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Why, as a comparativist, did I find it compelling to carry out field research in over 20 countries on five different continents? Because comparative politics should be question-driven, not driven by methodology or existing data. Good questions led to new countries. My book on how Brazilian civilian elites were complicit in coups led to a comparative book on how to transform such civil–military relations in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. My colleague Juan J Linz and I broadened the scope of questions of democratic transition theory by adding post-communist countries to the transition set. New questions and relevant new countries continue to emerge. What to do if more than one nation exists in a polity pursuing 'nation-state' policies? I helped create the concept of 'state-nation' and documented how 'multiple but complementary identities' were fostered in India. How did polities that respected the 'twin tolerations' emerge in Muslim-majority Indonesia, Senegal, and Tunisia?

As a reaction to the erosion of political parties, citizens increasingly engage in participation independently from parties (such as boycotts, petitions and street demonstrations). Looking beyond the often-stated contradiction between party membership and these forms of non-institutionalized participation, we tried to determine whether party members participate in non-institutionalized participation as a complement or an alternative to their party membership activities. Based on the relative deprivation and civic voluntarism model, three party variables were selected: activity rate in the party, government status and ideological orientation of the party. The results of our analysis conducted on party members in 22 European countries show that the government status and the ideological position of a party have the largest effects on the propensity to participate in direct action. Activity rate does not have a significant effect, except a positive one for street demonstrations. In sum, direct action is not an alternative for dissatisfied party members, but rather a complement.

Many readers look to comics and cartoons for entertainment, but they can also inform, as well as inspire, controversy and even acts of political violence, as the Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Hebdo cases demonstrate. Indeed, politics and comics connect and overlap in all sorts of ways. This review essay explores the nexus of politics and comics at a time when a growing number of cartoonists are creating extended works of graphic nonfiction that address serious political and historical themes.

In this article, we analyse the mechanisms of agenda setting by focusing on the determinants of individual attitudes towards crime and investigating the role played by the media. After a brief literature review supporting the relevance of the selected topic of inquiry and the presentation of our analytical framework, we study the persuasion effects of mass media. More specifically, we investigate how TV exposure can shape individual perceptions of specific issues such as crime, and then focus on the effects of exposure to crime news on voting decisions. Using the Italian 2001 general election as an important case study of TV power concentration, we provide evidence that media-induced agenda setting enhanced the salience of the crime issue in voters' minds during the 2001 Italian general election and contributed to the victory of the coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Interestingly, our results are partially driven by the switch of previous left-wing voters to voting for the centre right because of exposure to crime news.

On the question of how voters perceive party positions, much of the existing literature has not adequately considered the case of a multidimensional policy space. Since the ideological cues related to each issue differ in a policy space of multiple dimensions, it is possible that each individual favors different dimensional cues. To test this hypothesis, this paper focuses on Japan's 2012 Lower House election, which took place in a two-dimensional policy space. An analysis of how voters position the three major parties relative to each other reveals that there is actually heterogeneity in the voter perception of the policy space. Further, using a mixed logit model, we find that demographic factors and political attitudes explain this heterogeneity.

While the International Relations literature has long debated whether or not economic sanctions are an effective foreign policy tool, it neglects to empirically examine the damage sanctions impose on target economies. This study presents two theoretical explanations about the impact of sanctions on target countries' economies, and collects extensive empirical data to test such theoretical connections in three areas: international trade; foreign direct investment; and foreign portfolio investment. A cross-national, time-series data analysis of 133 countries during the period from 1970 to 2005 reveals that regardless of the number of senders, the type of sanctions or the level of anticipated costs to the target and the sender, economic coercion damages none of the economic conditions of the target. This finding suggests that if the objective is to maximize economic pain in the sanctioned country, a sanctioning country should think twice before choosing economic coercion as its primary non-military strategy.

The importance of incumbent evaluations for voting and the existence of an incumbency effect are well-established. However, there is limited research on the effect incumbency has on voters' engagement with election campaigns. This paper examines whether the use of incumbency as a cue when voting is associated with there being less interest in an election and whether campaign period attentiveness affects incumbent support. We consider these questions using data from the Toronto Election Study, a large- N, two-wave survey of Torontonians conducted around the time of the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election. We find that attentiveness, on its own, does not make voters more likely to support an incumbent or non-incumbent candidate. However, among individuals with high knowledge, attentiveness decreases the likelihood of supporting the incumbent, as opposed to a non-incumbent candidate.

Although many African governments introduced provisions for subnational elections in the early 1990s, there is variation in the extent to which these reforms were implemented and sustained. Our inductive analysis of three post-conflict cases – Angola, Ethiopia and South Africa – suggests that one factor explaining this variation is elite discontinuity when an insurgent group wins power in the aftermath of conflict. Systems of subnational elections adopted by new governments with an extensive social base derived from an insurgency, as in South Africa and Ethiopia, have proved relatively robust. By contrast, in Angola, where there was no change of executive power after the conflict ended, routinised subnational elections have not been implemented. The identified causal mechanism is that, for the new governments in the first two cases, subnational elections served as opportunities to mobilise party support and to consolidate control by sidelining local elites aligned with the previous regime.

The degree to which citizens perceive democratic political institutions as trustworthy indicates how well these institutions translate the citizenry's interests into public policy and how effective and accountable they are seen to be. Low levels of public confidence in political institutions are an indicator of various political problems and are likely to raise concerns over democratic governance. Recent findings that trust in major political institutions has fallen over the last quarter of a century in many democracies have led scholars to examine individual and institutional factors associated with political confidence. Aiming to contribute to this burgeoning literature, this study investigates the impact of semi-presidentialism on public confidence in two major political institutions: the government and parliament. Testing our arguments in 29 democracies through a multilevel analysis, we have found that, compared to presidential and parliamentary systems, semi-presidentialism often generates dual-legitimacy problems, thereby reducing confidence in both government and parliament.

Since 1979, one in every six South American presidents has failed to complete his constitutional term. These 'presidential failures' occur when elected presidents are forced out of office but without compromising the democratic order. This article seeks to discover the factors that underlie presidential failures through a survival analysis of 65 South American presidencies between 1979 and 2012. We argue that 'democratic stock', assessed by taking a historical perspective on democracy, significantly affects presidential survival, a finding which has not been observed in previous studies. It is found that partisan support and democratic stock reduce the hazard of presidential failure. Surprisingly, inflation, executive–legislative power imbalances, party system fragmentation and presidential scandals have no significant effects. These findings offer new evidence for the 'institutions vs. street' debate by showing that, when institutional variables are accounted for, the effect of social mobilisations significantly weakens.

New indices measuring the quality of democracy constitute a significant innovation in comparative political science. They might, however, provide a biased perspective because they largely focus on macro-level criteria. Thus, the question is whether the measurement of the quality of democracy can be improved by complementing the evaluations of these indices with assessments based on individual-level survey data. Using data from 20 established democracies in the European Social Survey 2012 and the Democracy Barometer, we compare the understandings and evaluations of the quality of democracy underlying these two measurement approaches. We demonstrate that while the results coincide to a certain extent, individual-level data provide an important complementary perspective that adds to the validity of the measurement of the quality of democracy.

Over the last several decades, elections and parties have become common features of most authoritarian regimes. While recent research on hybrid regimes has often focused on how dictators use these nominally democratic institutions to maintain their non-democratic rule, there is reason to suspect that electoral authoritarianism may pose particular threats to a regime's stability. Theories of collective behaviour suggest that electoral authoritarian regimes might face higher levels of anti-regime mobilization since parties and elections can help regime opponents overcome collective action problems and coordinate their efforts to challenge incumbents. An analysis of 136 authoritarian regimes over the last several decades indicates that regimes that hold nominally competitive elections are characterized by higher levels of political unrest than those with no elections. Furthermore, election years serve as a focal point for mobilizing anti-regime activity. These findings imply that authoritarian rulers face a trade-off when instituting a system of regular elections; while legislatures, parties and elections provide numerous benefits to incumbents, they also increase the frequency of anti-regime protests and other disruptive, mass political action.

What are the main reasons behind the regulation of political parties by contemporary constitutional practices? This article presents a framework for analysis which identifies types of justifications and actors involved in the process of regulation and their further influence on the outcomes of constitutionalisation. The empirical focus is on the revelatory case of Luxembourg, which amended the constitution for the sole reason of giving parties constitutional status. The analysis suggests that the constitutional regulation of political parties depends on their current interests and power status. Additionally, the paper draws attention to the involvement of external actors and to the changing nature of contemporary constitutionalism.

Performance voting studies implicitly assume that voters know who the government is, and can thus judge office-holders retrospectively. Scholars have recently addressed the issue in a majoritarian electoral context. This study expands into looking at (1) knowledge of the government in a multiparty setting by (2) focusing on the sociodemographic determinants of that knowledge. Using a 2008 survey data from Finland, the study finds that ignorance of government composition is more widespread in a proportional electoral system with a coalition government. Only 38% of the respondents correctly identified the government. Those on the political left, and hence in parliamentary opposition, men, over 45 years old and those with a high socioeconomic status were more likely to correctly identify the government. The results suggest that most voters do not know what they need to know in order to vote retrospectively. The implications for government accountability are discussed.

Do policymakers under financial and political distress make undesirable policy choices? This paper attempts to answer this question by studying the relationship between democratization and currency devaluation under speculative pressures. The central argument is that young democracies exhibit relatively high probabilities of succumbing to speculative attacks, as the political cost of economic adjustment needed for defense is relatively high for these nascent regimes. The paper further contends that this relationship is stronger when the regime can mobilize fewer resources to defend their currencies. To test these arguments, this paper uses monthly data for 117 countries from 1975 to 2008. The results from statistical analysis provide corroborative evidence for these arguments.