Suchergebnisse

Do the national trade unions have a European future? Observers and protagonists concur in identifying three decisive obstacles on the road to Europeanisation of the trade union movement. Established positions in the national arenas are showing cracks; the structures for supranational action fall short of requirements; the convergence required for harmonisation of national systems is barely perceptible. However, the attempt to think through the question of Europeanisation of the trade unions would not be complete if it failed to incorporate an additional area of data concerned with the internal springs of trade union action. How do the trade unions gain their status as actors on the national and European stage? From where do they derive their capacity for action and adaptation? The article focuses upon the "representative capacity" of the trade unions and shows that their strategic capacity is tied up with the requirement that they be representative of their membership. While representativeness remains a perennial objective of which the trade unions cannot afford to lose sight, it flows into different and deeply ingrained channels in different countries. It is also important to stress the dialectical nature of the construction of representative capacity. The conquest of representativeness depends perhaps less on the determination to reconcile the different and sometimes contradictory interests expressed by workers than on the trade unions' capacity to forge and confirm new collective identities.

This article attempts to explain the variation in post-Maastricht elite attitudes toward the single currency in Western Europe. It concentrates on the British reluctance to join the single currency in the first round as well as the French and German continuing support for it. We argue, first, that explanations based solely on material conceptions of actors' interests — whether economic or geopolitical — are insufficient in explaining the variation in attitudes. There are as many good economic or geopolitical reasons in favour of the Euro as there are against it. In particular, perceived instrumental interests of actors as such do not explain the considerable variation in attitudes. Rather, we claim that actors' perception of their material and instrumental interests with regard to the Euro are deeply influenced by their visions of European political order. Second, the visions about European order which give political meaning to EMU, need to be understood in the framework of identity politics. Differences in the construction of collective elite identities pertaining to the nation-state and to Europe explain the controversies among the political elites in the three countries as well as the variation in attitudes. While the French and German political elites — from the centre-right to the centre-left — have incorporated `Europe' into their nationally defined collective identities, British policy-makers including New Labour remain hesitant. Third, on a more conceptual level, this article does not try to push an `identity versus interest' argument. Rather, we claim that the causal arrows run both ways. Collective nation-state identities define the realm of instrumental or material interests considered legitimate and appropriate in a given political discourse. We claim this to be the case in Britain and Germany. The more identity constructions are contested or in flux in a political discourse, however, the more likely it is that those constructions carry the day which actors see as furthering their perceived instrumental, political or economic interests. We argue that this was the case in France.

This book explores the positions of small EU members in approaching external energy security, using Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia as case studies. It examines when small EU members support and when they oppose further development of cooperation at the European level in external energy security and argues that their preferences depend on their perceived ability to deal with the challenges of their energy policies. It finds that small EU members whose decision-makers believe that their states can successfully deal with these challenges do not support the deepening of European integration in external energy security as this would mean a loss of competences (and vice-versa), concluding that European integration is considered to be a response to perceived vulnerability. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and professionals in EU politics and foreign policy, energy policy and security, and more broadly to security studies, European politics and international relations.

AbstractThis article examines the impact of the recent EU enlargement on European governance. Enlargement is treated as a kind of external shock to the existing governance system, broadening and diversifying the European public space. The prevalent hierarchical mode of governance is increasingly inadequate under these new circumstances and the Union will have to embrace more flexible, decentralized and soft modes of governance.

Cover -- Title Page -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- List of Figures and Tables -- Table of Cases -- Introduction: Executive-Legislative (Im)balance in the European Union -- PART I: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS FROM A MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE -- 1. Recalibration of Executive-Legislative Relations in the European Union: Strategies Inspired by the Trilemma of Democracy, Sovereignty and Integration -- 2. The Anticipation Function of Interinstitutional Agreements: A Smooth Mechanism to Recalibrate Executive-Legislative Relations -- 3. Divided Accountability of the Council and the European Council: The Challenge of Collective Parliamentary Oversight -- 4. Executive-Legislative Relations and Delegated Powers in the European Union: Continuous Recalibration? -- PART II: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE (IM)BALANCE WITHIN MEMBER STATES -- 5. The Implementation of EU Law in Member States and its Impact on the Relationship between Parliaments and Governments -- 6. National Strategies of EU Law Transposition: Does the Distinction between Legislative and Executive Measures Matter in Practice? -- 7. Failed Constitutional Reforms and Silent Constitutional Transformations in Executive-Legislative Relations: The Case of Italy -- 8. Short-Lived Reparliamentarisation? A Year of Efforts to 'Take Back Control' from the Executive in the Brexit House of Commons -- PART III: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE (IM)BALANCE AND VARIATIONS ACROSS POLICY AREAS -- 9. How the Debates on Trade Policy Helped Rebalance the Executive-Legislative Relationship in Favour of the European Parliament -- 10. A Temporary Recalibration of Executive-Legislative Relations on EU Trade Agreements? The Case of National and Regional Parliaments on CETA and TTIP -- 11. Exploring Interaction between National Parliaments and the European Parliament in EU Trade Policy.

"In diesem Artikel entwickeln und testen wir ein mikrotheoretisches Modell, das zur Erklärung der Interessenvertretung in verschiedenen Politikfeldern in der Europäischen Union beiträgt. Dabei stehen zwei erkenntnisleitende Fragen im Vordergrund: Was beeinflusst die Zahl der Interessenvertreter in verschiedenen Politikfeldern? Und weshalb richtet die EU-Kommission in einigen Politikfeldern Foren mit beschränktem Zugang für Interessenvertreter ein? Unsere Erklärung basiert auf der Beobachtung, dass der Expertisebedarf der Kommission hauptsächlich durch Interessenvertreter gedeckt wird, dass aber die Interaktion mit einer großen Zahl von Interessenvertretern der Kommission Kosten (unter anderem Informationskosten) verursacht. Beide Beobachtungen führen unseres Erachtens dazu, dass die Kommission Foren mit beschränktem Zugang einführt, wenn die Zahl der Interessenvertreter ein bestimmtes Maß überschreitet. Wir vollziehen einen ersten Test unserer Hypothesen mit Querschnittsdaten der Interessenvertretung in verschiedenen EU-Politikfeldern, und finden unsere Erwartungen zumindest teilweise erfüllt." (Autorenreferat)