Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe EU has increasingly turned to PTAs (Preferential Trade Agreements) to spread environmental norms internationally. We argue that the rationale for this strategy is to be found in the tensions between the rigidity of the domestic dynamics of positive integration in the EU and the increased bindingness of WTO negative integration commitments. Consensual decision‐making procedures in the EU both drive the stringency of environmental regulation and make it resistant to change. When such environmental standards are challenged in the WTO, incentives arise for the EU to push for international environmental rules that can grant immunity from WTO legal challenges. When changing WTO rules is not an option, PTAs become a valid alternative. We illustrate the plausibility of our argument through an in‐depth case study of the EU's attempt to include provisions defining environmental sustainability criteria for the production of biofuels in the ongoing negotiations for a PTA with Malaysia.

Despite the pervasive rhetoric of transparency in the EU, the openness of the Court of Justice has received little attention. Openness consists of various forms of active cooperation and communication between the EU institutions and the public. While the Court has consistently guaranteed the principles of transparency of judicial proceedings and publicity of trial vis-à-vis the parties (stemming from Art. 6 ECHR), it has not provided a similar level of "openness" beyond this. By establishing that openness applies essentially to the work of the executive and legislative, the Court emphasized the specificity of its judicial task. This article examines to what extent the public is informed or may obtain information concerning the activity of the Court, paying due regard to the distinction made in Article 15 TFEU between administrative and judicial tasks. It argues that Article 15(1) requires rendering all the activities of the Court more open.

On 23 July 2014, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed the "Money Market Reform: Amendments to Form PF ," designed to prevent investor runs on money market mutual funds such as those experienced in institutional prime funds following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The present article evaluates the reform choices in the U.S. and draws conclusions for the proposed EU regulation of money market funds.