Room for maneuver? Economic and cultural perspectives of aid and food import dependency in Western Samoa ; The economic development of small countries : problems, strategies and policies
In May 1979, a joint delegation of UNDP and UNCTAD officials visited Western Samoa to investigate the possibilities of direct grant assistance to suitable projects available from a Special Least Developed Countries fund. Almost all Ministries were forewarned of the visit and invited to put forward proposals to the Prime Minister's Department. Although an inter-ministerial Aid Co-ordinating committee existed, its members were not involved at this stage and the possibility of obtaining approved funding rested primarily on an ability to present a good case - at very short notice - to the Prime Minister's Department and gain the support of the Financial Secretary. The chosen project, accepted in principle almost immediately by UNDP, was for a cool store to hold bananas and taro (coco yam) and small quantities of other fresh items prior to export. Some holding facility appeared to be necessary in view of the Government's concern to seek to re-establish its quality banana export market in New Zealand, partly through the development of a new 80 hectare plantation. A unit of this size - with potential for expansion in the light of twice-monthly shipments, called for cool holding facilities on a scale not required by the smaller producer, although it was anticipated that the Government banana marketing scheme would use the storage for short periods in advance of shipment. Government and (in principle) UNDP had made a decision on the project on extremely limited technical, financial and economic analysis. No recognizable feasibility study was produced at this stage, although the resident UNDP Representative did ultimately authorize the recruitment of an independent technical consultant to prepare the design proposals and draw up tender specifications. When tenders were opened it was discovered that the store and associated infrastructure could not be constructed for the $500,000 envisaged by UNDP. The grant was eventually extended to $900,000. One reason why the capital cost of the project was so far out of line with the original earmarked sum was that in the absence of any financial and economic analysis prior to the decision to finance the project, the technical consultant was instructed to draw up design plans for frozen foods storage as well as cool holding. As the export use of freezer space was at the time limited to comparatively small quantities of frozen fruit pulp, the capacity planned was justified as a source of auxiliary freezer capacity for importers. Thus a commercially and economically dubious project, inadequately planned but financed by a multilateral aid agency, relied for its justification - at least on the scale it was constructed - on a continuing buoyant importation trade in frozen meat, fish and dairy products. Although the UNDP financed Apia Cool Store has yet to be formally evaluated, it already focuses attention - albeit in a dramatic way - on the aid and food dependency paradox. A project designed to assist towards growing self-reliance by facilitating exports, also makes increasing provision for, and to an extent depends on, increasing food imports. It will be seen that this kind of paradox is not confined to a single project; it is one which has become built into the aid/trade relationships between a dependent economy and bilateral aid supplying countries supported in a variety of ways by multilateral agencies. This paper examines the extent of food import dependency in its historical social contexts and attempts to establish a framework for evaluating government policy. ; peer-reviewed
