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A review essay on a book by Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999). The reviewer attacks Sen's "pragmatic neoliberalism" on the grounds that it offers false promises of personal liberty to low-income people. By equating economic development with expanded personal freedom, Sen reinforces the World Bank's development model & the "Third Way" doctrine, in which the author finds significant shortcomings. He specifically rejects (1) the argument that market exchange is a natural feature of all human societies; (2) Sen's concept of democracy & its ability to survive in a global market economy; & (3) Sen's vision of "reasoned social progress," which redefines the neoclassical rational choice theory & disregards the moral foundations of Western capitalism. J. R. Callahan

Credit is an important instrument of acquiring command over
the use of working capital, fixed capital and consumption goods. In the
wake of Green Revolution, land and labour have receded into the
background as predominant factors of growth. Use of capital and adoption
of modern techniques of production which have become major sources of
growth of agricultural output necessitate access to credit markets for
financing their use. Institutional sources of credit have become quite
significant during the last few years. The rapid expansion of credit
from institutional sources can be seen from various indicators. The
total disbursement of agricultural loans has gone up from Rs. 306.75
million in 1972-73 to Rs. 5,102.14 million in 1981-82. On a per acre
basis, the loans increased from Rs. 7.33 in 1972-73 to Rs. 106.83 in
1981-82. In this perspective, the disparities in income and wealth in
rural areas would crucially depend on the distribution of capital among
farms of different sizes and occupational groups. Neglecting equitable
distribution of credit as a policy instrument for rural income
redistribution may be a serious omission by the policy makers interested
in an improvement of rural equity.

Leadership development theory and practice is increasingly turning its gaze on identity as a primary focus for development efforts. Most of this literature focuses on how the identities of participants are strengthened, repaired and evolved. This article focuses on identity work practices that are underdeveloped in the literature: the deconstruction, unravelling and letting go that can be experienced when working upon one's self. We group these experiences, among others, under the conceptual term 'identity undoing' and, based on findings from an 18-month ethnographic study of a leadership development program, we offer five manifestations of how it can be experienced. Through foregrounding the undoing of identity, we are able to look more closely at how power relations shape the leadership development experience. In order to raise questions and propositions for leadership and its development we use a micro-sociological and interactionist approach to explore the interplay between identity and power.

The crises of the past few years have significantly affected the volumes of official development assistance (ODA) – also known as aid – provided by traditional donors. 2023 marked the fifth consecutive year for increased ODA allocations globally: total volumes reached 223.7 billion US dollars, a significant increase from the 160 billion US dollars provided in 2019. The succession of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and, most recently, the flare-up of the Israel-Palestine conflict contributed to such increase.
Absolute volumes however position members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), that is, traditional donors, still far away from the United Nations target of allocating 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) to ODA – in 2023, the OECD average hovered around 0.37 per cent.[1] Although this percentage is the highest in 55 years,[2] the need for concessional finance for developing countries has arguably never been more urgent. The challenges brought about by an ever-worsening climate crisis, coupled with long-standing issues such as poverty and poor health are enough to justify increased ODA, according to practitioners.[3]
These figures are usually (and rightly) discussed from such outward impact perspective – how will a less generous donor affect the beneficiaries whose livelihoods its ODA supports? The input dimension, that is, whether these policies align with a country's public sentiment on ODA, is however relatively less explored. ODA is public funding, so it might be legitimate to ask: where does public opinion stand on aid, and what could this possibly mean for development policy and practice?Spending where the mind is?
Let's zoom in on five traditional donor countries where public opinion surveys on development engagement were carried out in recent years – the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the United States and Italy.[4] These countries were among the top ten largest ODA providers in 2023 in absolute terms.[5]
In the surveys, though to different extents, economic crises and climate change were mentioned among the top three most pressing issues in all the five surveyed countries, as illustrated in Figure 1. Only UK respondents mentioned inequality between the rich and the poor among their top concerns, although this might refer both to global inequalities and inequalities within UK society. The issue of education, healthcare, clean water and hunger in developing countries was generally less selected by respondents – 31 per cent of the sample in France, 28 per cent in the US, 18 per cent in Germany, 25 per cent in the UK, and 20 per cent in Italy.[6] On the other hand, war, conflict and terrorism were very much on people's minds, the continued war in Ukraine being a potential explanation for this.[7]

Figure 1 | Top three main concerns in selected countries



Note: A line was added in this and subsequent figures reporting all country data to distinguish between Italy's and other countries' data, due to the different data collection and reporting methodologies mentioned above.Source: Author's elaboration on LAPS and IAI, Italians and Development Cooperation in 2023, cit.; Paolo Morini, DEL Dashboards, cit.

Interestingly, while ODA for Ukraine overall increased by 9 per cent in 2023, totalling 20 billion US dollars, only two of the five countries followed this upward trend in funding. Germany's and the US's ODA to Ukraine increased by 0.8 per cent and 2.7 per cent respectively. France, Italy and the UK, instead, allocated around 1 to 2 per cent less ODA to Ukraine in 2023[8] – although other, non-ODA type of aid (for example, military) was also provided to Ukraine by these countries.Decreasing aid against public support for it
In terms of the actual level of ODA provided in 2023, the fact that economic crises were indicated as a top concern in all five countries might help to understand why reaching the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI goal remains so elusive. Governments continue to face a challenging macroeconomic environment, especially in Europe, and need to balance domestic demands with international commitments. The Italian government, for example, made this point very clear when discussing the 2023 budget and related ODA allocations.[9] This may explain the -5.8 per cent and -15.5 per cent in Germany's and Italy's 2023 ODA, respectively, driven mostly by a drop in bilateral loans.[10] Similarly, France's ODA recorded a -11 per cent. By contrast, the UK and the US increased their 2023 ODA spending by 12.1 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively.[11]
From the public opinion's perspective, however, while economic crises were high on respondents' minds and lowest-income countries' development was less of a concern, the majority of respondents in all five countries expressed support for either stable or even increased levels of ODA spending. In Italy, 41 per cent of respondents were in favour of increased ODA, and 42 per cent supported constant levels. In Germany, 55 per cent supported either an increase or stable spending; this figure was 60 per cent in France, 56 per cent in the US, and 51 per cent in the UK. The 2023 German, French and Italian cuts therefore represent the largest discrepancy between policymaking and public sentiment, even though the policy decisions behind them likely share the same preoccupation with domestic economic woes as the public's.Effective ODA channels
As far as aid channels are concerned, respondents in the five analysed countries were asked to indicate the impact that certain development actors have on poverty reduction. As Figure 2 illustrates, individual actions were deemed the least impactful by all respondents; on the other hand, with the exception of the US, international organisations were considered to have the highest potential for poverty reduction. Governments, instead, came fourth on the impact scale, following the private sector and civil society organisations.

Figure 2 | Percentage of respondents who attributed high potential impact for poverty reduction to these development actors



Source: Author's elaboration on LAPS and IAI, Italians and Development Cooperation in 2023, cit.; Paolo Morini, DEL Dashboards, cit.

This is another area where policymaking and public opinion seem to differ. While international organisations are perceived as the most impactful, in 2023 the amount of aid that was channelled through them (multilateral ODA) was significantly lower than the aid directly provided by governments to partners (bilateral ODA). Figure 3 illustrates these proportions in the five analysed countries. With the exception of Italy,[12] bilateral ODA was higher than multilateral ODA. Therefore, there seems to be a disconnect between what people think and what policymakers decide.

Figure 3 | Amounts of ODA provided through multilateral and bilateral channels (million US dollars)



Author's elaboration on OECD, ODA in 2023 Preliminary Data, v2, 12 April 2024, https://webfs.oecd.org/oda/DataCollection/Resources/2023-preliminary-dat....

It is however worth noting that for US citizens, the private sector is more impactful than international organisations and governments. Private finance is not always reflected by ODA data, making it difficult to determine whether public opinion and traditional donor's finance is aligned in this regard. Nevertheless, looking at the most recent data for private flow disbursements, the US ranked first among the five analysed countries for amount of private finance provided to developing countries in 2022 – around 114.5 billion US dollars. Germany, where the private sector is considered as impactful as international organisations, came in second with 18 billion US dollars. France followed with 7 billion US dollars, while Italy, where business was considered the fourth most impactful, provided only 400 million US dollars. No data were available for the UK.[13] Although private financial flows are not necessarily a reflection of policy decisions, their amount, which at times is even higher than ODA, seems to partially reflect the public sentiment.Inputs for G7 development policy action
ODA allocations are a national policy decision, and are not usually discussed in the G7 context beyond the renewed commitment to reach the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI target.[14] Nevertheless, 76 per cent of ODA was provided by G7 donors in 2023; their collective decisions therefore significantly affect total aid flows. Based on the findings of the public opinion surveys conducted in Italy, France, Germany, the UK and the US, continued action to address ongoing conflicts is necessary, given the high levels of concern with wars in the public. Addressing the climate crisis is equally important; while it is not yet known how much funding went to this budget line in 2023, it is crucial that G7 countries continue being committed to decreasing emissions and facilitating adaptation, both domestically and internationally through climate finance.
More generally, while policymakers continue to face domestic economic challenges that reduce the likelihood of increasing aid budgets in the near future, the public support for stable or increased levels of ODA should be kept in mind. Thus, striving for the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI goal remains a necessary pursuit.
As far as aid channels are concerned, international organisations are regarded by citizens as the most impactful. G7 governments could rebalance the proportion of bilateral versus multilateral ODA accordingly, increasing the share of the latter. Furthermore, the private sector could also be more greatly leveraged as a tool for poverty reduction. Joint commitments to strengthen the adoption of instruments to this end will be necessary to close the global income, infrastructure, energy and climate preparedness gaps that persist.Irene Paviotti is a former Junior Researcher in the Multilateralism and Global Governance programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] OECD, International Aid Rises in 2023 with Increased Support to Ukraine and Humanitarian Needs, 11 April 2024, https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/international-aid-rises-in-2023-with-increased-support-to-ukraine-and-humanitarian-needs.htm; OECD on Development, "Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2023, by Members of the Development Assistance Committee (Preliminary Data)", in ODA in 2023 - Preliminary Figures, 16 April 2024, https://public.flourish.studio/story/2315218.[2] 1969 was last year the OECD average ODA/GNI percentage was 0.37 per cent. OECD on Development, "Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Historical Perspective: 1960-2023", in ODA in 2023 - Preliminary Figures, 16 April 2024, https://public.flourish.studio/story/2315218.[3] Concord Europe, ODA … Missing the Mark (Again): Preliminary 2023 Figures Show EU Aid Keeps Failing Human Development and Equality, 12 April 2024, https://wp.me/p76mJt-7iV.[4] Public engagement on development issues was investigated across the UK, Germany, France and the US through a questionnaire developed by Development Engagement Lab (DEL). In the context of the project "A new agenda for development: the role of development cooperation in the Italian G7 Presidency", IAI adapted its own questionnaire to align it with DEL's. Data illustrated here refers to the October 2023 survey round for the UK, Germany, France and the US, and to the September 2023 IAI survey for Italy. Please note that while the questions asked were comparable, sample size differed between DEL and IAI's surveys (6,000 < n < 8,000 in DEL's surveys, versus n=1,026 in IAI's), and responses were represented in slightly different ways. The results are therefore described here at a face value, and these methodological differences should be kept in mind before making any direct comparison.[5] The United States was the largest donor (66 billion US dollars), followed by Germany (36 billion). The United Kingdom came in fifth with 19 billion US dollars, followed by France (15 billion). Italy ranked ninth with 6 billion US dollars. Source: OECD on Development, "Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2023, by Members of the Development Assistance Committee (Preliminary Data)", cit.[6] For the full set of data see LAPS and IAI, Italians and Development Cooperation in 2023, Rome, IAI, December 2023, https://www.iai.it/en/node/17888; Paolo Morini, DEL France Dashboard October 2023, London, DEL, 2023, https://developmentcompass.org/publications/briefs-and-reports/france-dashboard-october-2023; Paolo Morini, DEL United States Dashboard October 2023, London, DEL, 2023, https://developmentcompass.org/publications/briefs-and-reports/united-states-dashboard-october-2023; Paolo Morini, DEL Germany Dashboard October 2023, London, DEL, 2023, https://developmentcompass.org/publications/briefs-and-reports/germany-dashboard-october-2023; Paolo Morini, DEL Great Britain Dashboard October 2023, London, DEL, 2023, https://developmentcompass.org/publications/briefs-and-reports/great-britain-dashboard-october-2023.[7] The surveys were conducted before the flare-up in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[8] OECD, ODA Levels in 2023 – Preliminary Data. Detailed Summary Note, 11 April 2024, https://www.oecd.org/dac/ODA-summary-2023.pdf.[9] Italian Chamber of Deputies, Audizione del Ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale, On. Antonio Tajani, sulle linee programmatiche del suo Dicastero, 13 December 2022, http://documenti.camera.it/leg19/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/pdf/03c03/audiz2/audizione/2022/12/13/leg.19.stencomm.data20221213.U1.com03c03.audiz2.audizione.0001.pdf.[10] Despite these cuts, Germany was the only country of the five analysed here to reach the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI goal in 2023. See OECD on Development, "Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2023, by Members of the Development Assistance Committee (Preliminary Data)", cit.[11] OECD, ODA Levels in 2023 – Preliminary Data. Detailed Summary Note, cit.[12] This unequal distribution between bilateral and multilateral ODA has long been lamented by practitioners as a missed opportunity to showcase the country's active role in development cooperation. See Openpolis, La cooperazione allo sviluppo nella legge di bilancio, intervista a Ivana Borsotto, 20 January 2023, https://www.openpolis.it/la-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo-nella-legge-di-bilancio-intervista-a-ivana-borsotto.[13] OECD QWIDS: Private Flows (Disbursements) in 2022: France, Germany, Italy, UK and US, https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=1&y=6&f=4:3,2:1,3:51,5:3,7:1&q=4:3+2:1+3:51+5:3+7:1+1:9,10,13,23,24+6:2022. For a definition of private flows, see OECD website: DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm.[14] G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué, 20 May 2023, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/230520-communique.html.

Global power shifts are altering the development landscape, necessitating a parallel shift from a development aid focus to a global development policy that addresses priorities linked to global public goods. The European Union has the funds, expertise and experience to drive this initiative, but first its member countries need to agree on concrete goals and implement a common strategy for realizing them. Public diplomacy regarding EU development policy needs improvement. The EU and its members must convey to the public that global development is a long-haul process that does not immediately produce measurable results. The EU must also convey that the short-term costs will be outweighed by the longer-term benefits of equitable GPG provision.

This article develops a globalization framework and a model of transnational processes for analysing social change and development, and then applies the model to Central America. The analysis emphasizes determinacy, in the last instance, of social forces in historic developmental outcomes, and documents how social forces in struggles in an emergent transnational environment have shaped Central America's changing profile within the global economy and society. Revolutionary movements, a new class structure, US geo‐political considerations, and the internationalization of East Asian economies, have all contributed to a new model of development; from the 1960s into the 1990s the national model of development is being replaced by a transnational model. Maquiladora garment production, tourism, non‐traditional agricultural exports, and remittances from emigrant workers are coming to eclipse traditional agro‐exports as the most dynamic economic sectors linking the region to globalized circuits of production and distribution. The article also examines Central American migration to the US and gender dimensions of the new transnational model of development.

The paper analyses the official development assistance provided by France to African countries within 2001—2012. The term official development assistance is understood as financial flows directed by the institutions of donor countries to a certain group of countries and multilateral institutions in order to support the progress and prosperity of developing countries. The aim of the study is to verify whether the criteria for granting financial support declared by the donors (in here: France) and determined by the Millennium Development Goals (defined by the UN General Assembly in 2000), are covered by actual financial flows.
Data concerning the volume of the development assistance within 2001—2012 were analysed in the following subgroups of countries: the ones which were and were not historical colonies as well as countries with and without natural resources. For each subgroup, a panel model with fixed effects was estimated. It was stated that although mainly the development issues and anti-poverty campaign are postulated by the French foreign policy, the recipients structure of development assistance provided by France is largely dependent on the common colonial past, energy sources potential (oil, gas, uranium), migration level as well as bilateral trade exchange.

This report reviews the most recent developments concerning legislative proposals to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.

Intro -- Foreword -- Contents -- Contributors -- Sport, Development, and International Community -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Sport Development -- 3 Sport and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) -- 4 Sport for Development Goals and International Community -- 5 United Nations -- 6 Commonwealth -- 7 International Olympic Committee -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Part I: International and Multicultural Perspectives -- Sport Development and Development of Sport: Shifting Gears and Objectives Over Two Decades -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The UN Initiative on SDP and Its Development -- 3 The Change of Orientation of SDP and the Increasing Attention to Human Rights and Good Governance in Sport: The Importance o... -- 4 SDP, the Independence of Sport and Human Rights -- 4.1 The Independence of Sport -- 4.2 The Growing Importance of Athletes´ Rights -- 5 New Stakeholders Focusing on Remedies -- 6 Commitment and Capacity of Sport Institutions -- 7 Safety as a Fundamental Right during the Pandemic and Beyond -- 8 The Call from Society -- 9 Conclusions -- 10 The First Area of Concentration Is Capacity -- 11 The Second Area of Concentration Is Measuring the Social and Economic Impact of Sport Based on Evidence -- 12 The Third Area of Concentration Is the Use of Varied Existing Platforms Having a Common Interest to Advance Reforms in Sport -- References -- Proposal of Milestones to Map and Understand the Uses of Sport for Development and Peace -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Model for Mapping and Understanding SDP Uses -- 2.1 Axiology -- 2.2 Purpose -- 2.3 Objective -- 3 Identified Uses of Sport ``FOR´´ -- 3.1 Sport for Health (SDG3) -- 3.2 Sport for Education (SDG4) -- 3.3 Sport for Gender Equality Work (SDG5) -- 3.4 Sport for Peace (SDG16) -- 3.5 Sport to Respect Human Rights (SDG16) -- 3.6 Sport for the Support of Employability and Decent Work (SDG8).

First published in 1987, Siberia examines the developments in the different sectors of Siberian economy and discusses the role of this vast and little-known region in the Soviet Union's overall economic and defence strategy. It surveys historical developments and the geography of the region and focuses on the key problem areas such as manpower shortage, the difficulties involved in exploiting the territory's natural resources, internal communications - including the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway in the Far East- and considers Siberia's place in the context of international relations and the world economy. This book is a must read for scholars of Russian history, Russian geopolitics, European politics, international relations and European history.

Intro -- Contents -- About the Editors -- Social Behavior of Earthworms in the Context of Their Use in Bioremediation -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Earthworms as "Soil Engineers" and Processors of Waste Biomass in Nature -- 1.2 Harnessing of Earthworms for Ecorestoration and Biowaste Management -- 1.3 Importance of Understanding Earthworm's Sociobiology in the Context of Their Utilization -- 2 Sociobiology: A Brief Overview -- 3 Sociobiology of Earthworms -- 3.1 General -- 3.2 Aggregation of Earthworms-A Key Factor for Social Organization -- 3.3 Feeding Behavior of Earthworm -- 3.4 Mating in Earthworms and Sexual Selection -- 3.5 Migration and Invasion -- 3.6 Earthworms as Biomarkers -- 4 Summary and Conclusion -- References -- Vermiwash: An Organic Fertilizer of Great Potential -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Presently Available Methods of VW Preparation -- 2.1 Conventional Method -- 2.2 Heat-Stress Method -- 2.3 Cold-Stress Method -- 2.4 Soaking Method -- 3 Comparison Between VW and Vermicompost Tea (VCT) -- 4 Vermiwash-A Potential Organic Fertilizer -- 4.1 Seed Germination -- 4.2 Plant Growth -- 4.3 Yield and Productivity -- 4.4 Nutritional Content -- 5 VW in Suppression of Pests -- 6 Advantages and Disadvantages of VW, VCT and VC -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- A Study on Safety and Operational Procedures for Filling of Cylinders in an LPG Bottling Plant as Per OISD-144 -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Literature Review -- 3 LPG Filling Process -- 3.1 Bottling Operations -- 3.2 Cylinder Filling Machines -- 4 Fire Fighting Systems -- 4.1 Criteria for Fire Fighting System -- 4.2 Safety Equipment System Components -- 5 Results and Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Evaluating Probabilistic Chances of Overpressure-Induced Mechanical Explosion in Fixed Bed Reactor: A Case Study of Hydrogenation of Heavy Base Oils Using Fault Tree and Bayesian Network.