as I put 'social theory' in the subtitle of World of Our Making (1989) to no discernible effect). I think there's a status issue lurking here. Once identified with IR, it's hard to get acknowledged outside IR. Nobody reads or cites us; we 'don't get no respect'; status ordering condemns us to be consumers rather than producers of big ideas. If (just perhaps) the era of big ideas is over, then the next generation in IR may feel a little braver than I was about jumping ship. Not that I'm betting on it, especially since publishing in a host relatively new, expressly interdisciplinary journals, such as Global Constitutionalism, International Political Sociology and International Political Theory, offer a safer alternative.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
I have to say that events have never inspired me. In my callow youth, Hans Morgenthau's Politics among Nations (1948) inspired me to think about spending a lifetime doing IR, as did my teachers Robert Tucker and George Liska—both realists with a taste respectively for international law and international institutions. Working as Tucker's assistant in revising Hans Kelsen's Principles of International Law (1952) prompted a longstanding interest in legal theory. As a doctoral student, I got hooked on systems theory à la Hoffmann, Kaplan, Rosecrance; the special issue of World Politics (vol. 14, no. 1) on the international system left an indelible mark, as did Waltz's Man, the State and War (1959). Working with Richard Falk a few years later affected me a great deal—he remains one of my very few heroes. So did Fritz Kratochwil, briefly a student of mine and friend ever since.
In the 1980s I got to know a number of mavericks: Hayward Alker, Rick Ashley, Dick Mansbach, John Ruggie and Rob Walker are by no means the only ones on this list. More important, I think, were my feminist doctoral students, who changed my life in a great many ways and were largely responsible for my turn to social theory. It was in that context that I took the so-called linguistic turn to Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin et al. World of Our Making is pretty clear about its many sources of inspiration. The big trick was fitting everything together. Since then (and to keep the story manageable), working with my brother Peter is responsible for my interest in Aristotle and in the making of the modern world; republican theory links these two concerns. I cannot blame Peter for my ongoing fascination with Foucault.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
For me at least, this is a tricky question. As I said earlier, I am not very much interested in events—either as theoretical fodder or as a matter of what's happening in the world at any given moment. Most of my friends and colleagues are fascinated by current events—how often I find them glued to one news source or another. Students are too, and it seems pretty obvious they should be. Most people in the field engage in the skillful assembly of events, whether in 'cases' or as statistically manipulated patterns. Learning the appropriate skills takes a great deal of time and training. At the same time, students also need an exposure to theory—big picture thinking—and, in my view, the philosophical issues that lurk behind any big picture.
Theory is a seductive. I was seduced at the age of 19 and never gotten over it. Shifting metaphors, I always told my doctoral students not to succumb to the theory bug, at least to the exclusion of what I just called 'the skillful assembly of events.' In other words, don't do it my way—I was lucky to get away with it. Disposition is a different matter. Students must love to work hard for extended intervals with little immediate gratification. Machiavelli said that warriors must be disciplined and ardent. I used to tell my doctoral students, you have to be 'warrior nerds.' If you don't fit this profile, find another vocation.
You were immensely influential in constructing the theoretical pillar of social constructivism in IR, starting over 25 years ago. Looking back, has social constructivism delivered on the promise you etched out in World of Our Making?
No way, and for all kinds of reasons. This was all too clear within a decade, as I intimated in a review of Peter Katzenstein's The Culture of National Security (1996, read introduction here) and spelled out in Don Puchala's Visions of International Relations (2003). To simplify unduly and perhaps unjustly, the constructivists who came to prominence in the 1990s made three mistakes. First, they took for granted that a norm (as in 'the norm') is normative without asking whether, to what degree, or how this might be so. I'm pretty sure this mistake came from a mindless appropriation of functional sociology and utter indifference to legal and political theory. Second, they substituted identity ('who am I?' questions) for agency ('who acts for what or whom?' questions) in guessing at the implications of the end of the Cold War. In doing so, they compounded the felony by leaping from personal identity to collective identity and unreflectively imputing agency to imagined collectivities. Third, they treated culture as an aggregate residual and then assigned it enormous causal significance. Had any of them taken the linguistic turn seriously, they might have extricated those elements of 'culture' that (one might guess) are most consequential for social construction.
More generally, I came to see the constructivist surge of the 90s as a liberal-institutionalist renaissance. Standing in for legal rules, formal institutions and corporate personality, norms and identity look like a conceptual breakthrough to a generation of scholars who had been taught to dismiss old-time liberal IR. In the 2000s, a shifting panorama of events (genocide etc.) prompted a straight-on liberal institutionalist revival with lots of help from lawyers. Meanwhile, a much more diverse range of scholarship has come to be styled constructivist for lack a better label. Finally, there has emerged a gang of 'third generation' constructivists who now actively repudiate their predecessors from the 90s. They speak my language, but I'll let them speak for themselves.
How, do you think, do 'turns' in IR relate to the broader context of real-world historical events? If the origins of social constructivism have been located in the end of the Cold War, is there some kind of dialectic whereby social constructivism then impacts on the course of history? For instance, social constructivism is by now so established that a big part of newer generations of practitioners in IR are probably social constructivists. How does that influence international politics? In other words, does social constructivism as an illocutionary theoretical approach hold perlocutionary effect on its object of study?
I have some reservations about the metaphor 'turn.' Do we imagine IR as a colossal ship that turns, however slowly, all of a piece? I've already used the ship metaphor, but in this context it's not appropriate—we're not that put together, and, besides, no one is steering (not even those legendary gate-keepers). Or a herd of wildebeests, in which all the members of the herd turn together by keying off each other once one senses danger and turns? I don't think so, even if we do sometimes see signs of a herd mentality.
Back in the late 60s, Karl Deutsch suggested that the field had even then experienced a succession of waves. I like this metaphor better because it captures both the messiness of what's going on and a sense that perhaps not much is changing in deeper water. You yourself switch metaphors on me when you mention a new generation of constructivists. As it happens, I like this metaphor a lot (and have a piece entitled 'Five Generations of International Relations Theory' forthcoming in a new edition of International Relations Theory Today, which Ken Booth and Toni Erskine are editing). It suggests a dynamic internal to any field of study rather than one prompted by external events. Inasmuch as constructivism got its start before the Cold War ended but afterwards changed its profile significantly tells us the story is actually rather complicated.
The more interesting question is whether constructivism will, as you say, impact the course of history. The quick and dirty answer is, yes, but in ways too subtle to document. We already know how difficult it is to establish any impact from IR as a scholarly pursuit on world affairs. That is, any impact beyond realism and raison d'état. As we become more specialized in what we do and so does everyone else, it seems ever less likely that we'll be able to pin down extended causal chains. But I suspect that you have something more like 'mood' in mind. Once liberal institutionalists adopted a slick kind of constructivism, they were pretty much in sync with the Zeitgeist, at least for a decade or so. So, yes, as a not very helpful generalization, we can surmise that some degree of co-constitution was then at work. Always is.
One last point. I don't have even the slightest sense that my own scholarly work has had anything have much to do with large-scale world-making, or that it will in any near-term. I don't have to be told that my work is too austere and forbidding to reach very many people—though I am told this often enough. Years from now, who knows? Yet my teaching career convinces me that there's more co-constitution going on in the classroom than anywhere else we're likely to find ourselves. Interacting with hundreds of MA and PhD students in Washington DC over 28 years—during which I noodled through what would become World of Our Making—affected me and them in ways beyond measure. Some of those students became scholars, but many more have spent their lives in public service.
What has been, to you, the biggest surprise or exciting move in IR since social constructivism saw the light?
The biggest and most surprising 'move' has been the move offshore. I speak of course as someone raised, trained and employed in the US when IR was 'AnAmerican Social Science.' For the last twenty years, IR has not so much left the US as gained strength everywhere else. Better to say, its center of gravity has moved. In the process, IR has transformed, both as a claimant discipline and as a theory-driven enterprise. As a participant-observer, I see IR as an institutional beneficiary of globalization and, to a lesser degree, those of us in IR as agents in this hugely complicated process.
Globalization has meant, among much else, the extraordinary growth of higher education and its institutional apparatus. The proliferation of universities is an acknowledgment of cosmopolitan imperatives and an accommodation of national needs, exemplified in programs for the grooming of managerial elites. For IR, this large process has been colored by an ostensible rejection of American hegemony. One expression of this anti-hegemonial sentiment is the fashion for post-positivist scholarship and the sort of constructivism that is now conventionally ascribed to Fritz Kratochwil and me. For me personally, it's just wonderful to be taken seriously everywhere but my own country.
You recently have turned attention towards cognitive and evolutionary psychology. This is a pretty underrepresented field, in terms of its being mined in IR. What challenge has this literature to pose, in your view, to dominant IR?
Long ago, I ventured into cognitive studies as a consequence of casting a broad net in social theory. Since then, several disciplines have converged in making cognitive studies just about the most exciting game in town. I cannot imagine anyone not being fascinated (but then I am also fascinated by advances in cosmology, however little I understand the technical stuff). In recent years, I have developed a more specific interest in what cognitive and evolutionary psychology might tell about my mind, any mind, in relation to a world that my mind cannot access directly, the world of appearances. As you can see, I'm a philosophical idealist—with many qualifications, a Kantian idealist. Most people in IR are philosophical realists, for whom such issues are less compelling.
Let me comment briefly on any challenge the cognitive revolution might pose for IR in the philosophical realist mode. IR's substantive concerns are so far removed from the stuff of cognitive science (neurons and such) that I doubt scholars in IR will ever feel obliged take the latter into account. Nor should they. Positivist science is reductive—it always pushes down levels of analysis to explain what's going on at higher levels. But anyone pushing down risks losing touch with what seems to be substantively distinctive about one's starting point, and IR and its event-manifold are a long way up from the synchronized firing of neurons. I would qualify this bald statement somewhat to account for the recent interest of emotions in IR. At least some of the psychological literature on emotions taps into a deep pool of research where the age-old cognition-emotion binary has finally been put to rest.
You have a broad experience in IR. How do you see the evolution of the field? Is it a tragedy of unfolding rationalization and increasing division of labor, or is something else going on?
As I intimated earlier, IR has failed as a disciplinary project. I'm almost inclined to say, there's no hope for IR 'as we know it.' Better to say, IR has lost its self-told coherence. A hundred flowers bloom, but just barely, and there are a lot of weeds. I don't see this as a bad thing (your weeds may well be my flowers), although other disciplines, such as sociology and a resuscitated geography, cast shadows on our scraggly garden. I do think larger societal processes—modern rationalization and modernist functional differentiation—have conjoined to impose a coherence we don't see. Crudely, we are servants to other servants, all of us ultimately minions to run-away capital and victims of its techno-material seductions. I guess you could call this phenomenon a tragedy, though its very impersonality undercuts the sense of the term. I have no doubt, however, that it will eventuate in a catastrophe from we moderns will never recover. I have been saying this ever since the 1970s, when the debate over The Limits to Growth persuaded me that we would never turn the ship around.
A new 'turn' seems to be developing in the social sciences, possibly a swing of the ontological pendulum back to materialism—this time with a more postpositivist undertone. How do you relate to such a turn?
I am skeptical. It looks like a fad to me—people casting about for something new and interesting to say. Moreover, the vitalist, Bergsonian tenor of so much of the new materialism turns me off—I cannot see the case for ascribing agency (and thus purpose) to things when the language of cause suffices. (And I am not among those constructivists who will not speak of cause for fear of positivist contamination.) But there's another issue that troubles me: the continued power of the materialist-idealist binary. In IR, we call realists materialists and liberal institutionalists/soft constructivists idealists when it should be obvious that whatever separates them (in my view, not as much as they think) has nothing to do with idealism and materialism as philosophical stances. Security dilemmas, arms races and terrorist plots are not ideationally informed? Norm diffusion, identity crises and human rights are not materially expressed? Get serious.
I argued in World of Our Making that the material and the social are bound inextricably bound together. Rules do the job. They turn the stuff of the world into resources that we, as social beings, put to use. I think I got it right then. Needless to say, I also think students afflicted with mindlessly linked binaries can only benefit from reading that book.
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf is renowned as one of the founders of constructivism in International Relations. He is also known for his important contributions to International Legal Theory, International History, and Social Theory. Onuf's most famous work is arguably World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (published in 1989), which should be on every IR student's must-read list. His recent publications include Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War (2006, co-authored with his brother Peter Onuf) and International Legal Theory: Essays and Engagements, 1966-2006 (2008). Onuf is currently Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Florida International University and is on the editorial boards of International Political Sociology, Cooperation and Conflict, and Contexto Internacional. Professor Onuf received his PhD in International Studies at John Hopkins University, and has also taught at Georgetown University, American University, Princeton, Columbia, University of Southern California, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, and Kyung Hee University in Korea.
Related links
FacultyProfile at the Florida International University Read Onuf's Rule and Rules in International Relations (2014 conference paper) here (pdf) Read Onuf's Fitting Metaphors: the Case of the European Union (New Perspectives, 2010) here (pdf) Read Onuf's Institutions, intentions and international relations (Review of International Studies, 2002) here (pdf) Read Onuf's Levels (European Journal of International Relations 1995) here (pdf)
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In the last year or so there have been two books published on Althusser and Spinoza. Juan Domingo Sánchez Estop's Althusser et Spinoza: Detours et Retours and now Jean Matthys Althusser lecteur de Spinoza: Genèse et enjeux d'une éthico-politique de la théorie. This is perhaps not surprising, after all Althusser confessed to being a Spinozist famously in 1972, but I would argue that there are still some surprises to be found in terms of this combination. First, and most fundamentally, it is surprising to see two full length studies on Althusser and Spinoza since as much as the name and concepts of Spinoza played fundamental or pivotal roles in Althusser's thought, underlying his own concepts of structural, or immanent, causality, symptomatic reading, and ideology, Althusser wrote very little on Spinoza. I have often thought that the Althusser Spinoza connection exists more in its effects, in what it made possible in the writing of Macherey and Balibar, to name just two proximate effects, rather than in Althusser's thought. Estop and Matthys both contest such an interpretation, arguing for a Spinozism that is more immanent and more consistent in Althusser's works than the few times he is mentioned by name. That is not the only surprise. As I mentioned in my review of Estop's book, it is perhaps surprising that Althusser once stated in an interview that "the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is the Capital of Spinoza, because Spinoza is preoccupied above all with history and politics." One would think that Althusser, who drew from the Ethics in terms of his theory of ideology and immanent causality, would focus more on the Ethics and Capital, two works that are systematic and complete. However, Althusser's invocation of the TTP suggests that it is less Spinoza's system than his particular intervention in a specific conjuncture that matters. To this point Matthys adds another somewhat surprising, even paradoxical consideration, that Spinoza is less a foundation of Althusser's thought than the critical destruction of any such foundation. As Matthys writes, "With respect to Althusser the principle political virtue of spinozism is found paradoxically in its radical critique of any foundation, of any purity of knowledge, and of any originary and transcendental position which supposed to guarantee political action in its course, its end and means, and to reassure its subjects of a form of self-identity in action, supported by an instance of definitive and overwhelming truth. The paradox is doubled in that, if is precisely in not founding, in not delimiting a priori a philosophical guarantee of a true politics that spinozism can produce its properly political effects, it only seems to be able to free political practice from its imaginary guarantees by investing in the most literally "dogmatic" position in the kampflatz which is the fortress of metaphysics."For Althusser Spinoza is a question of theory of its conditions and limits. Matthys argues that this not only makes it possible to read a trajectory through Althusser's thought in which the question of theoretical practice is central, but it also distinguishes Althusser from the two primary orientations to Spinoza today, a rationalist and structuralist orientation in Lordon and a vitalist and ontological orientation that can be found in Deleuze and Negri. Althusser (and to some extent Macherey and Balibar) would represent a third orientation. It might be easy to call this orientation epistemological, since it would seem to be primarily concerned with knowledge, and the division between ideology and science, but I think that misses the way in which the question of knowledge is thoroughly implicated with that of practice in the works of Althusser. Matthys uses the phrase the "ethico-political of theory" to express this third orientation. With respect to the former, the trajectory of Althusser's thought, the formulation "without origin or end" is familiar to any reader of Althusser, and he made this idea central to his understanding of not only Marx's idea of history, as a process without origin or end, but his understanding of philosophy. Origin and end remained for Althusser fundamentally theological questions taken up by philosophy, but fundamentally alien to it. As Althusser writes in Philosophy for Nonphilosophers, "Philosophy inherited this question of questions, the question of the Origin of the World, which is the question of the World, humanity and God." This is a latter text, written in the late sixties and early seventies, but published posthumously. Matthys demonstrates that the question of the origin can be found at the origin of Althusser's thought, from his early text on Hegel onward. Althusser is not so much searching for an origin, a foundation, in the sense of an archimedean point, but trying to think without origin and guarantee. Spinoza in some sense resolves the question of origin by splitting it into two. We begin at once with imagination, with our immediate knowledge, which is necessarily distorted and inadequate. This immediate knowledge is necessary ideological. However, as Matthys argues, the illusions of ideology are also allusions, they always allude to the very social conditions that they conceal and efface, which is to say that there is the condition of knowledge in our misrecognition. Or as Spinoza puts it, habemus enim ideam veram, we have a true idea. For Althusser this true idea is tied to practice, which is to say that truth must be produced from ideological conditions. We are always at once in our imaginary and ideological apprehension of the world and in our practical engagement with it. The question of knowledge is how to turn the latter against the former, to locate the orientation of a practical dimension in ideology. As Spinoza describes such a production in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, "But just as men, in the beginning, were able to make the easiest things with the tools they were born with (however laboriously and imperfectly), and once these had been made, made other, more difficult things with less labor and more perfectly, and so, proceeding gradually from the simplest works to tools, and from tools to other works and tools, reached the point where they accomplished so many and so difficult things with little labor, in the same way the intellect, by its inborn power, makes intellectual tools for itself, by which it acquires other powers ... until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom." (This is a passage that is essential to Macherey's reading, I also write about it here)This probably won't be the cover but speaking of Spinozaand tools, Spinoza and Marx. I thought I would throw in a plug for my forthcoming book. As Matthys argues this idea of knowledge as a kind of production is what connects Marx and Spinoza. As Matthys writes, "That to read, to know, is always to produce: this is the first lesson that Althusser retains from Spinoza, projecting it to Marx and applying it to his own reading of Marx." Althusser's "symptomatic reading" is situated in between the theory of reading put forward by Spinoza in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and Marx's practice of reading political economy. Matthys juxtaposes this practice of producing knowledge, a practice that always begins with its specific and determined position, with ideology that begins with the subject. Reading, the production of knowledge, what Althusser calls science, is infinitely productive, capable of new knowledge because it begins from its finite position; in contrast to this ideology is infinitely repetitive and limited because it believes that it can immediately grasp everything. Two things are most striking about Matthys book. First, even though it is exhaustive in its survey of Althusser's writing, begin with the thesis on Hegel from 1947, it is unapologetically a book about what could be considered "peak" Althusser, the period between 1965-1972 when the concepts of symptomatic reading, structural causality, theoretical practice, and ideological interpellation where developed. This is the period in which Althusser is most influenced by Spinoza, thinking through in his own way, the Spinoza/Marx conjunction. This is also the period that came under the most criticism, as ahistorical, functionalist, determinist, etc., or, in terms of Althusser's own self-criticism, as theoreticist. Theoreticism as Althusser defined is reducing all of the demarcations between Marxism and political economy, as well as between Marx and the young Marx to a distinction between "truth and error," overlooking the social, historical, and political dimensions of Marx's transformation. This brings us to the second aspect of Matthys book, Matthys argues that what Althusser dismissed as too rational and theoretical has, at its core, a hidden ethico-political dimension. This is perhaps surprising. What does the critic of humanism have to say about ethics, that human, all too human of disciplines. Althusser's interest in Spinoza never seemed to touch on the title of his most important book. As André Tosel argued in his Du Matérialisme de Spinoza, "the Althusser of Spinoza has lost all ethico-political dimensions." It is hard to see immediately what the ethical dimension to Althusser's theoretical interventions are, and it is hard not to agree with Tosel. Tosel proves to be quite important to the final section of the book, however, not in terms of his criticism but in terms of important points of overlap between Althusser and Tosel. (Matthys is also the also the author of a great series of essays on Tosel). In some sense it is Tosel who provides the concepts to make sense of the ethical dimension of Althusser's theoretical interventions. As I have argued, here, and elsewhere, Tosel argues for a "finite communism," that is in sharp contrast to capital's dreams of endless accumulation as well as Marxist ideas of a thoroughly rational mastery of the productive forces. Matthys argues that Althusser can be understood as a thinker of finitude. That the very idea of theoretical practice was to think the limited efficacy of theory as practice, to situate it within other practices. As Matthys writes, "Practice in the Althusserian sense would be from this point of view analogous to the Spinozist mode, in the sense that it cannot be conceived by itself, but it can only exist, produce effect and be known in that it is articulated differently with different instances of the field." Finitude is understood here not as some particular relation to death, an all too human definition, but to be finite is to exist in and through relations with other finite things. Similarly, Althusser's famous statement about the lonely hour of the last instance is a statement about the finitude of Marxism as a theory. It will always be necessary to think the causality of the structure through its effects, to recognize the overdetermination of any essence or any essential contradiction. As Matthys writes,"Thinker of the limit, certainly, but if one prefers: a thinker of finitude. Because if Althusser tries to think the limit between marxism and its outside, between science and ideology, between materialism and idealism, it means that this line of demarcation necessarily through the heart of Marxism itself." Althusser's demarcations are not divisions accomplished once and for all, as in the epistemic break, but are produced again and again, and that finitude, that incomplete status, is precisely what makes them productive, creating new knowledge. I feel like I could go on and on about this book, but blogposts are definitely finite and limited in what they can do, so it seems necessary to conclude. The merits of Matthys book are multiple. To begin with the last, Matthys puts two of the most important Marxist philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century, Althusser and Tosel, in dialogue, using one to expand the insights of the other. Second, it is a thorough study of the "Spinoza effect" in Althusser's thought, how much Althusser was transformed by his engagement with Spinoza. Spinoza cannot be reduced to the few citations in Lire le Capital and Elements of Self-Criticism, but is immanent in its effects throughout Althusser. Matthys, like Estop referred to above, as well as Morfino, Montag, Sharp, Stolze, etc. recognizes that Althusser is as much a Spinozist as a Marxist. Thus, all of Althusser's deviations of the sixties, deviations labelled "theoreticism," "structuralism," "functionalism," have to be understood as not just fidelity to Marx and Spinoza, but ultimately as conditions for new theoretical production.
FLORENS'S RESISTANCE AGAINST SLAVERY IN TONI MORRISON'S A MERCY Dwi Arum Maryati English Literature, Faculty of Languages and Arts, Surabaya State University dwiarummaryati@yahoo.com Drs. Much. Khoiri, M.Si English Department, Faculty of Languages and Arts, Surabaya State University much_choiri@yahoo.com Abstrak Studi ini berpusat pada Florens sebagai karakter utama dan sebagai orang kulit hitam dan pengalaman hidupnya dalam sistem perbudakan pada abad ketujuh belas di Virginia dan perlawanannya terhadap hal tersebut yang terungkap dalam novel A Mercy. Penelitian ini menggunakan kedua konsep, yaitu konsep perbudakan dan teori Marxis feminis oleh Karl Max. Selain itu, untuk perlawanan yang dilakukan oleh karakter utama, konsep pertahanan seperti istilah silent oleh Audre Lorde, divisi Lanser tentang feminisme dan konsep Engel tentang meniru kaum borjuis juga digunakan untuk melakukan analisis. Selain itu, latar belakang perbudakan di Virginia juga disampaikan untuk memberikan gambaran tentang perbudakan untuk menjawab alasan mengapa Florens ingin melawan sistem perbudakan. Data dalam bentuk kutipan, komentar, dan dialog dalam novel yang mengekspos perbudakan dan pengalaman hidup Florens dan perlawanannya. Analisis kehidupan perbudakan yang dialami oleh tokoh utama dalam novel ini menunjukkan bahwa ia telah hidup sebagai budak kulit hitam dan tidak memiliki hak untuk memiliki kehidupan yang lebih baik. Cara karakter utama mengungkapkan perasaannya tentang perbudakan melalui surat yang ditulis untuk majikannya dan sikap yang meniru kaum borjuis mencerminkan perlawanannya terhadap perbudakan. Kata Kunci: teori Marxist Feminist, perbudakan, orang kulit hitam, perlawanan. Abstract This study is centered on Florens as the main character and as a Negro and her life experiences of slavery in the seventeenth century in Virginia and her resistance against it in the novel A Mercy. The study uses both slavery concept and Marxist Feminist criticism by Karl Max. In addition, for the resistance that the main character does, the concept of resistance such as silent terms Audre Lorde, Lanser's division of feminism and Engel's concept about imitating bourgeoisie are also used to conduct the analysis. Moreover, slavery background in Virginia is also delivered to give a description about slavery to approach the reason why Florens wants to resist the slavery system. Data are in form of quotations, comments, and dialogues inside the novel that expose the slavery of Florens's life experiences and her resistance. The analysis of slavery life experienced by the main character in the novel shows that she has lived as Negro slave and has no rights to have a better life. The way the main character expresses her feeling about slavery through the letter that she writes for her master and her attitude that imitating the bourgeoisie is reflecting the resistance against slavery. Keywords: Marxist Feminist criticism, slavery, Negro, resistance. INTRODUCTION Slavery is a relationship in which one person is controlled by violence through violence, the threat of violence, or psychological coercion, has lost free will and free movement, is exploited economically, and paid nothing beyond subsistence. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery retrieved on October 20th, 2013). Slave means a person who is legally owned by someone else and has to work for them, while slavery means the activity of having slaves or the condition of being a slave. Historically, slaves were institutionally recognized by many societies. They recognized slaves merely as property but others saw them as dependents who eventually might be integrated into the families of slave owners. By the end of 17th century, there were many slavery system and freedom power of the different classes. In America Literary Thought Book reveals that indispensible to the rich sugar economy of the British West Indies, slavery at first was more a convenience than a necessity in the thirteen colonies. Slavery had been practiced inBritish North Americafrom early colonial days. In 1619, twenty Africans were brought by a Dutch soldier who had seized them from a captured Spanish slave ship and sold to the English colony ofJamestown, Virginiaas"indentured servants". The Spanish usually baptized slaves in Africa before embarking them. As English law considered baptized Christians exempt from slavery, these Africans joined about 1,000 English indentured servants already in the colony. By Colonial America Period, in 1671 Governor Berkeley of Virginia reported 2.000 slaves in the colony as against 4.000 white servants, but after 1680 the Negro population began to grow enormously, and in 1715 had reached 23.000 in Virginia alone. (Horten and Edward, 1967: 376). The novel is A Mercy, and this novel has many sources in culture values and social status values. Both of them are combined into many action and many different events in each period at that time. Then, A Mercy by Toni Morrison depicts slavery which is happened in the end of 17th century. The author describes about the slavery situation, women slaves, the economic situation, and the resistance against slavery in Virginia to amuse reader in understanding this country. The issues are the slavery situation, women slaves, and resistance against slavery. These issues will be discussed more interesting and that the novel can reveal more complex than one perspective or a certain point in one character, or a setting of the study. Toni Morrison's ninth novel, A Mercy, published in 2008. It is set in the 1690s, in the slave era, at a time when it was perilous to be without the "protection" of a man, independent women were still suspected of being witches and paternalistic relations between men and women were still the norm. In this novel, Morrison brings together representatives of all the major racial categories in the New World—African, Native American, Anglo and mulatto. A Mercy is set in the America of the 1680s, a dangerous time for everyone, male or female, slave or free. There's Florens, Rebekka, Vaark's wife; Lina, a dependable servant who is also Rebekka's closest friend; Sorrow, an odd girl whose dreamy ways make her a poor slave; and Florens' mother. As Morrison makes clear, all women in this world are at the mercy of the men in their lives; without them, these women are as good as lost. As one character notes, "To be female in this place is to be an open wound that cannot heal. Even if scars form, the festering is ever below." By the slavery period in 1680's, the slavery status can be treated and ruled. They did nothing, because of powerless people in a discrepancy, and there was a choice of freedom to get satisfaction. Florens, Lina, Sorrow, Willard, and Scully were the sacrificed people to be exploited in work area of slavery system by the master of household, and slave trades. As the novel progresses, other characters bring the New World to life, and each struggles to survive in the face of the wilderness that surrounds them. In addition to Florens, several other women add perspective to the novel, and each proves that no woman is truly free, regardless of color or station. In accordance of background study above, it can be simplify to discuss among two problems that emerge as significant concern toward this novel. How is slavery experienced by Florens in Toni Morrison's A Mercy? How is Florens's resistance against slavery in Toni Morrison's A Mercy? This study will uses two concepts and one theory which are in line with the statement of the problems. The first problem is how slavery experienced by Florens depicted in A Mercy. To answer the first problem, this study uses the concept of slavery. Slavery is a system under which people are treated as property to be bought and sold, and are forced to work, (Brace, 2004: 163). There is also an additional slavery background in Virginia which is use to support the analysis. Then the second problem is how Florens's resistance against slavery. This statement will apply the concept of resistance and Marxist feminist. This concept is developed by Karl Marx. It is use to analyze the bad treatment that Florens had as the oppressed low class woman from the brutality of her owner, her experience to confront the slavery and finally her resistance from slavery. RESEARCH METHOD Research methodology that used in this analysis here must be qualified as an applying in literary appreciation. The thesis is regarded as a descriptive-qualitative study and uses a library research. This study uses novel of Toni Morrison entitled A Mercy that published in 2008 as the data source of this study. The datas are in the form of direct and indirect speech of the characters, dialogues, epilogues and quotations which indicate and represent aspect of slavery and the way it is expressed. This thesis is using the library method in collecting the data. It does not use the statistic method. That is why it is not served in numbering or tables. Library research used an approach in analyzing this study. The kind of library research which is used here is intensive or closely reading to search quotations or phrases. It also used to analyze the literary elements both intrinsic and extrinsic. The references are taken from library and contributing ideas about this study from internet that support the idea of analyzing. The analysis is done by the following steps: (1) Classification based on the statement of the problems. This classification is used to avoid the broad discussion. There are two classifications in this study. They are the depiction of slavery that experienced by Florens. (2) Describing the reason for being slave. Quotations classified the reason for being slave that was done by main character in the novel. (3) Describing the slavery that experienced by the main character. In this case, the quotations that showed and indicated the slavery experienced that was done by the main character. (4) Describing the main character's resistance against slavery. In this case, the quotations that are showed how the resistance was done by the main character. (5) Drawing the conclusion based on the analysis which is in line with the problems. ANALYSIS The first section is about the description of Florens's experiences being slave in Master Jacob house. Master Jacob brought Florens from Mr. D'Ortega to pay the whole amount he owes to Master Jacob. Sir saying he will take instead the woman and the girl, not the baby boy and the debt is gone. A minha mae begs no. Her baby is still at her breast. Take the girl, she says, my daughter, she says. Me. Me. Sir agrees and changes the balance due. (Morrison, 2008: 07) That quotation is revealed that Florens was a girl who had been purchased by the Master of Slave at America Slavery. Master Jacob brought Florens from Mr. D'Ortega to pay the whole amount he owes to Master Jacob. After losing the majority of his crew from bad management decisions, D'Ortega offers to give a slave to Jacob to settle their debt. Jacob initially refuses, but requests D'Ortega's favorite servant. Instead, the woman offers her daughter – Florens. The word "minha mae" here means a call for a mother in Portuguese language. She lived with her mother and her brother in Mr. D'Ortega's house. Her mother had been slaved in Senhor house, who is a Parliament member in Maryland. In the beginning of the novel, Florens still call Jacob as "Senhor" and call Mr. D'Ortega as Sir. It means that at that time when the story took place, Florens still Mr. D'Ortega's slave. In the other hand, if the slaveowner can sell or exchange their slave with a debt, the person who their change it must be a slave. Because if they change with a free person is set the law of human right, in that time (in 1690) slave usually can exchange with another materials for their Senhor. For the next psychical condition of Florens is she is known as the seven age years old when she firstly come to Master Jacob's house, and she grow up to the sixteen years when Rebekka as her Mistress Jacob's wife send her to find the blacksmith. Lina says from the state of my teeth I am maybe seven or eight when I am brought here. We boil wild plums for jam and cake eight times since then, so I must be sixteen. (Morrison, 2008: 05) When Florens firstly came to Master Jacob's house she just seven years old, and she did not much understand how and why someone must say and faithful, because she is too young for understanding all things. Here she actually do not know her age exactly, perhaps she never given knowledge of her age from her another, that is why she write with word "or". Here Florens just make statement "I am maybe seven or eight when I am brought here" it can be explained that she is seven ages when she bought to Master Jacob's house. And when she retells her story, she just grows up as a girl in sixteen. Then, Florens also passed her day as a slave with her mother in the previous master's house, as describe, Before this place I spend my days picking okra and sweeping tobacco sheds, my nights on the floor of the cookhouse with a minha mae. (Morrison, 2008: 05) This quotation above described Florens's work in the previous master, Mr. D'Ortega. Her mother had been slaved in Senhor house, who is a Parliament member in Maryland. This condition makes Florens became a slave, because she was born from a slave. She has to fulfill her duties and help her mother. Because she was very young when she lived in Mr. D'Ortega, she got an easy job. She spend her days picking okra and sweeping tobacco sheds. In the night, she sleeps on the floor of the cookhouse with her mother. As a slave, she had no right to ask for a room to sleep, even she was in good health or sick. Moreover, Florens also got a similar treatment when she lives in her new owner, Master Jacob. As follows, In cold weather we put planks around our part of the cowshed and wrap our arms together under pelts. […] in summer if our hammocks are hit by mosquitoes Lina makes a cool place to sleep out of branches. (Morrison, 2008: 06) From the quotation above indicates that Florens treated not too different from the old master. In Master Jacob's house, she sleeps in cowshed with Lina. They just use a planks to separated them with the cows and use the pelts to warm their hands and their body. And when summer comes, they sleep in hammocks that they bonded between two trees. If their hammocks are broken hit by mosquitoes, they build a bed from branches to sleep. Florens would do the slavery with a pleasure, and she wanted to a good treatment. Mistress Jacob had given her a training system to be a servant of household. And as a slave, she must obey all Mistress's order. As reflected in her statement "It proves I am no body's minion but my Mistress (Morrison, 2008: 111)", it means that there was inseparable relationship between slave and their master because the slave owner paid for unlimited work. They have to fulfill their duty from their master at everytime and everywhere. Because the slave master has complete control over all aspects of the life of the slave, whether the slave is educated or provided medical treatment, what the slave eats and wears, and when the slave can ends their work at that day and sleeps. In America Slavery, there were many servants of the Master who had power and powerless in slavery system implied by the Master and Plantation Owners at that time. All the slaves had suffered on the slavery, because of them had no hope to change in the life chances of slavery. With the same position of them, they had worked on the time regularly and they had worked where the slavery rules was obeyed by the slaves. Therefore, this issue would appear a resistance against the slavery. Resistance occurs when some people feels something wrong against their will or unaccepted behaving. Also according to Marx, resistance occurs as class struggle for exploitation as the fundamental cause, due to the extent which increases the size of the exploitation of working class. In this case, the resistance in this novel has been done by a woman slave, named Florens. In contrast, she lived under a tremendous burden. As woman there are treated as inherently inferior to men and are mostly viewed as servants. She has the freedom of movement when she met the blacksmith. She had the thought of being married and changed her life as a free woman. Thus she has the freedom of choice. Moreover, this freedom of choice is complemented by her freedom of thought. The impetus of the entire novel is testament to Florens's thought, as she narrates it to the reader. When a child I am never able to abide being barefoot and always beg for shoes, anybody's shoes, even on the hottest days. (Morrison, 2008: 04) On this quotation revealed that Florens always want to life better. She was born as a nigger, but her desire to live like bourgeoisies lady is huge. She always wanted the best for her. But, born as a slave cause limitations to achieve her dreams. Even for shoes she has to beg for anybody. She tried to convince herself to make a change for her and the other slave. They may poor and worthless, but they want to live like a normal people whose not slave. She never let her foot being barefoot and hurt when she step her foot on the ground, just like bourgeoisie lady. This quotation can supports Marx and Engels's prediction about woman and children in worker class will be a part of worker market, it is not impossible to them making reaction over the capitalism exploitation which increased not by doing revolution but slowly return woman and children into human source in order to imitate the bourgeoisie life style. Florens, she says, it's 1690. Who else these days has the hands of a slave and the feet of a Portuguese lady? (Morrison, 2008: 04) From this quotation then can be said that her heart start to resist and says "enough" for the slavery thing. She decided that one day she will get her freedom but she is not taking some act directly. She waits till the right time show up and she will use that chance. As a starting, she changes her attitude and her perspective like a Portuguese lady which always live in glamorous. Moreover, Florens can read and write among three women in Master's house. It can be seen in Lina's statement about Florens, "Already Florens could read, write. Already she did not have to be told repeatedly how to complete the chore." (Morrison, 2008: 61). That quotation revealed that Florens is a clever person, only herself who can read and write among three women. Master and Mistress also do not need to tell Florens many times to fulfill her work in the house. It means that Florens always one step ahead from others. This makes it easy for her to achieve her dream to be free and have a better life when she has a great thought. The highlight point on her resistance is she resists with non-violence actions as the author writing styles with full of simplicity. Until the time Master Jacob develops the pox while building his own grand home, and when close to death, he requests to be brought to the new house to die. After Jacob dies, Rebekka develops pox herself. It brings Florens to her passionate love for the unnamed man comes up again. Her obsession with the man illustrates her youth and inexperience in love. This man also happens to be Florens's lover, and she goes to him with hope in her heart for a new and different life. Lina sends her on a wagon to find the blacksmith since he was able to cure Sorrow of her pox previously. She thus begins her journey alone to find the man she loves with the medicine Rebekka needs. "I'm adoring you" Florens said "And a slave to that too" "You alone own me" (Morrison, 2008: 141) Indicates that her desire becomes stronger and she does not want to postpone it. This thinking is related to Lanser's theory about the first level of feminism. "Feminine: The main female character in that literary looking about respect for her existence and tries to find a space in togetherness live with other social classes (man)." She belongs to this level due to her thought about marriage things. She wants to find a man who will pay the refund for her to Vaark's family. Also her thinking also refers to find her existence while all the daylong she is considered as never existed. The blacksmith leaves almost immediately in order to reach Rebekka before the illness takes her life. The man who loved by Florens choose his child rather than being married with Florens. While Florens is overjoyed to be with the blacksmith again, she realizes that he may not feel the same way. He has adopted a young boy, and Florens is worried because the blacksmith acts as if the boy is his future. Not Florens. He tells her, "Own yourself, woman, and leave us be". Florens is in shock over her lost love and once again feels the pain of abandonment she first experienced when her mother urged Jacob to take her. It means her internal conflict appears again and she already thinks about getting her freedom. Her desire to get free is close enough and makes her thinks to leave Vaark's family as soon as she can. Since her way to get freedom from being married with the blacksmith is failed. Thus, Mistress is now paying Willard and Scully to help out on the farm, while Mistress herself "beats Sorrow, has Lina's hammock taken down, and advertises the sale of Florens" (Morrison, 2008: 155). This quotation revealed that as Florens's owner, Mistress uses her power and authority to anything to her slave, including sell her to the new owner. Scully allows these things to happen without remarking on them because he needs the money Rebekka is paying him in order to one day be free. As Rebekka considers selling Florens and giving Sorrow, the girl who has an imaginary friend and is too naive to understand her pregnancies away, Sorrow wants to escape. But, Florens wants to finish her story to the blacksmith and Mistress. Afterwards, she runs back to the Vaark farm. Florens is writing her story on the floor and walls of the big house Jacob insisted upon constructing. "You won't read my telling. You read the world but not the letters of talk." (Morrison, 2008: 160). She writes both in hopes that the blacksmith will one day read her account as well as a means to catharsis, to free herself from the pain of her multiple abandonments. Florens laments the changes Rebekka has undergone as a result of her new religious piety and the cruelty she has enacted upon the slaves, as described, Downstairs behind the door in the room where Sir dies. Mistress slaps her face. Many times. [….] Her churchgoing alters her but I don't believe they tell her to behave that way. (Morrison, 2008: 159) Florens' reiterates the blacksmith's conviction about intellectual slavery and writes "that it is the withering inside that enslaves and open the door for what is wild" (Morrison, 2008: 187). Even though the process of writing is painful, "My arms ache but I have need to tell you this" (Morrison, 2008: 188), it is necessary to do so in order for Florens to be free, as follows, I am become wilderness but I am also Florens. In full. Unforgiven. Unforgiving. No ruth, my love. None. Hear me? Slave. Free. I last. (Morrison, 2008: 161) From the quotation above indicates that she begins saying her opinion, her willing to get free through the letter. Like Audre Lorde's statement about silence transformed into an action, Florens statement is considered to be her action form and also as David B. Loughram stated about resistance types: speech and action. Actually she really in a crisis situation because she can get caught and killed by stating statements that she wants to be free by herself not by her master. Her action actually has a big risk, remembering the rule of slavery is they do not have any rights to speak or against their owner as the person who has the power in exploiting and controlling them. Declaring that she is free by herself clarified that she is truly freed from Mistress Jacob's slavery. This quotation strongly supports Florens to classify as the second level feminist according to Lanser. Therefore, she belongs to the second level feminism because she already takes an action by brave stating her freedom and took a defense from the physical abused from her owner. CONCLUSION In this chapter, the conclusion of the study of Florens's Resistance Against Slavery in Toni Morrison's A Mercy is stated. Based on the analysis of the study there are two conclusions which related with statements of the problems drawn: the depiction of Florens's experienced in Slavery in Toni Morrison's A Mercy, and the resistance against slavery in the novel. First, the study shows the events were depicted the slavery that experienced by the slave who served their master in the novel. There is a main character who is Florens and some other supporting character who had been slave. Florens is African Black Slave Girl, Lina is Native American Slave, Sorrow is a mixed – blood girl and she was an unpaid slave, Willard and Scully are indentured servants from Europe. Therefore, they get different responsibility and different treatment of Master Jacob's determination in the farm house, and companies. Toni Morrison shows up a certain illustration of a slavery background and how Florens was working and getting a different treatment and a different benefit that lead to resistance against slavery. Florens came from family in a poor line, and she was taken by Master Jacob Vaark, and she had helped to the Jacob's family as a household. At the last period, she was a Negrita Girl. Florens has worked to the tobaccos company, and Master provided to her in living, and he also gave a good care for her condition. After Master died, she did not find a protection from Mistress. She wanted to escape from a Big House when Mistress wants to sell Florens again for the second time. Same as Florens, Sorrow wanted to escape from a Big House after Master died, because Mistress Jacob gave displeasure treatment on her works in a garden and sewing training. She also treated by Mistress Jacob with displeasure when she took a care for her baby intensively. Mistress Jacob did not like Sorrow's baby while she had lost of her baby. Second, the main character, Florens, resists the system of slavery by doing resistance to her owners, Vaark's family. Her resistance can be seen from her action and also her speech through letter that she written in Big House as the types like David B. Loughram stated. Her resistance also categorized as non-violence resistance because she does not do anything harmful when she resists them. It also the way to fulfill her material needs; freedom (as in historical materialism discussed). She also categorized into second level feminism as Lanser observed; she declare her freedom by herself is categorized into the second level. Because she already brave to speak up and take some action to realized her dream. Moreover, she considers as young sophisticated woman because all education and knowledge that she got when she was working as slave in Vaark's family. This case also represents Engels's theory in his works which stated about "Imitating bourgeoisie". Florens in here is the represent from Engels's theory. She imitates the bourgeois life style. She speaks like them, her style like them, and also wants to marry and living like them. REFERENCE Brace, Laura. 2004. "Slaveries and Property: Freedom and Belonging". The politics of property: labour, freedom, and belonging. Edinburgh: University Press. Engels, Friedrich. 1884. The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State. Atlanta: Pathfinder Press. Horton, Rod W and Herbet Edward. 1967. Background of American Literary Thought. New York: APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS Division of Meredith Corporation. Loughran, David B. 1998. Rebellion. Scotland: Stewarton Bible School Press. Marx, Karl. 1887. Das Capital. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Morrison, Toni. 2008. A Mercy. New York: A Division of Random House, Inc. Olson, Loster C. 1997. "On the Margins of Rhetoric: Audre Lorde Transforming Silence into Language and Action". Quarterly Journal of Speech 83. pp. 49-70. Internet Source: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_slavery_in_Virginia) retrieved on October 20th, 2013. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery) retrieved on October 20th, 2013.
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Anyone who has ever taken or taught a philosophy class is familiar with the claim "[Blank] is subjective" in which the [Blank] in question could be anything from literary interpretations to ethical norms. This response effectively ends any and all cultural and philosophical discussion, which is why it is so aggravating. One response is to argue against this claim, to point out that not every interpretation of a poem, novel, or film, is authorized, that there are better or worse interpretations, with respect to cultural version. With respect to the ethical or political arguments it is tempting to point out that the very existence of ethics, of society, presupposes norms that are shared as well as debated and challenged.What if we took a different perspective? Instead of arguing against this view, ask the question of its conditions. To offer a criticism in the Marxist sense. By Marxist sense I mean specifically the criticism that Marx offers of idealism, of philosophy, in The German Ideology. In that text Marx gives the conditions of how it is that the world appears so upside down that ideas and their criticism rather than material conditions drive and determine history. So we could ask a similar question, how has subjectivity, subjective opinion and perspective, has come to appear as so prevalent and powerful. How did we come to live under the reign of subjectivity?In a move that will surprise no one who has read this blog that I find a useful starting point for answering this question Frank Fischbach's book Marx with Spinoza. In that text Fischbach argues that rather than seen alienation as an alienation from subjectivity, a reduction of a subject to an object, it is subjectivity itself that is an alienation, an alienation from objectivity, a privation of the world. As Fischbach argues:"The reduction of human beings, by this abstraction, from natural and living beings to the state of 'subjects' as owners of a socially average labour power indicates at the same time the completion of their reduction to a radical state of impotence: for the individual to be conceived and to conceive of itself as a subject it is necessary that it see itself withdrawn and subtracted from the objective conditions of its natural activity; in other words, it is necessary that 'the real conditions of living labour' (the material worked on, the instruments of labour and the means of subsistence which 'fan the flames of the power of living labour') become 'autonomous and alien existences'"And also: "This is why we interpret Marx's concept of alienation not as a new version of a loss of the subject in the object, but as a radically new thought, of the loss of the essential and vital objects for an existence that is itself essentially objective and vital....Alienation is not therefore the loss of the subject in the object it is the loss of object for a being that is itself objective. But the loss of proper objects and the objectivity of its proper being is also the loss of all possible inscription of one's activity in objectivity, it is the loss of all possible mastery of objectivity, as well as other effects: in brief, the becoming subject is essentially a reduction to impotence. The becoming subject or the subjectivation of humanity is thus inseparable according to Marx from what is absolutely indispensable for capitalism, the existence of a mass of "naked workers"—that is to say pure subjects possessors of a perfectly abstract capacity to work—individual agents of a purely subjective power of labor and constrained to sell its use to another to the same extent that they are totally dispossessed of the entirety of objective conditions (means and tools of production, matter to work on) to put to effective work their capacity to work."At the basis of subjectivity, of subjectivity understood as an abstract and indifferent capacity, there is the indifferent capacity of labor power. Behind the figure of the subject there is the worker. I have already argued elsewhere on this blog that this reading of the Marx/Spinoza connection could be understood as one which reflects and critically addressed our contemporary situation in which subjecitivity, a subjectivity understood as potential and capacity, is seen as the condition of our freedom rather than our subjection. What Fischbach suggests through a reading of Marx and Spinoza that such capacity, capacity abstracted and separated from the material conditions of its emergence and activity, can only really be impotence. Just as a worker cut off from the conditions of labor is actually poverty, a subject cut off from the conditions of its actualization is impotence. What now I find provocative about this analysis is that if we think of it as a general schema in which an objective relation, a relation to objects but also others, is transformed into a subjective potential or capacity it is possible to argue that the constitution of subjectivity through labor power is only one such transformation, and that the current production of subjectivity is itself the product of several successive revolutions in which subjective potentials displace objective relations. One could also talk about the creation of subjectivity as buying power, as a pure capacity to purchase. I know that criticisms of consumer society from the fifties and sixties today seem moralistic and often passé. I am thinking here of Baudrillard, Debord, Lefebvre, and of course Horkheimer and Adorno. It is worth remembering, however, that some of the early critics were less interested in moralizing criticisms of materialism as they were in this kind of constitution of subjectivity. As Jean Baudrillard wrote in The Consumer Society, 'It is difficult to grasp the extent to which the current training in systematic, organized consumption is the equivalent and extension, in the twentieth century, of the great nineteenth-century long process of the training of rural populations for industrial work.'One person who continued such an an analysis is Bernard Stiegler. Stiegler even uses the same word, "proletarianization" to describe both the loss of skills and knowledge by the worker and the loss of skills and knowledge by the consumer. As I wrote in The Politics of Transindividuality:"At first glance, the use of the term proletarianisation to describe the transindividuation of the consumer would seem to be an analogy with the transformation of the labour process: if proletarianisation is the loss of skills, talents, and knowledge until the worker becomes simply interchangeable labour power, then the broader proletarianisation of daily life is the loss of skills, knowledge, and memory until the individual becomes simply purchasing power. Stiegler's use of proletarianisation is thus simultaneously broader and more restricted than Marx, broader in that it is extended beyond production to encompass relations of consumption and thus all of life, but more restricted in that it is primarily considered with respect to the question of knowledge. The transfer of knowledge from the worker to the machine is the primary case of proletarianisation for Stiegler, becoming the basis for understanding the transfer of knowledge of cooking to microwaveable meals and the knowledge of play from the child to the videogame. Stiegler does not include other dimensions of Marx's account of proletarianisation, specifically the loss of place, of stability, with its corollary affective dimension of insecurity and precariousness. On this point, it would be difficult to draw a strict parallel between worker and consumer, as the instability of the former is often compensated for by the desires and satisfactions of the latter. Consumption often functions as a compensation for the loss of security, stability, and satisfaction of work, which is not to say that it is not without its own insecurities especially as they are cultivated by advertising."For the most part Stiegler considers this deskilling to take place in the automation of the knowledge and skill that makes up daily life. Everything from cooking to knowing how to navigate one's own city is now more or less hardwired into precooked meals and the ubiquitous smartphone. Other cultural critics have pointed to the general deskilling of daily life through the decline of repair, tinkering, and mending. The effect of all this is to change the consumer from someone who buys things based on knowledge and familiarity to a pure expression of buying power, an abstract potential. Just as the worker is separated from the means of production, from the objective conditions of their labor to be the subjective capacity to work, the consumer is separated from the knowledge to consume to become a personification of buying power. As with work the conditions to realize this buying power are outside the control of the consumer. We do not decide what to buy based on our knowledge of our needs and desires but on what is advertised to us as a need or desire.As much as the worker and consumer are opposed, making up two sides of economic relations under capitalism, they are unified, connected in the tendency to transform work to abstract labor power and consumption into abstract buying power. While abstract subjectivity is how these two sides of the capitalist economic relation function it is not how they are lived. They are lived as profoundly individual, subjective in the conventional sense of the word. What one does for a living is in some sense considered to be one's identity: "What do you do?" is in some sense equivalent to "Who are You?" Being reduced to abstract labor power, to capacity for work, is lived as a concrete and highly individualized condition, as my particular job and career. If for any one of the myriad reasons what one does is inadequate to constitute an identity, remains just a day job, then consumption or the commodity form steps in to supply the necessary coordinates for an identity. From this perspective we can chart not only the historical progression of the two identities, but also the structural similarities. With respect to the first, consumer society, consumption, and the myriad possibilities to construct an identity through consumption, comes after the worker, after the formation of capitalism. Any attempt to read Marx's Capital for consumer society, for the common sense understanding of commodity fetishism as the overvaluing of commodities, is going to have a hard time navigating the dull world of linen, coats, corn and coal. The consumer comes after the worker. However, it is also possible to see a similarity of a structural condition. In both case subjectivity is abstracted from, or separated from, objectivity, from not just objects, but objective spirit, in Hegel's sense, institutions, norms, and structures. This abstraction is lived as a highly individualized identity, in some sense work and consumption form the basis of individuality as such. However, it only has effects, only functions in the aggregate. As a worker one only has effects, both in terms of the creation of value, and in terms of any disruption of exploitation, as part of a collective. The same could be said for consumerism, even though it is through consumerism that we are encouraged to believe that we can have ethical effects as individuals, green consumerism, cruelty free products, etc. Consumers only matter as a mass, at an economy of scale, even in the age of niche marketing. This can be seen in the impotent attempts to bring back cancelled products, or to change corporate strategies through boycotts. The only demands that make sense to corporations are those that are already effective in terms of buying power. I am wondering if one can see a similar structure of abstract/individual subjectivity in other aspects of society. I am thinking of politics, in which individuals are abstracted from any real connection to their communities and societies only to be constituted as "voting power," an abstract aggregate that is lived as a highly individualized identity. I will have to think more about that one. My point here is to connect the often asserted claim "that everything is subjective" back to its material conditions, to the production of subjectivity in both work and the reproduction of everyday life, production and consumption. It is not just a matter of a bad reading of Nietzsche that is behind such claims, although it is often that as well, but an effect in the sphere of ideas and discussion of what is already at work in the sphere of production. Abstract subjectivity is a material condition before it is an intellectual interpretation. The thread running through both is connection between power and impotence. If everything is subjective then I can offer any interpretation, create my own moral code whole cloth, live as I prefer, but if everything is subjective then I can do very little, nothing at all to alter or change anything. This is the fundamental point of intersection between Marx and Spinoza, subjectivity, individual subjectivity, is not the zenith of our freedom and power, it is the nadir of our subjection. Updated 4/15/24I happened to be rereading Tiqqun's Introduction to Civil War which offers the following on this last point, on the political subject as a subject constituted in alienation. As they write:"In order to become a political subject in the modern State, each body must submit to the machinery that will make it such; it must begin by casting aside its passions (now inappropriate), its tastes (now laughable), its penchants (now contingent), endowing itself instead with interests, which are much more presentable and, even better, representable. In this way, in order to become a political subject each body must first carry out its own autocastration as an economic subject. Ideally, the political subject will be reduced to nothing more than a pure vote, a pure voice."Tiqqun offers an expression of this idea, and in doing so captures what I was starting to think about before. However, they also offer me some reservations, especially in their tendency towards deriving an ontological or existential situation from a social condition. As with work and consumption, the pure subjectivity, the pure labor, buying, or voting power, is presented as the zenith of a kind of power, a capacity, maximize your labor power, express your preferences with consumer choices, and, most absurdly, vote harder, but this power is entirely determined by the existing labor conditions, market relations, and political structures.
Abstrak Karya sastra merupakan miniatur dari dunia nyata, dimana sebuah karya sastra biasanya mengungkap beberapa masalah yang berkaitan dengan makhluk hidup termasuk isu-isu tentang hubungan manusia dengan alam. Manusia lebih cenderung melakukan kerusakan pada lingkungan daripada menjaganya, hal ini menyebabkan kehancuran bumi beserta isinya. Hal ini tergambar pada novel The Road karya McCarthy dimana lingkungan yang menjadi setting utamanya hancur berantakan. Lansekapnya tertutup oleh abu yang berterbangan. Dan ketika salju turun, ia berwarna abu-abu. Langitnya juga terlihat gelap. Oleh sebab itu, ada beberapa masalah yang berhubungan dengan kehancuran bumi yang tergambar pada novel yang kemudian memunculkan dua dasar pertanyaan (1) bagaimana kehancuran bumi digambarkan dalam novel The Road karya McCarthy? Dan (2) bagaimana kehancuran bumi memberikan dampak terhadap karakter utama dalam novel The Road karya McCarthy?. Untuk melihat masalah ini perlu teori yang pas yang biasa disebut ecocriticism. Ecocriticism melihat kehancuran bumi sebagai hasil dari tingkah laku manusia terhadap lingkungan misalnya: eksploitasi dan colonialisasi. Seperti yang dikatakan Lawrence Buell bahwa kondisi lingkungan itu ditentukan oleh manusia. Ecocriticism adalah suatu istilah yang berada dibawah payung postcolonialism dimana seorang postcolonialist meyakini bahwa kolonialisasi mempunyai campur tangan dalam penghancuran bumi. Para penjajah merasa percaya diri untuk mengeksploitasi bumi karena dianugrahi kekuatan oleh modernism. Untuk mendapatkan analisis yang jelas, skripsi ini menggunakan metode descriptive quality dimana kualitas data menjadi poin utama daripada jumlah data. Jadi, terlihat jelas bahwa kehancuran bumi terjadi diseluruh lapisan lingkungan; yaitu atmosfer, permukaan tanah, dan laut. Seluruh atmosfer dipenuhi oleh abu, debu dan karbon, tanahnya terkikis, tandus dan gundul, dan lautnya berubah menjadi abu-abu. Kehancuran bumi ini juga memberikan kesuraman tersendiri kepada tokoh si bapak dan si anak. Mereka harus melalui hidup yang keras, susah untuk bernafas, susah untuk menemukan sesuatu yang bisa dimakan dan secara mental mereka selalu takut akan ancaman-ancaman dari kehancuran bumi. Kata Kunci: kehancuran bumi, ecocriticism, postcolonialism, modernism. Abstract Literary work is a miniature of larger world or reality, whereas a literary work reveals some problems related to humans being including issues of human relationships with the environment. Humans tend to do damage to the environment rather than maintaining it, thus it causes devastation of earth. It is reflected in McCarthy's the road where the environment is devastated. The landscape save the ash on the wind, and when the snow falls, it is gray. The sky is also dark. Therefore, there are some problems of knowledge about how the devastation of earth portrays in the novel, which are delivered to two main questions of (1) How is devastation of earth depicted in Cormac McCarthy's The Road? and (2) How does devastation of earth give impacts to the main characters in Cormac McCarthy's The Road?. In case to observe these problems, it needs a suitable theory which called ecocriticism. Ecocriticism sees the devastation of earth as the result of humans' behaviour such as exploitation and colonialism of the environment, as Lawrence Buell says that the condition of the environment is determined by humans. Ecocriticism is under umbrella term of postcolonialism in which postcolonilist believes that colonization has intervention in devastating the earth. Colonizer is encouraged to exploit the nature because of power that is given by modernism. To get a clear analysis, this thesis uses descriptive quality method; it means the quality of the data becomes the reference to work rather than the quantity of the data. Thus, it is seen clearly that devastation of earth happened in the whole layers of environment; atmosphere, land and sea. The atmosphere is occupied by ash, dust and carbon, the land has eroded and barren and the sea have changed into gray. This devastation also gives a misery to the father and the son as the main characters. They have to undergo hard life; hard to breathe, hard to find food and mentally they are haunted by the devastated earth's threatens. Keywords: devastation of earth, ecocriticism, postcolonialism, modernism. INTRODUCTION Humans often feel indifferent toward nature. For them, nature is something considerably as a 'mystic' thing, when it goes right, humans forget it, when it goes wrong, they worry it. People tend to prefer natural environments more than built environments, and built environments with water, trees, and other vegetation more than built environments without such features (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989). On the other word, humans tend to permit the nature walks down by itself. They seem to just let it flow without thinking how to keep and maintenance the nature. The study of humans' relation with nature which is known as ecology was begun since years ago when humans lived in harmony with the nature. However, in line with development the nature also changes. Unfortunately, this natural changes brings devastation on earth, as Donald Hughes says that looking back to our historical ecology, Humans have related in multiple ways to the Earth's systems; some of these ways promise a sustainable balance with them, while others are destructive (Hughes, 2001: 269). Historically, through devastation of earth Humans have made major changes in their environments. This is happened almost in the whole surface, as Hughes says that devastation of earth has happened in every historical period and in every part of the inhabited Earth (2001: 1). In order to observe those processes of change that affect the relationship, ecologist studies the mutual effects that other species, natural forces, and cycles have on humans, and the actions of humans that affect the web of connections with non-human organisms and entities (id. at 4.). This ecologist's study shows that devastation of earth is the result of humans' behaviour toward environment. This bad behaviour has changed the environment that will bring devastation to the humans themselves. Humans seemingly don't care of the environment. Severity, humans tend to be more destructive. It forces some Ecocritics who concern in literary study and environment in late nineteenth criticized humans' behaviour toward nature. This criticises show how important avoiding that kind of behaviour toward nature which brings devastation of earth merely, it signed that the study of literature which related to the environment has to be discussed. There were in fact some isolated calls for an ecologically oriented criticism during the 1970s (Rigby, vol 2: 2). However, it was not until the end of the twentieth century that the study of literature and the environment was finally recognized as 'a subject on the rise'. In studying of literature, humans ordinarily focus on the relation between humans and others (society) or between humans and themselves (psychology), whereas, the relation between humans and environment actually is tightly connected. Unfortunately, the study of literature which related to the earth was often forgotten, whereas, the study of literature which related to the environment is greatly important. The study of environment is not merely observing of the nature or nonhumans aspect but it tends to study the relation among nature, earth and the humans themselves. Human actually is a part of environmental system, and therefore the environment has the crucial role in humans life in which it is become the main point of literary study. In some respects, it is perhaps not surprising that the study of literary texts should be coupled with such forgetfulness of the earth. Thus it is needed a study of humans' relation and environment. The study of literature and environment got a full attention when modern era begun to destruct the environment. Since last decade ago, especially years ago, humans consciously realized the impacts of their behaviour toward nature, moreover when they become crazier of invention, exploration and exploitation of the nature. Surely, this impact is indirectly causing ecological changes. However, actually what people do about their ecology depend on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny (White 1996, 6). It can be imagined when humans were only thinking about themselves and forgetting the nature or they were just considering their needs without considering the nature needs, it can be ascertained that the nature will vanish and be extinct. This idea or thought about indifference toward nature is criticized by the Ecocritics. Ecocriticism maintains that literature may be approached in a way that examines humans as part of an ecosystem; they are neither master nor slave to it, but simply one part of an intricate system. Literature and environment truly can't be separated each other. Moreover, Lawrence Buell argues in his book The Truth of Ecology as quoted by Dana Philip that literature would be environmental. It would evoke the natural world through verbal surrogates, and would thereby attempt to bond the reader to the world as well as to discourse (Philip, 2003: 7). It can be assumed that through the literary work, the reader will be brought to the environmental world and devastation of earth. Indirectly, literature causes the reader's interpretation of the environment. Thus, it is important to understand the relation between humans and environment through literary work. It needs to notice that ecology is not a slush fund of fact, value, and metaphor, but a less than fully coherent field with a very checkered past and a fairly uncertain future (Philip, 2003: 45). By understanding the relation between humans and environment, it is beneficial to determine the act effectively on the impact of natural destruction and to integrate knowledge and actions. The study of literature and environment works in tandem in determining humans' perception and interpretation toward nature. As Lawrence Buell says that literature and environment studies must make their case for the indispensableness of physical environment as a shaping force in human art and experience, and how such an aesthetic works (2001: 9). It can be assumed that environmental interpretation is a humanistic inquiry. In other word, what people think about nature, and how they have expressed those ideas is what people interpret of the nature. Generally what people expressed the idea of the nature is a Realistic depiction of the world. Thus, it needs a tool to see this depiction. Surely Ecocriticism is a proper tool to see the depiction of the world. Ecocriticism is the most suitable binoculars to telescoped ecological issue and ecological changes in such literary work, as Sheryl Glotfelty (1996: xviii) says that Ecocriticism is the study of the relationship between literature and the physical environment, Ecocriticism takes an earth-centered approach to literary studies. Only Ecocriticicism observes the relation between humans and nonhumans aspects. What Ecocritics do, in short, is attempting to discover nature as absence, silence in texts, and construe environmental representation as a relevant category of literary (Buell, 2005: 30). Ecocriticism encourages the changing of canonisation through entering literary works which carry up natural issue. Ecocriticism ecologically oriented critique of the way in which Nature is constructed in certain canonical texts. Environmental literature constitutes the third way in which Ecocriticism recasts the canon. According to Lawrence Buell (1995, 7-8), an environmentally oriented work should display some characteristics; first, the nonhuman environment is present not merely as a framing device but as a presence that begins to suggest that human history is implicated in natural history. Second, the human interest is not understood to be the only legitimate interest. Third, Human accountability to the environment is part of the text's ethical framework. The last, some sense of the environment as a process rather than as a constant or a given is at least implicit in the text. In such literary work; Cormac McCarthy's The Road the nature as the setting represents ecological changes. Surely, this change causes devastation of earth. Nothing is more miserable on earth but devastation. The world which is the closest place we live at is not convenient again when it was devastated. Thus, literary and environment has interrelation that cannot be separated. Then, it is important to analyze such literary work through Ecocriticism. Ecological issue commonly represented by the presence of natural thing such as; tree, land and also circumstance in the novel which it become the setting. In other word, ecological issue become a centre point of setting. One of great writers in narrating the setting is Cormac McCarthy. Not only known as a king of the setting, McCarthy also has known as famous environmental setting as Addy Haddock (a writer of McCarthy's bibliography) says that his ability to provide eloquent descriptions with smoothly rolling darker undertones and poetically dismal nuances makes him become a writer with powerful setting. Thus, McCarthy is a right author referenced as a study of Ecocriticism. Indirectly, McCarthy's proficient is caused by his settled at a barn near Louisville, Tennessee. All the stones he gathered, all the wood he cut and kiln dried by himself to renovate his small house. Seemingly, McCarthy's life is not far away from the nature. Years later, after marrying fellow student Lee Holleman in 1961, he and she moved to a shack with no heat and running water in the foothills of the Smoky Mountains outside of Knoxville. These experiences of life sharpen his idea toward nature. McCarthy reveals that he is not a fan of authors who do not deal with issues of life and death; it can be assumed that his writing tends to be explored issues of life including devastation of earth. Recalling blithely the months he spent without electricity in a house in Tennessee. Without money, and he had run out of toothpaste and he was wondering what to do when he went to the mailbox and there was a free sample. It made him become more sensitive facing the nature and more respect it. In 2006, McCarthy writes The Road that grants him a change to be interviewed by Oprah Winfrey. Surely, this interview related to his writing especially devastation of earth and won Pulitzer Prize for fiction. McCarthy told Winfrey that related several stories illustrating the degree of outright poverty he endured at times during his career as a writer. He also states that his novel; The Road inspired when he was standing at the window of a hotel in the middle of the night, his son asleep nearby, he started to imagine what El Paso might look like 50 or 100 years in the future. He just had this image of these fires up on the hill. It shows the condition of the nature at the time which the hill was fired up. McCarthy can be categorized as a weird person. People usually gathered with other people who have same hobby or pleasure. However, it doesn't apply for McCarthy. As a writer, he doesn't like to gather with other writer. He would rather hang out with physicists or scientist than other writer. He does not know any writers and much prefers the company of scientists. No doubt if his knowledge of nature is rich. His knowledge of the natural world is vast and includes many of the Latin names of birds and animals. His pleasure gathering with physicists and scientist caused by his interest in science and environment, by absorbing the intelligence scientists, he realizes that in 100 years the human race won't even be recognizable. For him, what physicists did in the 20th century was one of the extraordinary flowerings ever in the human enterprise, which would much prefer to befriend a scientist than another writer. Most of McCarthy's novels are portraying about life or reality which many of them associated to ecological issue. In 1985, Blood Meridian was published. Blood Meridian portrays the desolate and indifferent 1850s Texas-Mexico borderlands. The extreme violence which takes place comments implicitly on both the environment and human nature. The novel's full title- Blood Meridian, or The Evening Redness In The West- is indicative of the novel's portrayal of the environment. A relationship between location, nature and violence is created in the symbolism of the sun as a "blood meridian". To call McCarthy's environments as constructed in Blood Meridian simply violent is an unsatisfactory conclusion. What is more appropriate and evident in the text is that man is inherently violent and the indifference of nature to this creates an amoral setting. In 1979, McCarthy published his fourth novel, Suttree. In short, Suttree tells the reader about a man named Cornelius Suttree, a fisherman, disillusioned scholar, alcoholic, nihilist, existentialist and transcendentalist. The attention to detail identified earlier in Suttree is telling in terms of his relationship with his environment. Generally, to an Ecocritical reading Suttree shows that, stripped of societal anthropocentrism, man is forced to reassess his relationship with nature. It could be said that McCarthy's prose style is often atavistic (anti-civilization, anti-materialism, anti-industrialism, anti-progress and pro-Nature) in that it both reflects natural processes and often appears primitive, stripped of culture. In 1973, Child of God was published. It was inspired by actual events in Sevier County. Child of God begins with Lester Ballard's dispossession from his parent's house. McCarthy's description of Ballard's lone nomadic wandering after he inadvertently burns down his squat uses the same free indirect discourse. Child of God can also be described as an existential text, particularly for the authenticity of its protagonist. Lester Ballard's atavistic tendencies bring him closer to an animalistic level. From those all of McCarthy's novels, The Road which was published in 2006 by Vintage book publisher is the most representative novel which is related to the study of Ecocriticism. The novel is generally thick of environments' issue. The issue for instance is the fire of woods that happened along the country which give the reader an image of burned land, ash and dust everywhere and so on. Because of this reason, the writer felt that The Road is interested to be analyzed through ecological critics. In short, the novel portrays a journey of father and son as the main character in a burned land in America. The issue of devastation of earth becomes the centre point of interest which grasps the whole setting of the novel. The Road brings the readers onto 'the future' in as much as it is set in a time after an ambiguous 'end' has occurred and society has collapsed. The reverse of the most recent reissue claims that it is the first great masterpiece of the globally warmed generation. It is also the first of McCarthy's novels to have provoked Ecocritical study. This wide appeal to the novel relies strongly on its environmental themes. The use of allusion to genre and form elsewhere in McCarthy's novels can be said to universalise his appeal but in The Road the key concern is the 21st century's most immediate global problem; the irrevocable damage global industrial capitalism is doing to our environment. It is difficult to read The Road without feeling the overwhelming cumulative force of the novel's desolation, and this desolation is most prominently present in the landscapes McCarthy portrays. The setting is almost entirely bereft of life; the little that is found is often malign humanity. The Road greatly represents a study of Ecocriticism. It portrays the colourless world because of devastation of earth. This devastation issue is common object of the Ecocriticism study. The Road continually reminds us of the bleakness of the landscape in the earth. As readers, we only experience bright colours through the characters' dreams or memories, if someone happens to bruise or bleed, or through fire or flare guns. The rest of the time we see a gray ash covering the landscape. As a reality, our landscape is actually green and natural. However, The Road shows the possibility of devastation of earth when humans did devastation to the nature and they can't live in harmony with the nature. Therefore, there is no doubt that The Road becomes the most influencing novel toward environment. It proves from the acclaim written in the novel by George Monbiot, an environmental campaigner that says "It could be the most important environmental book ever. It is a thought experiment that imagines a world without a biosphere, and shows that everything we value depends on the ecosystem." According to the brief story in background of the study that gives perception about the devastation of earth in the novel, it appears two questions as the problems: 1. How is devastation of earth depicted in Cormac McCarthy's The Road? 2. How does devastation of earth give impacts to the main characters in Cormac McCarthy's The Road? METHOD The used method is descriptive quality; it means the quality of the data becomes the reference to work rather than the quantity of the data. Besides, a technique is needed to understand the data. Technique of interpretation must be used to interpret and analyze the data. Through interpretation the analysis can be worked. Interpretation is a crucial step that has to do before analyzing the data. Then, extrinsic approach is used as an approach toward the analysis in which environment belongs to it. According to method above, the first thing that has to do is collecting data. In collecting data this research focuses on reading and documentation. Reading novel. In this step, novel becomes the object of the research. The novel is entitled The Road, written by Cormac McCarthy. To collect the correctly data, it needs reading more than once, because to get interpretation, it needs understanding all contents completely with all possibilities both intrinsically and extrinsically. Inventorying data. This step is collecting data through noting the quotations related to the statement of the problems and objectives of the study, it is including in words, sentences, and discourse that can represent devastation of earth in Cormac McCarthy's The Road. Thus, all data that will be analyzed are started and sourced through the novel's contents. Classification data. It is appropriate to the statements of the problems about devastation of earth in Cormac McCarthy's The Road. Tabling the data. It is to simplify reading the data and classify data that is used in the analysis for the readers. Continuously, the selected data or the collected data, which are related to the statements of the problems and the objectives, are analyzed through Ecocriticism in depicting the devastation of earth and its impacts to the main characters in Cormac McCarthy's The Road. MODERNISM The word "modern" closely means to up-to-date, abreast of the times, and going beyond the past in more than a temporally or chronologically literal sense (Greenberg, 1979; 2). Marshall Breman as quoted Jan Rada defines modernism as a trend of thought that affirms the power of human being to create, improve, and reshape their environment, with the aid of scientific knowledge technology and practical experimentation (2008; 6). Breman then argues that modernism is as any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world-and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are (Berman, 1982; 5; 14). The development of modernism emerged two poles that confront each other; science and technology and natural degradation. As Helena J. Keler explanation that the image of 'creative destruction' is very important to understanding modernity precisely because it derived from the particular dilemmas that faced the implementation of the modernist project. This destruction of a holistic universe in the modern era shatters the conception of human beings and societies as total entities, instead inaugurating an era characterized by a never-ending process of internal ruptures and fragmentations within itself (Keler, 2005: 4). According to Horkheimer and Adorno as quoted by Helena, modern capitalist society is engaged in a pattern of domination: the domination of nature by human beings, domination of nature within human beings, and this system of domination is driven by fear of the human and nonhuman unknown the Other (Keler, 2005: 3). Movement of modernism manifests itself in the self-destructive nature of symbolism: when pushed to its logical extreme, the symbolist aesthetic starts to forgo any notion of an organic, necessary relationship between signifier and signified, and simply imposes a particular motif as an arbitrary symbol of something else (Hutchinson, 2011; 58). Modernism often demonstrates the destructive rather than constructive nature. Modernists argue that the ecologically destructive projects are not viable because of climate change but modernism movement (Johnston, 2012: 207). Specifically, Barbara Rose Johnston states that Human conduct that contributes to the destruction of our ecological balance. Such interpretations of environmental change, however, can have undesirable effect of deflecting responsibility, since blame is placed on a cycle of time about which a person can do nothing (Johnston, 2012: 212). Global environmental change, which spans natural sciences, policy and development studies, is currently experiencing its first waves. Perhaps it is time to recognize that already some people are getting their feet wet. On what criteria should one decide to retreat to higher ground or stick it out unmoved until the tide turns. Modernism challenges the modern project of understanding global environmental change and doing something about it when it causes problems (Blaikie, 1996: 81). According to Piers M. Blaikie, modernism First, it challenges all embracing world views or 'meta narratives' which tend to be highly teleological and assume the validity of their underlying assumptions and their claims. Thus, the role of environmental scientists in policy making as 'talking truth to power' and as the only rational and legitimate brokers between the 'real' environment and the rest of us, is rejected. Second, it challenges the tendency that is more pronounced in areas of global environmental change where the local hands on experience of the environment (land degradation, desertification and biodiversity). Third, it challenged that reality is socially constructed. An epistemology which builds models of society and environment with causal connections is challenged by one which is constituted as a series of descriptive accounts according to different actors' perceptions (Blaikie, 1996: 81). Modernism encourages people and countries to over-exploit natural resources, and contribute to reductions in spending on social and environmental welfare (Huckle, 1999: 36). Moreover, environmental reductions being blamed on the impact of foreign cultural domination this has allegedly eroded and damaged the 'essential harmony' between humans and nature (Mawdsley, 2001: 96). Evernden contends that the second instrumental vision of control and domination over nature is the historical product of modernity, more specifically of Renaissance, when a new mode of knowledge, based on reason and experimentation replaced the medieval search for knowledge as contemplation and wisdom (1992). This argument is supported that Modernity is thus responsible for creating Nature by abstracting from nature, and with it a whole history of conquest and domination comes to be enacted. In the words of C. S. Lewis: "We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may "conquer" them. We are always conquering Nature because "Nature" is the name for what we have, to some extent, conquered" (Lewis, 1978: 42). Latest, Environmental problems and other risks encompass less than the globally catastrophic. More and more disaster experts, development agencies, and citizens' groups are supporting that the globalisation is largely responsible for such human misery (Huckle, 1999: 36). Modernism signed by the development science and technology (Somerville, 2006: 17-18). Further, given the increasing production by technologically advanced capitalism of risks that threaten us all ironically that technology induced catastrophes and environmental disasters (Simon Cottle, 1998: 8). Since the Enlightenment, technology, especially science-based technology, has offered the promise of a better world through the elimination of disease and material improvements to standards of living. On the other hand, resource extraction, emissions of dangerous materials, and pollution of air, water, and soil have created conditions for unprecedented environmental catastrophe and have already caused irreversible damage to the biosphere (Vergragt, 2006: 7). Ironically, the persisting contradictions between a better life created and supported by technology for the wealthy few, also caused the increasing environmental degradation and persistent poverty for the vast majority calls for a deeper exploration and understanding of the nature. Philip J. Vergragt then, states that technology will support and enhance a "good life" for all of its citizens, in both rich and presently poor countries, without compromising the Earth's ecosystem or the prospects of later generations (Vergragt, 2006: 8). Thus, science and technology which shaped to the sophistication give man a power to colonize the earth. POSTCOLONIALISM Environmentalism in post-colonial discourse has its beginnings in Alfred Crosby's account of the impact of European incursions into the Americas and the Pacific (Ashcroft, 2000: 71). This incursion of course destructs not only the country; physical building and ideology but also the environment and nature. The conquest and colonization of so many extra-European environments produced irreversible changes in land use, in flora and fauna and frequently damaged beyond repair traditionally balanced relations between indigenous communities and their environments, a relationship unlike that of their conquerors crucial to their understanding of their 'being' as of the land rather than merely on it (Ashcroft, 2000: 71-72). He adds that imperial incursions and colonization have been regarded as environmentally destructive, yet as Richard Grove argues, the perception of what had already been lost in Europe, the sense of intrinsic connection between the 'more-than-human' and the human, and thus the urgency of environmental preservation became strikingly evident in Europe's colonies, particularly in the late nineteenth century. Much environmentalism in theory and practice has emanated from former imperial centres such as Europe and the United States. While belated recognition of the crucial importance of other forms of life on earth is both welcome and necessary, its export and sometimes imposition on postcolonized cultures invites the obvious charge of hypocrisy and generates resentment against former imperial states which having degraded their own and their colonies' environments in the 'interests' of progress and 'development' now encourage (or impose) the theory and practices of environmental preservation on other peoples (Ashcroft, 2000: 72). This also frequently creates division within post-colonized cultures themselves, where, for instance, peoples are moved off their traditional lands to make way for game parks, essentially for the benefit of wealthy tourists. Demands for the 'global' preservation of endangered species frequently clash with the policies of post-colonized governments eager to use their regained environmental sovereignty in the interests of a modern capitalism from which it is difficult for them to escape. Devastation of earth has highlighted how human–environmental vulnerabilities are amplified not only by anthropogenic climate change but also by the capitalist exploitation of natural resources (Carrigan, 2005: 1). Harmful environmental conduct exposes several broader dimensions such as the nation's ability to use its resources as determined by domestic political processes, such as; it changes the natural forest microclimates that have been transformed into new microclimates increasing sunlight and lowering humidity (Nazzal, 2005: 6). The ecological crisis is not merely an isolated event but has its roots in the modern materialistic civilization that makes man becomes the butcher of earth (Huggan and Tiffin, 2010: 1). They argue that one way out of this morass is to insist that the proper subject of postcolonialism is colonialism, and to look accordingly for colonial/imperial underpinnings of environmental practices in both colonising and colonised societies of the present and the past (Huggan and Tiffin, 2010: 3) Colonialism greatly changed the environmental condition of colonized country. Alfred W. Crosby (Crosby 1986) as quoted by Aschroft describes the ways in which the environments of colonized societies have been physically transformed by the experience of colonial occupation, imperialism/colonialism not only altered the cultural, political and social structures of colonized societies, but also devastated colonial ecologies and traditional subsistence patterns (Ashcroft, 2000: 69). Indirectly, colonization influences ecological changes in the past which cause ecological destruction in the present day. More importantly, based on Crosby statement in Aschroft explain that introduced crops and livestock not between colonizer and colonized country only supported conquering armies and colonizing populations, radically colonizer altered the entire ecology of the invaded lands in ways that necessarily disadvantaged indigenous peoples and annihilated or endangered native flora and fauna (2000: 69). Arguably this has led to one of the most profound ecological changes the world has seen. Colonization or colonialism can be defined as the conquest and control of other people's land and goods (Loomba, 2005: 8). Colonialism means a conquest which is done by the west or European and American country toward Asia and Africa by exploitation the land, surely it causes natural destruction. Elleke Boehmer has defined colonialism as the settlement of territory, the exploitation or development of resources, and attempts to govern the indigenous inhabitants of occupied lands (Boehmer as qtd. in McLeod 2000: 8). The term colonialism is important in defining the specific form of natural exploitation that developed with the expansion of Europe over the last 400 years (Ashcroft, 2000: 40). With the end of the cold war, global infatuation with neoliberal economics has intensified the peripheralization of the South along economic, political, social, cultural and natural lines (Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, 2002: 1). Postcolonial critique bears witness to those countries and communities - in the North and the South (Bhabha, 1994: 6). The assumption of postcolonial studies is that many of the wrongs, if not crimes, against nature are a product of the economic dominance of the north over the south (Young, 2001: 6). Thus, the Norh represents the West and the South represents the East. Postcolonialism sees the natural destruction on the South as the impacts of colonization The northern environmentalism considered as the rich (always potentially vainglorious and hypocritical) and the southern environmentalism considered as the poor (often genuinely heroic and authentic) (huggan and Tiffin, 2010: 2). However, northern needs of the natural need were supplied from the south in the name of colonization. Colonialism granted imperial powers the rights to arrogate and exploit the territory of a subject people as well as to appropriate unlimited property rights, post-colonial states acted quickly to regain control over their natural resources both through expropriation of foreign property interests and through the legal arena (Nazzal, 2005: 10). Colonialism, through both practice and discourse, has separated man from his natural surroundings and has given him a false idea about the meaning of nature: on the contrary, nature is not there to be plundered, but to be cared for, tended and made to yield its produce. Then, Man is ennobled by the relationship with the environment, by his power to make things grow and watch over their growth, but the reverse also holds true: devastation returns man to his primitive condition. It is not surprising when the the nature did reverse destruction to the humans. It is the result of what they do exploit to the nature. On the other world, man as the colonizer has colonized the earth which caused the devastation of earth. (Chrisman and Williams, 1994: 1–20). Thus, postcolonialism can be considered as umbrella term of ecocriticism in which it criticizes the relation between human and nature including criticizing humans' behaviour precisely humans' exploitation toward nature. ECOCRITICISM Humans truly can't be separated with environment. human beings are engaged in the eternal search for connection, for that which connects us to others and for that which connects us to ourselves, culture, language, history, belief systems, social practice, and other influences on human development are as much a part of place as the physical landscape one crosses (Dreese, 2002; 2-3). She emphasizes that environmental factors play a crucial role in the physical, emotional, and even spiritual configurations that determine our ideas of who we are. All human beings develop their own sense of place through life that determines why they love certain regions or feel utterly alien in others. The study of relations between humans and environment called ecology. Lawrence Buell defines ecology as the study of the interactions between organisms and the environment (Buell, 2005; 139). Meanwhile, Glen A Love defines ecology as not as merely a study of the relationship between organisms and their living and nonliving environment but also a combination of science and a sense of responsibility for life (2003; 37-38). Ecology as Lawrence Buell say above is drawn in the life circle; the life processes of many organisms put into their surroundings environment whose presence of other organism affects the life processes of these and other organisms sharing the same environment. When these processes are cut by such destruction, e.g. chemical by-products of the life processes of one species (or occupational group) are harmful to another species; the relationship between the two species is "antagonistic." Increased population density increases the probability of antagonistic interactions (Catton, 1994: 80). It is essential to be aware of the environmental damage which caused by ecological changes. The development of humans' ecology slowly damages the environment. The ecology of human development involves the scientific study of the progressive, mutual accommodation between an active, growing human being and the changing properties of the immediate settings (Bronfenbrenner, 1979: 21). Imbalance fine relations between humans and environment emerged a critic called ecocritic or ecocriticism (Buell, 2005; 2). John Elder as quoted by Dana Philip says that The science of ecology confirms the indivisibility of natural process: each feature of a landscape must be understood with reference to the whole, just as the habits of each creature reflect, and depend upon, the community of life around it (1999; 581). Ecology when it counts as science tends to be a lot more reductive, thus many of the core concepts of ecology once notable for their expansiveness have in recent years been cut down to size, made more particular, or abandoned altogether. It now appears that even the ecosystem concept may not be valid biologically, but valid concept or not, an ecosystem is primarily a theoretical entity, and therefore could never be the reality that somehow underwrites poetry, even if that poetry is of the good old-fashioned, supposedly "organic" sort (Philip, 1999; 582). By that kind of reason, Elder argues that culture too may be understood organically: it is the field of relationship between organisms and, as such, a complex organism in its own right (Philip, 1999; 582). Ecology is not merely bound to science and technology, but also moral and politic. Greg Garrard assumes that ecology itself is shifting and contested, the emphasis on the moral and political orientation of the ecocritic and the broad specification of the field of study are essential (2004; 4). Problems of ecology are features of our society, arising out of our dealings with nature, from which we should like to free ourselves, and which we do not regard as inevitable consequences of what is good in that society (Garrard, 2004; 5). Lynn white, Jr argues in his article on Cheryll Glotfelty's The Ecocriticism reader: landmark in literary ecology that environmental crisis is fundamentally a matter of the beliefs and values that direct science and technology and dominating attitude toward nature (1996; 4). Discoveries in ecology and cellular biology revolutionize our sense of self, teaching us that there is no such thing as an individual, only an individual-in-context (Neil Evernden, 1996; 93). Discoveries of course get much of invention. Unconsciously, humans' behaviour (ex: exploitation) toward environment was changed. Industrial Revolution affected humanity's conception of its relationship to nature, warning that technology has created the false illusion that we control nature, allowing us to forget that our "unconquerable minds" are vitally dependent upon natural support systems (Harold Fromm, 1996; 31) Ecocritic or Ecocriticism is an umbrella term, used to refer to the environmentally oriented study of literature and (less often) the arts more generally, and to the theories that underlie such critical practice (Buell, 2005; 138). Cheryll Glotfelty simply writes the definition, ecocriticism is the study of the relationship between literature and the physical environment, ecocriticism takes an earth-centered approach to literary studies (1996: xviii). Ecocriticism might succinctly be defined as study of the relation between literature and environment conducted in a spirit of commitment to environmental praxis (Lawrence Buell as quoted by Dana Philip, 1999; 583). Ecocriticism is, then, an avowedly political mode of analysis, ecocritics generally tie their cultural analyses explicitly to a 'green' moral and political agenda. In this respect, ecocriticism is closely related to environmentally oriented developments in philosophy and political theory (Greg Garrard, 2004; 3) Ecocentrism is more compelling as a call to fellow humans to recognize the intractable, like-it-or-not interdependence that subsists between the human and the nonhuman and to tread more lightly on the earth than it is as a practical program (Lawrence Buell, 2005, 102). Ecological criticism shares the fundamental premise that human culture is connected to the physical world, affecting it and affected by it. Ecocriticism takes as its subject the interconnections between nature and culture, specifically the cultural artefacts of language and literature (Cheryll Glotfelty, 1996; xix). The majority of ecocritics, whether or not they theorize their positions, look upon their texts of reference as refractions of physical environments and human interaction with those environments, notwithstanding the artifactual properties of textual representation and their mediation by ideological and other socio-historical factors (Lawrence Buell , 2005; 30). Literary theory, in general, examines the relations between writers, texts, and the world. In most literary theory "the world" is synonymous with society-the social sphere. Ecocriticism expands the notion of "the world" to include the entire ecosphere or nonhuman, which is physical environment. Several things that have to be seen are: • Transforming this concept becomes social movement that will bring the humans into conscious of the equality between human and their environment and doesn't consider the nature into binary opposition between dominate and dominated. • Ecocriticism encourages the changing of canonisation through entering literary works which carry up natural issue. • Ecocriticism is not only an approach but also a pendadogis tool. • Ecocriticism connects the literary study with the earth to see how is the relation between humans and earth where they stand (Cheryll Glotfelty, 1996, xxii) The majority of ecocritics, whether or not they theorize their positions, look upon their texts of reference as refractions of physical environments and human interaction with those environments, notwithstanding the artifactual properties of textual representation and their mediation by ideological and other sociohistorical factors (Buell, 2005; 30). It can be assumed that Ecocrtiticism sees the text as the refraction of physical environment. Another denigrates attempts to recuperate realism as restricting the field of environmental writing, as ludicrously foreshortened in focus ("its practitioners . . . reduced to an umpire's role, squinting to see if a given depiction of a horizon, a wildflower, or a live oak tree is itself well painted and lively"), and in any case bogus, since "mimesis presumes the sameness of the representation and the represented object" (Phillips 2003: 163–4, 175). Buell has added that this is a conviction that contact (or lack ofcontact) with actual environments is intimately linked, even if not on a one-to-one basis, with the work of environmental imagination, for both writer and critic (Buell, 2005; 31). Ecocriticism can explore what we can call a discursively manipulated nonhuman world in literature, and discuss how it gets marginalized or silenced by, or incorporated into the human language (Legler, I997: 227). Nonhuman environment must be represented as an active presence and player within the text made some astute readers inclined to be sympathetic of the environment (Buell, 2005: 51). The task of ecocriticism, then, is to formulate a conceptual foundation for the study of interconnections between literature and the environment. Literature can be perceived as an aesthetically and culturally constructed part of the environment, since it directly addresses the questions of human constructions, such as meaning, value, language, and imagination, which can, then, be linked to the problem of ecological consciousness that humans need to attain. Within this framework, ecocritics are mainly concerned with how literature transmits certain values contributing to ecological thinking (Glotfelty, 1996: xxi). Ecocriticism offers researcher a way how to analyze such literary work through three steps. First is seeing the representation of nonhuman aspect. This first step is looking how is the nature like rice field, village, wilderness, forest, sea, beach, hill, mountain, valley, river, animal (or treatment toward animal) and city environment pictured in the text. Second is seeing the accusation toward ecology issues. The second step destructs how the natural issue is portrayed with the different way. For instance, the nature is pictured as an inconvenient place again for humans because of the emergence the new value; technology, capitalism, extinction of local knowledge, and development of building which is not oriented to the environment. Last is taking part of text's ideology. In this case examines the relations between writers, texts, and the world. This third step is seeing and taking part of the ideology that contains in the text. How the author's view and commitment toward the nature (Cheryll Glotfelty, 1996, xix). DEVASTATION OF EARTH Those all theories mentioned above are related to the word "devastation" which happened on earth. Modernism granted colonizer a power to devastate the earth in which postcolonialism and ecocriticism tend to criticize that devastation. Certainly, what is actually the meaning of devastation of earth? The word "devastation" itself according to Merriam-Webster dictionary means the state or fact of being rendered nonexistent, physically unsound, or useless. In other word, devastation is deterioration, destruction, vanishing of the earth through depletion of resources such as air, water and soil. Devastation of earth can be defined as a destruction of ecosystems and the extinction of wildlife. Devastation of earth is a term used to describe a situation in which a part of the natural environment (the earth) is devastated or damaged. According to Shakhashiri, earth is areas of land as distinguished from sea and air (2011: 1). It means that the earth is composed by three parts; land, sea and air. Thus, it can be ascertained that if the devastation happened on earth, it will strike those all of earth's parts. The devastation which strikes the air will harm the condition of air in the atmosphere or known as devastated atmosphere, devastation which strikes the land will harm the condition of the soil and change it into erode and barren, and devastation which strike the water will contaminate the clean water into the dirty one. The earth as mentioned above that composed from three parts; certainly those each parts have a role. Land is the surface of the earth where the creatures are growing and developing; the plantations (trees) grow well, the animals breed and the humans dwell the life. Air is the mixture of gases which surrounds the Earth in which it contains a lot of vital substances such as oxygen and ozone. And water is a clear liquid, without colour or taste, which falls from the sky as rain and is necessary for animal and plant even human life. Water is also available in the river and sea. All of those parts of the earth greatly have advantage when it states in the normal/natural condition. However, when it was devastated, the earth turns into less natural and more miserable. That is the picture of the devastation of earth. DEPICTION OF DEVASTATION OF EARTH The devastation of earth as Hughes says has happened in every historical period and in every part of the inhabited Earth (2001: 1). It means that devastation of earth happened in the whole surface of the earth. Devastation has stroked the whole environment; atmosphere, land, and sea. Postcolonialism argues that colonialism has an intervention on devastating the earth. Colonialism has devastated the earth as Ashcroft says that the conquest and colonization of so many extra-European environments produced irreversible changes in land use, in flora and fauna and frequently damaged beyond repair traditionally balanced relations between indigenous communities and their environments (2000: 71-72). He adds that imperial incursions and colonization have been regarded as environmentally destructive. Devastation of earth happened over earth. It means that devastation happened on land, atmosphere and sea. The land has changed into gullied, eroded and barren. This changing surely as the impact of devastation of earth which is done by the colonizer in colonizing the land. Everything which stands on the land has changed, There was no reborn flora and fauna in McCarthy's The Road. However, the presence of the flora and fauna is the rest of the previous world. Indeed these flora and fauna have changed as the impact of colonialism. Flora in McCarthy's The Road is dominated by the trees. However, most of the trees have changed into gray, dark and black. It is so pathetic when the father and his son faced the standing black trees and they realized that it changes. Horribly, it seems like ghost of trees. The changing of the trees is not underlined on the changes of its colour but also its presence. It means that the trees are not only changing into dark and black with its standing but also there are many trees which die and fall to the ground. The changes of fauna can be seen when the father and his son was camp in the forest and listening for any sound, it draws that the bird has changed its behaviour by holding migratory to circle the earth. The birds can no longer life in harmony with the environment by occupying the forest. It is caused the changing of trees which turn into dead. Thus, it forces the birds to change themselves. Other fauna changing draws when the father who found an odor of cows. However, the cows are extinct since years ago. He asked to himself whether the cows are really real or not. He finally realized that it is extinct. It shows that the cows are changed from the presence to absence. The burning of a certain thing; such as the trees, surely produces a residue or combustion. It can be carbon and ash. It can be imagined how large the amount of ash will be produced if the whole land of forest were burned. Certainly, the ash will cover everything that has seen. A horrible fire of forest has produced a horrible ash too till everything is covered by ash. The ash has moved along the wind till it covered the city and everything in the city, The fire of forest makes the amount of ash become uncontrolled. The moving of ash filled the air and atmosphere in which it makes everything coloured covered by ash and dust. Hence, everything becomes colourless. The ash changes the landscape become gray. It can be assumed that the graying landscape is no other causing by the moving ash. The occupying of ash in the atmosphere makes the day become unseen and dark. The result of the residual combustion is not ashes merely, but also carbons that harm the environment. Ash and carbon both fill and occupy the atmosphere. As the greenhouse effect idea, that the ash and carbon also dust which in a large amount and uncontrolled in atmosphere will form a mantle which wrapped out the whole of earth. This causes our sight of the sky become dark and gray.The sky and cloud are devoured with ash. The cloud becomes ashen and gray. Severity, the ash and carbon have contaminated everything in the air including the sea water vapor. Then, the result is clouds of ash. Ash and dust have affected the form of the cloud to become gray. Probably its content has been also affected. When the clouds changes into gray, it can be predicted that the rainwater which come down from the clouds will also be gray. It is supported with the presence of the ash mantle that wrapped up the earth. Certainly, everything which come down from the sky; rainwater has to pass this mantle, consequently the rain water will be coloured as gray by the ash mantle. The ash mantle has coloured the rain water. The rainwater which drips down to the earth is seen as the gray sheets of rain. Rainwater that is usually used by humans to fulfil their needs such as to irrigate the fields has been contaminated by ash and carbon so that its contents no longer can be used for the benefit of man. Consequently, there will be no crops and there will be no natural food. Mantle of ash has blanketed the earth during the unknown time. As described above that everything which fell from the sky will pass this mantle so that everything will be contaminated by it. The result, everything which fell will be gray. After several days the father and his son watched the gray sheets of rain, the weather quickly changes into snowy. Everyone knows as it has seen that snow is falling from the sky. The snow actually is similar to the rain, including their formed and their fell. The sea water vapor which is formed into cloud in the sky will fall as the rainwater, however, because of the extreme/cold weather, the rain water freeze into ice and it changes into snow that is white and soft. This falling snow of course has to pass the mantle of ash and it changes into gray. The next devastation of earth is turned to everything which lay on the surface of the earth covered by darkness as the ash effect. Everything stands in the earth turned to be black such as the dead trees which burned by fire forest, and the rain water and snow which fell as gray turn into black in the land. The dead trees which burned by fire forest surely create a black view of trees. The trees which burned in incompletely will make an appearance of burnt and black trees. The rainwater and snow which are grey in their falling turned to be black in the land. The large number of those rainwater and snow gathered as one in the ground create a new colour, more intense and black. The gray flakes which fell down turned to the dark slush. Dark slush can be assumed as the slush which is thicker than a flake. Thus, the slush which is as the result of flakes changes into black. It is also applied in the rainwater; the water in the land is not the whole from the rainwater, some from the river and so on. However, the thick rainwater which fell down in gray proved that its water is dominated to black water. the slush which is melted flows through the ash and turned to the black water. THE IMPACTS OF DEVASTATION OF EARTH ON FATHER'S ATTITUDE Living and dwelling in such devastated earth surely give impacts to the humans who walk over it. The father and his son reveal those kinds of impacts. The father who lived before and after unknown disaster seems undergoing a lot of impacts. It is different with his son who born after that disaster. He tends to be innocent, only watch and observe what his father did. There was an idea to end the life when the father still lived with his woman. She always forces him to end their life because there was nothing else to do in the ruined world. However, the father keep his believe that humans have to struggle. The experience of dwelling the life before the unknown disaster made him stronger. The father realized that what the environment did to him is the result what the humans did to the environment, as Lawrence Buell says that human culture is connected to the physical world; nature and environment, affecting it and affected by it. In other word, humans have affected the environment and have been affected by environment. The woman forces him because they lived in unusual life, they lived like zombie. The devastation of earth causes their life as like as zombie or walking dead in a horror film which the father and his son have a role as the victims. They have to avoid even to face the zombie to keep alive. Dwelling the life in such devastated earth; the air was filled by the ash and dust forces them to wear a mask. The devastated earth; unfriendly air forces him to wear mask (canister mask) and even wear biohazard suit. As the affection of the devastated earth, the father and his son have to worry their life, Mostly he worried about their shoes. Worrying is something that the father in his son has to do. There is no certainty living in such ruined world. It is a common thing for them to worry anytime, worrying of food and shoes. Food is essential thing to keep alive. It is the reason why they worry of food. If they can't find some foods, it means they will die. The shoes are important stuff to hold a journey. As explain before that the weather extremely changes a while. Few days were raining, and another was snowing. Shoes keep the father in his son feet to keep away from coldness and freezing which can take their life. The weather is extremely cold. It is not surprising that the weather turns to colder and colder. The weather has changed anytime; sometime it rains and often snow. The coldness of weather doesn't only force them to eat the food that already fermented as above but also threaten their life. The coldness is very extremely danger for them. Moreover it is pictured that the cold can crack the stone and takes their life off. In such condition surely makes them hard to breathe because in the coldness the air contains thin oxygen. Dwelling the life in such devastated earth actually makes him aware of surrounding even the weather. The sounds like forest fire, fallen trees, and so on makes his ears disturbed and consequently he has to keep awake. Living in such devastated earth makes him to be more aware toward everything that threatens them. The father and his son have experienced many kinds of problems. Everything that happened to him does not break his spirit to keep alive even when they are in starving. He always believes that he would find something to eat. the father always optimistic dwelling life. the devastated earth makes him become more optimistic. Struggle is a must to do to find another thing to be eaten to keep the life. Keep trying is the key for the good guys who living in the ruined environment. By keeping trying, they can survive dwelling the life in such environment. Keep trying is not enough to live in such devastated earth. Always suspect the possibility that may happen has to be done, because no one knows what will happen, but the threat of nature always happen all the time. Thus, another thing that has to do is to remain vigilant about the environment. The devastated earth forces him to become "cautious, watchful" and always "on the lookout". He believes that no one expect a trouble. However, living in the devastated earth, the thing that has to do is to always expect it. Thus he was always wary of something bad that may happen. Nothing can be expected from the nature. The father always believed it. He no longer agrees if people prepare something for tomorrow. Although he always optimistic of what he did, he never believed it. For him, even though he's preparing for tomorrow, he doesn't believe that the nature will prepare for him. What the father believes that is now or tomorrow is the same. This belief keeps the father spirit to face his following days. As a father he would often feel the pain. Physically, he is ill of facing the devastated earth. And mentally, he is ill of the feeling of bearing the responsibility as a father who is responsible for the survival of his son and his own life. However nature should never take the life of his son. He would bet his life for the life of his son. Often he complains to himself about his illness. He pretends as tough man in front his son but actually he felt tremendous pain. It's just that he does not want his son to know. THE IMPACTS OF DEVASTATION OF EARTH ON SON'S ATTITUDE Being born in the devastated earth which the unknown disaster has swept it surely affects the son's behaviour toward environment. The greyscale image of environment has saved well in his mind that forces him to expect something else, something in colour. When they continue their journey, the son had found some crayons. These crayons change his mind that something left on earth in colour. Thus, environment is not filling of gray merely. The crayons seem like a hope for
Issue 36.1 of the Review for Religious, 1977. ; REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS IS edited by faculty members of St Louis University, the editorial offices being located at 612 Humboldt Braiding, 539 North Grand Boule-vard; St. Louis, Missouri 63103. It is owned by the Missouri Province Educational Institute; St. Louis, Missouri. Published bimonthly and copyright @ 1977 by REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS. Composed, printed, and manufactured in U.S.A. Second class postage paid at St. Louis, Missouri. Single copies: $2.00. Subscription U.S.A. and Canada: $7.00 a year; $13.00 for two years; other countries, $8.00 a year, $15.00 for two years. Orders should indicate whether they are for new or renewal subscriptions and should be accompanied by check or money order payable to REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS in U,S.A. currency only. Pay no money to persons claiming to represent REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS. Change of address requests should include former address. Daniel F. X. Meenan, S.J. Robert Williams, S.J. Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. Jean Read Editor Associate Editor Questions and Answers Editor Assistant Editor January 1977 Volume 36 Number I Renewals, new subscriptions, and changes of address should be sent to REVIEW I~OB R~L~GXOUS; P.O. Box 6070; Duluth, Minnesota 55802. Correspondence with the editor and the associate editor together with manuscripts and books for review should be sent to B~vi~w Foa R~LmlOUS; 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boule-vard; St. Louis, Missouri 63103. Questions for answering should be sent to Joseph F. Gallen, S.J.; St. Joseph's College; City Avenue at 54th Street; Philadelphia, Pennsyl-vania 19131. Review for Religious Volume 36, 1977 Editorial Offices 539 North Grand Boulevard Saint Louis, Missouri 63103 Daniel F. X. Meenan, S.J. Robert Williams, S.J. Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. Miss Jean Read, Editor Associate Editor Questions and Answers Editor Assistant Editor Review ]or Religious is published in January, March, May, July, September, and November 6n the fifteenth cff the month. It is indexed in the Catholic Periodical and Literature Index and in Book Review Index. A microfilm edi-tion of Review ]or Religious is available from University Microfilm; Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Copyright (~) 1977 by Review ]or Religious. Sand Traps for Renewal Programs Francis Blouin, F.I.C. Brother Blouin, who has written for REVIEW FOR RELI~31OUS before, has recently completed six years of service as provincial, an,d is presently enrolled in a full-time doctoral program in theology at Fordham University. He resides at 93 Park Terra'ce West; New York, NY 10034. ' For more than. ten years now, most of the communities of religious in the United States have made valiant efforts to be attentive to the injunction of Vatican II, Renew Thyself. Considerable energy, valuable time, impressive sums of~ money were expended in a host of activities and programs, in seminars and renewal sessions, in chapters and mini-chapters, in experi-mentation and adaptation. Many congregations which have .not initiated . renewal programs are either dead or dying; however, those that are involved in renewal efforts are not necessarily alive and well. Though it is impossible accurately to evaluate this determined effort, I would like to reflect in the following pages upon some Of the factors which might,have vit.iated the .dreams and the programs so optin~istically conceived and so enthusiastically endorsed. This exercise might ,appear quite negative, but it can help direct our thinking-in an area of renewal that might offer more chance of success, or discover a few,.of the reasons why some pro-grams have produced disappointing results. During the past six years, I was involved in a number oLrenewal pro-grams and was an active member of the Conference of Major Superiors of Men. The following reflections are based in great part upon my. personal observations and my prolonged discussions with superiors, of men.~ My"con-tacts with~religious superiors of women lead me to surmise that the results of their renewal activities are quite similar to those of men religious, though somewhat more encouraging. 4 / Review [or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 I would classify the sources of tension and frustration in the renewal effort under six headings: 1) Con,versiOn o] Heart; 2)Interiorization of Re-ligious Values; 3) Psychological Factors; 4) American Success Ethic; 5) Influence of Mass Media; and 6) Fragmentation. Conversion of Heart I am absolutely convinced that the most significant factor for the failure of many renewal programs was the fact that too often renewal efforts were based upon external programs which did not lead to a true conversion of heart. We cannot convert ourselves, let alone convert others. Yet we know that the Lord is ever calling us to greater love and fidelity and asking us only to remove the obstacles to his presence. In some religious communities in the 50's and 60's, community prayers were too often a ritualization of set formulas rather than an encounter with the living God present to all life. The prayer life of many religious was based upon an inadequate spiritual formation without sound scriptural basis. Furthermore, most religious were encouraged to develop a certain discretion, even circumspection, in speaking of their God-experiences. Spon-taneous shared prayer was seen as a threat to spiritual modesty and some even hesitated to speak freely and openly to their spiritual director (when they had one!). Thus, prayer was often considered a community activity rather tha~n a personal encounter with the Lord. Unfortunately, some of the religious who were most faithful and regular to the traditional forms of prayer were adamant against any change or adaptation and thus created a negative tension, while some of the most dedi-cated individuals openly questioned the need for prayer, further discrediting the God-encounter. In the 60's, when many communities granted religious considerable freedom in their prayer life, many religious simply ceased to pray rather than replace community prayers by longer, more intense periods of individ-ual prayer. Pragmatic, work-oriented Americans had been educated to recite prayers, to chant psalms, to meditate cognitively, but had been given woefully little education in contemplation and little incentive to be open to this vital form of prayer. They had been so active doing that they forgot that prayer was: .waiting, receiving, listening, centering, contemplating, creating a void, being open to the small still voice within, being present to a Presence. While they scurried from program to program and from .activity to activity, they'forgot to sit attentively and listen to the Lord speaking within. Man~y communities ~are now re-directing their renewal efforts, and it is this new orientation to a more contemplative stance that is giving new reason for hope. Communities that are still discussing "whether one should pray if one doesn,t feel like praying" or "whether one's work is one's prayer" are not in process of renewal: they are dying. Sand Traps Ior Renewal Programs Commuriities lose their raison d'etre unless they are gatherings of men and women of God whose lives find their meaning and sustenance in a personal relationship to Christ and provide moments and occasions of con-version of heart, an ever-to-be-renewed process. .,~'Without' personal prayer, a deeply religious life ~simply cannot develop, because no one can be a witness to Christ unless he knows Christ personally.'" ~ lnteriorization of Values A value has little influence upon a person unless it has been interior-ized: adequately formulated, clearly understood, generously accepted. Yet it is the unusual person who has interiorized his true values early in life. A significant number of religious entered religious life at an early age and quite often during their initial formation period, they were asked to conform to certain standards or to adopt definite procedures, more through trust in a person or a Rule, than through a reasoned, logical.process. "They were not to question why, they were to do ~and die." There are no shortcuts to an authentic religious formation which is a life-long process of growth in the understanding, acceptance and love of gospel values. Values cannot be legislated or decreed. They must be freely accepted after a long process of reflection and contemplation. It-is evident that this was not always done. Some religiou.s were willing to conform to set values when the external structures and the social climate supported and re-enforced these values/but they later discarded the same values be-cause these had not been properly interiorized. Long-established practices were~ often quickly abandoned because no rationale had been given for them. To try tO return to a system of regimentation.would be futile. "Religious life.with its demands of chastity, poverty, obedience and perpetual commit-ment can only be understood by a fully adult person . There are certain things, such as the need for affection, the security of a home, certain en-gagements and above all an affirmed need for independence, which a person cannot renounce too soon without doing himself harm., for a minimum of human maturity.is necessary to enter the religious life, and this minimum . may be long in coming,''~ Religious must .!iv, e in authentic freedom, the gospel freedom which is "not the power to choose between several possibilities, but is the reasoned ¯ decision, springing from the person's inmost depths, which causes him to follow at any price tl~e course that appears to be God's will. It is not a question of 'do as you please,' 'do what appeals to you,' but 'do coura-geously what you know your God has called you to accomplish.' This free-dom is linked with the inner power that enables each person to fulfill himself 1Ladislas Orsy, Open to the Spirit, p. 245. . ~Ren6 Voillaume, Con]erence o! Religious Superiors, Feb. 1970. 6 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 in terms of his truth, by. making a choice that is absolutely Consistent with his fundamental calling.''3 . This is the freedom that will give religious the desire, the conviction and the strength to live the gospel values of simplii:ity, poverty, celibacy for the kingdom, a life of contemplation and service, a life that is attentive to the call of the Spirit. The example of all revolutions certainly must have taught us that free-dom has to be learned. Tillard states that "it is essential to ~ve all members of the group an education in freedom; that is the first task of authority, the initial effort that 'precedes its fruitful ~xercise.''4 If values must be interiorized through a long reflective process, then it is useless for ~religious communities to attempt~ renewal through legislative reforms or by the imposition of new structures: The most important role of superiors is to establish in the community conditions that will. permit a true conversion o/. heart, encourage religious to~ deepen and strengthen their personal convictions, and promote~an atmosphere that will facilitate a true encounter,with each other and with the Lord. Psychological Factors ~ ~ During the p.ast ten years,~religious educators have generally stressed the values of openness, flexibility, adaptability, creativity, confidence, per-sonalism, sharing; and the initial formation programs areofrequently offered in one's normal milieu," This is quite different from the policies of the early 60's when Cardinal Suenens could state that the Church kvas in a period of "immobilism"; religious communities were strongly affected by this attitude. Religious educators stressed the values of conformity, perm.anence, stability, humility, obedience, self-denial; and religious formation was re-enforced by long periods of isolation from normal environments. Religious perfection was often considered conformity to set norms as proposed by the rules of the order. This radical change of attitude towards religious :formation is one bf the most significant develoPments of the past fifteen years. Formatioia is now seen ~is an on-going' process of growth,~ an ever-to-be-renewed activity e~nd-ing only at death. To have ceased to grow is already to have died. However, it was totally unrealistic and overly optimistic Co presume that religious who spent long years of their lives in a different value System, who were rarely e~ncouraged to share deeply, who were isolated at an early age, who were~often the victims of poor psychological practices, would b~ able to 'assume this radically different stance withrut deep anguish. That.many leaders greatly underestimated the difficulty of this adaptat~on and this over-sight partly explains the confusion and disarray of many renewal prograrias. :'I. M. R. Tillard, A Gospel Path, p. 73, Lumen Vitae Press, Belgium 1975. 4j. M. R. Tillard, ibid., p. 199. Sand Traps [or Renewal Programs / 7 It is a .credit to religious that so many were able to adapt and re-orient their thinking without major difficulty. I. would dare say that mhny religious communities are now plagued by the after-effects of .unsound and poorly adapted initial formation programs. I also believe this partly explains'why so many religious have a poor self-concept, have difficulty sharing at a value level, do not easily adjust to new situations. They were educated to stability and permanence when "one must now accept the. radicality of change, change that must go°right down to the roots . Change must be built into our systems so that they incor-porate flexibility and adaptability . The asceticism of today is to accept the agony of change. That's the discipline. It means study, dialogue, meet-ings, discussions, until you're sick of them. When you're sick, get healed and go back to the discussions.":' Religious communities should be. composed of individuals whom the love of Christ has so moved that they have given themselves 'totally to his cause and have united to transmit this love to others. They share their faith and their~ love and together build a community of believers, a com-munity of Christians. This can only be achieved in a real dialogue of love. American Success Ethic "There is nothing that succeeds .like succ6ss," and in the,50's and 60's, American religious wet6 "winners." They were highly respected, they en-joyed a privileged pbsition~in~ the ~urch and in society, their fiaembershilJ was increasing, and they .directed large, well-reputed institutions. They wanted to succeed, and they worked long hours for causes th~y esteemed yery highly. Too often however, they gauged their success according to human criteria rather than gospel values or by the authenticity of their witness to the Good News. One does not become a religious for human motives, but there is no doubt that success, respect, prestige, influence were definitemorale boosters for. pragmatic Americans. Because of past recognition and achievements it is now more difficult for religious to. accept rejection, failure; disalSproval, scorn. When. their apostolic work is questioned, their institutions closed, their values rejected; their ranks depleted, they become disheartened unless they remember that they _are simply being treated like the Mhster who was scorned, rejected, crucified. ~ Religious were so closely tied to their institutions that at times they confused means with ends, forgetting that they were first and foremost messe0gers of the gospel rather than professional workers. "To the degree to which an end is spiritual, the means employed to attain it are always inadequate. In fact, when speaking of a spiritual end, it is preferable today ~Fr. Cassian Yuhaus, C.P., Con[erence to Religious, Winslow, ME, Nov. 1975. Review [or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 to avoid the word 'means,' for to our contemporaries the word evokes an action which obtains exactly the effect envisaged,''6 This period of confusion and turm6il may become for religious a period of great creative tension. Though their lives and their activities a~re in-carnated in a specific work-situation which may project few signs of human success, their gospel vision will enlighten an apparently hopeless situation and give their religious consecration its full depth of meaning. "Unless a grain of wheat falls to the ground and dies, it remains only a single grain; but if it dies, it yields a rich harvest . Anyone who loves his life will lose it; anyone who hates his life in this world° will keep it for eternal life" (Jn 12:24-26). Now more than ever it is necessary, for religious to ponder the gospel message of failure, of inefficiency, of rejection, of death,,as well as the com-plementary message of success through failure, of life through death, of resurrection through annihilation. Father Pasquier states that: "It is impossible to bein communion with another before we have experienced our own poverty and our limitations. The quality of presence to others entails a risk of rejection. It is a risk that religious are called to take and from which they should not be sheltered by their vows.''7 Religious are now in the privileged position of experiencing their poverty and their weakness and are thus better able to commune with the weak and the rejected as well as with the strong and the respected. Influence of Mass Media Whether religious realize it or not, many have been gravely affected by the historical process of secularization. Some religious are now totally in-serted into a professional work-environment and they may have accepted almost imperceptibly many of the secular values so effectively propagated by mass media. The message of self-and~sense-gratification is in direct op-position to the gospel imperatives. , Self-denial and personal ascesis are in such ill repute that some religious have unwittingly accepted many of the pseudo-values and prevalent sophisms adroitly disseminated by our sense-sated society. It is never a pleasant prospect to accept experientially the reality of Christ's call to self-denial, but to speak seriously of renewal in religious life and ignore the injunction~ "Let him who wants to be my disciple, deny himself and take up his cross and follow me" (Mt 16:24), is nonsense. Very often religious simply do not realize the extent to which they are C'R6gamey, L'exigence de Dieu, p. 86, Quoted by Voillaume, Conlergnce o] Religious Superiors. :Jacques Pasquier, O.M.I., "Conference~on Spiritual Leadership." Sand Traps ]or Renewal Programs / 9 victimized by .mass media or subtly controlled by their professional en-vironment. Religious strove so strenuously for so many years to be fully integrated into the American culture that they forgot that by their religious consecration they had vowed to be "counter cultural." Some have suc-cumbed to the temptation of living a progressively more affiuent life-style or have been blinded by the glitter of wealth and the prestige of social status. It is useless to speak of renewal until the stark gospel message can once more be heard over the din of television commercials. "Where supposedly committed persons~seem to enjoy all the good things of life, the witness value is destroyed and not unusually, the whole person's sense of vocation along with it. He has fallen into the mistake not simply of imagining that things and experiences can make him happy, but that fulfillment or happi-ness itself can be directly sought.''8 Ordinary professional and religious obligations ,are certainly the main ingredients of a life of ascesis, yet Father George Maloney, S.J., in a course on prayer at Fordham University dared state: "It is impossible to make significant progress in prayer unless one is willing to practice ascesis with aggression." He was simply echoing St. John of the Cross: "Contemplation or detachment or poverty of spirit . are almost one and the same thing.'"' A life of authentic poverty, of generous service to others, of sensitivity to the Spirit, of loving celibate commitment, of creative solitude, of constant attentiveness to the Lord, are not possible unless one willingly accepts" the Lord,s clear challenge to self-denial. Many renewal efforts have come to naught because religious refused to pay the price. ~ Fragmentation I previously mentioned that' some of the values that are now cherished by certain religious communities are those of flexibility, openness, adapiabil-ity, creativity, personalism and I also indicated that most communities now permit a wide choice of apostolic works: All these positive values are to be respected, but if they are taken separately without consideration for stabil-ity,: permanence and community commitments, they can lead to a fragmenta: tion of the group, a qoss of identity with the community and an impover-ishment of the sense of missi6n. For a religious, "to do his own thing" or "to go his own way" may be an, acceptable temporary solution to a difficult problem, but it will rarely be satisfactory in the long run. Many communities have a number of religious "on the fringe" members who are hardly associated with the larger group either in body or in spirit. If this trend becomes .generalized, it could be disastrous for the communities. SRichard Jo Kropf, "Radical Commitment and Fulfillment," Spiritual LiJe, Summer, 1975, p. 91. ~'John of the Cross, Dark Night, I, Chap. 4, par. 1. Review [or Religious, V~lume 36, 1977/1 "A community cannot exist long in the Church, unless it is dedicated to giving collectively.''1° Furthermore, it. is not sufficient for individuals to 6e renewed. The whole community, or a significant number of members, must make deter-mined efforts at renewal. 'In every community there are a number of re-ligious who have: come alive during the past years, but sometimes these members are stymied or frustrated by a lethargic~ apathetic group. "For a revitalization to occur, transformation must go beyond the personal. It must penetrate and reshape the. social reality of the community. If the cen-tering of personal-transformation is ekperienced~:by a number ~of people within the community, then a network can emergd through which that trans-forming experience is '~ustained, supported, enhanced. As the sharing of transformational experiences and awareness deepens and intensifies, there emerges a group with a shared vision and codamitment~.~This group becomes a revitalizing force dedicated to building more rewarding community ex-periences and recovering the gripping attraction to living according to Christ's conditions.for .evangelical discipleship.'''1 When this revitalization occurs to'a significant number of people in the cbmmunity great things~ begin to happen, a new life pulsates through the group and a spirit (Spirit?) comes alive in the community._ Possible Orientations It is impossible' for me to indicate what could or should be done by each community to promote a true renewal. Let me simply raise a few ques-tions that may suggest some possible orientations in groups seriously dedi-cated to renewal. l. Are the difficulties~experienced by many communities in organizing community discussions that are a true faith-sharing,due mainly to psy-chological factors, poor knowledge of group dynamics, or weak religious motivations? What .specific steps have been. taken by your community to facilitate this meaningful exchange? 2. Is it POssible for ygu, for your community to live with insecurity, contradiction, rejection? IS this contrary to the gospel teaching? 3. How does your co,,mmunity determine the priorities of personnel, of time~, of resources in selecting an apostolic work? If apostolic choice is left to the individual, what efforts are made to determine a priority .of ac-tivity? 4. Has your community ever tried to gauge the ~impact of mass media upon community values? How many religious in your community are slaves to the "one-eyed monster?" a~°Ladislas Orsy, "Talk, given to Conference of Major JSuperiors,:' America, August 8, 1970, p. 59. ~Lawrence Cada and Raymond iZitz, REVIEW FOa REL~OOS, Vol. 34, No. 5, p. 716. Sand Traps ]or Renewal Programs 5. Is contemplation a common and regular form of individual prayer in your community? What is the attitude of the community towards this form of prayer? ~ 6. Do you define yourselves in terms of your work or in terms of your status? What conclusions can you draw from this? 7. What percentage of the religious in your communities have partici-pated in some more prolonged renewal program within the last three years? five years? eight .years? What does this indicate about your group? 8. Is the life-style in your communities consonant with a religious com-mitment to poverty? In what way? 9. "Christian leadership is accomplished only through service. This service requires the willingness to enter into a situation with all the human vulnerabilities a man has to share with his fellowman" (Henri Nouwen, Wounded Healer, p. 77). Does this quotation quite adequately portray, your district and com-munity leaders? 10. What is the community attitude towards tension? When is it a positive sig9 of growth? When is it a negative factor in the community? 11'. Do community discussions occasionally lead to specific decisions which can be implemented? Why is it so difficult to reach a consensus when specific proposals are suggested? 12. Are religious in your community personally affected by the plight of the 450,000,000 people in the world who are on a starvation diet? What specific activities have been taken by your community to alleviate this situa-tion? 13. Do religious in your community have the freedom to challenge each other to fidelity to sacred promises publicly expressed? If not, what does this indicate? - 14. Do your communities have an effective way of evaluating~the initial formation program? 15. Are long-term institutional: commitments still possible or desirable? How are these to be implemented if everyone is free to choose his own apostolic activity? , Let me conclude by a quo.tation from Father Ladislas Orsy: "Since re-ligious life is the existential gift of God, any question about the future of religious life is a question about the future ~of God's abundance in the Church, about the dynamic action of the Holy Spirit among his pebple-- thus it is not, subject ~to human power. If God gave this gift in the past, he is not likely to deprive, his Churcl~ of it in,the future.''~ V-'Ladislas Orsy, op. cit., p. 21. Seven-hundred-and-fifty years later: Reflections on the Franciscan Charism Eric Doyle, O.F.M. Fr. Eric Doyle, O.F.M. teaches at the Franciscan Study Centre, Canterbury CT2 7NA. Kent, England. This year marks the seven-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the death of St. Francis of Assisi at the Portiuncula on October 3rd 1226. The sources for his life record that larks gathered on the roof above where he lay dying and sang sweetly as he welcomed Sister Death into his life? No one would deny that on that Saturday evening in 1226 a most holy man, a truly human man and a faithful disciple of Christ Crucified passed over to God. And the earth was made the poorer for that passing. Already in various parts of the world there have been courses of lec-tures and celebrations to mark the event and there will be quite a few more before the year has ended. Eulogies will be made in many languages and no doubt St: Francis from his place in heaven will hear himself hailed again as "Patron of the Environment" and "Patron of Ecumenism." The anniversary provides a good opportunity for a Franciscan to reflect on the order's efforts to come to terms with the demands to rediscover its own charism made over the last decade or so since the Second Vatican Council.-Though my ~primary concern is the First Order of Franciscans, and specifically the Order of Friars Minor, I think these reflections will have some relevance for the Conventuals, the Capuchins and the various branches of the Third Order Regular as well, for it is the same charism aSee "Legend of Perugia," 110, in St. Francis o] Assisi. Writings attd Early Biogra-pities, English Omnibus Edition o] the Sources ]or the Li]e o] St. Francis. Ed. by Marion A. Habig. Franciscan Herald Press, ChiCago 1973, 1085-1086. ~ . , Reflections on the Franciscan .Ch~arism / 13 which ultimately inspires them all. These reflections may have even wider relevance. Orders which lead the so-called "mixed" life share many of the same problems in facing the demands of renewal. The Question of Poverty These pages contain no detailed analysis of poverty. In the case of an order which has been so intimately assdciated wiih the profession of pov-erty, this calls for a word of explanation. For the Franciscan Order the question of poverty is ambiguous. It can be a very complicated question and it can be a very simple question, according to the approach one takes to it. For the order as it is de facto organized in the world, poverty is a complicated question. It cannot be examined or discussed in any realistic or satisfactory way if it is isolated from the findings of biblical exegesis and the understanding of poverty in the bible, from a study of all the ele-ments contained in the idea of evangelical perfection which relati;cize the place of poverty in the life and writings of St. Francis, 'from the question about the extent and effectiveness of apostolic activity; and from the de-mands made on the order to find resources to cope with and provide for the numbers who seek to enter it. No one would deny that the Franciscan Order should bE involved in work among the poor. At the theoretical level this is almost a truism for. the Franciscan. At the practical level, however, it is no easy matter to de-termine who precisely are the poor today. While the term certainly covers the homeless, th'e destitute, the oppressed and the exploited, it may also be used to describe countless millions all over the globe who ar~ spiritually impoverished. But even when we have arrived at a moderat~ely sa!isfactory answer to the question': Who are the poor?, we find at once that there are required no mean resources, for example, to have a friar trained to be a ~ompetent and reliable apostle among social outcasts. For the order to providd re-sources to train a friar as a professional social worker is a deeply Christian work and a tremendous act of service to the world. : On the°'~other hand, the question of poverty can be very simple. If a person reads the accounts of the early history of the order and is convinced that the poverty which St. Francis and his first companions embraced is the unique charism of the order, and feels assured that he is called to do the. same, then that person must go and do likewise and thus institute a new branch of the Franciscan Order in the world. The same obligation, it seems, would rest upon a professed friar who became conscientiously convinced that the order has sacrificed an essential element of its charism and mission to the wrrld in abandoning the poverty of St. Francis. He would be bound quite simply to leave the order as it is and to establish another form of the Franciscan life. It would be pointless to ask him where he would go, because, from that moment onward, total ' 14 / Review [or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 abandonment to divine providence would be of the structure of his voca-tion, and he would literally have to wait for something to turn up. What he certainly cotild not do would be to stay in the order as it is now consti-tuted, passing away his days in criticizing it and growing old in bitterness, while living by its resources and in its security. Perhaps at the very outset we ought to familiarize with these difficulties all who seek to join us. They would then be able to make such considerations a conscious factor in their decision to join us or not. We should also make sure they know by experi-ence that the gospel spirit of St. Francis does live on in the order, despite the fact that his povertyis not observed. I do not wish to suggest that the order as it now finds itself can'simply ignore the question of poverty. In .fact it has not ignored it over the last decade. There have been many attempts to come to terms with it at the practical level. But it remains problematic.~ However, the issue cannot be discussed in these pages, nor can a.ny assessment be made of the at-temp~ s to come to terms with poverty, firstly, because it would take far too lorlg and, secondly, because while it isundoubtedly an important issue, it is not, in our opinion, the most important issue for the life and mission of the order. There are more vital matters to be considered to which we now shall turn: Rediscovery of the Origi'nal Charism, The Second Vatican Council called all religious to rediscover the par-ticular charism given to the Church in the grace of their origins and to renew and adapt their life according to its form. By a proces.s of discernr ment in the light of the gospel and according to the signs of the times-- that is by Word and wprld--religious were required to define the specific ahd permanent acquisition made by the Church in the life and work of their particular order. ~Th, e FranCiscan~ Order, like every order, belongs to the Church. Only in virtue of its ecclesial character can it be understood in its specific genius at any moment of its higtory and as a renewal movement at its origins. Apa.rt from the Church, the Franciscan Order is ultimately meaningless. St. Francis himself was not only a man of the gospel, but also and by that very'fact, he was a man of the Church. Therefore, the attempt by any order 6r congregation to discover its own particular grace is not anexercise in self-analysis, but a profound act of service to the Church. The call to rediscover the original charism ~raised ~t once a question for the Franciscan Order which .has not yet been satisfactorily treated. The question is this: Is the original charism to be sought uniquely in the period between the oi'al approval of the Rule by Pope Innocent and the death '-'We have touched onosome, of these problems in "Reflections on the Theology of Religiou.s Life," REv~:w FOR RELICIOOS, vol. 32, n. 6. Nov. 1973, 1254-1256. Reflections on the Franciscan Charism of St. Francis (1209-1226), or is' it to be sought throughout the first cen-tury of the order's history from the approval of the Rule to the death of John Duns Scotus (1209-1308)? This is not just an academic question, but a matter of some concern to any Franciscan conscious of the profound contribution made to the development of Christology by the Franciscan School, in the first century of its history, The order has beew far :to6 pre-occupied in its renewal program with the period up to the death of St. Francis. This is an unjust .and uncritical restriction of the content of tile Franciscan charism. Of course, the call to rediscover the charism required of us to return to St. Francis himself. About that there is no argument. The complaint being made here concerns the well-nigh exclusive preoccupa-tion with the early years of the order's life, which drasticallyotruncates the order's charism. Many reasons might be suggested to explain this restrictive version of the charism. I wish to single out,the one which bears most responsibility. It is romanticism. Romanticism has exercised far too much influence on judgments of the order's history since the death of St. Francis. It has given the order a bad conscience, especially over the last eighty years or so since Paul Sabatier's views became common patrimony? What we can describe in general terms as the "Fioretti-picture" of the early years, has exercised inordinate influence over the general public and over the scholarly fraternity, particularly its non-Catholic representatives. We need to be on our guard in the presence of romantics. Their understandable sadness at the way the order developed can have the most extraordinary effe°ct on how they .read the sources . ,~,J When the, Franciscan Order, for example, in late fourteenth-century English history is described.by students of Wyclif, Chaucer and Langlan~d ,as "decadent" I have often concluded that we really ought to read in many cases no~t "decadent" but,"different"--that is, different from the little band of beggars which landed at Dover in September 1224 and different from the early days at Rivo Torto. Disapl;ginted and sad romantics are a dangerous breed. The "romantic myth" has had profound .though subconscious influence on the order, It has subtly brainwashed~ us into believing that if only we could repeat as " closely as ,possible the form of life which .S~. Francis led, if only we could do away with the ~whole intellectual edifice which the orde{ constructed for itself, then we would be true and authentic Franciscans. From these remarks it will be clear where we intend to place the locus of the original Franciscan charism. According to our view the original charism is to be sou.ght in the period~from the approval of the Rule in 1209 up to the death of John Duns Scotus in 1308. To return to the sources means, for a Franciscan, a return to the first hundred years of develop- :~Vie de S. Francois d'Assise, l~dition drfinitive (Paris: Fischbache'r, 1931). 16 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 ment in doctrine and life. The fullness of the charism is to be found there and not exclusively in the life and teaching of St. Francis. It is quite legiti-mate, in function of. this, to consider the Franciscan charism under two headings: form of life and Christological doctrine. The first concerns the evolution of the order's life in the thirteenth century. The second concerns the development of the Christology in the Franciscan School in the thir-teenth century. The results of historical analysis show that the form of Franciscan life changed radically from what St. Francis had intended and that the Christological doctrine of the Franciscan School remained totally faithful to his original Christocentric inspiration. The ,Form of Life The foundation of the Franciscan Order in the thirteenth century marked a new stage in the history of the religious life in the Wefftern Church. While it. is clearly the case that St. Francis intended to establish an order in the commonly accepted sense of that term, it is equally clear that he was conscious of its radical newness. According to his intention, the order was to be a brotherhood of itinerant apostles--whether priests or manual workers, or, as we should say today, professional men--who would go into a society that was still Christian and also go out to foreign lands among the ~Saracens, to spread the gospel of peace and reconciliation by the ministry of the Word and the apostolate of presence. For a period of time that intention was realized. Whenever the friars met they showed that they were members of the same fraternity and they offered one another mutual help and support. At the end of their day's work they returned to their small communities to be refreshed bodily and spiritually, to pray together, and to draw strength from their fraternal cele-bration of the Eucharist. Thus renewed and restored, they were able to return to their mission of sharing with others what they themselves had re-ceived so generously from being together in the "local church" 6f their own community. As is universally ~recognized, this did not remain for very long the pat-tern of life of the order. Due to internal tensions and from ~xternal pres-sures from the demands of the apostolate at the time and from the wishes ~f the Holy See, the order was compelled to take a line of development which° radically changed what St. Francis had intended and what the original form of life had been. There are those who look upon this as a Salutary de-velopment, precisely because it took place ultimately under the authority and guidance of the Holy See. While this attitude demands sor~e respect, it also creates difficulties in ,deciding which has priority between the poles of institution and charism. In responding to the call to rediscover its original charism (and it was the institution which gave the call) the Franciscan Order found itself in a slightly embarrassing position. As it retracted the steps of its development Re[tebtions on the Franciscan Charism / 17 through a very checkered history back to the thirteenth centur);, it discovered that.~it was largely due to the institution that an important element in its charism :h~id been lost. The loose structure of its form of life had been heavily instituti6nalized and the fraternity had been "monastified" and "hierarch-ized" almost beyond recognition. Institution and Charism From the outset there has been tension in the Franciscan Order between charism and institution. St. Francis himself, who is always proclaimed as a most obedient son of the Holy Roman Church, managed to get his own way with the wily and astute Pope Innocent IIl. One wonders what would have been the outcome if the pope had refused him permission to live his very distinctive interpretation of the Gospel. Perhaps he would have be-come a hermit. To the end of his days, in any case, he remained convinced that what he desired his order to be was completely at one with the will of God." The turn of events in the thirteenth century gaye the order a very dif-ferent character from that which it possessed in its early decades. The con-stitutional development from the late 1230's up to the Chapter of Nar-bonne in 1260 is the history of a gradual "monastification" of the order. This cannot in justice be laid exclusively at the door of St. Bonaventure, for the winds of change had already been blowing for nearly thirty years when he was elected Minister General." By the end of the thirteenth century the order had been substantially altered, due in 'large measure to the institu-tional Church, for what were undoubtedly the most laudable ends. Of course, there were also internal reasons for the change and it would '1See Lawrence C. Landini, The Causes o] the Clericalization O[ the Order o] Friars Minor 1209-1260 in the Light o] Early Franciscan Sottrces (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1968). We have given rio consideration here to St. Bonaventure's theology of history nor to his eschatological interpretation of the life of St. Francis. These highly developed aspects of St. Bonaventure's thought played no significant part in the order's self-understanding and program of renewal during the past decade. For this reason we have not touched on his solution of the "Franciscan Question." This omission, therefore, should not be understood as a value judgment. Our concern is ¯ with those aspects of the original charism which have been re-discovered and, with varying degrees of success, reduced to practice, and with other aspects which deserve further consideration, which ought to influence the o.rder's continuing renewal. St. Bonaventure's eschatological interpretation of St. Francis is, in our view, the most satisfactory solution to the problem about th~ order's relation to St. Francis. It is, however, not only, satisfactory; it is" also fully consonant with the way the early sources present him and the ~rimitive community. It has most relevance in any dis-cussion of Franciscan poverty, for it raises the question not only whether the order can or cannot observe St. Francis' poverty, but whether or not it is even meant to observe it. To assess St. Bonaventure's place in the development of the order in the thii'teenth century, without taking into serious account his theology, of history and his eschatological interpretation of St. Francis, leads to profound misunderstanding of that development and commits injustice against St. Bonaventure. Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 be unhistorical to place responsibility entirely on the Holy See.-It is no idle speculation to ponder what the order might have been, had it not experi-enced the process of clericalization in the thirteenth century and had Friar Elias not alienated so many while he held office. But in the final analysis, one is compelled to conclude that the Holy See can hardly be :said to havi~ done all in its power to preserve what St. Francis so plainly intended. This was the result of tension between charism and institution. The Church ha~s known this tension in varying degrees of intensity ever since the New Testament, and perhaps." never so acutely as over the last two decades. Tension arises precisely because both institution and charism proceed from the grace of God. Charisms are given to the Church for the sake of the institution; the prophet is alw~iys sent to renew the institution. The sad story is, however, that so often the institution resists the charism because'it threatens the established order; it leads out into the unknown and the uncharted. The temptation for the institution is always to neutralize a charism by institutionalizing it. This is not done maliciously or even con-sciously. But it is done and it is done effectively. The intentions of St. Francis could not easily be categorized. They were not neat and tidy, cut and dried, but on the contrary, like himself; paradoxical and a fraction complicated. I have never believed that this passionate, romantic and ambitious young man was ever as simple as some of his biographers have inade out. Of course, he did not have a legal mind; he had the soul of a poet'sand poets are notoriously difficult to pin down. In his own head ior perhaps better: in his own heart) everything was crystal clear: he. wanted to 'live the life of the gospel according to the form that God 'had revealed to him. One can sympathize with Rome, ithei:efore,t whose genius has always been principa!ly of the legal order. How does one categorize an intention that expresses itself in a Rule for itinerant apostles which is identified with the gospel, and in another for hermitages that al-lows for a change of rbles between Martha and Mary according to what seems best for the moment? Aspects of the Charism Rediscovered In going back to its original inspiration, the Franciscan Order knew in its heart that,~it simply could not recreate in our time the full intentions of St. Francis. However, it has mandged to reintroduce some of the essential elements of his charism, and what it has done is a sple6did achievement. 1. Over the last ten years the order has "de-monastified" itself and restored in principle its truly fraternal character. It is now more obviously an Order of Friars, some of whom are engaged in priestly work, others in manual work inside'~and outside the order and still others who Are engaged in professional work. There is a deep consciousness of what it means e~xistenti~ally to be a Franciscan friar. This consciousness is growing alsace and it will ultimately be in complete possession. Reflections on the Franciscan Charism / 19 2. There has also been a gradual "de-clericalization" of the order. This does not necessarily mean a reduction in the number of priests (though this will happen, I think) nor does it imply, nor should it ever have im-plied, an anti-priest complex, The order was unfortunately plagued .with that complex for a period after the Council. To be a priest does not neces-sarily mean to be clericalized. There are many young priests, middle-aged p~iests and elderly priests in the order who are most certainly not clerical-ized; but then there are some who .are. Clericalization creates an elite and a,:caste system. There is no true place for an elite or a caste system in the Franciscan Order, nor, for that mat~.er, .in the Church at large. The Church knows no hierarchy of persons but acknowledges only a hierarchy of func-tions and at its pinnacle is service. Moreover, authority has been restored to its original role, according to the understanding of St. Francis, as a ministry and service to the friars. This has had its influence also on the gradual abolition of hierarchical structures from the order. 3. Experiments of living the Franciscan life in small communities have proved in the main successful and have undoubtedly enriched the quality of community life. This has been one of the most significant contributions of all our efforts to restore the fraternal character of the order. There have been losses, excesses and mistakes. But these are negligible when compared with the gains, the openness and the insights we have harvested. Franciscan life in small communities or groups has. proved to be far more demanding on the individual friar than it ever ~was in the heavily structured .forms of life we knew for so long, Our experiences have taught us that life in small communities requires a high degree of human and Christian maturity: For life thus lived is a creative process, not a structured, unchanging pattern into which one is fitted. 4. Many of these small communities have been established in the center of towns and cities where the realities of modern living, its pressures and demands may be witnessed and experienced at first hand. A number of friars in such communities have taken up ~work in social organizations often not' instituted by the Church nor directly connected with it. These developments have given concrete expression to other aspects of the original charism and primitive form of life. Unlike~the older monastic orders, the friars settled in the heart~ iof towns and cities where they were brought face to face with the social evils of the time: As a result, the Franciscans were closely con-nected with the foundation of medieval guilds, the ,distant0ancestors of the modern trade unions. They supported the organization of workers into guilds. which protected the legitimate material interests of the workers and fur-thered their spiritual lives. Some of the charters of these guil~ls were drawn up in the refectories of the friars or on the altars of their churches. Later on, in the fifteenth century, the iniquities of t~sury led the Franciscans to establish the Montes Pietatis--an institution which guarantees them a place for all time in social history. All these developments may be traced back 20 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 to St. Francis himself who, from the outset of his conversion, was involved in caring for lepers, one of the greatest social evils of the Middle Ages. The modern form of the apostolate of presence: living at the heart of urban life and working from within non-ecclesiastical social structures, is really a reduction to practice of The Canticle o[ Brother Sun 'and of St. Bonaventure's beautiful work On Retracing the Arts to Theology. For the Franciscan there is no distinction between the sacred and the profane. The problems of what is described as secularization prove for a Franciscan to be false problems~ This is now simply man's world and man is made in the image of Christ and Christ is the image of the Father we cannot see. The Spirituality of St. Francis The rediscovery of the basic elements of Franciscan spirituality has been the most rewarding of all. A comparative study of the spirituality of the Conciliar documents and the writings of St. Francis shows how incredibly modern this very medieval man turns out to be. His spirituality is simply Jesus Christ. The thoroughly biblical and sacramental, above all eucharistic, char-acter of his piety and holiness make it clear that it was our spirituality and practices of piety that had to be brought up-to-date, renewed and reformed, not his! There is nothing nauseating about his spirituality, nothing repulsive about his piety. There° is not one line, not one word, in the expressions of his evangelical holiness that need be changed, corrected or expunged. He loved the God-Man in all his poverty and humanity, in all his kindness and suffering. He loved him absolutely, without qualification. He loved Christ not only with his whole heart, but with his whole soul and mind and strength. His conversion was complete because it was born of love. Every-thing he said and sang, everything he desired and longed for, his every though and deed, came from and led back directly to his love of Jesus Christ. The most distinctive feature of his holiness is its tenderness. And it bears that feature because he was a passionate man. He did not extinguish in himself the fire of passion; he redirected it by grace into the love of Christ, where it burned more ardently in the all-consuming flame of the love of Christ's heart for the Father and for all creation. Our renewed understanding of the totally Christocentric spirituality of St. Francis has Shown the order that in its common life of prayer it does not need a multiplication of devotions and practices of piety. To: be faithful to the spirituality of St. Francis requires of the friars to live and work, to think and pray;" after the example of the life Jesus led on earth, by the power of his glorified existence with the Father, in the beauty of his vestiges and images in creation, according to the message of his Word, through his selfless love in the Blessed Eucharist and together with his brethren in the Church. All of which may be summarized by saying that we must live by his threefold presence in our midst; his verbal presence (the proclamation Reflections on the Franciscan Charism of the gospel, among us); his sacramental presence (preeminently the eucharistic celebration); his mystical,.pregence (the community of believers which gathers to proclaim and celebrate his victory over death and his faith-ful witness' to love). The Tension That Remains "~ None of these changes according to~ the form of the original charism has been achieved without suffering and bitterness; This is the sad side. to the history' of renewal and reform in the Church generally. However, it was an inevitable and predictable concomitant to the renewal from the begin-ning and it is,'rooted in the tension between institution and charism. The movement for reform initiated by the Council brought to the surface two diametrically opposed views of the Church which have been labeled, not satisfactorily though not unjustly, as reactionary-conservative and liberal-progressive. The fears of the former soon turned to suspicion; the enthusi-asm of the latter speedily became intrlerance. And for a time the .result was deadlock and suffering on both sides. Tension between institution and charism can be healthy and construc-tive. It can also be deadly and,destructive if attitudes polarize. As an out-come of the changes in the order's form of life there was a polarization of attitudes. Two basic attitudes emerged which differed radically about what had taken place and" what were being predicted as the .lines of future development. The attitudes correspond to the labels reactionary and liberal. The tension between these polarized attitudes 'is by no means as acute now as it was five years ago, but it is still present. From a state of complete in-ability to communicate, a modus vivendi was eventually found, based on an unspoken and precarious truce to steer clear of all that might open the wounds. Now, thanks to more openness ~on the one side and.greater tolerance on the other, the truce has given place to a willingness to dialogue and the gigns areothat the tension will become creative. Up to the present, however, while having had some creative and productive effect, it has been largely negative and counter,productive. Two "orders" have been existing side by side in the one order. But now the signs are that they are growing towar~s unity once more. This tension continues to exist in varying degrees of intensity through-out all the provinces of the order. To a greater or less extent it concerns every aspect of the charism in relation to our form of life and every attempt to reduce it to practice. But the deepest tension has been caused by the opposing views on what may be described as the order's apostolate of presence. The one view maintains that it is our vocation to engage in priestly ministerial work, in charitable works centered upon our friaries ~and in domestic works within the friaries, which latter ensure that they remain habitable and in good condition, so that the former works may be carried 22 / Review for Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 on with competence and efficiency. To these works the major part of the order is now committed and thi~ commitment has come to pass by the demands made upon us and the indications given to us by °the institutional Church, whether the Holy See or the diocesan bishops. These works; it is argued, have been assigned to us by the 'authority of the Church and there-fore they are clearly what we are meant to do unde'i: God: Furthermore, they put us in direct contact with the evolution of the order as this took place under the guidance of the Holy .See in the thirteenth century. This is a version of the adage, "Roma locuta est"; it gives priority to the institu-tion. It maintains that priestly work is the ~paradigm of the Franciscan apostolate. This view is prepared to admit that some friars might well work in other forms of the apostolate which are .neither priestly nor ministerial nor centered upon a friary. These forms of the"apostolate, however, have significance only insofar as they~ proceed ultimately from the priestly min-istry and eventually lead back to it. The other view maintains that it is our vocation to spread the gospel message by our presence in the world. This can be fulfilled in a large variety of ways; by priestly ministerial work and charitable works centered upon our friaries; by priestly ministerial work and charitable works not centered upon our friaries; by domestic work inside and, outside our friaries; by professional work outside the friaries in ecclesiastical institutions-or non-ecclesiastical institutions~ by taking up salaried trades and professions out-side ecclesiastical institutions. This view, it is argued, is in direct continuity with the earliest years of the order's history and is a version of the saying of St. Francis that the Holy Spirit is the Minister General of the Order; it gives priority to the original charism. It holds that there is no special paradigm for the Franciscan apostolate and that the order must balance the demands made by the institution with the clear requirements of the charism, even if this means that we may have to sacrifice some of the areas in which we are exclusively committed to priestly ministerial work. Due to circumstances we could neither foresee nor control, these two views eventually reached the compromise of co-existence and then entered into dialogue. The circumstances which brought them together were the overall decrease in numbers of those entering the order, the high figure of those who left the order and an extraordinary awareness of the original charism among the majority of those who seek to enter~the order. This last phenomenon is remarkable, Its major effect has been that entrants to the order express their vocation simply in terms of wanting to be friars with-out further qualification.This is a reliable sign of how the future of the order will evolve. Christology and the Franciscan School . Earlier in this paper we insisted that the original charism of the order is to be sought not exclusively in the life and teaching of St. Francis but Reflections on the Franciscan Charism in the whole period that extends to the death of Duns Scotus, the last of the major representatives of the Franciscan School of Theology. We must examine the reasons which jrstify this position. During the period up to the death of Duns Scotus theologians of the order worked out a doctrine of the person and work of Christ and of his l~lace in the oikumene and cosmos that is as beautiful as it is original and as inspiring as it is profound. It stands out as a remarkable contribution to the development of Christology in the Church. Any study'or presentation of the original F.ranciscan charism that limits itself to the life of St. Francis not only misrepresents that charism, but also does disservice and injustice to the Church by depriving her of what,belongs to her by right. The Christo~ logical teaching of the Franciscan School is as much an essential element of the Franciscfin charism as is the fraternal character of the early order, ,the apostolate of presence, the Rule o/ 1221, the Rule ]or Hdrmitages, The Canticle of Brother Sun and the Rule of 1223. What Fr. Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. has written about the philosophy of education in the spirit of St. Bonaventure, may be applied without qualification to the Christological doctrine of the whole Franciscan School: : Those of us who stand heirs to that tradition have a weighty obligation to ~ee that such a tradition be not lost and that it be brought to bear in our world today. That it should have.come to be deposited with such clarity and power in the order that claims the poor, s~mple man of Assisi as its founder will no doubt puzzle those who tend to limit the meaning of that order in an unhistori-cal and arbitrary way. That its outstanding spokesman should be a Franciscan does not make it the private possession of the order. For what the order car-rieshere as in an earthen vessel is a treasure for the whole of the Church and a heritage for mankind as such. Certainly the order would be unfaithful to its tradition and remiss in its obligation to the Church and the world if'it were not to thke up" this tradition anew, in a creative way, in"a world for which one of the,most pervasive and potentially destructive idols is the ideal of rational control.'~ The Constitutions of the Order The General Constitutions of the order published in 1953 state in Arti-cle 238, par. 6:~.~'In the philosophical and theological faculties the lectors shall earnestly endeavour to follow the Franciscan School; they shall hold in high regard the other Scholastics, especially the Angelic Doctor, .St. Thomas, the Heavenly Patron of,Catholic Schools.''° Despite this exhorta-tion, however, the order as a whole has not endeavored as earnestly as it might have done to follow its own school. The manuals of philosophy and z",Toward a Philosophy of Education in the Spirit of St. Bonaventure," Proceedings ol the Seventh Centenary Celebration o/ the Death o] Saint Bonaventure (The Fran-ciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1975), 26-27. 6The Rule and Constitutions o] the Order o] Friars Minor (Rome, 1953), 100. 24 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 theology, ,which were the staple intellectual diet of most of the houses of study in the ordei'~ were composed chiefly by authors of the Thomistic tradition (not always the same as the tradition of St. Thomas!), who tended to reduce the contents of the Franciscan tradition at best to footnotes and scholia, at worst, to being adverse to the thesis advanced. The high place accorded to St. Thomas in Catholic theology and the fact that he received honorable mention in the Code o] Canon Law made him the touchstone of orthodoxy and the gauge of true Catholic doctrine. The second title given to him--the Common Doctor--resulted in every other doctor becoming for the most part decidedly uncommon. In comparing the Dominican and Fran-ciscan Orders we find that the former exalted St. Thomas and tended to forget St. Dominic; the latter exalted St. Francis and tended to forget St. Bonaventure. Thus it is that we speak of the Thomistic School, not the Dominican School; of the Franciscan School, not the Bonaventurian School. This latter designation has further significance, as will be seen below. , In the Revised General Constitutions promulgated by the Minister General in December 1973, it is stated.in Article 20, par. 1: "Mental prayer should be based on the writings and example of Francis and on the teaching of the Franciscan masters. Nevertheless, each friar is free to choose the method~of prayer that suits him"r; in Article 170, par. 2: "Theological edu-cation should be encouraged in the order with special care. The greatest at-tention shouldobe given to the preparation of expert teachers of theology who will administer spirit and life after the intent of Francis and the other masters of the order"; ibid., par. 4: "Where there are no houses of study of the order, students should be given lectures on the~history and teaching of the Franciscan School"8; in the Introduction to Chapter Six: Formation to Franciscan LiIe: "Franciscan pedagogy, according to a thought-plan (dialec-tic) which continually renews itself, takes as its greater and most difficult task to bring together the divine with the human--a process begun by St, Francis and set in logical order by the Masters of the Franciscan School, a process rightly styled "thought in acting"--in other words, love.''° It is to be hoped that the spirit behind these statements in the new Constitutions will prevail over the strange indifference to the Franciscan theological tradition that has characterized the order in modern times and that it will eradicate the dull anti-intellectual element in the order which re-sulted from that fatal romanticism mentioned earlier. This anti-intellectual element has been making itself felt ifl'various parts of the order over the past few years. Its root lies in a subconscious belief that there is something rThe Plan ]or Franciscan Living. The Rule and General Constitutions o[ the Order of Friars Minor (English-Speaking Conference of Provincials: Pulaski, Wisconsin, 1974), 70. ,~ Slbid., 147, 148. °Ibid., 129-130. ~ Re~qections on the Franciscan Charism not quite authentic about a learned Franciscan or a Franciscan who wishes to devote his life to study. The popular picture of the Franciscan friar has had a surreptitious influence on the order. The Franciscan is expected to be a jolly friar, simple to the point of lunacy, preferably rotund in shape and bald into the bargain, rfiddy-face.d and definitely not learned, who trips through the world hoping to get a good dinner, but happy to sing to the sun if he does not. This picture is reproduced each year on hundreds of Christ-mas cards all over the world. (I have made a collection of the more amusing ones!) The irony of the popular picture is that it bears no resemblance what-ever to the first Franciscan, St. Francis himself was a man of joy, but in "no sense could he be called jolly; he had the simplicity of the dove but also the cunning of the serpent, just as the gospel says; he was a small man, thin and emaciated; not bald, but shaven-headed; his skin was delicate and his flesh very spare;1" though not learned in a bookish sense, he knew French, wrote tolerably good Latin, composed a very beautiful song and was ac-quainted with the intricacies of the cloth trade and he had some idea about building. His attitude to learning is at best ambiguous. In any case he ad-vocated reverence for theologians and Scripture scholars and he warned even those who work with their hands not to allow their work to extinguish the spirit of prayer and devotion. Despite Masseron's .fear that if St. Francis were to return to earth today, he would probably consign a Franciscan bibliography to Brother Fire,ll I am convinced that he would not destroy the sermons of St. Anthony, the works of St. Bonaventure nor the third book of Duns Scotus' Commentary on the Sentences. The Development of Christology ,. It is noteworthy and encouraging that the Renewed Constitutions ex-plicitly link the teaching of the Franciscan masters of St. Francis himself. Specifically, the Christological doctrine of the Franciscan School took its origin from the insight of St. Francis into .the absolute centrality of the Word-made-flesh. His spirituality was centered totally on Christ. He gave concrete expression to it in devotion to the Crib, to our Blessed, Lady-- precisely because she made the Lord of Majesty our brother, to the Passion and Cross, to the Word of God in Scripture and to the Blessed Eucharist. To read of the imprinting of the stigmata on his poor body comes hardly as a surprise after a life spent in total conformity to the Gospel Christ. His initial encounter with Christ issued in a desire to imitate the life of a0See the description of St. Francis given in I, Cel. 83 in English Omnibus Edition o[ the Sources, 298-299. 11Alexandre Masseron, The Franciscans. Tr. W. B. Wells (New York, 1932). 4: "What would St. Francis, if he returned to earth today, have to say to anyone who was rash enough to show him a Franciscan bibliography? Is it not to be feared that 'our Brother Fire' would be charged with settling the fate of a work of such un-wieldy uselessness?". 26 / R~view lor Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 Christ in its every detail, to follow in the very footsteps of Christ:To follow the footsteps of Christ was for' Francis to take the Way that leads back to the Father. Though his heart and soul were .centered on the poverty and humility of Jesus in the New Testament, whereby the Rule and life.of his order became, synonymous with observing the gospel, there is no exclusive concern with the so-called,"simple" Jesus of history in the life and writings of St. Francis. He embraced a life of poverty in imitation of Christ who "is the glorious Word of the Father, so holy and exalted, whose coming the Father made known by St. Gabriel the Archangel to the glorious and blessed Virgin Mary, in whose womb. he took on our weak human nature. He was rich beyond measure and yet he and his holy Mother chose poverty.''1"-' This humiliation which the Word of the Father freely chose for our sake, is daily renewed on our altars: "Every day he humbles himself just as he did when he came from his heavenly throne (Ws 18: 15) into the Virgin's womb; every day he comes to us and lets us. see him in abjection, when he descends from the bosom of the Father into the hands of the priest at the altar?'1,~ There are three texts in the writings of St. Francis which in our opinion contain the seeds of the future development of Christology in the Franciscan School. If these were all he had left us, they would be more than sufficient as the foundation of the Franciscan School. The first is to be found in the fifth Admonition: "Try to realize the digqity God has conferred on you. He created and formed your body in the image of his beloved Son and your soul in his own likeness (see GO 1:26).''~4 The second is in the first paragraph of his Letter to All Clerics: "Indeed in this world there is noth-ing of the Most High himself that we can possess and contemplate with our eyes, except his Body and Blood, his name and his words, by which we were created and by which we have been brought back from death to life.''~'~ The third is found 'in the Letter to a General Chapter: "Kissing your feet with all the love I 'am capable of, I beg you to show the greatest possible reverence and honour for the most holy Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things, whether on the earth or in the heav-ens, have been brought to peace and reconciled with Almighty God (see .Col l:20).v~ There is a fair amount of deep theology in the writings of St. Francis, but nowhere is this more clearly attested than in these texts. Their depths and the implications they contain will be obvious to any student of St. Bonaventure or Duns Scotus. With regard to the first text, we may ask if St. Francis meant to say that the body of the Word Incarnate was the lz"Letter to all the Faithful" in English Omnibus Edition o] the Sources, 93. a3"First Admonition," ibid., 78. ~4English Omnibi~s Edition, 80; .a~lbid;, 101. ~qbid., 104. Re[tections on the Franciscan Charism blueprint used by God in the creation of Adam? He states explicitly: "He created and formed your body in the image of his beloved Son." The Son as Son has no body; it is the Son as Word-Incarnate who possesses a body. Whether or not St. Francis was aware of the implications of what he wrote, these lines evoke at once Duns Scotus' doctrine of the ~absolute primacy of Christ. Furthermore it would not be difficult at all to trace St. Bonaven-ture's entire theology of creation and incarnation ~back to the two latter texts .we quoted. St. Anthony, St. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus 1. The Christological teaching of the Franciscan School found its earli-est expression in the setmons of St: Anthony of Padua. Already therein we find contained the doctrine of the primacy of Christ, for which Scotus is so justly acclaimed. St. Anthony shows a preference for the symbol of the circle of egression and return of which St. Bonaventure made such pro-found and superb use in his theology of the Word and creation?r 2. It is, however, St. Bonaventure himself who gave the most complete theological formulation to the Christological insights of St~ Francis. He is the mystical theologian par excellence of the Franciscan Order and in him the~ School reached the high point of its development, He belongs to the tradition.in the Church which has its origin in the Greek and Latin Fathers, according to which the work of the theologian and the ministry of preach-ing are understood to be.no more ~than different modalities of one and the selfsame service of the Word of God, Every concrete form in'which St, Francis expressed his devotion to the poor and humble Christ, is paralleled by a mystical work in the Bonaven-turian corpus, For example, to the crib at Greccio corresponds the beautiful work On the Five Feasts of the.Child Jesus; to St. Francis's reverence for the Blessed Eucharist corresponds the work On How to .Prepare for the Celebration of Mass18; to his devotion to the Passion and Cross of Christ correspond St. Bonaventure's The Tree of Life and The Mystical Vine.l'J St. ~Bonav.enture's !heology of the Word may be summarized as follows: the Word is the inner expression of the Father and the world is the outer expression of t_he Son. Creation gives outward expression to the inner Word of the Father, With the advent of man, the Word of God 5s spoken in a ~rSee V. Schaaf, 'O.F.M., Saint-Antoine de Padoue. Docteur de I'Eglise (Montreal: Editions Franciscaines, 1946); T. Plassmann, O.F.M., "St. Anthony the Theologian;" St. Anthony o] Padua Doctor o] the Church: Universal Souvenir o] the Commemora-tive Ceremonies (Washington, D.C., 1946), 49-70. J. Heerinckx, O.F.M., "Antoine de Padoue," Dictionnaire de Spiritualitd~ 1, 714-717. a,~The Works o[ Bonaventure. Tr. Jose de Vinck. Ili: Opuscula, Second Series (Pater-son, N.J., St. Anthony Guild Press, 1966), 197-214; 215-238. V.qbid., I: Mystical Opuscula (Paterson, N.J., St. Anthony Guild Press, 1960), 95- 144; 145-205. Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 radically new way, for it now opens the possibility of the most perfect out-ward expression of God's inner Word in the Incarnation of the Word: the Man, Jesus of Nazareth. By the enfleshmcnt of the Word, the words already spoken by God in every creature throughout all creation can be heard un-ambiguously for what they are: revelations of God. As the Eternal Word is the Center of the Trinity, so the Incarnate Word is the Center of every-thing outside the 'Trinity. Nothing can be known unless it is known through Christ. At every level and in all orders of reality Jesus Christ is Mediator. To have true knowledge of God, man and the cosmos we must take faith as our starting point. From this we may then proceed to reason in order to know whatdt may discover about God, man and the cosmos.-"° This latter aspect of St. Bonaventure's world view has a relevance today which it would be difficult to overestimate. It concerns particularly the separation between philosophy of God and theology in Catholic institutes of education which has had deplorable effects on intellectual formation.'-'1 A return to the con-creteness of St. Bonaventure's method will teach us to distinguish, but not separate, a philosophy of God from theology. The correct method is to treat the theology of God first. After St. Clare I know of no one who loved St. Francis more than St. Bonaventure did. His sermons on St. Francis show him to have agonized in loving astonishment at what God had done in the person and life of the poor Francis of Assisi.~'-' Everything St. Bonaventure strove after in his study of the Word of God he found realized in St~ Francis. Of all the vir-tues which St. Francis possessed, St. Bonaventure avowed that he admired most his poverty and humility. He laid.down at the feet of St. Francis the powers of his brilliant mind and the rich treasures of his wide and deep learn-ing. Thus it was in his own act of humility that St. Bonaventure proved that after all a learned man can be holy and be saved! ,~ 3. In the teaching on the absolute primacy of Christ, Duns Scotus put the final touches to the Christological doctrine of the Franciscan School. The '-'°For recent presentations of the Christology of St. Bonaventure see the important studi+s by Zachary~Hayes, O.F.M., "'Revelation in Christ," Proceedin~,s o[ the Seventh Cehtenary Celebration o] the Death o[ St. Bonaventure (The Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1975), 29-43; "The Meaning of Convenientia in the Meta-physics of St. Bonaventure," Franciscan Studies, vol. 34, Annual XII, 1974, 74-100; "Incarnation and ~.reation in the Theology of St. Bonaventure," Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady. Friar Minor. Ed. R. S. Almagno, O.F.M. and C. L. Harkins, O.F.M. (The Franciscan Institute: St: Bonaventure, N.Y., 1976), 309-329. See also Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., "St. Bonaventure's Theology of the Imitation of Christ," Proceedings of the Seventh Centenary Celebration o[ the Death of St. Bonaventure (The Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1975), 61-72. '-qSee: B. J. F. Lonergan, S.J., Philosophy o[ God and Theology (The Westminster Press: Philadelphia, 1973). :zSee his five sermons on St. Francis in Opera Omnia IX (Ad Claras Aquas, 1901), 573-597. We are preparing an edition and translation of these sermons. Relqections on the Franciscan Charism / 29 Incarnation is not occasioned by sin, though sin affected its modality. Scotus is not indifferent to evil and sin in the world, nor does he merely juggle with hypotheses. But the destruction of sin and evil is no more than a moment in God's movement out of himself towards the world, to unite all creation in the Love that is forever. The most recent and famous formulation of this doctrine has been made by Teilhard de Chardin in terms of an evolving cosmos. °Speaking of the Scotistic doctrine with Padre Allegra, Teilhard ex-claimed:"' v'o"l~a," la th6ologie c'osmique; voile, la th6ologie de l'avenir"--a cosmic theology, a theology of the future. Because of the unambiguous value it places on creation, one can readily understand why this,, doctrine is so attractive to the French Co.rnmunist philosopher, Roger Garaudy.'-''~ These brief reflections on the development of Christology from St. Fran-cis himself to the School which has from him its name, make it clear that Franciscan Christology is a structural element in the original Franciscan charism. If it is ignored .or neglected, then the charism itself is impaired. Charism and Ongoing Renewal As the order moves on towards the beginning of the third millennium of the Church's history, it will continue to adapt and renew itself accord-ing to the spirit of its original ,charism. In the process of on'going renewal the following aspects of the charism will need to be giveo more serious con-sideration: 1. Public witness--minimum structure." The "monastification" of the order was an undesirable development, not merely because it led to a dull uniformity and reduced individuality to a minimum, but also because it .imposed,a superstructure of organization on the order's life which virtually abolished one of the most characteristic aspects of the Franciscan charism. This is the genius of living a publicreligious life in the Church (St. Francis founded an order) with a minimum amount of structure (St. Francis was conscious of its original newness.). It is among the order's most attractive and, at the same time, most deman.ding characteristics. It is attractive be-cause it manifests the freedom won for us in Christ Jesus; it is for the order a sacrament of freedom from the :burden of the Law. It is demanding because it places firmly on the shoulders of each member of a community full re, sponsibility for every facet of communal life. Community life is an ongoing process, created by the uniqueness and originality of its several members and it issues in a unity which is something more than the mere sum total of the individuals. In such a process no one can shirk responsibility without setting back this process and thus injuring community life. An important area in which this aspect of the charism should exercise maximum influence is formation. The whole process of formation must have 23See Eric Doyle, O.F.M., "John Duns Scotus and the Place of Christ," The Clergy Review, vol. LVII, Sept. 1972, 667-675; Oct. 1972, 774-785; Nov. 1972, 860-868. Review for Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 as its "chief aim the active reception by each friar of total responsibility for 6ur way of life, where the duty of each is to help the others to glow in wis-dom and maturity before~ God and man. The capacity and willingness to ¯ accept this responsibility may be taken as the touchstone of suitability for this way of life. 2. The Rule for Hermitages:'''~ Thomas of Celano in his Second Life tells us that St. Francis "wanted his brothers to live not only in the cities, but also in hermitages." This element of the charism has had effect in some provinces and it is recommended and encouraged in the Renewed Constitu-tions."-'~' It is clear from the short Rule for Hermitages that St. Francis .wished his order to lead not only a "mixed" life'--that is, one devoted to prayer and the apostolate---but to hold within itself at one and. the same time the two distinct expressions., of the.religious life: the active and the contempla-tive: The contemplative life he intended as a permanent feature of the order's existence in the world. It is interesting to recall in this context that both the Rule of the Friars Minor (for itinerant apostles) and the Rule of St. Clare (for enclosed contemplatives) are identified with life according to the Holy Gospel. In our opinion the notion of a "hermitage" should not be confused with a. "house of prayer." Houses of prayer, to which friars may resort for shorter or longer periods of recollection, do not fulfill adequately what St. Francis appears to have intended. It seems that he wanted the contemplative life to be a permanent feature of the life of the First Order. If our view here is correct, then there should be a place in the order for the exclusively contemplative life. On this understanding a "hermitage" and a "house of prayer" are quite distinct notions. The former should be employed uniquely to describe a community of friars dedicated exclusively to the contemplative life. The feature's that would distinguish a Franciscan contemplative community from the older monastic forms of the contemplative life would be precisely the minimum structure and the far smaller number in the community.-Whether the number would have to be restricted to three or four, as is mentioned in the Rule [or Hermitages, is a matter that calls for further discussion. It may not be possible for every province of the order to have'a hermi-tage (or hermitages) as a permanent feature of its life. Perhaps, therefore, hermitages could be instituted at the inter-provincial level and be made open tO international membership. Such contemplative communities in the order would give fine expression to this. element of the Franciscan charism. The reference made above to the Rule of the Poor Clares recalls what St. Francis wrote down in the Form of Life for St. CIare: ~'I desire and promise you personally and in the name,~of my friars that I will always have the same loving care and solicitude for you as for them." Their way of life "-4English Omnibus Edition of the Sources, 72-73. '-'SThe Plan ]or Franciscan Living, Articles 28-31. Reflections on the,~Franciscan Charism / 31 was very dear to St. Francis both because he loved St. Clare and because he himself was strongly attracted to the contemplative life. The First Order today should show the same loving care for the Poor Clares and there ought to be more frequent and closer contact between the first and second branches of the order. By so doing we would be more faithful to St. Francis and we would be helped considerably to.discern our own charism more clearly. 3. The Rule of 1221.""-~ Although the Rule of 1223, which gave the FrancisCan Order its legal" basis, and the Rule of 1221, which never re-ceived papal approval, both contain the spirit of St; Franci.s, it could be argued that the latter is a finer expression of that spirit than the former. This is not to deny that the Rule of 1223 is more a spiritual document than legal code. Nevertheless, it is just that one step removed from the earliest expression of the form of life and, therefore, just that little further from the original charism. .,, In terms of continuing renewal, the directives of the seventh chapter of the Rule of 1221 raise important questions for ,the future development of the order. The chapter is titled: "Work and the Service of Others." It con-cerns the friars who are engaged in the service of lay people and those who already have a trade when they join the order. The chapter lays down: "Everyone should remain at the trade and in the position in which he was called." This one sentence alone gives rise to a serious question about what attitude the order ought to adopt to a person seeking admission to it who is already qualified in a trade or profession. It is not a question about whether the order .should,allow a plumber or a doctor to continue as a plumber or ¯ doctor after an initial period of formation; it is rather a question of Whether or not the order is obliged to allow a plumber or a doctor to return at least for a certain time, to his previous work, after the period of formation. Priests who have joined the order in the past have continued to exercise their priestly ministry to a.limited extent during the period of formation and it has always been assumed that. they will go back to its full exercise after formation. There are many, many more professions ands:trades which are as equally compatible with the vocation of being a Franciscan friar,as is the ministerial priesthood. Before the oral approval of the Rule in 1209, St. Francis had already assured the Bishop of Assisi that he and his companionS would earn their living and have recourse to begging only when it was absolutely necessary. Some of them worked as laborers in monasteries and private houses; others took care of lepers in the lazar houses; others helped farmers in the fields. In the early years after the,approval of the Rule the friars were given to preaching, praying and manual work. The statement made at the Madrid Chapter in 1973 concerning the vocation of the order today, gave definite approval to this aspect of the "-'~English Omnibus o] the Sources, 31-53. 32 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 original charism as contained in the Rule of 1221. The statement empha-sizes: For recent times, our participation in the general evolution of religious life and the influence of certain other communities,have led us to the rediscovery of an aspect of work as it was understood by ~Francis. New forms of work and a variety of occupations are now being undertaken by our friars. Min-istry, our own works, and domestic tasks within our friaries legitimately oc-cupy the majority of our friars, but it is becoming more frequent to find friars engaged in salaried trades and professions within enterprises and institutions which belong neither to the order nor to the Church. An orientation of this kind appears to us to be in line with our vocation; by it we are a part of society in a special way, working for its upbuilding and we are brought closer to those who live. by their work. While placing us squarely on the road to the future it brings us back to one of the institutions of our origins.zr This new type of work is itself the apostolate: the apostolate of presence by silent witness. We must not forget, however, that this form of the apostolate is not easy. It demands that a friar put into practice the unsystematic though profound theology of work scattered throughout the writings of St. Francis. Thus: pay is not to be the motive of work, nor should the friars become the slaves of work or of gain. Work is to be undertaken as a contribution to the final form of creati6n, carried out under the supreme lordship of God; it is to be sanctified by being brought back to its right relationship with God. It is not, nor can it be, for the friar an end in itself; it is a means of exercising the apostolate of peace and reconciliation in the midst of the world. It requires above all of those who engage in it, that they be contem-platives. Before actio.n there has to be what St. Bonaventure calls sursumac-rio-- that uplifting activity which is contemplative prayer. Further developments of this kind of work may well bring about a de-crease in the number of priests in the order. At the same time it must not be ignored that those engaged in the apostolate who are not~priests (for ex-ample, nuns°and brothers) often find that there are circumstances where it would be a definite advantage to be a priest. In fact, experiences of this kind have often led~non-ordained apostles to seek ordination to the priest-hood. 4. St. Francis the Deacon:'-'~ St. Francis never became a priest. One often hears that the reason for this was his deep humility; he felt himself unworthy of so sublime a dignity. This explanation, however, is not to be found in the sources; in fact there appears to be no mention of the matter at all. In any case our concern here is not with the reason why he did not become a priest, but with the [a.ct that he was a deacon. "-':General Chapter Documents, Madrid 1973 (The English-Speaking Conference of the Order of Friars Minor; 1974), 68. '-'sSee I, Col. 86 in English Omnibus Edition o[ the Sources, 301: "The saint of God was clothed with the vestments of the deacon, for he was a deacon, and he sang the holy Gospel in a sonorous voice." Re[tections on the Franciscan Charism / 33 The re-institution of the order of permanent diaconate is one of the most encouraging results of Church renewal. The diaconate in the Church is directly derived from, and immediately related to, the episcopal office. It concerns the Church's mission to the world in.the very concrete form of the corporal and sp)ritual works of mercy and of work for reconciliation, justice and peace. These works pertain to the essence of the apostolic office. It is, therefore, theologically incorrect and quite unsound to understand the diaconate merely in terms of assistance to the priestly ministry; nor is the diaconate adequately presented exclusively in terms of liturgical functions. In practice at the moment, however, the actual form of ministry exercised by permanent deacons is, in the vast majority of cases, only a lesser form of the priestly ministry. This is true throughout the Western Church. On the missions it has been ~made a substitute for the priesthood, and the permanent deacon is in fact a "mini-priest?' With the exception of saying Mass and ad: ministering absolution, he does everything that the priest does. The diaconate has become also a substitute for a married priesthood. In ,many of our city and towm parishes in the Western world, the ministry of the permanent deacon is in fact no more than that of assistant to the local priests. In all these cas~s, therefore, 'the priesthood is the determining factor in the per-formance of the office of deacon. It would be a pity if this were to become the exclusive form of the diaconal ministry. The permanent diaconate in the Church proclaims that the corporal and spiritual works of mercy and work for reconciliation, justice and peace are not merely the special concern of individuals who may feel called to per-form them. They belong to the episcopal office, because the bishops must have anxious care not only for all' the churches but also for the whole world. Ordinatioh to :the .permanent diaconate graces the man called to this work with the authority and power of the apostolic mission to the world, In virtue of this sacrament the deacon is sent by the bishop publicly in the name of Christ to work; for example, in the field 0f communications, as a counselor, a welfare officer, a doctor or a nurse. The. Franciscan Order is committed by its very existence to work for reconciliation,., justice and peace. It would be most fitting for the order to incorporate the permanent diaconate, as here understood, into its life and mission and to offer this as an option to those wishing to join the order. It would manifest that work other than priestly'ministry is not merely the hobby or pa~rticular preference of an individual, but a part of the Churcl~'s ¯ mission to the world. It would contribute also towards restoring the diaconate to its fuller ministry. 5. Christology of the Franciscan School: Every friar should receive a thorough grounding in the doctrine of the Franciscan School. Christology is at the heart of that doctrine from which has developed a distinctive anthro-pology, .!he values of which center on freedom, the primacy of the will and charity, and the dignity of the individual person. In order that this rich 34 / Review Jot Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 heritage be not lost; it is of paramount importance that studies be encouraged ever more keenly in the order. One acknowledges with gratitude .the re-newed interest in Franciscan studies brought about by,~the establishment of the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University, New York. More friars should .be encouraged to devote their lives to the production of good texts and critical editions of the authors of the Franciscan School. It must be impressed on them that this is not a waste of time nor merely the pri-vate interest of the scholarly "types" which the order can tolerate, but a splendid contribution to the understanding of a tradition which belongs, to the Church and mankind at large;. ~ The~Future of the Order and Its Vocation The future will see a more balanced proportion between, the number of priests and non-priests in the Franciscan Order. The indications are that throughout the world the order as a whole will continue to decrease in numbers. There will be many more small communities. In fidelity to its many-faceted charism the order will have to learn to hold within itself a great pluriformity of~ life-styles and, work. The former will have to contain the widest variety from the contemplative to the actix;e' life.~ The latter will have to.embrace every, form from strictly priestly.work to the apostolate of presence and silent witness in salaried trades, and pro-fessions. Every friar on the apostolate will have to be prepared to preach, teach or' share with others, in whatever ways are opened up, the riches of the order's Christological tradition, particularly the teaching on the centrality of the Word and the absolute 'primacy of Christ: By so doing, the order will contribute to the fruitfulness oLthe encounter and dialogue between East and West, from which will result a spirituality for the post-modern world. The East has developed towards an extreme spiritualistic interpretation of man and the world; the West towards an extreme materialistic interpretation of man and the world. There are~ however, strands in the tradition of both East and West, which point the way to a real unity and balance between these extremes. It is not too much to suggest~that the theology of the:Fran-ciscan School and the spirituality of St. Francis belong to these strands in the West. This theology and spirituality lead one to a material spiritualism or spiritual materialism, to a holy worldliness or worldly holiness. It is along these lines that spirituality in the future will develop. In conclusion we wish to make a brief comment about a very important matter. It concerns a fair number of those friars who have left the order and have taken up other walks of life. In traveling around one frequently comes across ex-friars who long to share again the spirituality and atmosphere which formed them and left a deep impression on their minds and hearts, and who desire to participate once more in some way directly in the order's mission to the world. It is not that they are unhappy in their new. way of life or regret having married~ These longings and desires are th~ outcome of a~ Reflections on the, Franciscan Charism / 35~ renewed and deeper appreciation of Franciscan values which their new life has brought home. to them. Specifically, 'it is married rife which is most fre-quently mentioned as the cause of this. There is a very positive impulse behind these desires which one discerns as the Ho!y Spirit of God. Serious thought and prayer must be given to working out how these desires might be fulfilled, It must not be presumed a priori that we can do nothing for them. One suggestion would be the institution of a new [ormof the Third Order which could be so established as to meet both desires mentioned. It could exist in very close liaison and cooperation with the work of the First Order, for this latter is mature enough to embrace an added element in its. pluri- ¯ formity. In this way the order would be helping to prepare for the eventual re-deployment of so much energy, goodwill and holiness in the apostolic mission of the Church. Now Available As A Reprint Centeri. g Prayer-Prayer of Quiet by~ M. Basil Pennington, O.C.S~.O. Address: ¯ Price: $.50 pier copy, plus postage. Review for Religious 612 Humboldt Building 539 North Grand St. Louis,, Missouri 63103 To God Via Per Patricia Lowery, M.M. Sister Lowery's article, "The Suffering Servant and the Wounded Healer" (May, 1976) was well-received by our readership. She continues to reside at: Madres de Maryknoll; Casilla 491; Arequipa, Pert]. Editor's Note: I asked Sister Patricia to write an article on her reason for remaining in Pert] even as a suffering servant. In response to read.er-reaction, she had earlier written an article with fuller information about "The Fraternity of the Sick," but I judged the present article to be of haore immediate im-portance. The other article will be published later. The following passages from her covering letter will "flesh out" the article which follows. She writes: "I guess it is not such a great thing that I stay in Pert], but some people without a missionary vocation might think it is. 1 am not exactly 'all crippled up,' but Rheumatoid Arthritis affects all the joints, and, whatever the degree of deformity, there°is always pain . Some people, I think, Would be taking it easy in my condition, but because my spirit is always 100 miles ahead of my body, I need to romp around. I do it in Pert] because the pace is slower, I have the freedom to invent' my own aids to independence, and most of all because it is 'home' for me .I hope what I have written will serve as an inspiration to someone else." When I left New York harbor destined for Pert] on the f~ast of St. Rose of Lima, I instinctively felt that I was making.a journey that would shape my life. Twenty-five years later, as I reflect on the events of those years, I know it to be true. As I stood at the rail, face to face with the ocean, the fact that I was going to a strange country, to a-mission that was as yet an empty lot, to work with people I did not know and whose language I could not speak, seemed not to frighten me. I was too caught up with the journey itself. With Sister Madaleva's "Travel Song" in my heart, I was blinded by' enthusiasm! 36 To God Via Per~ / 37 "Know you the journey that I take Know you the voyage that I make The joy of it one's heart would break. No jot of time have l to spare Nor will to loiter anywhere SO edger am I to be there. What thatothe way is hard and long What that gray fears upon it throng I set my journey to a song. And it grows happy, wondrous so Singing I hurry on, for Oh! It is to God, to God I go. I am still singing that song, for my journey has taken me steadily toward God, accompanied now by many frierids and the voice of ,the quena (Indian flute), whose music calls to mind all that I have liv.ed, loved and learned in Peril. A Life of Fulfillment Recently, a visiting sister from the United States asked me what satis-factions I had after working twenty-five years in Perti. I could not answer that question directly because .I had not thought of my years in Perti in terms of "satisfactions," but. rather, more comprehensively, as a lifetime of fulfillment. I feel that I came to Peril almost as a child, unsure of many things, and here I grew up, formed 'in the school of joy; struggle, suffering, achievement and love. My teachers'were often uneducated people whose only book was the testimony of their lives. I knew, sowehow, that in such a book were contained the lessons I wanted desperately to learn. There was conflict, though, because I was supposed to be the teacher, prepared as I was for that profession. Later in novitiate work, I assumed the role of spiritual guide only to find that the insights of the Peruvian girls with whom I lived were much more "real" than my own. In pastoral work, too, I had to learn to accelSt people as they are, in the context of their cul-ture and reality, and to set aside my well-prepared o~ganizational plan. It was only when I found myself on a level with so many others (brought together through that universal mystery of suffering) that I began my real ministry~ This shared experience taught me to be present to others as a friend, learn from them, be at their side rather than "ahead" of them, to understand and appreciate them--and m~self as well. I sincerely feel that over the years the gift of happiness and fulfillment has been given to me by people who are themselves still oppressed by in- . justices and hunger for bread and who carry man-made burdens. In humble gratitude to them, I take my stand with all those who fight for liberation, human dignity and the precious gift of personal fulfillment. A Vocation to Stay As a Maryknoll Missioner, my heritage includes devotion to the Church, Review ]or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 love for people of all cultures, simplicity, loyalty, generosity, adaptability, joy in hardships and faith in God. My earliest years at Maryknoll were filled with hearing about, and meeting, great men and women who, sustained by those virtues, ventured to "fields afar" even before I was born. Their unassuming lives spoke to me of humifity, courage a,ad joy, virtues that stood by them. as they fought the good fight, faced imPrisonment and even death for the people to Whom they were g(nt. All this was part of their missionary vocation. ~ Therefore, it seems strange to me that anyone would ask why I, who am only semi-incapacitated by a physical'iliness, would remain on a mission where few resources are availi~ble. Actually, it never occurred to me to do otherwise. Having received very good medical attention and knowing how to take care of myself, there seems little else to do but wait until science discovers a'cure. B~t one can waist anywhere. Bishop James E. Walsh, M.M., whose story is well known in the United States, made a statement in 1951 regarding his decision to remain in China in the face of imprisonment (which he actually suffered for twelve years). From among his valuable insights, ! will quote a few which I can apply to myself: Vocation: Our vocation is not simply our occupational work. The teaching, preaching, village visiting we usually do, it is something much deeper, per-mahent, indelible. It does not change if our work is imped(d, if we are in. prison, or for any other reason. One of the necessary conditions to carry it out properly, I think, is to accept in advance every trouble and contingency in connection with it that Divine Providence puts in our way. If we start to pick and choose for ourselves; it is very hard to tell if we are carrying out our vocation or running away from it . The only safe rule for a man with a mission vocation, .I think, is to adhere to the clear indication of God's will (his appointed place where he finds himself) and to make no changes of his own volition. .4ch°vity: Enforced inactivity is a term that needs some distinguishingl Activ-ity does not depend on the place; it depends on the man. Suffering patiently bourne is activity, so is prayer, so is any kind of mental work--things that can be done, one WOUld think, in prison as well as anywhere. What is really meant is a change of activity. This is something of a hardship to many men, I confess it---especially to those who are lacking in the. faculty of imagination. However, we can all learn something new, or at least wecan try tO do so. If an examp!e of prison life will help the Church in China, as. I. believe any suffering undergone for Qod will do, then we are just being given another sort of activity for a time. There is no question of ~complete inactivity, I believe."r Encouraged, therefore, by the tradition of my elders as well as by the example of many valiant companions of today, I choose to stay in Pert~ because: 1Zeal For Your House by James E. Walsh, M.M., Our Sunday Visitor, Inc. (Hunt= ington, IN; 1976), pp. 140-141. To God Via Per~ / 39 --it is my vocation; ---I believe in Christian witness (no matter what else I may or may not be able to do) ; --although it is the nature of the missionary vocation to move on when when the. local Church has come of age, I feel that Peril is still in the growing process and needs to feel solidarity with the universal Church; --it builds morale both for the people and the missioners; (to celebrate a "staying-here" rather than a "going-away" makes everybody happy); --God has directed my life in such surprisingly beautiful wa3;s that I fear if I "pick and choose for myself," I may miss out on something he has in store for me; --finally, I would feel reluctant to break the bonds of friendship built up over the years. Yahweh's feeling toward his people has rubbed off on me: How could I give you up, O Ephraim? How could I part with you, O Israel? (Ho 11:8) While my sentiment for Peril runs deep, I k~aow that missioners are sent to people rather than to count.ries. In the case that ,I were to find my-self in another situation, my ministry to people need not change: Pockets of Hope In my small circle of the poor and the sick, I se.e signs .of Christi.an witness which prove that what we have been able to build in the hearts of people has already outlasted our institutions and monumental structures. Christian values like kindness, service, patience, humility, thoughtfulness and friendliness mark people as being followers of Christ. In my own ex-perience, especially since I have been sick, I have been deeply moved by the unexpected and touching concern shown for me.by those who carry heavy burdens and, apparently, have nothing to give. It prompts me to look into my life, and give of its essence as well as its superfluity. Because of my involvement with the "Fraternity of the Sick," I have come to realize the truth, that through baptism (be it of water or in the fire of suffering), the humblest among the people of. God are called to be ministers. In the past, because of concentrating only on our own call to ministry, we religious have tended to over-look the vocation to service being lived out all around us. Only with our encouragement can these ministers come to take their place as true servants of the Church. We have nothing to lose and everything to gain if only we can set aside our fears and believe that: As one lamp lights another, nor grows less So nobleness enkindles nobleness. (Lowell) Founding "Founderology": Charism and Hermeneutics Francis E. George, O,M.I. Father George is Vicar General of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate. This article is based on a conference given in Rome at the beginning of a three-week congress, April 25-May 15, on the charism of their founder, Eugene De Mazenod, ,He resides at the Curia Generalitia O.M.I.; Via Aurelia, 290; 00165 Roma, Italy. The renewal of religious, institutes means getting in touch with several "charisms." We can distinguish the charism of the religious life as such, individual charisms and the cha.rism of a founder and of his institute. Religious life as such is a gift of the Holy Spirit, a" grace given to the entire Church, enabling it to follow Christ ever more closely (Lumen Gentium,~ 44). There is also.the "charism" or individual grace of each member of a religious institute. The Spirit calls each of us by name, and this individual vocation is a source of the richness that religious institutes have recently begun to acknowledge more openly and appreciate more warmly. But the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council spoke of the "original inspiration behind a given community" as one of the principles of ongoing renewal of religious institutes (Perlectae Caritatis, 2), and the "spirit" of a founder has' its source in a grace (charis) given to him. Like all.grace, it is a personal gift; but by reason of his founding a public institute in the Church, this grace has far-reaching public consequences. Those who are his followers adopt a stance, a viewpoint, in some way derived from or inspired by his thought, his work, his graced life. It becomes possible there-fore to speak of a "collectNe charism," a view proper to a group. The charism of a religious institute, as such has been defined as "a grace given Founding ~'Founderology'" / 41 by the Holy Spirit to a religious institute to help it to carry out its proper mission.''~ Each religious foundation began with a group who shared a common spirit. This spirit, rooted in grace, enabled them to lead a common life and attempt a common task: How can a religious institute today know if it still has this original spirit? Is there a method which can help a religious community get in touch with the founder's spirit and live it authentically? Historical Approach to Charism There are two methodological approaches to charism (the spirit of the founder and his followers) which, taken singly, . might ,lead to an impasse. The first approach is historical. Starting with the historical reality of a founder, his life and work, we can try to see him as a kind of model, some-what separate from us in time, but still providing us with a clear and even a detailed picture of the life we should lead today. "Fidelity to the founder's spirit" then means handing on this model, essentially unchanged, to future generations of religious. They, in tur6, will interiorize it and make it vital thr~ough their lives and works. The difficulty with this ap~proach is that it "often assumes a "funda-mentalism" based on texts or on events, accepting as normative many models which are irrelevant to contemporary life. While seeming to empha-size the historical reality of the founder, this approach, taken by itself, is really a means of escaping from history. It makes the founder's ideas become ah ideology, protecting a community's present institution,'ilizati6n but divorced from the contemporary responses to problems the founder him-self was concerned about? On the practical level, "copying" the founder cannot serve as a guide for present decision making. Few people, and certainly not most religious founders, are so .self-consistent in act that it is not possible to find his-torical precedent in their lives for al}nost any a~tion. Almost any par-ticular decision can thereby be justified by saying we are "imitating the founder." The ideological nature of this approach, used alone, becomes clear. Experiential Approach to Charism The second approach "begins with contemporary experience. Looking at an institute's life and ministry today, the members discern what are the values and the motivation inspiring them. A synthesis of this group "spirit" is articulated and accepted as normative. Certain similarities with the XTeresa Led6chowska, O.S.U., A la'r~cherche du charism de I'institut (Rome, 1976), p. 14. "Ideology, as used here, means ideas which serve as weapons or cloaks for special interests. This usage is common., in .the sociology o~ knowledge and derives from Karl Marx via Karl Mannheim. 42 / ,Review ]or Religious, VOlume 36, 1977/1 spirit of the founder are either° found or are-read back into his life, but the important thing is to avoid withdrawing into the cocoon of the ~insti-tute and away from contemporary events and problems. If historical similarity.to the founder is lacking, this must be accepted" as a part'of his-torical development itself, the price ,paid for being truly in and of our own time. ~ The difficulty with this approach, considered in itself, lies in its easy acceptance of the zeitgeist as almost uniquely normative. The founder himself tends to become instr~umentalized, brought'in .whenever he can be used to justify current thinking and activity; and conveniently forgotten at other moments. Eventually, it would be hard to find any specific content at all to the so-ca.lled charism of the institute. If the first approach merely "copies" the founder~ the second tends to replace him. Hermeneutic Approach to Charism Is ~here a third approach,~incorporating the best Of the two sketched above? Perhaps a iook at hermeneuticg ~igl!t help to put'together a meth-odology which neither copies a founder nor replaces him but rather inter-prets him for Our time and for generations of religious yet to come. Hermeneutics Heymeneutic~, the science of interpretation, has its theolggic)d roots in the discussion of the historical Jesus and his relation to the Christ of faith? ]~he~gradual dissociation of religious, beliefs from historical'dvents had its beginnings in the late"l 8th century work of Lessing and has its best known twentieth century explication in the work of Rudolf Bulimafin. Hermeneutics as such, h~owever, is .a" theologically neutral ente'rRr~ise, concerned with the understanding of expressions of life as fixed in writing2 As a method, hermeneutics demands first of all exegesis, the careful establishment Of what the author ~f a text consciously meant to say in his writing. Next, h~rmeneutics tries intelligibly to span the historical distance between the text and our present reading of it by studying the author's con-text of understanding, including both his presuppositions (what he took for granted) and his horizon (what he was up to and how he did it). Finally, a third area of understanding must be made explicit. If the text is to be adequately interpreted, there is needed also a critique of the reader's context, the presuppositions .he brings to his reading, what is mean- .~See P. Grech's rrsum6 o[ the question in, "Jesus Christ in History and Kerygma," A New Catholic Commentar.v on Holy Scripture, Reginald G. Fuller, General Editor (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1969), pp. 822-837. 4See Berriard Lonergan, Method in Theology (N.Y.: Herder & Herder, 1972), pp. 59-64 and 153-173. Founding "Founderology" / 43 ingful in his understanding and life~ The interpreter's own subiectivity is utilized as a principle of interpretation. The challenge of hermeneutics lies at least partially in finding a context of understanding which incorporates both the explicit intentions of the author of the text and his cont6xt of understanding, along with the context of the reader or interpreter. ~ ,, Charism Interpretation In charism interpretation, the object of interpretation is not directly a single text or group of te£ts but rather a group-spirit which has its. origin in a particular historical person. Nevertheless, three areas of understanding, anaiogou~ to those necessary for textual interpretation, can be seen to be necessary: for an appreciation of a founder's spirit. First, we must understand what he personally intended and chose. A study,~ of his own writings and the decisions of his life is therefore necessary. Secondly, we must understand the founder's historical context, his horizon .of meaning and ,action .as a~man of his age. Accepting a spurious. contemporaneity, overlooking, for example, authoritatian presuppositions ~which.~.are now unattractive, would only falsify our interpretation. Thirdly, we must understand our own presuppositions and 'our own historical context. The general horizon of modern consciousness accepts unquestioningly that finitude is the vantage point of all, thinking and that ,,there are no privileged viewpoints. Nobody today, for example, believes he can know the mind of God or his will in the same rather absolute way peo-ple thought it possible to know them before the mediating structures :broke down. This contempor.ary tentativeness :can readily degenerate into a super-cilious attitude, debunking, every human thought "and value; at its best, however, it reminds us that we, too, are not necessarily smarter than peo-ple were in the founder's time. We just have a different pbint of view; and we must therefore work all the harder to understand the founder's context of meaning and action. Interpretation as. a. Communitarian. Activity But these three areas of understanding do not of themselves give us an interpretation of a founder's spirit. They prepare the task of' interpretation, but the actual interpretation must be~done in community~ Interpretation takes place in community nc;t only because community is a constitutive part of the life of most religioias institutes, but also because :interpretation is, of its very nature; a communitarian activity. ~ Community of Interpretation Interpersonal" Structure Interpretation is a communita~-ian activity because it is a joining, a communion, of three poles: the interpreter, the sign or object interpreted, 44 / Review [or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 and the person(s) for whom the interpretation is intended, or the inter-pretee( s)? By way of example, one can imagine an international conference during which speeches are translated simultaneously. The speaker's words are the sign or object interpreted, the translator is the interpreter, and those who do not understand the speaker's language are the interpretees. Together they form a community of interpretation, Without one of the three, but espe-cially without the interpreter, no community exists and the conference be-comes impossible. To push the example a bit further, one can imagine a particularly abstruse speech which makes little sense even to those who understand the language in which it is given. Then another sort of inter-preter is called for, perhaps a teacher or clarifier, who creates community between speaker and those spoken to. What might happen Should even the speaker not understand his speech? Then probably the situation calls for that sort of interpreter called a psychiatrist,'who can explain the speaker to himself. In any circumstance, the act of interpretation means that someone interprets something to and for another. The "other'-' might be the inter-preter himself at a different time. Everyone has had the experience of puz-zling through a conundrum and finally "interpreting" it to himself --- but even in this case there are three logically distinct subjects of the relationship: interpreter, interpreted and interpretee. Interpretation, then, is always a communitarian activity. Temporal Structure Chronologically, the interpreter can be placed in the present, the' inter-preted in the past and the interpretee in the future. The community of in-terpretation is a temporal community, in the sense that something in the past is interpreted by someone now for someone else in the future. The ac-tivity of interpreting, then, creates a community of memory and of hope. It brings together, in the present, both the past and the future. Again, an example might help. It is fashionable today to speak of "owning" one's own behavioi'. A person self-consciously appropriates in the present some act of his past so that it fits into his future. A self-image is an interpretation. When others share the individual's self-interpretation, community with them is possible. When all place the same interpretation on a past event and look forward to a common future, a larger community is possible, There is a Christian community, to use another example, because in the present we all interpret the past Christ-event in such a way that we look forward to his future coming in glory. Those who do not look back to Jesus '~This analysis of interpretation depends upon the work of tl~e American philosopher Josiah Royce, The Problem o] Christianity (N.Y.: Mac"millan, 1913), vol. ii, Lectures ix through xiv. ~ Founding "Founderology'" / 45 of Nazareth as Lord and Savior or do not look forward to the Parousia are not members of the Christian community, There is no common interpre-tation. Every community is a gathering of many separate persons into a commonly held memory and a commonly shared hope. In this sense, every community is a community of interpretation. In the community of interpretation which is a particular religious insti-tute, the members interpret in their time the.spirit and acts of their founder, a person now dead, to their future selves and to future generations of re-ligious, They say what they understand the founder to be, thereby establish-ing their community with him and enabling him--and them--to join those who will consider their interpretation in the future. This future considera-tion, of course, will be another interpretation in another present for another future in which they are past. Religious Community of Interpretation The Founder:s Concerns The relation of interpretation has a triadic personal structure (interpre-ter, interpreted and interpretee) and a triadic temporal structure (present, past and future). But the abstract framework explored so far is true of every act of interpretation and of every community of interpretation. Is there a specific 'contribution a founder makes to the community of interpretation which is his religious, institute? Obviously; if we are able to speak of a charism proper to an institute, then the object interpreted, the signs of God's grace which are the founder's words and acts, must provide the content which his followers interpret in the present. The founder raises concerns in the hearts and minds of his followers and these concerns specify religious com-munities .of interpretation., so that followers of Francis of Assisi are different from followers of Francis de Sales, Each religious, each community, each institute can produce a list of those concerns which were closest to its founder's heart. The founder I know best, Eugene De Mazenod,* was a diocesan priest who brought together a small mission, band to help re-evangelize southern France after the destruc-tion of parochial life in the French Revolution, Heavily influenced by the writings of St. Alphonsus Ligouri and by the example of St. Vincent de Paul, De Mazenod chose as a motto for.his missionaries the words of Isaiah echoed in Luke's Gospel: "He has sent me to preach the .Gospel to the poor; the poor have the Gospel preached to them." A practical leader rather than a speculative theorist, he saw his group develop slowly in response to many different needs in many different situa-tions. In some respects he seems to be a not very original man, yet certain *Eugene De Mazenod (1782-1861), ~ounder ~f the Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate and Bishop of Marseilles. ' He was beatified on Mission Sunday, October 19, 1975. 46 / Review [or Religious, Volume 36, 1977/1 personal concerns return constantly in his letters and his.life, An authentic Mazenodian community of interpretation, therefore,, would have to harbor at least the following four concerns:, 1 ) ~a concern ]or the poor: who are they; what language do they speak; what are their needs and their ways of understanding themselves? This was a constant ,concern of ,De Mazenod from the days of his first preaching in" the Provenqal dialect to his final instructions to his missionaries in Africa, Asia and North America ~ 2,) a co'ncern ]or the Church as universal: De Mazenod's own conver-sion to Christ crucified and his .love ~of Christ as universal Savior prompted both, his missionary zeal and his love of the pope as universal pastor; a vision of Christ's universal salvific action as sacramentalized in the Church must be somehow present to De Mazenod's interpreters. 3) a concern ]or ministry, and specifically for preaching Christ 'cruci-fied, in local circumstances: religious foundations were frequent in nine-teenth century France, but when another founder spoke~t6.De Mazenod of the need to go to all of France, De Mazenod insisted'on,first making Christ present in Provence, in the circtimstances he knew best. ,.A universal. Vision was coupled with a concern for local effectiveness, even as.the congregation itself became global. 4) a. concern ]or the quality of copnmitment bf the community itself: De Mazenod called his followers not to,share his opinions nor even only to share his work but to share his commitment, a commitment finally expressed in religious vows. Other areas of concern could certainly be raised. Concern for the way in which Mary is part of the Oblate spirit as exemplar:and guide is forced on De: Mazenod's institute by its very title. Concern for the proper under-standing of mission or of evangelization is also important~ But De Mazenod in pr~actice preached to and served and lived with certain grotips of people. Without living contact with analogous groups today, his spirit will escape his followers. ~ For the purpose of this paper, De Mazenod is only an exam
