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An annual collection of the best research on European and global themes, the Annual of European and Global Studies publishes issues with a specific focus, each addressing critical developments and controversies in the field.

This lecture focuses on the costs of public debt when safe interest rates are low. I develop four main arguments. First, I show that the current US situation, in which safe interest rates are expected to remain below growth rates for a long time, is more the historical norm than the exception. If the future is like the past, this implies that debt rollovers, that is the issuance of debt without a later increase in taxes, may well be feasible. Put bluntly, public debt may have no fiscal cost. Second, even in the absence of fiscal costs, public debt reduces capital accumulation, and may therefore have welfare costs. I show that welfare costs may be smaller than typically assumed. The reason is that the safe rate is the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital. If it is lower than the growth rate, it indicates that the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital is in fact low. The average risky rate however also plays a role. I show how both the average risky rate and the average safe rate determine welfare outcomes. Third, I look at the evidence on the average risky rate, i.e., the average marginal product of capital. While the measured rate of earnings has been and is still quite high, the evidence from asset markets suggests that the marginal product of capital may be lower, with the difference reflecting either mismeasurement of capital or rents. This matters for debt: the lower the marginal product, the lower the welfare cost of debt. Fourth, I discuss a number of arguments against high public debt, and in particular the existence of multiple equilibria where investors believe debt to be risky and, by requiring a risk premium, increase the fiscal burden and make debt effectively more risky. This is a very relevant argument, but it does not have straightforward implications for the appropriate level of debt. My purpose in the lecture is not to argue for more public debt, especially in the current political environment. It is to have a richer discussion of the costs of debt and of fiscal policy than is currently the case. (JEL E22, E23, E43, E62, H63)

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Part of a CIHM set. For individual microfiches in this set see CIHM microfiche nos. 05417-05432. ; Original issued in series: Dominion election : campaign of 1886. Hon. Edward Blake's speeches ; series 1, no. 7 ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

Who are the dominant owners of US public debt? Is it widely held, or concentrated in the hands of a few? Does ownership of public debt give these bondholders power over our government? What do we make of the fact that foreign-owned debt has ballooned to nearly 50 percent today? Until now, we have not had any satisfactory answers to these questions. Public Debt, Inequality, and Power is the first comprehensive historical analysis of public debt ownership in the United States. It reveals that ownership of federal bonds has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 1 percent over the past three decades. Based on extensive and original research, Public Debt, Inequality, and Power will shock and enlighten.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze two out of three main types of Hidden Public Debt, Commercial Debt and Public Private Partnerships Financing Needs, across 11 European Countries between 2000-2012. When faced with the need to raise taxes or reduce spending, governments have for some time turned to a third option by resorting to off book loans and liabilities that do not appear in public accounts. Hidden public debts are those state commitments and liabilities that, despite a lack of specific allocation or inclusion in forecasts and liabilities, are assumed by the government. Amongst the major results, this article concludes that countries with stronger economies, more transparency of government expenditures and relatively high tax rate stayed in- or moved to the bucket of relatively low debt levels, namely with hidden debt below 1% of GDP. Also, the level of hidden debt within the PIIGS is twice if what the rest of the sample has.

Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the inter-temporal pattern of tax rates-it reduces current rates and increases future rates. Accordingly, whether the share of the cost of a given public expenditure is reduced or increased by debt for a given individual depends on the time profile of that individual's income (tax base) vis-à-vis others' incomes. Therefore, given the age-profile of income in virtually all Western countries, individuals will tend to be better off under current taxes the younger they are. If (as most standard models of political economy assume) individuals vote according to their economic interests, and if they are tolerably well-informed, then the pattern of support for public debt will track age. And increases in the median age of the population will lead to larger public debt. In other words, public debt policy collapses to a kind of demographic politics. This explanation may, however, be sensitive to assumptions about motives for bequest. Specifically, if bequestors seek to leave positive bequests and are motivated exclusively by the lifetime consumption of their heirs (as well as themselves) then the aged may, under plausible assumptions about the age of their heirs, prefer current taxes over debt.

The slowness of the industrial recovery is gradually disclosing unmanageable situations in public finance. From the standpoint of public debt, countries engaged in the export of staples fall into three classes: (1) those where widespread default occurred in 1931 or 1932 on both public and private debt and where little or no resumption of debt service has occurred, such as most of the South American republics; (2) those where a critical position appeared early in the depression, followed by collective adjustment of internal debts and measures designed to maintain the level of prices, such as Australia and New Zealand; and (3) those where little or no public default or manipulation of debts, foreign exchange, or price levels has hitherto occurred, such as the Union of South Africa and Canada. Newfoundland occupies a curious position, more like that of European countries, having undergone a political as well as a financial reorganization. The Argentine occupies a position intermediate between groups (1) and (2).

Based on Austria's fiscal stance in 1995, we compute the generational accounts for currently living as well as future generations. The results reveal the existence of an enormous intergenerational imbalance in favor of currently living generations. Total public sector liabilities may be more than five times as high as the officially recorded level of public debt. Without any action, future generations would face life-time net taxes that are about 65 percent higher than the tax burden of a current newborn. If the government could fully and permanently retain the expenditure cutting and revenue raising effects of the 1996 fiscal consolidation package and the 1997 pension reform, then it might be able to significantly reduce the intergenerational liabilities. However, enacting both the recent tax reform 2000 and the reform of the family support scheme would increase again the fiscal imbalance and intergenerational inequity of fiscal policy in Austria.