Suchergebnisse

In this edition, the reader will find ten articles distributed in two thematic sections: Cooperation and asymmetric international integration in matters of security, strategy and commerce and Global culture in international relations.Cooperation and asymmetric international integration in matters of security, strategy and commerce We opened the 2018-I edition of the article entitled "How to strengthen EU-China cooperation based on Belt and Road", by the authors Weidong Wang and Simona Picciau; in which the Belt and Road initiative, presented by the Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013, promotes cooperation and the strengthening of person-to-person connections between Asia, Africa, and Europe. China has already signed cooperation agreements with more than forty States and trained thirty others. This initiative impacted the establishment of relations between China and the European Union, based on win-win cooperation and aimed at fostering mutual respect.Sonia Alda Mejías publishes her article "The challenges of Latin America to project as a regional actor in the field of international security", in which she considers the possibility of Latin America to project itself as a regional actor in the field of global security from a qualitative methodology. Also, reference as necessary the processes of subregional or regional integration and the development of national and international multilateral cooperation in the field of security and defense, and the participation of Latin American countries in international peace missions, from a sovereignty perspective very marked.The article "Notions of safety and control in the Northern Border Plan: an expression of teichopolitics", by the authors Gilberto Aranda and Cristian Ovando, considers the teichopolitics as a current expression of segmented globalization, which not only raises the erection of walls. Chile manifested this policy in the 70s, undermining border areas as preventive mechanisms to a foreign invasion and today, through the Northern Border Plan. This securitization mechanism aims to guarantee the continuity of trade flows and the cultural consequences that it entails, from the constructivist approach.Pablo Garcés Velástegui presents his article "Latin American integration as a wicked problem: the case for a plural approach". In this paper, social planning is not any problem, but a "wicked", not docile, a problem of exact sciences that involves a public policy issue; a problem hard to define, unique, inherently paradoxical, important, subject to many interpretations and, thus, without a correct solution. Latin American integration has these characteristics, and the implications are relevant for academics and decision makers. If regional integration continues to be approached as an easy problem, the results will probably continue to disagree with expectations."The United Kingdom and Argentina: geopolitics of technological constraint and strategic-export controls", by Daniel Blinder, shows how the United Kingdom controls the export of military or dual-use technology to the Argentine Republic through its defense institutions and trade, as well as with others of an international nature. A strategic public policy at a local and global level represented in the logical space/power, relative to the possibility of Argentina acquiring sensitive technologies.The co-authors Roldán Andrés-Rosales, Luis Alberto Sánchez-Miter and José Nabor Cruz Marcelo, present the article entitled "Insecurity and its impact on tourism in Guerrero: a spatial approach, 1999-2014". This paper gives the reader the possibility to know how Mexican insecurity has affected the economic growth of the State and the region at the tourist level. This is done through a case study in Guerrero because it obeys one of the most insecure areas, classified worldwide, which is an index of violence that shows the concentration of the danger through the analysis of the figures of the Institute. National Statistics and Geography."Asymmetric regionalism as the axis of the South American resistance to Brazil (2000-2013)", by Rita Giacalone, assumes that regionalism in itself creates asymmetric tensions. Brazilian regionalism has realistic, constructivist and institutionalist features, which emphasize such asymmetries following the region-centric paradigm. The organizations built to support the regional and global projection of Brazil generated resistance in South American governments between 2000 and 2013. This article analyzes the opposition of Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela, through a decentralized multipolarity.Global culture in international relationsWe open this thematic section with the article by Juliano Oliveira Pizarro titled "Governance of sport: an inflection of global governance?" In this, it is considered that the global is a birthplace of diverse actors that exercise specific governments, as represented by football. A sport made a social and cultural mechanism that suffers direct impacts from the globalizing processes. FIFA is a non-profit, non-governmental organization, although it may not seem so, because its activities express hybrid and contradictory conditions, either from the perspective of global governance or as a multinational company.Luis González Tule, in his article "Organization of global space in 'classic' geopolitics: a view from critical geopolitics", starts at the roots of the geopolitics and its development, in between of European imperial rivalries, global wars, border mutations, political changes, significant technological developments and transformation in the dynamics of power (1870 and 1945). The classic indoctrinators coming from the main powers established the geopolitical discourses to their accommodation.Thus, this edition closes with the article "The emergence and increase of Anti-Semitism in the Governments of Hugo Chávez and its relationship with the deepening of the relations between Venezuela and Iran (2005-2013)", by Margarita Figueroa Sepúlveda, which establishes the growth of media and Chavez anti-Semitic incidents in 2004, as well as their direct proportional relationship with the rapprochement and creation of new ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The ideological convergence —based on anti-imperialism— is analyzed through the empirical evidence provided by primary and secondary sources. The author considers that anti-imperialism made Israel be conceived as an enemy of both countries.Thanking the confidence of the institutional authorities again to edit the Journal of International Relations, Strategy and Security, I invite you to know, use and disseminate the content of this edition. ; En esta edición el lector encontrará diez artículos distribuidos en dos secciones temáticas: Cooperación e integración internacional asimétrica en asuntos de seguridad, estrategia y comercio y Cultura global en relaciones internacionales.Cooperación e integración internacional asimétrica en asuntos de seguridad, estrategia y comercio Abrimos la edición 2018-I con el artículo denominado "Cómo fortalecer la cooperación EE. UU. - China basada en el cinturón y la carretera", de los autores Weidong Wang y Simona Picciau, en el cual la iniciativa belt and road, presentada por el presidente chino Xi Jinping en 2013, promueve la cooperación y el reforzamiento de las conexiones persona-a-persona entre Asia, África y Europa. China ya ha firmado acuerdos de cooperación con más de cuarenta Estados y capacitó a otros treinta. Esto impactó el establecimiento de relaciones entre China y la Unión Europea, basadas en la cooperación win-win y direccionadas al favorecimiento del respeto mutuo.Sonia Alda Mejías publica su artículo "Los desafíos de América Latina para proyectarse como actor regional en el ámbito de la seguridad internacional", en el que contempla la posibilidad de América Latina de proyectarse como actor regional en el ámbito de la seguridad internacional desde una metodología cualitativa. Asimismo, referencia como necesarios los procesos de integración subregional o regional y el desarrollo de la cooperación multilateral intra e internacional en el ámbito de la seguridad y la defensa, y la participación de los países latinoamericanos en las misiones internacionales de paz, desde una perspectiva soberanista muy marcada.El artículo "Las nociones de seguridad y control en el plan frontera norte: una expresión de teichopolítica", de los autores Gilberto Aranda y Cristian Ovando, considera la teichopolítica como una expresión actual de la globalización segmentada, la cual no solo plantea la erección de muros. Chile manifestó dicha política en los años 70, minando zonas fronterizas como mecanismos preventivos a una invasión extranjera y hoy, a través del plan Frontera Norte. Este mecanismo securitario pretende garantizar la continuidad de los flujos comerciales y las consecuencias culturales que conlleva, desde el enfoque constructivista.Pablo Garcés Velástegui presenta su artículo "Integración latinoamericana como un problema perverso: el caso para un abordaje plural". En este la planificación social no es un problema cualquiera, sino uno "perverso", nada dócil, un problema de ciencias exactas que conlleva un tema de política pública; un problema difícil de definir, único, inherentemente paradójico, importante, sujeto a muchas interpretaciones y, así, sin una solución correcta. La integración latinoamericana tiene estas características y las implicaciones son relevantes para académicos y tomadores de decisión. Si la integración regional continúa siendo abordada como un problema dócil, los resultados probablemente seguirán discordando con las expectativas."El Reino Unido y Argentina: geopolítica de la limitación tecnológica y controles de exportación estratégicos", de Daniel Blinder, muestra cómo el Reino Unido controla la exportación de tecnología militar o de uso dual a la República Argentina a través de sus instituciones de defensa y comercio, así como con otras de índole internacional. Una política pública estratégica a nivel local y global representada en la lógica espacio/poder, relativa a la posibilidad de que la Argentina adquiera tecnologías sensibles.Los coautores Roldán Andrés-Rosales, Luis Alberto Sánchez-Mitre y José Nabor Cruz Marcelo presentan el artículo titulado "La inseguridad y su impacto en el turismo en Guerrero: un enfoque espacial, 1999-2014", que le brinda al lector la posibilidad de conocer cómo la inseguridad mexicana ha afectado el crecimiento económico del Estado y la región a nivel turístico. Esto lo hacen a través de un estudio de caso en Guerrero, pues obedece a una de las zonas más inseguras, clasificada a nivel mundial, lo que constituye un índice de violencia que muestra la concentración del peligro a través del análisis de las cifras del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía."El regionalismo asimétrico como eje de la resistencia sudamericana a Brasil (2000-2013)", de Rita Giacalone, supone que el regionalismo en sí mismo crea tensiones asimétricas. El regionalismo brasileño posee rasgos realistas, constructivistas e institucionalistas, que enfatizan tales asimetrías siguiendo el paradigma región-céntrico. Las organizaciones construidas para apoyar la proyección regional y global de Brasil generaron resistencia en Gobiernos sudamericanos entre 2000 y 2013. Este artículo analiza la resistencia de Chile, Argentina y Venezuela, mediante una multipolaridad descentralizada.Cultura global en relaciones internacionalesAbrimos esta sección temática con el artículo de Juliano Oliveira Pizarro titulado "Gobernanza del deporte: ¿una inflexión de la gobernanza global?". En este se considera que lo global es un espacio de nacimiento de diversos actores que ejercen gobiernos específicos, como lo representa el fútbol. Un deporte hecho mecanismo social y cultural que sufre impactos directos desde los procesos globalizadores. La FIFA es una organización no gubernamental sin fines lucrativos, aunque no lo parezca, pues sus actividades expresan condiciones híbridas y contradictorias, bien sea desde la óptica de la gobernanza global, o bien como una empresa multinacional.Por su parte, Luis González Tule, en su artículo "Organización del espacio global en la geopolítica "clásica": una mirada desde la geopolítica crítica", inicia en las raíces de la geopolíca y su desarrollo, en medio de rivalidades imperiales europeas, guerras mundiales, mutaciones fronterizas, cambios políticos, grandes desarrollos tecnológicos y transformación en las dinámicas de poder (1870 y 1945). Los doctrinantes clásicos provenientes de las principales potencias establecieron los discursos geopolíticos a su acomodo.Así, pues, la presente edición se cierra con el artículo "La emergencia y aumento del antisemitismo en los Gobiernos de Hugo Chávez y su relación con la profundización de las relaciones entre Venezuela e Irán (2005-2013)", de Margarita Figueroa Sepúlveda, que establece el crecimiento de los incidentes antisemitas mediáticos y chavistas en 2004, así como su relación directamente proporcional con el acercamiento y creación de nuevos lazos con la República Islámica de Irán. Se analiza la convergencia ideológica –sustentada en el antiimperialismo–, a través de la evidencia empírica proporcionada por fuentes primarias y secundarias La autora considera que el antiimperialismo hizo que Israel fuera concebido como enemigo de ambos países.Agradeciendo nuevamente la confianza de las autoridades institucionales para editar la Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, los invito a conocer, usar y divulgar el contenido de la presente edición. ; Nesta edição o leitor encontrará dez artigos distribuídos em duas seções temáticas: Cooperação é integração internacional assimétrica em assuntos de seguran- ça, estratégia, comércio e Cultura global em relações internacionais.Cooperação e integração internacional assimétrica em assuntos de segurança, estratégia e comércioAbrimos a edição 2018-I com o artigo denominado "Como fortalecer a coopera- ção EE. UU - China baseada no cinturão e a estrada", dos autores Weidong Wang e Simona Picciau, no qual a iniciativa belt and road apresentada pelo presidente chino, Xi Jinping em 2013, promove a cooperação e o fortalecimento das conexões pessoa-a-pessoa entre a Ásia, África e a Europa. China já assinou acordos de cooperação com mais de quarenta Estados e treinou a outros trinta. Isto impactou o estabelecimento das relações entre a China e a União Europeia, baseadas na cooperação win-win e direcionadas ao favorecimento do respeito mútuoSonia Alda Mejías publica no seu artigo "Os desafios da América Latina para projetar-se como ator regional no âmbito da segurança internacional", no qual contempla a possibilidade da América Latina de projetar-se como ator regional no âmbito da segurança internacional desde uma metodologia qualitativa. Assim mesmo, referência como necessários, os processos de integração sub-regional ou regional e o desenvolvimento da cooperação multilateral "intra" e internacional no âmbito da segurança e a defesa, e a participação dos países latino-americanos nas missões internacionais de paz, desde uma perspectiva "soberanista" muito marcada.O artigo "As noções de segurança e controle no plano fronteira norte: uma expressão de "teichopolítica", dos autores Gilberto Aranda e Cristian Ovando, considera a "teichopolítica" como uma expressão atual da globalização segmentada, na qual não fala somente na construção de muros. Chile manifestou tal política nos anos 70, minando zonas de fronteiras como mecanismos preventivos a uma invasão estrangeira, através do plano Fronteira Norte. Este mecanismo de segurança pretende garantir a continuidade dos fluxos comerciais e as consequências culturais que leva, desde o foco construtivista. Pablo Garcés Velástegui apresenta seu artigo "Integração latino-americana como um problema perverso: o caso para uma abordagem plural". Neste a planificação social não é um problema qualquer, si não um problema "perverso", nada suave, um problema de ciências exatas que encaminha a um tema de política pública; um problema difícil de definir, único, inerentemente paradóxico, importante, sujeito a muitas interpretações e assim sem uma solução correta. A integração latino-americana tem estas características e as implicações são relevantes para acadêmicos e tomadores de decisão. Sem a integração regional continua sendo abordada como um problema suave, os resultados provavelmente continuarão discordando com as expectativas."O Reino Unido e Argentina: geopolítica da limitação tecnológica e controles de exportação estratégicas", de Daniel Blinder, mostra como o Reino Unido controla a exportação tecnologia militar ou de uso dual para a República Argentina através de suas instituições de defesa e comércio, assim também como com outras de caráter internacional. Uma política pública estratégica a nível local e global representada na lógica espaço/poder, relativa a possibilidade de que Argentina adquira tecnologias sensíveis.Os co-autores Roldán Andrés-Rosales, Luis Alberto Sánchez-Mitre e José Nabor Cruz Marcelo apresentam o artigo titulado "A insegurança e o seu impacto no turismo em Guerrero: um enfoque espacial, 1999-2014", que lhe oferece ao leitor a possibilidade de conhecer como a insegurança mexicana tem afetado o crescimento econômico do Estado e da região a nível turístico. Isto o faz através de um estudo de caso em Guerrero, pois abrange a uma das zonas mais inseguras, classificada a nível mundial, o que constitui um índice de violência que mostra a concentração do perigo através das análises das cifras do Instituto Nacional de Estatística e Geografia."O regionalismo assimétrico como eixo da resistência sul-americana ao Brasil (2000-2013)", de Rita Giacalone, supõem que o regionalismo em si mesmo cria tensões assimétricas. O regionalismo brasileiro possui rasgos realistas, construtivistas e institucionalistas, que enfatizam tais assimetrias seguindo o paradigma "região-centrico". As organizações construídas para apoiar a projeção regional e global do Brasil geram resistência nos Governos sul-americanos entre 2000 e 2013. Este artigo analisa a resistência do Chile, Argentina e Venezuela, mediante uma multipolaridade descentralizada.Cultura global em relações internacionaisAbrimos esta seção temática com o artigo de Juliano Oliveira Pizarro titulado "Governança do deporte: uma inflexão da governança global?". Neste se considera que o global é um espaço de nascimento de diversos atores que exercem governos específicos, como representa o futebol. Um esporte feito para mecanismo social e cultural que sofre impactos diretos desde os processos globalizadores. A FIFA é uma organização não governamental sem fins lucrativos, ainda que não pareça, pois, as suas atividades expressam condições híbridas e contraditórias, seja ela, desde a ótica da governança global ou bem como uma empresa multinacional.Luis González Tule, por sua parte, no seu artigo "Organização do espaço global na geopolítica "clássica": um olhar desde a geopolítica crítica", inicia nas raízes da geopolítica e seu desenvolvimento, em meio das rivalidades imperiais europeias, guerras mundiais, mutações de fronteiras, mudanças políticos, grandes desenvolvimentos tecnológicos e transformações nas dinâmicas do poder (1870 e 1945). Os doutrinantes clássicos provenientes das principais potencias estabeleceram os discursos geopolíticos de acordo a sua conveniênciaAssim, a presente edição se fecha com o artigo "A emergência e aumento do antissemitismo nos Governos de Hugo Chávez e sua relação com a aprofundamento das relações entre Venezuela e o Iram (2005-2013)", de Margarita Figueroa Sepúlveda, que estabelece o crescimento dos incidentes antissemitas mediáticos e chavistas em 2004, assim como a sua relação diretamente proporcional com a aproximação e criação de novos laços com a República Islâmica do Iram. Se analisa a convergência ideológica –sustentada no anti-imperialismo–, através da evidencia empírica proporcionada por fontes primárias e secundarias. A autora considera que o anti-imperialismo fez que Israel fosse concebido como inimigo de ambos países.Agradecendo novamente a confiança das autoridades institucionais para editar a Revista de Relações Internacionais, Estratégia e Segurança, os convido a conhecer, usar e divulgar o conteúdo da presente edição.

Tutkimuskohteena Emmanuel Macron on mielenkiintoinen ja jopa historiallinen hahmo. Macron oli valituksi tullessaan Ranskan nuorin johtaja Napoleon Bonaparten jälkeen. Macron oli niin ikään kokematon ja lähes tuntematon poliitikko, joka oli asettunut ensimmäistä kertaa ehdolle ylipäätänsä missään vaaleissa ja joka valittiin ensimmäisenä kansanliikkeen ehdokkaana Ranskan viidennen tasavallan kahdeksanneksi presidentiksi. Macronin vaalivoittojen jälkeen Ranskan vanhat mahtipuolueet tasavaltalaiset ja sosialistit olivat menettäneet täydellisesti asemansa maan tosiasiallisina hallitsijoina. Lyhyesti sanottuna: Macron toteutti täydellisen demokraattisen vallankaappauksen, jollaista kukaan ei ollut kyennyt ennakoimaan vielä vuotta aikaisemmin. Tässä lyhyesti faktat, jotka innoittivat minua tekemään väitöstutkimuksen Macronista liittyen nimenomaan hänen politiikkaansa ja poliittiseen ajatteluunsa. Varsinaisesta vaalitutkimuksesta ei siis ole kysymys, koska minua kiinnosti päästä kiinni eniten Macronin politiikan ja arvomaailman ydinkysymyksiin. Väitöskirjani nimen otsikko Ideologioiden tuolla puolen? perustui useisiin ristiriitaisiin näkemyksiin, jotka olivat ympäröivät presidenttiä koko hänen verraten lyhyen poliittisen uransa ajan. Äärivasemmisto ja äärioikeisto näkivät Macronin ehdokkaana ja poliitikkona, joka edusti uusliberalismia ja hallitsematonta globalisaatiota, jossa suuryritysten ja EU:n edut olivat etusijalla Ranskan kansallisten etujen sijaan. Macronia on myös kuvailtu populismiin taipuvaiseksi ideologialtaan ohueksi poliitikoksi, jonka kritiikki vanhojen poliittisten puolueiden ja poliitikkojen edustamaa elitismiä kohtaan ei ollut uskottavaa. Maltillinen oikeisto puolestaan kommentoi Macronia vuoden 2017 vaalien aikana presidentti Francois Hollanden epäonnistuneen hallinnon jatkeena ja edustajana. Keltaliiviliikkeen mielenosoituksissa Macronia syytettiin myös rikkaiden presidentiksi, joka oli unohtanut tavallisten ranskalaisten arkipäivän ongelmat tarjoten avokätisiä verohelpotuksia jo ennestään varakkaille kansalaisille ja yrityksille. Koska ristiriitoja oli huomattavan paljon jo pelkästään Macronin vastustajien suunnalta, oli aiheellista pohtia voiko Emmanuel Macronia arvioida perinteisellä oikeisto–vasemmisto ulottuvuudella vai pitäisikö häntä sen sijaan lähestyä kokonaan uudella tavalla? Tämä on toinen syy, miksi nimesin tutkimukseni ensimmäisiksi sanoiksi jo mainitun Ideologioiden tuolla puolen. Edellä mainittujen väitteiden ja näkemysten perusteella lähtökohtani oli pohtia Macronin politiikkaa ja ajattelua perinteisen ja dogmaattisen tavan sijaan tavalla, joka edustaisi myös Macronin henkilökohtaisia näkemyksiä ja lausuntoja ideologioiden ja politiikan suhteesta. Tässä kohtaa löysin Macronin ajattelussa yhtymäkohdan politiikan teoreetikon Michael Freedenin ajatteluun ideologioista, liberalismista ja niiden merkityksestä nykyisessä maailmassa ja politiikassa. Edellä mainittuihin seikkoihin perustuen, oli luonnollista, että lähestyisin Macronin politiikkaa pääosin retorisen analyysin avulla. Retorinen analyysi oli luonnollinen valinta myös sen vuoksi, koska suurin osa tutkimusaineistosta oli Macronin kampanjan aikana ja valituksi tulemisen jälkeen pitämiä puheita ja muita julkisia kannanottoja. Toinen tärkeä syy menetelmäni takana oli luonnollisesti itse ranskalainen poliittinen kulttuuri ja historia. Ranskassa politiikassa on aina korostunut poliitikon ja varsinkin presidentin kyky esiintyä ja käyttää erilaisia retorisia keinoja vakuuttaessaan kansalaiset vaalien aikana, mutta myös vaalien jälkeen. Edellä mainitut taidot ovat olleet myös poliittisen menestyksen ja uskottavuuden perusedellytys. Tutkimuksen kaksi tärkeintä teoriaa ovat saksalaisen politiikantutkijan ja sosiologin Ulrich Beckin luoma riskiyhteiskunta, jota seuraa Anthony Giddensin luoma kolmannen tien poliittinen teoria. Beckin globaali näkemys oli, että vanhat perinteiset instituutiot (kirkko, poliittiset puolueet, perhe, ammatit) ja niiden asema ovat rapautuneet, mikä on lisännyt epävarmuutta esimerkiksi työmarkkinoille ja kansalaisten henkilökohtaiseen elämään liittyen. Beckin teorian mukaan vakituisten työpaikkojen määrä vähentyy edelleen ja erilaiset määräaikaiset ja epätyypilliset työsuhteet yleistyvät tulevaisuudessa entistä enemmän ja vastuu menestymisestä tai menestymättömyydestä on aina selätetty kuitenkin aina yksilölle itselleen. Toinen tärkeä ilmiö liittyy globalisaation ja riskiyhteiskunnan väliseen suhteeseen, jossa päätökset mm. paikallisten työpaikkojen säilymisestä voidaan tehdä tuhansien kilometrien päässä itse tarkasteltavasta maasta. Riski-yhteiskunnan myötä globaaliksi ilmiöksi on tullut myös edelleen kasvanut riski ajautua työttömyyteen, ja tämä koskee myös useita akateemisia ammatteja. Kolmannen tien politiikan teoria oli luonnollinen valinta tutkimukselleni, koska Macronin poliittinen ajattelu perustui kolmeen kolmannen tien keskeiseen pilariin, joissa työ, yrittäjyys ja henkilökohtainen vastuu olivat politiikan lähtökohtia yhdessä markkina myönteisen ajattelun kanssa. Macron siis haastoi myös perinteisen ranskalaisen etatistisen eli valtiovetoisen talousajattelun, jossa pro-business-ajattelu hallitsi taloutta ja talousympäristöä ja jossa usein valtio-omisteiset yritykset olivat nauttineet usein valtion avokätisestä tuesta ja asemasta suhteessa pienempiin toimijoihin. Macronin mukaan säännöt tulisi olla kaikille samat ja tämä koski myös digitaalisia jättiläisiä (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple), joiden verovälttelyyn presidentti Macron on halunnut puuttua kovalla kädellä. Edellä mainittujen yksityiskohtien perusteella Macronin politiikka lähestyi Britannian entisen pääministerin Tony Blairin (1997–2007) politiikkaa, jossa kolmannen tien politiikan teoria muodosti keskeisen New Labourin ja Blairin poliittisen ja ideologisen sisällön. Macron halusi myös puuttua ranskalaisen yhteiskunnan ruohonjuuritason epäkohtiin, jotka ovat aiheuttaneet paljon negatiivisia seurauksia viimeisen kolmen vuosikymmenen aikana. Viimeksi mainittuun kuuluu pitkäaikaistyöttömyys, köyhyys ja yhteiskunnallinen syrjäytyminen. Tarkemmin sanottuna ruohonjuuritason ongelmiin puuttuminen tarkoitti sitä, että Ranskan hallitus ja Macronin hallinto olivat valmiita tekemään suuria investointeja peruskoulutukseen ja alueille, jotka olivat kärsineet eniten mm. heikosta opetuksesta ja tuetun opetuksen vähyydestä. Tasavallan presidentti kyseenalaisti myös Ranskan korkeakoulujen nykytilan ja tulokset. Macron oli huolissaan opintojensa keskeyttäneistä opiskelijoista ja hän näki myös, että Ranskassa oli vanhoja elitistisiä instituutioita, kuten ENA (National School of Administration), jotka eivät palvelleet maan etua tulevaisuudessa. Macronin ajattelussa oli myös useita yhtymäkohtia Ranskan myöhäiseen valistukseen ja erityisesti filosofien ja poliitikkojen Francois Guizot'n ja Benjamin Constantin ajatuksiin, joihin Macronin ajattelua peilasin. Macronin, Guizot'n ja Constantin ajatukset koskivat erityisesti työn, koulutuksen ja ammatin roolia yhteiskunnallisen edistyksen takaajana. Myös poliitikkojen rooli eräänlaisena roolimallina kansalaisten edessä yhdisti niin Macronia, kuin Constantia ja Guizot'a toisiinsa. Macron nosti esiin kampanjansa aikana useasti Ranskan poliittisen järjestelmän ongelmat, jossa poliitikot käyttivät hyväkseen järjestelmän porsaanreikiä ajaessaan omia ja intressipiiriensä etuja. Viime vuosituhannen ajattelijoista nostan esiin Ranskan liberaalien kärkinimen Raymond Aronin ja Macronin mentorin Paul Ricœurin. Aronia, Ricœuria ja Macronia yhdisti kiinnostavalla tavalla kriittisyys ideologiota kohtaan ja totuuden ensisijaisuus politiikan keskeisenä hyveenä. ; As an object of research Emmanuel Macron makes an interesting, and even a historic figure. The youngest leader of France since Napoleon Bonaparte, he was an inexperienced and almost unknown politician, when elected as the President of the Republic from neither of the two traditional parties. Emmanuel Macron was a political actor and a candidate of a new unknown political movement, which he founded alone only about a year before the Presidential elections. The name of my dissertation Beyond Ideologies? Risk Society in Emmanuel Macron's Reformist Politics is based on the several contradictory views that have surrounded Macron since the very beginning of Macron's career. The far left and the far right saw Macron as a candidate and politician who represented neoliberalism, and uncontrolled globalisation, in which the interests of big business and interests of the EU had priority instead of the French national interests. Macron has also been described as a politician with a thin ideology prone to populism, whose critique of the elitism represented by the old political parties and politicians was not credible. The moderate right, in turn, commented on Macron during the 2017 election as an extension and representative of President François Hollande's administration. During protests of the Yellow Vest movement, Macron was also accused of being the President of the rich, who had forgotten the everyday problems of ordinary French people and offered generous tax reliefs to the already wealthy citizens and companies. These were the main reasons behind my motivation to study Macron. Given all this controversy it was relevant to ask: is it even possible to evaluate Macron in terms of classical French ideologies or should his politics be approached in a whole new way? That is the second reason why I have named my research first: Beyond Ideologies. Starting point was to reflect on Macron's politics and thinking without resorting to the traditional and dogmatic approaches, in a way which would also represent his personal views and his statements about the relationship between ideologies and politics. Related to the previous it was relevant that I would approach Macron's politics using mainly rhetorical analysis as most of the research material consisted of the speeches and other public declarations Macron made during his campaign, and after he entered into the office in May 2017. The second important reason behind my method was of course the French political culture itself that has always emphasised the politician's ability to use various rhetorical skills and speak well in public debate. The skills have formed a precondition to one's political success and credibility. Two of the most important theories of the research are the risk society created by the German scholar Ulrich Beck and the third way political theory created by Anthony Giddens. Beck's global view was that the fragmentation and lower status of the old institutions (church political parties, family professions) have increased insecurity in the job market and in citizens' lives as the share of permanent jobs has decreased. At the same time the risk of unemployment has increased, and this concerns even academic professions. Third way theory was a natural choice as Macron was for example keen on using public money and investments on basic education and various internships programmes. Education policies were directed especially at suburban areas where the societal challenges were the most difficult. Macron's politics resembled the former Prime Minister of UK Tony Blair's politics where the third way politics was a leading political doctrine. Macron was also keen to intervene into various grass root grievances of French society which have caused a lot of negative consequences during the last three decades such as long term unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. In addition to the French government and Macron's administration making huge investments in basic education. The President of the Republic also questioned the current status and the current results of French higher education. Macron was concerned of the dropout figures and saw also that there existed old elitist institutions, such as ENA (National School of Administration) that did not serve country's interest. As my research continued it became clear quite soon that Macron's values and the goals he presented for France differed from his predecessors, and there were elements France had not actually faced during the political history of the Fifth Republic. Macron's political thinking was based on three pillars where work, entrepreneurship, and personal responsibility were the starting points together with pro-market thinking. Macron challenged also the traditional French statism thinking where the role of state dominated economic activity. One of the negative features was distorted competition with state-owned companies that had governmental support behind them. Specifically, this meant that these companies were able to receive cheap loans and other financial support guaranteed by the government. Macron wanted to create the same rules policy for all in domestic markets and this applied also to the European level. According to Macron GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) companies' tax evasion should be finished. Finally, I included several confluences from the late French Enlightenment where ideas of the philosophers François Guizot and Benjamin Constant ideas influence Macron's thinking. These ideas concerned especially the role of work, education and politicians role models in front of the citizens. A precondition to the fair and civilised society was openness and accountability. One of the typical problems in France has been how the politicians and political parties have used various loopholes in the political system as they have financed their campaigns.

Africa's growing demand for food has been met increasingly by imports from the global market. This, coupled with rising global food prices, brings ever-mounting food import bills. In addition, population growth and changing demand patterns will double demands over the next 10 years. Two key issues must be addressed: (a) establishing a consistent and stable policy environment for regional trade in fertilizers; and (b) investing in institutions that reduce the transaction costs of coordination failures. Many countries have enacted new fertilizer laws in recent years, but few have provided the resources to define and enforce regulations through standards and testing capacity. This report shows that reducing regulatory burdens on fertilizers and the consequent increase in use of fertilizers will have substantial impacts on returns to farmers, with consequent impacts on poverty. The report highlights the range of barriers to food trade in Africa along the entire value chain. The issues pertain to many ministries and agencies within government: trade, agricultural, health and safety, transport, and finance. This in turn requires a "whole of government' approach to freeing up food trade, which will require strong and effective leadership to articulate the rationale and sustain the momentum for reform. Leaders must also address the hard choices that will arise in dealing with the political economy constraints that have until now blocked the capacity of Africa to exploit its enormous potential to feed Africans.

This joint working paper lays out a rationale and strategic framework for improving food security and managing food-price shocks in the Arab countries. The paper does not provide country specific policy and project recommendations. Such recommendations will follow from the country by country application of the framework, taking into account each country's political and cultural preferences, resource endowments, and risk tolerance. In 2007 and the first half of 2008, a sharp rise in agricultural commodity and food prices triggered grave concerns about food security, malnutrition and increased poverty throughout the world. While the threat of a prolonged food-price shock receded with falling energy and commodity prices and a weakening global economy in the second half of 2008, many factors underlying the volatility in food prices appear here to stay and will require careful management if the world is to avoid future food-price shocks. This paper suggests three critical strategies that, together, can serve as pillars to help offset future vulnerability to price shocks: a) strengthen safety nets, provide people with better access to family planning services, and promote education; b) enhance the food supply provided by domestic agriculture and improve rural livelihoods by addressing lagging productivity growth through increased investment in research and development; and c) reduce exposure to market volatility by improving supply chain efficiency and by more effectively using financial instruments to hedge risk.

Trotz des erheblichen Ausmaßes der Bodenerosion in vielen Entwicklungsländern ist bislang weitgehend unklar, welches ihre wesentlichen anthropogenen Ursachen sind, und damit auch, wo Politiken und Maßnahmen für den Erhalt der Nahrungs- und Produktionsressource Boden ansetzen sollten. Jenseits unmittelbarer natürlicher und landnutzerischer Ursachen stehen heute sozioökonomische Faktoren im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion, von denen angenommen wird, daß sie die Anbau- und Bodenschutzentscheidungen der Landnutzer und darüber das Ausmaß an Bodenerosion beeinflussen, insbesondere: (i) verstärkte Armut, (ii) zunehmender Bevölkerungsdruck, (iii) verzerrte Agrarpreise, (iv) unangepaßter technischer Fortschritt sowie (v) unsichere Landbesitzverhältnisse. Der Bedeutung dieser Bestimmungsfaktoren wird vorwiegend im Rahmen produktionsökonomischer Ansätze und der Theorie der Induzierten Innovation nachgegangen. Allerdings wird die Wirkung einzelner Ursachen in der Literatur sehr unterschiedlich eingeschätzt. So wird beispielsweise in eher optimistischen Szenarien davon ausgegangen, daß Armuts- und Bevölkerungsdruck langfristig zur Entwicklung und Verbreitung bodenschonender Innovationen führen. In negativen Szenarien überwiegen hingegen Stimmen, die gerade in diesem Druck bei gleichzeitigem Preisdruck die wesentlichen Ursachen für die kurzsichtige Übernutzung des Bodens sehen. Empirische Studien zur Fundierung der kontrovers diskutierten Hypothesen liegen bislang nur für einen jeweils begrenzten lokalen Kontext vor und sind kaum verallgemeinerbar. Vor diesem Hintergrund bieten die Daten der ersten weltweiten Erhebung zum Stand der Bodenerosion (GLASOD, UNEP/ISRIC, 1991) nunmehr die Möglichkeit, sozioökonomische und landnutzerische Determinanten der Bodenerosion auf überregionaler Ebene empirisch zu untersuchen. Anhand der Aggregation und Analyse der im GLASOD enthaltenen Informationen wird zunächst deutlich, daß Afrika und Südostasien flächenmäßig mit jeweils rd. 4,5 Mio km2 am meisten zur Degradation durch Bodenerosion und Nährstoffverluste[1] in Entwicklungsländern beitragen, während der Anteil erodierter Fläche an der jeweiligen Gesamtfläche des Subkontinents[2] in Südwestasien (37%), Mittelamerika und Südostasien (jeweils rd. 25%) am höchsten ist. Extrem stark erodierte Länder finden sich v.a. in Mittelamerika und Afrika: In El Salvador, Haiti und Costa Rica sind zwischen 60% und 90% der jeweiligen Landesfläche betroffen. In Afrika sind vor allem die nord- und westafrikanischen Sahelländer Tunesien, Mauretanien, Libyen, Niger, Burkina Faso und Mali, im Osten die Hochlandstaaten Burundi und Rwanda sowie schließlich die Kapverdischen Inseln, besonders stark erodiert (40% bis 80% der Landesfläche). Wassererosion hat den größten Anteil an der Erosionsfläche, in Mittelamerika und Südostasien sind sogar mehr als 70% der erodierten Fläche von Wassererosion betroffen. Für die empirische Analyse der Zusammenhänge zwischen Bodenerosion und möglichen Bestimmungsfaktoren wird ein exploratives, ökonometrisches Vorgehen auf Grundlage nationaler Daten gewählt[3]. Die spezifische Aufeinanderfolge verschiedener Korrelations-, Faktoren- und Regressionsanalysen wird der großen Anzahl in Frage kommender Indikatorvariablen für mögliche Erosionsdeterminanten sowie den zu erwartenden Problemen der Multikollinearität und Modellspezifizierung in besonderem Maße gerecht. Letztere ergeben sich einerseits aus anzunehmenden Abhängikeiten unter verschiedenen Erosionsdeterminanten. Andererseits macht der latente Charakter[4], den die aus einem mikroökonomischen Kontext abgeleiteten Erosionsursachen auf aggregierter Ebene haben, es notwendig, für jede der angenommenen Determinanten verschiedene, u.U. korrelierte Indikatorvariablen zu definieren, was zusätzlich Kollinearität bedingt. Für Bodenerosion werden auf der Basis der national aggregierten GLASOD-Daten verschiedene Erosionsindizes definiert, die prinzipiell den von Wasser- und Winderosion sowie durch Nährstoffverluste betroffenen Anteil der nutzbaren Landesfläche wiedergeben. Die Datengrundlage für mögliche Erosionsdeterminanten wird ausgehend von Datensammlungen internationaler Organisationen für den Zeitraum 1961-1990 zusammengestellt. Für eine große Anzahl der in der Literatur diskutierten sozioökonomischen, landnutzerischen und auch natürlichen Rahmenbedingungen können repräsentative Indikatorvariablen definiert werden. Mangels geeigneter Indikatoren und Daten bleiben allerdings die Art und Sicherheit der Landbesitzverhältnisse unberücksichtigt. Insgesamt umfaßt die Datengrundlage rund 150 Variablen. Die Ergebnisse der Einfachkorrelationsanalysen zwischen den Erosionsindizes und möglichen Determinanten dienen einer ersten Einschätzung der Zusammenhänge. Sie zeigen, daß länderübergreifend insbesondere Variablen des Bevölkerungsdrucks sowie der durchschnittliche Waldanteil mit dem Ausmaß Bodenerosion in Zusammenhang stehen. Die Abholzungsraten in den 80er Jahren sind vor allem mit dem Ausmaß der Wassererosion korreliert. Bei Betrachtung der Länder mittleren Klimas[5] können Zusammenhänge mit Variablen nachgewiesen werden, die die Landnutzungsintensität und die Ausdehnung der tatsächlichen Nutzfläche in Relation zur potentiellen Nutzfläche wiedergeben. Weiterhin stehen in der mittleren Klimazone tendenziell sinkende Produzentenpreise für Agrarprodukte in Zusammenhang mit dem Ausmaß der Erosion. Erwartungsgemäß ist die Bedeutung natürlicher Faktoren für einzelne Erosionsformen und Klimazonen charakteristisch. Insgesamt scheinen Variablen, die das Ergebnis einer vermutlich längerfristigen Entwicklung wiedergeben, mehr Bedeutung für das Ausmaß der Erosion zu haben als solche, die Veränderungen im Referenzzeitraum 1961-1990 erfassen. Anhand verschiedener Faktorenanalysen für 62 Variablen und 73 Länder mit annähernd vollständigen Datensätzen können sodann strukturelle Zusammenhänge unter der Vielzahl möglicherweise relevanter Erosionsdeterminanten aufgedeckt und die Variablenanzahl auf Grundlage dieser Zusammenhänge auf eine geringere Anzahl weitgehend voneinander unabhängiger Größen reduziert werden. Es zeigt sich, daß die Struktur der Variablen durch etwa zehn gut interpretierbare Faktoren bei rd. 75% erklärter Gesamtvarianz klar wiedergegeben werden kann, und daß diese Faktoren auch bei Variation der Ausgangsvariablen sowie der Faktorextraktions- und Rotationsmethode stabil bleiben. Bemerkenswert ist, daß viele der Faktoren einen deutlichen Bezug zu den in der Literatur diskutierten Wirkungsketten unter möglichen Erosionsdeterminanten haben. So werden in dem für die Erklärung der Gesamtvarianz wichtigsten Faktor Variablen gebündelt, die die langfristige Intensivierung der Landnutzung im Zusammenhang mit strukturellem Bevölkerungsdruck und begrenzter Verfügbarkeit landwirtschaftlich nutzbarer Flächen erfassen. Weitere wichtige Faktoren beziehen sich auf strukturelle Armut in Verbindung mit erhöhtem ländlichen Bevölkerungswachstum; auf die mit Bevölkerungsdruck einhergehende langfristige wie auch rezente Expansion der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzfläche und Abholzung von Naturwald; auf Entwicklungswege, die eher auf die Produktion hochwertiger Produkte statt auf eine Flächenexpansion abzielen. Für die Preisentwicklung im Referenzzeitraum kann anhand einer Faktorenanalyse mit reduzierter Länderanzahl[6] gezeigt werden, daß ein Zusammenhang zwischen langfristig geringen oder negativen Preiszuwächsen im Agrarsektor und dem Faktor "Rezente Abholzungsraten" besteht. Um die relative Bedeutung dieser Faktoren für Bodenerosion zu quantifizieren, werden schrittweise Regressionsanalysen mit Bodenerosion als abhängiger Variablen und ausgewählten Repräsentantenvariablen für jeden Faktor als angenommenen unabhängigen Variablen durchgeführt[7]. Es lassen sich drei besonders relevante anthropogene Entwicklungen identifizieren, anhand derer das Erosionsausmaß bis zu rund 75% erklärt werden kann: (1) die langfristige, historische Ausdehnung der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzfläche auf Kosten des Waldbestandes in Zusammenhang mit einem Gesamtbevölkerungsdruck, der gegen Ende der 80er Jahre die agrar-ökologische Tragfähigkeit überschreitet; (2) die rezente Abholzung von Naturwald, die in Zusammenhang mit dem Wachstum der Gesamtbevölkerung zu sehen ist. Hier scheinen weniger der Druck der Agrarbevölkerung und die Ausdehnung der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzfläche - also die Produktionsseite - im Vordergrund zu stehen, als vielmehr der Druck der Nachfrageseite, in Kombination mit einem tendenziell sinkenden Agrarpreisniveau, das den Expansionsdruck auf das Land verstärkt hat. (3) Die langfristige, bevölkerungsdruckinduzierte Intensivierung der Agrarproduktion, vor allem durch Umwandlung von Dauergrünland in Ackerland, verkürzte Brachezeiten und erhöhte Viehbesatzdichten. Ein weiteres Ergebnis ist, daß in keinem Fall ein wesentlicher Einfluß von Armut auf das landesweite Ausmaß der Bodenerosion nachgewiesen werden kann - wie bereits die Ergebnisse der Einfachkorrelationsanalysen für immerhin 15 verschiedene Armutsindikatoren vermuten lassen. Es bestehen Unterschiede in den Erklärungsmustern für verschiedene Erosionsformen und Klimazonen. Die rezenten Abholzungsraten haben für Wassererosion, insbesondere in Ländern der extrem humiden Klimazone, herausragende Bedeutung. Zusätzlich zu den Faktoren (1) und (2) ist die Intensität der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion (3) vor allem für Wassererosion und in Ländern der mittleren Klimazone von Bedeutung. Hier ist auch die negative Wirkung einer sinkenden Agrarpreisentwicklung am stärksten. Gleichzeitig gilt hier: je eher der eingeschlagene Entwicklungsweg auf die Produktion hochwertiger Produkte im Gegesatz zur reinen Flächenexpansion abzielt, desto geringer ist das Erosionsausmaß. Für das Ausmaß der Winderosion und der Degradation durch Nährstoffverluste hingegen sind insbesondere die agroklimatischen Bedingungen ausschlaggebend. Die als erosionsrelevant identifizierten anthropogenen Rahmenbedingungen sind mit zentralen theoretischen Hypothesen konsistent. Fraglos gehören sie eher zu den Größen, deren kurzfristige Beeinflussung durch politische Maßnahmen schwierig ist. Dennoch können folgende Ansätze für eine Schwerpunktsetzung bei der Gestaltung von Politikmaßnahmen zur wirksamen Erosionsverminderung abgeleitet werden: Die Reduktion des Bevölkerungsdrucks durch eine an die natürlichen Bedingungen und relativen Faktorknappheiten angepaßte Erhöhung des Produktionspotentials, gerade auch in Regionen mit relativ niedrigem Potential. Eine stärkere Fokussierung auf Forstpolitiken bzw. auf eine Regulierung der kommerziellen Nutzung von Wäldern, vor allem in humiden Klimazonen. .Eine selektive, langfristig angelegte Verbesserung der incentive-Struktur für bodenschonende Produkte und Anbaumethoden über wirtschaftspolitische Eingriffe sowie durch verbesserte institutionelle und rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen. Von Politiken zur Armutsbekämpfung ist hingegen nicht zu erwarten, daß sie maßgebliche Impulse zur Verminderung der Bodenerosion geben können. Es muß jedoch immer präsent bleiben, daß arme Landnutzer sicherlich am stärksten und häufig existentiell von Erosionsschäden betroffen sind. Die Qualität zukünftiger Forschungsbemühungen auf globaler Ebene wird vor allem von der zukünftigen Datenverfügbarkeit und -qualität bestimmt: Für den Stand der Bodenerosion sind Informationen für verschiedene Zeitpunkte erforderlich; für anthropogene Erosionsdeterminanten eröffnen georeferenzierte Daten der Forschung gänzlich neue Perspektiven. Parallel zu überregionalen Analysen sind weitere lokale, sub-nationale Studien unbedingt notwendig, um umfassend zu ergründen, warum und welche Landnutzer die Ressource Boden in einem konkreten sozioökonomischen Kontext degradieren. Fußnoten: [1]Neben der Wasser- und Winderosion wird eine weitere Degradationsform, der Verlust von Nährstoffen und organischer Substanz, mitberücksichtigt und vereinfachend mit "Nährstoffverluste" bezeichnet.[2]Gemeint ist die nutzbare Landesfläche, Ödland ausgenommen. [3]Georeferenzierte Daten liegen derzeit für sozioökonomische Erosionsdeterminanten noch nicht vor.[4]D.h. Größen, von denen a priori nicht bekannt ist, wie sie beobachtet und gemessen werden können. [5]Dies sind Länder, in denen weder extrem aride noch extrem humide Bedingungen vorherrschen. [6]Für die entsprechende Variable liegen nur Daten für 56 Länder vor.[7]Umgekehrte Wirkungen der Erosion auf die als unabhängig angenommenen anthropogenen Variablen sind im Betrachtungszeitraum - bis auf die Armutswirkung starker Erosion - unwahrscheinlich. ; By the end of this century, soil erosion has reached an alarming extent in many developing countries. Still, uncertainty prevails regarding the human-induced causes of soil erosion. In consequence, many efforts to design efficient anti-erosion policies and instruments remain erratic. The actual discussion about human-induced causes of soil erosion focusses on socioeconomic factors that assumably influence the land users´ decisions on agricultural production and soil protection, and, hence, the degree of soil erosion. The most frequently discussed factors are: (i) poverty, (ii) population pressure, (iii) biased agricultural prices, (iv) the introduction of inadequate technical innovations and (iv) insecurity of land tenure. They are basically deduced from and discussed on base of production theory and the theory of induced innovation. Nevertheless, the different views on the importance to be assigned to the single factors are quite controverse. For example, in a rather optimistic scenario, it is argued that poverty and population pressure lead to the development of soil-conserving innovations in the long run. On the other side, poverty and population pressure, in combination with falling agricultural prices, are assumed to lead to a short-termist overuse of the soil. Empirical evidence that supports some of the controverse hypotheses on the causes of soil erosion is restricted to local studies based on local data on soil erosion, their results can hardly be generalized. In this context, the spatial data compiled within the global assessment of human-induced soil degradation (GLASOD; UNEP/ISRIC, 1991) for the first time permits a large-scale empirical analysis of socioeconomic and landuse factors relevant to erosion. By aggregating the information of the GLASOD data, countries and regions whith marked soil erosion can be identified. While Africa and Asia most contribute to the extent of soil erosion and the loss of nutrients[8] in absolute terms (4,5 mio sqkm each), it is in Southwest Asia (37%), Central America and Southeast Asia (25% each), where the proportion of of the land area - excluding wastelands - that is affected reaches the highest levels. Looked at on a national level, countries with an extreme extent of soil erosion are to be found in Central America and Africa: In El Salvador, Haiti and Costa Rica, 60 to 90 percent of the land area[9] are affected. In Africa, Sahelian Countries as Tunesia, Mauretania, Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as the eastafrican highlands of Burundi and Rwanda, and also Cape Verde show the highest proportions of eroded land area2 (40 to 80 %). Water erosion is the most widespread type of erosion, in Central America and Southeast Asia it even contributes with about 70% to the area affected by erosion and the loss of nutrients1. The methodological approach chosen for the empirical analysis of human-induced causes of soil erosion is an explorative, econometric one, based on national cross-country data[10]. A specific combination of correlation analyses, factor analysis, and regression analysis is designed, that can handle the great number of possible indicators for the assumed causes of erosion, and cope with related problems of multicollinearity and model specification. Those problems result from supposed interrelationships among different human-induced causes of soil erosion. At the same time, many of the causes of erosion have a latent character when considered on a national level[11], since they are deduced from a microeconomic context. This makes it necessary to define various indicator variables for each of them, which, again, implies additional multicollinearity. On the basis of the aggregated GLASOD data, a set of operational variables for soil erosion is defined. They basically indicate the proportion of a country´s degradable land area (i.e. land area minus wastelands) that is eroded through wind, water, or degraded by the loss of nutrients and organic matter by the end of the 80´s. In turn, the database for possible determinants of erosion is compiled departing from standard international data sets for the time span 1961-1990. Representative indicators can be defined for many of the causative factors discussed in literature, as well for socioeconomic ones, as for landuse, and also for natural factors. They are adapted in a way that they not only best fit and capture the hypothesized determinants, but also the ecological and timely dimension of the analysis. One important field that is not covered is land tenure. The resulting database comprises about 150 variables for possible causative factors, with a varying number of country-data available. The results of correlation analyses between the indicator variables for soil erosion and for possible causative factors facilitate a first assesion of relevant relationships. They show, that variables that quantify population pressure and the proportion of forested area are correlated with soil erosion for all countries. Deforestation rates in the 80´s are especially related to water erosion. Considering only countries without extreme climatic conditions[12] correlations are found between soil erosion and variables for the intensity of land use and the degree of expansion of the agricultural frontier. Producer price declines for relevant agricultural products are also found to be correlated with soil erosion in these countries. Corresponding to theoretical assumptions, the importance of different natural factors vary for different types of erosion and climatic zones. Altogether, variables that express structural conditions and can be regarded as the outcome of historical, long-term developments, seem to have stronger correlation with the extent of soil erosion than variables that quantify changes that took place within the time span under consideration, 1961 to 1990. The next methodological step consists in different factor analyses for 62 of the variables that express possible causative factors and for 73 countries with approximatively complete data sets. The principal objectives are to detect structural interrelationships among the multitude of variables and to reduce their number on the basis of these interrelations, in a way to obtain a set of variables that are largely independent of each other. It turns out that the structure of the 62 variables under consideration can clearly be reproduced by about 10 factors, with about 75% of their total variance being explained. These factors prove to be robust with respect to changes in the set of included variables, and in the methods of extraction and rotation. It is noteworthy, that many of the identified factors refer to cause-effect relationships that are discussed in literature. For instance, the factor that explains the greatest part of total variance, combines variables that quantify the long-run intensification of land use with others that stand for structural population pressure and a limited buffer for the expansion of the agricultural area. Other important factors relate to structural poverty, in combination with high rates of rural population growth; to the long-term and recent deforestation and to total population pressure; to development paths that aim at sopisticated animal procuction and permanent culture rather than at a mere expansion of the agricultural area. Other factors stand for the prevailing natural conditions. Based on a factor analysis for a reduced number of countries, it can be shown that declinig aggregate agricultural producer prices[13] are associated with the factor ´recent deforestation rates´. To quantify the relative importance of the identified factors, stepwise regression analyses are then carried out, with soil erosion as the dependent variable and selected representative variables for each of the factors as presumed independent variables[14]. Three human-induced factors, or developments, show to have particular relevance for the extent of soil erosion, that they can explain to up to 75%: (1) the long-run historical expansion of the agricultural frontier at the expense of the forested area, in combination with a population pressure well above the corresponding supporting capacities in the 80´s; (2) recent deforestation rates in conjunction with total population growth. This effect can rather be associated with a growth of demand for agricultural and forestral products and declining agricultural prices than with pressures directly resulting from agricultural population and expansion; (3) the long-run intensification of land use, mainly throug the conversion of permanent pastures to arable land, the shortening of fallow periods, and the increase of animal densities. This type of intensification is associated with and possibly induced by high structural population pressure in agricultural areas. Another important result is that poverty seems to have minor impact on the extent of soil erosion at the aggregate, national level. None of the included variables that represent the factor ´poverty´ shows a significant relative impact, neither in the models for the sum of erosion nor for specific types of erosion or climatic zones. This fact supports the low correlation coefficients for altogether 15 different poverty indicators that were calculated in the context of simple correlation analysis. Specific models for specific types of erosion and climatic zones show that there exist characteristic patterns of explanation for each type and zone. Recent deforestation rates and the associated features (factor (2))are particularily important in the explanation of water erosion, especially in countries with predominant humid climate. The impact of production-intensity in terms of factor (3) is specific for water erosion, and for countries without extreme climatic conditions, together with the factors (1) and (2). This is also where the negative effect of declinig agricultural prices appears to be strongest. At the same time, the development of sopisticated animal procuction and the growth of the area under permanent culture in contrast to a mere expansion of the agricultural area seem to be favourable to the soil in this context. In the explanation of wind erosion and loss of nutrients, natural factors are in the foreground. The identified, human-induced pressures related to long-term population growth, intesification, agricultural price decline and recent deforestation are consistent with important theoretical hypotheses. Those pressures are clearly not of the type that can be overcome over night through political intervention. Nevertheless, they lead to the following areas of intervention that should be given priority in the design of policy measures for the reduction of soil erosion: A reduction of population pressure through an increase in site-specific production potentials, based upon innovations that match the prevailing agro-ecological and economic conditions. Special attention should be given to low potential areas.A stronger focus on forest policy and the regulation of commercial forest use especially in the humid zone.A selective, long-term improvement of economic incentives for the production of soil-conserving crops with soil-conserving methods, by means of economic policy as well as through improved institutional conditions. Policies that aim at the reduction of poverty can not be expected to play a decisive role in the reduction of soil erosion. In spite of that, it is most necessary that policy makers keep in mind that the poor certainly are most affected by and vulnerable to erosion damages. At a global scale, the quality of future research on the topic will largely be determined by data availability and quality: concerning soil erosion, information at different points in time is necessary; for anthropogenic factors, spatial datasets will bring a new dimension into scientific research. Parallel with global analyses, further in depth local studies are necessary for a comprehensive and detailed insight into why and which land users degrade the resource they depend on in a specific socioeconomic context. footnotes: [8]The loss of nutrients and organic matter, independent of soil erosion, is also considered and is abbreviated with the term ´loss of nutrients´ in this text. [9]Again, it is the land area excluding wasteland that is being referred to. [10]Spatial data sets are not avaiable yet for socioeconomic factors related to soil erosion. [11]I.e. it is not known a priori, how these causes can be measured and quantified. [12]I.e. countries without predominant arid, hyper-arid or humid agroclimatioc conditions. [13]The availability of data for the variable in cause is limited to 56 coutries. [14]Reciprocal effects that soil erosion might have on anthropogenic factors are not very likely to occurr within the considered time span, except a possible increase of poverty due to erosion.

La presente tesi non è solo l'esito di una ricerca su un precetto giuridico controverso, ma è anche la narrazione di un processo personale di scoperta, che a partire dallo studio di una specifica norma ha fatto emergere la complessità delle interazioni nell'ambito delle politiche in materia penale, economica, e finanziaria. Partendo da un approccio microsociologico focalizzato sull'analisi di una determinata norma penale, il reato di riciclaggio,1 la ricerca ha dovuto confrontarsi con temi di interesse macrosociologico, al fine di inserire l'analisi della legge all'interno di un contesto più ampio di politiche nazionali, europee e internazionali, di attori e di governance transnazionale. Per mantenere la scientificità dell'elaborato ho omesso di esprimere opinioni personali sui temi, talvolta di carattere fortemente politico, e ho cercato, invece, di presentare aspetti critici e discussioni aperte fornendo una visione completa e imparziale delle contrastanti argomentazioni in modo da lasciare il lettore libero di trarre le proprie conclusioni. Il riciclaggio di denaro sporco è il processo tramite cui a proventi di reati viene data un'apparenza di essere stati guadagnati in modo illecito. È un reato tipico della cosiddetta 'zona grigia', poiché avviene al confine tra la sfera della legalità e quella dell'illegalità. Nel momento in cui profitti realizzati illecitamente si mescolano ai flussi di denaro lecito è molto difficile discernere ciò che ha un'origine legale da ciò che è stato guadagnato illegalmente. Il reato di riciclaggio di denaro sporco è stato introdotto proprio per affrontare questa difficoltà ed impedire che le strutture legittime dell'economia e della finanza globale venissero abusate da trasgressori al fine di ripulire i proventi di reato. Infatti i flussi di denaro sporco utilizzano spesso gli stessi canali usati per le transazioni lecite; la loro riuscita dipende dalla cooperazione di professionisti quali avvocati commerciali, agenti finanziari, commercialisti, la cui reputazione è raramente sospetta. Data questa promiscuità spesso la gravità del fenomeno è sottovalutata dal pubblico che non ha gli strumenti per riconoscerne la pericolosità, anche a causa dell'assenza di vittime dirette. Dall'altra parte le stime sulla quantità di proventi di reato riciclati a livello mondiale (che oscillano tra il 2,5 % e il 5,5 % del PIL globale) richiamano l'attenzione su quella che Dalla Chiesa definisce la mitologia del volume dell'economia criminale,2 e una parte della letteratura descrive il riciclaggio come il lato oscuro della globalizzazione,3 e come uno dei maggiori problemi dell'era moderna.4 Con questa ricerca ho voluto mettere in discussione l'efficacia del reato di riciclaggio nel far fronte al fenomeno dell'infiltrazione dei flussi di denaro sporco nell'economia lecita. Sebbene la pratica di nascondere i proventi di reato in modo da evitare la persecuzione giudiziaria risalga probabilmente a molto tempo addietro, il concetto giuridico di riciclaggio è relativamente recente ed è stato introdotto nei codici penali nella maggior parte del mondo a partire dalla fine degli anni 80.5 Nel frattempo un gran numero di autori si è scagliato contro la scarsa efficacia delle legislazione anti-riciclaggio6, nonostante le innumerevoli novità introdotte e i cospicui ammendamenti che hanno in larga parte espanso il campo di applicazione della normativa. La decisione di scegliere il contesto tedesco come caso di studio deriva dal fatto che il paese è considerato avere un rischio particolarmente alto di riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Secondo il rapporto emesso dal 2010 dal GAFI (Groupe d'Action Financière), dal FMI (Fondo Monetario Internazionale) e dall'OCSE (Organizzazione per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo economico)7 ci sono alcuni fattori che rendono la Germania propensa ad essere usata al fine di riciclaggio di denaro sporco: il volume del sistema economico-finanziario, la locazione strategica al centro dell'Unione Europea con forti legami internazionali, l'uso diffuso di denaro contante,8 l'apertura delle frontiere, la vastità del settore informale, l'importante ruolo a livello di economia globale, e il coinvolgimento nei flussi di denaro transfrontalieri. Anche i media, a partire soprattutto dalla pubblicazione del citato rapporto, hanno attirato l'attenzione del pubblico sul fenomeno, descrivendo la Germania come "paradiso" o "Eldorado" per i riciclatori. Alcuni recenti scandali hanno visto coinvolte prominenti banche tedesche, come la Deutsche Bank, la Commerybank e l'Hyopovereinsbank, contro cui procure straniere hanno sollevato l'accusa di riciclaggio di denaro sporco.9 La legislazione in atto, ed in particolare l'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco, non sembra essere sufficientemente efficace per contrastare il fenomeno, nonostante gli abbondanti emendamenti e il continuo processo di aggiornamento e di espansione del campo di applicazione della norma. Al fine di spiegare questa per lo meno apparente incapacità della norma di fare fronte al fenomeno del riciclaggio, ho costruito l'ipotesi di ricerca sulla base delle teorie sociologico-giuridiche relative all'efficacia del diritto, alle funzioni manifeste e latenti delle norme e quindi alle intenzioni espresse e non dal legislatore, all'efficacia simbolica del diritto e di singole legislazioni e all'impatto, inteso come comprensivo degli effetti indesiderati o collaterali. L'ipotesi di ricerca è che la norma esplichi una funzione simbolica di allineamento dell'ordinamento nazionale a quello europeo e transnazionale, di compromesso tra gli interessi politici in gioco, e di creazione di consenso pubblico verso il legislatore per essersi occupato della questione. Si ipotizza che il legislatore abbia quindi consapevolmente accettato o addirittura scelto di formulare una norma strumentalmente poco efficace, ma simbolicamente capace di raggiungere i suoi obiettivi latenti. Si solleva inoltre l'ipotesi che la norma sia stata appositamente approvata con lo scopo di non modificare lo status quo delle relazioni e strutture economiche, e di permettere quindi l'ingresso di capitali sporchi nel paese, sulla base del motto pecunia non olet. La suddetta ipotesi viene parzialmente smentita dai risultati della ricerca empirica. La ricostruzione del processo di produzione legislativa mette in risalto l'esistenza di svariati e contrastanti interessi e della forte pressione esercitata dagli organismi internazionali per l'introduzione e lo sviluppo del reato di riciclaggio, e conferma, quindi, l'argomentazione che la norma sia stata approvata in un contesto di pressione politica esterna e di necessità di trovare un compromesso tra diverse parti politiche. Anche l'analisi degli aspetti problematici dell'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco messi in risalto dalla dottrina supporta l'ipotesi della simbolicità della norma. Il fatto che il legislatore abbia formulato un reato così complesso crea evidenti problemi di integrazione dello stesso all'interno del sistema penale tedesco, e quindi di accettazione da parte degli studiosi e potenzialmente da parte degli operatori del diritto. Inoltre, la scelta di costruire un reato così complesso riflette la necessità di venire a compromesso con opposti interessi, ma potrebbe essere anche essere interpretata come un disinteresse al raggiungimento di un'efficacia materiale. La ricerca empirica sull'implementazione dell'articolo 261, invece, smentisce l'idea che la norma abbia un'efficacia puramente simbolica. Infatti il numero di condanne, di investigazioni, ed in generale l'uso ricorrente della legge riscontrato nelle statistiche criminali provano che essa conduca ad effetti strumentali, oltre che simbolici. Inoltre, nella prospettiva di alcuni degli operatori del diritto e degli esperti intervistati, l'articolo 261 è percepito come una norma particolarmente efficiente, sia in relazione alle quote di chiarimento, che come strumento di demarcazione tra comportamenti leciti e illeciti, in un contesto di deregolamentazione del settore finanziario. Da un'analisi piè ravvicinata delle statistiche e di altri rapporti emessi da enti internazionali e nazionali emerge però un quadro non così univoco: La norma sembra colpire più le vittime dei network criminali che operano a livello transnazionale che gli autori, perché spesso i colpevoli sono coinvolti in transazioni sospette in cambio di guadagni monetari. Le cospicue indagini finanziarie non riescono a raggiungere coloro che operano dietro gli esecutori dei reati minori, ed infatti la maggior parte di esse si concludono senza una condanna per riciclaggio. Questo a fronte di un volume di denaro sporco circolante nel paese che rimane allarmante, secondo alcuni degli studi analizzati. Se da una parte i risultati dell'applicazione della norma, sebbene strumentali, non possono considerarsi soddisfacenti, perché non sono riusciti ad evitare l'ingresso di capitali illeciti nell'economia nazionale, dall'altra parte sembra che l'esistenza di interessi profondamente contrastanti in gioco renda quasi impossibile la formulazione di un reato piè efficace. La tesi è composta da cinque capitoli, un'introduzione e una conclusione. Nel primo capitolo espongo le teorie sociologiche adottate per la valutazione di efficacia della norma e il metodo della ricerca. Inizialmente richiamo concetti di efficacia forniti da discipline affini alla sociologia del diritto - tra cui per esempio il concetto di efficienza e di efficienza indipendente rispetto allo scopo (zielunhabhängige Effizienz) riferito agli apparati amministrativi - che torneranno utili per l'interpretazione dei risultati delle interviste. Successivamente procedo con una panoramica sulle definizioni di efficacia del diritto fornite in sociologia del diritto, sulla ci base adotto una nozione "elastica" -riprendendola da Ferrari- di efficacia di una norma che guarda alle funzioni della norma e alle intenzioni del legislatore, in una prospettiva "intenzionalistica": "la corrispondenza fra un disegno politico di utilizzo di uno strumento normativo e i suoi effetti". Tale nozione, oltre a prestarsi ad un'analisi critica del diritto, fornisce indicazioni utili per l'analisi empirica dell'efficacia della legge in questione. In particolare ritengo utile considerare le seguenti variabili: le intenzioni latenti e manifeste del legislatore, gli scopi diretti e ed indiretti, l'eventuale efficacia simbolica del diritto, l'implementazione, la ricezione della norma nel senso di accettazione nel sistema giuridico e di interpretazione e percezione da parte degli operatori giuridici. Nella seconda parte si evidenzia il rilievo di tali variabili con riferimento specifico al diritto penale. In conclusione, sulla base delle riflessioni teoriche, formulo l'ipotesi sull'efficacia simbolica del reato di riciclaggio nell'ordinamento tedesco, che verrà poi verificata nei capitoli successivi. Nello specifico, presumendo che il reato di riciclaggio, introdotto come strumento fondamentale della lotta alla criminalità organizzata, così com'è formulato non adempie agli scopi dichiarati, nonostante gli innumerevoli emendamenti finalizzati proprio ad aumentarne l'efficacia, ipotizzo un'efficacia simbolica della norma, introdotta per offrire un'immagine di efficienza al pubblico (elettori). Inoltre sollevo l'ipotesi che la norma sia stata emanata appositamente inefficace per neutralizzarne le aspirazioni di punizione delle condotte illecite tipiche dei colletti bianchi, in una lettura moderna del conflitto sociale che avviene tramite l'emanazione di norme, con la volontà di decriminalizzare secondariamente comportamenti tipici delle classi forti. Nel secondo capitolo analizzo il processo legislativo a livello internazionale, europeo e nazionale. Il processo che ha portato alla creazione del reato di riciclaggio a livello internazionale viene ricostruito tramite dichiarazioni di intenti degli attori partecipanti, opinioni pubblicate, trascrizioni dei dibattiti parlamentari. Una particolare attenzione è posta sulle diverse intenzioni degli attori che hanno partecipato alla formulazione del reato. Il processo legislativo che ha portato alla formulazione dell'attuale legislazione anti-riciclaggio è un processo complesso, in cui diversi attori partecipanti hanno contribuito con differenti aspettative e dunque attribuendo diverse funzioni alla criminalizzazione del riciclaggio. Al fine di permettere svariate interpretazioni del dettato normativo in modo da soddisfare i differenti bisogni, e con lo scopo di trovare un compromesso tra gli interessi divergenti, il reato di riciclaggio è stato formulato in modo vago. Mentre alcuni Stati (ad esempio la Francia) inizialmente sostenevano l'introduzione del reato con lo scopo di combattere i paradisi fiscali e rafforzare la lotta all'evasione fiscale, altri Stati, come la Svizzera, hanno accettato di firmare l'accordo internazionale sulla criminalizzazione del riciclaggio solo a condizione che l'evasione fiscale non fosse inserito nella lista dei reati antecedenti. Con la nascita del GAFI la policy viene usata allo scopo di difendere l'integrità del sistema finanziario dall'infiltrazione di capitale illecito e dal 2001 si aggiunge la funzione di lotta al finanziamento del terrorismo. Tramite la soft law emanata dal GAFI per la prevenzione del riciclaggio, si trasferiscono compiti solitamente pubblici al settore privato: banche e istituti finanziari devono segnalare alla polizia ogni transazione sospetta, devono raccogliere e mantenere informazioni sui clienti e verificare le identità dei clienti. L'Unione Europea finora ha emanato quattro direttive nell'ambito del riciclaggio, l'ultima risale al 20 maggio 2015. Inizialmente la CE non aveva competenza in ambito penale, perciò la materia riciclaggio fu assorbita nella sfera economica (DG Economia e industria). La funzione dichiarata dal legislatore è la protezione del mercato interno, con particolare riguardo al fatto che i criminali possano sfruttare la libera circolazione dei capitali e l'eliminazione delle frontiere. Le direttive esprimono anche la volontà di impedire agli stati membri di emanare regolamentazioni che possano bloccare il libero mercato al fine di difendere le proprie economie dall'infiltrazione di capitale illecito. Emerge dunque un ulteriore conflitto di interessi. Nella seconda parte ricostruisco il processo legislativo e le evoluzioni interne alla Germania fino al momento della scrittura e fornisco il quadro del sistema repressivo e di prevenzione anti-riciclaggio. L'articolo 261 StGB è stato introdotto con legge Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalität, quindi nell'ambito della lotta alla criminalità organizzata. Il dibattito parlamentare rileva che la norma è il frutto di un compromesso sotto diversi aspetti, non ultimo il fatto che è stata emanata del 1992, a pochi anni dalla riunificazione, e che quindi è parte del processo di negoziazione per la formazione di un diritto penale adattabile alle due culture giuridiche. Il legislatore tedesco evidenzia alcune funzioni della norma: la lotta al consumo di eroina e al traffico di stupefacenti, la diffusione e la pericolosità della mafia alla luce dei fatti recenti italiani, la volontà di proteggere l'amministrazione della giustizia e di isolare i criminali puntando alla criminalizzazione dei cosiddetti gate-keepers. Nel terzo capitolo individuo alcuni dei problemi sollevati dalla dottrina tedesca sul piano teorico con riferimento alla criminalizzazione del reato di riciclaggio nel contesto del sistema penale tedesco. Uno dei temi più discussi è relativo al bene giuridico protetto. La dottrina non ha ancora trovato un accordo su quale interesse sia protetto dall'articolo 261 StGB, le ipotesi sono: gli interessi dei reati antecedenti, l'amministrazione della giustizia, il sistema finanziario e la sicurezza. La vaghezza del dettato normativo non aiuta a trovare un interpretazione dottrinale univoca. La questione del bene giuridico protetto, lungi dall'essere una mera questione teorica, risente delle diverse funzioni attribuite alla norma dagli attori partecipanti al processo legislativo. Finora la giurisprudenza, che pur è intervenuta a chiarire altre questioni relative alla norma, non è intervenuta sul tema. Un altro tema su cui il dibattito è ancora aperto è il fatto di aver previsto al comma 5 l'ipotesi di colpa lieve, in controtendenza rispetto al legislatore europeo. Questo, secondo alcuni studiosi porta all'assurdo per cui anche il panettiere Tizio che vende del pane ad un evasore fiscale Caio potendo aver riconosciuto che Caio fosse un evasore, si rende colpevole di riciclaggio. La questione del livello di mens rea richiesto per una condanna per riciclaggio era sorta anche durante il dibattito parlamentare e l'introduzione del comma 5 è stato sostenuto da un emendamento della SPD che avrebbe voluto criminalizzare anche l'ipotesi di colpa lievissima. Questo, secondo la CDU avrebbe messo un freno al mercato e alle transazioni, poiché avrebbe costituito una minaccia per chiunque avesse intrapreso operazioni economiche. Essendo la funzione della norma incerta, la dottrina si divide tra chi sostiene che questa vasta criminalizzazione faccia perdere il senso del reato che sarebbe invece colpire i criminali che agiscono con intento, e chi invece sostiene che la norma abbia lo scopo di impedire qualsiasi infiltrazione di denaro illecito e quindi richieda una responsabilizzazione di tutti colori i quali prendano parte in operazioni finanziarie o economiche. Ancora una volta l'indeterminatezza del precetto legislativo è di ostacolo ad un'interpretazione univoca. Il quarto capitolo offre un'analisi qualitativa delle statistiche officiali sull'implementazione della legge dal 1992 ad oggi da parte delle istanze repressive e di prevenzione. Tra i dati analizzati i più rilevanti sono per esempio il numero di segnalazioni di transazioni sospette ricevuto dalle procure, il numero delle investigazioni condotte, il numero di condanne effettivamente inflitte ed eseguite e per quale delle ipotesi di riciclaggio, il volume di denaro confiscato. Essendo tali numeri indici del funzionamento del sistema penale e non del fenomeno del riciclaggio per sé, in conclusione si confrontano tali statistiche con le stime sul volume di flussi illeciti in Germania. Tale analisi, non potendo dare conto del numero dei reati evitati, sulla base dell'efficacia deterrente della norma, non intende esaurire il giudizio di efficacia della legislazione. Tra i risultati più rilevanti vi sono il fatto che il 60% delle persone condannate vengono condannate per l'ipotesi di colpa lieve, che solitamente consiste in casi in cui una persona poco abbiente ha accettato di far usare il proprio conto a terzi per operazioni sospette in cambio di un guadagno. Nel 5% dei casi le condanne sono inflitte per le ipotesi aggravate di commissione da membro di un'associazione criminale o in forma commerciale. Nel 90% dei casi le transazioni sospette segnalate alle procure portano a una chiusura dei procedimenti per mancanza di indizi che possano sostenere un rinvio a giudizio. La norma sembra colpire delinquenti minori e non grandi gruppi criminali, né altri delinquenti più potenti. Si ipotizza inoltre che l'incapacità di sostenere un rinvio a giudizio nonostante le informazioni acquisite e le indagini preliminari riduce la capacità deterrente della norma e permette, invece, ai criminali di conoscere le modalità di funzionamento del sistema repressivo e agire di conseguenza. Inoltre, le transazioni sospette sono segnalate nel circa 90% dei casi sa parte di istituti di credito, mentre gli altri enti obbligati dalla legislazione non sembrano partecipare attivamente al processo preventivo, in particolare il settore forense e immobiliare e del gioco d'azzardo. Sulla base di questi dati si ipotizza un effetto spill-over, ossia un trasferimento di illegalità dai settori più controllati a quelli meno controllati. I rapporti pubblicati dalla polizia, invece, considerano l'articolo 261 StGB come una norma con una delle più alte quote di chiarimento (ca 90%), quota calcolata sul numero di casi chiariti dal sistema penale, a prescindere dalle modalità di chiarimento. Per quanto riguardo il volume di denaro riciclato, il capitolo richiama alcune delle stime pubblicate da diversi enti, tra cui il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, il GAFI e la polizia criminale federale. Essendo il fenomeno del riciclaggio un campo in cui la cifra oscura è stimata essere molto alta, tali dati non possono essere presi come misura obiettiva del fenomeno. Infine il capitolo si conclude richiamando alcune analisi del tipo costi-benefici per misurare l'efficacia delle politiche anti-riciclaggio o alcune delle sue norme, condotte da enti terzi. Tali analisi sembrano concordare nel considerare i costi di implementazione della politica più alti rispetto ai benefici conseguenti. Nel quinto capitolo, infine, vengono discussi i risultati della ricerca empirica con gli operatori giuridici e con alcuni osservatori privilegiati, in modo da fornire una prospettiva interna sul funzionamento della norma. Tramite le interviste condotte si mettono in luce aspetti della prassi giuridica non fotografati dalle statistiche, allo scopo di offrire un'immagine dell'impatto della legge quanto più vicina possibile alla realtà. La ricerca empirica si avvale di interviste con operatori del diritto e con osservatori privilegiati che siedono in posizioni ministeriali rilevanti nella lotta al riciclaggio. La metodologia adottata è di tipo qualitativo, è stato fatto uso di interviste semi-strutturate a operatori del diritto e a osservatori privilegiati. Il capitolo presenta le percezioni degli intervistati su quattro temi principalmente: la dimensione del fenomeno del riciclaggio, l'adeguatezza tecnica della legislazione, i conflitti di interesse intrinseci alla legge e sorti dall'applicazione della norma e l'efficacia delle legge. A fronte di un rapporto emesso da quattro ONG nel novembre 2013, sulla base di statistiche prodotte dall'UNODC e dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale, e immediatamente riprese dai media, che descrive il paese come "Eldorado" per i riciclatori,10 le interviste sono dirette a cogliere l'opinione dei rispondenti sulle dimensioni del fenomeno del riciclaggio in Germania. Un intervistato ritiene inaccettabile desumere dal PIL tedesco il volume di affari del crimine organizzato nel paese, e obietta che non si possa, sulla base del giro d'affari del centro finanziario di Francoforte, definire lo stesso come centro di riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Un altro intervistato, dichiara, al contrario, che sicuramente il fatto che la Germania abbia un'economia stabile ed un settore bancario affidabile attiri coloro che vogliano investire proventi illeciti, neppure quest'ultimo possiede, però, dati affidabili sulla quantità di denaro riciclato. Il riciclaggio, come altri fenomeni legati alla criminalità organizzata, è una fattispecie che per definizione sfugge alle autorità e ai confini nazionali. Lo scopo dello stesso è nascondere proventi di reato e sottrarli in questo modo al sistema repressivo, questo è sicuramente un elemento che rende complessa, se non impossibile, la sua quantificazione. D'altra parte, osservano i soggetti intervistati autori del Rapporto del 2013, l'incapacità di fornire statistiche rilevanti dopo più di 20 anni di lotta al riciclaggio, sembra essere un sintomo di una carente volontà politica nel contrastare efficacemente il fenomeno. Secondo gli osservatori privilegiati se la Germania fosse davvero un paradiso per i riciclatori, ciò non sarebbe collegabile ad un deficit legislativo, dato l'impegno del governo nella lotta al riciclaggio, negando, quindi, l'accusa rivolta dai media per cui i criminali sceglierebbero il paese tedesco ai fini di riciclaggio di denaro sporco sulla base delle lacune normative. Agli intervistati è stato chiesto di evidenziare aspetti positivi e problematici della legislazione. Tra i più rilevanti vi sono: la necessità di bilanciare il bisogno di punire la condotta di riciclaggio e rispettare i principi fondamentali del sistema giuridico, il disinteresse da parte degli istituti finanziari nell'indagare l'origine del capitale investito dai clienti, anche in caso di sospetto di provenienza criminale, a causa della possibile conseguente perdita di reputazione nell'ipotesi di apertura di investigazioni da parte delle autorità sul cliente sospetto. Vi è poi una difficoltà materiale nel condurre indagini finanziarie, che spesso, conducono a condotte illecite commesse all'estero; sul punto si osserva che le condotte di riciclaggio, intese come operazioni atte ad ostacolare la provenienza delittuosa, non avvengono su territorio tedesco, bensì all'estero, il denaro che entra in Germania, è, quindi, già "pulito". Inoltre, l'articolo 261 è stato introdotto nel sistema tedesco come trasposizione di una direttiva Europea e non rifletteva una necessità interna dello Stato; la formulazione così vaga, infatti, si presta più per il sistema giuridico degli Stati Uniti, in cui non vige l'obbligo dell'azione penale, mentre in Germania, dove i pubblici ministeri hanno l'obbligo di azione penale, tale norma porta ad iniziare numerose indagini senza avere la capacità di proseguirle. In generale, gli intervistati rappresentanti dei Ministeri rilevano la forte pressione subita da parte del GAFI e dell'Unione Europea per l'emanazione della legge anti-riciclaggio e concordano nel dire che se la norma fosse stata creata sulla base di una necessità e di un dibattito nazionale sarebbe stata scritta diversamente. C'è chi individua nel sistema penale le cause di inefficacia dell'articolo 261, nello specifico, la limitata possibilità di effettuare intercettazioni telefoniche, le restrizioni in materia di inversione dell'onere probatorio, e lo scarso utilizzo della confisca dei proventi di reato a causa del disinteresse da parte delle procure (gestite a livello di Bundesländer) nell'investire risorse in tal senso dato che i beni confiscati non resterebbero in mano al Bundesland ma verrebbero raccolti in un fondo federale e poi spartiti. Si osserva una generale mancanza di risorse pubbliche che porta ad una carenza di personale coinvolto nelle investigazioni e, quindi, ad una incapacità di far fronte ai processi in corso in modo efficace. Per questo motivo, i pm non hanno la capacità di indagare più a fondo casi di riciclaggio all'apparenza semplici, ma che potrebbero portare alla luce organizzazioni criminali operanti nell'ombra. Alla totalità degli intervistati è stata chiesta un'opinione sull'efficacia della legge. L'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco è stato definito da un soggetto "una legge scritta in modo indecente, che produce risultati banali sul piano delle statistiche criminali, soprattutto con riferimento alle condanne per riciclaggio in grossi casi di criminalità economica". Il reato è così difficile da provare in giudizio, che risulta facile, per la difesa, sfruttare le lacune legislative per evitare una condanna per riciclaggio. I rappresentanti dei Ministeri confermano che la lettera dell'articolo 261 crea confusioni e che quindi l'accusa, pur trovandosi di fronte ad un caso di riciclaggio spesso preferisca perseguire i delitti presupposto. Questo non è, però, un sintomo di inefficacia, dato che l'effettività a cui mira il Ministero dell'interno non è data dal numero di condanne per riciclaggio, ma dal numero di casi risolti, e quindi dal numero di condanne in generale, a prescindere dall'imputazione. D'opinione opposta un altro intervistato che ritiene che l'articolo 261 non abbia alcuna capacità deterrente nei confronti della criminalità organizzata, "la norma ricorre così raramente nella prassi giudiziaria che di fatto non rappresenta una "minaccia" per i potenziali criminali". I soggetti intervistati esprimono più soddisfazione a riguardo della legislazione di prevenzione (GWG); in particolare, con riferimento alle piccole e medie imprese, per le quali è difficile riconoscere tra i partner commerciali coloro i quali investono denaro di provenienza illecita, la possibilità di affidarsi alle autorità investigative, in caso di sospetto è fondamentale. Un avvocato specializzato in compliance per società, descrive la norma preventiva come molto efficace e severa, tanto che è impossibile per le aziende, specialmente per quelle di medie o piccole dimensioni, adempiere a tutti gli obblighi prescritti dalla norma, ma, egli osserva, l'efficacia del sistema sta proprio nel fatto che le autorità di controllo, consapevoli dell'elevata rigorosità della legge, chiudono un occhio di fronte a lievi inadempienze. Una legge meno severa e un controllo più fiscale non otterrebbero la stessa efficacia, perché la norma non avrebbe lo stesso potenziale deterrente. L'efficacia all'interno delle amministrazioni responsabili per la lotta al riciclaggio è interpretata come efficienza dell'apparato, per questo motivo, non ci sono verifiche sull'efficacia degli strumenti giuridici sulla base degli scopi dichiarati, quanto piuttosto sulla correttezza del funzionamento dell'amministrazione e sulle possibilità di migliorarlo; il punto è capire come migliorare, non se il sistema sia efficace o no. Agli intervistati è stata chiesta un'opinione sull'eventuale efficacia simbolica della legislazione. La maggioranza delle risposte è stata negativa, gli sforzi compiuti da parte dello Stato -e quindi delle procure, della autorità competenti e della polizia- nel contrastare il riciclaggio e la criminalità economica non possono essere considerati simbolici. Alcuni intervistati ritengono assolutamente necessaria e strumentale – e quindi non simbolica- l'esistenza del reato nel codice penale come demarcazione di illegalità di tali condotte e come strumento atto a contrastare la criminalità economica perché mette in chiaro entro quali limiti le società possano perseguire profitti in modo legittimo. Di opinione diversa, invece, gli avvocati penalisti i quali si sono detti favorevoli a tale definizione sulla base dello scarso numero di condanne e soprattutto sulla mancata previsione da parte del Governo di mezzi adeguati per l'implementazione della legislazione. Lo stesso è osservato dal terzo settore, il quale sostiene che, a fronte di una legge complessa, oggetto di svariati emendamenti nel corso degli anni, non c'è stato un sufficiente impegno sul versante dell'implementazione; il coinvolgimento del GAFI e dell'OECD nella lotta al riciclaggio è percepito come un modo per creare posti di lavoro e nuove figure professionali, più che un'arena dove discutere efficaci strumenti di lotta ai reati economici. Altri elementi interessanti riscontrabili nelle interviste sono i conflitti di interessi che emergono dall'applicazione delle leggi anti-riciclaggio. Tra essi, vi è il dibattito tra il Ministero dell'Interno e quello di Giustizia in riferimento all'adeguatezza dello strumento penalistico nel contrastare la criminalità economica, dibattito già affrontato dalla dottrina, a cui, però finora, non è stata data una risposta univoca. Da una parte il Ministero dell'Interno auspica un intervento giuridico più deciso, che, per esempio, ricomprenda il reato di riciclaggio nella responsabilità penale degli enti (non ancora esistente in Germania) e sollecita una svolta politica generale in tema di criminalità economica dalla deregolazione del mercato finanziario all'intervento dello Stato in ambito economico ai fini di chiarire i comportamenti leciti e quelli illeciti. Dall'altra parte, il Ministero della Giustizia considera erroneo il ricorso al diritto penale ai fini di risolvere problemi di tipo economico o finanziario e cerca di frenare la tendenza moderna alla proliferazione penale, a favore di un intervento di tipo preventivo-sociale. A tal proposito, si osserva che agli incontri del GAFI a cui partecipano i rappresentanti dei Ministeri di Giustizia, coloro che provino a richiamare l'attenzione sulla necessità di rispettare i principi fondamentali costituzionali e di limitare l'intervento penale a tutela dei cittadini, vengano tacciati di non voler combattere la criminalità organizzata in modo efficace. In conclusione riapro la prospettiva a livello globale ed inserisco il reato di riciclaggio in una riflessione più ampia sulla governace finanziaria. In una prospettiva storica di analisi delle politiche economiche recenti si osserva come vi sia stata una tendenza a deregolare il mercato per mano delle istanze tradizionali pubbliche, e al contempo un aumento di strumenti transnazionali di cosiddetta soft-law che si sono fatti portatori di interessi particolari. Finché questa conflittualità non verrà risolta sarà impossibile impedire il riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Con particolare riferimento al contesto europeo, si prende atto che è stato molto più facile chiudere le frontiere per le persone fisiche e non a quelle giuridiche o ai capitali. ; This paper aims to question the sociolegal1 effectiveness of the money laundering offence.2 The literature that assesses the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering system is abundant. While most of it does not question the regime's goals this paper takes a step back and critically looks at the law-making process. In addition, while most studies have assessed the effectiveness of anti-money laundering law by looking at statistical outcomes, this paper takes a step forward and tries to explain those statistics by looking at legal praxis and at indirect effects. The significance of the research derives from the insertion of the analysis on money laundering offence in a broader political, economic and historical context. The methodology adopted is qualitative, with the intended purpose of underlining the complexity of the issue tackled, rather than reducing it through a quantitative approach. While most of the existing literature has quantitatively assessed the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regimes on the basis of statistical data and other quantitative indexes and has tried to reduce the complexity of the issue by measuring it numerically, this research adopts a qualitative methodology, which instead highlights the entanglement and the different perspectives on the question. Money laundering is the process of giving profits originated illegally an appearance of having been made lawfully.3 Due to the tightening of economic criminal policies that limit the possibility of integrating ill-gotten gains in the legitimate economy, offenders have developed more and more complex methods and subterfuges to launder proceeds of crime, so the rise of a proper 'money laundering industry' (industria del riciclaggio) is mentioned.4 The total volume of money laundered is estimated to amount to between 2,5 and 5, 5 % of the world GDP.5 Due to the borderline nature of money laundering, which happens between the so-called 'legitimate economy' and the 'dirty economy', and thus involves different actors such as banks, the financial sector, certain professions and businesses, offenders, victims and law enforcement agencies, the legal response needs to compromise with all the various economic, political, social and financial interests at play. Furthermore, where legitimate business intermingles with illegal business and legitimate funds with illicit funds, it is very difficult to distinguish what is legal from what is not. The criminalisation of money laundering was specifically supposed to tackle this fine line. The goal of this research is to assess whether the choice of criminalising money laundering has been effective to tackle this fine line. In order to assess the impact of the domestic implementation of the existing legal framework, the research uses a case study that specifically questions the effectiveness of the money laundering offence in the German national criminal legal system. The interest in the German case derives from the fact that, according to the IMF, the OECD and the FATF, Germany might have 'a higher risk profile for large scale money laundering than many other countries'.6 There are some factors identified as enablers of money laundering activities, such as the large economy and financial centre, the strategical location in the middle of Europe, with strong international links, the substantial proceeds of the crime environment involving organised crime operating in most profit generating criminal spheres, the open borders, the large informal sector and a high use of cash, the large and sophisticated economy and financial sector, the important role in world trade, and finally the involvement in large volumes of cross-border trade and financial flows. The media have kept on reporting the fact that Germany is an ideal country, or even a paradise for money launderers.7 According to most recent media reports, corruption is increasing in Germany along with money laundering and organised crime,8 and illicit financial flows are estimated to amount to 50 Billion Euros annually.9 Renowned banks such as Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, and Hypovereinsbank have been the focus of recent scandals due to their involvement in large tax evasion and money laundering schemes, investigated mostly by US law enforcement agencies.10 The legal framework has been considered as not being sufficient to tackle the estimated volume of money laundering. In 2007 and 2010 the European Commission initiated two proceedings against the German government for having contravened the European treaty by not having effectively transposed into national law the European framework to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing.11 In response to this wave of criticism, some important changes have been made.12 With specific regards to penal law, the legislature has amplified the scope of the money laundering offence and the sphere of criminal liability in order to improve the effectiveness of the existing legislation.13 Yet the continual expansion process has raised legal challenges that could constitute an obstacle for the effective enforcement of the measure. With regards to international legislation, scholars have often criticized the ineffectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime to not be able to achieve its goals and thus to be only appearance of public action. 14 While there is theoretical support for the perception that policies have contributed to a decrease in the incidence of money laundering, there is no evidence that this goal has actually been achieved.15 The official discourse describes the regime as a crucial tool to prevent and combat money laundering, and lawmakers have been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-money laundering laws. This work however takes a critical approach towards the existing legal framework and presents the view that questioning the effectiveness of the money laundering offence is essential before expanding the scope of the existing legal framework.16 On the background of the reflections based on the sociolegal framework that sets the definition of legal effectiveness with specific respect to criminal law, and on the critical literature on the inadequateness of the international anti-money laundering system to eliminate the targeted activity recalled in the introduction, the hypothesis underlying the case study is the following: Article 261 Gcc may be an example of a symbolic legislation, whose latent functions prevail on its declared functions. In particular, it is hypothesised that the law is an example of a 'compromise-law' that satisfy all parties taking part in the law-making process, thanks to the vagueness of the wording that allows a broad range of possible interpretations, and also thanks to the actual ineffectiveness, which pleases those who were contrary to the introduction of the provision. It is here necessary to recall the considerations on the 'legislator' being an heterogeneous group of parties not only constituted of members of the Parliament but often also by external actors, who can influence more or less transparently the law making-process. While the manifested function of tackling money laundering has in fact remained in the background, the thesis hypothesises that other latent goals have been pursued. It is further hypothesised that the 'law inaction' is part of a process of decriminalisation that intentionally grants impunity to a certain group of actors, in this case those laundering money, while giving the appearance that the practice is not accepted by law by labelling it as criminal. By using the concept of function, the study focuses on eventual conflicting interests emerging throughout the policy-making process and/or being displayed through the implementation of the provisions. In order to verify these hypotheses the research proceeds with a case study that aims at empirically assessing the sociolegal effectiveness of Article 261 Gcc. In particular, by applying the 'elastic' definition of effectiveness, the following chapters analyse the law-making process, the level of acceptance by legal scholars, the implementation, and the opinions of legal experts and professionals. The methodology adopted is qualitative. The research consists of a case study that includes a documental research, a qualitative analysis of statistical data and the conduction of interviews with privileged observers and legal actors. The study is a macro-sociological assessment of the effectiveness of a criminal legislation through the analysis of the motives that have triggered lawmakers to enact the current legal framework and the practical effects of the 'law in action'17 and of the 'law inaction'.18 Thanks to the use of sociological conceptual tools, as the ones of function, symbolic effectiveness, power, labelling, and legal culture, the research critically approaches the legal framework. In addition, the sociolegal perspective allows us to take into account the multidisciplinary nature of the phenomenon of money laundering and of its countermeasures and the diverse conflicting interests at play. The work has been conducted by a single person and not by a team of researchers; this has imposed a limit on the interviewing sample and the impossibility of undertaking, along with the qualitative analysis of the provision, a qualitative analysis of the jurisprudence and a quantitative analysis of the case law. In addition, criminal provisions have a deterrent purpose, yet in certain cases it is almost impossible to quantify the deterrence effect of those provisions, as in the case of the money laundering offence, and this represents a shortcoming of the current research. Official numbers are highly problematic, this element, despite impeding an objective quantification of the phenomenon, can represent a partial result for the qualitative analysis, because it highlights the complexity of the matter. The anti-money laundering regime is constantly evolving, and this would require continuously updating the assessment, instead the research provides a picture of the current situation. Yet the work offers the reader an instrument to critically interpret also possible changes in the wording of the money laundering offence that may be made following the publication of this work. The outcomes of the critical study on the reasons and effects of the current legislation can be used as a starting point for further research; the methodology set for the empirical analysis can be applied to assess the effectiveness of following developments. The structure of the thesis is the following: The first chapter presents the theoretical sociolegal framework and provides an operational definition of the concept of effectiveness that directs the empirical research. At the end the chapter describes the methodology of the qualitative research. Chapter two traces the genesis of the money laundering offence, as well on an internal, European and domestic level. The chapter analyses legislative intents, parliamentarian debates and other external contributions as declarations of intents and opinions through a desktop-study. The third chapter is dedicated to the doctrinal debate about the money laundering offence regulated in the German penal code. In particular the chapter highlights the controversial issues that have emerged through the abundant legal scholarship production, which might affect the effectiveness of the money laundering offence. Chapters four and chapter five present the empirical research. The fourth chapter analyses the quantitative data of the implementation of the money laundering offence from a qualitative perspective. The last chapter presents the results of the interviews. The main outcomes of the research are that the interests expressed more or less manifestly from the actors taking part in the initial phase of the creation of the anti-money laundering regime were strongly conflicting with each other. One representative example is the question whether to use the policy also to tackle large scale tax evasion or to leave proceeds deriving from fiscal crimes outside of the regime. Very different justifications were given for the criminalisation of money laundering at different stages. Often the declared motives did not correspond to the real goals of the actors taking part in the law-making process. The rhetoric connected to the seriousness of the drug issue was the manifest function of the new criminalisation of money laundering. However, other latent goals, for instance, the desire of financial institutions to clean their reputation and gain customs confidentiality or the interest of some governments to curb tax evasion were already present during this initial phase. Another controversial issue concerns the fact national states have adopted anti-money laundering measures under the pressure of the FATF, which is led by most industrialised countries.19 Despite lacking democratic legitimation, the FATF has imposed worldwide a brand new regime of criminalisation, prevention and enforcement. The legal framework has been used to address ever-new challenges, and this expansion process has been coupled by a rhetoric that scholars have defined the securitisation rhetoric.20 The most recent function manifestly attributed to the anti-money laundering legal framework, that is, in short, the protection of the soundness of the financial system. Especially in times of financial insecurity, the tendency of hardening laws against economic crimes increases. Having previously deregulated the financial system to enhance economic liberties, legislatures resort to criminal law to control illegality in the economy. As a response to the European financial crisis of 2007-2011, legislatures, instead of rethinking the approach towards the protection of the global finance, called for a tightening of economic crimes regulations. The European discourse on money laundering has mostly been related to the destabilisation of the market, the abuse of capitals' movement liberty, the disintegration of the internal economy. But, why was the EU so keen on imposing a common standard for the criminalisation of money laundering, without even enjoying competence in penal matters? The introduction of a common anti-money laundering control policy served to a latent function, namely to the purposes of the creation of the 'Single Market', by way of avoiding that Member States would have adopted measures inconsistent with the completion of the Internal Market, while taking action to protect their own national economies from money laundering.21 This was done by avoiding that domestic regulations implemented for protecting national economies from the infiltration of ill-gotten capital could have hampered the freedom of movement of capital within the European borders. The tension emerges, also in the wording of the most recent EU money laundering Directives, due to lack of Community action against money laundering could lead Member States, for the purpose of protecting their financial systems, to adopt measures which could be inconsistent with completion of the single market.22 There are thus conflicting interests between the claim for regulation to avoid the infiltration of illicit capital, and the demand for deregulation to foster the free market. The European legislature, however, did not declare completely this intention and justified, instead, the imposition of anti-money laundering rules given the threats posed by money laundering to the financial system and thus to society. According to this critical approach, the criminalisation of money laundering turns out to be more of a political tool aimed at achieving governance within the EU, while being presented to the public as an essential intervention to guarantee security and well-being. Once again, thus, the declared goals of the lawmakers did not correspond with the real intentions. It is especially in the interest of a research on the law's effectiveness to unveil functions that were undeclared, in order to evaluate the outcomes in a more critical way. Also from the analysis of the national law-making process emerged divergent opinions and expectations relating to the criminalisation of money laundering. The Parliamentarians debate that took place with regard to the introduction of the money laundering offence and other instruments to tackle drug-trafficking shows that the discussion was deeply embedded in the political-historical context. Given that Germany was just reunified after a period of two dictatorial regimes, the hearing gives the impression that lawmakers felt the responsibility of creating a new legal system against such historical background. In order to balance the very different legal cultures, the divergent approaches had to be compromised. The introduction of a new crime was particularly delicate due to the discriminatory and arbitrary use of criminal labels by the previous dictatorial regimes. Therefore, delegates would not easily give up on fundamental rights for the cause of persecuting criminals. The legislation can be seen as an attempt to balance the need to adopt more effective measures to tackle crime and the necessity of respecting the rule of law and creating a 'militant democracy'. Yet, given the external pressure of the FATF, the EU and of the media, the text was less of a compromise and rather a ratification of 'internationally' accepted standards. The rule of law was not the only issue emerged in the initial phase of the political debate. Controversial opinions were raised also with regard to the questions of the mens rea and the interest protected by the new criminal provision: Certain political parties supported the broadest criminal liability to ensure an effective prosecution of money laundering, other parties were worried that a widespread liability would have been cumbersome for the economic system. Moreover, along with the expansion of the international criminal legal framework to fight against money laundering, also the scope of Article 261 Gcc was extended to include ever-new predicate offences. From the analysis of the doctrinal debate, it emerged that legal scholars have revealed technical hindrances that hinder the provision's legitimacy and thus hamper a positive integration of the act in the criminal legal system. In addition, given that most controversial issues are caused by the wording of the offence, the chapter seems to uphold the idea of an intentional potential decriminalisation of money launderers. The wording of Article 261 Gcc has the potential of frustrating some of the intentions expressed by the legislature in occasion of the adoption of the provision. While the vague formulation of the money laundering offence was thought to tackle ever-new emergencies and has been justified by legislatures as necessary to ensure a more effective fight against money laundering, it has also raised issues that, far from being purely dogmatic, have undermined the acceptance of such law. If law makers have designed the offence in a broad way to allow the criminalisation of conducts that could not have been prosecuted by the existing offences before, the large discretion left to prosecutors, has resulted in a cumbersome element for the prosecution of money laundering. In addition, criminalising the reckless conduct without envisaging a specific criminal liability for security positions has widened the scope of the offence to the point that the law has missed its function of isolating criminals by criminalising gate-keepers' activities. In addition it emerged that there are some open questions with regard to the wording of the offence, for example the question of the interests protected by Article 261 Gcc. On one side a state intervention is considered necessary to contain the impact of economic misbehaviours to protect citizens, on the other side it is important to limit the resort to criminal law only for safeguarding individual or collective situations and not for defending an existing economic structure. The economic system may, in fact, not be considered as a collective interest that needs protection. Also, safeguards provided by penal law need to be substantial and not symbolic, because they urge to change a given situation of inequality, where criminals can profit from illegal practices while legitimate economic actors undergo unfair competition. From the doctrinal analysis it has instead emerged that the legislator seemed to be more interested in drafting a symbolic legislation that can be hardly integrated in the legal system and that raise strong challenges. Lawmakers have been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-money laundering in order to improve its effectiveness, yet without providing legitimacy for such expansion. One of the most meaningful fact observed in the qualitative analysis of statistical data is that organised crime and 'gross money laundering' are not persecuted through Article 261 Gcc. This fact can be inferred by the low number of convictions pursuant to Article 261 (4),23 by the low number of money laundering proceedings categorised as organised crime and by the low number of investigations in the field of money laundering, tax crimes and economic crimes recorded by public prosecutors offices in 2013, where more than one person was involved (18 %). Yet, this does not mean that the criminal justice system does not act against them, but rather that it uses other tools to achieve the goal. While the low conviction rate for serious money laundering cases could be also a symptom of a high degree of deterrence of the provision, it seems that law enforcement uses the money laundering charge as a fallback for authorities who are unable to acquire sufficient evidence in a preliminary phase for the predicate crime and necessitate further information otherwise not accessible. The charge of money laundering allows investigators to access the vast amount of information recorded pursuant to the GwG, which would not be otherwise accessible. Yet, after the investigative phase, prosecutors seem to prefer to modify the charge and opt for indictment for predicate offences instead. The law seems to be effective to the extent that it facilitates the initial investigations, while it does not serve directly the function of punishing money launderers. Besides having a substantial nature, the provisions seem to have a procedural function. It can be inferred that prosecutors find particularly difficult to bring evidence against organised money launderers also due to the fact that professional offenders do not leave traces. From the scarce use of Article 261 Gcc for tackling organised criminality, it can be inferred that the measure is not serving for one of the purposes declared by the legislature when introducing the offence. In addition, it can be hypothesised that other measures may be more suitable to tackle 'gross money laundering'. Given the high number of STRs filed and the low number of money laundering charges and of convictions deriving from the STRs since the introduction of the laws, it can be assumed that the system has been anyway maintained because it still provides some sort of benefits. It can be hypothesised that one benefit is the number of information provided to law enforcement agencies. This amount of recorded information is helpful not only to support further indictments, but also to increase the personnel awareness about the ever-changing money laundering techniques and schemes. Again the effect of the 'law in action' differs in respect to the declared legislative intentions, which justified the criminalisation of money laundering with the necessity of tackling organised crime's economic power. By spelling out this function, the assessment on the effectiveness of the law - as the possibility of collecting information - can be positive. Yet, this effect could be considered a social cost rather than a benefit. On a theoretical side, many scholars see the recording of personal information by private actors as an infringement of the right to privacy.24 On a more practical side such mechanism imposes significant costs on the designated businesses and professions that are in charge of collecting the data.25 When compared to the effective outcomes of the preventive regulations, in terms of law enforcement results, this aspect does not seem to win a cost-benefit analysis, as showed in the quoted researches. If one considers the advantages in terms of information collected, the policy may be considered worth the burden imposed, instead. However, the fact that the laws would have an effective impact on the long run on the fight against money laundering and organised crime may be seen as a diminished deterrence effect, because perpetrators would have the time to adapt to the new laws and find new ways of circumventing them. A collateral effect of the long-run effectiveness of the policy hypothesised on the basis of the outcomes of the research on the implementation is the fact that perpetrators could take advantage of the initiated but not completed cases, by acquiring knowledge about law enforcement strategies and thus develop subterfuges to elude them. On the contrary, it seems that the legislature is always running after to cope with the offenders' ever-new strategies. In fact, regulations about a new sector are updated when there is evidence that there is a risk of money laundering in that specific sector. Yet, offenders might have already moved their laundering activities to another sector. On the assumption that the inclusion of the reckless conduct would have potentially criminalised daily activities, a focus was posed on the number of convictions related to Article 261 (5) Gcc26 to verify the target of the criminal provision. Since 2005 a high number of convictions have been actually referring to reckless money laundering. This shows that the offence is used to punish primarily 'petty money laundering'. This fact can also be inferred from the relevant number of money laundering cases to the detriment of senior citizens, signalled by the FIU in the recent years. Also the fact that a significant number of STRs is filed in relation to the 'financial agents' phenomenon' is a symptom that the preventive mechanism targets more 'small fishes' rather than big perpetrators. Individuals convicted for the reckless conduct may be even victims of a fraud perpetrated by criminal networks. However, the criminal network acting behind the offender remains undetected. If on the one side it cannot be claimed that such offenders, given the lower degree of culpability should not be punished at all, on the other side this effect of the law involves a change of paradigm. The money laundering offence was initially introduced with the goal of tackling serious crimes. The observed effect, however, changes the function and the nature of the law, so that Article 261 Gcc could be considered rather a 'blue collar crime' more than a 'white collar crime'. From the analysis on the quality of STRs filed to the FIU, it can be inferred that certain designated professions and businesses are very reluctant in filing STRs, despite their notably exposure to money laundering risks. The list of designated professions and businesses has been amplified over the years exactly with the goal of facing this transfer of crime from one area to the other. Yet some professionals, such as legal advisors, do not report them, although they possess the capacity of recognising illicit transactions. The fact that some sectors do not actively participate in the effort of preventing money laundering, by allowing criminal proceedings to enter the legitimate economy, may lead to a general ineffectiveness of the system, because it can significantly hinder the capacity of the whole anti-money laundering system to respond to the ability of offenders to move their field of activity there where the law is lax. The provision does generate some instrumental effects by punishing offenders and by triggering a cooperation directed at signalling suspicious transactions between the obliged entities and law enforcement. However, some of the effects do not seem to completely fulfil the legislature's declared goals. For example the chapter seems to prove wrong the legislature's expectation of tackling the grey area by punishing gate-keepers or the attributed function of eliminating organised and serious crime. Given the high costs of implementation highlighted by the cost-benefits analyses, the rather low outcomes seem to be insufficient to fulfil the legislature's goals. Since it is sufficient that without latent functions it would be impossible to explain the adoption and maintenance of a legal act,27 it can be concluded that the intents declared by lawmakers do not satisfy the reasons why the provision was introduced. This opens up the hypothesis that Article 261 Gcc is an example of a symbolic legislation, which has been enacted with the purpose of compromising a complex parliamentarian debate. The analysis of the law-making process has revealed the existence of different expectations attributed to the introduction of Article 261 Gcc. Expectations that were conflicting with each other had to be negotiated and were compromised through the formulation of a vague offence that allowed different interpretations. Yet, the implementation of the law has led to the re-emersion of some of the conflicting situations. In addition, given that the policy regulates a complex and multifaceted issue new conflicts have emerged through its enforcement. The effects triggered by the norm can be indeed perceived positively or negatively by the different actors involved. In particular five principal conflicting situations have surfaced from the interviews. The first issue is the role played by external actors in the law-making process and the constant influence exercised by those actors in the process of updating the policy. The imposition of a US American approach to money laundering control through the role of the FATF has also been highlighted in the second chapter. Specifically, some scholars see the development of a global prohibition regime fostered by the US in the diffusion of anti-money laundering law. According to this literature, the powerful state creates an international regime focussed on achieving its own goals through global acceptance triggered by the securitisation rhetoric and compliance processes imposed through the menace of exclusion by international business relations. The second conflict that emanates from the words of the respondents is the one of the demand for criminal law to face financial misbehaviours and the necessity of limiting the tendency of expanding criminal law on the background of a situation of financial instability. Given the previous deregulation of the market, policy makers need to control and sanction economic abuse in order to protect fair competition and law-abiding individuals. On the other hand, the state needs to respect fundamental principles, such as the rule of law and the principle of ultima ratio that imposes a restriction of the use of criminal law in situations in which no other measures are suitable. This conflict has already been raised along the formulation of the money laundering offence with regards to the question of the interests protected by the law. Despite the legislator tying to limit the scope of the offence by attributing to Article 261 Gcc the protection of the administration of justice and of the interests protected by the predicate offences, this explanation was not considered suitable to the peculiarity of the offence. Indeed, shortly after the enactment, legal scholarship and the judiciary entered in a vivid debate in order to identify more suitable interests protected by the law, among them the financial and economic system under different perspectives. However, as chapter three shows, no solution could be found. In fact, the question concerning the suitability of criminal law to tackle illicit financial flows is perceived in the current research as still unsolved. The matter does not only concern money laundering control. On the contrary, it is a fairly widespread issue that has recently emerged due to the tendency of hardening economic crimes on the background of a situation of financial instability. The third conflict can be summarised as the following: on the one hand the policy being required to interfere with the personal sphere of suspected money launderers; on the other hand private institutions being interested in protecting their relations with loyal and trusted customers. Therefore, they are reluctant to give law enforcement the possibility to interfere too much in their business. The interest manifested by the private sector involved in the prevention of money laundering seems thus to collide with the legislative intent of preventing the infiltration of dirty money by way of preventing gate-keepers to help money launderers. The clash emerges at a micro-economic level and is triggered by the fact that the anti-money laundering policy demands an active participation by private sector in the detection of suspects. Private actors, are not appropriate to bear the burden of detecting offenders, moreover they need to protect the relationships with customers by avoiding unnecessary interferences. At the same time, the privatisation of crime control is questionable also from a governance point of view. It seems therefore that the public interest in persecuting crimes through having access to personal information from the private sector only marginally collides with the interest of protecting the right to privacy. Businesses and professions are predominantly interested in not interfering with their clients and in not bearing the burden of detecting offenders. The issue was also addressed during the national Parliamentarian debate, with regards to the degree of mens rea required for money laundering criminal liability. Making everybody taking part in economic or financial activities actively participating in the monitoring of the economic system under the threat of criminal liability for negligent money laundering was considered harmful for the business market. The same debate has been picked up by legal scholarship too. Yet, it seems that, despite the law being the result of negotiations, the question is still open. The fourth issue consists of discording opinions with regards to the opportunity of including tax evasion as predicate offence for money laundering. On one hand there is the interest of tackling tax evasion through the anti-money laundering regime, on the hand the concern of keeping the two phenomena distinct in order to avoid an overrating of money laundering. Since the genesis of the anti-money laundering policy, some actors taking part in the international law-making process, opposed the labelling of 'black money', naming money deriving from tax violations, as 'dirty money', indicating all proceeds of crime typically committed by organised crime. This distinction was based on the perception that tax-related offences were less serious and less harmful than capital flight and were advocated by financial centres in order to maintain a good reputation while still granting peculiar financial services, such as bank secrecy. This issue is a good example of the labelling theory, to the extent that it shows how a practice that was firstly not considered criminal enough to amount to a predicate offence for money laundering, has become part of the scope of the anti-money laundering regime on the basis of a political decision of labelling it as such. Respondents of the current research show to have different perceptions of the degree of the seriousness of tax laws violations and thus about the appropriateness and necessity of tackling them under the umbrella of the anti-money laundering policy. Again, the matter, which seemed to have been resolved through the negotiations on an international and European level, is still being debated at national level. The last two contrasting interests are the necessity of regulating the flows of money and the free movements of capitals in a neoliberal economy. The question is intrinsic in the nature of money laundering, which is a phenomenon that happens at the interface between legality and illegality. Regulations that facilitate the licit exchange of goods, capitals and services do also facilitate the flow of ill-gotten gains; there are thus conflicting interests between the public interest of persecuting crime and the claims for less regulation in a free market economy. From the interviews surfaced that not only opinions on the effectiveness of the law differ, but the very concept of effectiveness is perceived differently among the interview partners. Perceptions about how effective the anti- money laundering policy is appear to be similar among respondents belonging to the same experts' group. In particular, given the fact that the policy triggers many preliminary investigations, investigators work on a daily basis with the provision. This led to their opinion on the implementation of the legislation being rather positive. Positive opinions have common ground: they assert that the policy is not a simple one to implement, however, they believe that the legal practice has found its way through. On the contrary, defence attorneys specialised in economic crimes do not receive a significant amount of clients suspected for money laundering. For this reason they tend to have a rather negative opinion on the policy's effectiveness, also driven by the perception that the policy is not able to achieve the indirect goals. The diverse concepts of effectiveness provided by disciplines close to the sociology of law and the different definitions of effectiveness given by sociologists of law turn out to be useful here. Particularly the notions of 'efficiency' and of 'efficiency regardless of the goals' are proved very useful to interpret the respondents' opinions. Efficiency, is according to the administrative legal approach, the optimal relation between the goals achieved and the instruments used. A subcategory of this concept is the efficiency calculated through a cost-benefit analysis, of which some examples have been presented in the fourth chapter, which defines efficiency as the functioning of a legal order without assessing the goals achieved. This type of analysis focuses on the correctness of the operating system since the purpose of the system is its own existence. It refers to a whole legal order rather than to a specific single provision. Given that the anti-money laundering policy constitutes a legal order, due to the diverse regulations involved and the competent authorities created in order to achieve the goals of the policy, this notion can be applied. In the field of administrative legal theories, the first chapter has focussed on the approach that considers the (in)effectiveness of a law depending on its (failing) enforcement. A high degree of compliance of the anti-money laundering legislation might correspond to a high level of effectiveness of the policy with respect to its direct function, but at the same time to a rather low level of effectiveness with regards to its indirect purposes. The way to evaluate the degree of effectiveness is therefore also different. While compliance with legal provisions is calculated through a quantitative assessment of the processes in force and of the functioning of the system, the achievement of the indirect functions is measured on the impact of the policy. Interview partners have different perceptions about the indirect functions of the legislation too. This reflects, once again, the fact that the policy was a result of a compromise between different expectations and that the legislator was not able to limit the scope of its application to a particular goal. The different expectations and intents, which already emerged in the doctrinal debate about the legally protected interests, appears again in the different perceptions of the interviewees. The respondents were asked about the legislation's effectiveness with regards to one of the indirect functions, namely the capacity to deter organised crime. The legislator enacted the money laundering offence in the context of the fight against drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime, thus Article 261 Gcc's expressed rationale is the prevention and repression of organised crime. Finally, a relevant outcome regards the respondents' opinions on article 261 Gcc's latent symbolic function. Some of them agree with this. Others strongly oppose the hypothesis. They argue instead that the policy has instrumental effects on their daily practice, which cannot be defined as purely symbolic. According to most respondents, the law cannot be defined as symbolic, because it has led to instrumental effects. In the first place information gathered thanks to the GwG is used to start preliminary investigations under Article 261 Gcc. Secondly, the structure enacted to comply with the anti-money laundering policy is attainable and is visible and cannot be denied. Thirdly, the law is considered necessary because it labels a deviant behaviour. In particular, despite the fact that investigations do not lead to a conviction for money laundering they allow investigators to collect information in support of criminal cases for the predicate offences or to start a preliminary investigation for a predicate offence. In this sense, the function of the 'law in action', despite being questionable, is objectively instrumental. However, the fact that the law serves the purpose of tackling predicate offences through the support of investigations does not exclude the hypothesis that the law was enacted to pursue latent functions too. According to the sociologist Aubert, it is not necessary that the latent goal is the only one that plays a role, but it is necessary that the other purposes would not explain the analysed phenomenon completely. Indeed, in the opinions of those who exclude the symbolic function, yet the results achieved through compliance do not legitimate the burden imposed by the legislation. In other words, it seems that they recognise that the purpose of compliance cannot completely explain the policy makers' motivation, which re-opens the doors for the hypothesis of the existence of latent functions. In fact, such a demanding policy cannot be accepted for the sole purpose of re-enforcing the action of the criminal justice system in tackling predicate offences. On the other hand, compliance with the policy in terms of building of a structure and of expertise does not automatically mean fulfilling the policy's purpose. Particularly the creation of new professionalism, has been interpreted by scholars as a sign given to the public that the policy has produced certain effects. In conclusion, on the background of the research's outcome, the paper tries to reply to the question: (How) can the effectiveness of the money laundering offence be improved? While technical hindrances can (and perhaps) will be removed through legal reforms, 28 the inherent political economic and financial conflicting interests that impede a higher level of effectiveness are more difficult to solve. In contemporary industrialised economies there is a complicated and sometimes shifting boundary between legitimate and illegitimate transactions. This is particularly exacerbated in the context of financial capitalism, which 'subordinates the capitalist productive process to the circulation of money and monetary assets and hence to the accumulation of money profits'. Since the very beginning, determining the boundary between an area defined as 'criminal' and the space of 'legality' has been controversial. In fact, money has a neutral nature, pecunia non olet, making profit, irrespective of the monies' origin, is a very strong interest for both private and public entities, which collides with the one of eliminating illicit financial flows. In other words criminal policy goals diverge from purely economic interests. While one can assume the justice and correctness of the current financial system, and thus describes money laundering as harmful because it interferes with the existing economic order, one can also assume that the capitalist system leads per se to injustice and inequality, and that money laundering is actually embedded in this profit-oriented system and represents just the darker side of the capitalist economy. A compromised viewpoint is the one that describes money laundering as an accepted collateral effect of the capitalist system, that is to say 'a certain amount of illicit financial flows may be considered an acceptable price to pay for a market where free mobility of capital is guaranteed'. In other words, money laundering is intrinsic in or at least exacerbated by the capitalist system.

Together with reductions in indirect taxes on food imports, cash for work programs were one of the main responses implemented by African governments following the food, fuel, and financial crisis of recent years. The main objective of those programs was to help the poor cope with the various shocks by increasing their net earnings through community-level work paid for under the programs. Yet it is unclear whether these cash for work programs indeed reached their intended beneficiaries and to what degree they generated other, potentially long-term beneficial impacts. This paper explores these issues in the context of Liberia and the performance of the Cash for Work Temporary Employment Program (CfWTEP) funded by the World Bank through an emergency crisis facility in response to the 2007/2008 food crisis. Both quantitative and qualitative data are presented, focusing on the operational and policy experiences emerging from program implementation. This paper analyzes the context that led to the creation and implementation of the CfWTEP in Liberia, the nature and administrative arrangements for the program, and its operational performance. The objective is to share the lessons learned from evaluation findings so that they can be useful for implementing similar programs in the future in Liberia itself or in other countries. Findings from the analysis highlight the possibilities of implementing public works program in low capacity, post conflict setting and the scope for using the program as a springboard towards a broader and more comprehensive social safety net.

Pitanje mogućnosti formiranja ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji u kontekstu postsocijalistiĉke transformacije društva i procesa evrointegracija, predstavlja predmet bavljenja ove doktorske disertacije. Rad se sastoji iz tri veće celine i poglavlja u kome su izneta zakljuĉna razmatranja. U prvom delu rada, razvijeni su uporedno-istorijski, kontekstualni, konceptualni i metodološki okvir istraţivanja, kao polazne osnove za dalje analize. Kako bi mogle biti obuhvaćene sve relevantne dimenzije kompleksnog fenomena ekološkog pokreta i sloţena mreţa ĉinilaca koji utiĉu na njegov nastanak i razvoj, u istraţivanju su kombinovano korišćene razliĉite metodološke tehnike: anketno ispitivanje stavova i praksi na reprezentativnom uzorku graĊana Srbije (N=1952) i predstavnika lokalnih samouprava (N=232), polustrukturisani intervjui sa predstavnicima nevladinih organizacija (N=44), kao i dve studije sluĉaja zajednica sa izraţenim ekološkim problemima - Panĉeva i Bora. Drugi deo rada je posvećen opisu i analizi pojedinaĉnih elemenata ekološkog pokreta: ekoloških aktivista, ekoloških grupa / organizacija, ekoloških mreţa, kolektivnog identiteta i ekoloških konflikata. Na osnovu detaljne analize karakteristika osnovnih elemenata pokreta, u zakljuĉnom poglavlju drugog dela rada daje se odgovor na pitanje: da li u Srbiji postoji ekološki pokret? Osnovni istraţivaĉki nalaz je da u Srbiji nije došlo do formiranja klasiĉnog participativnog tipa ekološkog pokreta, kakav je prisutan u zemljama Zapada. TakoĊe, nema ni naznaka znaĉajnijeg prisustva elemenata transakcionog ekološkog aktivizma (pokreta), ĉiji je prisustvo zabeleţeno u zemljama Centralne Evrope. Umesto toga, svedoci smo razvoja specifiĉnog modela ekološkog kolektivnog delanja koji smo nazvali "ekološkim trećim sektorom". Naime, za razliku od participativnog i transakcionog delanja, koji imaju naglašeno politiĉku dimenziju, aktivnosti organizacija u okviru trećeg sektora su preteţno "apolitiĉne" po karakteru, usmerene na pruţanje usluga u oblastima iz kojih se, u sklopu neoliberalnih reformi, drţava povukla. Pored nerazvijenosti konfliktne (politiĉke) dimenzije, ekološki treći sektor odlikuje i atomizovano delanje profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija, koje samo izuzetno (pod spoljnim pritiscima ili podsticajima) uspostavljaju fiziĉke veze (mreţe) meĊu sobom, dok se na planu kolektivnog identiteta razvija samo kognitivna dimenzija (formalno prihvatanje odreĊenih ekoloških vrednosti i naĉela koja ĉine sastavni deo ekološkog diskursa dominantnog na Zapadu). GraĊani, po pravilu, nisu ukljuĉeni u rad ovih organizacija, izuzev kao korisnici usluga. U trećem delu rada se razmatraju razlozi usled kojih ne dolazi do razvoja participativnog i/ili transakcionog ekološkog pokreta (aktivizma). Za potrebe objašnjenja nastanka specifiĉne hibridne forme ekološkog trećeg sektora, kreiran je sintetiĉki eksplanatorni model koji kombinuje elemente razvijene u okviru razliĉitih teorijskih pristupa fenomenu društvenih pokreta. Eksplanatorna shema je formulisana na sledeći naĉin: za pokretanje kolektivnog delanja i nastanak ekološkog pokreta neophodno da prethodno budu ispunjeni sledeći uslovi: potrebno je da postoji izvesno socijalno-konstruisano nezadovoljstvo (problem) kod većeg broja pojedinaca / profesionalnih zastupniĉkih organizacija (socijalno-konstruktivistiĉka reinterpretacija klasiĉnih pristupa); zatim, grupa pojedinaca koja oseća dati problem / zalaţe se za njegovo rešavanje, mora posedovati odreĊene resurse za pokretanje i odrţavanje 5 kolektivne akcije (pristup teorije mobilizacije resursa); šire okruţenje treba da bude relativno povoljno kako bi nagovestilo mogućnost pozitivnog ishoda aktivnosti koja se ţeli realizovati (pristup strukture politiĉkih mogućnosti), a vrednosni okvir na takav naĉin podešen da usmerava na delanje predstavnike profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija i / ili neposredno ugroţenu populaciju (nezadovoljne) i (eventualno) širi krug podrţavalaca (pristup Novih društvenih pokreta). Na proces formiranja ekološkog pokreta, kroz ĉetiri neposredna faktora (socijalna-konstrukcija ekoloških rizika, dostupnost i karakteristike resursa, struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti, vrednosni sistem),indirektno deluju širi društveni procesi - postsocijalistiĉka transformacija i evropeizacija srpskog društva, kao i ĉinioci duţeg trajanja ((pred)socijalistiĉko nasleĊe). Testiranje postavljenih eksplikativnih hipoteza je pokazalo da ni jedan od uslova neophodnih za formiranje ekološkog pokreta, nije delimiĉno ili u potpunosti zadovoljen. Postojeći ekološki problemi su dominantno odreĊeni u kategorijama niskog rizika i male vaţnosti u odnosu na druga društvena pitanja, usled ĉega je i njihov podsticajni kapacitet za kolektivnu (re)akciju bitno sniţen. Pored toga, vladajuće shvatanje prema kome u ekološkoj modernizaciji leţi rešenje za gotovo sve ekološke probleme, pokazuje se kao ĉinilac koji nepovoljno utiĉe na graĊanski aktivizam, jer upućuje na pasivno išĉekivanje uvoĊenja obećanih mehanizama odrţivog razvoja. Većini graĊana na raspolaganju stoji vrlo ograniĉena koliĉina resursa, usled ĉega, u velikom broju sluĉajeva, oni odustaju od uĉešća u ekološkim akcijama. Ekološke organizacije, takoĊe, imaju poteškoća da obezbede neophodne resurse za rad, a dodatni problem predstavlja i naĉin njihove mobilizacije, usled kojeg gube samostalnost postajući zavisne od stranih izvora finansiranja. Kao posledica, ekološko delanje je atomizovano, a rivalitet i konflikti unutar ekološkog civilnog sektora, naglašeni; ekološke mreţe se teško formiraju i odrţavaju, kolektivni identitet je slab (nad njim prevagu odnose partikularni interesi), a kritiĉko delovanje ekoloških organizacija, nerazvijeno. Struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti se, uprkos postojanju relativno povoljnog zakonskog okvira, pokazuje zatvorenom prema uĉešću graĊana u donošenju odluka. GraĊani percipiraju predstavnike vlasti kao neprijemĉive za njihove potrebe, što se nepovoljno odraţava na njihovu spremnost da se organizuju i pokušaju da nametnu svoje zahteve. S druge strane, ekološke organizacije su iskljuĉene iz procesa odluĉivanja i svedene na ulogu asistenata u podizanju kapaciteta drţave za sprovoĊenje programa u oblasti zaštite ţivotne sredine. Konfliktno delanje organizacija je ograniĉeno, s jedne strane, time što ne dobijaju podršku moćnih aktera (meĊunarodne ekološke organizacije, strani donatori), a sa druge, finansijskim uslovljavanjem od strane drţavnih struktura. Karakteristike kulturološkog konteksta se, takoĊe, pokazuju nepovoljnim za razvoj ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji. Dominacija materijalistiĉkog sistema vrednosti i s njim povezano visoko vrednovanje ekonomskog razvoja, koje u senci ostavlja ekološke probleme, negativno utiĉe na ekološko aktiviranje graĊana. Ipak, uprkos preteţno materijalistiĉkoj vrednosnoj orijentaciji, graĊanima su vrlo bliske vrednosti Nove ekološke paradigme. MeĊutim, od naĉelnog prihvatanja vrednosti karakteristiĉnih za ovu paradigmu do aktivnog delanja, u kontekstu materijalne oskudice, put je dug i vrlo neizvestan. Zakljuĉno poglavlje je posvećeno rezimiranju i diskusiji empirijskih nalaza, kao i razmatranju širih implikacija nerazvijenosti ekološkog pokreta na zaštitu ţivotne sredine u Srbiji. ; he environmental movement in Serbia, in the context of post-socialist transformation and the EU integration process. The paper consists of three major parts and the concluding chapter. In the first part a comparative - historical, contextual, conceptual and methodological framework of the research is developed, as a starting point for the further analyses. In order to capture all relevant dimensions of the complex phenomenon of environmental movement and the composite set of factors that influence its emergence and development, the study is using a combination of different methodological techniques: a survey of attitudes and practices based on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N = 1952) and local government representatives (N = 232), in parallel with the semi-structured interviews with representatives of non-governmental organizations (N = 44), and the two case studies of communities with serious environmental problems – the municipalities of Pancevo and Bor. The second part contains the description and analysis of individual elements of the environmental movement: environmental activists, environmental groups / organizations, environmental networks, collective identity and environmental conflicts. Based on a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the key elements of environmental movement, the concluding chapter of this part of the paper offers an answer to the question - is there an environmental movement in Serbia? The main research finding is that participatory type of environmental movement that is typical for the Western countries has not been formed in Serbia. There are even no indications of the existence of significant elements of transactional environmental activism (movement), that is present in the countries of Central Europe. Instead, we are witnessing the development of a distinct model of collective environmental action that we have named "the third environmental sector". Different from the participative and transactional activism which have an emphasized political dimension, the nature of the activities of the third sector organizations is mostly "non-political", aimed at providing services in those areas that the state has withdrew from, in the context of neo-liberal reforms. In addition to the underdeveloped conflict/political dimension, the environmental third sector is characterized by atomized actions of professional environmental organizations, which establish physical connections (networks) among themselves only as an exception (under external pressures or incentives), while at the level of collective identity only the cognitive dimension is being developed (the formal acceptance of the environmental values and principles which form an integral part of the environmental discourse dominant in the West). Citizens, as a rule, are not included in the work of these organizations, except as users of services. In the third part, the reasons for the absence of the participatory and / or transactional environmental movement (activism) are discussed. In order to explain the emergence of the specific hybrid form of the environmental third sector, a synthetic explanatory model was established, combining elements developed within different social movement theories. The explanatory scheme has been formulated as follows: for the launch of collective action and the emergence of the environmental movement certain conditions are necessary to be met - a certain level of socially-constructed 8 dissatisfaction (problem) needs to be generated in large numbers of individuals / professional advocacy organizations (social constructivist reinterpretation of classical approaches); then, a group of individuals who perceive the problem / advocates for its solution must possess appropriate resources to initiate and sustain a collective action (the Resource Mobilization Theory approach); the wider context should be relatively favorable as to suggest the possibility of a positive outcome of the action (the Political Opportunities Structure approach); the value framework should be set up in such a way to initiate the action of professional environmental organizations and / or the directly affected population, and possibly also of a wider circle of supporters (the New Social Movements approach). Through the four direct factors (social – construction of environmental risks, the availability and characteristics of resources, the structure of political opportunities, the value system), the process of development of the environmental movement is indirectly affected by wider-scale social processes – the post-socialist transformation and Europeanization of Serbian society, as well as by the factors of longer duration ((pre-) socialist heritage).The testing of the set of explicative hypotheses showed that the necessary pre-conditions for the formation of the environmental movement in Serbia have neither been fully, nor even partially met. In comparison with other issues, the existing environmental problems are dominantly defined in the terms of low-risk and low-importance, due to which their capacities to induce collective (re)action are significantly reduced. In addition, the prevailing concept of environmental modernization, presented as a solution to almost all environmental problems, proves to be a factor that adversely affects civic activism, as it leads to passive anticipation of the promised introduction of mechanisms for sustainable development. Since the majority of citizens have access only to very limited resources, they, in many cases, tend to give up their participation in environmental actions. Environmental organizations also face difficulties in obtaining necessary resources for their operation. An additional problem lies in the way resources are being mobilized: becoming increasingly dependent on foreign funding, organizations tend to lose their autonomy. As a result, the environmental action is atomized and rivalries and conflicts within the environmental civil society accentuated; environmental networks are difficult to establish and maintain and the collective identity is weak (due to domination of particular interests); the conflictual dimension of environmental organizations remains undeveloped. Despite the relatively favorable legal framework, the structure of political opportunities seems closed to the participation of citizens in the decision-making process. Citizens perceive government representatives as unresponsive to their needs, which negatively affects their readiness to act in an organized way and to attempt to impose their demands. On the other hand, environmental organizations are excluded from the decision-making process and reduced to the assisting role in the capacity building of the state bodies for the implementation of programs in the field of environmental protection. Conflicting action of such organizations is limited, on the one hand by the lack of support from powerful actors (international environmental organizations, international donors), and on the other - by the financial preconditions imposed by the state authorities. The characteristics of the cultural context also appear to be unfavorable for the development of the environmental movement in Serbia. The dominance of the materialistic value system and the related high priority attributed to the economic 9 growth, leaves the environmental problems on the margins, thus negatively affecting the environmental activation of citizens. However, despite the predominantly materialistic value orientation, the values of the New environmental paradigm are very familiar to the citizens. Still, in the context of material insecurity, the road from the general acceptance of such values to active action towards reaching them, is long and very uncertain. The concluding chapter is devoted to summarizing and discussing the empirical findings, as well as to considerations of implications of the under-developed environmental movement to the overall state of environmental protection in Serbia.

The longstanding "cash versus food" debate has received renewed attention in both research and practice. This paper reviews key issues shaping the debate and presents new evidence from randomized and quasi-experimental evaluations that deliberately compare cash and in-kind food transfers in ten developing counties. Findings show that relative effectiveness cannot be generalized: although some differences emerge in terms of food consumption and dietary diversity, average impacts tend to depend on context, specific objectives, and their measurement. Costs for cash transfers and vouchers tend to be significantly lower relative to in-kind food. Yet the consistency and robustness of methods for efficiency analyses varies greatly.

This paper builds on the global experience and Mali s context to identify an effective nutrition approach as well as costs and benefits of key nutrition programs, as part of a resilience agenda after the crisis. It is intended to help guide the selection of the most cost-effective interventions as well as strategies for scaling these up. The paper looks at both relevant nutrition-specific interventions, largely delivered through the health sector, and at multisectoral nutrition-sensitive interventions delivered through other sectors such as agriculture, social protection, and water and sanitation that have the potential to strengthen nutritional outcomes in Mali. We first estimate that the costs and benefits of implementing 10 nutrition-specific interventions in all regions of Mali would require a yearly public investment of $64 million. The expected benefits are large: annually about 480,000 Disability-adjusted Life Years (DALYs) and more than 14,000 lives would be saved and over 260,000 cases of stunting among children under five would be averted. However, because it is unlikely that the Government of Mali or its partners will find the $64 million necessary to reach full national coverage, we also consider three potential scale-up scenarios based on considerations of their potential for impact, the burden of stunting, resource requirements, and implementation capacity. Using cost-benefit analyses, we propose scale-up scenarios that represent a compromise between the need to move to full coverage and the constraints imposed by limited resources. We identify and cost six nutrition-sensitive interventions that are relevant to Mali s context and for which there are both evidence of positive impact on nutrition outcomes and some cost information. These findings point to a powerful set of nutrition-specific interventions and a candidate list of nutrition-sensitive approaches that represent a highly cost-effective approach to reducing child malnutrition in Mali.

This report describes trends in the beef industry in the Monsoonal North. It aims to provide the region's natural resource management (NRM) groups with an understanding of how best to support the industry, undertake the changes required to improve its environmental sustainability and economic viability, and to provide it with resilience in the face of increasing development pressures and climate change. This report charts the industry's history and development; describes its current condition and the pressures and drivers it is experiencing; and explores how these are likely to change in the near future. The region: The Monsoonal North covers 20% of Australia's land surface across the tropical savannas. It shares a monsoonal climate, extensive intact ecological systems, generally poor soils and limited development. Its river systems carry nearly half of the runoff. The region has a large Indigenous population; most land is either under Indigenous ownership or subject to Native Title; and the highest proportion of Indigenous people live in the region's north and north-west. The region also faces a number of shared issues, particularly the challenges of intensifying climatic extremes and pressure to exploit Asia's growing demand for agricultural produce, which is placing pressure on land and water resources. The industry: Cattle production is northern Australia's most important agricultural industry. Two-thirds of the Monsoonal North is currently used for extensive cattle grazing. Through most of the region, cattle are grazed at low stocking rates on native pastures, with introduced pasture species being restricted in extent. Most enterprises breed animals for the low-value live export trade or for fattening and finishing on better pastures or in feedlots. Cattle numbers in Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia have doubled since 1965, and fluctuated with changes in demand and climatic conditions. In 2009, the Monsoonal North held around 5.7 million head of cattle. High export demand from Asia and drought destocking has seen the region's cattle numbers fall and prices rise through 2014-15. In the longer-term, continued growth in global demand, a reduced Australian dollar and high global prices, and improved incomes are forecast for Australian beef producers. Since 2009, each of the three northern governments have released policy documents that included targets to increase the herd size by between 1 and 5%, with the greatest planned increases on Aboriginal land in the Kimberley. Between 2009 and 2014, the Northern Territory herd grew by more than the projected 5% increase. Herd size in Queensland has recently diminished because of drought, and the current government's stance on herd-building is unclear. Nevertheless, long-term growth is expected to increase the northern Australian herd by a further 80% by 2050. Recent growth in the northern cattle herd has been achieved through intensification (spreading grazing pressure using water points and fencing) and development of underutilised properties, notably on Indigenous lands. Indigenous pastoralism is growing rapidly, with developments in all parts of the sector from cattle breeding to slaughter. Markets: Most beef grown in northern Australia is sent to Asia, with Indonesia being the largest buyer of live cattle. Despite a long-established framework for assuring animal health and welfare within Australia, widely-publicised animal mistreatment in Indonesia resulted in the temporary closure of the live-export market in 2011 until animal welfare could be assured throughout the supply chain. This closure demonstrated how dependence on a single market exposed the northern beef industry to market volatility. Bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations by the federal government are now progressively broadening market access, with agreements favouring Australian beef now in place or close to finalisation with most significant beef markets. Enterprises: Cattle enterprises in the Monsoonal North have been struggling because, in real terms, cattle prices have declined, while input costs have remained stable. In addition, escalating land prices through the 1990s and 2000s encouraged many land owners to increase their mortgages to levels that became unsustainable once land prices fell. This has implications for environmental management. In comparison to pastoralists in a good financial position, those in debt have less resilience to cope with drought; are less likely to adopt practice improvements needed for improving enterprise viability and environmental conditions; and are more likely to suffer adverse health effects. Many enterprises, especially those with small herds, derive more income from off-farm work than they earn from cattle operations. While large cattle enterprises allow economies of scale, increasing cattle herd size seems less important to profitability than does improving herd performance. Performance: Except on Mitchell Grass pastures and small areas of intensively managed pastures, cattle performance in the Monsoonal North is substandard when compared to the rest of the country, and is affected by poor quality pasture quality. Breeding performance is typically poor; with low pregnancy rates; high foetal and calf death rates; and many cows are lost. However, the achievements of the top 25% of the industry indicate there is great potential to improve performance on the remaining properties. Health and well-being: Pastoral production is a stressful occupation, involving financial insecurity and isolation; and pastoralists have high rates of injury, disease, accident and suicide. Recent years have brought additional challenges associated with falling land prices, market instability and drought. In the Burdekin Dry Tropics, proposed coal mining is increasing stress levels for many pastoralists. Supply and demand: Domestic demand for beef in Australia stagnated because per capita beef consumption has fallen, but global demand is escalating with population growth and economic development. Demand for beef is expected to keep increasing until at least 2050, with greatest growth occurring in China. Australia was the world's top beef exporter until 2003. Only Brazil and India currently export more beef than Australia does. Australia's disease-free status gives it access to markets that are closed to these exporters. Australia's dominance of the live-export trade to Indonesia also helps provide a disease free buffer to its north. Australian beef producers are disadvantaged by protectionist measures employed by both beef importing countries and exporting countries. The Australian Government has been engaging in international trade agreements that will overcome some of these barriers and increase market access. Market requirements and consumer preference: A high percentage of Brahman genes in the herd makes northern cattle attractive for slaughter and feedlots in tropical countries. However, slow growth rates and long transport distances mean most beef is sold in the low end of the market. Ethical, health and environmental concerns have contributed to the decline in domestic meat consumption, and are influencing consumer preferences in global markets. These concerns are driving practice improvement throughout the Australian beef supply chain. Challenges: Industry viability is constrained by lack of infrastructure, including feedlots, intensive fattening pastures, saleyards and meatworks, inactive ports and poor quality roads, all of which combine to make freight expensive, pushing up input costs. Considerable advances have been made in alleviating these constraints by building meatworks in Darwin, Arnhem Land and the Kimberley. However, lack of competition through the supply chain may be depressing returns at the farm gate. The ports of Darwin and Townsville are operating at record capacity, but some northern ports with export facilities (Port Hedland, Weipa, Mourilyan and Mackay) have not operated for several years. Water for cattle operations and irrigated crops may be at risk if extraction for these and other activities is not sustainably allocated. While broadscale irrigated cropping is likely to be restricted to a small proportion of the region, its requirements for water resources and fertile soil may deprive the pastoral industry of some of its most productive pasture land. Extraction for mining and irrigated agriculture is of particular concern. This has become a contentious issue with several coal projects in Queensland's Galilee Basin. Mining also has the potential to disrupt pastoral operations by removing land from production for both mineral extraction and infrastructure. Again, this is a significant issue in Queensland, where several landholders will be affected by the rail corridor servicing mines in the Galilee Basin. The disruption caused by mining poses a risk, not only to the financial viability of pastoral enterprises, but also to the health and welfare of pastoralists and their families. If well managed, however, mining and agricultural development can also have co-benefits, improving regional economies and providing employment and infrastructure. Weeds, fire, pest animals, disease and cattle theft all impose financial burdens on northern pastoral operations. Production losses caused by weeds have been estimated at costing the industry around $1,000 million/year; pest animals: ca $36 million/year; disease and parasites: ca $390 million; and cattle theft between $1.5 and $2 million a year in Queensland alone. No industry-wide estimates are available for impacts of fire, cyclones or other natural disasters. Conversely, pastoral managers perform important roles in control of weeds, fire, pest animals and diseases that would not be undertaken if no one was living on the lands they manage. Climatic and seasonal conditions are also serious constraints, particularly in inland Queensland, where periods of drought of two or more years are not uncommon. Conversely, extended periods of above average rainfall may encourage pastoralists to stock land beyond its long-term carrying capacity, and develop unrealistic impressions of what average conditions are. This could be an issue in the Kimberley if the elevated rainfall of the last few decades is not sustained. Climate change is already being felt in the region. Temperature have risen by up to 1.0°C since 1910, with further increases of up to 5°C expected by the end of the century. Droughts, cyclones, wildfires and flooding rains are likely to intensify over the next few decades, and continue to intensify until at least the end of the century. Carbon dioxide enrichment may increase forage production, but reduce its quality and stimulate woody thickening, as woody plants are favoured over tropical grasses. In most climate change scenarios, whether rainfall remains roughly the same or decreases, pasture growth and safe stocking rates in the Monsoonal North are expected to decrease, with the worst scenarios predicting decreases in pasture growth and safe stocking rates of between 50% and 60%. Climate change will also have adverse impacts on each stage of the supply chain, with effects ranging from increasingly uncomfortable work conditions to increased frequency of flood and cyclone damage to infrastructure. Policy environment: Many organisations have an influence on the direction of the pastoral industry. Individually, or as part of cross jurisdictional alliances, national, state and territory governments promote industry sustainability and herd-building. The preferred approach is to improve trade relations; simplify regulation; invest in roads; and provide a conducive business environment to attract infrastructure investment. The Developing Northern Australian White Paper and the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper further these objectives. Under Australian national legislation, the Red Meat Advisory Council was established to represent the interests of beef and other meat producers, and is reported to by various state farming organisations that work closely with the industry as advocates and information and extension providers. Research and marketing is largely driven by Meat and Livestock Australia (informed on northern issues by the North Australia Beef Research Council) and extension is delivered by state agencies, state farming organisations and NRM groups. The emphasis of both research and extension is on practice improvement, rather than herd building. The Australian Government funded Indigenous Land Corporation is also playing a pivotal role in the northern grazing industry by assisting Indigenous people acquire, develop and manage pastoral properties. Finally, the policies and assessments made by financial institutions can both determine the level of debt that a pastoral enterprise can acquire and the cost of repayment, and influence whether developments seeking external funding are seen as viable. The Australian Government is committed to climate change action by virtue of signing international agreements. Its commitments to reduce emissions will help moderate the long-term impacts of climate change. Both the Western Australian and Northern Territory Governments have also made climate change commitments and the Queensland Government is currently revitalising its climate change agenda. Regulatory environment: Legislation and regulation govern much activity on pastoral properties, most of which are pastoral leases coexisting with Native Title. This type of land tenure allows pastoralists to undertake most activities that can be justified as core business to a pastoral operation, including pastoral-related activities that reduce carbon footprints. Diversification into other activities requires the consent of Native Title holders, which is usually negotiated through Indigenous Land Use and Access Agreements. Pastoralists have the right to water stock and clear vegetation for pastoral uses, but conditions vary between jurisdictions and water use for agricultural development requires a permit. There is a lack of clarity about whether permits can be granted for non-pastoral uses (including diversification into broadacre cropping) in Western Australia and Queensland. Pastoral leases also come with a range of legislated responsibilities. Leaseholders in each jurisdiction are to manage weeds, pest animals and diseases and to report notifiable cattle diseases to the relevant authority. They must use National Livestock Identification Scheme tags to ensure their cattle can be traced through the supply chain, and adhere to animal health and welfare standards. In addition, as employers, pastoral operators must follow conditions laid down by Fairwork Australia. Graziers in the Burdekin catchment are required to manage their properties to minimise reef pollution. The rights of miners to access land and water override those of pastoral leaseholders. While legislation facilitating exploitation of mineral and gas and fuel resources purports to safeguard other interests (notably environmental matters and water access), few mining proposals have been rejected because of environmental or pastoral concerns. Practice improvement: Much effort has been invested in identifying the best practices to improve the profitability and environmental sustainability of the northern beef industry. Key areas of knowledge advancement include: • Improving land condition • Improving diet through exotic pastures and supplementary feeding, especially at finishing • Improving reproductive performance by culling non-productive animals, vaccinating against reproductive diseases and improving diet quality • Increasing liveweight gain through early weaning and improving diet quality • Spreading grazing pressure by increasing fencing and water points. Improvements to herd management are largely compatible with practice change required for reducing adverse impacts on biodiversity, carbon footprints and Great Barrier Reef water quality. Improved animal performance increases animal growth rates (meaning fewer animals are required to produce the same volume of meat), and therefore also reduces the methane emissions generated. Good herd performance in rangelands is also dependent on moderate stocking rates to maximise forage quality, especially by improving the cover of productive perennial grasses. Improved ground cover also reduces soil loss (when cover is at least 50%) and gully formation (when at least 75%). Resilience to climate change will be built by undertaking the practice improvements identified to improve pastoral productivity and land condition. Of particular importance is the ability to adjust stocking rates in relation to seasonal conditions. At the industry level, decision support, including improved access to climatic information, is required to assist pastoralists make the best decisions for their circumstances. Diversification: Another approach to increasing enterprise resilience is diversification. Options being canvased include small-scale irrigation of pasture crops for finishing cattle on the property, grain and oil seed crops, biodiversity conservation and carbon abatement. Conservation efforts on some properties attracted subsidies in return for entering into conservation agreements. Biodiversity offsets may widen opportunities for on-property conservation, particularly in Queensland, where a formalised offset scheme is being developed. A small number of pastoral properties in the region are also receiving funding for fire management to reduce carbon emissions. A range of other emission reduction opportunities are at various stages of development, including reducing emissions from pastoral operations through improved herd management and adjusting cattle diets and storing carbon in soil or vegetation. Natural resource management implications: As practices to improve performance are adopted and/or diversification options are pursued, careful management will be required to avoid potential adverse environmental impacts. Best-bet options for improving environmental outcomes along with pastoral productivity include: • Avoiding the use of "transformer" grasses (with high biomass and fuel loads), or at least ensuring they do not escape from improved pasture plantings • Protecting areas of high biodiversity values when increasing extent and/or intensity of grazing, in particular protecting biodiversity values on riparian corridors when planning irrigated cropping projects • Ensuring wet season supplementary feeding does not weaken native perennial grasses • Ensuring early dry season burning does not lead to vegetation thickening and biodiversity decline. The NRM implications of the current trajectory of the pastoral industry are mixed. Herd building will put more pressure on the natural environment. However, performance improvement has many benefits by reducing the number of hooves and mouths required to produce a kilogram of meat. If well managed, mosaic agriculture can contribute to herd performance while taking pressure off pastures and the natural environment during the wet season, but managed poorly could result in further degradation of alluvial environments and over stocking of adjacent areas. The environmental footprint of diversification into agriculture would similarly need to be managed carefully. However, increasing income from various forms of ecosystem service delivery, particularly on lands that are marginal for grazing, would be a boon to both pastoral enterprises and the environment. Central to all this change are the pastoralists themselves. And with all that is required from them and all the stresses and strains they already have to bear, many will be in no position to take up improved practices, let alone participate in conservation activities. Pathways out of debt must be found before resilience in the face of change can be achieved, and pastoralists must be supported in the adoption of new practices, rather than have it mandated.

The study includes: glossary; references; and annexes. A number of countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region have been severely hit by food-price crises in 2008 and are still very vulnerable to food-price volatility experienced since late 2010. Humanitarian responses to high food prices, crises, shocks, or emergency situations should help the poor avoid the consequences of the reduced affordability of a basic food basket. This is especially crucial in the first 1,000 days of life (that is, children from pregnancy until they reach 2 years of age and breastfeeding women), since most of the physical and cognitive damages due to improper nutrition in this period are irreversible. The World Bank is leading a regional study on how to improve LAC country responses so as to protect the nutritional status of the poorest and most vulnerable in times of crises and emergencies.

[spa] La tesis titulada 'Essays on the economics of crime: Determinants of crime in an urban context' tiene el objetivo de analizar los principales determinantes de la delincuencia en el contexto urbano. En concreto, analiza en profundidad los efectos de los partidos de fútbol jugados por el Fútbol Club Barcelona en la delincuencia con un objetivo tanto de análisis espacial como temporal. Adicionalmente, se analiza otra dimensión de la delincuencia: la percepción del delito. Para tales objetivos, se divide la tesis en 3 principales capítulos que reflejan 3 artículos que pueden ser leídos de forma separada o conjunta. En el primer capítulo, se analiza el efecto que los partidos de fútbol tiene sobre la distribución espacial de la delincuencia en la ciudad de Barcelona. Para tal objetivo, se utiliza una base de datos que por una parte, contiene todos los partidos de fútbol jugados por el F.C.B (tanto los jugados en casa como los jugados en otros campos de fútbol). Adicionalmente, y como gran novedad, se utiliza una base de datos única en España que contiene todos los delitos registrados por los Mossos de Esquadra i la Guardia Urbana desde 2007 a 2011 con información específica de donde han ocurrido, cuando han ocurrido y de que tipología delictiva se trata. Esta base de datos, permite realizar un análisis primero para el conjunto de toda la ciudad de Barcelona, y luego para aquellas secciones censales cercanas al estadio del Campo del F.C.B. La metodología utilizada consiste en un análisis exploratorio de datos espaciales mediante funciones de densidad de Kernel y la comparación de estos valores cuando existen partidos de fútbol jugados en casa y fuera de casa. De forma adicional, se añade un análisis de regresión que consiste en una primera estimación con datos de serie temporal a nivel de día para analizar los efectos de los partidos de fútbol sobre los hurtos y los delitos violentos en toda la ciudad de Barcelona. A continuación, también se realiza una estimación espacial que consiste en la estimación del efectos de los partidos de fútbol sobre los delitos violentos y sobre los hurtos a nivel de sección censal y día. En el segundo capítulo de la tesis, se realiza un análisis de los efectos de los partidos de fútbol sobre el desplazamiento de hasta 8 tipologías delictivas en la ciudad de Barcelona. El análisis se realiza mediante los datos descritos anteriormente. La metodología utilizada consiste tanto en un análisis descriptivo de todas las tipologías delictivas al nivel de hora, día, semana y mes, como en un análisis de regresión a nivel hora de los efectos de los partidos de fútbol sobre el desplazamiento de los delitos en el tiempo. Los resultados reflejan que ciertas tipologías delictivas parecen aumentar después del partido de fútbol mientras que otras, como el consumo de substancias estupefacientes y los delitos contra la seguridad vial, parecen disminuir. Finalmente, el último capítulo analiza, mediante datos de la encuesta de victimización de Barcelona, que determina la percepción del delito de los individuos. Analizo desde los determinantes individuales como sexo, edad, nacionalidad o renta, hasta los determinantes de barrio. Es decir, variables relacionadas con el entorno de orden y del aspecto del barrio. Finalmente, en este mismo capítulo se analiza como el simple contacto con la policía puede incrementar o disminuir el nivel de percepción del delito. La metodología utilizada es un análisis multinivel logístico que tiene en cuenta tanto el orden de la variable dependiente como las variables independientes a dos niveles. ; [eng] In this thesis, I draw on these theoretical models from the criminological literature and on the empirical tools from the field of economics to analyze crime from the perspective of economics. I use the city of Barcelona, known worldwide for its ability to attract tourists, as my area of study. To the best of my knowledge, no similar crime research has previously been undertaken in this city and, therefore, the results of this thesis should provide interesting outcomes for policy makers. In Chapter 2, entitled "Should football teams be taxed? Determining crime externalities from football matches", I begin by demonstrating the economic importance of Football Club Barcelona. I then analyze the effect of Football Club Barcelona matches on crime from a spatial perspective. That is, I first evaluate the effect of the number of spectators on crime (thefts and assaults) by comparing crime rates on match days, both home and away, and days that are very similar in all other characteristics apart from the fact that no match has been played. I analyze two types of crime given that their determinants are likely to be very different: first, I focus on thefts, where the concentration of people in space and time may introduce incentives, or reduce costs, to potential offenders; and, second, I focus on assaults (fights and brawls in the main), whose drivers would appear to be more closely related to hooliganism, i.e., unlawful behavior related to football matches, such as fights, drunken disorder or damage to the belongings/property of others. In the next step, I analyze the impact of a football match on the spatial distribution of crime, by carrying out an Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) of the census tracts around the stadium on football match days and on days free of football. Employing econometric models that account for the positive skewed distribution and the over dispersion of the data (e.g. negative binomial regressions), I analyze how the scheduling of a football match can modify the distribution of crime in the city of Barcelona. In the case of thefts, the results indicate an increase in the number of crimes for the whole city of Barcelona on home match days, especially, in those census tracts that are within a 1-km radius of the stadium. This suggests that despite the increase in the number of police officers deployed around the stadium, pick pockets are attracted to crowds where the rewards are likely to be higher and the probability of being detained lower. These results are confirmed by the placebo test that shows a lower number of crimes are recorded in the census tracts around the stadium when Football Club Barcelona plays away. In the case of assaults, a similar spatial pattern to that described for thefts is found, although the overall impact for the whole city is not significant. This result suggests that there is a marked displacement effect towards the census tracts around the football stadium from other parts of the city. This phenomenon would seem to reflect the hooliganism that is present in and around most football stadiums in Spain. As such, the results obtained in this chapter provide public administrations with the opportunity to raise their revenue levels by taxing the crime externalities generated by football teams. In Chapter 3, entitled "How time shapes crime: the displacement effects of football matches in the city of Barcelona", I purposefully omit the spatial dimension of crime in order to focus on the temporal. I begin by undertaking an analysis of the temporal profile of crime for the city of Barcelona. That is, I carry out a very specific analysis of different types of crime and their unique temporal patterns. I specifically observe temporal crime patterns on a daily, weekly and monthly basis to determine whether they actually follow a clear pattern over time. I then conduct an hourly analysis to examine the impact of a major event, in this case a football match, on different types of crime. The results show that the football matches played by Football Club Barcelona reduce the levels of certain types of crime during the period of the game due to the incapacitation effect, i.e., potential criminals are incapacitated by the fact of their watching the game. Moreover, I find a reduction in those crimes typically reported only by the police, including driving crimes and drug consumption, due to what I identify as a substitution effect, i.e., police officers substitute their duty of reporting crimes for that of safeguarding citizen security. The consequence is an apparent fall in these types of crime, although the reality may be quite different. Finally, the results also show that in the hours leading up to a game and in the hours following the final whistle there appears to be significant increases in certain types of crime such as pick pocketing and violent crimes. Chapters 2 and 3 give more evidence on the determinants of crime and specifically on crime behavior modifications (as regards both time and place displacements) attributable to major events such as football matches. The results obtained provide police agencies with a better understanding of the way in which criminals shift their decisions regarding the commission of crimes in relation to major events: on the one hand, when criminals decide to commit their crimes on days when a football match is being played; and, on the other, where criminals choose to commit these crimes on match days. Placing these results into the context of public economics, football matches generate negative externalities in the form of higher levels of crime, which serves as a justification for policy makers to find new ways of financing the public sector and compensating the costs of these events. Moreover, and given that tackling crime is one of the main goals of police agencies, Chapters 2 and 3 also shed light on criminal behavior. Specifically, the results reported in these chapters help understand the way in which criminals modify their target preferences (both in terms of time and space) and, therefore, how the police might best deploy police officers in time and space. However, since the early eighties there has been an increasing interest among police officers to ensure that that people not only feel safer, but that they have an enhanced perception of their own safety (Cordner, 2010). Thus, the reduction of the fear of crime has been a major objective of the police given its impact on individuals' well-being. For instance, a robbery not only has an impact on the victim itself, it also affects the individuals that witness the act (and those who subsequently know about it) since they are likely to feel unsafe and to modify their behaviour accordingly. Networking and social interactions can spread this insecurity among individuals consequently affecting individuals' well-being. If the authorities are incapable of ensuring that people perceive their personal integrity as being guaranteed and that they live in a safe environment, public efforts and resources devoted to crime prevention and control may well not be assessed as fulfilling their primary objectives. In this sense, assessing the determinants of fear of crime and of crime risk perception are crucial for the public sector as they tackle the potential negative effects on individuals' well-being. Community policing is the policy that has been used since the early eighties in an attempt at assessing crime risk perception determinants as well as the potential factors that may reduce crime. It consists of a more human approach to society as the police seek to get closer to the real problems and fears of the citizens. The level of crime risk perception is not only determined by crime or individual characteristics such as gender or age, but also by the characteristics of the neighborhoods. The broken window thesis (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) links three important concepts in neighborhoods: disorder, fear and crime. Specifically, this thesis states that the link between the three concepts may start with a minor disorder such as a broken window. If left unchecked, it will generate the perception that no one cares about it. Hence, this minor disorder may generate increasing levels of fear. Levels of distrust among the neighbours consequently rise and they start to behave differently - staying at home more and socializing less with each other. In turn, this leads to a reduction in natural surveillance permitting further disorder and minor crimes. In sum, crime risk perception is known to be an important determinant of individuals' well-being. Therefore, it is crucial, especially for governments, to understand its determinants and those (public) policies that can reduce it. Among those policies, public resources devoted to police forces emerge as a key instrument not only to tackle criminal activity but also to impact on citizenship crime risk perception. In this framework, the aim of Chapter 4, entitled "When police patrols matter. The effect of police proximity on citizens' crime risk perception", is precisely to analyze the determinants (both individual and neighborhood) of citizens' crime risk perception for the city of Barcelona focusing on the effect of police proximity and taking into account spatial aspects of neighborhood characteristics. We measure, according to the main theoretical theories, how the simplest contact of a police officer with citizens' can affect their level of crime risk perception. In this sense, we analyze how police policies consisting of an approach to citizens, may be effective in terms of reducing peoples' crime risk perception. After controlling for possible problems of endogeneity of police forces and crime risk perception and the potential sorting of individuals across neighborhoods, our results show that crime risk perception is reduced when non-victims (randomly) interact with police forces. Moreover, neighborhood variables, such as proxies for social capital and for the level of incivilities, as well as individual characteristics have an impact on individuals' crime risk perception.

The impact of infectious diseases on populations all over the world has long been recognized as an imminent global crisis.[1]The 21st century has seen an increase in outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases ("EIDs"), which threaten the health and safety of citizens all over the globe.[2]EIDs are diseases that have "recently appeared in a population or have already existed but are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range,"[3]which explains the widespread fear such disease outbreaks can incite. However, despite how many times EID outbreaks have made global news headlines in contemporary history, the international community has struggled to adequately respond, leaving vulnerable populations at risk. Many factors contribute to the disproportionate impact of EIDs on vulnerable populations, including those stemming from disparities regarding poverty and gender. Socioeconomic status influences health, to the point where "poverty breeds disease and ill health leads to poverty."[4]Data on gender differences in infectious disease outbreaks also show that disease does not affect everyone equally.[5]Although both men and women suffer from different diseases due to biological inequalities and social differences,[6]women are particularly vulnerable due to the lack of attention and integration of women in global health policies and management strategies of EID outbreaks. One case study that demonstrates the disparate impact on vulnerable populations during EID outbreaks is the current Ebola Virus Disease ("EVD") outbreak in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC"). This outbreak began in August 2018 and has grown to become the second largest EVD outbreak on record.[7]As observed in the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak and other large-scale EID outbreaks such as Zika or SARS,[8]the 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak has had a significant impact on women. While research has been conducted on "diseases of poverty" and the vulnerability of women in EID outbreaks, the preference to deal with the immediate outbreak instead of addressing more systemic societal concerns forgoes the focus on the individual and their human rights. As a result, little has been done to bring in a human rights perspective to the management and response mechanisms of such outbreaks. A human rights perspective not only brings to the forefront these core issues of inequality, but also introduces supplemental and useful tools for considering how to achieve the most effective response to these emergencies. The first section of this paper provides an important background to the relationship between poverty, women, and EIDs by considering both legal and public health perspectives. The second section analyzes the role of women in global health, particularly in responses to EIDs, by examining how women have been impacted in past EID outbreaks and the current 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak as a case study. Finally, this paper concludes with a discussion of how global health policymakers and healthcare professionals can address this gap by applying a gendered lens to EID outbreak management. Background The human right to health as a foundation for addressing inequality in poverty and gender As human rights have developed throughout history, the issue of health has consistently been regarded as a core, fundamental human right.[9]Beginning with the United Nations ("UN") Charter (1945), this emphasized the need for international cooperation in Chapter IX, particularly for finding solutions to health problems.[10]In 1946, the World Health Organization ("WHO") Constitution declared that the objective of the WHO is the "attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health."[11]In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") referenced this same objective for health in Article 25(1): "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care, and necessary social services . . . ."[12]In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") stated in Article 12: "The States Parties . . . recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health"[13]and to achieve this, highlighted the "prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases"[14]as a vital prerequisite for success. The drafting history of this provision demonstrates that the object and purpose of this provision was to obligate States to address the prevention of disease and malnutrition, two major factors which pose obstacles for achieving health for all.[15]Additionally, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("CESCR") General Comment 14 further explained ICESCR Article 12(2)(c), stating that "The right to treatment includes the creation of a system of urgent medical care in cases of accidents, epidemics and similar health hazards, and the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergency situations"[16]and "[t]he control of diseases refers to States' individual and joint efforts to . . . make available relevant technologies, using and improving epidemiological surveillance and data collection on a disaggregated basis, the implementation or enhancement of immunization programmes and other strategies of infectious disease control."[17]With these core international instruments, basic standards of health, treatment, and particularly disease management all set the stage for a baseline of States' obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health. Currently, the Sustainable Development Goals ("SDG") also highlight the right to health. In SDG 3.3, States' target to end "the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases . . . ."[18]is particularly relevant because neglected tropical diseases ("NTDs") are a subset of EIDs and mainly affect the poorest populations in the world.[19]SDG 3.c to "substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries . ." and 3.d to "strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks"[20]are both also important goals for addressing the disproportionate disease burden on States that currently lack the capacity to respond to health crises such as EIDs. These goals, voluntarily assumed by States, continue to build upon the human rights foundation of the right to health and further solidify the importance of addressing health through a human rights framework. Just as the right to health has been established through international treaties, women's rights have also been protected through Article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), which "obligates States Parties to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care and to ensure women access to appropriate services in connection with pregnancy."[21]Like the CESCR, the CEDAW Committee further explained the importance of protections for women's health through its General Recommendation regarding CEDAW Article 12, stating that the "duty of States parties to ensure . . . access to health care services, information and education implies an obligation to respect, protect and fulfill women's rights to health care."[22]Additionally, another CESCR General Comment addresses women's health in particular by articulating "State obligations as including identifying how gender roles affect health and removing legal restrictions on reproductive health, among other things."[23]These international treaty provisions demonstrate the importance of protecting the right to health especially as it applies to women. Poverty as a determining factor of health outcomes in EIDs Poverty is a main determining factor of EIDs in communities[24]because "poor health and poverty are intertwined in developing countries. Poverty breeds disease and ill health leads to poverty."[25]With almost 900 million people living in extreme poverty[26]across the globe, understanding how poverty and disease are related is urgent.[27]Poverty is an important factor which contributes to more opportunities for infectious diseases to impact humans.[28]NTDs are a subset of EIDs which particularly thrive and persist under conditions of poverty.[29]One disease example is tuberculosis ("TB"), which is often described as a "disease of poverty" because it is "significantly associated with poor housing, low literacy and nutritional status, and lack of access to health services."[30]NTDs are often called infectious diseases of poverty and are the result of the "complex interaction of biological, social, and environmental factors [because they] disproportionately affect poor and disadvantaged populations in which the poverty context reinforces risk and vulnerability."[31]This is compounded by the fact that disease "control tools such as drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics often do not reach the populations that most need them because of social issues . or because they are ill adapted to the cultural, social, and economic realities in which people live."[32] Another connection between poverty and disease is that since EID outbreaks such as the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, the 2015–2016 Zika outbreak, and the current 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak can have a very significant impact on a community, they can essentially reach the level of a crisis or disaster. When disasters hit, people living in poverty are much more vulnerable.[33]On top of this, women make up approximately 70% of people living in poverty worldwide, so this indicates that overall, women are more likely to be affected by disasters in poverty-stricken areas.[34] Gender as a determining factor of health outcomes in EIDs Another key determinant of health is gender.[35]The term "gender" refers to societal and cultural factors that are different between traditional male and female roles.[36]Studies on the relationships between sex and gender to infectious diseases have been conducted across a variety of disciplines, which has actually acted as a barrier to application of this research in outbreak settings because each discipline tends to work in isolation.[37]Thus, to fill this gap, it is important to integrate a gendered lens into outbreak response and management. Disease does not affect men and women equally.[38]Women are a particularly vulnerable group because they "disproportionately bear the burden of poverty and disease."[39]Thus, vulnerability is deeply gendered.[40]Not only do over 80% of women in the world live in low- or middle-income countries,[41]putting them at higher risk for more EIDs, women also live longer in general. Over a lifetime, the "social context of women's lives place exceptional burdens on the quality of life lived." Understanding the pre-existing biological and socio-cultural conditions in which women live is an important foundation for understanding their vulnerability in crises and disasters. Risks related to health concerns from cooking fumes in the home and complications with pregnancy "overlap with developing countries and are exacerbated in the contexts of poverty combined with conflict . [and] such risks are further aggravated in situations of humanitarian crisis."[42] State and international core obligations to protect health for all Although there are international instruments protecting health, given the vulnerabilities of those living in poverty, especially women, it is not surprising that many States lack the capacity to "progressively realize and ensure that a minimum core of a properly functioning health system and infrastructure . exists for people to gain access to health services."[43]While States are required to "take all appropriate measures subject to available resources,"[44]to prevent diseases, the States that experience the most NTDs "are least able to counter the existing imbalance in disease prevention research and development."[45]The lack of capacity in many States in the Global South has been attributed to "historical vulnerability from slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, bad governance, and neoliberal reform policies like structural adjustment."[46]In addition to States' obligations, there is also an "obligation of international co-operation under the right to health."[47]If a State lacks capacity, the international community is called upon to address this problem via a 'collective responsibility.'[48]The ICESCR addressed collective responsibility, stating that States should realize the rights in the Covenant "individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical."[49] Case study on the 2018 DRC EVD outbreak The most recent EVD outbreak began in August 2018 in the eastern region of the DRC, originally concentrated in North Kivu and Ituri provinces.[50]It has since grown to be the second largest EVD outbreak on record, the largest being the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak.[51]Although this is the tenth EVD outbreak to take place in the DRC, there are many factors which differentiate this outbreak from those in the past.[52] First, past outbreaks in the DRC have not been concentrated in the eastern region of the DRC. This region has been a conflict zone for decades and violence continues today.[53]Compared to the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, North Kivu province houses an even denser population than Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone combined, and also shares borders with four more provinces and two other countries.[54]This subregion of the DRC has a history of insecurity and presence of well over one hundred active non-state armed groups,[55]which still remain in the region after conflicts such as the DRC independence in 1960, the bordering 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the civil war that established the regime of recent President Joseph Kabila.[56] In the broader context, the history of the DRC has not provided a backdrop conducive to effective management of deadly EIDs. Centuries of colonialism led to decades of armed conflict, which continues today and has spread deep-rooted mistrust for the government across the country, especially in the Eastern DRC.[57]The DRC is also one of the three poorest countries in the world, despite its rich natural resources, so while colonialization may no longer be an issue, there is still an ongoing presence of exploitation.[58]These elements all contribute to the context in which the current 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak is taking place, which is important to understand for the purposes of analyzing the impact of EIDs on women in poverty. Women play an integral role in global health and applying a gendered lens in all levels of EID responses provides better protections for women and more effective management strategies of EID outbreaks The role of women in global health Informal caregivers The 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak began in December 2013, but in just eight months, data reported that "55-60% of all Ebola fatalities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were women."[59]Additionally, news headlines asking "Why Are So Many Women Dying from Ebola?" revealed that "women in Ebola-hit countries do not enjoy the promise of equality called for under human rights law."[60]Since increased risk in transmitting EVD comes from basic day-to-day interactions, traditional gender roles put women in especially vulnerable positions.[61] One role that women in many societies fill is that of the caregiver in the home. This societal expectation for women to care for the family greatly contributes to the disproportionate impact that EIDs such as EVD and HIV have on women.[62]For especially fatal diseases such as EVD, women are not only caring for more individuals, but the work is also laborious and dangerous because the disease is spread through direct contact with bodily fluids.[63]This is a particular challenge because often the intensity of the care given at home is equal to that given at a health care facility, yet not all women are formally trained health care professionals.[64]There is a gap in education and important information for women as informal caregivers, which further perpetuates the disparate impact of EIDs on women. As caregivers and due to traditional gender roles, women are also often heavily involved in the mourning and burial rituals once their loved ones have died and they are the "ones to perform funeral rites such as washing bodies and preparing them for burial."[65]During the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, one area of Sierra Leone reported that as many as 365 deaths were connected to one funeral, and when the outbreak first began in Guinea, approximately 60% of all EVD cases were connected to traditional burial practices.[66]Since EVD is still transmissible after death and women play such a prominent role in these rituals, their gender role as caregiver and mourner puts them at a disproportionately higher risk of infection.[67] Additionally, while women in many societies are seen as the primary caregivers in the household, when they fall ill the roles are not reversed. Instead of the men taking care of the women, other women in the community are responsible for caring for each other.[68]This is partially due to socio-cultural aspects of what are appropriate roles for men and women, and also contributes to women being more vulnerable to EIDs. Nevertheless, while the role of women as caregivers is clear, in past EVD outbreaks it is shown that "men dominated informational meetings on the disease,"[69]leaving out the key voice of women and putting them in a vulnerable place without adequate information or agency to voice their concerns during these discussions. Health workers The healthcare workforce is also a vulnerable population during EID outbreaks due to the nature in which the disease is spread, such as EVD. Since EVD is spread through contact with bodily fluids once the patient has started to show symptoms and even after death during burial, the level of close contact that healthcare workers have to infected patients puts them higher risk of transmission. Healthcare workers are between 21 to 32 times more likely to be infected with EVD than the general adult population during an outbreak.[70]Especially in countries where the healthcare workforce is already scarce (i.e. West African countries during the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak), losing healthcare workers to EVD is especially challenging for effective management of the outbreak.[71] While men often perform higher-level healthcare positions such as doctors due to gendered differences in education levels, women also play a very important role in the healthcare workforce. In almost all countries, the nursing staff is predominately female, and nurses make up a considerable amount of the healthcare workforce.[72]For example, during the 2014–2016 EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone, 70% of the healthcare workers were nurses and midwives.[73]The work conducted by nurses differs from doctors because nurses are often the healthcare workers who are in direct contact with the most patients, making them more vulnerable to contracting diseases.[74]The WHO reports that "nurses and nurse aids account for more than half of all health worker infections."[75]As a result, since nurses are overwhelmingly female and the duties of nurses put them at higher risks of contracting diseases, "the occupational exposure of nurses can be considered a gender related exposure."[76] Another important consideration related to the high infection rates of healthcare workers is that a decrease in healthcare workers also results in a decrease in availability of health care services for women.[77]This is especially significant in States that already lack adequate health infrastructure and resources. Because women already experience many health inequalities, disasters such as EID outbreaks only exacerbate them further.[78]Especially given the specific provisions under international law to protect women's health, the lack of available health care services for women due to a decrease in healthcare workers is a serious concern. Global health security requires a gendered lens to adequately address the disparate impact of EIDs on women Global health security recently emerged in the 21st century. It expands upon the definition of public health security[79]and also includes "the health consequences of human behavior, weather-related events and infectious diseases, and natural catastrophes and man-made disasters . . . ."[80]Also, "public health emergency preparedness" brings in an additional legal aspect, in both a proactive and reactive manner to best prepare and respond to such emergencies.[81] Because women play such an integral role in global health and are greatly and differentially impacted by EIDs, it is important to consider these issues with a gendered lens. The CESCR recognized this by recommending that States "integrate a gender perspective in their health-related policies, planning, programmes and research in order to promote better health for both women and men [because] a gender-based approach recognizes that biological and sociocultural factors play a significant role in influencing the health of men and women."[82]Thus, women are a key voice that should be "included at all levels of planning and operations to ensure the effectiveness and appropriateness of a response."[83] However, though these recommendations have been made by many international actors, little has been done to integrate women into global health security responses. During the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, women were "invisible" at every point of international response.[84]It is clear how women are closely intertwined in EID responses, "yet they are invisible in global health strategy, policy or practice . [and] only made visible through motherhood."[85]When it comes to addressing gender during a disaster such as an EID outbreak like EVD, the tendency is to focus on "Ebola first, gender later," as if gender concerns are an optional add-on that others can address after the outbreak has ended.[86] However, not only do women play important roles in global health security, but particularly in societies like the DRC's North Kivu province, women are often leaders and heads of households. They are not only responsible for caring for their families, but their position gives them social power as well, and they care for entire communities.[87]This is especially important for EIDs like EVD because community fear and distrust of governmental and international actors in recent outbreaks have greatly complicated the EVD management response. In just seven months after the start of the 2018 Eastern DRC outbreak, studies reported "low levels of trust in government institutions and widespread belief in misinformation about EVD,"[88]which has led to "reduced adherence to EVD preventative behaviors" such as vaccinations.[89]To combat these challenges, it is vital to build up community trust by "engaging locally trusted leaders and service providers . . . to build trust with Ebola responders who are not from these communities."[90] One example of how the WHO has tapped into women as a resource[91]to address this is through a partnership with Mama Mwatatu, a woman so well known in her community in North Kivu she earned the nickname "Mother Counsellor of Beni."[92]Listeners of her radio show are mostly female, so the impact she has had on the EVD management efforts in Beni has been significant.[93]On her broadcast, she answers her listeners' questions about EVD, emphasizing the reality of the disease. If she is unable to answer a question, she "carefully notes it down and consults with WHO experts,"[94]thus forming an invaluable partnership between the WHO and the local female community. Julienne Anoko, a social anthropologist for the WHO has also proven the power of women by collaborating with the Collectif des Associations Feminines to educate 132 women leaders about EVD and send them out to their local communities to conduct a two-week information campaign, explaining EVD vaccines, treatment, contract tracing, and the vulnerability of women and children to EVD, ultimately reaching over 600,000 people that would not have otherwise been reached due to fear and stigma.[95]These are just a few examples of ways in which women can contribute to the management of an EID outbreak. They are a key connection to the local population, and at a time when trust of authority figures is low and belief in misinformation is high, it is vital to reach all corners of affected communities. Conclusion Gender might not be the first element global health policymakers and healthcare professionals responding to an EID consider, but it should be. Applying a gendered lens to EID outbreaks reveals the disproportionate impact of EIDs on women, due to their higher rate of living in poverty and susceptibility to disease as a result of gendered roles in many societies. Women's rights in health have been codified in many provisions in international law, but the connection between gender and EID response has not yet been developed. Due to women's heightened susceptibility and integrated role in EID management, empowering women to do global health work in their communities and supporting them is an extremely effective way to combat not just this current EVD outbreak, but to strengthen global health security as a whole.

NDI President Derek Mitchell and NDI Board Chairman Secretary Madeleine Albright talk about her new book Hell and Other Destinations, and her experiences as Secretary of State. She reflects on U.S. foreign policy, democratic trends, and her hopes for the future.

This podcast was recorded May 27, 2020, prior to demonstrations in support of racial equality across the United States.

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Derek Mitchell: Hello. Welcome to DemWorks. My name is Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute.
We indeed are honored to once again to have Secretary Albright join us. Madam Secretary first, thank you again very much for doing this. Do you want to share some opening thoughts? I want to turn it over to you. Perhaps some things that have happened since we last got together about a month back.
Secretary Albright: Terrific. Thank you very much, Derek. Two important meetings I've participated in the past weeks. What was very interesting, it was the ... First was a virtual hearing convened by the house foreign affairs committee. They couldn't have testimony, so this was a briefing, and I did it alongside Derek and Dan Twining from IRI, and the subject was authoritarianism, disinformation and good governance during COVID-19. And this was the first time that the committee had done this kind of a hearing, And I think it's a very important signal that they chose to focus on the subject of democracy. And I think that it's a great tribute to NDI that we were the first organization asked to debrief the committee.
What is very, I think, positive is that leaders in Congress, both Republicans and Democrats recognize that good governance is critical to responding to the pandemic. And they know that NDI therefore has a key role to play in helping the world overcome the challenge and others like it.
DM: We discussed it at that last town hall, featuring our chairman about how she was on the cusp of releasing a new memoir about her life. This one being about her very eventful life after leaving her job as the first woman vice secretary of state. Hell and Other Destinations was released in mid April. During my time in doors last month, I read her book and it really is funny, a funny and fascinating read. So my intention today is to open up another conversation with our chairman and do so first by asking some questions based on themes from her life that she discusses in her book.
You said in your book that everyone should write a memoir. Why do you say that? And do you, or did you, have you kept a journal yourself?
SA: Well let me say this. I have thought, because basically I come from an academic background that when one looks at what happened in a certain period of history, it's very important to read people's memoirs. Now what I have found as I've analyzed memoirs, and I have, is that people write it from a different perspective. And so it's important because often we disagree on the context or what we did or what our role was. But I think it is interesting to kind of have the memoirs and it's really worth the doing. And I think especially people that have been in public positions, but everybody, I think in terms of ...
So let me just say, I have tried over the years to keep a journal. And I haven't really, because at a certain stage I was made much ... Obviously when I was young and had met a lot of people, I thought, "Isn't this great. I have to write about it." And then it always kind of stops after one month. Then, I did actually not keep a journal when I was in the government, because as we know ... I don't know if you remember, everything was being subpoenaed. But I had a lot of scratchy notes. And then what happened as I was writing Madam Secretary initially, was that when I found the schedule it was like the Rosetta Stone, because I could identify what the scratchy notes actually has something to do with. But embarrassingly, my mind would wander, and all of a sudden in the middle of my scratchy notes it was say, "Buy yogurt." And so I was multitasking even then, but I didn't keep a journal. And in many ways I wish I did, but there are so many records of the kinds of things that we all did together that I think my memoirs have been fairly complete.
DM: I felt one of the most poignant chapters in the book was the story about how you discovered your maternal grandmother's journal. It was about five or six years ago while you're going through your father's artifacts. And it turned out your grandmother had been killed in the Holocaust in 1942, and the journal, you have excerpts with the journal in the back of the book and it was written as a kind of dialogue she had ... She wanted to have with your mother and maybe with you while you're all in England. It also reads like kind of a lonely mother who wanted to connect with an absent family alone and isolated and Czechoslovakia, as things happened around her. Dangerous world was swirling in 1942 ... Well, really it started in 42 for her in that journal.
Can you talk a bit about the experience of discovering this journal, and through it your grandmother, so late and what it meant to you? Because we're also being isolated with things swirling out our doors, but also just what it meant to you to discover this and discover your grandmother so late.
SA: Well, thank you for asking that. And I ... Just for people that don't know my story, I was raised a Catholic, married and Episcopalian, and found out I was Jewish. So I can have my religious discussions sitting in a corner. But basically, I did not know about my Jewish background until 1996. And I had gotten a letter from somebody that had the names of the villages and my grandparents' names and dates right, and that was just as I was being vetted to be secretary of state, and the White House lawyer asked all the questions about taxes and nannies and stuff, but then he said, "We always ask this question of everybody. Is there anything you'd like to tell us that we didn't ask you?" And I said, "Well, it's perfectly possible I'm of Jewish background." And they said, "So what? The president is not antisemitic."
And it was only later when I was already an office that I was visited by some reporters who started giving me this disgusting index cards. These Nazis were very good record keepers and they had names of my relatives that have been sent to concentration camps. So to get to the journal part of it is my parents, we left Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, or escaped frankly. My father was in the Czechoslovak diplomatic service, and we escaped to England. And they ... When I think about all the things that happened, I find it harder and harder to get my head around it.
My parents were in their 30s, they left their families behind and went to England, where they were isolated in many different ways. We came back and I won't go through the whole story, but my father died in 1997 and he had lots of papers, and then my mother moved to Washington and she brought all his stuff with her. And when she died, all of a sudden all of it got transferred to me. And I had some hesitation in looking at anything, frankly, because of how the memories, but then what happened is when I became a public official diplomatic security moved into in my garage and were around all the time and there were all these boxes. And they said, "You've got to put these in storage." So I put all these boxes into storage and I didn't look at them, and it wasn't until 2015 that I had to find something and I went to the storage and I start poking through the boxes. And all of a sudden, there's this old envelope, and inside it is a diary. A journal. And it kind of blows my mind.
I look at it, obviously it's a ... And it's from my grandmother, and it is something that she wrote to ... They were letters to my mother describing what was going on. And it was kind of an interesting mixture of just day to day kind of things. "I did this, I washed my hair and I went shopping." And then all of a sudden it began to say things like, "They're talking about Aryans and non Aryans. I've never heard that distinction," she says. And goes through the kinds of things that the Jews in the town we're not able to shop in a variety of places. Oh, they had to give up all their warm clothes to the Nazi soldiers, and ... Just stunning. And in the middle it would say things, "How was it [Mudlanka 00:08:45]?" Which was me. "She's so cute." And it just was unbelievable.
And it was really like a message in a bottle where all of a sudden it's hearing from a previous generation in terms of their hopes and their wishes. And obviously in the most incredibly complex time. And the other thing I try to figure out, how my mother even got this and I've tried to put together what the path of it was and how stunned she must've been when it showed up. And so I have translated it, and it is in the book. But it's really very meaningful and it has hope in it, which I think is such an important part. And one of my messages just generally is that we can't control everything around us. We can only control our behavior. And I think that that's something that also came through in my grandmother's journal.
DM: It also is you talked about the various identities you have in a way as a Catholic Episcopalian Jew, in terms of heritage. And that issue of identity is a big one that we work with at NDI. And there's a big question for nations nowadays, given your past and your family, that of your family, how has the question of identity shaped you?
SA: Well, I have definitely been a lot of different things. As a child, we spent the war in England then went back to Czechoslovakia briefly, and then my father was made ambassador to Yugoslavia. I think some of you've heard me tell this. The little girl in the national costume that gave flowers at the airport, that's what I did for a living. My father didn't want me going to school with communists, so I had a governess. And then I got ahead of myself, and as people know in Europe, you have to be a certain age to get into the next level. So my parents sent me to school in Switzerland, where I was finally told how I should spell my name, because my mother used to pronounce it [Mudlan 00:00:10:44]. And so anyway, I have the French spelling and I learned to speak French. And then we come to the United States.
And so I was recently asked to describe myself in six words, and it is, worried optimist, problem-solver, and grateful American. And I think those are my identities and I'm grateful to be an American, but I'm also grateful for the background that I've had in terms of trying to understand how other people see themselves. I do think identity is important. I think we all want to know who we are. We may get surprised, but it's worth it knowing. What I don't like, and this is what troubles me and I wrote about this in my previous book on fascism is when my identity hates your identity, because that then is obviously very divisive. And it's one thing to be proud of your identity, it's another, hyper nationalism, which we're seeing that is undercutting everything. And we know that the virus knows no borders. So there are an awful lot of paradoxes that are going on now in terms of wanting to know who you are, but not thinking that you're better than everybody else.
And my, as I describe, authoritarian leaders and fascists, I begin with Mussolini. It's a matter of the leader identifying himself. And by the way, they're all his, with one group at the expense of another and makes them scapegoats. And that's why I'm very troubled by the divisions that are being exacerbated now.
DM: There's individual identity and there's national identity. And the national identity, as you say, that's most pernicious is an exclusive identity, rather than an inclusive identity, which is what we're all about. We're all about an inclusive identity. We're all treated equally. And these authoritarians are about identifying those exclusive identities, us and them, that tear countries apart and create the instability and insecurity that results. So this is a key part of what we do, I think absolutely.
During the writing process, we you able to identify the moment in your life when you knew what your life purpose was? At what point did you know what Mark you wanted to leave in this world?
SA: And it's a hard question to answer, because I do think that one of the things that was a motivating factor for me growing up was that I was, and am, a grateful American, and wanted to give back in some form. I also ... My father had, obviously, a great influence on me. So did my mother, and my father kept saying that Americans are taking democracy for granted. We had just left the country of our birth twice. Once because of the Nazis and then because of the communists. And the fragility of democracy. And so I looked at trying to figure out, in looking back, what were the different methods that I thought I could use to give back to America?
By the way, it never occurred to me that I would be secretary of state. There's some people who think I planned that. Never. But I do think that I wanted to have some kind of a role where I was able to talk about the necessity of supporting democracy. And I got fascinated by the UN because that's what brought us to America. And so kind of looking at institutional structures, but it never, never occurred to me. Nor did it occur to me, frankly, that I would be able to have a post secretary of state life, where I was able to put together the various things that I was interested in.
What I tried to do always is to make whatever I was doing next more interesting than what I'd done before. Not easy if you've been secretary of state, but the reason I wanted to write this book was to show how the various things that I got involved in related to each other and how I learned from one thing to another. My greatest talent, frankly, is dot connection, of trying to figure out how one thing relates to another.
I do want to talk about one specific moment that's so stands out. My favorite thing to do is to give naturalization certificates at the ceremonies. And so the first time I did it was July 4th, 2000 at Monticello, and I'm handing out a certificate and I hear this man. He goes away and he says, "Can you believe I'm a refugee, and I just got my naturalization certificate from the secretary of state?" And I go up to him and I say, "Can you believe that a refugee is secretary of state?" And I so believe in what America stands for and what we can do to be helpful to others, which is why I say that at this moment, the statue of Liberty is weeping.
DM: Our research in Ukraine has uncovered historical memory as a significant target of Russian information attacks. Ukrainians appear to be vulnerable to attacks that speak to evoke nostalgia for the economic stability of the Soviet period. These attacks exploit an actual democratic challenge for Ukraine, which is an economy that is not working for all citizens. In the US, what vulnerabilities do you worry similar information attacks could seek to exploit.
SA: I do think that I have been ... I love history. When I teach at Georgetown, I always try to put everything into historical context. And I have to say what I was just doing before we started this discussion was watching a program about a project in the United States about slavery. And there's ... The New York Times was doing something called 16 19, and there were some very strong arguments on Morning Joe this morning about this, between those who recollect history differently, or are trying to use it in particular ways for political movement, which we do. And I think people do that in terms of understanding what their history means.
And then one of the people there said, "History is to be argued about," which I find interesting because you kind of think, "Okay, well, we know what history is." But it goes back to your first question, Derek, about writing memoirs. Because people have different ideas of their history. I think the question is, do you have a society where you can dispute the history? And the Ukrainian one is clearly unbelievably complicated, in terms of that a modern Russia comes out of Ukraine, and that that relationship and Ukraine itself is a complicated country in terms of East and West and religion, and the aspect of communism that gave people a certain sense of understanding what the system was. They might not have gotten the kinds of things ...
Not everybody just wants the freedom to talk. Some of them want to be able to what their history is about. Are they going to have retirement? What group do they belong to? Can they send their kids to school? And I found this in a lot of research that I did about central and Eastern Europe at the time, right after the fall of the wall. What is it that the people thought that they ... What was communism and what were the possibilities of democracy? And I do think that Ukraine is one of the more complex countries, and the fact that it has been invaded, and the fact that the economic situation is something that is being pushed by the Russian hacking and the way that they operate, and their way of trying to divide us and divide Ukrainians from each other.
DM: Rebuilding a United Europe was one of the success stories of the second part of the 20th century. The last few years have seen the foundations of Europe shake with Brexit and the rise of authoritarian populace. How do we ensure that the European project continues as a liberal democratic one?
SA: I think that it is something that I ... I keep going back, trying to figure out what went wrong. Why did this happen? And I think partially we didn't appreciate enough the problems of societies that had been under communism for 50 years, and that it was much ... We spent a lot of time, I think, with a lot of the wonderful dissidents and intellectuals, and didn't think enough about how it affected the people that had had jobs. I mentioned that a little bit. And I think that also there are the issues now of this identity and the hyper nationalism, and that has been created to some extent in Europe, by the differences in the economic lives of, initially, Northern and Southern Europe, and trying to figure out why some were doing better than others, which then did lead to the fact that there were some leaders like Orban and the Poles that started blaming the other. And that was the most evident in many ways in why Brexit happened.
So these are big trends. I happen to believe in a European Union, but I think that as a structure, it also needs some fixing in terms of how it works with the different economic situations in the central and eastern European countries.
DM: In your book, you speak about how you dealt with misogyny as you progressed in your career. Can you share what helped to keep you steadfast in fighting this prejudice?
SA: I think that what is interesting ... And I often say that I went to college sometime between the invention of the iPad and the discovery of fire, but here it was a women's college. And basically we were told by our commencement speaker to get married and raise children. And I think that what I've been trying to do is to understand why women, why we're so hard on ... Tough on each other in terms of being very judgmental or finding our own inadequacies and other women. And so I have been very much for having ... Creating groups of women that can support each other.
And that is why I think it is so important, the kind of things that NDI is doing, in terms of working with women, to make sure that they are participants in society, run for office, and are respected. And I'd love talking about the fact now that the countries that are doing best on dealing with the coronavirus are ones that are run by women. New Zealand, Taiwan, Finland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Iceland. And I think trying to make clear what the characteristics are of women that make that possible in terms of multitasking, of caring, not setting their children against each other, but you have to keep ... I do think that what is important is for women to support each other, and so that you're not the only woman in the room.
DM: Sometimes moments of crisis and trial like this pandemic lead to better things. What are your hopes in that regard? And also what is the significance of today's pin?
SA: My hope, this is where my optimism comes from, our young people. I love learning from my students, and students that are particularly interested in foreign policy and diplomacy. Many of whom have traveled and they speak different languages and they certainly are tech literate. And I think that they question ... I think the important part for all of us as a democracy organization is to make sure that they participate, that they do vote, that they are interested in the institutional structures in the countries where they are. But that is definitely what gives me hope. And not ...
And I think it's very important, and I say this wherever I can, that democracy is not a spectator sport. It is something that the people need to be involved in. They need to be informed. They need to be respected. And I think the other part that I often talk about, and this is so true of NDI activities, is to spend time with people with whom you disagree and try to figure out where they're coming from, and understand what their needs are, and have a dialogue with civil society, and then understand the various institutions that are important. But definitely what makes me hopeful, our young people.
DM: On this issue of hopes of how moments of crisis and trial can lead to better things, I do think that's a very important question. I really hope that moments of trial by fire are sometimes very important, to set priorities to remember what's important, and to tell you how precarious things always are. I think we can get kind of complacent about things, as we are as a country, or we as individuals, that everything is going to be simply easy. I'm sure it's not easy for any of us. I'm sure many people have gone through lots of trials in their lives, as we all have. But crises can be moments where we focus on how ... Okay, we take stock of where our priorities are, and what kind of choices we want to make, which is what Madame Secretary said. Not just ... Crisis don't just happen to you, you also have a choice in how you respond to that crisis, both individually and as a collective, as a country, as a unit.
So I do think it's an opportunity and I'm certainly seeing that NDI of having better communication and doing more to force change, even potentially in culture because of this moment that's quite different than we've ever experienced. So we should be thinking in those terms. What are the things that we can do to take advantage of this moment, even when there's a lot of stress and anxiety? To take advantage of the opportunity as well. And that's my hope for all of us at NDI, again, as an organization and individually, that we can do that. And I think we can come out better on the back end if we go through it together on those terms.
SA: One of my heroes was Harry Truman. He was my first American president. We came to the United States, November 11th, 1948. He is the one that understood, to a great extent, America's role in the world, a democracy. And understand linking domestic to foreign policy. But I think there's so many other people that I have admired. I admire the first president of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Masaryk, who married an American. And the first Czechoslovak constitution was modeled on the American one with one difference. It had a women's rights in it in 1918.
And so I think that one can have more than one hero, and I think it's important to point them out and to understand that people have gone through very difficult periods before. And I do think that what is important is to really be proud of things that we can do, and the thing that I personally am proudest of, because it put things together and how I used representing the United States was what we were able to do to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And going there with President Clinton made a big difference cause they kept saying, "We were just there. We are so grateful to the United States."
DM: Well Madam Secretary, let me just close the book conversation with a quote from the book that I saw that I just want to share with everybody that you say at the end. I think it's in the acknowledgements at the end. The central theme of this book is about how people of all descriptions can work together for common goals against the background of accelerating history. It is about trying to make sense of the world we have while attempting to contribute to something better. Madam Secretary and everybody out there, stay safe, be well. Thank you all. Have a good day, and we'll talk again soon.
SA: Thank you so much for everything that you do. Thank you.
DM: Please visit our website at www.ndi.org. Thanks very much.

NDI Board Chairman Secretary Madeleine Albright



Derek Mitchell & Secretary Madeleine Albright on her past and democracy's future

Democracy (General), Podcast Listen Secretary Albright Madeleine AlbrightCountries: All Regions