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Liberale Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Grundrechteschutz zählen zu den Grundprinzipien der Europäischen Union. Diese sind insbesondere in Artikel 2 des Vertrages über die Europäische Union festgeschrieben. Der Fall Ungarn zeigt jedoch, wie schnell die Dekonsolidierung europäischer Demokratien vonstattengehen kann, wenn gewisse Einflüsse zusammenspielen. In Ungarn erlangte das Wahlbündnis Fidesz-KDNP bei den Wahlen 2010 eine Zweidrittelmehrheit im Parlament, mithilfe derer es Ungarns verfassungsstaatliches, politisches und soziales System fundamental umgestaltete. Darüber hinaus kündigte Ungarns Premierminister Victor Orbán an, einen illiberalen ungarischen Staat auf der Grundlage nationaler Interessen errichten zu wollen. Der Fall Ungarn zeigt auch die eingeschränkte Handlungsfähigkeit sowie den mangelnden Willen der EU, sich in die internen Angelegenheiten von Mitgliedsstaaten einzumischen, die die Grundprinzipien der EU verletzen. Sollte die EU illiberalen Entwicklungen in Mitgliedsstaaten keine klaren Grenzen setzen, so könnten Verstöße gegen die Rechtsstaatlichkeit zunehmen. Wenn sich Abschottung, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Rechtspopulismus in der EU weiter ausbreiten, und die EU keine nachhaltigen Lösungen für diese Probleme findet, könnte zudem der gesamte europäische Integrationsprozess in Frage gestellt wird. Der Fall Ungarn kann also als Test betrachtet werden, anhand dessen die EU zeigen kann und muss, dass sie fähig und gewillt ist, auf Verletzungen der eigenen Grundwerte angemessen zu reagieren. ; The European Union is founded on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as stipulated in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. However, the case of Hungary demonstrates how quickly the deconsolidation of European democracies can take place when certain influences converge. From the 2010 parliamentary elections onwards, Hungarys Fidesz-KDNP government has used its two-thirds majority in parliament to fundamentally transform the countrys constitutional, political and social system. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán even proclaimed that it is his intention to build an illiberal Hungarian state based on national interests. The case of Hungary also demonstrates the EUs limited will and capacity to intervene in the internal orders of member states that violate the EUs core principles. If the EU will not set clear limits to illiberal practices, other governments may step on the same path and rule of law violations may spread. When insularity, xenophobia and right-wing populism will gain further ground, and if the EU will not be able to come up with appropriate solutions for these pressing challenges, the entire process of European integration could be put into question. Hungary can therefore be seen as a test for the EU to prove that it is capable and willing to appropriately react to threats and breaches of its own founding values. ; Dominik Mayer, B.A. ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung des Verfassers/der Verfasserin ; Zusammenfassungen in Deutsch und Englisch ; Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Masterarbeit, 2016 ; (VLID)1664208

International audience ; La perspective des prochaines élections européennes nourrit deux approches différentes. D'un côté, pour certains observateurs ou acteurs politiques, à l'instar de la République en marche en France, un spectre hante l'Union européenne : celui du populisme. Tout doit être mis en œuvre pour éviter cette catastrophe qui se profile. Davantage, des comparaisons avec les années 30, plus que douteuses d'un point de vue historique, sont parfois mobilisées pour dramatiser l'enjeu présent.

International audience ; La perspective des prochaines élections européennes nourrit deux approches différentes. D'un côté, pour certains observateurs ou acteurs politiques, à l'instar de la République en marche en France, un spectre hante l'Union européenne : celui du populisme. Tout doit être mis en œuvre pour éviter cette catastrophe qui se profile. Davantage, des comparaisons avec les années 30, plus que douteuses d'un point de vue historique, sont parfois mobilisées pour dramatiser l'enjeu présent.

International audience ; La perspective des prochaines élections européennes nourrit deux approches différentes. D'un côté, pour certains observateurs ou acteurs politiques, à l'instar de la République en marche en France, un spectre hante l'Union européenne : celui du populisme. Tout doit être mis en œuvre pour éviter cette catastrophe qui se profile. Davantage, des comparaisons avec les années 30, plus que douteuses d'un point de vue historique, sont parfois mobilisées pour dramatiser l'enjeu présent.

Few would disagree that Western democracies are experiencing a crisis of representation. In the United States, gerrymandering and concentrated political geographies have placed the Congress and state legislatures in a stranglehold that is often at odds with public opinion. Campaign financing ensures that only the affluent have voice in legislation. Europeans, meanwhile, increasingly see the European Union as an anti-democratic body whose "diktats" have no basis in popular rule. The response, however, has not been an effective pursuit of better representation. In Good Government, Pierre Rosanvallon examines the long history of the alternative to which the public has gravitated: the empowered executive. Rosanvallon argues that, faced with everyday ineptitude in governance, people become attracted to strong leaders and bold executive action. If these fail, they too often want even stronger personal leadership. Whereas nineteenth-century liberals and reformers longed for parliamentary sovereignty, nowadays few contest the "imperial presidency." Rosanvallon traces this history from the Weimar Republic to Charles De Gaulle's "exceptional" presidency to the Bush-Cheney concentration of executive power. Europeans rebelling against the technocratic EU and Americans fed up with the "administrative state" have turned to charismatic figures, from Donald Trump to Viktor Orbán, who tout personal strength as their greatest asset. This is not just a right-wing phenomenon, though, as liberal contentment with Obama's drone war demonstrates. Rosanvallon makes clear that contemporary "presidentialism" may reflect the particular concerns of the moment, but its many precursors demonstrate that democracy has always struggled with tension between popular government and concentrated authority.--

The European migration crisis beginning in 2014 served as a turning point in Hungarian politics where immigration issues effectively altered the nation's security environment. The migratory routes as a pathway for illegal border crossings positioned Hungary on the frontline as a transit country for migrants seeking asylum in Western Europe. A critical analysis of Orbán's rhetoric and Hungary's behavior in the realm of immigration and counterterrorism (CT) policy during and after the immigration crisis is relevant in understanding the state's security environment. Anti-immigrant sentiments reflected in the population and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's rhetoric aims to tie refugee migration to terrorist acitvity. Migrants were targeted as a risk to the traditional European identity and survival of the state with a specific emphasis on Muslim migration from the Middle East and North Africa. This study seeks to understand Hungary's regional and global security role and how CT activity is used by the government to legitimize government actions, particularly on immigration via securitization theory from the Copenhagen School.Hungary has heightened its role on the international stage through transnational CT cooperation and capitalized on anti-immigrant sentiments through speech acts to further exercise its influence in border control and the international fight against global terrorism.By examining a total of 36 speeches presented by Orbán from 2015 to 2020, the study is able to examine how immigration issues were securitized to develop pathways for extraordinary actions and authoritarian reforms performed by securitizing actors.

First online: 06 February 2018 ; The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of constitutionalism towards a kind of 'populist, illiberal constitutionalism' introduced by Hungary's new constitution in 2011. The populism of FIDESZ was directed against all elites, including the ones that designed the 1989 constitutional system (in which FIDESZ also participated), claiming that it was time for a new revolution. This is why PM Viktor Orban characterized the results of the 2010 elections as a 'revolution of the ballot boxes'. His intention with this revolution was to eliminate all checks and balances, and even the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. His vision for a new constitutional order-one in which his political party occupies the centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end to debates over values-has now been entrenched in the new constitution. The paper argues that this current Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by FIDESZ' anti-pluralist nationalist populism, but is not necessarily based on a true commitment to expressing the will of the people via 'illiberal constitutionalism'. The populist government rather misuses the country's lack of constitutional culture. Adherence to constitutional patriotism would mean that FIDESZ would have to endorse what John Rawls once called 'constitutional essentials'. The core of this kind of constitutional patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal democratic norms and values. Instead, the current Hungarian constitutional system is confronted with unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that violates constitutional essentials in the name of 'national constitutional identity'.

The hopefulness that accompanied the establishment of the Republic of Hungary in 1989 was soon tempered by divided politics that seemed unable to address systemic economic woes facing the nation. Though the 1956 Revolution remains foundational, parts of the polity remain uneasy with the concept of the liberal state and instead hearken back to the Christian National politics of the interwar years to legitimize a vision of the Hungarian nation not dependent on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), let alone the European Union (EU) which Hungary joined in 2004. The promise of economic prosperity found in EU member states such as Austria remains elusive and many Hungarians yearn for the social security system of the 1970's communist era while at the same time subscribing to a resurrection of the strong state. The populist rhetoric of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán draws sharp contrast between the EU's dream of a Europe without Borders and the localized/nativist vision of Hungarian national identity that resonates with a large part of the polity that provided his FIDESZ (Young Democrats)/KDNP (Christian Democrats) coalition with parliamentary majorities in 2010 and 2014. Further to the right, Jobbik (the better ones) excoriates both gypsies and Jews for undermining the state. The current refugee crisis has been cast by Orbán as an Islamic tide that will reconfigure Europe into bloodless and docile societies. Orbán's decision to build a fence in summer 2015 to keep out refugees seems prescient to those subscribing to these nativist beliefs. The State forwards a public presentation of history that absolves the interwar regime of the Lord Protector Miklós Horthy, 1920-1944 of alliance with the Axis and genocide. Though there remains substantial opposition to current nationalist sentiment, the prospects for the survival of liberalism seem bleak without a unified opposition. Interestingly, there remains an embedded dissonance in History curriculum and texts that challenges the State's interpretation of History. This article studies the state's public presentation of history in contrast to that found in curriculum and textbooks to understand the contrast between Orbán's stated aim to create an illiberal state and stories found in texts that undergird the dream of a liberal republic found in the failed revolutions of 1848 and 1956. Disturbingly, previous regimes that extoled the strong state have imaginatively rearranged history so that the two strains of political desire antithetical to each other are reconciled. How does the Hungarian case help us better understand the resurrection of strong state politics that seem to have infiltrated the global stage?

Review of research -- Arrested development : globalization and the growth of radical populism and unreason : the American case in comparative perspective / David H. Kamens -- The northern exception : populism in Canada in the age of Trump, Brexit and COVID-19 / Michael Adams -- Defining new populisms : causes, characteristics and trajectories. Australia and beyond / Stephen Alomes -- Matteo Salvini -- a political chameleon and a populist par excellence? / Liane Ströbel -- Populist discourses in Italy : the case of immigration / Stella Gianfreda -- The Finns Party : from catch-all populism to radical anti-immigration discourse / Urpo Kovala, Tuija Saresma, and Tuula Vaarakallio -- "i respectant la voluntat dels ciutadans" : populism in the Catalan crisis / Sandra Issel-Dombert -- Moderating rhetorics of populism : moderators' encounters with antagonistic rhetoric in the 2020 U.S. Presidential and vice-presidential debates / Jennifer M. Love -- The French discourse of populism since 2015 : a corpus-based study of the uses of the terms populisme(s)/populiste(s) in Le Monde and Le Figaro from 2015 to 2018 / Thea Göhring -- Discursive strategies on non-European immigration to Spain in the Spanish press : an analysis of the newspapers El País and El Mundo / Alicia Rodríguez López -- Tremendously metaphorical : a rhetorical analysis of Trump's crooked Hillary image macro / Eleni Blum -- Populism on paper : is Viktor Orbán a strong leader in Hungary's HVG magazine? / Lilla Petronella Szabó and Ágnes Virág -- The role of the media in an extremely polarized society : the case of Venezuelan populism / Virpi I. Salojärvi -- Nicolás Maduro : populist rhetoric without populist leadership / Nelly Margarita Arenas -- Challenging populism through literature : anti-populist discourses in Behrouz Boochani, Valeria Luiselli, and Suketu Mehta / Ludwig Deringer -- Conclusion : summary of results and needed research / Ludwig Deringer.

How a new breed of dictators holds power by manipulating information and faking democracyHitler, Stalin, and Mao ruled through violence, fear, and ideology. But in recent decades a new breed of media-savvy strongmen has been redesigning authoritarian rule for a more sophisticated, globally connected world. In place of overt, mass repression, rulers such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Viktor Orbán control their citizens by distorting information and simulating democratic procedures. Like spin doctors in democracies, they spin the news to engineer support. Uncovering this new brand of authoritarianism, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman explain the rise of such "spin dictators," describing how they emerge and operate, the new threats they pose, and how democracies should respond.Spin Dictators traces how leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Peru's Alberto Fujimori pioneered less violent, more covert, and more effective methods of monopolizing power. They cultivated an image of competence, concealed censorship, and used democratic institutions to undermine democracy, all while increasing international engagement for financial and reputational benefits. The book reveals why most of today's authoritarians are spin dictators—and how they differ from the remaining "fear dictators" such as Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad, as well as from masters of high-tech repression like Xi Jinping.Offering incisive portraits of today's authoritarian leaders, Spin Dictators explains some of the great political puzzles of our time—from how dictators can survive in an age of growing modernity to the disturbing convergence and mutual sympathy between dictators and populists like Donald Trump

The paper highlights development and some problematic issues of Ukraine's relations with the neighbouring European Union Member States - the Republic of Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic, that have been escalated and exploited from time to time by the Russian Federation. This situation poses a potential threat to Ukraine and international security in the Carpathian region and needs to be resolved as soon as possible. This also emphasizes the aggravation of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations after a conservative and essentially authoritarian government, headed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, had come into power in 2010. A perceptible increase in tension between the parties is related to Ukraine's 2017 Education Act and the situation of the Hungarian national minority in Transcarpathia. Additionally, the paper focuses on Ukrainian-Polish contradictions in issues of historical memory and problems of Ukrainian migrants in Poland, Ukrainian-Romanian territorial disputes and some problems of Ukrainian-Slovak relations, in particular regarding the "Rusyns question" and so on. The author stresses that Ukraine belongs geographically and politically to Central Europe, therefore the states of this region are its most obvious friends and partners, and the task of governmental, regional and public institutions, international organisations and regional groupings is to overcome existing conflict situations and problems in mutual relations by joint active and consistent efforts. The factor of European integration, economic cooperation and interdependence of neighbouring countries, security challenges in Europe from Russia's aggression and the latest threats in contemporary international relations are strong levers for this, as well as for deepening interstate partnership and neighbourly, mutually beneficial cooperation between peoples of the Carpathian region

If there's one theme in Washington this week, it's this: Ukraine needs more weapons, and it needs them now. Two top Biden administration officials told Congress Wednesday that, if new Ukraine funding isn't passed soon, Russia could win the war within months or even weeks."A sovereign and secure Ukraine is critical to global security," Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said during a meeting with European defense leaders earlier this week. "And we must not waver in our support for Ukraine." While European leaders are attempting to fill some gaps in Ukraine's stockpiles on a bilateral basis, there is little that can be done to bolster Kyiv's defenses and keep its economy afloat without U.S. help. Congressional talks have so far failed to produce a deal that would trade border security measures for increased aid, and it's looking increasingly likely that any future funding, if it is forthcoming, will narrowly focus on military aid at the expense of economic support.A failure to pass new economic aid would badly damage Ukraine's government, which currently relies on American and European cash to pay state employees and provide many essential services in the country.Making matters worse is the fact that the European Union — which has been far more generous with budgetary support than military aid — is facing its own internal struggle over future funding. As the EU considers a new, $54 billion aid package, all eyes are on Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has long been skeptical of support for Ukraine."It's difficult. I know Viktor Orban well," said Luxembourgeois Foreign Minister Xavier Bettel. "It won't be easy to convince him."There is, however, some hope that Orban will change his mind. The Hungarian leader has long opposed Ukraine's accession to the EU but was willing to sit out a vote on the question last month after the bloc freed roughly $11 billion in Hungarian funds that had been frozen due to alleged democratic backsliding. In other words, Orban may throw his support behind more aid for the right price.Ukraine also marked a consequential victory Wednesday when Slovakia's controversial prime minister announced that he would back new aid during a visit to Kyiv.But all of this uncertainty has left Ukraine in a difficult position. The blame game has already begun in anticipation of challenges on the battlefield, according to Politico. "If Russia wins the war against Ukraine, some officials in Kyiv are ready to pin the blame on the West," an anonymous Ukrainian military official told the outlet.If the tide starts to turn against Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky "will desperately look for options of whom to blame," the official continued. The shifting dynamics suggest that the potential for a negotiated peace — a reasonably probable possibility just a month or two ago — is quickly fading as Russian leaders see an opportunity to pursue their likely advantage on the battlefield.In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Russia President Vladimir Putin "may be willing to consider dropping an insistence on neutral status for Ukraine and even ultimately abandon opposition to eventual NATO membership" in exchange for keeping the Ukrainian territory Russia currently occupies, according to anonymous people close to the Kremlin who spoke with Bloomberg. The report says the proposal is part of Moscow's quiet signaling to Washington that it is open to talks to end the war, though U.S. officials deny any backchannel communications.— Russia's ambassador to Switzerland slammed the country's decision to host a pro-Ukraine peace conference without Russian participation, saying that Swiss actions have caused it to lose "its role as an impartial international mediator," according to Reuters. The Swiss talks will only include Kyiv's supporters and will be based on a 10-point Ukrainian plan that the Kremlin has rejected out of hand. The ambassador also reiterated Moscow's public demands for talks, which include an independent status for Ukraine and the protection of Russians and Russian speakers in the country.— Talks aimed at restarting the Black Sea grain deal have quietly begun, according to Ukraine's ambassador in Turkey, the country that held several previous rounds of negotiations on the issue, Reuters reports. Details on the new discussions are scarce, but the renewed interest in talks suggests that Ukraine's alternative shipping route, which hugs the coast of Romania, has not been as effective at boosting trade as was previously hoped. The news also points to Russia's increasing desperation to resume exports of fertilizers and fertilizer components, a key part of the original deal that Moscow abandoned due to alleged shortcomings in implementation.— Turkey's parliament formally approved Sweden's accession to NATO, marking a major step in Stockholm's so far arduous path to joining the bloc, according to the BBC. The Biden administration urged Congress to approve a sale of F-16s to Turkey shortly after the announcement, shedding light on what inducements helped Ankara come around.The final country that must sign off is now Hungary. While Budapest has yet to give a specific reason for slow-rolling the decision, some members of the ruling Fidesz party have said they oppose Sweden's accession due to its criticisms of alleged democratic backsliding in Hungary. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Orban said Wednesday that he "supports the NATO membership of Sweden" and will push parliament to move forward with ratification as soon as possible.— Russian officials threatened to seize as much as $280 billion in Western assets if the U.S. and Europe follow through on their proposal to give $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, according to Reuters. Cyprus and the Netherlands have the most to lose, according to Russian state media, while countries like France, Germany, Britain, Japan, and the U.S. would also have significant assets seized. Meanwhile, a bill that would allow the U.S. to seize Russian funds overwhelmingly passed a U.S. Senate committee Wednesday. Backers of the proposal expect that it will pass both chambers of Congress with significant bipartisan support.U.S. State Department news:In a Wednesday press conference, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel praised Turkey's approval of Sweden's accession to NATO and called on Hungary to follow suit. "We look forward to Hungary concluding their ratification process and the Alliance welcoming Sweden into NATO without further delay," Patel said.

A unique analysis that looks at the true motivation of Trump supporters.The Authoritarian Personality, which was published by Theordor Adorno and a set of colleagues in the 1950s, was the first broad-based empirical attempt to explain why certain individuals are attracted to the authoritarian, even fascist, leaders that dominated the political scene in the 1930s and 1940s. Today, the concept has been applied to leaders ranging from Trump to Viktor Orban to Rodrigo Duterte. But is it really accurate to label Trump supporters as authoritarians?In The Securitarian Personality, John R. Hibbing argues that an intense desire for authority is not central to those constituting Trump's base. Drawing from participant observation, focus groups, and especially an original, nationwide survey of the American public that included over 1,000 ardent Trump supporters, Hibbing demonstrates that what Trump's base really craves is actually a specific form of security. Trump supporters do not strive for security in the face of all threats, suchas climate change, Covid-19, and economic inequality, but rather only from those threats they perceive to be emanating from human outsiders, defined broadly to include welfare cheats, unpatriotic athletes, norm violators, non-English speakers, religious and racial minorities, and certainly people from othercountries. The central objective of these "securitarians" is to strive for protection for themselves, their families, and their dominant cultural group from these embodied outsider threats.A radical reinterpretation of the support for Trumpism, The Securitarian Personality not only provides insight into a political movement that many find baffling and frustrating, but offers a compelling thesis that all observers of American political behavior will have to contend with, even if they disagree with it