Suchergebnisse

This special volume of "Studies in Law, Politics, and Society - The Aesthetics of Law and Culture: Texts, Images, Screens" - examines practices of representation and their relation to juridical and cultural formations. The chapters range across the media of speech and writing, word and image, legislation and judgment, literature, cinema and photography. The contributions draw on disciplines including jurisprudence, literary criticism, philosophy, cinema studies, art and visual studies, cartography, historiography and medicine. They are ordered according to four prominent themes in contemporary, theoretically informed critical scholarship: Crime Scenes: Sexuality and Representation; Sites Unsaid: Testimony, Image, Genre; (Post) Colonial Appropriations; and Screen Culture: Sovereignty, Cinema and Law.

This master thesis provides an analysis of the legality of preemptive self-defence under international law. In assessing the lawfulness of preemptive self-defence two basic sources of international law: customary and treaty law are examined. The analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that there is strong disagreement between scholars regarding the legality of anticipatory self-defence. However, the term "armed attack" in article 51 UN Charter should embrace imminent threats. Two basic reasons are: the advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and new methods of warfare; the inherent right of anticipatory self-defence was not exhausted after the adoption of the UN Charter. The examination of customary international law showed that the Caroline doctrine allows states to act in anticipation of an armed attack if the requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled. In addition, the analysis of state practice and opinion juris prior and after September 11, 2001, revealed that anticipatory self-defence is not prohibited. The conclusion is maid that the right of anticipatory self-defence, if requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled, is not illegal under international law. In contrast, the analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that preemptive self-defence against perceived threats is not legal under the UN Charter, because there is no actual armed attack or imminent threat against which state can legally defend itself. In addition, preemptive use of military force against emerging threats has no safeguards. The examination of customary law prior and after September 11, 2001, revealed that a new rule, which would allow states to use military force in self-defence, was not created, because there is a lack of opinio juris and state practice. The conclusion is drawn that preemptive use of force is not legal under international law.

This master thesis provides an analysis of the legality of preemptive self-defence under international law. In assessing the lawfulness of preemptive self-defence two basic sources of international law: customary and treaty law are examined. The analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that there is strong disagreement between scholars regarding the legality of anticipatory self-defence. However, the term "armed attack" in article 51 UN Charter should embrace imminent threats. Two basic reasons are: the advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and new methods of warfare; the inherent right of anticipatory self-defence was not exhausted after the adoption of the UN Charter. The examination of customary international law showed that the Caroline doctrine allows states to act in anticipation of an armed attack if the requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled. In addition, the analysis of state practice and opinion juris prior and after September 11, 2001, revealed that anticipatory self-defence is not prohibited. The conclusion is maid that the right of anticipatory self-defence, if requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled, is not illegal under international law. In contrast, the analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that preemptive self-defence against perceived threats is not legal under the UN Charter, because there is no actual armed attack or imminent threat against which state can legally defend itself. In addition, preemptive use of military force against emerging threats has no safeguards. The examination of customary law prior and after September 11, 2001, revealed that a new rule, which would allow states to use military force in self-defence, was not created, because there is a lack of opinio juris and state practice. The conclusion is drawn that preemptive use of force is not legal under international law.

This master thesis provides an analysis of the legality of preemptive self-defence under international law. In assessing the lawfulness of preemptive self-defence two basic sources of international law: customary and treaty law are examined. The analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that there is strong disagreement between scholars regarding the legality of anticipatory self-defence. However, the term "armed attack" in article 51 UN Charter should embrace imminent threats. Two basic reasons are: the advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and new methods of warfare; the inherent right of anticipatory self-defence was not exhausted after the adoption of the UN Charter. The examination of customary international law showed that the Caroline doctrine allows states to act in anticipation of an armed attack if the requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled. In addition, the analysis of state practice and opinion juris prior and after September 11, 2001, revealed that anticipatory self-defence is not prohibited. The conclusion is maid that the right of anticipatory self-defence, if requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled, is not illegal under international law. In contrast, the analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that preemptive self-defence against perceived threats is not legal under the UN Charter, because there is no actual armed attack or imminent threat against which state can legally defend itself. In addition, preemptive use of military force against emerging threats has no safeguards. The examination of customary law prior and after September 11, 2001, revealed that a new rule, which would allow states to use military force in self-defence, was not created, because there is a lack of opinio juris and state practice. The conclusion is drawn that preemptive use of force is not legal under international law.

Cyber warfare has become more pervasive and more complex in recent years. It is difficult to regulate, as it holds an ambiguous position within the laws of war. This book investigates the legal and ethical ramifications of cyber war, considering which sets of laws apply to it, and how it fits into traditional ideas of armed conflict.

This paper examines the usefulness of testing the conformity of macroeconomic data with Benford's law as indicator of data quality. Most of the macroeconomic data series tested conform with Benford's law. However, questions emerge on the reliability of such tests as indicators of data quality once conformity with Benford's law is contrasted with the data quality ratings included in the data module of the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (data ROSCs). Furthermore, the analysis shows that rejection of Benford's law may be unrelated to the quality of statistics, and instead may re

Environmental values and policies : an introduction -- Environmental law : a structural overview -- Preventing harm in the face of uncertainty -- Waste management and pollution prevention -- Air pollution control -- Water pollution control -- Land use regulation and regulatory takings -- Environmental impact assessment -- Preservation of biodiversity -- Environmental enforcement -- Protection of the global environment -- Environmental progress and prospects

The increasing use in the EU of soft law norms has created an extensive debate over the centrality of law as the principle instrument of European integration. Under a certain understanding of legality – one that sees the function of law as the provision of stable normative expectations - the development of methods like the OMC appears as an explicit threat. By another, the complex nature of the EU polity - and the functional tasks it must carry-out - places an impossibly high burden on any attempt by the EU to model its conception of legality this way. While this seemingly leaves the EU with a stark choice, the very features – the dispersion of normative authority between different national orders, and the need for rapid and iterative regulatory interventions – that have borne soft law also point towards the development of new conceptions of legality and its limits in a post-national setting. Soft law has both empirically challenged law's place in the integration project, and demanded a re-evaluation of its contemporary meaning.

"This Research Handbook is a multi-faceted, comparative analysis of how law and political systems interact around the world. Chapters include analyses of judicial deference, congressional support, democratic representation, politicization of courts, public support, and judicialization across multiple jurisdictions in the United States and abroad. Chapters also investigate transnational courts and the linkages between international and domestic law and politics."

For decades political scientists have been fascinated with the problem of establishing a formal mathematical relationship between the popular votes cast for a political party and the number of parliamentary seats it holds. The most famous attempt at solving this problem, known as the 'cube law', was formulated more than sixty years ago by James Parker Smith. Since then a large number of papers in support of the cube law have been published. Perhaps the most cited paper is by Kendall and Stuart. The cube law also has been stated to apply to parliamentary elections in New Zealand, the United States and Canada. But doubts about the cube law have also been expressed by Brookes, Eldersveld and just a few years ago by Tufte.

Theodor Meron has been a Judge and, between March 2012 and January 2019, was the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (the Mechanism). He was also a Judge of the Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from November 2011 until the closure of those tribunals. He served a total of four terms as President of the ICTY and three terms as President of the Mechanism. A leading scholar of international humanitarian law, human rights and international criminal law, Judge Meron is the author of thirteen books on international law and chivalry in Shakespeare and more than 100 articles, including some of the books and articles that helped build the legal foundations for the international criminal tribunals. His most recent book is Standing up for Justice (Oxford University Press, 2021).He is a member of the Institute of International Law and of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the recipient of numerous awards, honours and medals, such as the Hudson Medal (American Society of International Law) and the Haskins Prize (American Council of Learned Societies). He is also an Officer of the French Legion of Honour, Grand Officer of the French National Order of Merit, Officer of the Order of Merit of Poland and Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George (United Kingdom). A past honorary President of the American Society of International Law and past Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal of International Law and Visiting Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, he is Charles L. Denison Professor of Law Emeritus at NYU Law School and, since 2014, a Visiting Professor of Law at Oxford University. He is a Visiting Fellow at Mansfield College, an Academic Associate of the Bonavero Human Rights Institute and an Honorary Fellow at Trinity College.