Search results

This interdisciplinary study provides an original account of the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to show how, why and with what consequences, twenty-first century wars became seen as policing wars. Holmqvist starts from the assumption that wars always reflect the societies that wage them and combines the analysis of western strategic thinking with a philosophical examination of the core ideas that structure the contemporary liberal imagination. She argues that the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterised by a widespread understanding of war as 'policing', that is, waged against opponents deemed 'criminal' rather than political, and directed at the creation and maintenance of a certain type of 'order'. Holmqvist turns to themes of social theory and philosophy to offer new perspectives on why the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were waged in the way they were, and why the fantasy of policing wars came to resonate so widely amongst policy makers and academics alike. This unique contribution to the study of war and international politics will appeal to scholars of the philosophy and sociology of war, military strategy and international relations.

The success rate of military intervention has traditionally been judged by its ability to end conflict and/or serve intervener security interests. However, contemporary military intervention in troubled or collapsing states is often intended not only to increase security but also to establish conditions in which political reform or reconstruction can proceed. Judging the success of intervention therefore means isolating and measuring its impact on internal change. Scholars and policymakers have staked many assumptions on the belief that the motivation and form of military intervention might improve conditions for peacebuilding over time. Among these are expectations that multilateral interventions undertaken for purposes of social reconstruction and reform might be the best hopes for security and long-term stability. The data tested here generally give reason for pause in such assumptions. Our findings only slightly support neoliberal arguments and assumptions about the superiority of multilateral or neutral interventions in promoting postintervention peace, reform, and stability. Rather, our findings indicate that regardless of type of intervener, target state governance, physical quality of life, and economic growth are not much impacted by intervention. Adapted from the source document.

The need for & value of a revised doctrine of international humanitarian intervention is examined. Though its opponents argue that such intervention is outlawed by the UN charter, contravenes international law, & is in conflict with principles of state sovereignty, it is argued that arguments have little factual basis, & ignore the world community's responsiblity of advancing human rights to all peoples. A fully articulated, new doctrine to address these concerns is needed. One approach would recast international legal principles so that the international community becomes the guardian of human rights around the world. The development of a Commonwealth of Humanity doctrine & reorganization of the UN is discussed. Adapted from the source document.

Internal conflict continues to be the most common form of organized violence, most often occurring in a so-called 'arc of instability' comprised of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The misery and death caused by these conflicts, with helpless civilians often victims, has resulted in states and coalitions of states intervening militarily to stop the bloodshed, giving rise to many difficult issues. When should states perform military intervention? How should it be conducted? Is intervention a tactic that can be executed exclusive of other considerations or must it be part of a wider strategy? What makes it a success? And when can occupying troops return home? Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century strives to answer these and other questions by comparing and contrasting both the theory and practice of military intervention. It thoroughly reviews the literature and derives a set of guidelines for initiating, conducting, and terminating this complex undertaking. It then evaluates the validity of these guidelines by analyzing the recent cases of Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. The volume concludes with lessons on the why, when, and how of conducting a military intervention and offers recommendations for Afghanistan and Iraq.

Abstract
This article addresses, from a sociological point of view, the involvement of the Portuguese armed forces in international peace operations. After reviewing some major sociological contributions for understanding change in military institutions and the development of international military missions, it concentrates on the Portuguese case, aiming at uncovering the place and meaning of peace operations for the Portuguese armed forces during the past two decades. After briefly recalling some facts and figures concerning the Portuguese participation in peace operations, it addresses the relevance of such involvement at different analytical levels, showing that peace operations have come to play a decisive role in the national defence political discourse, the organizational configuration of the Portuguese armed forces and the soldiers' professional identity. The last section consists of a short prospective exercise looking at possible implications of disengagement from international peace missions. The conclusion is that, considering the strategic, organizational and socio-psychological centrality of these missions, disengagement is likely to have important consequences in the overall strategic definition, purpose and identity of the Portuguese military, while entailing an additional cost: the possible loss of at least part of a recently reinforced legitimacy.

1. Sharing risks and costs of military alliance : burdens of peace and war -- 2. Case one: The multinational force in Lebanon, 1982-1984 : national collective action -- 3. Case two: The Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 : leadership and legitimacy -- 4. Case three: The Balkans : incubators of European insecurity -- 5. Case four: NATO and Afghanistan : coalition warfighting and stability operations in a new century -- 6. Case five: Nuclear abolition and arms reduction : stakes and risks for NATO -- 7. Conclusion.

Current research on motivational sources of military interventions in civilwars frequently assumes that states intervene due to direct interests in thecivil war country. However, this study argues that there exists a subset ofinterventions in which weaker powers intervene on behalf of interestswhich great powers hold vis-à-vis the civil war country. Using the logic ofprincipal-agent theory in combination with arms trade data allows one toidentify 14 civil wars which experienced the phenomenon of indirectmilitary interventions. This type of intervention features a weaker powerproviding troops for combat missions, whereas its major arms supplier isonly involved with indirect military support. The analysis is complementedwith two brief case studies on the Moroccan intervention in Zaire (1977) andthe Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic (2009). Both casestudies corroborate expectations as deduced from the proxy interventionframework.