Suchergebnisse

On September 25, Mali's military government announced it will delay elections that were slated for February 2024. The authorities cited technical reasons for the postponement and did not name a replacement date.

Viewed against the backdrop of the junta's actions since taking power in 2020, the delay appears the latest in a series of maneuvers by the junta to extend its rule, even as the junta has failed egregiously in its promises to restore security. The United States has little influence over what happens in Bamako, but by taking a clear and public stand against open-ended military rule in Mali and other countries in the region, Washington can enhance its credibility in the long term.

A recent wave of coups in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa has involved officers who show no serious willingness to hand power back to civilians. Military officers have now seized power in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023). Add to this the coups in Guinea (2021) and Sudan (2021) and one has a "coup belt" that evokes the dark days of the Cold War. Amid much talk of "coup contagion," each putsch has had its own, primarily domestic causes — but what has been contagious is coup-makers' playbooks.

Mali's Colonel Assimi Goita and associates have been key movers in elaborating this playbook, extending their "transition" time and again. Goita and company came to power in August 2020, appointed a civilian-led transition, overthrew their own civilian appointees in May 2021's "coup within a coup," defied sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), compromised on a transition for 2024, and have now begun to tamper with that timetable.

Mali's colonels have repeatedly exposed the weak hand of regional and Western diplomats. ECOWAS first sought to impose an 18-month timetable in August 2020 — meaning the February 2024 elections should have already occurred in February 2022. What happens in Mali has serious ramifications for how officers in the other countries — some of whom are in close contact with Mali's junta — will approach their own transition timetables.

The U.S. has few good options in Mali or elsewhere in the region. In Washington, there are concerns that criticizing and antagonizing juntas would diminish whatever influence the U.S. may command in the Sahel. Washington also prefers to take the region's countries and their coups case by case, frowning on those in Mali and Burkina Faso while showing a significantly more ambivalent and even lenient attitude towards those in Chad and Niger.

And certainly there are diplomatic costs to criticism, as France has learned in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where its soldiers and diplomats are effectively unwelcome.

Yet U.S. "influence" in the region is overstated — what is there to preserve? After 20 years of military training programs, the U.S. has no significant and enduring counterterrorism accomplishments to report. On the political side, if the U.S. has avoided the backlash that has greeted France, it has also not been able to convince soldiers to return to barracks, or even to temper the overreach of some of its favored civilian leaders (the decision by Senegalese President Macky Sall not to seek a third term in 2024 is one bright spot in the region, and may reflect behind-the-scenes international pressure, but Sall continues to crack down severely on the opposition).

Given that U.S. influence has not appreciably bent the curve of the region when it comes either to endemic insecurity or the militarization of politics, it would be better for the U.S. to be consistent, vocal, and clear when it comes to denouncing coups and distorted transition timetables. As of September 30, for example, there was no statement by the U.S. on the Malian junta's delay of the elections. Nor has the U.S. clarified, more than two months after the coup in Niger, whether it considers that takeover to be a coup in legal terms — a decision that would trigger a suspension of much assistance to Niger.

As one analyst recently commented, allowing ambiguity to fester when it comes to the U.S. stance on Niger is a recipe for exacerbating conspiracy theorizing about whether the U.S. and other Western powers actually support the coups in the region.

Speaking out at key moments would elicit rebukes from Bamako and Niamey, but it would also send vital signals to the actual people of the Sahel. The region's populations are Washington's most important audience at this point, because it is more important to shape positive perceptions of the U.S. over the long term than it is to tiptoe around generals and colonels who rule capitals by force.

Over the long term, moreover, it is in the U.S. interest to give moral support to genuine grassroots democratic culture in the region, which has been a serious force in Sahelian history time and again. At the moment, the U.S. should not materially support civilian organizations that seek to challenge the juntas politically, because doing so could pose profound risks to such civilians (of being arrested and/or tarred with the charge of being Western puppets) and could create unnecessary credibility risks for the U.S. itself.

But by being blunt and forthright that military rule is unacceptable, the U.S. can help set the expectation that norms, and not crass and misguided efforts at realpolitik, will guide Washington's and others' policies towards the Sahel.
Publicly criticizing and privately pressuring the region's military rulers does not mean that Washington will be loathed as much as Paris is. Washington does not have Paris's colonial baggage, and French officials, from President Emmanuel Macron down to individual ambassadors, have been particularly imperious and insensitive to Sahelian concerns, squandering numerous easy opportunities to appear flexible and humble.The U.S. can be a more friendly critic, clarifying that it disapproves of juntas' choices but leaving the door open to conversation

The American public almost unanimously agrees that the nation's War on Drugs has been a huge failure. Now, South American leaders have a plan to form an alliance with key nations to initiate a new, non-violent approach to drug crime. This is a critical opportunity for the Biden administration to combat organized crime while regaining geopolitical credibility by promoting peace.

Since the United States' War on Drugs began more than five decades ago, the nation has spent over a trillion dollars enforcing drug policies domestically since 1971.

Meanwhile, the number of drug cartels in the Americas has only increased, as have the casualties.

The U.S. is not alone in these failed efforts. Both drug-related violent crime and drug trafficking itself are at record highs in a number of countries around the hemisphere. According to InSight Crime, cocaine trafficking is at historic highs, and the homicide rate in Andean countries is skyrocketing. Clearly, violent efforts to combat drug use and trafficking are ineffective. Fortunately, some South American politicians are suggesting a new solution.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro recently proposed the creation of an alliance between Latin American and Caribbean states looking for a different way to fight organized crime and drug trafficking. In his speech at the Latin American and Caribbean Conference on Drugs on September 9th, Petro argued that "it is time to rebuild hope and not repeat the bloody and ferocious wars, the ill-named 'war on drugs', viewing drugs as a military problem and not as a health problem for society." Petro likened the policy to "genocide" against the Colombian people, with more than 200,000 civilians dying in the country as a direct result of the civil conflict — including drug violence — since 1958.

Presidents Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil have already supported this new approach, at least rhetorically. At the conference, representatives from 17 countries signed a statement agreeing to the need to "rethink the global war on drugs" and focus on "life, peace, and development."

Unfortunately, some countries in Latin America have taken the opposite perspective, embracing militarization and "mano dura" (hard hand) policies based on the record of autocrat Nayib Bukele of El Salvador. Many U.S. policymakers promote similar tactics, including a ludicrous U.S. invasion of Mexico. Ecuador and Honduras, in response to rising homicide rates, chose to militarize counternarcotics, leading to more death, instability, and democratic backsliding.

But these violent tactics have never worked. Not only did the U.S.-led War on Drugs fail miserably, but the nation also played a large role in inciting violence in Central America by supporting violent groups and governments in the hopes of tackling drug traffickers and left-wing guerrillas in the region. The security infrastructure in most Central American countries is a direct result of U.S. involvement during the Cold War.

By promoting a violent solution to the drug crisis and emboldening anti-drug militias, the U.S. has created more drug cartels. According to records from the Drug Enforcement Administration, Colombian paramilitaries have become the largest domestic drug producers and traffickers in Colombia. They were originally propped up, funded, and armed by the United States.

Under the Reagan administration, Latin American factions and dictators engaging in drug trafficking, including the Contras in Nicaragua, and Manuel Noriega in Panama, were also supported by the U.S. In Mexico, the U.S. and Mexican governments' policy of decapitation — removing top leaders from cartels — led to fractionalization and the creation of more cartels battling over resources and power, making Mexico a narco-state with hundreds of groups.

In light of the negative influence that Washington has had on the War on Drugs throughout the American regions, the Biden administration should extend an olive branch to Petro and support his new alliance. By inviting Petro and other sympathetic Latin American leaders to the White House, or to a Latin American city with a connection to the War on Drugs, Biden could discuss a regional, non-violent approach that would repair international ties with South and Central American countries and renew the nations' vision for reducing drug crime. Involving the U.S. publicly would give weight to the transition and bring international media attention to the drug problem.

The alliance's members and leading in-country experts could then come up with a list of policies to be implemented across the hemisphere in line with the new non-violent approach. Those policies should then pass the legislatures and become law in the respective countries.

The list could include harm-reduction programs to reduce consumption, scholarship programs for youths in high-risk areas, public education programs, housing subsidies, negotiation with drug-trafficking organizations, reintegration programs for former members, funding for public mental health counseling, and large-scale investment in public projects to boost employment in low-income communities.

Examples of the far-reaching success of these policies should be included to support their validity and implementation.
In addition, regimes that continue their hardline policies should be isolated and condemned by alliance members. El Salvador, Honduras, and Ecuador have suspended constitutional rights and liberties to bolster the rights of the security state. In doing so, they have sacrificed civilian life, institutional stability, democracy, and human rights in exchange for temporary security. The United States should put diplomatic pressure on political leaders like Nayib Bukele of El Salvador and Xiomara Castro for militarized drug policies that perpetuate this behavior.Unifying the Americas around this approach would help equalize the burden of the drug problem while sharing the benefits of the new approach's success. Leaders of the alliance should publicly call out problematic policies within these regimes. Petro has already done this with El Salvador.
Other countries wanting to adopt the "hard hand" approach to counternarcotics should beware of the political, diplomatic, and economic consequences of adopting illiberal and unsuccessful drug policies. Proposing an invasion of Mexico won't help tackle the drug problem, promote U.S. security interests, or restore U.S. influence around the region. Supporting a new South American alliance would do this and more.

Aus südkoreanischer Sicht

Undaunted by the challenges posed by providing historic levels of aid to Ukraine while also supporting Israel's campaign against Hamas, U.S. President Joe Biden defiantly declared recently on 60 Minutes: "We're the United States of America for God's sake, the most powerful nation in the history — not in the world, in the history of the world."

True. But to pretend that U.S. capabilities aren't being strained is to ignore reality. Forecasts of relative material capabilities point to a reality that will become even harsher. America's relative geopolitical advantage is shrinking. As such, the affordability of maintaining U.S. dominance the world over will increasingly come into question.

Unfortunately, President Biden's assertion is reflective of a broadly held attitude. Many in the U.S. national security community on both sides of the political aisle have beer money and champagne tastes.
More money, less relative advantage, more problems
To support the U.S. response to ongoing war efforts in Ukraine and Israel and to deter war with China, the White House recently made a $100 billiom supplemental budget request to Congress. That is on top of the Department of Defense's proposed $842 billion budget for fiscal year 2024, inching ever closer to the $1 trillion threshold.

Meanwhile, Social Security spending is forecast to continue to increase as a percentage of GDP while revenues to pay for that spending will decline as a percentage of GDP. More broadly, the Congressional Budget Office's long-term outlook involves deficit spending that steadily grows to 10 percent of GDP around mid-century. For many prominent U.S. policymakers, however, there seems to be little serious thought with regards to spending trade-offs.

Yet, at the height of World War II, U.S. defense spending as a percent of GDP was more than ten times what it is today. Why, then, should today's U.S. policymakers make any national security-related trade-offs?

First, skyrocketing U.S. government debt appears unsustainable. But whether the U.S. government technically has the dollars to pay for all its present national security priorities ignores other important questions. To what extent and how quickly can U.S. dollars be converted into increasing quantities of arms, ammunition, and other resources — and do these purchases make strategic sense?Hangover The attitude of many of today's U.S. national security analysts is a hangover from America's "unipolar moment" following the collapse of the Soviet Union. For most of the two decades that followed, the U.S. faced few serious challengers at the nation-state level.The U.S. still has an extraordinary amount of money to spend on munitions — but money does not equal munitions. Amid support for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, the U.S. is facing tradeoffs about which munitions to provide to which parties and when. Arms manufacturers are rushing to meet present shortfalls, but meaningful increases in production capacity will take time. Meanwhile, a replenishment of U.S. military stockpiles will come at the cost of other priorities — the unforgiving "guns versus butter" logic made famous by President Dwight Eisenhower. It is a logic that offers no easy answers, where, for example, the recent $6.2 billion "accounting error" for military aid to Ukraine would have instead been enough to house the entire U.S. homeless population for a year. Such tradeoffs will become increasingly stark in the coming decades. While absolute U.S. resources will grow considerably, absolute resources for the rest of the world combined are forecast to grow more quickly. Even if China does not surpass the U.S. in terms of GDP at market exchange rates, the gap between the size of the two economies will likely continue to close. India will see considerable growth. Nigeria, too, possesses awesome growth potential. These and other less developed countries are expected to take a larger share of the global economic pie, a measure which has historically coincided with increasing geopolitical assertiveness. The U.S. military will likely continue to be an 800 pound gorilla for many decades. But it will no longer be able to dominate the lot of four- and five-hundred pound gorillas soon to populate the international system. This reality could change if Congress continues to spend more on defense, as some advocate. But spending more instead of spending better may lead down a dark path. At the extremes, do we want the U.S. to adopt the modus operandi of the Soviet Union as once described by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher? "They put guns before butter, while we put just about everything before guns." Making better choices ​This is not to say that the U.S. should cease support for Ukraine, or Israel, or Taiwan. President Biden has made a reasonable case for why the success of each is vital to U.S. national security.But the present strains on U.S. industrial capacity and debt burdens foreshadow more severe strains to come. A few solutions present themselves: 1) Pursue a course of increased militarization at the expense of domestic welfare projects or ballooning deficits; 2) Downgrade some national security priorities; or 3) Lean more on partners and allies. (Significantly raising taxes is a fourth, but that political third rail hardly feels worth discussing with a Republican-led U.S. House of Representatives, it being the run-up to an election year, and the long history of American society's resistance against increasing taxes.) By leaning more on partners and allies, U.S. policymakers will have to accept that such a passing of the baton will involve occasional drops. Berlin has repeatedly backtracked on commitments to substantially plus-up its defense. But Germany's ability to commit substantially more resources to defense — perhaps an action that its leaders will only take when forced — is not in question. The elimination of several military research and development and procurement programs with weak justification would also cut costs. How necessary are hypersonic missiles in a world where the most advanced ballistic missile systems struggle to intercept Cold War-era intercontinental ballistic missiles? Much was made of China's development of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) in 2021. It is a terrifying capability, and also one that uses Soviet-era technology. New hypersonic technology isn't needed to pose a similar threat to U.S. adversaries, and new U.S. hypersonic capability is unlikely to resolve China's FOBS threat or threats from more advanced hypersonic weapons. So why continue to pursue hypersonics? Nuclear modernization also deserves interrogation. Some upgrades — such as improved arming, fuzing and firing systems, which help ensure that warheads detonate at the exact point and time designated and only when properly authorized — are clearly beneficial. In contrast, fielding of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, for example, would be escalatory and fill no clear strategic purpose. In the event of an adversary's use of tactical nuclear weapons, other less escalatory and arguably more preferable options are available. Yet, making cuts to these and other programs and platforms would likely only shrink the military's budget by a few percent each year. To be successful, such cuts will need to be part of a fundamentally less martial U.S. grand strategy. After generations of a largely U.S.-led global order, it is natural that many in the U.S. national security community would want to continue to dominate the global environment. They want a refill of their champagne. However, due to declining relative U.S. advantages, the most they can reasonably afford is the champagne of beers.​

The article deals with the process of initiation and implementation of the idea of creating the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the social and political discourse of the USSR in the late 1980s – early 1990s. The positions of key pro-Ukrainian public associations and movements, their programs, and statements concerning the "Ukrainianization" of the military forces that were located in the USSR are explored. An estimation of the position of these forces on public policy in the military sphere is given. It has been found out that the majority of the public associations and movements created under the conditions of "restructuring" insisted on the need for de-ideologization and demilitarization of social and political life. In most cases, members of such organizations required on the need to form military units based on the existing USSR armed forces exclusively from residents of the republic, who would report directly to the leadership of the USSR. Besides, the demand for military service by USSR citizens only within the republic remained one of the principal in the speech of Ukrainian associations and movements. The main proposals for possible reform of the military sphere on the territory of the republic are outlined. The author points out that among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, there were different visions regarding the ways of creating such forces. One part insisted on the creation of armed forces subordinated to the government based on and in the composition of the armed forces of the USSR. The other required a complete reboot of the military sphere, the introduction of a new approach to the army formation, and, ultimately, the creation of an army of an independent Ukraine. Much attention is given to the youth's opinion about the ideologization and militarization of the Soviet high school. Representatives of the student youth were much more active than other social groups, expressing their dissatisfaction with the current situation, which resulted in spontaneous protests against the authorities. It was concluded that, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the issue of military development was one of the key issues in the activities of Ukrainian unions, movements, and the first political parties. The members of these organizations were aware of the need to create an armed force in Ukraine that could counteract potential threats to state sovereignty. Such policies have resulted in numerous political actions, strikes, and demonstrations, which have been used as a mechanism to put pressure on the authorities to achieve individual political goals. In the end, under public pressure, as well as in the context of disintegration processes in the USSR, these requirements were fulfilled, which created the necessary basis for the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. ; В статье рассмотрен процесс зарождения и реализации идеи создания Вооруженных Сил Украины в общественно-политическом дискурсе УССР в конце 1980 – начале 1990-х гг. Исследованы позиции ключевых проукраинских общественных объединений и движений, их программы и заявления, касающиеся «украинизации» военных сил, которые были расположены на территории УССР. Дана оценка позиции этих сил относительно государственной политики в военной сфере. Установлено, что в своем большинстве созданные в условиях «перестройки» общественные объединения и движения настаивали на необходимости деидеологизации и демилитаризации общественно-политической жизни. В большинстве случаев члены таких организаций настаивали на необходимости формирования на базе существующих вооруженных сил СССР военных подразделений исключительно из жителей республики, которые подчинялись непосредственно руководству УССР. Кроме того, требование прохождения военной службы гражданами УССР только в пределах республики оставалось одним из основных в риторике участников украинских объединений и движений. Определены основные предложения по возможному реформированию военной сферы на территории республики. Указано на то, что среди представителей украинской интеллигенции существовали различные видения относительно путей создания таких военизированных формирований: часть из них настаивали на создании вооруженных сил, подчиненных центральной власти УССР на базе и в составе вооруженных сил СССР. Другая часть требовала полной перезагрузки военной сферы, внедрения полностью нового подхода к формированию армии и, наконец, создания армии независимого Украинского государства. Особый акцент в статье сделан на позиции молодежной среды относительно идеологизации и милитаризации советской высшей школы. Обращено внимание на то, что представители студенческой молодежи значительно активнее других социальных слоев населения выражали свое недовольство существующим положением вещей, вливался в стихийные акции протеста против действующей власти. Сделаны выводы о том, что на рубеже 1980–1990-х гг. В деятельности украинских объединений, движений и первых политических партий вопросы военного строительства было одним из ключевых в деятельности. Члены этих организаций четко осознавали необходимость создания вооруженных сил Украины, которые могли бы нейтрализовать потенциальные угрозы для государственного суверенитета. Такая политика вылилась в проведение многочисленных политических акций, забастовок и митингов, которые использовались как механизм давления на власть для достижения отдельных политических целей. В конце концов, под давлением общественности, а также в условиях дезинтеграционных процессов в СССР эти требования были выполнены, что создало необходимую основу для создания Вооруженных Сил Украины. ; У статті розглянуто процес зародження та реалізації ідеї створення Збройних Сил України у суспільно-політичному дискурсі УРСР наприкінці 1980 – початку 1990-х рр. Досліджено позиції ключових проукраїнських громадських об'єднань та рухів, їхні програми та заяви, що стосувалися «українізації» військових сил, які були розташовані на території УРСР. Надана оцінка позиції цих сил стосовно державної політики у військовій сфері. З'ясовано, що в своїй більшості створені в умовах «перебудови» громадські об'єднання та рухи наполягали на необхідності деідеологізації та демілітаризації суспільно-політичного життя. У більшості випадків члени таких організацій наполягали на необхідності формування на базі наявних збройних сил СРСР військових підрозділів винятково з мешканців республіки, які б підпорядковувались безпосередньо керівництву УРСР. Крім того, вимога проходження військової служби громадянами УРСР лише в межах республіки залишалась однією із основних у риториці учасників українських об'єднань та рухів. Окреслено основні пропозиції щодо можливого реформування військової сфери на території республіки. Вказано на те, що серед представників української інтелігенції існували різні візії стосовно шляхів створення таких воєнізованих формувань: частина з них наполягали на створенні збройних сил, підпорядкованих центральній владі УРСР на базі та в складі збройних сил СРСР. Інша ж частина вимагала цілковитого перезавантаження військової сфери, запровадження цілковито нового підходу до формування армії і, зрештою, створення армії незалежної Української держави. Особливий акцент у статті зроблено на позиції молодіжного середовища стосовно ідеологізації та мілітаризації радянської вищої школи. Звернена увага на те, що представники студентської молоді значно активніше від інших соціальних верств населення висловлювали своє невдоволення існуючим станом речей, що вливалось в стихійні акції протесту проти чинної влади. Зроблено висновки про те, що на зламі 1980–1990-х рр. у діяльності українських об'єднань, рухів та перших політичних партій питання військового будівництва було одним із ключових у діяльності. Члени цих організацій чітко усвідомлювали необхідність створення збройних сил України, які б могли нейтралізувати потенційні загрози для державного суверенітету. Така політика вилилась у проведення численних політичних акцій, страйків та мітингів, які використовувались як механізм тиску на владу задля досягнення окремих політичних цілей. Зрештою, під тиском громадськості, а також в умовах дезінтеграційних процесів у СРСР ці вимоги були виконані, що створило необхідну основу для створення Збройних Сил України.

Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock "Emerging community judgments were quickly recognized-the bayonets should come off those guns. It was an affront to the community that was not justified in the first place" for this situation rested on the white community. No efforts were made to help the Negroes put into leadership positions their most disciplined and wisest men and women. When a prosecution was begun a little while later under a city ordinance against NAACP officials, including a Negro Methodist minister, for what appeared to be technical violations, it only strengthened the position of the NAACP among Negroes. "Mrs. Bates has no large personal following among our people," said one of the Negro ministers, "but this sort of thing drives them in masses into her camp." The Negroes seemed eager at all times to appear to be just as friendly as ever with their individual white friends, but they stuck to their mental retreat and did not invite discussion. They were aware of the necessities of the situation, and there was a certain pathos in the severing of the pleasant contacts between individuals. McClinton called in October to ask me to see a committee of his group to discuss the future. With him were a Baptist minister and a retired mail carrier. They made clear their determination to do all within their power to prevent violence. The Negro people, they said, were united in this. Further, they thought that the white people should know that the Negroes were also united in thinking that their rights as defined by the United States district court should be protected, even if the troops had to stay. This meant that the nine students should continue in Central High. They hoped that the white people would not ask for troop withdrawal until it could be done with safety. I pointed out that the two races had a common interest here-if the school board kept the school open and obeyed court injunctions, both white and colored students should have adequate protection. This view is consistent with my opposition to military enforcement. I believed these three men as to the unanimity of Negro opinion on desegregation of Central High. Later, professional poll takers confirmed this judgment with irrefutable proof produced by their comprehensive local survey. Skeptical white leaders were convinced. The question whether Little Rock Negroes would seek mass integration is a different question. The people of Little Rock were largely inarticulate during the early days of the presence of federal troops at Central High. I made no effort to find out what the Administration had in mind as to withdrawal. No one could answer that question anyway. We had witnessed violence, and we breathed easier when strong men stood between our city's children and danger. White parents shared these anxieties, of course. They knew that violence directed toward Negro children would expose all to danger. I was a bit impatient during those days with some of the statements of partisans in other States who seemed to welcome a showdown. Had they known the extent of our anxieties I am sure they would have, in expressing their own convictions, omitted the "Let's you and him fight" overtones. We were too close to violence to find any enjoyment in outbursts of that kind. School Board's Side of Case In one of the several huddles of the 26 Chamber of Commerce former presidents, Superintendent Blossom and the six members of the school board were invited to participate, and they did a superb job of informing us of the extreme difficulties facing the administrators and faculty under court orders to teach nine Negro students in what was historically the all-white high school. Blossom spoke feelingly and convincingly. With a short dissertation on the local NAACP decision to rely on their legal rights, he dispelled any idea of an official closing of doors to the nine at that time, and his board sustained him. This, they argued, was the practical side of it. The board's critics have tried to interpret this consistent court-compliance policy as a thrusting of integration upon the people of Little Rock against their wishes. The record will not support that charge, as later action by the board proved. The hours spent by the 26 on these talks were fruitful. These outstanding civic leaders gained new understanding of the educational, sociological and legal phases of the problem. If some had not been convinced by newspaper editorials that yielding to extremists, by sending the Negroes home or closing Central High, would mean a strengthening of lawlessness, they were made fully aware of this point by Dr. Will Cooper, at that time chairman of the school board, and by Mr. Blossom. No one questioned for a moment that a majority of the people preferred the segregated schools. No one argued that the defeat by two of these directors of extremist opponents in a 1956 election carried any mandate to integrate. The issue appeared in clearer outlines every day: law and order as opposed to threats and pressures- chiefly from outside Little Rock. Emerging community judgments were quickly recognized -the bayonets should come off those guns. It was an affront to the community that was not justified in the first place. Military men are tough and they do not take chances, but we did not like that aspect of the policing one bit. The bayonets did come off, and, furthermore, the military men very quickly recognized that, while it might be weeks, maybe months, before all troops could go home, the strong display of power was no longer called for. Soldiers Leave-Tension Eases With the withdrawal of the last of the regular troops about Christmastime and the assignment of the task to the federalized Guard units of our own Arkansas men in greatly reduced strength, there was considerably less feeling about "militarization." The meetings of the 26-they have never adopted a name nor taken any steps toward formal organization-were occasionally devoted to related issues, such as the election of the governing board for the new city-manager form of government on November 5. All were eager to avoid the inclusion of the question of segregation in the election, so the month of October was a period of suspended judgment as to the next steps to be taken. Some sessions were solely to hear reports from those who were observing internal school conditions and to confer regarding measures to avoid a special session of the State's General Assembly, which would, unless the political climate changed, result either in closing Central High School altogether or penalties such as withdrawal of State aid. In view of the desire of some leading political figures who were quite indifferent to Little Rock's misfortune, there was every reason for our disquietude. Modern cities have often been confronted with hostile political forces originating in nonurban areas and injustices U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959 133

Craig Santos Perez presents on the Literatures of the World panel for the Words in the World Symposium. Literatures of the World: This panel engages from different locations the question of the pedagogical limits of the concept of World Literature, both in terms of classroom practice and theoretical understandings of literary traditions across the world. It asks as well: How might the phrase "literatures of the world" (rather than the pluralizing phrase "world literatures") work toward notions of literary commons? On what terms would such commons be envisioned as most productively countering the globalizing logics and poetics that have driven "world literature"? Moderator: Paul Lyons Panelists: Hosam Aboul-Ela, Francesca Orsini, Ruth Mabanglo, Craig Santos Perez