Search results

Featuring an international slate of artists, the festival focuses on the ceaseless flow of people, information, and substances, through expanding urban areas, the virtual realm of cyberspace, and endangered natural landscapes. In the face of worldwide streams of refugees and migrants, an overload of manipulable digital information, and injurious amounts of harmful particles suspended in the atmosphere and discharged into waterways, those in power look the other way. And all the while they withdraw and intensify control to protect what they have. Short-term success is favoured over having a sustained vision of the future. The programme derives its thematic approach from the concept of the "space of flows", as set forth by the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells in his seminal 1996 volume The Rise of the Network Society. "The space of flows", explained Castells, "dissolves time by disordering the sequence of events and making them simultaneous, thus installing society in eternal ephemerality". Two decades later, one could say that we exist in exactly such a society: a networked one, defined as an open, borderless, and intangible entity, in constant flux and an ever shifting shape. It is our shared experience that we are all part of an enmeshed whole that provokes and confronts us on a near-daily basis with events unfolding in faraway locales. As we take note of them via our screens in the form of a tweet, an image, or a video they evade traditional geographic boundaries and notions of localness. And the speed with which people, goods, information, and pollutants are distributed and disseminated is so rapid that it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between catalyst and consequence. Moreover, how should we judge a message on our screen? Can we really see and understand what is going on? Through the rise of the network society, a real virtuality became visible, making us aware that we are no longer only living in a "space of places". Castells explains this as a space in which we were familiar with every nook and cranny of our village and acquainted with all our neighbours, and in which we could trace in our minds the jigsaw configurations of the horizon-bound fields. A new layer was created, and this "space of flows" catapulted us into a fluid ecosystem that requires a substantial shift in our perspective on humanity and the planet. On that note, Rebecca Solnit, author of River of Shadows, describes the ascents of Hollywood and, somewhat later, Silicon Valley as those of industries which have reshaped "a world of places and materials [into] a world of representations and information, a world of vastly greater reach and less solid grounding". And it is precisely the industries of Hollywood and Silicon Valley that by and large define the frames through which we perceive and see the world.Solnit interweaves her biography of Eadweard Muybridge, the photographer and innovator of early motion-picture studies and technologies, with meditations on the concept of "the annihilation of time and space". "The annihilation of time and space" is an expression from the Industrial Revolution used to describe the groundbreaking, time-altering technologies of the day, such as rail travel and the telegraph, both of which aimed to accelerate lines of transportation and communication.In this respect, each new technology functions as yet another medium that enhances our experience of time and space. But do they bring us a clearer vision? Or do they blur our minds instead? The artists selected for this year's Photomonth present projects that encourage us to develop ways of thinking that refuse to be hemmed in by boundaries and led by prejudices. The works provoke a more informed, flexible, and empathetic response to the most pressing issues that we, as humans, face today. As such, the festival focuses on the tension between the impulse to delimit a space with walls and to fearfully exclude the unknown, and the impossibility to regulate processes of moving enormous quantities of people, information, and substances within and across physical and virtual spaces. Envisioned as one overarching group show, the festival blends stories and images in an attempt to examine the "space of flows" that we currently inhabit, and grapple with its implications. To distinguish between the myriad focuses of the artists' projects, they have been divided into three chapters: migration to and within contemporary Europe; the invisibility and intangibility of digital data; and urgent environmental issues. The exhibited works address multiple topics, including: societal anxieties stirred by ignorance and mistrust, as well as political fearmongering; consequences of human interventions for the climate; stories of forced displacement; and the growing threat of cyberwarfare. Conflicts, unemployment and lack of prospects have forced untold thousands of people to leave behind their homes, belongings, and loved ones. Refugee or migrant, they undertake an often perilous journey to promised lands where they find themselves at risk of being detained and targeted by the rhetoric of populist political movements.Europe finds itself divided between the liberal values of tolerance and the nostalgia of those who crave a return to a fantasised past in which "everything was known". Meanwhile, in an etheric elsewhere, our data hover invisibly in an artificial "cloud", or else whizz in the blink of an eye through cables snaking underground and undersea. In truth, the vast majority of us don't have a clue what happens to our data after their transformation into bits and cascading scrolls of zeroes and ones. Computer programmers, cryptocurrency experts, and bitcoin speculators have little interest in making their shadowy realm more transparent or comprehensible to the layperson. The rest of us are left in the dark as to what exactly happens to the digitised facsimiles of ourselves, once rendered and uploaded. What subcutaneous layer, for example, do we unwittingly expose when we pass through an airport's body scanner? And although "wild nature" has been reduced in many latitudes to a contradiction in terms, it is still a quality we seek out and yearn to experience. In some regions of the world in which a highly cultivated natural environment is mistaken for its original state, we have been disrupting natural processes for ages. Heavy industries such as mining, the presence of nuclear power plants, and what goes under the name of forest management have had a profound, and in many cases irreversibly deleterious effect on the well-being, and long-term vitality of both human and animal habitats. Even if statistically calculable, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to visualise and truly comprehend the vast movement of migrant populations, the frictionless transfer of encoded data and its ciphered binary digits, and the large-scale release of contaminants into our air, soils, and water. Nevertheless, all the selected artists attempt to do just that: with their lens-based art, they make the "space of flows" more fathomable by humanising its statistics, personalising and particularising its abstractions, and demystifying its technophilic enigmas. Their art stimulates and resonates with the intellect, imagination, and conscience of the viewer. Work shown by Edmund Clark: 'Negative Publicity: Artefacts of Extraordinary Rendition' https://www.edmundclark.com/works/negative-publicity/#text Exhibition also includes: Esther Hovers, Rune Peitersen, Armand Quetsch, Agnieszka Rayss, Katja Stuke & Oliver Sieber

[spa] La investigación «Fronteras y transmigraciones del diálogo intercultural: implicancias del acto educativo como acción estética y emancipadora» consiste en el diseño (en el marco de la metodología de modelización ecosistémica) de un proyecto pedagógico (investigativo/interventivo) cuyo objetivo es reflexionar críticamente acerca de los elementos fundamentales de la educación en perspectiva intercultural y dialógica. En tal sentido, se documentan algunas reflexiones episte-metodo-lógicas acerca de temáticas relevantes en este campo. Éstas se han trabajado en paralelo (e interconexión) a una serie de acciones socioeducativas en ámbitos formales e informales de la ciudad de Barcelona. En relación a las temáticas de interés investigativo, se abordan (en los capítulos respectivos) una serie de cuestiones importantes, a saber, los debates acerca de las diferencias entre las tradiciones multi e intercultural; el desarrollo de la filosofía intercultural durante las últimas décadas; las formas de la inteligibilidad (en ocho metáforas) del fenómeno intercultural; la alfabetización intercultural como referente teórico de la acción socioeducativa; también lo referente entre interculturalidad, hermenéutica diatópica e intertextualidad; se propone, por otra parte, hacer explícito el marco constituyente entre cultura y alteridad entendido como fundamento de principio del pensamiento intercultural; además se realiza un compendio de las conceptualizaciones en relación a la "cultura" en las tradiciones humanista y antropológica, y su traducción pedagógica en términos de vecindad e imaginación; lo anterior a la luz de las implicaciones que tiene la noción de la experiencia para la investigación educativa, y la compresión de la metodología como una forma de tekné. Como se señaló previamente, estas inquietudes son concurrentes a la formulación y ejecución de una serie de acciones socioeducativas en la ciudad de Barcelona: 1. La participación en la fundación Migra Studium en cuatro escenarios: el grupo de visitas y monitoreo al Centro de internamiento para extranjeros (CIE) de Barcelona, la construcción del programa de parejas lingüísticas "Alliberar la paraula", el montaje (junto al colectivo de teatro La Trilateral) de la obra "Ramon Llull a la ciutat nova", y el diseño de los espacios de "Espai de Trobada Intercultural". 2. La participación en la Comisión de Pedagogía de la Comunidad de Aprendizaje (Escola Coves d` En Cimany), los grupos interactivos, y la ejecución del proyecto comunitario "Las nuevas aventuras de las bacterias cromáticas". 3. La colaboración (en la organización) y participación en el encuentro "Imaginarios desarmados. Arte y exilio", que tuvo por objetivo apoyar los acuerdos de Paz de la Habana (entre el gobierno colombiano y las fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia) junto a un grupo de colombianos (y otros aliados) residentes en Barcelona. 4. Por último, la participación como profesor invitado a los seminarios de antropología para estudiantes de educación social y pedagogía de la UB (campus Mundet). Desde la complementariedad de estos niveles se delimita la hipótesis de trabajo de investigación, que se formuló tardíamente como «la (im) posibilidad de una educación intercultural». Esta consideración se expone en la introducción. Con base en esta hipótesis se invita a la filosofía de la educación, esto es, a la pedagogía, a convenir en un pacto donde poner entre paréntesis esas (im) posibilidades, entendidas en tanto retos pedagógicos. En otras palabras, se pone en consideración que establecer una agenda educativa sobre el diálogo intercultural se trata de un asunto que reviste unos retos significativos. De los cuales el principal sería estimar el pedagógico de dicha educación, dígase a propósito de los principios sobre los que se fundamenta. Esta reflexión se pone en contraste (e interlocución) con la discusión política sobre la posibilidad de una ciudadanía mundial, principalmente teniendo en cuenta algunas consideraciones acerca del arraigo, la solidaridad, la globalización y el cosmopolitismo. Acá se marca un escenario de complejidad. En el prefacio se establece que la "esperanza" pedagógica frente a las (im) posibilidades se enriquece en la analogía del "intercambio epistolar" (entendido como correspondencia en la amistad). A partir de estas consideraciones se propone a la correspondencia y la amistad como fundamentos del diálogo intercultural. En esto orden de ideas, se plantea comprender el horizonte de la interculturalidad en la perspectiva de una política de los afectos: donde los sujetos políticos son capaces de pactar alianzas. Lo que aparece de nuevo como interpelación sobre el alcance de esas alianzas, pregunta fundamental para la pedagogía que piensa la educación intercultural. Como cuando Gonzalo Arango afirmaba: "Ni usted ni yo necesitamos presentación. Tenemos tres cosas en común: esta tierra, la vida y la muerte. En eso somos semejantes, casi amigos." ; [eng] This research entitled points to design a pedagogical ecosystem modeling, consisting on a research/intervention project. It aims to enhance the critical pedagogical reflection on intercultural and dialogical education. Several subjects are documented to achieve it, including episte- methodological issues, which have been connected to formal and informal educational actions performed in Barcelona city. Concerning to the key conceptual topics important issues are addressed, namely, multi and intercultural discussions; last decades' intercultural philosophy developments; eight metaphorical interculturality understandings; intercultural literacy and socio-educational action; intertextuality and diatopical hermeneutics; culture and alterity as a intercultural constituent framework; humanistic and anthropological approaches to culture, and its pedagogical translation as neighborhood and imagination based on the experience`s role on systemic modeling methodological tradition. As previously noted, these concerns were linked to a number of socio-educational actions: 1. NGOs participation on four Migra Studium scenarios: the CIE´s visit and monitoring Group, linguistics couples program "Alliberar la paraula", design and execution on "Ramon Lllull a la Ciutat nova" social theater project, and the involvement on the intercultural space meetings "Espai de Trobada Intercultural". 2. Learning- Community contributions on pedagogical commission, interactive groups, and the project execution "Las nuevas aventuras de las bacterias cromáticas" (supported by the school Coves d´ En Cimany and Juan Marse´s neighborhood library). 3. "Imaginarios desarmados. Arte y Exilio" collaborations, which aimed to build community alliance around the Havana Agreements between Colombian government and Farc´s Guerrilla. 4. University of Barcelona Guest Professor on Anthropology classes. Related to this complementary "between-levels" analysis, the research hypothesis, which was later formulated, is defined as follows: . Based on this rhetoric statement an invitation is required to pedagogy: to put in parentheses those impossibilities as if were pedagogical challenges. In other words, establishing an educational agenda concerning to intercultural dialogue poses significant challenges. The main would be estimating it´s pedagogical «scope» based on certain principles. To make a contrast on this idea, some political arguments about world citizenship are brought: roots, solidarity, globalization and cosmopolitism. A complex scenario is thus marked. Because of these impossibilities, a pedagogical hope is suggested: as an analogy (to an exchange symbol) based on an epistolary frame. Correspondence and friendship notions are highlighted from this idea. Furthermore, an affections politics is proposed in this sense: the political subject´s power is thus understood as the ability to pact alliances. In short, pedagogical hope is referred to solidarity and potential arrangements. Both values whose "devaluation" appears worrisome, but involve the possible, as Gonzalo Arango used to say: "Neither You nor I need an introduction. We all have three common things: the land, life and death. Places where at least We are similar, almost friends."

This thesis explores ideals and practices of Islamic charity and how these relate to notions of development and development aid in Pakistan and the Pakistani diaspora. The study includes a focus on gender and transnational dimensions. 'Islamic charity' is understood in a broad sense to describe normative ideals and Muslim religious practices intended to help people in need and to contribute to development. Taking an actor-orientated approach, the study is not driven by theological analysis or by preconceived notions of what constitutes development. Rather, it examines how actors, as individuals and as organizational members, give meaning to what they do by reflecting on their religious practices, social activism and development engagements. The thesis draws on data produced through multi-sited, qualitative fieldwork conducted in Pakistani Punjab, Oslo, and London during the period 2012 to 2015. It incorporates 92 semi-structured interviews, as well as informal interviews, observation, and written material. Four articles form a major part of the thesis. The first article questions how ideals and practices of Islamic charity intersect with and motivate the ways migrants engage in development. It examines how migrants' everyday practices of Islamic charity relate to their development engagements in their country of origin and beyond. Article 2 explores the role of religion in the migration–development nexus by investigating how Islamic charity is organized transnationally. As opposed to studies focusing on faith-based organizations, the article unpacks what it means for something to be 'faith-based' and explores the different roles religion can take in both formal and informal modes of organizing. The intersection of religion, gender, and development is explicated in Article 3. Studying women activists in two religio-political aid organizations in Pakistan, it examines how religion influences the women's ideas and practices of development, and how the practices are gendered. The fourth article focuses on the 'NGOization' of Islamic charity in Pakistan. Attention is devoted to the normative dimension of organizational legitimacy by examining how actors make claims to legitimacy as providers of aid in changing institutional environments. Researching Islamic charity and development in multiple contexts sheds light on how religion influences conceptions of development and the ways people engage. The analysis reveals how actors relate to, and draw on, ideals and practices from the Islamic tradition, as well as from mainstream aid and development discourses. It finds significant gendered variations in how Islamic charity is organized in Pakistan and the diaspora, and that women play noteworthy roles as development actors in both contexts. It brings out how motivations for engaging in Islamic charity and development work combine worldly and transcendental dimensions. In relation to actors in the diaspora, this research points to the ways in which religious duties can overlap with familial and other social obligations, but can also intersect with what elsewhere is termed diaspora development. The study reveals how religion influences conceptions and practices of development, and that religion can be both explicit and implicit in different contexts. Moreover, including religion in analysis allows for a broader and more nuanced understanding of actors in development, and of what development is conceived to be by these different actors. This thesis concludes that many aspects of Islamic charity, and particularly where it has focused on activities to support longer-term social change, reflect a unique type of development in practice. This development practice is deeply embedded in cultural and religious norms and values, but is nevertheless influenced by globalized understandings of social, political, and economic development. ; Denne avhandlingen utforsker idealer og praksiser knyttet til veldedighet blant muslimer (Islamic charity) og hvordan disse kan knyttes til ideer om utvikling og bistand i Pakistan og den pakistanske diasporaen. Studien fokuserer også på kjønn og transnasjonale dimensjoner. Begrepet 'Islamic charity' er brukt i vid forstand til å beskrive normative idealer og religiøse praksiser blant muslimer som har til hensikt å hjelpe mennesker i nød og bidra til utvikling. Studien er aktørorientert, snarere enn å være drevet av teologisk analyse eller forhåndsdefinerte ideer om hva utvikling er. Den utforsker hvordan aktører, som individer og som medlemmer av organisasjoner, gir mening til det de gjør gjennom refleksjoner rundt sin egen religiøse praksis, sosialt engasjement og utviklingsarbeid. Oppgaven benytter data innsamlet gjennom kvalitativt feltarbeid i pakistanske Punjab, Oslo og London i perioden 2012 til 2015. Det omfatter 92 semi-strukturerte intervjuer, samt uformelle intervjuer, observasjon og skriftlig materiale. Fire artikler danner hoveddelen av avhandlingen. Den første artikkelen undersøker hvordan idealer og praksiser forholder seg til og motiverer måter migranter engasjerer seg i bistand og utvikling på. Artikkelen utforsker hvordan migranters hverdagspraksiser knyttet til veldedighet kan knyttes til deres engasjement for utvikling i opprinnelsesland, så vel som andre steder. Artikkel 2 utforsker religionens rolle i krysningspunktet mellom migrasjon og utvikling gjennom å undersøke hvordan veldedighet blant muslimer er organisert transnasjonalt. Artikkelen gransker hva det betyr at noe er trosbasert, og utforsker religionens ulike roller i formelle og uformelle organisasjonsformer. Artikkel 3 utforsker forholdet mellom religion, kjønn og utvikling. Med utgangspunkt i kvinnelige aktivister i to politisk-religiøse organisasjoner i Pakistan undersøkes kvinnenes ideer og praksiser relatert til utvikling, og hvordan disse er kjønnet. Artikkel 4 konsentrerer seg om «NGO-isering» av muslimers veldedighet i Pakistan. Artikkelen tar for seg normative dimensjoner av organisatorisk legitimitet ved å analysere hvordan politisk-religiøse aktører gjør krav på legitimitet som bistandsleverandører når de institusjonelle omgivelsene endres. Ved å forske på muslimers veldedighet og utviklingsengasjement i flere ulike kontekster, kaster oppgaven som helhet lys på hvordan religion påvirker så vel forestillinger om utvikling som måten folk engasjerer seg på. Analysen viser hvordan aktører på ulike måter relaterer til og anvender idealer og praksiser både fra islamsk tradisjon og fra mainstream bistands- og utviklingsdiskurser. Studien finner signifikante kjønnede variasjoner i hvordan veldedighet i islam er organisert i Pakistan og i diasporaen, samt at kvinner spiller viktige roller som utviklingsaktører i begge kontekster. Analysen viser videre at motivasjoner for å engasjere seg i veldedighets- og bistandsarbeid har både verdslige og religiøse dimensjoner. Med hensyn til aktører i diasporaen indikerer denne studien at religiøse forpliktelser kan overlappe med familiære og andre sosiale forpliktelser, men at de også kan overlappe med det som ofte omtales som diaspora-basert utviklingsengasjement. Studien viser hvordan religion påvirker forestillinger og praksiser relatert til utvikling, og at religion kan ta både implisitte og eksplisitte roller i ulike kontekster. Inkluderingen av religion i analysen muliggjør en bredere om mer nyansert forståelse av hvem som er utviklingsaktører, samt av hvilken forståelse de ulike aktørene har av utvikling. Denne avhandlingen konkluder med at mange aspekter ved 'islamsk veldedighet', spesielt den som dreier seg om langsiktig samfunnsendring, representerer en unik type utvikling i praksis. Dette er utviklingspraksiser som er dypt integrert i kulturelle og religiøse normer og verdier, men som likevel påvirkes av globaliserte forståelser av sosial, politisk og økonomisk utvikling. ; Norwegian Research Council ; Peace Research Institute Oslo

When thinking about the purpose of the university, we often think about such things as knowledge, critical thinking, new ideas, rigorous science, scholarly development, and recently also employability, productivity, and academic citizenship. However, the future university might carry an equally important, but perhaps more disturbing purpose within it – that of resistance, transgression, and otherness. In other words, the purpose of the university might be the ability and will to push against standardization of education and thinking, to make room for different people and voices, to embrace otherness, strangeness and things that seem intelligible and of no use at first glance. But nurturing this not-yet-ness of our thinking, doing and being is at the heart of the university, partially through an insistence on careful listening to and for otherness, on creating room for seeming non-sense, and on revolting against limiting or oppressing hegemonies. In On Resistance: A philosophy of Defiance (2013) Howard Caygill calls attention to the importance of resisting and defying the urge for conformity, appropriation and consistency within every system of power. This is however not easily done as Henry Jenks points out in Transgression (2003), given that the 'systematization' and 'ordering' of thinking going on in institutions such as the university, pushes back and demands loyalty, agreement and shared 'norms' and 'values'. In a productive struggle between revolt and systematization in thinking at the university new ideas, innovative viewpoints and radical advances are nurtured. Unfortunately, looking across the higher education landscape today resistance and defiance are often suppressed as unproductive or even dangerous by the university itself. The university has become afraid and concerned with its own financial and political survival and, thus, absorbed in delivering clear comprehensible and evident proofs of its worth to society. In the face of neoliberalism and the political endorsement of the 'Mode 2-university' we might ask what is the fate of the future university and the people within it when an anxious university eradicates its places of resistance and spaces of transgression? What happens when room for and tolerance with revolting thinking, wicked ideas and transgressive actions is diminishing? Is there any hope for the university to offer itself as an open ethical room for staff and students living there in ways that are welcoming to the Other and resistant to the conformity of the Same (Levinas, 1999)? Importantly, here, resistance and transgression does not entail a breaking down or demolition of the university, knowledge or HE practice, but rather, an acknowledgement and insistence on the inclusion of other forms, voices, and rooms for thinking. Consequently, boundaries are needed to ensure ethical and meaningful education – the purpose of HE is also an insistence on universal ethical imperatives and academic virtues as Nixon attests in Towards the Virtuous University: The moral bases of academic practice (2008). Transgressive thinking and defiant behavior in HE does not deny limits or boundaries, rather it engages them through dialogue to complete them. As such, transgression is not the same as disorder, and resistance not the same as riot, but the insistence on breaking into new territory, on caring for otherness, and on revolting against marginalization and exclusion of thinking into comfortable familiarity (Jenks, 2003). Thus, the university creating places of resistance and spaces for transgression, is also the university that dares to insist on being an ethical, caring and democratic university. For the future university to keep on thinking, it must include and embrace unsettled and heterotopic spaces for transgression and caring places for resistance in the form of revolt as 'a commitment to freedom' and 'an invitation to alterity' (Jenks, 2003). It is a purposeful offering of places and spaces where people can gather, experiment, explore, and think in radical democratic ways along the lines described by Jacques Ranciére's Hatred of Democracy (2005). Taken together, such a conceptualization of the purpose of the university is an invitation for staff and students to dare to be thinking on the other side of the known through reinserting possibilities for revolt, in a dissident thinking that haunts established knowledge hegemonies, constantly unsettling the already settled (Kristeva, 1996). In this view, the university must establish itself as vibrant matter that never allows thinking to sediment or become instrumental tools in the service of society. Here, the university must reclaim itself as a place of resistance and a space for transgression – as what Kristeva (1998) calls a 'space of life' that comes into being as an affectionate place through allowing and embracing defiance and revolt. Such a notion of the purpose of the university entails a university capable of defiance and able to resist the pressure for uniformity and consensus-seeking in thinking. It is a purposeful university unafraid and daring and insisting on staying polyphonic and heterotopic in both mood and mode. Even when its rationale, purpose, and worth is questioned as intelligible, valuable, viable, or reasonable it will strive to foster and promote Otherness of both knowing, doing, and being through nurturing and harboring what Kristeva (1998) and Peters (2016) call dissident thought. That is, thinking that aims at critical questioning, unruly subversion and transgression of hegemonies. Explicating the purpose of the university through the lens of a philosophy of resistance and transgression, we see the place of the future university as a place for vibrant and vital defiance and as offering spaces of revolting and revolutionary disturbance. It is, however, not a violent or belligerent university as some of the narrower understandings of transgression, revolt and resistance might suggest – but a call for a university of care and affection for the Other and seemingly non-sensical. The future university rises from the mongrel collective, the polyphonic voice, the heterotopic space, and the ethical transgression. It is not the sole virtuous trumpet calling the world but rather a cacophony of torn trumpets singing the ethical song of revolting Otherness. Can such a howl of torn trumpets make itself heard in a world overcome with trumpism, neoliberalism, fake news and the alt-right? Is there any place and space for the university to be defiant through insisting on doing philosophy through embracing Otherness? And can the future university simultaneously be a non-violent, affectionate, and caring place of resistance and space for transgression without losing its dangerousness, disorderliness, and disobedience? This paper offers thinking on what a future university that promotes places of resistance and spaces of transgression might bring about as it contests the lazy, marketable, useful university that has accidently dulled its own thinking through becoming opportunistic, utilitarian, and afraid of its own future.

The research is originated from the concern of understanding the role of architecture in a complex social phenomenon, as is the tangibility of social abstractions through institutions. lt is studied why and how this relationship between social and physical is produced in architecture, and specifically, how it is manifested in the case of the State of Chile, in a singular political social period, marked by a republican ethical sense. This investigation is born from the need to understand the role architecture has in the materialization of social abstractions through institutions, beyond stylistic or formal considerations. lt allows to demonstrate that the recognition of the main architectural works is simultaneously a recognition of a social volition which has an ethical and value-based character that is embodied in architecture, in parallel to its own spatial and technical values. Projects therefore are a social co-construction, a specific praxis that changes the behavior of the daily social life organization. History is observed in relation to a specific project and the categories of its time and its society, because they are a product of an evolution based on a social dialogue. The sociocentrism is revalidated in the study of architecture and history in general. The investigation is divided into three parts: first, an elaboration of a theoretical framework that addresses the concepts of abstraction, dialog and identity, as parts of a social significance process. This framework is orientated to explain the existence and strengthening of social abstractions that acquire identity by means of a social dialog and that operate over certain institutions to configure them as ideological state apparatuses. Second, an elaboration of the development of the Chilean state and its actions in the 1932-1973 period, in function of a group of ideas that are key to understand the institutions which establish a modern ethos, associated to social progress ideas. Third, the focus is on specifically, how the state has materialized a certain architecture, which has played a relevant social role in the configuration ofthe nation·s identity, through 8 key buildings: the Law School of the University of Chile, the Military Academy, the Votive Church of Maipu, the Bank of the State, the Medicine School of the University of Chile, the Naval Academy in Valparaíso, the Cepal Headquarters and the Ministry of Labor. These buildings were chosen from a series of public tenders, and are the most significant in the public works of the State. Finally, two emblematic cases are analyzed in depth: the Law School of the University of Chile and the Cepal Headquarters.These cases are considered paradigmatic examples of the relationship with national social abstractions: from the national developmentalist discourse to the abstraction of structural changes, which means, the ideology-utopia with which these study cases are refigured. For the Thesis is it relevant to study the state works as a whole, by its condition of being the physical support and simultaneously the testimony of an interaction between the particular abstraction of a peripheric and open mind society as the chilean one, with the generic abstractions of the dominant world culture. The study cases can be recognized as a partial synthesis situation in that interaction, and with identity value. lt is attached, in addition, a series of theoretical, historical, political annexes, that bring specific information about the study cases, that are part of the investigation, that allow timely deepening o wider frameworks to understand the presented phenomena. ; La investigación nace de la inquietud por comprender el papel de la arquitectura en un fenómeno social complejo como lo es la tangibilización de sus abstracciones sociales a través de instituciones. Se estudia por qué y cómo se produce esta relación de puente entre lo social con lo físico en la arquitectura y específicamente cómo se ha dado en el caso del Estado de Chile, en un período político social marcado por un sentido ético republicano. La utilidad de esta investigación está en incorporar una dimensión histórico social más abstracta en los antecedentes, que permitan valorar una cierta arquitectura sobre una base identitaria, más allá de consideraciones estilísticas o formales. Permite demostrar que el reconocimiento a algunas de las más importantes obras en Chile es simultáneamente un reconocimiento a una voluntad social de carácter ético y valórico que se plasmó en la arquitectura, en paralelo a sus propios valores espaciales y técnicos. Los proyectos por lo tanto, constituyen una co-construcción social, una praxis concreta que modifica conductas de la organización social de la vida diaria. Se observa la historia en función de un proyecto y de las categorías de su época y su sociedad, pues son producto de su evolución en base a un diálogo social. Se revalida el sociocentrismo en el estudio de la arquitectura y de la historia en general. Se desarrolla en tres partes: primero se elabora un marco teórico que aborda los conceptos de abstracción,dialogía e identidad, como partes de un proceso de significación social. Este marco se orienta a explicar la existencia y consolidación de abstracciones sociales que producto del diálogo socialadquieren identidad y que operan sobre ciertas instituciones para configurarlas como aparatos ideológicos del Estado. Segundo, se desarrolla el devenir del Estado de Chile y sus acciones en el período entre 1932 y 1973, en función de un grupo de ideas que son claves para comprender las instituciones que instauran un ethos moderno, asociado a ideas de progreso social. Tercero, se desarrolla específicamente cómo el Estado ha materializado una cierta arquitectura, que ha cumplido un rol social relevante en la conformación de la identidad nacional, a través de 8 proyectos claves: la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Chile, la Escuela Militar, elTemplo Votivo de Maipú, el Banco del Estado, la Escuela de Medicina de la Universidad de Chile, la Escuela Naval de Valparaíso, la sede para la Cepal y el Ministerio del Trabajo. Estos edificios son los más significativos en la obra del Estado en el período y fueron convocados mediante concurso. Finalmente se resumen dos de ellos (la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Chile y la sede para la Cepal) como ejemplos paradigmáticos de relación con las abstracciones sociales nacionales: desde el discurso nacional desarrollista a la abstracción de los cambios estructurales, es decir, la ideología-utopía con que se pueden refigurar estos casos de estudio. Para la tesis es relevante estudiar la obra del Estado como conjunto por su condición de ser el soporte físico y a la vez el testimonio de una interacción entre las particulares abstracciones de una sociedad periférica y abierta como la chilena con las abstracciones genéricas de la cultura mundial dominante. Los casos en estudio pueden ser reconocidos como situaciones de síntesis parcial en dicha interacción y con valor de identidad. Se adjuntan además una serie de anexos de carácter teórico, histórico, político y de información específica de los casos de estudio que forman parte de la investigación, que permiten profundizaciones puntuales o marcos más amplios para entender los fenómenos presentados. ; Postprint (published version)

The research is originated from the concern of understanding the role of architecture in a complex social phenomenon, as is the tangibility of social abstractions through institutions. lt is studied why and how this relationship between social and physical is produced in architecture, and specifically, how it is manifested in the case of the State of Chile, in a singular political social period, marked by a republican ethical sense. This investigation is born from the need to understand the role architecture has in the materialization of social abstractions through institutions, beyond stylistic or formal considerations. lt allows to demonstrate that the recognition of the main architectural works is simultaneously a recognition of a social volition which has an ethical and value-based character that is embodied in architecture, in parallel to its own spatial and technical values. Projects therefore are a social co-construction, a specific praxis that changes the behavior of the daily social life organization. History is observed in relation to a specific project and the categories of its time and its society, because they are a product of an evolution based on a social dialogue. The sociocentrism is revalidated in the study of architecture and history in general. The investigation is divided into three parts: first, an elaboration of a theoretical framework that addresses the concepts of abstraction, dialog and identity, as parts of a social significance process. This framework is orientated to explain the existence and strengthening of social abstractions that acquire identity by means of a social dialog and that operate over certain institutions to configure them as ideological state apparatuses. Second, an elaboration of the development of the Chilean state and its actions in the 1932-1973 period, in function of a group of ideas that are key to understand the institutions which establish a modern ethos, associated to social progress ideas. Third, the focus is on specifically, how the state has materialized a certain architecture, which has played a relevant social role in the configuration ofthe nation·s identity, through 8 key buildings: the Law School of the University of Chile, the Military Academy, the Votive Church of Maipu, the Bank of the State, the Medicine School of the University of Chile, the Naval Academy in Valparaíso, the Cepal Headquarters and the Ministry of Labor. These buildings were chosen from a series of public tenders, and are the most significant in the public works of the State. Finally, two emblematic cases are analyzed in depth: the Law School of the University of Chile and the Cepal Headquarters.These cases are considered paradigmatic examples of the relationship with national social abstractions: from the national developmentalist discourse to the abstraction of structural changes, which means, the ideology-utopia with which these study cases are refigured. For the Thesis is it relevant to study the state works as a whole, by its condition of being the physical support and simultaneously the testimony of an interaction between the particular abstraction of a peripheric and open mind society as the chilean one, with the generic abstractions of the dominant world culture. The study cases can be recognized as a partial synthesis situation in that interaction, and with identity value. lt is attached, in addition, a series of theoretical, historical, political annexes, that bring specific information about the study cases, that are part of the investigation, that allow timely deepening o wider frameworks to understand the presented phenomena. ; La investigación nace de la inquietud por comprender el papel de la arquitectura en un fenómeno social complejo como lo es la tangibilización de sus abstracciones sociales a través de instituciones. Se estudia por qué y cómo se produce esta relación de puente entre lo social con lo físico en la arquitectura y específicamente cómo se ha dado en el caso del Estado de Chile, en un período político social marcado por un sentido ético republicano. La utilidad de esta investigación está en incorporar una dimensión histórico social más abstracta en los antecedentes, que permitan valorar una cierta arquitectura sobre una base identitaria, más allá de consideraciones estilísticas o formales. Permite demostrar que el reconocimiento a algunas de las más importantes obras en Chile es simultáneamente un reconocimiento a una voluntad social de carácter ético y valórico que se plasmó en la arquitectura, en paralelo a sus propios valores espaciales y técnicos. Los proyectos por lo tanto, constituyen una co-construcción social, una praxis concreta que modifica conductas de la organización social de la vida diaria. Se observa la historia en función de un proyecto y de las categorías de su época y su sociedad, pues son producto de su evolución en base a un diálogo social. Se revalida el sociocentrismo en el estudio de la arquitectura y de la historia en general. Se desarrolla en tres partes: primero se elabora un marco teórico que aborda los conceptos de abstracción,dialogía e identidad, como partes de un proceso de significación social. Este marco se orienta a explicar la existencia y consolidación de abstracciones sociales que producto del diálogo socialadquieren identidad y que operan sobre ciertas instituciones para configurarlas como aparatos ideológicos del Estado. Segundo, se desarrolla el devenir del Estado de Chile y sus acciones en el período entre 1932 y 1973, en función de un grupo de ideas que son claves para comprender las instituciones que instauran un ethos moderno, asociado a ideas de progreso social. Tercero, se desarrolla específicamente cómo el Estado ha materializado una cierta arquitectura, que ha cumplido un rol social relevante en la conformación de la identidad nacional, a través de 8 proyectos claves: la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Chile, la Escuela Militar, elTemplo Votivo de Maipú, el Banco del Estado, la Escuela de Medicina de la Universidad de Chile, la Escuela Naval de Valparaíso, la sede para la Cepal y el Ministerio del Trabajo. Estos edificios son los más significativos en la obra del Estado en el período y fueron convocados mediante concurso. Finalmente se resumen dos de ellos (la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Chile y la sede para la Cepal) como ejemplos paradigmáticos de relación con las abstracciones sociales nacionales: desde el discurso nacional desarrollista a la abstracción de los cambios estructurales, es decir, la ideología-utopía con que se pueden refigurar estos casos de estudio. Para la tesis es relevante estudiar la obra del Estado como conjunto por su condición de ser el soporte físico y a la vez el testimonio de una interacción entre las particulares abstracciones de una sociedad periférica y abierta como la chilena con las abstracciones genéricas de la cultura mundial dominante. Los casos en estudio pueden ser reconocidos como situaciones de síntesis parcial en dicha interacción y con valor de identidad. Se adjuntan además una serie de anexos de carácter teórico, histórico, político y de información específica de los casos de estudio que forman parte de la investigación, que permiten profundizaciones puntuales o marcos más amplios para entender los fenómenos presentados. ; Postprint (published version)

Die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe deutscher Klassiker wurde seit 1904 bis in die Zwanziger Jahre hinein im Insel Verlag in Leipzig publiziert. Die Buchreihe hat nicht nur für den Verlag und die Druckerei Poeschel in der sie gedruckt wurde eine ganze Reihe von Neuerungen nach sich gezogen, auch für den deutschen Buchmarkt hat die Klassikerausgabe einen Meilenstein bedeutet. Sie hat einige Eigenschaften des Taschenbuches vorweggenommen. Sie orientierte sich an der Qualität bibliophiler Buchpublikationen, aber war dennoch preislich erschwinglich. Zeitgenössische Klassikerausgaben erschienen zumeist mit einem Kommentar. Nicht so die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe. Der Text wurde zwar von führenden Wissenschaftlern editiert, aber sie war dennoch unkommentiert. Der Text war in einer Jenson-Antiqua gesetzt obwohl die Debatte um individuell gestaltete Künstlerschriften und die Diskussion um die als deutsche Schrift begriffene Fraktur unter den wichtigsten Protagonisten des deutschen Buchgewerbes ihren Höhepunkt noch nicht erreicht hatte. Ziel für die Klassikerausgabe war darüber hinaus, das zur Jahrhundertwende leicht angestaubte Image der Stadt Weimar aufzupolieren. Über das Patronat des Großherzogs hinaus hätte man die Gewinne aus dem Verkauf der Bücher der Permanenten Ausstellung für die Anschaffung von modernen Kunstobjekten zur Verfügung stellen wollen, die unter der Leitung von Harry Graf Kessler stand. Sieht man den Inhalt der Werke der in der Klassikerreihe erschienen Dichter Goethe, Schiller und Körner in einem ästhetischen Kontext mit dem der Philosophen Schopenhauer und Kant, wird im Spiegel der Formalästhetik der Klassikerausgabe Graf Kesslers Bildungs- und Kulturbegriff erkennbar, der sich in den Jahren nach der Jahrhundertwende zu seinem Lebenskunstideal verdichtete. Der zerrütteten Existenz der Zeitgenossen, wie Friedrich Nietzsche sie beschrieben hatte, sollte der Inhalt der Ausgabe in seiner modernen Form eine moderne Wertehaltung entgegensetzen. Die Lektüre der Klassiker sollte den deutschen Philister "entkrampfen" und ihm ein Stück der verloren geglaubten Lebensfreude wieder zurück bringen, in dem dieser auch die Facetten des Lebensleids als normal hinnehmen und akzeptieren lernte. Die Klassikerausgabe repräsentierte aus diesem Grund auch den kulturellen und politischen Reformwillen und die gesellschaftlichen Vorstellungen die der Graf für ein modernes Deutschland als überfällig erachtete. Die Buchreihe war aus diesem Grund auch ein politisches Statement gegen die Beharrungskräfte im deutschen Kaiserreich. Die Klassikerreihe wurde in der buchhistorischen Forschung zwar als bedeutender Meilenstein charakterisiert und als "wichtiges" oder gar "revolutionäres" Werk der Zeit hervorgehoben, die Ergebnisse der Forschung kann man überspitzt aber in der Aussage zusammenfassen, dass es sich bei der Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe um einen "zufälligen Glückstreffer" deutscher Buchgestaltung zu handeln scheint. Zumindest lassen die Aussagen, die bisher in dieser Hinsicht gemacht wurden, keine eindeutige Einordnung zu, außer vielleicht der, dass die Klassiker von der englischen Lebensreform inspiriert wurden und Henry van de Velde und William Morris einen Einfluss auf ihre äußere Form hatten. Gerade die Gedankenansätze dieser Beiden nutzte Graf Kessler aber für eigene Überlegungen, die ihn schließlich auch zu eigenen Vorstellungen von idealer Buchgestaltung brachten. Da für Kessler auch Gebrauchsgegenstände Kunst sein konnten, wird das Konzept der Klassikerausgabe bis zur Umsetzung in ihrer `bahnbrechenden´ Form in das ideengeschichtliche und ästhetische Denken des Grafen eingeordnet. Die Klassiker werden zwar in buchhistorischen Einzeluntersuchungen bezüglich ihrer Komponenten, dem Dünndruckpapier, ihrem Einband oder der Schrifttype exponiert. In buchwissenschaftlichen Überblicksdarstellungen wird ihr Einfluss hingegen weniger beachtet, denn verschiedene Kritiker bezogen sie seit ihrem ersten Erscheinen nicht als deutsches Kulturgut mit ein, denn sie lehnten sowohl die englischen Mitarbeiter Emery Walker, Edward Johnston, Eric Gill und Douglas Cockerell wie auch ihre Gestaltung als "welsche" Buchausgabe ab. Richtig ist, die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe hatte dieselbe Funktion wie die von Graf Kessler in Weimar konzipierten Kunstausstellungen und die dortige Kunstschule unter der Leitung seines Freundes Henry van de Velde. Auch das für Weimar geplante Theater, das unter der Leitung von Hugo von Hofmannsthal hätte stehen sollen und die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Schule, hätten dieselben Ideen der Moderne mit anderen Mitteln transportieren sollen, wie die Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe deutscher Klassiker. ; The Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst Edition of German Classics was published by the Insel Verlag in Leipzig from 1904 well into the 1920s. While this series of books obviously sparked a range of innovations at both the publishing house and the printer Poeschel, the overall impact of the series was much wider, and as a whole it represents a significant milestone in the development of the modern German book market. In many ways, the series already anticipated some of the characteristics of the modern paperback. The level of quality echoed that of serious literary publications, but the pricing was reasonable. The Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series appeared without commentary, in stark contrast to other editions of the classics at the time. The text itself was edited by leading literary experts, but the content was delivered "pure". The books were typeset in Jenson-Antiqua; this at a time when the entire debate between new artistic typefaces and Fraktur, i.e. the "old German" script, hadn't even reached the main players in German publishing. One of the goals of this fresh repackaging of the classics was to give a new shine to Weimar's slightly dusty image as a city. Thanks to the patronage of the Grand Duke Wilhelm himself, it was planned that the profits from sales of the books would be made available to Weimar's Permanent Exhibition, managed by Harry Graf Kessler, for the purchase of modern art objects. Looking at how the series juxtaposes works of the poetic writers Goethe, Schiller and Koerner with the philosophical ideas of Schopenhauer and Kant, and brilliantly packages them all into a publishing work of such beauty, one can see Graf Kessler's concepts of education and culture clearly reflected in both the content and the form. These are the concepts he slowly solidified into an ideal "art of living" in the years just after the turn of the century. The rotten, decayed existence of contemporary man as Friedrich Nietzsche had viewed it, was to be answered with a set of modern values firmly rooted in the classics. Reading the classics was meant to "uncramp" the German philistine and bring him back a piece of his supposedly lost joy of life by learning to see life's suffering and accept it as normal. For this reason, the Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series of classics also embodied a slightly subversive will for political and cultural reform, as well as a spark of social imagination that Graf Kessler viewed as long overdue in a modern Germany. In effect, the series was a political statement against the conservative elements of the German Kaiserreich. Although researchers have characterised the series as a milestone and even gone so far as to label it an "important" or even "revolutionary" work for its time, the general opinion of these literary historians can be curtly summarised by saying that the great success of Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst editions was little more than a "happy accident." Their statements do not attribute any serious weight to the series, other than occasionally mentioning that it was inspired by the English arts and crafts movement, and that Henry van de Velde and William Morris had an influence on its appearance. But it was actually the fundamental ideas of these two men rather than just their design approach that Graf Kessler had used as a basis for further developing his own ideal approach to book publishing – and to other areas. Kessler was clear that everyday objects could also be works of art, so the very concept of a new edition of the classics and its groundbreaking execution is clearly an expression of the Graf's views of philosophical history and his aesthetic thinking. In literary research, the series is occasionally praised for specifics such as the quality and feel of its thin paper, its binding and its typeface. But in historical literary summaries, scant attention is paid to the overall influence of the series because many critics of the time simply excluded it from consideration as a work of German culture. They rejected the involvement of English employees such as Emery Walker, Edward Johnston, Eric Gill and Douglas Cockerell, and dismissed the "garden variety" design of the books. What is clear is the Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst Edition of German Classics did indeed have a very serious purpose; one that was shared by nearly all of Kessler's projects. Like the art exhibitions he conceived for Weimar, like the establishment of Art Academy under the care of his friend Henry van de Velde, like the Grand Duke Wilhelm Ernst School, and like the planned theatre for Weimar that was to have been led by Hugo von Hofmannsthal, the Großherzog Wilhelm Ernst series had a serious, somewhat provocative purpose: to unite art with life, to make the classics relevant to the common man, and in so doing, inject a breath of creativity into the stifled society of Germany under the Kaisers.

"Promotion of Women and conjugal Sexuality confronted to the AIDS Epidemics". The article describes the changing roles of Cambodian wives and husbands in the wake of the drastic social changes that Cambodian society has experienced in the past thirty years. In particular, the Aids epidemics which began in the 1990s has been instrumental both in changing the existing social practices and in revealing transformations. When she began her field research on the influence of the Aids epidemics on Cambodian society, the author assumed that urban, educated women who held positions in the government and NGOs were most likely to be involved in activities related to women promotion and to have much to say about changing gendered roles. So the author interviewed 47 of these women (in Khmer), mostly in Phnom Penh, between April and June 1999. The article first describes the social and political environment of the fight against the Aids epidemics; the fight was not very strong at the beginning of the 1990s but progressively was put on top position of the Cambodian government's agenda. The paper goes on with examining the public debate on the opportunity of legalizing prostitution which was perceived as being responsible for the outburst of the Aids epidemics. This debate involved individuals adopting a pragmatic attitude, and others claiming that prostitution was destroying "the true Cambodian values". Moreover, women's organizations, political parties and NGOs had often developed perceptions that Cambodian men had so far failed at creating a peaceful, fair and economically developed society. These organizations compared this failure with the "ancient good times" back to the Angkorian times, when women were supposed to be the rulers of society. What do interviewees think about women's social status and gendered roles in Cambodian society and particularly in married couples ? Field data reveals that they all think that the social status of women is too low: Cambodian women's activities, they say, are limited by their traditional roles as housekeepers, keen to meet all the needs of their husband and children so that they are comfortable at all times. Women, they say, are alienated by the "rice power" held by their husbands. But things are changing because Cambodian women are increasingly providing incomes to their families and, at the same time, men are less and less filling their traditional duties as family leaders responsible for the family's needs. The interviewees promote education and waged work as a means of promoting Cambodian women. But the discourses regarding sexuality are totally different. Asked about the sexuality of married couples, the answers show a feeling of powerlessness and fatalism. The women interviewed perceive male sexuality as being "naturally" demanding and out of control, contrary to that of women. Women are the real "pillars" of their households (as a proverb puts it) and therefore, their sexuality is shaped by "culture" and not by "nature". Most husbands are perceived as unfaithful. But this is not of strong concern as long as they do not threaten the economic and reproductive stability of the married couple by wasting money in the financial support of a lover, or by contaminating their wives with HIV. On the contrary, Cambodian women are perceived as sweet, resigned and faithful. And these qualities guarantee the stability of their couple. Moreover, these qualities are perceived to be typically Khmer. Women are therefore the warrants of national identity. The "cutting principle" invented by French anthropologist Bastide in his analysis of individuals' experience of drastic social change, perfectly suits the case of Cambodian educated urban women: they are trying to invent a new gendered identity which would be both "modern" and "Khmer". But at the same time, they establish a clear-cut division between their full socio-economic integration into Cambodian society and their role as watchdogs of the stability of the family, and by extension of the culture and the nation. ; L'objectif est de comprendre comment se transforment les rôles sexués des couples cambodgiens dans les années 1990, sous l'effet des changements brutaux et profonds qui touchent la société cambodgienne depuis vingt ans, en particulier l'épidémie du Sida – à la fois transformatrice de pratiques et révélatrices de mutations. L'idée de départ était que les femmes urbaines, instruites, occupant des fonctions politiques ou associatives étaient les plus susceptibles d'œuvrer à la promotion des femmes. L'analyse se base donc essentiellement sur les interviews de l'auteur avec 47 de ces femmes (en khmer), surtout à Phnom Penh, en avril-juin 1999. L'article débute par une présentation du contexte socio-politique de lutte contre l'épidémie du Sida, lutte timidement commencée puis sérieusement menée. Le texte se poursuit avec l'apparition du débat public sur la prostitution féminine (jugée responsable de l'évolution de l'épidémie du Sida), entre réticences et pragmatisme. Parallèlement, la place des organisation féminines, partis politiques et ONG, est décrite, ainsi que leurs discours mettant en avant l'échec de la politique masculine et l'évocation des temps ancestraux où les femmes étaient aux commandes. Que disent ce femmes interviewées sur les statuts et les rôles socio-sexués cambodgiens, en particulier au sein des couples ? Avec une ferveur militante et une belle unanimité, toutes estiment que le statut social des femmes cambodgiennes est trop bas ; cantonnées qu'elles sont aux travaux domestiques et à la satisfaction du confort de leur époux et de leurs enfants, elles sont soumises au "pouvoir du riz", détenu par l'époux. Mais les femmes sont en réalité, disent-elles, de plus en plus pourvoyeuses de revenus dans une société en crise économique, en même temps que les qualités masculines traditionnelles (sens des responsabilités familiales) se délitent, faisant peser un poids de plus en plus lourd sur les épaules des femmes. Les interviewées prônent l'instruction et le travail salarié comme moyens de promotion de la femme cambodgienne. Mais dès que l'on aborde la sexualité conjugale, le ton des entretiens est à l'impuissance et au fatalisme. La sexualité masculine est en effet vue comme relevant de la "nature" (exigeante, irrépressible) quand celle de la femme, gardienne du foyer, relève de la "culture". La nature volage des maris suscite une certaine indifférence dans la mesure où il ne met pas en danger l'association conjugale, dans ses fonctions économiques et reproductives en particulier (entretien d'une maîtresse, contamination par le VIH). Capables, par leurs qualité de douceur, de résignation, de fidélité, disent les interviewées, d'assurer la pérennité du mariage, les femmes s'estiment ainsi être les reflets des caractéristiques ethnico-nationales typiquement khmères et, au-delà, les garantes de l'identité nationale. Le "principe de coupure" de Bastide décrivant des individus dans des contextes d'acculturation rapide, s'applique donc parfaitement aux femmes instruites et urbaines du Cambodge : leurs actions obéissent au double impératif de construire une identité féminine à la fois "moderne" et "khmère", en maintenant une séparation nette entre leur pleine intégration socio-économique et leur rôle de gardienne de l'union conjugale, de la culture, de la nation.

 Draft Translation: Not for CitationWhat follows is another attempt at a translation of an important text by André Tosel on the Marx/Spinoza relation. It is not a finished, or polished translation, but a rough sketch put forward to help people get a sense of this overlooked articulation of the relation between Marx and Spinoza.For a Systematic Study of the Relation of Marx to Spinoza: Remarks and Hypotheses

André Tosel Published in 2008 in the book Spinoza au XIXe Siècle  The question of relation of the thought of Marx to that of Spinoza has up until now been the subject of more of a hermeneutic investigation than a philology. It is easier to construct a history of the different interpretations of Spinoza at the center of different Marxisms then to have determined the precise function of the reference to Spinoza in the work of Marx and to define the use Marx made of the spinozist problematic and the elaboration of his thought.  More or less the Marxists that were first developed a relation to Spinoza were an important milestone on the way to developing what could be called a historical and materialist dialectic. The relation begins in the midst of the Second International. The singularity of Spinoza's thought has often been reduced to a stepping stone on the way to "monist" immanentism, which is supposed to be its philosophical structure at least in the reception of two thinkers, as Plekhanov has asserted in some preliminary texts working from some notes of Engels in manuscripts published in the USSR under the title of the Dialectic of Nature. In the dogmatic frame of the struggle between idealism and materialism, Spinoza anticipates materialism by his thesis of the unity of nature and by his doctrine of the equal dignity of the attribute of extension in relation to the attribute of thought. The doctrine of mode and substance causality, coupled with the critique of final causality and the illusions of superstition, signifies at the same time an overcoming of mechanistic thinking and the first form of the dialectic. Rare were those who, like Antonio Labriola, were careful not to oppose two conceptions of the world head-on and maintained a certain distance with polemical opposition, preferring instead to indicate that Marx did for mode of production what Spinoza had done for the world of the passions—a geometry of their production. In the Soviet Union before the Stalinist freeze, this interpretive tension is reproduced: Spinoza becomes the terrain through which the clarification of the dialectic takes place opposing mechanists and anti-mechanists, and original articulation of the thesis of liberty as the comprehension of necessity. These problems have been clarified somewhat. (Zapata, 1983; Seidel, 1984; Tosel, 1995)One would have to wait for the deconstructive enterprise of Louis Althusser for this movement to be reversed. Spinoza is no longer a moment in the teleology which is integrated and surpassed on the way to Marxism-Leninism. His work is the means of theoretical production for reformulating the philosophical and scientific revolution of Marx without recourse to only the Hegelian dialectic. Spinoza is the first to have elaborated a model of structural causality that makes it possible to think the efficacy of the structure as an absent cause over its effects. The theory of knowledge is not one that authorizes absolute knowledge, but it announces this infinite exigency of a break with ideology without the hope of arriving at transparent knowledge. It obliges one to renounce any idea of communism as a state of a final reconciliation in social relations which would be deprived of any contradictions. "We have always been spinozists,' Althusser announces in the Elements of Self-Criticism, and then proceed to the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect from the Hegelian dialectic. It is then only an epistemological obstacle which prevents Marx from realizing the full power of his critique of political economy and to explore the continent of history that he discovered. Spinoza for clarifying Marx himself. Everything has been clarified. (Cotten 1992; Raymond, Moreau, 1997).  In terms of historical research, the spinozist studies that have been made after the end of the nineteen sixties in France and Italy have often been made by researchers who have rubbed shoulders with Marxism. We find the same oscillation between a tendency to read Spinoza according to a pre-marxist perspective, in the sense of a dialectic of emancipation, or liberation from a theological political complex and disalienation, even constituent power, and another tendency insisting on the infinity of the struggle against all illusions, even those of total liberation, affirming the unsurpassable dimension of the imagination in the constitution of the conatus and in the production of the power of the multitude. This oscillation is manifest often in the same commentators, often itself a function of the change of the historical conjuncture. However, up until now, there has never been an attempt to study from Marx's works themselves the structural function of the spinozist reference in the constitution of Marxist theory, one which would permit us to better understand the understanding that Marx made of Spinozist work. The interpretations have anyway have developed from a certain exteriority to the letter of Marxists texts.  Several years ago, a German researcher, Fred E. Schrader, in a short text dedicated to the thematic of "substance and concept" chez Marx (Substanz und Funktion: zur Marxsrezeption Spinoza's) drew attention to this situation (1984). He rightly noted that it was necessary to distinguish two moments in the research to avoid any merely external confrontation: a) first, obviously, document the explicit and implicit mentions of Spinoza in Marx's text; 1) then, reconstruct the position of the reference to Spinoza in the process of the constitution of the critique of political economy which is the central Marxist work, alongside of the references to "Hegel" which one knows were constitutive in the years of 1857-1858. Only this philological and philosophical work can permit us to renew the state of the question.
Schrader's study must be considered. We propose to develop it and comment on it because up until now it has not received the attention that it merits. Before everything else, it is necessary to be precise. The work envisioned must be considerable, it includes taking into account the texts published by Marx, those published posthumously by Engels and by Kautsky, and all of those—collections of notes and thematic notebooks—which make up the incomplete nature of Capital, including Marx's correspondence. The MEGA 2, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, still incomplete, has not finished being scrutinized. This work could begin from the hypothesis that we can conceptualize two periods in Marx's work from which it is possible to reassemble occurrences that conceptualize the reference to Spinoza in order to determine their structural function. The first period corresponds to the years of his formation and the interlinking of the critique of politics and the early critique of political economy, it begins with the concept of history underlying the German Ideology and culminates in the Poverty of Philosophy and the Communist Manifesto. The second period begins with the research operating under the title of the critique of political economy beginning in 1857, interrupted provisionally in January of 1859 and beginning again in 1861. The reference to Spinoza is more explicit in the first period where it is a matter of an specifically political practice, articulating a materialism of practice. It is less explicit in the second period, it functions nonetheless as a fundamental operator in the essential theory of the substance of value in capital. The Philosophical Intensifier of Spinoza of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Destruction of the Theologico-Political Complex and Democratic Radicalism.  Marx encounters Spinoza in the beginning of his theoretical and political journey. In 1841 we know from the preface by Alexandre Matheron (Cahiers Spinoza), Marx, after his doctorate, reproduced the extracts he copied from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (MEGA 2 VI/I Berlin, 1977). He is curiously presented as the author of these texts and moreover they are reorganized in their own order which is not that of the Tractatus itself. The chapters containing the critique of the supernatural, of the miracle, and all of all forms of superstition are brought forward as essential and open on the properly political chapters dedicated to the freedom of thought (XX) and the foundation of the republic (XVI). The Ethics is not ignored but it is not reproduced, Letter XII takes the place of a speculative text and is accompanied with Letter LXXVI to Burgh. Everything takes place as if Marx considered as the most important question to be that of theological politics and is concentrated on the question of human freedom in its radical ethico-political dimension. What is important is that the revolutionary democratic state is realized according to this concept.  One could also consider that Spinoza is utilized here as one of the figures that a Doctorate of Philosophy considers along with Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as provocations, of that which puts knowledge in the service of a life liberated from the fear of authorities, which reappropriates humanity's power of thinking and acting confiscated in the service of gods and fetishes. In a certain manner Epicurus is the paradoxically the first of the thinkers who claims that "it is a misfortune to live in necessity, but it is not necessary to live under necessity." This truth finds a new application, after the French Revolution, in the age of a new ethics, where free individuals recognize themselves in a free state.  2. The explicit reference to Spinoza is displaced in the texts of the years 1841-1843—the Kreuznach manuscript dedicated to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, followed by the introduction and the Jewish Question. These constitute the Feuerbachian moment of Marx, at the heart of his theory of the alienation of the human essence. One must not make this critique of politics a simple transition towards the discovery of the alienation of social powers, nor understand it as an end of a politics understood as primarily statist. It is the ethico-political liberation which requires a transformation of social relations and which is a transvaluation or emancipation of social powers. Spinoza is not named, but certain passages from the TTP are repeated almost to the letter: Spinoza figures as the index of a new task , that is lacking in Hegel which is that of thinking beyond the dualism of civil society and the state. The name of this passage is democracy or true democracy. Marx returns to the letter of the Spinozist thesis according to which democracy is not only the name of a constituted political regime, but the essence of politics, the most natural regime, constituting the power of the people. The intensive force of Spinoza is that of democracy not as a mystical act or utopian ecstasy, but as a process of constitution that replaces actual void of the Hegelian state where the people lack themselves, in which the state becomes something separate, still theologico-political. Democracy is the active process by which the people is refigured as the negative instance of any separate political form and gives a political form to its social power. "Democracy is the truth of monarchy, monarchy is not the truth of democracy. Monarchy is necessarily democracy in contradiction with itself, whereas the monarchial moment is no contradiction within democracy. Monarchy cannot, while democracy can be understood in terms of itself In democracy none of the moments obtains a significance other than what befits it. Each is really only a moment of the whole Demos. In monarchy one part determines the character of the whole; the entire constitution must be modified according to the immutable head. Democracy is the generic constitution; monarchy is a species, and indeed a poor one. Democracy is content and form; monarchy should be only form, but it adulterates the content.
In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its modes of existence,. the political constitution; in democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determination, and indeed as the self-determination of the people. In monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the people. Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here the constitution not only in itself, according to essence, but according to existence and actuality is returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people, and established as its own work. The constitution appears as what it is, the free product of men." It is possible to remark that this constituent power of the demos tends to be presented as a sort of causa sui in the order of world of social relations. The naturalist dimension thematized in the Ethics is not posited here with the insistence of humanity as part of nature, with the thematization of the relations between internal and external causality. Necessity seems to have disappeared for an instant. It is notable that this in the same moment that Feuerbach defends Spinoza's naturalism against Hegelian idealism and makes the author of the Ethics the Moses of modern thought who has destroyed theology by his pantheism, while reproaching him, for not having arrived at a radical humanist affirmation, since he maintained an equivocal equivalence between the naturalization of god and the divinization of nature. The Marxist reference is primarily to the ethico-political Spinoza, one of the "intellectual heroes of morality" as he says in a text contemporary with it, "Comments on the Latest Russian Censorship—" along with Kant and Fichte he is one of the heroes that found and defend the principal of moral autonomy. Spinoza makes it possible to undertake a philosophical political of Hegel, the people would be the only ontological instance that constitutes the political constitution, which is to say democracy, of civil society. Spinoza makes it possible to introduce a new dialectic within the incomplete dialectic of The Principles of the Philosophy of Right. This dialectic is simultaneously a critique. The object of this critical dialectic is the self-constitution of political activity in the struggle to overcome the domination of abstract entities erected into speculative abstractions defining the latest avatars of the theological-political complex.  Schrader does not say more in the exposition of the reference to Spinoza in this first period. We could take a step beyond his analysis. A unpublished path seems to be presented. We could in fact explore it as Yovel has done (Spinoza and Other Heretics); also the first book of Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (1968) examines the double relation of the human conatus to other conatuses and objects that suit them or do not suit them the rudiments of a theory of objectification of the human essence that Marx elaborates in the texts of 1844 where he analyzes the people under the figure of the proletariat subject and object of alienated labor. The reading can shed light on Spinoza, but Marx has for his interlocuters Hegel, Adam Smith, and Feuerbach. Spinoza does not intervene here explicitly. It is preferable to follow the letter of his texts.  3. The text which follows, The Holy Family of 1845, indicates an unexamined reversal of perspective. Far from finding in Spinoza a radical thinker of liberty through the radicalization of the democratic process and developing Feuerbach's theses of the virtues of Spinoza's naturalization, far from continuing the anti-idealist elements of Spinoza, Marx for the first time distances himself from Spinoza placing him on the side of Descartes, of Malebranche, of Leibniz, of abstract rationalist metaphysics, in a paragraph before celebrating the materialists in which he inscribes himself. These are the materialists of the French Enlightenment, La Mettrie, Holbach, Helvétius, which are lauded for having operated outside of metaphysics. These are the authors that Plekhanov reinscribes as a defenders of monistic materialism in the thought of nature and in the theory of history. Certainly as Olivier Bloch in an important contribution has demonstrated ("Materialism, genesis of Marxism, 1981, reprinted in Matières à penser, Vrin, 1997), this chapter of the history of philosophy is a plagiarism by Marx who literally takes it from the Manuel d'histoire de la philosophie moderne by Charles Renouvier (1844). The soviet Diamat has been founded by a French critic… But the fact remains that Marx endorses this reconstruction which prefers Bacon, Hobbes and Locke to Spinoza, lauding them for the empiricism and nominalism: the English thinkers critique metaphysic speculation and open directly the way to materialism. Pierre Bayler in France can be considered the only fellow traveler of British empiricism by his scepticism he dissolves the metaphysics of Spinoza and Leibniz (The Holy Family, 171).  The Spinoza criticized here is that of the Ethics understood as a dogmatic treatise of metaphysics which has a "profane content" but it has lost its historical condition. This is no longer the antitheological political Spinoza but the speculative philosopher. Is it necessary to conclude that this is a contradiction on the part of Marx and to forget his previous theses? It is a surprising oversight because that which Marx and Renouvier give credit to Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke can be imputed to Spinoza as well. Everything takes place as if Marx, put off by the metaphysics of the Ethics forgets what he had found in the TTP—and this seems to be a permanent transformation. In fact the contradiction is not only apparent, or, more to the point, it concerns Spinoza himself. Marx does not have as his object an analysis of Spinozism. He uses the latter by breaking it down according to the needs of his task which is at this moment is to study the activity of real man and the possibility of his transformation by bringing together the theoretical humanism of Feuerbach, the French communism and socialism, and the English thinkers who represent this humanism in the domain of practice. "[Metaphysics] will be defeated for forever by materialism which has now been perfected by the work of speculation itself and coincides with humanism. As Feuerbach represented materialism in the theoretical domain, French and English socialism and communism represent materialism in the practical field which now coincides with humanism." (The Holy Family, pg. 168) One can detect in this passage the presence of a schematic of the history of modern philosophy which has echoes of Moses Hess and Ludwig Feuerbach, the two have confronted the problem of the critical comprehension of Hegel and have begun to present a reinterpretation of the grand moments of the history of philosophy after their master.  Marx deviates from the interpretation of Hess given in a text which had a particular impact: The Sacred History of Mankind by a Young Disciple of Spinoza (1838). Hess appropriates Spinoza's theory of knowledge and exploits his theory of the imagination to develop a positive sense of social utopia, and overall makes Spinoza the true alternative to Hegel's Christian philosophy. Far from being an acosmism, the theory of substance is the perfect incarnation of the Hebraic idea of the unconditional unity of all. It is paradoxical, the other part, of the interpretation by Renouvier followed by Marx recovers and conceals that of Feuerbach that one can find in the same period in Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy (1842) and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1843). Marx brushes up against these theses of Feuerbach on Spinoza without reproducing them in their entirety. They make Spinoza an important moment in modern philosophy: at the heart of this movement they make this philosophy an important realization of the humanization of God, Spinoza remains still a speculative philosopher who is at once produces the realization and negation of God. Speculative metaphysics realizes with him its ultimate phase which is determined contradictorily as theism and atheism in the form of pantheism. "Spinoza is the originator of speculative philosophy, Schelling its restorer, Hegel its perfecter."(Thesis 102) Pantheism becomes the only consequential theology in that it anticipates the end of theology in atheism. The Spinozist substance transforms all independent beings into predicates, into attributes of a unique and independent being. God is no longer only a thing thought, it is equally an extended thing (Thesis 3). Spinoza does not make the self-activity of self-consciousness the attribute that unifies and transforms substance into subject. This was Hegel's tour de force but he paid for it with an absolute idealism of spirit since once again spirit prevails over extension and concrete man is subject to abstraction separated from reality of self-consciousness.
This inscription of Spinoza in metaphysics is all the more paradoxical because Marx finds in empiricism and British materialism the theses that Feuerbach attributes to Spinoza, and Marx accepts a definition in which materialism coincides with communism. As can be seen in this passage from Principles of the Philosophy of the Future  Pantheism is theological atheism or theological materialism; it is the negation of theology while itself confined to the standpoint of theology, for it turns matter, the negation of God, into a predicate or an attribute of the Divine Being. But he who turns matter into an attribute of God, declares matter to be a divine being. The realisation of God must in principle presuppose godliness, that is, the truth and essentiality of the real. The deification of the real, of that which exists materially – materialism, empiricism, realism, and humanism – or the negation of theology, is the essence of the modern era. Pantheism is therefore nothing more than the essence of the modern era elevated into the divine essence, into a religio-philosophical principle. Empiricism or realism – meaning thereby the so-called sciences of the real, but in particular the natural science – negates theology, albeit not theoretically but only practically, namely, through the actual deed in so far as the realist makes the negation of God, or at least that which is not God, into the essential business of his life and the essential object of his activity. However, he who devotes his mind and heart exclusively to that which is material and sensuous actually denies the trans-sensuous its reality; for only that which constitutes an object of the real and concrete activity is real, at least for man. "What I don't know doesn't affect me." To say that it is not possible to know anything of the supersensuous is only an excuse. One ceases to know anything about God and divine things only when one does not want to know anything about them. How much did one know about God, about the devils or angels as long as these supersensuous beings were still objects of a real faith? To be interested in something is to have the talent for it. The medieval mystics and scholastics had no talent and aptitude for natural science only because they had no interest in nature. Where the sense for something is not lacking, there also the senses and organs do not lack. If the heart is open to something, the mind will not be closed to it. Thus, the reason why mankind in the modern era lost the organs for the supersensuous world and its secrets is because it also lost the sense for them together with the belief in them; because its essential tendency was anti-Christian and anti-theological; that is, anthropological, cosmic, realistic, and materialistic. [In the context of the present work, the differences between materialism, empiricism, realism, and humanism are, of course, irrelevant.] Spinoza hit the nail on the head with his paradoxical proposition: God is an extended, that is, material being. He found, at least for his time, the true philosophical expression for the materialistic tendency of the modern era; he legitimated and sanctioned it: God himself is a materialist. Spinoza's philosophy was religion; he himself was an amazing man. Unlike so many others, Spinoza's materialism did not stand in contradiction to the notion of a non-material and anti-materialistic God who also quite consistently imposes on man the duty to give himself up only to anti-materialistic, heavenly tendencies and concerns, for God is nothing other than the archetypal and ideal image of man; what God is and how he is, is what man ought to be or wants to be, or at least hopes to be in the future. But only where theory does not belie practice, and practice theory, is there character, truth, and religion. Spinoza is the Moses of modern free-thinkers and materialists. 4. The anti-metaphysical fury of Marx, the blind submission to Renouvier, limits him in developing an interpretation of the Ethics more nuanced and sensitive to the historical contradictions. This situation is even more strange because it is in The Holy Family that Marx interprets materialist philosophers such that they are a Feuerbachian Spinoza. On can find then three theses that Marx distributes to different representatives of materialism and that can also be imputed to Spinoza. --Thesis 1. Nature is a primary reality, it can be explained by itself without recourse to the principle of a creator. Nothing comes from nothing. One can then have recourse to Bacon for who "the primitive forms of matter are essentially living forms, individuals, and it is they that produce specific differences." He follows, as does Hobbes, in adding that "one cannot separate thought from the matter which thinks." Thought cannot be separated from matter capable of thought.  --Thesis 2. The human order is inscribed in a specific manner in nature. This specificity does not specify anything extra-worldly of human activity. Hobbes has demonstrated the sensible nature of activity. "Man is subordinate to the same laws that nature. Power and liberty are identical." The Holy Family) This order is known to promote the art of forming ideas, the human species is fundamentally educatable. ---Thesis 3. What is important is to think the constitution of this human order according to radical possibilities of the ways of transforming these necessary conditions of experience of liberty-power. "If man is unfree in the materialist sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality,
crime must not be punished in the individual, but the anti-social source of crime must be destroyed, and each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his being. If man is shaped by his surroundings, his surroundings must be made human. If man is social by
nature, he will develop his true nature only in society, and the power of his nature must be measured not by the power of separate individuals but by the power of society." (The Holy Family 176).  It is not necessary to give the history of philosophy presented in The Holy Family a structural importance. It acts as a provisionally constructed polemical text where Marx has given the means for his own philosophical conception in broad strokes in order to better understand the intersection of humanism, materialism, and communism. The incongruence of the treatment of Spinoza, reinterpreted to be behind Feuerbach's position, was not overlooked by Marx's comrades in combat since H. Krieg (himself denounces by Marx in a virulent circular as a confused partisan of religious socialism), he wrote in a letter of June 6, 1845 in order to restore Spinoza's battle against metaphysics overlooked by Marx, "you're probably right about what it says in the English Hobbes and Locke [i.e. that they vacillate contradictorily between materialism and theism], the same for Voltaire and his direct partisans; but Holbach is practically Spinozist, and it is with and Diderot that the Enlightenment reaches its summit and becomes revolutionary." (cited by Maximilien Rubel and his edition of the philosophical texts of Marx titled Philosophie) 5. The instrumental and fluctuating character of the reference to Spinoza as a metaphysician is confirmed precisely by The German Ideology. Marx returns in passing to the place of Spinoza in modern philosophy. Spinoza has developed the principle of substantial immanence but he has not integrated the principle with self-consciousness. Hegel would be the unity of Spinoza and Fichte (The German Ideology, 107). But for Marx this representation consigns him to a partial aspect of the Hegelian synthesis. Self-consciousness is at once a hypostasis of the real activity of human beings in the process of their self-production and the "the real consciousness of the social relations in which they appear to exists and to which they appear to be autonomous." In a similar manner substance is "an ideal hypostatized expression of the world as it exists" that is take as the foundation of the world "existing for itself." Marx returns to Feuerbach for clarification of substance and it anthropological resolution. We do not know much more, but the text seems to distinguish the Hegelian critique of substance and its possible materialist significance as "the existing world." We would have expected considerations on the immanence of modes in natura naturans and of their dynamic interdetermination.
In any case, Marx refuses the young Hegelain opposition between self-consciousness and substance, and proposes to maintain the category of substance as an inseparable unity of the existing mode and the beings which constitute the world in the play of their relations. Marx's criticism has as its target the mystification of self-consciousness and its anti-substantial phobia. Everything takes place as if the ontological categories of Spinoza up until now rejected as conservative metaphysics have an intensive force irreducible to the critique of the young Hegelians. However, it remains that in this complex itinerary the use value of the reference to Spinoza is concentrated in the theological political constellation and the political constitution of the political force of social force. This reference becomes the presupposition of the materialist conception of history, but it does not intervene in the texture of these concepts.  The Spinoza Reference in the Critique of Political Economy, Substance and Concept Returning to Schrader and his propositions for the study of the second moment of the reference to Spinoza, that of the Marxist use of Spinozist concepts from the Ethics in the development of the critique of political economy in the development of Capital. Schrader pays particular attention to the reappearance in the margins of the reference to Spinoza in the period of the creation and exposition of the critique of political economy which is developed from 1851 to 1863. An important letter from Marx to Lassale from May 31, 1858 which was published in an obscure book on Heraclitus, gives to Spinoza's metaphysics the same status that he gave to Hegel in a famous letter to Engels a few months before.  Even among philosophers who give a systematic form to the works, as for example Spinoza, the true inner structure of the system is quite unlike the form in which it was consciously presented. The true system is only present in itself. (Marx MEW, 29, Berlin, 1963, 561).

What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken another look by mere accident... If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified. (Correspondence Marx-Engels)  Marx makes it clear that the elaboration of the critique passes through the utilization of elements of philosophical works which others appear to have completely bypassed. The presence of Hegel is the center of the interpretation of Capital. It would appear certain to this period that Marx no longer takes inspiration from the Feuerbachian critique of abstract speculation. In this case, the Idea separated from its contents generates the latter in a mystified way by legitimizing the crudest aspects, losing the benefit of seizing the real as a contradictory process, as is explained in The Holy Family or The Poverty of Philosophy. Hegel is from now on solicited for his dialectical discoveries: he elaborates the dialectic as an immanent process of thought and his discoveries serve Marx in developing his proper critique. The presence of Hegel in the period up to the publication of the first volume of Capital in 1867, in passing through diverse manuscripts of 1857-1858 (The Grundrisse) and the manuscripts from 1861-1863, has been attested to and demonstrated by works, either to reaffirm the heretical Hegelianism of Marx, (Rosdolsky, Reichelt, Zelenyi, all dedicated to research the logic of Capital, all following one of the most famous injunctions of all times, Lenin in the Notes on Dialectics) or to combat it in order to argue that Marx was Hegelian or anti-Hegelian (Althusser, and Bidet in his famous study, The Making of Marx's Capital).
This usage of Hegel consists essentially in using the categories of logic to expose the theoretical structure of the passages which operate from the commodity to value, from money as the measure of value to money as the means of exchange and as the universal means of payment, from money to capital. Schrader proposes the following recovery of the Marxist exposition of Hegelian categories: --Exchange value and the form of value correspond to the pure quantity of Hegel: this value and its measure is realized as money. The Marxist measure of value adopts the Hegelian determinations of the quantitative relations and their measure. --The circulation of commodities and money is described by the concepts of an infinite qualitative and quantitative process.  --Finally the passage from money to capital transposes the passage from being to essence. Marx has thus read and reused these conceptual determinations for the diverse functions of commodity, value, money and circulation.  And what about Spinoza? According to Schrader, he intervenes to resolve a logical problem that is at this point unresolved, that of the determination of the concept of capital supposed to integrate the logically preceding determinations. In good Hegelianism, Marx has made the movement of capital that of the essence of the concept. When Marx maintains that exchange value is realized in the circulation of other substances, in an indefinite totality, without losing the determination of its form, always remaining money and commodities, he makes capital the totality of substances. However, it thus impossible to maintain the internal connection between capital and labor, and more precisely abstract labor. Spinoza intervenes to make possible another use of the category of substance: that would not have its function to subsume the plurality of all substances, but to determine the quality of the fluent quantity that defines abstract labor.  One can see this in the text of Volume One of Capital, revised by Marx in 1873 for the French translation of J. Roy. The category of substance is introduce in the passage from the commodity to its determination as the contradictory unity of use value and exchange value. The exchange of commodities is only possible if the their values are "expressed in terms of something common to them all, of which thing they represent a greater or less quantities." This something is a substance specific to all commodities. "This common "something" cannot be either a geometrical, a chemical, or any other natural property of commodities…[] it is evident that one makes an abstraction from use value when one exchanges, and that the relation of exchange is characterized by this abstraction (Capital). Exchange and the production process which supports it operate this real abstraction from the useful qualities of the objects to be exchanged. This utility, although necessary, does not render possible the exchange of objects of value insofar as they products of labor. Exchange concerns the objects considered as products of labor.  If then we leave out of consideration the use value of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labour. But even the product of labour itself has undergone a change in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use value, we make abstraction at the same time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use value; we see in it no longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put out of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labour of the joiner, the mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labour. Along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the various kinds of labour embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labour; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labour, human labour in the abstract.  Capitalism cannot be grasped as a subject enveloping the totality of the process of the development. It is no longer a simple quantity in indefinite expansion. It is thought as the "social substance of as exchange values." This substance can be determined as capital, but it goes beyond this process of determination by constituting a remainder, a "residue" that constantly reappears. "Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the same unsubstantial reality in each, a mere congelation of homogeneous human labour, of labour power expended without regard to the mode of its expenditure. All that these things now tell us is, that human labour power has been expended in their production, that human labour is embodied in them. When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they are – Values." The concept of Capital is not that of the concept of substance becoming subject., it returns to the concept of social substance defined as abstract labor creator of value, substance of value, and substance which increases value: purely progressive quantity reduced to its infinity which is a true infinity irreducible to the logic of bad infinity, that of capital which nonetheless subsumes it.  However it is said that this reconstruction does not rest on an explicit reference to Spinoza. The objection is well founded. Schrader responds that it is Marx who reread Hegel and saw that the formal system of Spinoza could be used against Hegel critique of the concept of substance in the Logic. It is a matter of the problem of determination. Omnis determination negatio, Marx keeps reminding everyone of this. If it is Hegel who validates Spinoza's judgement by demonstrating its insufficiency which for Marx transforms into a sufficient truth to permit him to avoid identifying capital with the Hegelian concept. Capital can increase its reality only by determining this social substance of abstract labor, by negating it. The tendency of capital, its ideal, is the absolute negation of this substance. Marx makes the insufficiency of Spinoza's substance according to Hegel into a virtue.  In the Logic the principle according to which determination is negation is recognized as essential. But Spinoza, according to Hegel, remains with determination as limit which is founded on an other being. The mode is in another from which it derives its being but this other is in itself. It is the integral concept of all realities. But its immanence is only apparent. Each mode negates each other, determination of each is the result of the determined negation of all of the others. Far from determining itself in these negations, substance is negated in its absolute indifference. It does not reflect itself in these negations no more than they reflect it. The Spinozist principle does not arrive at absolute negation that it anticipates contradictorily. The substance is posed by an external reflection which compromises the otherwise affirmed subsistence of the determinations which become an effervescent moment (attributes and modes). This can be read in the texts from The Science of Logic dedicated to Spinoza.  "Of this proposition that determinateness is negation, the unity of Spinoza's substance — or that there is only one substance — is the necessary consequence. Thought and being or extension, the two attributes, namely, which Spinoza had before him, he had of necessity to posit as one in this unity; for as determinate realities they are negations whose infinity is their unity. According to Spinoza's definition, of which we say more more subsequently, the infinity of anything is its affirmation. He grasped them therefore as attributes, that is, as not having a separate existence, a self-subsistent being of their own, but only as sublated, as moments; or rather, since substance in its own self lacks any determination whatever, they are for him not even moments, and the attributes like the modes are distinctions made by an external intellect. Similarly, the substantiality of individuals cannot persist in the face of that proposition."Hegel, Science of Logic  "Since absolute indifference may seem to be the fundamental determination of Spinoza's substance, we may add that this is indeed the case in so far as in both every determination of being, like every further concrete differentiation of thought and extension and so forth, is posited as vanished. If we stop short at the abstraction [of substance] then it is a matter of complete indifference what something looked like in reality before it was swallowed up in this abyss. But when substance is conceived as indifference, it is tied up with the need for determining it and for taking this determination into consideration; it is not to remain Spinoza's substance, the sole determination of which is the negative one that everything is absorbed in it. With Spinoza, the moment of difference — attributes, thought and extension, then the modes too, the affections, and every other determination — is introduced empirically; it is intellect, itself a mode, which is the source of the differentiation." Hegel, Science of Logic  3. It is capital which fails to realize its ideal determinations of essence and which falls back into the residue of the social substance, of the abstract labor which it masks. Capital as a mode of production is ruled by the real abstractions of exchange value which are not comprehended by social agents. Value is a social abstraction that is produced from the base of multiple dispersed evaluations, that the understanding of the economist produces only after the fact, but can be known as a real abstraction operated by society and which is determined as a social substance of abstract time. The determination of the common substance as abstract labor makes it possible to dissipate the mystification produced by the appearance of capital as the self moving essence of value. All of the people, who are modes of this substance, cannot immediately represent to themselves the internal determinations of this substance in which they appear other than as representation of theological-political complex, the same as the agents of capital who cannot represent to themselves the determinations of capital (commodity-value-money-forms of capital) without fetishizing them as autonomous movements of the value form. Theoretical knowledge, the Wissenschaft, does not dissolve this fetishism because the mechanisms of its social reproduction are founded on the constitution of these forms of representation and their real efficacy. Capital cannot arrive at self-identity in terms of an absolute reflection. The determination that Hegel imputes to Spinoza negatively of substance as exterior reflection can better convey the determinations of moments of its critique. This places within the development of initial economic forms this sort of equivalent of the attribute of extension that is human labor, this common social substance comprising the forms of modal representations which capture it, that is to say that the forms of consciousness and their functional relations in the material process of reproduction. It is therefore the relationship between the substances of abstract human labor and mystified or adequate forms of social representations of this substance that Marx finds in in the hidden Spinozian system and that he utilizes in order to escape the limits of Hegel's categories, which tend to sublimate substance into the concept and therefore annul the contradictions of capital in the passage from substance to the essence and the concept. From this point of view, Hegel and Spinoza would both be utilized without reservations by Marx as the complimentary and constitutive means of production of the critique of political economy. Spinoza would thus be primarily critical to the extent that the process of the development of the determination of capital cannot be ruled by the teleological order of being-essence-concept. The theory of the substance of abstract labor interrupts the movement of the idealization of capital from the mimesis of the Hegelian order that has been opposed. Spinoza is a moment of the emendation of the intellect internal to the Marxist critique, not an external instance that would be opposed in the confrontation with exteriority.  On an Incomplete Analysis  1. Schrader goes no further. The outline of his work remains open. In particular this analysis
Postulates as evidence a substantial theory of abstract labor, one that has come under criticism from multiple non-marxist thinkers (Croce, Pareto, Menger) and also, more recently, by Marxists (Althusser and Bidet). In this case the relation to Spinoza would lose its fecundity. But if one leaves to the side the labor theory of value and its supposed foundational role, on the internal level the analysis still remains allusive, because it would have been necessary to exceed the level of Volume One of Capital in order to demonstrate the decisive character of Spinoza's conceptuality in the Marxist conception.  Despite these uncertainties, the perspective opened by Schrader is stimulating in that can necessitate a more rigorous study, tempering the contradictory interpretations by the rigors of philology.  2. Schrader's final remarks seem to us be more provocative. Starting from the idea that
Spinoza and Marx begin from two different historical moments—that of manufacturing capital limited by the desire of hoarding and that of capitalism fully developed—the logical and ethico-political thesis of the submission of needs to absolute monetary enrichment, and that therefore the refusal of money as an end in itself, he begins to construct a shocking analogy between the third type of knowledge in Spinoza and the knowledge of the capitalist which exposes its money to circulation in order to multiply it. The determination of particular things sub specie aeternitas, as deepening the knowledge of their essence would symbolize with the effort of capitalists to insert money to measure things in their circulation sub specie capitalis. The reference to Marx attests to the irony of Marx: if the movement of true knowledge is infinite, this infinity cannot be confused with that of monetary accumulation which becomes a bad infinity because the means of accumulation are reversed and perverted to be posited as an end in itself.  3. It is more correct, as Schrader makes apparent, to find a space more effective for the
forma mentis common to Marx and Spinoza: the two both diagnosis the pathology of the understanding and that of a form of life proper to a given historical world. Both understand the irreversible character of modern passions and set to understand and eventually cure these pathologies.
Spinoza, son of a merchant enriched by international trade and a merchant himself in his youth, does not have contempt for money and the new wealth of nations promoted by capitalist economy. He does not dream of a return to oikos of finite needs in a household setting, he is not an aristoltean who condemns bad infinity of the circulation of merchandise which has as its object money and not the use value of merchandise. He registers the emergence of exchange value, he sees, as Aristotle did, that it is the subordination of true value.
Remember the famous text from Ethics IV Appendix, consecrated to the function of money.  XXVIII. Now to achieve these things the powers of each man would hardly be sufficient if men did not help one another. But money has provided a convenient instrument for acquiring all these aids. That is why its image usually occupies the mind of the multitude more than anything else. For they can imagine hardly any species of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause.  XXlX. But this is a vice only in those who seek money neither from need nor on account of necessities, but because they have learned the art of making money and pride themselves on it very much. As for the body, they feed it according to custom, but sparingly, because they believe they lose as much of their goods as they devote to the preservation
of their body. Those, however, who know the true use of money, and set
bounds to their wealth according to need, live contentedly with little. The realization of money as a concept, the accumulation of money for accumulation, is unrealized. Marx adds that this goal is inaccessible because the character of use value of commodities contradicts the universal sociality of value. The common social substance in so far as it is measured in abstract labor time is measured according to quantitatively determined portions. Money is supposed to represent value in its infinite becoming of an end in itself, but it can only effectively represent a determined part. This contradiction is resolved in the deplacement that money makes in becoming capital, exchange value multiplied in profit. Spinoza's therapeutic of desire also concern the intellect of calculation: the latter is not condemned, it is superior to the intellect of avarice which theorizes by avarita and does not develop the capacity to act and think. This understanding, however, is called upon to better understand the monetary economy by subordinating it to immanent true utility, that which is inscribed in the republic of free citizens. It is only in this sense that the accumulation of wealth under the monetary form can enter into the correct perspective of knowledge of the third kind. Marx in his own way wants to understand the action of human beings without deploring or flattering them. Capital cannot be understood going from substance to the essence of the concept, but it has its basis in substance, the social substance of abstract labor, and can be rethought and regrouped in the forms of economic understanding. Capital also has as its goal a particular therapeutic manner, the health and well-being of a social body that cannot be subsumed under capital but must encompass the increase of the capacities of acting and thinking that capital subordinates to itself.  4. This anti-teleological function of the concept of substance/abstract labor is not
maintained by Marx for long in his dialectic. Certainly the function of the subject cannot be attributed to capital, but it is displaced and given a different support, not that of abstract labor with its internal multiplicity and impersonality, but its bearer, that of the working class, the proletariat, the people of the people. The substance of abstract labor becomes subject in the determination that Marx always uses with the English term general intellect. One could thus see a final return of Hegel which interrupts Marx's return to Spinoza. The communism developed by the general intellect is the practical substitute of the Hegelian concept and imposes an anthropological version and anthropocentric teleology that Spinoza would not accept. What does the general intellect represent? It represents the capacity of the proletariat to organize the ensemble of forces defining the collective worker and the cooperation associated with it, under the direction of formation of the factory in the constitution of the unqualified worker, all representing the advance front of the progressive socialization of the social productive forces. Communism is not something that is imposed as a simple moral ideal, it is a product of the real historical process.  However, Marx does not escape here the teleologism that he shares with majority of
German idealism. The socialization of productive forces—that for Marx leads the process of the self-production of humanity realizing its immanent end and to which he attributes the function of the concept—is not realized at the level of society. It cannot in any way constitute itself as a causa sui. The human world remains a world of world of modal relations and interactions: if the effects of liberation can realize themselves at the level of the individual (by the knowledge of singular things) or at the level of collectivity ( by the democratic constitution of the multitude), these effects would not be made from a mode as a complete cause of itself under all points of view. The capacity of a mode to act and think, human individual or society, can be more or less adequate, but this adequation does not annul the difference that separates the mode which is produced by and in another which it requires to subsist and which is produced in and by itself and becomes a cause of itself. The identity of natura naturata and natura naturans cannot grant a mode the capacity to be cause of itself under all points of view: it permits it to do so under certain points of view and certain conditions which are sufficient for an ethical realization. Communism to the extent that Marx thinks in terms of the becoming concept of the collective worker exceeds the conditions and possibilities of action predicated on modes.  To this structural impossibility we can add the consideration of an analytical one: modern society is not immense and singular enterprise under the order of the collective worker, it is, to say the least, a network of antagonistic enterprises in which on the contrary the process of work is fragmented to the point where it loses all material and ideal unity, a fragmentation that has been imposed by the imperative of capitalist society. Exploitation is not only maintained but it is generalized, it is only in compensation that the recomposition of labor process itself as something collective, cooperative, and associated that Marx believes leads the dialectic of the process of capitalist production. Spinozist realism is here irreducible. It does not limited us in taking the measure of the problem posed generally by Marx, it excludes, however, the solution envisioned from speculative teleology and it compels us to attempt to comprehend the modal form in which exploitation is reproduced. How can we form a new theory of the capacity for insurrection of the multitude subordinated to capital while they also resist it. What effects of liberation can still be manifested by producing new subjectivities which are embedded in real productive activities, not prisoners of unproductive ghettos ravaged by self-destructive violence, nor recluse themselves in the powerless rumination of a moral salvation? How can we escape forms of historical impotence? How can we avoid being reduced to the status of spectators of this impotence? Such are the questions posed by Marx and which are posed again today along with Spinoza and his critique of the teleological illusions of the general intellect, questions which have not arrived at the end of their road. But it is historically vain to ask Marx these questions: they are ours and it is up to us to answer them.

Social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups, together with public policy and management objectives. The essay indicates and discusses the most important contemporary problems, solving of which requires social innovations.

Social innovations precondition the progress of civilisation. The world needs not only new technologies, but also new solutions of social and institutional nature that would be conducive to achieving social goals.

Social innovations are experimental social actions of organisational and institutional nature that aim at improving the quality of life of individuals, communities, nations, companies, circles, or social groups. Their experimental nature stems from the fact of introducing unique and one-time solutions on a large scale, the end results of which are often difficult to be fully predicted. For example, it was difficult to believe that opening new labour markets for foreigners in the countries of the European Union, which can be treated as a social innovation aiming at development of the international labour market, will result in the rapid development of the low-cost airlines, the offer of which will be available to a larger group of recipients. In other words, social innovations differ from economic innovations, as they are not about implementation of new types of production or gaining new markets, but about satisfying new needs, which are not provided by the market. Therefore, the most important distinction consists in that social innovations are concerned with improving the well-being of individuals and communities by additional employment, or increased consumption, as well as participation in solving the problems of individuals and social groups [CSTP, 2011]. In general, social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups together with the objectives of public policy and management [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017]. Their implementation requires global, national, and individual actions. This requires joint operations, both at the scale of the entire globe, as well as in particular interest groups.

Why are social innovations a key point for the progress of civilisation? This is the effect of the clear domination of economic aspects and discrimination of social aspects of this progress. Until the 19th century, the economy was a part of a social structure. As described by K. Polanyi, it was submerged in social relations [Polanyi, 2010, p. 56]. In traditional societies, the economic system was in fact derived from the organisation of the society itself. The economy, consisting of small and dispersed craft businesses, was a part of the social, family, and neighbourhood structure. In the 20th century the situation reversed – the economy started to be the force shaping social structures, positions of individual groups, areas of wealth and poverty. The economy and the market mechanism have become independent from the world of politics and society. Today, the corporations control our lives. They decide what we eat, what we watch, what we wear, where we work and what we do [Bakan, 2006, p. 13].

The corporations started this spectacular "march to rule the world" in the late 19th century. After about a hundred years, at the end of the 20th century, the state under the pressure of corporations and globalisation, started a gradual, but systematic withdrawal from the economy, market and many other functions traditionally belonging to it. As a result, at the end of the last century, a corporation has become a dominant institution in the world. A characteristic feature of this condition is that it gives a complete priority to the interests of corporations. They make decisions of often adverse consequences for the entire social groups, regions, or local communities. They lead to social tensions, political breakdowns, and most often to repeated market turbulences. Thus, a substantial minority (corporations) obtain inconceivable benefits at the expense of the vast majority, that is broad professional and social groups. The lack of relative balance between the economy and society is a barrier to the progress of civilisation.

A growing global concern is the problem of migration. The present crisis, left unresolved, in the long term will return multiplied. Today, there are about 500 million people living in Europe, 1.5 billion in Africa and the Middle East, but in 2100, the population of Europe will be about 400 million and of the Middle East and Africa approximately 4.5 billion. Solving this problem, mainly through social and political innovations, can take place only by a joint operation of highly developed and developing countries. Is it an easy task? It's very difficult. Unfortunately, today, the world is going in the opposite direction. Instead of pursuing the community, empathic thinking, it aims towards nationalism and chauvinism. An example might be a part of the inaugural address of President Donald Trump, who said that the right of all nations is to put their own interests first. Of course, the United States of America will think about their own interests. As we go in the opposite direction, those who deal with global issues say – nothing will change, unless there is some great crisis, a major disaster that would cause that the great of this world will come to senses.

J.E. Stiglitz [2004], contrary to the current thinking and practice, believes that a different and better world is possible. Globalisation contains the potential of countless benefits from which people both in developing and highly developed countries can benefit. But the practice so far proves that still it is not grown up enough to use its potential in a fair manner. What is needed are new solutions, most of all social and political innovations (political, because they involve a violation of the previous arrangement of interests). Failure to search for breakthrough innovations of social and political nature that would meet the modern challenges, can lead the world to a disaster. Social innovation, and not economic, because the contemporary civilisation problems have their roots in this dimension.

A global problem, solution of which requires innovations of social and political nature, is the disruption of the balance between work and capital. In 2010, 400 richest people had assets such as the half of the poorer population of the world. In 2016, such part was in the possession of only 8 people. This shows the dramatic collapse of the balance between work and capital. The world cannot develop creating the technological progress while increasing unjustified inequalities, which inevitably lead to an outbreak of civil disturbances. This outbreak can have various organisation forms. In the days of the Internet and social media, it is easier to communicate with people. Therefore, paradoxically, some modern technologies create the conditions facilitating social protests. There is one more important and dangerous effect of implementing technological innovations without simultaneous creation and implementation of social innovations limiting the sky-rocketing increase of economic (followed by social) diversification. Sooner or later, technological progress will become so widespread that, due to the relatively low prices, it will make it possible for the weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and chemical weapons, to reach small terrorist groups. Then, a total, individualized war of global reach can develop. The individualisation of war will follow, as described by the famous German sociologist Ulrich Beck.

To avoid this, it is worth looking at the achievements of the Polish scientist Michał Kalecki, who 75 years ago argued that capitalism alone is not able to develop. It is because it aggressively seeks profit growth, but cannot turn profit into some profitable investments. Therefore, when uncertainty grows, capitalism cannot develop itself, and it must be accompanied by external factors, named by Kalecki – external development factors. These factors include state expenses, finances and, in accordance with the nomenclature of Kalecki – epochal innovations. And what are the current possibilities of activation of the external factors? In short – modest. The countries are indebted, and the basis for the development in the last 20 years were loans, which contributed to the growth of debt of economic entities. What, then, should we do? It is necessary to look for cheaper solutions, but such that are effective, that is breakthrough innovations. These undoubtedly include social and political innovations. Contemporary social innovation is not about investing big money and expensive resources in production, e.g. of a very expensive vaccine, which would be available for a small group of recipients. Today's social innovation should stimulate the use of lower amounts of resources to produce more products available to larger groups of recipients.

The progress of civilisation happens only as a result of a sustainable development in economic, social, and now also ecological terms. Economic (business) innovations, which help accelerate the growth rate of production and services, contribute to economic development. Profits of corporations increase and, at the same time, the economic objectives of the corporations are realised. But are the objectives of the society as a whole and its members individually realised equally, in parallel? In the chain of social reproduction there are four repeated phases: production – distribution – exchange – consumption. The key point from the social point of view is the phase of distribution. But what are the rules of distribution, how much and who gets from this "cake" produced in the social process of production? In the today's increasingly global economy, the most important mechanism of distribution is the market mechanism. However, in the long run, this mechanism leads to growing income and welfare disparities of various social groups.
Although, the income and welfare diversity in itself is nothing wrong, as it is the result of the diversification of effectiveness of factors of production, including work, the growing disparities to a large extent cannot be justified. Economic situation of the society members increasingly depends not on the contribution of work, but on the size of the capital invested, and the market position of the economic entity, and on the "governing power of capital" on the market. It should also be noted that this diversification is also related to speculative activities. Disparities between the implemented economic and social innovations can lead to the collapse of the progress of civilisation.

Nowadays, economic crises are often justified by, indeed, social and political considerations, such as marginalisation of nation states, imbalance of power (or imbalance of fear), religious conflicts, nationalism, chauvinism, etc. It is also considered that the first global financial crisis of the 21st century originated from the wrong social policy pursued by the US Government, which led to the creation of a gigantic public debt, which consequently led to an economic breakdown. This resulted in the financial crisis, but also in deepening of the social imbalances and widening of the circles of poverty and social exclusion. It can even be stated that it was a crisis in public confidence. Therefore, the causes of crises are the conflicts between the economic dimension of the development and its social dimension.

Contemporary world is filled with various innovations of economic or business nature (including technological, product, marketing, and in part – organisational). The existing solutions can be a source of economic progress, which is a component of the progress of civilisation. However, economic innovations do not complete the entire progress of civilisation moreover, the saturation, and often supersaturation with implementations and economic innovations leads to an excessive use of material factors of production. As a consequence, it results in lowering of the efficiency of their use, unnecessary extra burden to the planet, and passing of the negative effects on the society and future generations (of consumers). On the other hand, it leads to forcing the consumption of durable consumer goods, and gathering them "just in case", and also to the low degree of their use (e.g. more cars in a household than its members results in the additional load on traffic routes, which results in an increase in the inconvenience of movement of people, thus to the reduction of the quality of life).

Introduction of yet another economic innovation will not solve this problem. It can be solved only by social innovations that are in a permanent shortage. A social innovation which fosters solving the issue of excessive accumulation of tangible production goods is a developing phenomenon called sharing economy. It is based on the principle: "the use of a service provided by some welfare does not require being its owner". This principle allows for an economic use of resources located in households, but which have been "latent" so far. In this way, increasing of the scope of services provided (transport, residential and tourist accommodation) does not require any growth of additional tangible resources of factors of production. So, it contributes to the growth of household incomes, and inhibition of loading the planet with material goods processed by man [see Poniatowska-Jaksch, Sobiecki, 2016]. Another example: we live in times, in which, contrary to the law of T. Malthus, the planet is able to feed all people, that is to guarantee their minimum required nutrients. But still, millions of people die of starvation and malnutrition, but also due to obesity. Can this problem be solved with another economic innovation? Certainly not! Economic innovations will certainly help to partially solve the problem of nutrition, at least by the new methods of storing and preservation of foods, to reduce its waste in the phase of storage and transport. However, a key condition to solve this problem is to create and implement an innovation of a social nature (in many cases also political). We will not be able to speak about the progress of civilisation in a situation, where there are people dying of starvation and malnutrition.

A growing global social concern, resulting from implementation of an economic (technological) innovation will be robotisation, and more specifically – the effects arising from its dissemination on a large scale. So far, the issue has been postponed due to globalisation of the labour market, which led to cheapening of the work factor by more than ten times in the countries of Asia or South America. But it ends slowly. Labour becomes more and more expensive, which means that the robots become relatively cheap. The mechanism leading to low prices of the labour factor expires. Wages increase, and this changes the relationship of the prices of capital and labour. Capital becomes relatively cheaper and cheaper, and this leads to reducing of the demand for work, at the same time increasing the demand for capital (in the form of robots).

The introduction of robots will be an effect of the phenomenon of substitution of the factors of production. A cheaper factor (in this case capital in the form of robots) will be cheaper than the same activities performed by man. According to W. Szymański [2017], such change is a dysfunction of capitalism. A great challenge, because capitalism is based on the market-driven shaping of income. The market-driven shaping of income means that the income is derived from the sale of the factors of production. Most people have income from employment. Robots change this mechanism. It is estimated that scientific progress allows to create such number of robots that will replace billion people in the world. What will happen to those "superseded", what will replace the income from human labour? Capitalism will face an institutional challenge, and must replace the market-driven shaping of income with another, new one. The introduction of robots means microeconomic battle with the barrier of demand. To sell more, one needs to cut costs. The costs are lowered by the introduction of robots, but the use of robots reduces the demand for human labour. Lowering the demand for human labour results in the reduction of employment, and lower wages. Lower wages result in the reduction of the demand for goods and services. To increase the demand for goods and services, the companies must lower their costs, so they increase the involvement of robots, etc.

A mechanism of the vicious circle appears

If such a mass substitution of the factors of production is unfavourable from the point of view of stimulating the development of the economy, then something must be done to improve the adverse price relations for labour. How can the conditions of competition between a robot and a man be made equal, at least partially? Robots should be taxed. Bill Gates, among others, is a supporter of such a solution. However, this is only one of the tools that can be used. The solution of the problem requires a change in the mechanism, so a breakthrough innovation of a social and political nature. We can say that technological and product innovations force the creation of social and political innovations (maybe institutional changes). Product innovations solve some problems (e.g. they contribute to the reduction of production costs), but at the same time, give rise to others.

Progress of civilisation for centuries and even millennia was primarily an intellectual progress. It was difficult to discuss economic progress at that time. Then we had to deal with the imbalance between the economic and the social element. The insufficiency of the economic factor (otherwise than it is today) was the reason for the tensions and crises. Estimates of growth indicate that the increase in industrial production from ancient times to the first industrial revolution, that is until about 1700, was 0.1-0.2 per year on average. Only the next centuries brought about systematically increasing pace of economic growth. During 1700- 1820, it was 0.5% on an annual average, and between 1820-1913 – 1.5%, and between 1913-2012 – 3.0% [Piketty, 2015, p. 97]. So, the significant pace of the economic growth is found only at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Additionally, the growth in this period refers predominantly to Europe and North America. The countries on other continents were either stuck in colonialism, structurally similar to the medieval period, or "lived" on the history of their former glory, as, for example, China and Japan, or to a lesser extent some countries of the Middle East and South America. The growth, having then the signs of the modern growth, that is the growth based on technological progress, was attributed mainly to Europe and the United States.

The progress of civilisation requires the creation of new social initiatives. Social innovations are indeed an additional capital to keep the social structure in balance. The social capital is seen as a means and purpose and as a primary source of new values for the members of the society. Social innovations also motivate every citizen to actively participate in this process. It is necessary, because traditional ways of solving social problems, even those known for a long time as unemployment, ageing of the society, or exclusion of considerable social and professional groups from the social and economic development, simply fail. "Old" problems are joined by new ones, such as the increase of social inequalities, climate change, or rapidly growing environmental pollution. New phenomena and problems require new solutions, changes to existing procedures, programmes, and often a completely different approach and instruments [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017].

Issue 1.3 of the Review for Religious, 1942. ; Review for Religious MAY 15, 1942 The General Chapter of Elections . Adam C. Ellis Retreat Resolutions . Clarence McAuliffe Reparation to the Sacred Heart . Malachi J. Donnelly The, Pivotal Point of Good Will . G. Augustln~ Ellard Scruples Versus the Human Way . ~ Gerald Kelly Hints for Sacristans . Gerald Ellard The Presumed Permission . ¯ . James E. Risk Book Reviews )uestions Answered E)ecisions of the Holy See VOLUME NUMBER 3 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS VOLUME I MAY 15. 1942 NUMBER CONTENTS. THE GENERAL CHAPTER OF ELECTIONS IN A RELIGIOUS CONGREGATION Adam C. Ellis, S.3 . 146 FOR CHURCH MUSICIANS . " . 156 RETREAT RESOLUTIONS---Clarence McAuliffe, S.J . 157 BOOKS RECEIVED . , . 166" ¯ SOME PAMPHLETS . 166 REPARATION IN THE DEVOTION TO THE SACRED HEART Malachi J. Donnelly, S.J. . ." . . . 167 THE PIVOTAL POINT OF EFFECTIVE GOOD WILL G. Augustine Ellard, S.J . 170 SCRUPLES VERSUS THE HUMAN WAY---Gerald Kelly. S.J. 187 HINTS FOR SACRISTANS~erald Ellard, S.J . 194 THE PRESUMED PERMISSION--Jame$.,E~. Risk. S.J . 196 BOOK REVIEWS PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN AND RELIGIOUS PERFECTION . 206 BLESSED ARE THEY THAT HUNGER By the Reverend Richard Graef, C.S.Sp. 206 THE MASS OF BROTHER MICHEL. By Michael Kent . 207 FAST BY THE ROAD. By John Moody . ; 208 THE CATHOLIC REVIVAL IN ENGLAND. By John ,J. O'Connor 209 MEDIEVAL HUMANISM. By the Reverend Gerald G. Walsh, S.J. 209 DECISIONS OF THE HOLY SEE OF INTEREST TO RELIGIOUS 210 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Extension of Temporary Vows; Use df Parish School Funds; Is Reli-gious Habit a Sacramental; Days of Abstinence during Lent; Languages during Canonical Year; Inspection of Letters: Administration of Anes-thetics: Aspirant of East Syrian Rite: Converts from Greek Orthodox Church; Indulgence for Kissing Habit: Extending Period of Probation: Chanting of Little Office; Working during Evening Recreation 211 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, May, 1942. Vol. I, No. 3. Published bi-monthly: January, March, May, July, September, and November, at The College Press, 606 Harrison Street; Topeka, Kansas, by St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas, with ecclesiastical approbation. Entered as second class matter January 15, 1942, at the Post Office, Topeka, Kansas, under the act of March 3, 1879. Editorial Board: Adam C. Ellis, S.J., G. Augustine Ellard, S.J., Gerald Kelly, S.d. Copyright, 1942, by Adam C. Ellis. Permission is hereby granted for quotations of reasonable length, provided due credit be given this review and the author. Subscription price: 2 dollars a year. PHnted in U. S. A. The General Chap!:er ot: I::lect:ions in a Religious Congregat:ion Adam C. Ellis, S.3. BY CHAPTER in a reli.gious institute is meant the lawful assembly of those members to whom the con-stitutions give the right to vote when matters of im-portance are to be discussed and decided. Chapters may be general, provincial, or local, according as they represent an entire institute (order or congregation), or a province, or a local community. Provincial and local chapters meet, as a rule, only for the election of delegates to the general or provincial chapter respectively. In this article we are concerned only with the g.eneral chapter, though many of its provisions will apply equally well to a provincial or local chapter. An ordinarg general chapter is convoked at the times prescribed by the constitu-tions-~ every three or six years, or at other regular inter.- vals. An extraordinar~ general chapter is ofie convoked outside the time of the ordinary chapter~ Constitutions approved by the Holy See usually prescribe that an ex-traordinary chapter may not be convoked without the per-missioh of the Holy See, except in the case of the death or resignation of the superior general. The purpose of the general chapter is two-fold: to elect superiors, and to transact other important business. The first kind of chapter is usually called the chapter of elections; the second, the business chapter, or the chapter of affairs. We are dealing here with the chapter of elections only, which is governed by the regulations of the Code of Canon Law as well as by the provisions of the constitu-tions which are not contrary to the Code (cf. canon 507. §1). 146 CHAPTER OF ELECTIONS Time, Place, and Cor~oocation of Chapter. The common law of the Church does not prescribe any particular place for the meeting of the general chapter of elections. The constitutions usually allow the superior general to determi.ne the date and place of the chapter, with the deliberative vote of his council. Sometimes, however, they prescribe that the chapter be held in the motherhouse, and set the day for it as well. In the absence of any definite regulations of the constitutions, the superior general with his council is free to determine the day on which the chap-ter is to be held, as well as its meeting-place. This is true even in the case of a diocesan congregation of religious women which has houses in more than one diocese, as was declared by the S. Congregation of Religious on June 17, 1921, when it explicitly stated that the choice of the meet-ing- place of the chapter rested with the superior general, and not with the local Ordinary in whose diocese the moth-erhouse is located. At the same time the S. Congregation declared that the right to preside over the election in the case mentioned belonged to the local Ordinary in whose diocese the election took place, hence not to the Ordinary of the motherhouse, unless the election is held in his dio-cese. Pope Benedict XV confirmed these decisions and ordered them to be published. The day and place of the general chapter having been determined upon, the superior general will then convoke the chapter, usually by means of a circular letter to be sent to all those who have a right to assist at the chapter. The constitutions usually pr.escribe that such letters are to be sent at least three, if not six, months before the day on which the chapter is to meet. An error in convoking the chapter does not make the election invalid unless one third of those who have a right to attend have not been sum-moned and, by reason of this irregularity, have not taken 147 ADAM C. ELLIS part in the voting (cf. canon 162, § 3). Electors or Members of the Chapter The constitutions will determine who have a right to take part in a chapter of elections. The following are com-monly members of such a chapter: 1. The superior general; 2. The members of his council; 3. All ex-superiors general; 4. The secretary general; 5. The treasurer general; 6. Provincials and two or more delegates from each province, if there are provinces; 7. Local superiors, and delegates of the various houses chosen according to the constitutions. The common law of tl~e Church prescribes that reli-gious with temporary vows have neither active nor pas-sive voice1 unless the constitutions explicitly grant it to them. The constitutions sometimes grant active voice to religious with temporary vows, seldom if ever passive voice. The number of years required by the constitutions for the enjoyment~ of active and passive voice is tO be counted from the" first profession of temporary vows, un-less the constitutions provide otherwise (cf. canon 578, 30). It is customary to elect substitutes for all delegates who are elected to take part in a chapter of elections. These substitutes take the place of such delegates as are impeded or who do not wish to attend the chapter. Unless the con-stitutions declare otherwise, the religious who have been elected delegates may give up their right to attend the chap-ter. XActive voice is the tight to vote: passive voice is the right to be voted for or to be elected to an ot~ce, 148 CHAPTER OF ELECTIONS Prelirainar~.t Session of Chapter In a preliminary session of the .chapter it is customary to examine the credentials of all the delegates to the chap-ter. This having been done, the assembly proceeds by se-cret vote to the election of at least two "scrutineers".0r tellers (cf. canon 171, § 1), unless these are already desig-nated by the constitutions. They must be elected from among the members of the chapter. After being elected they take an oath to fulfill their of Iice faithfully, and to observe secrecy regarding everything done in the chapter of elections. A secretary is usually elected in a similar man-ner, unless one of the tellers acts in this capacity. General Regulations Regarding Voting On!y those religious who are actually present in the chapter have a right to vote. Votes sent in by mail or cast by proxy are forbidden and invalid, unless the constitu-tions or a special privilege granted by the Holy See author-ize the employment of those methods (cf. canon 163). An exception., however, is made in favor of members of the chapter who are in the house but unable to attend the meetings because of illness. Such a person's vote given in writing shall be collected by the tellers and placed with the other votes, unless particular laws or a legitimate custom determine otherwise (cf. canon 168). All must abstain from seeking votes either directly or indirectly for themselves or for others, and no one may validly vote for himself (cf. canons 507, § 2, 170). This does not forbid the members-of the chapter from seeking information from one another regarding the qualities of this or that religious. The constitutions frequently pro-vide for such an opportunity before the day of the election. All votes must be freely given. A vote directly or indirectly extorted by grave fear or fraud in favor of a 149 ADAM C. ELLIS determined person, or of one of a group of persons, is an invalid vote (cf. canon 169, §.1). In order to be valid, a vote freely cast for an eligible candidate must have four qualities: it must be secret, cer-tain, absolute, and determined (cf. canon 169, § 2). Each one of these qualities demands a brief explanation. A secret vote. This means that no member of the chapter may make known to another, the pers6n for whom he voted. A vote which is made public is by that very fact invalid. However, for special reasons, a member of the chapter may declare before the president and the tellers which person he wishes to vote for. The vote is secret, since all the persons to whom it is made. known are bound under oath. not to reveal it. Though not strictly speaking required by law, a written ballot is the most common and most convenient form of carrying on the election and safe-guards the secrecy req.uired. It would seem to be the only form contemplated by the Code. A certain vote. In order to be certain the vote must glare the full name of the person v6ted for so as to distin-guish him from all other persons having a similar name. A vote cast for "the person who will receive the majority of the votes," is an uncertain vote. A vote which cannot be read, or understood, is likewise uncertain; as is also a blank vote. An absolute vote. Each vote must be free from all con-ditions. A vote cast for Peter "provided he is fifty years old," would be an invalid vote. If the condition, however, merely expresses a requirement of the law for the valid election of the person voted for, the. vote would not be invalid: But such conditions should not be put in the vote when given since they are presupposed. A determined vote. An alternative vote is invalid. 150 CHAPTER OF ELECTIONS Such would be, for example, a vote cast for "either Peter or Paul." In conclusion it may be well to note that an invalid vote does not make the balldt in which it is cast invalid. Such an invalid vote is simply not.counted. By accident it may keep the person for whom it was given from getting the required majority of votes. The Election of the Superior General -Before the voting begins for the election of higher superiors in institutes of religious men, all and each of the members of the chapter shall promise under oath to elect those whom they deem before God should be elected (cf. canon 506, § 1). This oath is not required of reli-gious women. In institutes of religious men the superior general pre-sides over the election unless the constitutions provide otherwise. In congregations of religious women the elec-tion of the mother general is presided over by the Ordinary of the place in which the election is held. He may preside personally or through a delegate (cf. canon 506, § 4). For the election of superiors the common law requires an absolute2 majority of votes on either the first or second ballot, while a relative majority suffices on the third ballot, If, on the third ballot, the highest number of votes is given equally to two or more persons, the presiding officer may determine the election by casting his vote, but never in his own favor. Should he decline to do so, then the senior by reason of ordination, or of first profession, or of age, shall be regarded as elected (cf. canon 101, § 1, 1°). Theconsti- 2An absolute majority is constituted by any number exceeding half the number of valid votes cast, for instance, 9 out of 16, 10 out of' 19, and so forth. The person receiving the greatest number of votes cast is said. to have a plurality or relative majority of the votes cast when that number does not constitute an absolute majority of all the'votes cast. Thus, in a chapter in which 25 votes are cast,-,John may receive 11, Peter 8, and Paul 6. ,John has a relative majority. 151 ADAM C. ELLIS tutions may require a greater number of votes, for instance, a two-thirds majority for the election of the superior gen-eral. Constitutions approved by the Holy See usually require that :a fourth ballot be taken in case the third ballot does not result in an absolute majority. ¯ In this fourth bal-lot only the two religious who have received the greater number of votes on the third ballot are eligible for election, though they themselves are excluded from voting on the fourth ballot. In case this fourth ballot results in a tie, the election is determined by priority of ordination, or of first profession, or of age, respectively as mentioned above. The Voting Process When all are prepared the voting begins. It is the duty of the tellers to see to it that the votes be cast by each elector secretly, diligently, separately, and according to the order of precedence (cf. canon 171, § 2). No particular form of collecting the votes is prescribed by the common law, though the constitutions usually determine some detailed method, for instance, the tellers carry a locked box into which each member casts his sealed vote, or the members proceed slowly, one by one, to-the table or desk of the presiding officer, and there deposit their votes in an urn or box, under the watchful eyes of the tellers. When all the votes have been thus.collected, the tellers shall examine in the presence of the presiding officer, according to the manner prescribed by the particular con-stitutions or legitimate customs, whether the number of votes corresponds to the number of electors. Should the number of votes exceed the number of electors, the ballot is invalid (cf. canon 171, §§ 2 and 3), the ballots are destroyed, and a new vote taken. If the number of ballots does not exceed that of the number of electors, they are opened one by one so as to be seen by both tellers, and by 152 " CHAPTER OF ELECTIONS the presiding officer, and noted down by the secretary. After the votes have been counted the presiding officer or one of the tellers announces to the chapter how many votes each candidate has received. This may be done in either of two ways. After each vote is opened and inspected by the tellers and the presiding officer, the name of the person voted for is read aloud.-Or after the votes have been counted, the final results may be read to the chapter by the presiding officer or by one of the tellers. The constitutions or custom will determine the method to be followed. The votes are to be burned immediately after each bal-lot, or at the end of the session if several ballots were taken during it (cf. canon 171., § 4). When the election of the superior general has been com-pleted according to the prescribed formalities, the presiding officer will declare it lawful, proclaim it, and receive the oath of the newly elected superior general. Thereupon the religious both of the chapter and of the community will make their obedience according to custom. All the acts of the election shall be diligently written down by the secretary and, after being signed at least by him, by the presiding officer, and by the tellers, they shall be carefully preserved in the archives of the congregation (cf. canon 171, § 5). Acceptance and Confirmation of the Election The announcement of the result of the election made to the chapter is sufficient notification if the person elected is present; if he is not present the result should be officially communicated to him, and he is to be summoned to the chapter, all further business of which is suspended until his arrival. Unless the constitutions state the contrary, the reli-gious elected is not obliged to accept the office. Should he 153 ADAM C. ELLIS renounce it; he loses all the rights connected with the same, and a new election is held. In the case of diocesan congregations of religious women, the election of the mother general must be con-firmed by the Ordinary who presides over it. For grave reasons, according to his conscience, he may refuse to con-firm the election (cf. canon 506, § 4). In that case, how-ever, he may not appoint the superior general, but a new election must be held. Postutaiion It may fiappen that the members of a chapter wish to have for their superior a religious who is able and worthy to fill that office, but who is excluded from it by some impediment of church law from which the-competent ecclesiastical ~uperior can and is accustomed to dispense. Such a person cannot be validly] elected, but the members of the chapter may postulate him, provided that he receives two-thirds of. the votes of the chapter (cf. canons 179, § 1; 180, § 1)which means that they ask the Holy See to grant the necessary dispensation. Postulation, however, may be admitted only in an extraordinary case and provided the constitutions do not forbid it. (cf. canon 507, § 3). In a letter addressed to the local Ordinaries of the world on March 9, 1920, the S. Congregation of Religious instructed them to be very strict in allowing postulation in the case of the superior general of a congregation of religious women who has just com-pleted two terms of office. In such a case the simple desire of the members of the chapter to re-eleCt the same superior, or the mere ability of the person to fill the office, is not a sufficient reason for postulation. If, however, other grave reasons seem to require the choice of the same person beyond the time allowed by the constitutions, the Ordinary must 154 CHAPTER OF ELECTIONS send a petion to the S. Congregation, in which it is clearly stated what the reasons are, how many ballots were taken, and how many votes were in favor of the person postu-lated. Finally the OMinary must state his own opinion in the matter. The S. Congregation will then give a decision. The fact that the constitutions expressly allow postulation does not excuse from the requirements of this instruction. In case of postulation the members of the chapter who wish to vote for an ineligible person, must write on their ballot: "I postulate N. N." Election of Other Officers The newly elected superior general presides over the election of the other officers to be chosen by the general chapter, unless the constitutions allow the Ordinary the right of presiding likewise at the election of the members of the general council. These elections are usually held in a separate session Of the chapter. The manner of voting is the same as that employed in the election of the superior general. An absolute majority of votes is required on the first and second ballot. If no one has received such a major2 ity, a third ballot is taken in which a relative majority is sufficient. ,If on this third ballot two or more candidates receive an equal number of votes, the presiding officer may cast a deciding vote, though he is not .obliged to do so. If he declines to use his right, the person who is senior by ordi-nation, or by first profession, or by age, is considered elected. The constitutions may provide for a fourth bal-lot in case the third re.sults in a tie. If the person elected is not a member of the chapter, he must be summoned at once, but the chapter does not await his arrival in order to continue its business. After the elections are over, the former superior gen-eral, the members of his council, the secretary general and 155 ADAM G. ELLIS the treasurer general, usually continue to sit in chapter with active voice as long as it r~mains in'session, even though they may have been replaced in their offces by other reli-gious. Should the superior general die during his term of offce, or resignbefore its completion, the assistant superior gen-eral will take his place in the government of the community and will ~onvoke an extraordinary chapter in which dec-tions will be held not only for a new superior general, but also for all the other offices which are usually filled by election in general chapter. The reason for this is that all ¯ the officers elected in a general chapter hold office from chapter to chapter, rather than for a "definite number of years. FOR CHURCH MUSICIANS Of unusual yalue to religious and seminarians working in the field c~f church music is 'the new Catholic Choirmasters' Correspon-derice Course. Four semesters of ~olle'giate° work, accredited by St. Albertus College Department of Music, are done under personal tutorship and will be coricluded with summer schools in 1943 and 1944. The lessons have been prepared by a~ faculty international in personnel and repute, including Dom Desrocquettes0 Dr. Becket Gibbs, Dom Ermin Vitry, Father Gerald Ellard, and others. Zest and .authority characterize their teaching, and phonograph recordings assist amply in problems that need the living voice. General' editor is Clifford Bennett, Gregorian Institute, 1515 Berger Building, Pittsburgh, Pa. Those interested may obtain an attractive pros-pectus by writing to the General Editor. 156 Retreat Resolutions Clarence McAuliffe, S.3. AS ~WEGO ON in the religious life, certain practices, n6t binding under pain of sir/, but nevertheless, of paramount importance in their bearing on the whole spiritual structure, become increasingly .difficult. Among these are the particular examination of conscience, certain rules governing religious discipline, such as the rule of silence, and the formulation of apt resolutions during re-treat. That the delicate web of religious virtues clings for partial support upon the particular examen is admitted by all ascetical writers. The same holds true for the rule of silence, since its utter neglect means the undermining of the spirit of prayer and recollection. But the resolutions we take in our annual retreat are even of greater moment since the continued practice of the particular examen and the preservation of a prayerful disposition depend in no small measure upon them. If we reflect on our happy novitiate days, we shall remember that we experienced no difficulty in making resolutions and recording them. We jotted them down carefully as tokens of our affection for our Divine Savior Who alone besides ourselves knew what they were. We may still have them. We may smile now at some of their characteristics. No doubt we took too many resolutions; we aimed too often at purely external practices; we may even have aspired to fanciful performances. But we can-not deny that they did us good. They kept us fervent: they kept our ideals high; they were concrete proof of our good will in God's service; they bolstered our flagging spir-itual forces. As long as we exercised care in formulating and inditing resolutions during our retreat, we were also 157 CLARENCE MCAULIFI~E faithful to our particular examen and observant of a cred-itable practice of silence. If we ever relaxed our diligence in making resolutions during retreat, our particular exa-men becamea half-hearted or neglected undertaking and our love for silence grew notably remiss. No Excuse t:or Neglect W.hy should the task, for task it is, of taking retreat resolutions ever be neglected by. us? What truly solid rea-son can we give for not writing them down and keeping them close at hand? Every man or woman engaged in a profession or business or in any other activity of moment pauses now and then to determine hn altered course of ac-tion. Small defects ard bound to seep in unnoticed, but they impede success and must b~ removed. Positive prog-ress also must be made; knowledge must be extended; greater zest must be engendered or the business will grow languid and die. Merchants do not hesitate to pay ample fees to public accountants and efficiency experts. These men detect pecuniary losses and open up new fields of ac-tivity for the merchant, and he makes definite plans accord-ing to their advice. Are we religious not engaged in a pro-fession, and a profession transcending all others? Can we deny that peccadilloes of one kind or another are, almost unobserved, weakening the fabric of our spiritual gar-ments? .that we are yet far distant from the glorious hori-zon of perfec~tion to which God beckons each one of us? Should we hesitate during our annual retreat to be our own public accountants and efficiency experts because of the unreasonable murmurings of our natural selves? A Faoorable Time for Resolutions Certainly no time is better suited for determining new spiritual policies than the annual retreat. During it we are segregated from our active duties; we engage in several days RETREAT RESOLUTIONS of silent communing with God; we see again what we al-ways know, but never reduce to perfect practice, that we are made only to serve Him; our spiritual ideals, dimmed by a whole year's mis~, are refurbished; God himself speaks to us and we hear His whisperings periodically, during each day of retreat pleading with us: "Why not give up this sin-less, but inordinate attachment for my sake? Why not de-vote more attention to developing this virtue?" Further-more, our subjective condition is fit for taking sage resolu-tions. We are calm, tranquil; excessive nervous tension, emotional ebullitions, the agitation engendered by custom-ary daily contact with other human personalities m all these vanish in the solitude of retreat. Those New Year resolutions so widely publicized by the newspapers can scarcely ever be successful if brought to bear upon spiritual matters, because the hectic round of daily duties and dis-tractions impedes clear vision and sound judgment. But the retreat is the New Year for religious and it is certainly to our shame if we pass up this one propitious occasion for taking efficacious resolves. Retreat resolutions are apt to be successful for another reason. Our profession is spiritual and its successful prac-tice does not depend on mere human endeavors. God called us to the religious life; He keeps us in it'; .He enables us every day to live it. Any resolution we take is doomed to failure if we count upon our own natural energies to fulfill it. Even the simplest, such as thedetermination to prepare Our meditation more carefully, to make an additional visit to the Blessed Sacrament, to relinquish some convenient, but unnecessary article, cannot be accomplished without the grace of God. Consider what vast stores of grace we must obtain in time of retreat. Not only do we perform our ordinary spiritual exercises, but the whole time is one continual prayer. A veritable mountain of sanctifying. 159~ CLARENCE MCAULIFFE grace is accumulated and with it the right to actual graces to be given us in the future as we need them. We shall need them particularly in order to be faithful to our reso- ¯Iutions, the fruit of our retreat, and they will be supplied generously and persistently by God, success depending solely upon our wholehearted cooperation. Negative Resolutions Why, then, we may ask have our resolutions so often been failures?' Why is it that we can hardly recall them after a few weeks perhaps? Have we been grossly negli-gent in corresponding with the grace of God? Not neces-sarily so. Perhaps our resolutions were not prudently made. God constructed the human being according to very definite laws. If we take resolutions contrary to these laws, especially our psychological laws, we can scarcely expect God to work a miracle to enable us to keep them. For in-stance, most' of us are probably too negative in drawing.up our resolutions. We will not do this; we will not do that; we will quit doing this, and so on. In other words, we pay entirely too much attention to our faults. If we are com-mitting deliberate sins, we must, of course, make them the first object of our determinations. But 'such is not usually the case. We fret over our imperfections or merely semi-deliberate faults, forgetting a sound teaching of theology which declares that it is impossible for any person without a special privilege, rarely granted, to keep from these even for a single day. The chances are that such defects spring from temperament, nervous disposition, unstable health or some other natural cause, partially, at least, beyond our control. Now it is a psychological law that negatives de-press the human soul. If our retreat resolutions comprise merely a lengthy list of "Don'ts" over inconsequential matters, we are .quite surely going to let them lapse. The 160 RETREAT RESOLUTIONS human soul is too lofty in its aspirations to be fettered' by a chorus of petty "I will not's"; it soars to the highest heavens in search of God Himself; unending vistai of per-fection lie stretched out before it and microscopic imper-fections are no obstacle to exalted sanctity even if they stay with us to our dying day. How much wiser it would be to 'resolve: "I will pay an additional visit to the Blessed Sac-rament each day this coming year for a few minutes out of love for my Savior," than to promise: "I will never sit down during meditation in the chapel", when, as a matter of fact, constant kneeling may so distract us that we cannot pray at all from bodily uneasiness. Besides, protracted kneeling may even do us positive corporal harm unless our backs and nerves are of rugged texture. How Man~/ Resolutions? Another mistake to which we may easily succumb is that of taking too many resolutions. It is true that a hun-dred resolutions would be none too many when we see in retreat the intricate labyrinth of perfection. Even so, it would certainly be unwise to take more than four. or, at most, five. Here again asimple law of. human psychology enters into play. We are so constructed that a multiplicity of resolves overbalances US~ dissipates our energies and re-sults in no accomplishment whatever. We cannot expect our Savior to rescind that law in our case by a miracle. It is well for us to recall that old axiom of spiritual au-thors that to advance in one virtue is to advance in them all. Progress, for instance, in the spirit and practice of obedi-ence necessarily reflects progress in the love of God. But love is the pith and core of all sanctity; loreis the all-em-bracing virtue; it means a closer alliance with God, more intimate union with Him; if it makes the tree of obedience more verdant, it must necessarily transmit its vigor to the 161 CLARENCE MCAULIFFE entire forest of virtues. Bearing this in mind, we should in retreat pay heed, firit of all to our vows. An outpost to one of them may have been weakened during the previous year. Then we should look to the virtues animating the vows and make a few positive resolutions that will stimu-late their growth. We must never forget that a religious observant of the vows is a good religious. Focusing our attention upon them, we keep our resolutions down to a minimum. Yet we will make more rapid spiritual s~rides .than we would if we squandered our resources by making decisions on the whole gamut of faults and virtues. The Search After Causes Our resolutions may result in failure for another rea-son also. They may be too vague, too imprecise, too gen-eral. For example, how often have we resolved in retreat to be more fervent in our spiritual exercises! No one could condemn a determination to better these exercises of piety. It is they especiall.y that keep our spiritual lives vigorous and bolster our flagging virtue. But what happened to that resolution to make them more devotedly? For a day or two, for a week or two perhaps, we were more attentive .to them and then, behold, we soon found ourselves in the same old rut of routine and mechanical performance. Why? Simply because our resolution violated a metaphysical law which states that to attain a purpose it is necessary to .~elect means, causes, that will conduce to its realization. If we resolve only upon the end to be achieved, we shall accomplish nothing. Every day we dream ofthings we should like to do, but we neglect the specific means to the end and our resolves are thus mere fancies relegated to the vast mound of inefficacious desires. If we really wish to improve our meditation, examinations of conscience and other spiritual exercises, let us investigate the reason 162 RETREAT RESOLUTIONS why they are performed so perfunctorily. Ii it because we indulge in considerable unnecessary talking? This will certainly dissipate the mind and react upon our spiritual exercises. If we make a determination to practise silence, we shall find that contact with God will become much eas.ier and our meditations will improve. Is it due to un-regu. lated affections of the heart? Then a resolution must be taken to watch carefully over such ungoverned move-ments by removing their occasions as far as possible. Is it due to stark physical fatigue? Then we can do nothing directly, but perhaps we can adopt some regime that will improve our health. Is it due to some other cause? Then let us examine for that cause and decide to overcome it if possible. Definite resolutions of these kinds will inject new life into our meditation whereas a mere hazy resolve to perform it better will soon vanish. This point is of the utmost consequence. Take another example. Most of us are guilty of positive faults against charity and all of us could practise this virtue much more perfectly. Shall we then determine during retreat: "I shall be more charitable"? Such a resolution is praiseworthy,, as a sign of our good will in God's service, but it is bound to lapse just as is the vague determination to do better in our spiritual exercises. If we wish to be more charitable, we must pry into the reasons why we are not more charitable. If we wish to obtain an effect, we must find a proportion-ate cause to produce it. Do we fail in charity because we associate only with those whose temperaments .are con-genial? because we areof a squeamish disposition and allow tiny impolitenesses to jar our nerves? because we indulge in idle ,gossip and small talk? because we have a biting or ridiculing tongue? Could we add blossoms to our charity by interesting ourselves in the activities of others? by de-veloping the spirit of a good listener? by watching for 163 CLARENCE MCAULIFFE opportunities to say a kindly word or express Our sym-pathy? Ways and means to add lustre to this virtue are truly endless. If one defect, in particular, makes us un-charitable, let us in retreat decide to banish it; if some precise means of burnishing our charity occurs to us, let us determine to adopt it. Then we shall find that Christ's own spirit of charity will take root and flourish in our souls. The Bizarre Resolution Fantastic and complex resolutions should also be avoided. Though we never relax our aim at the highest possible perfection, we always keep our feet anchored to earth by the bonds of prudence and common sense. The human mind can only think of one thing at a time; the will can be directed toward only one conscious goal at a time. Both faculties are bound to be smothered by kaleido-scopic resolutions. Suppose a religious were to emerge from retreat armed with this single resolve: From eight o'clock in the morning when her active day began until ten at night when she retired, exactly fourteen hours inter-vened, the same number of hours as there are stations of the cross. During the coming year she would divide the day according to the stations. From eight to nine in the morning she would live in the spirit of the first station, the condemnation of the Savior. From nine to ten her thoughts would Be engrossed with the second station, and so on throughout the day. It is not likely that this well-inten-tioned religious would keep that resolution. It is too bizarre and too involved .and would require constant at-tention from morning to night every single day. Human nature could not stand such a strain without well-nigh miraculous support. 164 RETREAT RESOLUTIONS Keeping the Resolution Once our resolutions are taken and written down, how can we perpetuate them for three hundred and sixty-five days? By adopting them as subjects for Our particular ex-amination of conscience. How often we puzzle over a suitable subject for this examen! The problem vanishes if we have our retreat resolutions on hand. Even though these be only three or four,, they will provide ample matter for the examen. Each resolution can be the subject for a few weeks or a month. Thereafter each resolution can be repeated again and, if this becomes wearisome, variety may be introduced without changing the subject matter. FOr instanc.e, if one of our retreat resolutions is to eliminate unnecessary talking, we can practise this for some days under the patronage of the Blessed Virgin and in imitation .of her silence in the home at Nazareth. Later on, we might exercise it in union with Christ in the desert and in His infancy and in His secluded hours of prayer upon the mountain. At another time we may practise it by repeated ejaculatory prayers to some favorite saint whose help we implore. In this way the subject will not grow tedious and it will never lose its value Since it is one of our rdreat resolutions. These may also be kept alive and vibrant by referring to them duriag the monthly recollection. Why devote this period to any other consideration when God has shown us in our previous retreat what actions of ours will most please Him? Despite our best efforts, however, we shall make un-successful resolutions. In framing them we may continue to violate the laws of human psychology. We may not observe them even for a week though we honestly wanted to do so. We should not be discouraged. God values our good will; and our retreat resolutions, if written down, are 165 CLARENCE MCAULIFFE palpable proof of this" good will. The resolutions of our novitiate days were often ill-formed and impossible of achievement, but they secured God's blessing for us. We kept the vows though we did not as yet have them; rarely did we commit even a deliberate venial sin; we strove by our clumsy retreat resolutions to improve our religious lives. These resolutions won from Christ the gift of fer-vor. He Will reanimate and increase that fervor if we per-severe in taking and recording resolutions during our re-treat. BOOKS RECEIVED (7"0 be reviewed later.) I PRAY THE MASS~. By Hugo H. Hoever, S. O: Cist. Catholic Book Publishing Company. New York. MARCH INTO TOMORROW. By, 3ohn ,J. Considine, M.M. Field Afar,Pres~. New York. ~, . WATCH AND PRAY. By ,John Moffatt, S.~J. The Bruce Publishing' Company. Milwaukee. IN THE SHADOW OF OUR LADY OF THE CiENACLE. By Helen M. Lynch; R.C. The Paulist Press. New York. SOME PAMPHLETS Cheer Up!; Be of Good Heart!; Have ConfidenCe!; Take Courage! These four pamphlets are by Father Bruno Hagspiel, S.V.D. They consist of a varied collection of Scripture texts, anecdotes, poems, and so forth, all designed to cheer the downhearted.~ Price, 10 cents a copy. May be obtained from The Mission Press, Techny, I11. Also, four pamphlets listed under the general title, GOSPEL MOVIES, that treat of Grace; Faith; Sin; Wed in Christ. They contain brief stories based on the Gospels and illustrating these various topics. All are written by Father Placldus Kempf, O.S.B. Price, 10 cents a copy. May be obtained from THE GRAIL, St. Meinrad~, Indiana. 166 Reparation in t:he Devotion t:o !:he Sacred I-leart: Malachi 3. Donnelly, S.J. THE "great apparition" of our Lo~d to St. Margaret Mary took place duiing the Octave of Corpus Christi, most probably in 1675. Showing her His Heart, our Lo~d said: "Behold this Heart which has so loved men, which has spared nothing, even to being exhausted and consumed, in order to testify to them its love. And the greater number of them make me no other return than ingratitude, by their coldness and their forgetfulness of me in this Sacrament of love. But what is still more painful to me is, that it is hearts who are consecrated to me who use me thus." And our Lord continued: "It is because of this that I ask you to have the first Friday after the Octave of Corpus Christi kept as a special feast in honor of my Heart. by receiving Communion on that day and making it a reparation of honor for all the insults offered to my Heart during the time that it has been exposed on the altars." The end of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, as revealed to St. Margaret Mary and as approved by the Church, is reparation to this same Heart for the coldness and indif-ference, for the sins and insults suffered by the Sacred Heart, especially in the Sacrament of His love. Reparation, in general, means the making up for an injury or offense committed against one to whom honor and love are due. In the case of reparation to the Sacred Heart, this presup-poses a real personal wound in that Heart caused by the sins of men, and a real ability on the part of those devoted to the Sacred Heart to repair this wound. This confronts us with two difficulties: 1) how can the Heart of Jesus now suffer? 2) how can we repair His sufferings? 167 MALACHI ,J. DONNI~LLY The soul of Jesus Christ.in heaven experiences no sor-row, nor does His glorified body know aught of pain. His perfect happiness can be dimmed by absolutely nothing: nay! not even by the most heinous sins of ungrateful men, How, then, could He complain of the coldness and indif-ference of m~n, and that in words which, seemingly indicate that each sin of the present day is a direct and piercing wound in His Sacred Heart? In a word, the solution lies in an Understanding of the knowledge that Christ, as Man, enjoyed during His, life on earth. Our Blessed Lord was both God and Man. As Man He enjoyed the beatific Vision throughout His whole life. Now, through this vision He received the complete perfection of His intellect. He knew all things that per-tained to His office, His dominion, His mission on earth, all that pertained to the plan of redemption. The knowledge that Christ had, as Man~ was like unto the eternal knowledge of God. During His whole lithe, .especially during the Passion, Christ',' as Man, had knowl-edge of future things; the good and bad 'actions of all men were directly1 present to His mind. Just as a giant search-light in one blazing stream of light covers at once a half-mile area and every inch of space therein, or just as the human eye gazing on a distant landscape sees the whole and each detail at the same time, so, too, did Christ see through the whole of time to come and all the actions of men con-tained therein. He saw all future events as actually present before His eyes and each event was the direct object of His vision. In order to understand better the relationship between the knowledge of Christ and reparation in the devo-tion to the Sacred Heart, let us go in imagination with Jesus to the garden of Gethsemani. As Jesus kneels in 168 REPARATION TO THE SACRED HEART meditation, He begins to grow sad. Why? This sadness can only be caused by the vision in His human mind. As He kneels there, the sins of all men Unfold before His eyes; all the ingratitude of men--especially, of those from whom He might well have expected better things--is directly present to His clear vision. Not a.single sin --- even an ever so secret sin of desire-~elu~les His all-seeing gaze. Also (and this is the consoling aspect of Gethsemani), every single act of reparation of those especially devoted to His Sacred Heart was present to Him. And, as Jesus looked upon these acts of reparation, His loving Heart felt real and deep consolation. When, therefore, at the present time we perform acts of reparation, it is perfectly true to say that there is direct contact between our act of reparation and the Heart of Christ in Gethsemani. Time and space are wiped out. His knowledge bridges nineteen hundred years as readily as we look across a river. We are present before His eyes: our acts of reparation console Him, our sins cause Him sorrow-ful agony. What should be the effect of this truth that all our actions were actuatl~t present to the suffering Christ in His Passion? A deep realization of this can only ground more firmly our love for the Sacred Heart and spur us to more ardent acts of loving reparation to the Sacred Heart. Just as the spokes of a wheel lead to the hub, with which they are in direct contact, so likewise do all the reparatory actions of men the world over lead back to Christ in the Garden; establish immediate contact with His Suffering heart. And the deep realization of this solidly established truth should arouse the deepest aspirations of our hearts and wills to do our utmost to console the great and loving Heart of Jesus. 169 The Pivol:al Point: ot: l=fl:ec!:ive ,ood Will G. Augustine.Ellard, S.J. ['Because of the importance of Father Ellard's theme, and because of the length of the article, we thought that the followihg summary might be appreciated by those who wish some handy way of visualiz!ng and recalling the points devdopedin the article. The Roman numerals refer to the same divisions of the text.--ED.] Summary I. The problem of bringing about moral good will is illustrated by three cases: a)" Good~ but weak, will in oneself; b) Generous, but inconstant, will in oneself; c) Irresponsive or bad will in others. II. What is meant by the expression: "the pivotal point of good will"? III. Things which do not constitute it. IV. It does consist in the realistic appreciation of values. These terms defined. V. Reasons for the assertion: a) Common sense; e) Philosophy; b) ExperienCe; f) Sacred Scripture; c) Observation; g) Theology. d) Experimental psychology: gI. The characteristics of the knowledge that is d~]namic, i.e. apt to move or strengthen the will: a) Presentation of the right aspect; e) Actuality: b) Sufficient" quantity ; f) Novelty ; c) Personal reference: g) Affinity and sympathy. d) Immediacy and imagery; VII. Practical conclusions-- 1. To move or strengthen the will for the present: Realize the values of motives: a) Learning what the pertinent values are; Means: b) Serious reflection and prayer, especially mental: c) Organization of the motives. 2. To steady the will in the future: Have the realization in the focus of consciousness at critical moments. a) Recollection; c) Habituation: Means: b) Association; d) Experience. 170 PIVOTAL POINT OF GOOD WILL SISTER Mary Frail is making her annual retreat. More clearly than she has been wont, she sees the magnifi-cence and beauty of the divine plan for herself, she is delighted with it, and she feels that it would the grand-est thing possible to carry it out in all its fulness. Also she notices that to do so would mean giving up certain rather dear little habitual imperfections. She is torn between two conflicting attracti6ns. Though she is free, and by all means would be pleased to embrace .the whole of the divine plan for her, especially since it is all for her own happiness, still she finds that her will does not respond as she would like. Making his retreat also is Father Inconstant. He finds no great difficulty in resolving upon the noblest courses, but in looking back over many retreats, many excellent resolutions, and many performances not so excellent, be feels rather distressed at the sight of his inconstancy. This time, if possible, he is going to make the new beginning that will stick. Just how--well, that is not too clear to him. Brother Zealous faces a different kind of difficulty. He is a teacher, and he is glad to do everything he can to make good Christians out of his charges. But often enough he finds that his pupils are irresponsive or wilful. Is there anything we can do for Sister Mary Frail, Father Inconstant, and Brother Zealous? Their problems concern wills, their own and those of their charges. Pos-sibly, some consideration of that upon which moral good will turns in a peculiar way, may be of service to them. II. By "the pivotal point of good will" let us under-stand a certain something that precedes good will itself and that, more than anything else, is a condition of its coming into being. Of course it does not determine the will; for man, being free, makes his own determinations, But even the free will is dependent upon previous conditions, and it 171 -G. A. ELLARD is the principal of these that we propose to consider. Ill. This pivotal point of good will cannot be simply knowledge. Hardly anyone would maintain nowadays the old doctrine attributed to Socrates that knowledge makes virtue. It is not freedom of the will; everybody knows by sad experience that he cannot make himself good by a mere fiat of his will, nor even by many of them. Imposition of good habits from without, though continued over a period ,of years, in the discipline, for example, of a boarding school,, may ultimately produce, not what is sought, but a reaction in the contrary direction. Good habits developed freely and from within cannot be the point we are inquir-ing after, primarily because they presuppose much good volition and action, .and the pivotal point is antecedent to these. Nor, to pass to the supernatural order, is grace as such the pivot. Grace could not help to explain natural good will:. Even in supernatural activity, it is not sanctify-ing grace, which of itself is not operative, but a habit in the order of b.elng, not of action. Nor can it be the infused virtues or the gifts-of the Holy Spirit; neither are these of themselves operative; to go into action, they need stimula-tion. In what sense actual grace may fulfill the function we are investigating, will be taken up later on. Prayer, that is, asking God for good will, cannot bethe pivotal point. If the request be granted, the question would remain by what means the good will is brought about. Realistic Appreciation of Values IV. The pivotal point does seem to be found in a realistic, sense or appreciation of values. Let us consider. Everything that is good has value, and therefore value here is understood to be any good. Good is, according to the classical division: the.pleasant, the useful, the proper. Val-ues may be high or low, and positive, like pleasure, or nega- 172 PIVOTAL POINT OF (~00D ~'ILL tive, like pain. Appreciation is the subjective or'personal response to the objective goods that we call values. To appi~eciate is, according to the dictionary, "to set a just value on; to esteem to the full worth of; to be fully sensi-ble of; to exercise a niceperception of worth." Good busi-ness people, like SisterMary Buyer, who has been chosen out.of many to make the purchases for the convent or hos-pital, presumably know how to discern values and prices, In art or literature a man is said to have appreciation if he recognizes or prizes what is beautiful. In general, a person has appreciation if he knows a good thing when he sees it. The wise man has been defined as he who knows true val-ues. Religious who properly evaluate the excellence of God and of His plan have appreciation. Realistic apprecia-tion equals .the reality, or at least approximates the reality, of the value. Appreciation, or evaluation, knowing good things as good, seems to be the vital link between the two spiritual facultieS. It involves knowledge of a certain kind, and thus it is intellectual; since complacency or some other indelib-erate movement of.will must follow the perception of. good or evil, it brings in the will also. In practise, the cultivation of appreciation of true or major values ri~quires the har-monious cooperation of both faculties. V. Among the reasons for placing the pivotal point of good will in a realistic sense or appraisal of values, we may notice the following. Common sense would seem to indicate that it is mo-tives that move the will. But what are motives, directly or indirectly, except values? If athing be of no value to one, why should one bother about it? Our own experience seems to teach the, same. If we consider carefully the best moments and the worst mo-ments in our past lives, and allow for all influences; internal- 173 G, A. ELLARD and external, can we give a better reason for our own inte-rior strength or weakness at such times than that just then our sense of values, our perception of what was really good, ~was most adequate and realistic or least so? A little observation of men shows how eagerly they react to what they value highly; to money, for example, or pleasure, or power, or honor. Salesmen and advertisers achieve their, purpose by inducing people to conceive, the highest possible idea of the worth of their merchandise. Everybody notices how much clerks will put up with from prospective buyers. Would the same persons be so com-plaisant if there were no immediate .gain in view? If it be necessary to, hold his job a man may rather easily bear with the caprices of his employer, ~though at home; with his wife and children, he acts like an 01d bear. Wars, in spite of all their evils, are fought for great economic or. political values. Suppose that, in the iight of experience and observa: tion of men, we. consider this hypothetical case. Let A be anybody who has great sums of money at his disposal. Let B be anybddy else. Let A ask B to do anything that is within the limits of reason. If A0 offer greater and greater amounts of money to B indefinitely, is it likely that B w~ill resist the attraction? Is it not to be expected thathe will yield~ and moreover like it? But money .is only the measure of .material values. That volition is a function Of appreciation or evalua-tion is also a finding of experimental psychology. This is the main practical contention in the works on the w.ill of the distinguished German ~lesuit psychologist, Lindwor-sky1. He specialized in0 the psychology~of~this faculty, and it is to him that I am mostly in~tebted for the ideas in this 1See especially The Training of the ~rill, translated by Steiner and Fitzpatrick (Brute. Mil~.'aukee) ; and The Ps~Icholog~t of Asceticism, translated by Heiring (Edwards: Eondotl). ~ " 174 PIVOTAL POINT OF GOOD WILL paper. According to Lindworsky, experiments show that volition depends chiefly upon insight into values, without of course being determined by them. The will can embrace whatever appears to it to be of value, and it can become very strong if one feels sufficiently that the value is great enough. To move the will, values must be subjectively. experienced. Keeping a resolution is dependent, not so much upon the energy with which it was made, nor upon an inner general strength of will developed by particular exercises, as upon sufficient initial evaluation and especially upon the presence of it in the focus of consciousness at critical moments. "That the secret of influencing the will lies principally in this, to present the ~right motives at the right time, is no new discovery; . it was always the doctrine of the tradi-tional Scholastic psy, chology": so writes Hertling2, a con-temporary authority in ascetical theology. From modern American psychologists: "Forcing oneself to an early rising, and compelling oneself to run six times around the barn before breakfast, or to do some other useless and diffi-cult thing daily, will not bring the result sought for . Will training implies bringing sufficient motivation into play.''8 Philosophy teaches that the object of the will is good that is known. There are two elements expressed in the object and a third is implied. The first is goodness, real or apparent. Hence no one can expect to influence the will except by proposing some good to it. To do anything else would be like trying to make one see what has no color or to hear something that is not sounding. Knowledge is the second requisite, and it is just as necessary. If one had an opportunity to pick up a million dollars, but did not ~Hertling: Lehrbuch der Aszetlschen Theologie (Rauch, Innsbruck), p. 177. 8Goult and Howard: Outline of General Ps~lcholog~l, pp. 338-339. 175 G. A. ELLARD notice it, nothing would come of it. Thirdly, the good whichis presented and known, must be apprehended not merely as true or in any other way, but as good. Where there is no good or no perception of it, there can be no voli-tion. If the good be sufficiently great and seen with suf-ficient clarity, there can be no resistance to its-attraction, as happens with the Infinite Goodness and Beauty in the beatific vision. Hence, in general, the greater the good and .the clearer one's knowledge of it, the more likely the will's acceptance of it, and the more energetic and constant that acceptance will be: Sacred Scripture seeks to move men mostly by prom-ising good things and threatening evil things. But these are values, positive or negative. Christ Himself appears to have indicated what the will follows in such texts as these: "For where thy treasure is, there shall thy heart be also" (Matthew 6: 21). "For what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his soul? Or what shall a man give asaprice for his soul?" (Matthew 16: 26). "The kingdom of the heavens is like unto a treasure hid in the field, which a man findeth and covereth; and in his j6y he goeth and selleth.all that he hath and buyeth that field. Again, the .kingdom of the hea~'ens is like unto a merchant in search of. goodly pearls; and when he .hath found one pearl of great price, he goeth and selleth all that he hath and buyeth it" (Matthew 13: 44-46). A theological consideration: interior actual grace helps us to do good or avoid evil by enlightening the mind and inspiring the will. Psychologically Speaking, one would say that grace moves the will by enlightening the mind. The indeliberate inclination excited in the will corresponds to the ideas aroused in the intelligence. Light relative to a practical step can conceivably bear upon any or all of these three points: what is to be done, why it is to be done, and 176 PIVOTAL POINT OF GOOD '~rILL bow it is to be done. The firstalone would be quite insuf-ficient, and might well be deterrent, as when an unpleasant duty is indicated. To show why a thing is to be done: what is this but to manifest its motives or values, to reveal that it is becoming, profitable, necessary, and so on? In this way, by giving one a subjective appreciation, actual grace enters into the pivotal point of supernatural good will. It tends to correct that perversity which the prophet Isaias denounces: "Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for dark-ness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter" (Isaias 5: 20). It gives one something of that gift of the Messias: "that he may know to refuse the evil, and to choose the good" (Isaias 7:. 15). In modern terms, it enables one to share in Christ's sense of value. The Church has incorporated into the Breviary4 a famous passage of St. Augustine in which he comments on the text: "No one can come to me, except the Father . draw him" (John 6: 44), and uses a quotation from Ver-gil: "If the poet could say, 'Each one's pleasure draws him,'5 not necessity but pleasure, not obligation, but delight, how much more strongly ought we to say that the man is drawn to Christ who is delighted with truth, delighted With beatitude, delighted with justice, delighted with everlasting life, all of which Christ is? . You show a green branch to a sheep and you draw it. Sweets are shown to a child, and he is drawn. Because he runs, he is drawn; he is drawn byloving; without injury to body he is drawn; with bonds of the heart he is drawn. If. earthly delights and pleasures revealed to lovers draw them; does not Christ, revealed by the Father, draw us? For what does the soul desire more strongly than the truth?''° 4Ember Wednesday after Pentecost; Lessons 7-9. 5Eclogues, II, 65. OTractatus 26 in doannem. 177 G. A. ELLARD It may be objected that we know enough or too much already. What we need is not more knowledge, but more willing. Sometimes that is true. But at other times, it may be asked; have we the right kind of knowledge, and enough of that kind? In ~any case, if a man cannot directly make a decision that he would like to make, what do you advise him to try? Have you anything better than that he should reconsider his motivation? Dynamic Knowledge VI. Now let us see if we can discern what kind of knowledge of ~;alues it is that, as it were, magnetizes the will. It is a certain, dynamic knowledge, found to be char-acterized more or less by the following attributes. First, it will present things under the right aspect, that is, it will propose things, not as true--the usual function of knowledge--but as good or evil, lovely or odious, beau-tiful or hideous, and so on. Such are the phases of things that it will bring out into relief. A quotation from the psychologist James will illus-trate what is meant by the right aspect. Consider "the case of an habitual drunkard under temptation. He has made a resolve to reform, but he is now solicited again by the bottle. His moral triumph orfailure lil~erally consists in his finding the right name for the case. If he says that it is a case of not wasting good liquor already poured out, or a case of not being churlish and unsociable when in the midst of friends, or a case of learning something at last about a brand of whiskey he never met before, or a case of celebrating a public holiday, or a case .of stimulating him-self to a more energetic resolve in favor of abstinence than any he has ever yet made, then he is lost. His choice of the wrong name seals his doom. But if, in spite of all the plausible good names with which his thirsty fancy so copi- 178 PIVOTAL POINT OF GOOD WILL ously furnishes him, he unwaveringly clings to the truer bad name and apperceives the case as that of 'being a drunk-ard, being a drunkard, being a drunkard,' his feet are planted on the road to salvation. He saves himself by thinking rightly.''7 The right aspect is not enough. There must also be a certain quantitg in the knowledge. It must be sufficiently clear, evident, rich, and full. In fact, the closer it approaches equality to the reality, the better. This is a particularly important dement in the realism of dynamic appreciation. Hence, obscure, vague, or hazy conceptions of the most tremendous realities may remain inert and sterile. Moreover, personal rfference is vitally necessary. To see that a thing matters to another may leave me unaffected. I must see the vital importance of it for my own dear self. In the last analysis evaluations must be based on one's past experiences of pleasure, pain, or love. Through these gen-uine experiences present knowledge must be vitalized. A man, for example, who does not remember vividly how it feels to have his finger burned, is in no position to begin to imagine how it would feel to be consumed with raging fires in the infernal regions. If one should never have experi-enced the thrill of unselfish love, one could hardly under-stand God's absolute loveliness and make an act of divine charity. Nor could a man who ha~ never been aroused by created beauty react to the Uncreated Beauty. Personal reference is necessary in another sense also. Great things have many values or suggest many motives, some of them apt to appeal to one and others t6 another. Each one must discover those that evoke interest and response in himself and exploit them. One soul may love God as a father, another as a friend, and a third as a spouse. 7James: Talks to Teachers, pp. 187-188. 179 (3. A. ELLARD Two more marks of dynamic recognition of worth are iramediac~t and iraaqer~. Direct perception of an object is much more apt to stir one than knowledge that is only mediate, discursive, or abstract, because it is closer to the object and more like it. Hence .the weakness, from an affective and effective point of vie.w, of reasoning and argu-ments. Love at sight, even to infatuation, is said to occur at times; but nothing like it is possible when men and women know each other only through description or cor-respondence. A dreadful catastrophe may horrify one who sees it but leave.a reader little affected. To make up for lack of immediate knowledge when it cannot be had, the imagination must be used. The more vivid and realtand rich the imagery, the better. The human mind is depend-ent on the senses and the imagination. Hence, to get at the emotions and, through them, the will, fill the imagination. "Empathy," the ability "to feel-oneself into situations," for example, into the Gospel scenes, or into the conse-quences of one's choices, into the pleasures or pains that may follow them, can compensate to some extent for the deficiencies of indirect knowledge. Happily most of the moral and spiritual values may be contemplated in the concrete in persons who have real-ized them. The scale would range from Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and the Saints down to the humblest person who has Something to be admired and imitated. Actuatit~I of knowledge gives it power. It is of deci-sive importance that the motives be actually before con-sciousness at the critical moments when they are moit needed and least likely to be there. It is not enough that they be stored away in the recesses of the memory. Actual consciousness, for instance, of the ~ttractions of unchaste pleasure may win the battle against merely habitual aware-ness of the reasons for keeping chaste. The force of occa- 180 PIVOTAL POINT OF GOOD 'q~rlLL sions of sin illustrates well the characteristics of dynamic knowledge that we have been reviewing; the impression they produce is thoroughly realistic. Nooeln.I is also an aid, as it makes a greater appeal to the sensibilities. Hence, ~o keep a good idea from losing its motive power, consider it from new angles and find new beauties in it. Since choice is always comparative, a preference of one thing to another, superiority! of knowledge of one alterna-tive gives it an added chance of being taken. A slight value well known may be preferred to a much greater one less well known. In general, .other things being equal, that alternative will be chosen the values of which are better known or predominant in the focus of consciousness at the time. FinaliSt, a factor of knowledge that induces prefer-ential appreciation is found in the subject himself, namely. a certain s~tmpath~t, based on a natural or supernatural affinity: the "connaturality" discussed by St. Thomas in the Summas. The classical example, from Aristotle on, is the chaste man's knowledge of chastity as opposed to the theoretical ethician's. With respect to the Supreme or Absolute Value, that is, to God, this affinity is founded principally upon the essential relations of the creature to the Creator and of sonship to the Divine Father. Such seems to be the kind of knowledge that leads to willing and to action. It does not make one learned, and may be greater in the ignorant peasant than in a scholar or theologian. But if its object be divine values, it will help to make one wise and holy. If we could make our knowledge and estimation of eternal values equal to our appraisal of temporal things, our probation would be over. We cannot, to cite an 88umraa Tbeologic~, 2a, 2ae, q. 45, a. 2. 181 G. A. ELLARD instance, have an experimental knowledge of God in this life, though the mystics do lay claim to just that or some-thing like it, and in the light of it they conceive for God a love like that fierce, overwhelming, personal love which arises between man and woman. On the other hand, and to our misfortune, the false or minor values of material things do solicit us through precisely that form of knowl-edge which is thoroughly realistic and dynamic. There-fore it is all the more imperative for us to be mindfully aware of the advantages that sensible attractions have over spiritual, values, and in oposition to do whatever we can to compensate for the difference. Practical Corollaries VII. Suppose we consider separately the cases in which ¯ one wishes to influence a will at the moment and in the future, or what is about the same thing, making a resolu-tion now and endeavoring to secure its observance in the future. 1. To move the will now, and to charge it with power, get l~y all available means the maximum possible appreciation of the values or motives that are pertinent, and diminish as much as possible any antagonistic evalua-tion. ¯ First, it is important rightly to discern just what ought to be done, that is, in our case, what the law of God is or what He prefers. Missing this point, through impru-dence or scrupulosity or laxity, is not conducive to good will. But then focus attention, feeling, and effort on the advantages, gains, and reasons for so acting. Not u~bat ought to be done is to be stressed, but the u;h~/'s. Imitate the clever salesman who sells his wares by persuading the potential buyer that it is really to his own interest and profit to buy. Exhortation had better take this form than a tedious repetition of "Let us'es" or "Let us not's." Put 182 PIVOTAL" POINT OF GOOD WILL the accent, not on the rights of authority, but on the advantages to the subject in obeying; these include the values of obedience itself. Even if you urge that it is God's will, try to explain whg He wills it, what values He has in mind. With most persons, begin with a stron.g appeal to self-interest; then proceed to the nobler interests, such as God's; Christ's, souls'. Very especially in case something difficult or distressing be involved, for example, self-- abnegation, or love of the Cross, the greater the disagree-able feature, the greater must be the emphasis on the good aspects and results. This is a simple psychological neces-sity. Some who exhort to abnegation would seem to think the greater the evil, the more it will be welcomed. Mere negatives--"Dont's"--are never inspiring, and therefore negative resolutions should somehow be given a positive character and value, for instance,-by substitution or sub-limation. To acquire a dynamic sense of moral values two chief means are available; first, to learn what those means are; and secondly, by serioi~s reflection and prayer, to take their measure or realize their magnitude. What the values are is to be learned by study and reading or listening to sermons and conferences. We could not attempt to outline them here. But it may be sug-gested that the perfect man Would strive to know and will .the same values that. God Himself wills and to have a simi-lar appreciation of them. They are the Infinite Goodness Itself and the excellences of the divine cosmic plan, cul-minating in divine beatitude for an,gels and men, with immunity from all evil, for eternity. Included in that plan would be the sublime grandeurs of the Incarnation and of its effects in time and eternity. Next in order is to work up an adequate appreciation of these motives, justly to appraise them, to recognize their 183 G. A. ELLARD ' full worth, to feel their force and significance. This is ~o be done principally by serious reflection and prayer, or better, by both together, that is, by mental prayer. This is the great means and hence the supreme importance and efficacy of it in the spiritual life. St. Thomas has a whole article in the Summa to demonstrate that "contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion.''9 In it he quotes these words from St. Augustine: "the act of the will arises from understanding." Without mental prayer, or something approaching it, one cannot expect much grasp of moral values: such is human nature. The senses and the world overwhelm one with their values, which are in possession. as it were, from the beginning. A counterbalancing per-ception of the worth of things divine does not come with faith nor without effort. The germ of it.is there, but it must be developed. The human spirit is immersed in mat-ter, and if it is to raise itself above material attractions and maintain itself upon that superior level, it-must exert its forces with an energy comparable to that of the powerful motors of the big clippers or flying-fortresses. This means in the beginning hard thinking and much of it, with ener-getic and sustained will-activity corresponding to the light won. In mental prayer.a vitalized and dynamic insight is gained into divine truths and values, the will reacts and responds at once, the appropriate affections are elicited, the consequences of possible courses of action are carefully weighed and felt in anticipation, the correct moral atti-tudes are assumed, practical resolutions are made and their execution rehearsed, many fervent petitions are made, and grace, coming in ever increasing measure, deepens and enhances the whole process. In a word, one is filled with that light, good will, and strength which are needed to ful-fil one's part in God's magnificent plan. 9Summa Theologica, 2a, 2ae, q. 83, a. 3. 184 PIVOTAL POINT OF GOOD WILL If one cultivati~ m~ntal prayer well and sufficiently, he will also use all the other means to spiritual advancement and thus he will become perfect. If one be faithful in the lower degrees of mental prayer, he may be led on even to mystical contemplation, wherethe labor will be less, and the infused light, appreciation, and love may be incom-parably greater. Mostly in the intimate commerce of con-templation do the spouses of God come to their peculiar experience and all-absorbing love of Him. The funda-mental difference between a mere believer, a person of medi~ ocre virtue, and a saint, seems to be that, whereas they all assent to the same truths, the believer hardly does more, the mediocre person feels to some extent what they mean, and the saint truly realizes their significance. All the motives, general and particular, having been considered, they are to be assembled and associated together, so that one may recall the others, and then they are to be thrown into the scales against their false contraries, and proposed for acceptance to the will, with an inexorable "either. or!" 2. To aid in securing future execution of a resolution, four means in particular are effective: recollection, associa-tion, habituation, and experience. Recollection will tend tO prevent the light and warmth of one's vivid appreciation from vanishing into the dark-n~ ss. God and divine things are in themselves interesting, and if one's insight into them has been sufficient, interest in them will spontaneously spring up. Then without too much difficulty interest will direct attention; attention to divine values will keep them in the field of consciousness; and naturally the affections and will should follow. One should foresee as far as possible the occasions in which one's constancy will be put to the test, and deter-mine in advance by .what precise means one is going to 185 G. A. ELLARD react. "The modern psychology of will teaches that mere volition accomplishes nothing, unless a definite "way of behaving has been planned and practised.''1° Then the occa-sion, the resolution with its means, ~nd the motives, already organized among themselves, are to be associated together in thought as firmly as possible, so that when the occasion comes, it may recall into the focus of consciousness the reso-lution with its means, and this in turn the whole constella-tion of motives. Thus their cumulative force will be available, and successful action may be expected. To illustrate by'an example from Lindworsky: John notices that whenever he meets Charles on the way to work, he falls into uncharitable conversation. He adds to his gen-eral resolve not tofail against charity this means, that when he meets Charles again, he will promptly open a discussion of such or such a topic. Thus he links together all four: -the occasion, the r.esolution, the precise means, and the ¯ motives. 1~ All the procedures indicated in the preceding pages can be cultivated more and more until they become solid l~abits of virtue. Thus greater sureness, facility, and perfection in good are acquired. With every success in accomplishing what one desires, one actually feels and experiences to a certain extent the fruition of one's ideals and values, and thus one's appreciation of them becomes ever more realistic, and more like the divine or Christiike sense of what is of value. If with sufficient realism you. see that your treasure is ~n the Infinite Goodness of the Blessed Trinity and in the advantages of the divine plan, you will find your will there also. lOLindworsky: The P~cbolog~/ of Asceticism, p. 38. ~lbid.o p. 37. 186 Scruples Versus !:he Human Gerald Kelly~ S.3. THIS sketch concerns two characters, both of whom .are "| purely fictitious. Any resemblance to any person in real life.is a mere coincidence. One character is called Humanus, because he represents the ordinary conscientious human being, one who is.cheerfully content to be .~'like the rest of men," The other character is Scrupulosus, so-called because he typifies the victims of that gnawing and unfounded fear of sin known as scruples. ' For Scrupulosus, a supreme difficulty is to appreciate what may be called "the human way of acting." It is hard to.define this human way. It expresses itself in a quiet resignation to the fact that human problems cannot be solved with the exactness of mathematical problems. ~.It is an essential requisite for peace among men and for interior peace with God and oneself. Humanus takes this human way in full, easy stride. A reliable man tells him something; he believes it without struggle. True, the .man might be wrong, might be lying, using a mental reservation, or even deceiving himself. But Humanus does not tr6uble himself about these things, unless there is some reM evidence.to make him suspect them. When a man gives him money, Humanus does not bite it or ring it on a counter. He knows the possibility of counter-feit money; but he knows .too that social life demands that we practise a certain amount of trust in the good will of others. (Incidentally, the author once lived in a place where there must have been a great deal of. counterfeiting. Every time one paid for something in coins, a cautious clerk rang the coin on~the counter. It was most distressing.) . ¯ . Humanus follows the.same human way in his dealings with Go&and himself.God made him huma'n; God.ought GERALD KELLY to be content if he simply acts humanly. And he has enough troubles in life without suspecting himself unduly. Scrupulosus can follow the human way in his dealings with other men; but in those things which concern God and himself he is decidedly inhuman. He seems to thinl~ that, in dealing with God, he must have God's own unerring and penetrating vision of the human heart; that in dealing with himself none of the canons of human peace are applicable. Perhaps a few examples will make this clear. The Sacrament of Penance, truly a Sacrament of peace according .to our Lord's designs, affords no real peace to Scrupulosus. Definitely, it is a torture; a torture to go. a torture to stay away. And the reason for the torment, to put it simply, is that the reception of this Sacrament involves four elements---examination of conscience, con-fession, contrition, satisfaction--each of which can be fulfilled only :in a human way. Suppose we follow Humanus and Scrupulosus through an examination of conscience. Humanus says a few pre-liminary prayers, then looks into-his soul. This is riot a very strenuous process for him;in fact, it verges on sheer routine. Humanus is conscious of the fact that he could improve his method, but he also knows that he fulfills all the essentials. Mortal sins first; and it does not take him long to find :them. Heis no laxist. He knows a mortal sin when he sees one; but he. knows too that they are big enough to be seen with the naked eye. On some Com-mandments he does not even examine himself. Idolatry, murder, robbing banks--all such things are off his list. He would waste his time searching his soul for them. If he does find that he has sinned seriously, he notes the number of times; and if he cannot recall the number, he is content to add the saving word "about." If he is doubtful about the serious sinfulness of~anything--well--he is doubtful: 188 SCRUPLES VERSUS THE HUMAN '~AY There is no use wrestling with the doubt now; if he could not solve it before, he is less likely to solve it now. Venial sins? Humanus knows there were many little things, but it is often hard to cat~ilogue them. He selects two or three, and phrases them as best he can. Sometimes he numbers venial sins, sometimes he doesn't; and he" knows tha~ the number need not be confessed. Finally, Humanus makesan act Of contrition. In this, too, there is a trace of dry routine. Humanus has often resolved to "polish it up" a bit. Contrition never causes him worry; though it has at times puzzled him. However, he has solved the puzzle in the following manner. When a friend offends him and afterwards comes to him, holds out his hand and says he is sorry, Humanus takes the hand and forgives. He never looks to see if there are tears in the man's eyes. He does not stop before forgiving to ask: "Now, John, are you sure you're sorry? Can you swear you're sorry? Do you t:eel sorry? Maybe you're deceiving me, or yourself?" No, Humanus does none of these things; so he solved his puzzle about contrition by deciding that God doesn, t act that way, either. God is content with our just being human. Scrupulostis also examines his conscience! After lengthy preparatory prayers, he finally musters the courage to plunge into the .abysmal depths of his black soul. He goes after mortal sins with searchlight and microscope; and at the end of the search he is amazed that he hasn't found any. That cannot be right. There must be some; at least, there might be some some grim deed that his lax conscience is covering up. Further examination still fails to reveal a clear-cut mortal sin, but by this time he has managed to work up a doubt. Now, is he doubtful? He'd better con-. less it as certain, because if he only thinks he is doubtful and really is not doubtful he will be deceiving the priest. 189 GERALD KELLY As for venial sins, he must have scores of them. Missed morning prayers--distractions in the prayers he did say! He has been told that missing morning prayers is really no .sin, that there is no law of either God or man that says: You must pray in the morning. But be ought to pray in the morning. As for distractions, he has also been told that when involuntary they are not sins, and that even when voluntary they are merely small irreverences. But be ought not to get distracted; it is base ingratitude for him to neglect God in that manner. He'd better give the number of the distractions: 15--no, perhaps it was only 14. He cannot make up his mind, so he decides to say 15; in fact, he finally decides to give the whole background of the ghastly affair. And so on. It is time for him to go to confession. He is not ready, but he will try. Humanus makes his confession, returns to his pew and says his penance and a few prayers of devotion. The time passes very quietly. He leaves the church, full of peace and ready, as he has often.expressed it, "to be hit by a truck." In a general way, he knows that his .confession is not mechanically perfect. Sometimes be does not say things just as he had planned them; he becomes confused, dis-tracted, or even a bit embarrassed. Also--and he has this on the authority of adevout priest--he knows that the confessor may get distracted, or even nod a bit. But this percentage of error does not greatly concern Humanus. God Himself arranged that this Sacrament should be received and administered by human beings. The essentials are quite easy to fulfill; the accidentals allow both the priest and the penitent the opportunity to strive for greater perfectio.~l and increase in humility. It should: be evident from the story of his preparation that no great peace floods the soul of Scrupulosus as he emerges from the confessional. Nevertheless, he grits his 190 SCRUPI~S VERSUS THE HUMAN ~rAY teeth and kneels dowh to say his penance. Three .Hail Marys! He literally "tackles" the first one. But in the middle something goes wrong; he must have missed a word. He starts again, and then again; but he cannot satisfy himself that that Hail Mary is properly said. As he pauses'in desperation, the whole blurred story of the confession begins to unfold before his mind. Nothing was said right. The priest must have misunderstood him com-pletely. The fact that he got only three Hail Marys con-firms him in this fear; if the priest had understood him cor-rectly, he would have given him at least a Rosary. At this moment, a new source of interior torment opens up. Even if the confession had been good, the absolution could not be valid because he did not make a real: act of con-trition. He just went through some words. God must know that he was not really sorry. And his confessions have been that way for a long time; he'simply must make a gen-eral confession. He has made general confessions before without any subs.equent peace of soul, but this one will be different. We might take Holy Communion as another example of the difference between Humanus and Scrupulosus. It should be one of the supreme consolations of the Cath-olic's life. The essentials for its reception are very small: the state of grace, acquired by Sacramental absolution, if need be; and the keeping of.the fast from midnight. Humanus finds the fulfillment of these conditions simple enough. He is satisfied with normal, .human assur-ance that he is in the state of grace. If he doubts about a serious sin, he generally prefers to go to confession, but he knows he has no strict obligation to do so, and he is con-- tent on occasions merely to make an act of contrition and go to Communion. The fast presents him with no prob-lem at all. The law is a safeguard to the reverence due the 191 GERALD KELLY Blessed Sacrament. It forbids eating and drinking after midnight. Humanus knows what ordinary people look upon as eating and drinking, and he does not have to con-sult a chemist~ to find out just what is food. or a physiologist to discover precisely what is meant by eating. All these things are so many thorns for S~'rupulosus. How does he know he is in the state of grace? He can't prove it. He is not sure he can make an act of contrition, so he must always go to confession when in doubt. It may be that his confessor has assured him again and again that, in his present trial, he mayalways~go to Communion, no matter what his doubts, no matter how many sins he thinks he has committed. Even after this and though he knows that the Providence ofGod guides souls through superiors and confess.ors, yet his case is different, and the confessor does not really understand it. As for the fast, here is but one of Scrupulosus'.many hard experiences with it. He is on his way to Mass. His lips tickle. .He rubs his coat-sleeve over his mouth. A moment later he feels something strange in his mouth-- some lint from his coat, he thinks! He gathers all his salivary forces to remove it, but he is too late. He swallows. Well, that's the end. He has broken his fast, he may not go to Communion. This is his first conviction, but in church a gleam of saving common sense is still able to pierce the fog of fear and he does go to Holy Communion. Later the fear returns with a vengeance. He made a sacrilegious Communion. After that, one thing leads to another. He begins to notice a strange taste in his mouth every morning--the lint from the bedclothes! He tries again and again to remove it; but the consciousness of the lint remains, and with it the conviction that he may not receive Communion. There are two ways of solving this lint problem. One 192 SCRUPLES VERSUS THE HUMAN WAY way is to consult a trained theologic/n, wh~ might show Scrupulo~us by keen argumentation that lint is not food, or who might indicate that, even if. it were food, it was not taken "in the manner of food." This is a perfectly legiti-mate method of solving the problem, but hardly a satis-factory one for Scrupul0sus. It allows for too much quibbling, and, even when it does convince, its appeal is only to the intellect. Scrupulosug needs something that will impress his imagination and thus remove the emo-tional pressure of his fears. The second method is therefore a much better one for -Scrupulosus. It is a method suggested by an old and experienced diagnostician of his problem. It is very simple. "You take awoolly blanket, the woollier the bet-ter. Seize firmly in both hands, raise to the mouth with-out flinching, and bite hard. When you have a good bite, then you chew thoroughly and trot to swallow.'" This is a guaranteed cure. After one such experiment Scrupulosus needs no metaphysical discussion to be °con: vinced that human beings do not eat coats or blankets. In this matter, at least, he will be content with ?he human toad. No one-should gather from this brief sketch of Huma-nus and Scrupulosus that the latter does not wish to act as others do. His difficulty .is more subtle. Briefly put, it amounts to thi~: he cannot relax. 'He is like a sick man who fights an anesthetic; or, perhaps more accurately, he is like a man who will take the anesthetic, even if it kills him. So it is with Scrupulosus; at times he fights his fears, at other times he clenches his fists and says he will be human. Neither method will help him. He must relax under the pressure of his fear. This is not easy to do; yet it can be done if only one retains the power of laughing at oneself. For Scrupulosus, a sense of humor is more precious than the gift of tears. 193 Nint:s t:or Sacris!:ans Gerald Ellard, S.J. SACRISTANS for whom its cost or other considerations make Self-Lite Charcoal undesirable may readily secure the advantage of a large glowing surface with ordinary charcoal in the following way. After the unlighted charcoal ~has been placed in the censer, a little wood-alcohol is allowed to, drip on it and soak into it. It is then ignited, and, when the alcohol has burned away, the charcoal will be alight through and through and thus able, when fed with incense, to send up what is actually something like a pillar of smoke, a symbol of prayer visible to the entire congre-gation. The matter of securing the most suitable incense within the means of all is no small concern, and prompts one to mention a variety now being used with eminent satisfac-tion. Its cost is very low' but it is not on sale, as far as we know, in the church-goods houses. Trees of Syria exude a balm that is known in trade as. olibanum. This fragrant and gummy substance is widely used in varnish-making. It is graded in trade circles by the size of the lumps: egg (large) and tears (small). Tears of olibanum make an ideal incense.:~ Stocks available in this country may not.~ last much longer, but up to the present time wholesale drug dealers have had no difficulty in supplying it. The tears should not be powdered, as much of the fragrance would be lost, but burned as they come. In sacristies serving a large number of priests the prob-lem of quickly providing each priest with an alb of just the right length often proves formidable. A Chicago church 194 HINTS TO SACRISTANS where many Masses are the daily rule has at the edge of its alb-cabinet, at shoulder height, an unobtrusive measure indicating the number of inches from the floor. A priest has just to hold up an alb to the measure to see if it is the proper length for his use. It may no longer be news .to sacristans that candle~ burners in pyrex glass are now available in all candle sizes. In style they follow-not the older lamp-chimney shape, which "black out" tOO much of the candle flame and cause difficulties in lighting the candles, but the snug, dose-fitting sleeve pattern. The pyrex burners have all the advantages of the better type of metal burners, with the big additional one of beirig practically invisible. Sacristans shudder to see priests, in adjusting the man-iple, disregard the little tab provided for pinning, .and run the pin.into the precious fabric of the maniple itself. This is riot perverseness, but a measure of necess!ty (or rather, convenience), inasmuch as many of these little .tabs are too narrow to aliow one to run a pin crossways. Many new vestments now provide a shield-shape, or even semicircular, tab which affords ample room for pinning without being conspicuous. In repairing vestments sacristans might well provide such "pin-space." A strict law of the Church prescribes that the priest mix a "very small quantity;', of water with the wine to be consecrated at Mass. Most priests wish to take only a few drops of ,water; and sacristans can help them in this regard by filling the .water cruet almost to the top. When the cruet is pract.ica!ly full, it is easy to shake out a few drops. This is not so easy to do when the neck of the cruet is empty. 195 The Presumed Permission James E. Risk, S.J. THE philosophers tells us that what happens by chance happens rarely and cannot be foreseen. The Church, in her legislation, makes provision for many unusual situations that have arisen in the course of her past history, and may arise again. Hence she grants to all priests emer-gency faculties such as to absolve from censures, to assist at marriages and to perform other priestly functions. Fac-ulties of this kind are not granted to all priests save in cases of spirituhl emergency. Now, the most conscientious reli-gious, too, will find himself at times in an unforeseen situ-ation where permissions required by his vow of poverty or obedience are needed; where the delay necessarily in-volved in obtaining such permissions cannot be admitted. Unusual circumstances arisirig from the uncertainties of travel or health may, for example, produce a situation calling for the legitimate application of the principles gov-erning the presumed permission. Since actions based on presumed permissions should be the exceptioh in the normal life ofa religious, the older theologians took great care to limit their number to the minimum, lest a too liberal application of the-norms of presumption tend to obviate the necessity of asl~ing for many of the ordina~ry permissions. Sincere reflection and a normal exercise of foresight will lead a religious to limit the number of presumed permissions, while a ready ad-mission by superiors that unforeseen situations are, from time to time, inevitable, will prompt them to make allow-ances for the reasonable presumptions of their subjects. Though the question of presumed permissions is by no means limited to the field of religious poverty, it is chiefly from this angle that we shall endeavor to examine it. 196 THE ~RESUMED ~ERMISSION Various Kif~ds or: Permissions Progress in the exercise of religious poverty demands an accurate knowledge of the various kinds of permis-sions granted by superiors. By obtaining permission to acquire, dispose of, and use material things possessing some economic value such as books, money- and the like, the religious is faithful to the obligations freely accepted when he vowed poverty. He does not act in his own name nor as an independent proprietor, but as a poor man who has nothing that he can .truly call his own. Acting w~th-out permission in these matters, he violates his vow by committing what many moralists choose to call a "sin of proprietorship." They say that such a religious acts like a man who is bound by no vow of poverty and is independ-ent of any superior in the acquisition, use, or disposal of property. The commentators on the religious life usually speak of superiors as granting permissions; though in most communities there is generally appointed an assistant su-perior who is empowered to grant many of the ordinary permissions demanded by the obligations of the vow of poverty. Our purpose in examining the nature of the pre-sumed permission leads us to comment briefly on the other forms of permission employed by a religious in the observ-ance of his vow. This will serve to clear the ground for a more accurate understanding of the presumed permission. We spea~k of an express permission as one given by word of mouth or in writing, indicating unmistakably the mind of the superior. A tacit permission, as the very name implies, is p[udently considered as granted from the silence of the superior, who is aware of certain actions that are governed by poverty or obedience. The axiom "silence gives consent" may be reasonably applied when circum-stances are such that, if the superior objected, he would voice his disapproval. An implied permission is one that 197 JAMES E. R~sK is contained in another permission. The permission of a superior, for example, authorizing a /eligious to make a trip, implies the permission to use the funds necessary for traveling. A general permission may embrace many acts of the same or different species. In some religious commu-nities there prevails the practice of renewing each month general permissions in virtue of which a religious may ac-quire or dispose of objects of a very small economic value, such as articles of devotion and the like. The extent of such permission depends on-the constitutions, rules and customs Of the institute. A particular permission .is granted for an individual case. Such a permission, how-ever, if the superior so desired, might be extended not only to a singie occasion but to several occasions calling for the same permission. Thus, permission granted to an ailing religious to consult a specialist might be limited to a single visit or extended to several, according to the nature of the indisposition requiring attention. The Presumed Permission Authors who have treated of the obligations of the religious life agree that a religious is justified in presuming permission when, owing to some inconvenience in obtain-ing permission without delay, he prudently decides that if the superior in the present circumstances, were .asked for the same permission, he would readily grant it. Now be-fore proceeding further, let it be noted that there is one very substantial difference between the presumed permis-sion and. every other kind. All permissions save the pre-sumed permission have this note in common, namely, that they are expressions of the will of the superior who knows the wish of the subject and freely grants it. In doing so, he says, equivalently at least, "I grant you permission for this or that object." Yet when we examine the presumed per- 198 THE I~RESUMED PERMISSION mission, we find that the superior cannot say this for the simple reason that he is unaware of the subject's wish. This leads us to conclude that the presumed permission is, not a permission in the strict sense of the word, but it is a legitimate substitution; and the act resulting from a sin-cere presumption, whether it lies in the sphere of poverty or obedience, is quite in accord with the obligations arising from the religious vows. The religious is acting, not in his own name, but with a clear dependence on the will of the superior. To come more properly to an examination of the pre-sumed permission, the following points of division are suggested by the definition of the presumed permission given above. We must consider: I) On the part of thereligious who presumed: a) the inabitit~/ tO obtain permission in one its ordinarg forms, b) the motioes sufficient to justifg a presump-tion; c) a prudent conclusion. Z) On the part of the superior: the different~mental attitudes towards a presumed permission. Our first condition requisite for the legitimate pre-suming of a permission is the inability to obtain permis-sion in one of its ordinary forms because of the absence of the superior. The most circumspect religious may encoun-ter such a situation when both superior and assistant are .abse, nt or indisposed or so occupied as to permit no inter-ruption. If the proposed action of the religious is so urgent as to exclude a delay until such time as the superior may be contacted, permission may be presumed, supposing the .other conditions are fulfilled. In the second place sufficient motives, reducible to ne- 199 JAMES E. RISK cessity or utility, are required to make a presumpt.ion law-ful. Let us suppose that, while traveling, two sisters are caught in a heavy rainstorm that gives little hope of imme-diate abatement. An umbrella would be a very welcome addition to their equipment in the present predicament. To purchase an umbrella without delay may be instru-mental in protecting their health as. well as their clothing. In such straits it would be quite unnecessary to look for a telephone so as to obtain express permission to make this necessary purchase. The same religious now proceed to browse through a book store while waiting for a train. To their pleasant surprise a rare and very valuable book, much sought after by their superior, meets their eye. It is available at an extremely reduced rate. A real service would be rendered the convent by the immediate purchase of such a book. A situation such as this might even justify the conclusion that the permission to buy the book ought to be presumed. The prudent in.terpretation of the superior's mind, the third requisite for a valid presumption, must never be wanting. On this point, the commentators supply us with expressions that furnish a key to the solution of many a problem that in practice may arise when we wish to justify a presumed permission. They say: "_ . it is prudently judged that permission would be given if asked"; "Per-mission reasonably presumed is sometimes sufficient"; "To presume permission is to act conformably to the will of the $a p er" t "o't ; and so forth. "Prudent"l y" , reasonabl"y, and "conformably to the will of the superior" indicate that a well-founded judgment enters into the very character of the presumed permission. Resting on the basis of whim or hallucination, instead of prudence and reflection, the act of the presuming religious is not to be dignified by the title of a permission; it is rather a gratuitous-presumption or 200 THE PRESUMED PERMISSION the sin of proprietorship. The reasons tha~ justify the prudent judgment will at least approximate those which in ordinary circumstances influence the conscientious superior in consenting to the requests of his subjects. Such reasons will be reduced ulti-mately to necessity or utility in harmony with the norms of the particular religious institute of which both superior and subject are members. For each religious order or con-gregation professes a more or less definite standard in these matters, admitting, for example,, in the matter of poverty, the use of some things as necessary or useful, while exclud-ing others as superfluous or even detrimental to the. spirit-ual interests 6f the religious. With this in mind, the reli-gious about to presume a permission knows that the habit-ual attitude of the superior is to abide by these norms in granting permissions, that the object desired in the present emergency has been granted on other occasions by the same superior, that there is no reason that leads him to suspect that in the present situatioi~ the superior would act differ-ently. Thus, a religi6us says to himself, equivalently at least, "If, here and now; I should ask the superior to grant me this request, I am reasonably certain that he would readily grant it." He comes to this conclusion after hav-ing deliberated on his particular rule of life and the habit-ual inclination of ~i conscientious superior. The "if" clause just expressed is always at least implied in the legitim~te presumption. This explains why the presumed permission is sometimes called the conditioned permission. The per-mission that would involve the acceptance of gifts of an incon.sequential value can be much more readily presumed than the more costly kind. Needless to say, in practise the reasoning process re-quired for a presumed permission is far more quickly con-cluded than described. While walking through town, a 201 religious priest meets a crippled beggar, whom he knows to be sincere. He gives the poor man a few small coins on the presumption that his superior would not object. His own particular institute encourages devotion .to the poor and he has seen his superior, a conscientious religious, act in the same generous fashion. His presumption is reason-able; he has "conformed" his action to the .reasonably in-terpreted mind of the superior. I.s. a religious who has legitimately presumed a permis-sion, say in a matter governed by his vow of poverty, later obliged to notify the superior of his act?. The rule may call for such a manifestation in every case of a presumed permission. Supposing such a prescription does not exist, one would not be obliged to notify the superior of articles now consumed which'had been received b~r way of a legiti-mately presumed permission. Objects Of a more enduring nature, received in virtue of a presumed permission, should be made knov~n to the superior. A kind friend, for exam-ple, meets a' religious and invites him to take dinner with him. The religious accepts his friend's gracious invitation. Before parting, the same kind friend presents the religious with a very excellent volume. To what is the religious obliged in the case? We suppose, first of all, that his pre-sumptions in both cases are justified. If the rule of this religious obliges him to manifest all presumed permissions to the superior, his duty is clear. Without such a provision made by his rule, he would not be obliged to acquaint his superior with the fact that he had prudently presumed to take dinner with his friend. If he wishes to keep the vol-ume which he had lawfully presumed to accept, he would be obliged to approach the superior for permission. For while it was inconvenient to make contact with the supe-rior at the moment when he received the book, there should be no special inconvenience involved in asking for permis- 202 THE PRESUMED PERMISSION' sion on his beturn home. In other words, he can lawfully ¯ presume only as long as conditions justify it. Attitudes of Superior Having examined the conditions that warrant a pre-s. umed permission, let us now look briefly at the different attitudes with which a superior may view such presump-tions on the part ~of the subject. We may reduce them to three classes. 1) The first type of superior may be so disposed that he is ready enough, if asked, to grant the ordinary permis-sions, and does not object to the reasonable presuming of the same permissions. It is possible that he has. expressed himself on this point.To ex.emplify: a religious of the community of this superior knows that permission to sub-scribe to useful periodicals is readily granted. He knows too from his close acquaintance with the superior that there is no objection to presumed permissions in ordinary mat-ters. Such a religious, provided there be no insincerity on 'the point, .may presume to subscribe under the ordinary conditions. For he knows, in the language of the theo-logians, that his superior is opposed neither to. the sub-stance of the act (the~ subscription) nor to the mode or manner (by way of a presumed permission). 2) Another superior, perhaps .with a view of check-ing abuse in the matter of poverty, may be decidedly op-posed to his subjects' presuming permissions. So strong may be his attitude that, outside of cases of real emergency, he is prepared to veto the presumed permissions of his sub-jects. A presumed permission then, outside of extraordi-nary circumstances, would be tantamount to a violation of poverty or obedience as the case might be. To resume the example of subscription for periodicals. The superior in question is not opposed to the subscriptions to useful :peri- 203 JAMES E. RISK odicals. So strongly, however, is he opposed to presumed permissions, that he refuses to allow a subject to subscribe without first obtaining express permission. In this case he would object to the substance of the act (the act of subscribing') not because he failed to appreciate the cul-tural value of useful periodicals, but because he would be opposed to the toad/ir~ which such a subscription were made (i.e. by way of the presumed permission). 3) S~ill a third attitude might be evidenced towards the matter of presuming. Admitting the use of presumed permissions as sometimes justifiable, a superior may reveal his general attitude towards presumed permissions as one of reluctance and displeasure. Such a disposition, however, would not necessarily in'dicate his refusal to ratify a pre-sumption once made. The subject of this superior sub-scribes to a periodical and on the arrival of the first issue is reminded that the superior would gladly have granted the permission if asked. Has this religious violated poverty? He may have sinned venially because of the toay in which he obtained the subscription, that is, by presu~ming instead of asking. The substance of the act, namely, the mere sub-scribing, would not necessarily be'sinful, because the supe-rior would have gladly permitted it. Obedience too could be violated, if the religious deliberately acted against the expliCit order of the superior. To complete our consideration of the various attitudes which mayinfluence a superior in .these matters, this ques-tion may be proposed. Suppose that after a sincere and prudent presumption is made, it is totally repudiated by the superior? If, for example, a book were purchased in such circumstances, what could be done? Strictly. speak-ing, the superior might order the return of the book and reimbursement on the part of the proprietor of the book-store, if this were feasible. That would be for the superior 204 THE ~RESUMED PERMISSION to decide. The religious, who in good' faith erroneously estimated his superior's attitude, would in no wise be guilty of a violation of poverty. For in the case he sincerely inter-preted the mind of his superior and concluded that the con-ditions justified his transaction. Conclusion In conclusion, let .us remember that the presumed or interpretative permission, as some authors call it, has a defi-nite place in the life of an observant religious, but that p!ace is reserved for occasions when the ordinary methods to obtain permission cannot be observed. The conscien-tious religious, as we have already stated, will rarely fail to obtain whatever permis.sions are ordinarily necessary by the more express method of asking the superior. A habitual use of presumption can easily lead to laxity in the observ-ance of poverty so essential to a life in religion that is to be led with any degree of sincerity. What must never be. for-gotten is that cooperation is always necessary in the observ-ance of the vow of poverty: the superior should show him-self ready to grant any request in keeping with the particu-lar grade of poverty professed in hisinstitute, since it is not unknown for subjects to violate poverty rather than ap-proach a superio/Who has shown himself less gracious in the question of permissions. Subjects have been known to deliberately violate poverty, I say, not to mention the gratuitous or unnecessary presumption which is another name for the sin of proprietorship. The religious should be habitually disposed to express that dependence on supe-riors for the use of temporal things, not out of a spirit of servitude but out of a desire to imitate Him Who was hungry and Who had nowhere to lay His head. 205 ook Reviews PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN AND RELIGIOUS FERFECTION for the use of the Merlst Brothers of the Schools. Trensleted from the slx~h French edition; revised end enlercjed. Pp. 567. To be procured from the Marlst Brothers, St. Ann's Hermltege, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. $1.~0. Though this book was written for the Marist Brothers, it could be of great service to other religious as well. In fact, it would make an excellent manual of introduction or a good brief guidebook to the spiritual iife in general and particularly to the religious life. It might be used as a sort of text-book for young religious; it was designed to serve that purpose for the Marist novices. It ~s small, but rich in content; its form is that of. question a~ad answer; in presentation of its material, it is systematic, clear, and definite. From it one could get a well ordered and fairly comprehensive knowledge of the practice of the spiritual and religious life. The Introduction supplies general notions on the end of man, holiness, the religious state, and religious institutes. Part I is entitled "General Means of Christian Perfection," and deals with the desire for perfection, prayei, mental prayer, exercises of piety, conscience, Confession, Communion, direction, spiritual reading, the exercise of the presence of God, and various devotions. In Part II, "General Means of Perfection in the Religious Life," are treated religious vocal tion, the noviceship and religious profession, the vows, and the corre-sponding virtues. It closes with a chapter on "Regularity." Part III is concerned with the obstacles to Christian and religious perfection, and the fourth part is devoted to the virtues. To many of the answers "to the questions are added brief further explanations in smaller type. On many points of major importance select quota-tions from the Fathers and Doctors of the Church are givefi; in these the' influence of St. Francis de Sales and St. Alphonsus Liguori is noticeable. The m~iterial make-up, paper, print, and binding, are neat and attractive. A full table of contents, an analytical tab!e, and a good index make it easy to find what the book contains on any particular point.--G. A. ELLARD, S.,J. BLESSED ARETHEY THAT HUNGER. By the Reverend Richard Graef, C;.S.Sp. Trensleted by Sister Mary Hildegerd Windecker, M. A., Sister of the Blessed Sacrament for Indians end Colored People. 206 BOOK REVIEWS Pp. ~vli + 175. Frederick Pustet, Inc., New York, 1942. $2.00. Father Graef attempts in various ways to encourage the good Catholic in the practic.e of a strong and living faith. His main lines of argumentation are the following: A dynamic faith is necessary for personal sanctity; because sanctity demands self-renunciation, and this renunciation will not be made unless one sees clearly and power-fully the value of making it. Such evaluation is had only in the light of faith. Moreover, supernatural efficiency demands the work both of Christ and of the soul. The principal part of the soul's cooperation consists in genuine, earnest desire; and the source of such desire is faith. Finally, the apostolic influence that each soul is called upon to exert in the world, and thus the ultimate mastery of the world by apostolic souls, can be appreciated only when the world is viewed with the eyes of faith. The" author has made frequent and apt use of the Sacred Scrip-tures. Each of the main sections of the book is divided into numer-ous brief topics. The meditative reading of one or two of these topics might prove, helpful to those wlJo are accustomed to make their men-tal prayer in that way.--G. KELLY, S.,I. THE MASS OF BROTHER MICHEL. By Michael Ken÷. Pp. 307. The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1942. $2.S0. Here is a new Catholic novel with an entirely different theme. The setting of the story is sixteenth-century France, a turbulent his-torical period for that country, owing to the threatening Surge of heresy. The spreading falsehoods of Calvin and Luther provide' a dramatic background for the lives of the de Guillemont family, about which the story is told. The interest centers in Michel de Guillemont, the elder son and heir. It is his story from his sincere, impetuous love of Louise to his final unyielding love of God and his Faith in the self-oblation of martyrdom. We share in the tragedy before his contemplated mar-riage that was partly due to the jealousy of his brother Paul and that led to his becoming a saintly religious. We are carried along from the injustice and cruelty of his father to ~he providential meeting with the und.erstanding Father Andr4. We sympathize with him in his deep suffering when the priesthood is denied him. Brother Michel's courageous acceptance of God's will and his intense love of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass keep the interest keen up to the power- 207 BOOK REVIEWS ful climax of his death. The subordinate characters of the least-resisting Paul, the unscru-pulous Anne; the bitter Louise, the heretic Armand, the lovable Father Andre, and others are well portrayed. The story is told with excel-lent description and good use of suspense. The tragic atmosphere is relieved by romance and clever humor. The one striking weakness is the characteristic trait of the modern novel: it leaves untold the retribution due to some charaCters. The Mass of Brother Michel shows the triumph of grace over .personal pain and loss, sin, and human frailty. The passages that deal with the spiritual consolation of the Mass, the reason for pain and suffering in this life, God's love for the sinner, and the courage coming to the soul through prayer are worth reading again and again. Priests, in particular, will find here many inspiring thoughts for practical use and may grow in their appreciation of the privilege of offering the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.---A. J. DEEMAN, S.J. FAST BY THE ROAD. By John Moody. Pp. xiv + 308. The MacM~llan C~rnpany, New Yorl~, 1941. $2.50. The Wall Street expert on investments and kindred subjects who occasioned not a little surprise a decade ago by embracing the Catholic Faith and reporting the event in the popular The Long Road Home has a new treat for his expanding reading public. The present vol-ume, to quote from the author's foreword, is "an attempt to explain in simple language or by illustration, certain teachings and view. points to be found within the Church which are often misunder-stood by non-Catholics. All this is merely incidental to the general purpose, which is primarily to tell of some of the experiences of one convert .during his first decade as a Catholic." Mr. Moody writes simply, entertainingly, and with precision on a wide variety of subjects connected with his Faith. In his chapters the hard-headed, efficient business man, with the help of God's grace, approaches the Truth. He turns back his cuffs and proceeds to defend it and, campaign for it with gusto. The chapters are topical for the most part, ranging with consider-able agility back and forth over some focal point of Catholicity by means of observation, analysis, chance discussion, and illustrative anecdote. Their cumulative effect is to deepen one's gratitu.de for the gift of Faith and to jolt one anew with the realization that most of 208 BOOK REVIEWS one's non-Catholic friends and neighbors are totally ignorant of or gr6ssly misunderstand the Catholic concept of supernatural life, and are usually indifferent to it. And Mr. Moody, so thoroughly at home in the Church after his ten years as a Catholic, writes with more than ordinary authority and perception of .the money-mad, speed-benumbed, materialistic American mentality. The book is recommended especially to those in search of reading matter never heavy or tiring yet providing food for serious thought --and prayer. The chapters m~y be read in any order, and any or all of them would be suitable for refectory reading.--C. DEMUTH, THE CATHOLIC REVIVAL IN ENGLAND. Pp. ix -I- 102. The MacMillan Company, MEDIEVAL HUMANISM. By the Reverend Pp. ix -!- 103. The MacMillan Company, By John J. O'Connor. New York, 1942. $1.00. Gerald G. Walsh, S.J. New York, 1942. $1.00. These books are respectively the third and fourth volumes in The Christendom Series. According to the announcement of the publishers, "this is a series of popular books on important topics in the history of Christendom, prepared under the auspices of the Con-fraternity of Christian Doctrine . The books are intended to provide informative reading for both Catholic and non-Catholic readers; for study clubs in the parochial units of~the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine: for study groups in the Newman Clubs: as collateral texts in colleges, normal schools, and senior high ~and preparatory schools.'~ Both books appear to measure up very well to the purpose of the series. Professor O'Connor's book gives a fine sweeping picture of that very important period in English life known as "The Catholic Revival," the story of the gradual breaking away from the tyranny of th~ penal laws to the winning of freedom and influence for Cath-olics. Father Walsh's book puts within the reach of the ordinarily intelligent reader with good educational background an illuminating study of the meaning of "Humanism" and of the development of Christian Humanism through the middle ages till it reached its high point in Dante. Bibliographical notes are appended to each book. Father Walsh has also included an abstract for study and review which should prove very helpful.~. KELLY, S.d. 209 Decisions o[ !:he Holy MEANS OF COMMUNICATING WITH THE HOLY SEE A communication from the Most Reverend Apostolic Delegate to the Most Reverend Ordinaries reads as follows:. "In order to remedy, the difficulties of correspondence with the Holy See, His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State has'directed me to inform the Diocesan and Religious Ordinaries and Superiors of this country'that in the present circumstances they may recur to the Holy See through this Apostolic Delegation, and so avail themselves of the facilities at our disposal. This office makes frequent use of radiograms, and also of the air-mails to Lisbon wblch, however, are not as regular as formerly. "Upon the receipt of the petitions of Religious for faculties and dispens,ations, this Delegation will communicate with the .Holy See by radiogram or by other channdls, according to the possibilities and the circumstances. When a response has been received from the Holy See, the relative rescript will be issued by this Delegation, in accord-ance with instructions already given or to be given in particular cases. "When requests are made for the renewal of a faculty, the orig-inal rescript should be presented with the petition for renewal. "The Holy. See hopes in this way to continue to correspond with the Religious !n this country and to furnish every assistance to them." 1942, March 21. At the request of many members of the Hier-archy, heads Of universities, and authorities in the world of science, among them members of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, His Holiness Pope Pius XII proclaimed Saint Albert the Great to be the heavenly patron of natural sciences. The Most Reverend Martin Gillet, Master General of the Order of Preachers, read the Brief at a solemn meeting held in the Pontifical International Institute Ahgeli- CUmo 1941, November 18. The Sacred Congregation of Rites held a preparatory session in the cause of the Servant of God, Catherine Tekakwitha, Indian virgin, to discuss the heroicity of the virtues practised by her. 210 .uesffons and Answers !1. According +o our constitutions. +he members of our congregation pronoun~:e temporary vows for three years, +hen take. perpetual vows unless, for a very serious reason, a sister is obl;gecl by superior~ to renew her temporary vows for another period of three years. At the end of +ha+ time she must either pronounce perpetual vows or seek~ an inchlt from the S. Congregation of Religious for a fur+her ex+en-sion of temporary vows if she is not 1o return to the world. Recently this latter c~se occurred, but the rescript was delayed, "and the sister d~d not renew her temporary vows until twelve days after they had' expired. In this case, did +he sister cease +o be a member of +he congregation on the day on which her vows expired, and were her subsequent vows invalid? The sister would not cease to be a member of the congregation. by the mere fact that an interval of time elapsed between the expira-tion of the temporary vows and their renewal, unless the superior had positively ordered her to leave and to return to the world. As the case is presented, it is not clear whether or not the constitutions allow this appeal to the S. Congregation of Religious.

The aim of this report is to describe and analyze the embodiment of acceptance and recognition in discourses and practices which address cultural diversity in the Swedish educational system. In order to fulfil this general aim, we study how different categories of practitioners in the Swedish school system, such as teachers, headmasters and union representatives, and other stakeholders, such as civil servants, and representatives of political parties and the civil society, discuss and relate to the claims of recognition put forth by Muslim practitioners and/or policy measures designed to reach the fulfilment of those claims. Two cases are studied: the establishment of Muslim independent schools and the claims to dress veiled in public schools, out forth by Muslim youth. The cases are selected with consideration to a number of circumstances. First, the faith and belief practices of Muslim migrants have been debated on a large scale in Swedish media during the last decade, as in many other West European and North American countries. It is quite common that these practices has been put under scrutiny, and subjected to extensive critique. The attention paid to Muslim belief practices and institutions has also reached Muslim denominational schools and the practice of Burqa and Niqab. The establishment of denominational schools during the last two decades, whether Islamic or not, has also received a lot of attention, in mainstream media as well as in debates on education policy. For instance, a number of political parties have voiced demands to keep down the number of Islamic denominational schools. Second, Muslim migrants has, according to a number of studies, been subjected to direct and indirect discrimination. Whether this discrimination primarily is religious to its nature, or ethnic, and hence targeting their ethnic identity, is not always concluded, but the extensive negative attention mentioned above suggests that the scope of religiously motivated discrimination is either predominant or on the rise. The enactment of Muslim belief practices is not infrequently obstructed. For example, the construction of Mosques does seldom take place in silence; frequent and high-pitched voices of rejection and disapproval are common, and when the buildings once are completed, the congregations receive numerous threats and insults. The opposition is evident, and two mosques have been burned down. Moreover, women wearing burqa or niqab report being harassed in public. Apart from the lack of recognition and acceptance in religious matters, the prevalence of discriminatory mechanisms might also obstruct the access to welfare services and the entry to the labour market. This report consists of two cases studies, which relies solely on qualitative data. The main part of the empirical material consists of interviews with 13 persons – three teachers, three headmasters, two union representatives, two civil servants, one jurist, one imam and one representative of a political party. The interviews are used as a source for both cases. As additions to interviews, we have collected newspaper articles, memos from public authorities, bills introduced to the parliament, debates on commentary fields in web-edition of newspapers, et cetera. Being a minor study, it is necessary to make some reservations concerning the reliability of our material. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether or not it is possible to make generalizations from our material, thus asserting that the viewpoints found in our material are overlapping with or similar to the attitudes of other teachers, headmasters et cetera. In sum, a number of disadvantages with the establishment of Islamic denominational schools are expressed. They are allegedly divisive, both culturally and socially, and the quality of their instructions is supposed to be inadequate, in relation to the standards explicated in the national curriculum and syllabi. If the attitudes found in this study is spread all over Sweden, it could reasonable be said that Muslim schools are met by suspicion. Still, few calls for shutting down of these schools are voiced. It seems that the Muslim denominational schools are tolerated in a literal sense: it is accepted, sometimes pragmatically, but not liked. On the other hand, it could be said that the provision of a juridical and institutional space for religious minorities to establish denominational schools is part of politics of recognition; i.e. an educational policy which, under auspicious circumstances might provide the means for religious minorities to receive respect as equal and gain admission as normal. It must also be noted that the some of the objections to the existence of denominational schools implicitly and explicitly related to some central notions in Swedish educational policy. The notion of equivalence is a keyword in this context, and signifies on the one hand a demand for abidance by the national curriculum and syllabi, and on the other a priority of equalizing measures over freedom of choice. The equalizing and integrative objectives of the compulsory school project seem to be vital, but the quest for recognition of minority beliefs systems is circumscribed. Thus, the reproduction of "demos" is given priority over the recognition of "ethnos". As such, the notion of "equivalence" [likvärdighet] has been a keyword in Swedish educational policy since the 1980's, denoting equalizing ambitions as well as educational uniformity and compliance to steering documents. A number of objections to the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab are put forth by our interviewees. In contrast to the media debate, the argument of gender equality was relatively downgraded. Rather, the interviewees focused on assumed problems with identification and communication. It was said that the abovementioned veiling practices obstructed the possibility of identifying the students at school, and also rendered the communication – and hence the instructions – at school more difficult. In comparison with the question of Islamic denominational schools, the non-tolerant stance was more manifest, although few explicit calls for a prohibition were made. Moreover, a specific discursive framing of the veiling practices could be discerned. The wearing of Burqa or Niqab was associated with phenomena such as mischief and the hidden, thus casting suspicion over the practice in question. As an instance of the everyday life, rather than an institutional arrangement, veiling practices could arguably be considered to be of less concern for educational policy than the establishment and maintenance of Islamic denominational schools. Still, the question of prohibition has gained a lot media attention during the last years, and brought the regulating dimension to the fore. And though our material contains few explicit calls for prohibition, several interviewees claimed that a teacher must see the face of the student in order to instruct and educate. And although the goal of equivalence was less relevant in this matter, the practice of veiling was questioned with reference to universal human rights, as the rights of the child. The right of the parent to exert influence in religious matter was questioned, since it could be regarded as a limitation of the freedom to choose direction to the walk of life. Thus, it seems like that the right to wear Burqa and Niqab in public schools are among the non-tolerable, although few explicit calls for prohibition can be discerned. So far, the material in our report, consisting of relatively limited set of qualitative data resonates with the broader tendency discerned by Orlando Mella, Irving Palm and Kristin Bromark (2011): the resistance in Sweden against the Burqa and the Niqab is compact; almost nine Swedes out of ten find it (totally or partly) unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab, respectively, at school or at work (Mella et al 2011:30), whereas seven out of ten find it (totally or partly) unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab at other public places. As noted above, the stress on equivalence consists of two distinct although related arguments. On the one hand, there is a demand for abidance by the law (here: steering documents such as national curriculum and syllabi), which among other things are paid attention to because Islamic schools are suspected not to follow these steering documents accordingly. This interpretation of "equivalence" is related to an understanding of the term which has become more and more frequent since the introduction of freedom of choice and independent schools in Swedish educational policy, and the decentralized system of governance of education in Sweden (Lindensjö & Lundgren 2002). In this context, where regulation is obtained through management by objective and evaluation, and responsibilities are spread between numerous responsible organizations, the goal of equivalence is equivalent (!) to abiding by the law. On the other hand, there is wish to maintain socially integrated educational environments, in which students from different ethnicities, classes and gender meets and interacts. Thus, it seems like the equalizing and integrative objectives which were central to the compulsory school project implemented during the heyday of the Scandinavian welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) seem to be "alive and kicking". But the quest for recognition of minority beliefs systems, central to the policy of multiculturalism, is circumscribed. In so far, the arguments employed here gives priority to the reproduction of "demos" over the reproduction of "ethnos". It must also be noted that the freedom of choice, an important feature in the neoliberal turn of educational policy, does not seems to be so important for the interviewees in this particular matter. If we focus on the most elaborated objections in the report, we find arguments which 1) was presented as a response to the presumably universalist claims of freedom of religion, thus setting the professional considerations which are presented above in a more general, ethical context, and 2) focused on an ethical value of overriding importance, viz. the rights of the child. Emphasis is laid on the right of the child to "choose his own path", a wording which is used by several interviewees, which most of all seems to refer to the first paragraph in article 14 in the United Nations convention on the Rights of the Child, which aims at protecting "the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion". In the arguments of the teachers, the headmasters and the union representatives, this ethical principle makes it to possible to assert that children possess the freedom from the religion (as well as from other loyalties, or sets of ideas and beliefs) of their parents. Although not explicitly questioning the parents rights' to raise and guide their own children, they distinctly emphasize the autonomy of the child, and it's potential to choose something else than that which is given within the family. The emphasis on the rights of the child is regularly explicated in a specific discursive context. The right to "choose one's own path" is contrasted to the restrictions inherent in the religiosity of the parents. Religion is regularly depicted as the repressive force, and the secular mind-set as the entity in need of protection. The possibility of secular parents putting down religious inclinations among their children is never represented. Evidently, a discursive coupling of religion with repression and secularism with liberation may be discerned in the claims for freedom from religion. It may also be noted, that the impact from parental (Islamic) faith is the only aspect of upbringing which is questioned in this context. The arguments against tolerance or recognition of Islamic belief practices in this report are not primarily based on islamophobic or orientalistic discourses, but with reference to notions of equality. The interviewees stress the professional aspect of their opposition against veiling practices. They dissociate themselves from standpoints put forth in media, above all those who solely focus on the gender aspect of complete veiling practices. Instead, their emphasis on the professional educator dimension entails a focus on communication and identification. These acts of discursive positioning might be seen as an effort to "maximize the intertextual gap" between their own argument and the discourse in media, which to a fair-sized extent was articulated by radical right-wing populists. This dilemma is solved by the rhetoric of equivalence, which offers a way to reject claims of recognition in tandem with the defence of values as diverse and important as social justice, the rule of law and the freedom of the individual (child). Thus, the non-tolerance of religiously motivated veiling practices could be motivated with values which is central to diverse but culturally dominant ideological universes, such as socialism and (neo-)liberalism. ; Accept Pluralism

Author's introductionIssues surrounding what has variously been defined as 'global', 'international' or 'transnational' forms of 'organized crime' are a frequent staple of globalization crisis talk and are frequently used to justify the emergence and elaboration of transnational policing capacities. How well does this functional explanation account for these related sets of phenomena? What are the particular organizational and institutional characteristics of transnational policing institutions? What counts as transnational organised crime? How does the apparent dialectic between transnational organised crime and transnational policing relate to broader issues of global governance? How do the practices of transnational policing relate to the structure of global society more generally? Sociological questions about global crime and policing turn out to be fundamental questions about the nature of the world system.Author recommendsSheptycki, J. (ed.) 2000. Issues in Transnational Policing. London: Routledge, ISBN 0‐415‐19260‐9.This pioneering book opened up the sociology of transnational policing. The book contains chapters by leading scholars in the sociology of policing and is the first to consider the consequences of globalization specific to the institutions of policing. Chapters consider a number of important emerging issues in relation to transnational policing. The introduction attends to the definitions of the book's central terms: 'policing' and 'transnational'. It also provides a typology relating to the field of policing that has had major implications for the understanding of policing accountability under transnational conditions. The first chapter, by Les Johnston, considers the emergence of transnational private security, by mapping the global security market. Chapter two, by Jean‐Paul Brodeur, provides empirical insights into the workings of legal due process in complex transnational criminal enquiries raising questions about the accountability structures in the coming 'age of transnational high policing'. Chapter three, by Didier Bigo, traces the emergence of liaison officer networks across the European policing field. Frank Gregory charts the historical rise of private criminality as a matter of international concern in chapter four, while James Sheptycki undertakes a descriptive analysis of the global system for policing money in chapter five. In chapter six, Peter Manning considers various aspects of policing and technology under conditions of transnationalisation, paying some considerable attention to the policing of 'new social spaces'– that is the rise of so‐called 'cyberspace'. Chapter seven, by James Sheptycki, is a concluding chapter which considers the historical case of the 'international war on drugs' held to be the 'paradigm example of transnational policing'.Sheptycki, J. and A. Wardak (eds) 2004. Transnational and Comparative Criminology. London: Routledge, ISBN 978‐1‐904385‐05‐9.This book advocates that contemporary criminology be both transnational and comparative. The introduction describes the field of criminology by placing it in a global context. One key question is how academic criminologists can cope with the difficulties of cultural relativism in fostering a comparative and transnational view of the field. The book is broken into four sections. In the first, a variety of comparative studies are considered. Difficulties in measuring trends in comparative crime statistics across national jurisdictions, techniques for doing so and the interpretation of such data are all considered. The use of qualitative data in comparative studies is also considered. The authors advocate the combination of different types of data in a 'second best' approach to the interpretation of transnational and other types of crime. In the second section, a variety of 'area studies' are considered. These are: West Africa, Southern Africa, Singapore, China and Saudi Arabia. These chapters each offer extended transnational and comparative treatment of issues of crime, crime definition and crime control in their respective regions. Section 3 deals with specific transnational crime control issues that have been identified. Four separate chapters consider transnational organized crime, transnational white collar crime, transnational corruption in the EU and international sex‐trafficking in the EU. The final section considers transnational control responses to transnational crime and the book concludes with a chapter on reflexivity in the academic study of crime, crime definition and crime control.Goldsmith, A. and J. Sheptycki (eds) 2007. Crafting Transnational Policing. Oxford: Hart Publishing, ISBN‐10: 1841137766.The notion that police around the world share a distinctive outlook has been established, as has the assumption that police must co‐operate internationally if they are to respond effectively to the crime and insecurity associated with the transnational condition. Yet the possibility of developing a genuinely transnational policecraft seems negligible. It is possible to discuss in ideal terms such notions as transnational ethics, global social justice and the like but what, practically speaking, could be meant by a transnational constabulary ethic? Arguably, the situated nature of policing means that there is no such thing as a common transnational policecraft and hence no possibility of an overarching ethic for the constabulary. Liberal democratic theories of policing are also ill‐adapted to the global conditions that are the consequence of prevailing neo‐liberal governmental logics. This book presents a collection of essays that are the results of a workshop at the Onati Institute for the Sociology of Law entitled: Transnational Policing and the Constabulary Ethic. It provides descriptive accounts of transnational policing in a variety of regional settings around the world but grounds the analysis in debates about what would constitute good policing under transnational conditions.Sheptycki, J. 2008. 'Transnationalism, Orientalism and Crime.'Asian Journal of Criminology, 3: 13–35. DOI: 10.1007/s11417-008-9049-0The article asks the question: how applicable are European and North American criminological theories to the situation in Asia? It takes a transnational and comparative perspective in relating contemporary and historical trends in crime, crime definition and crime control in a variety of Asian countries that comprise the so‐called Confucian sphere. It provides a criminological critique of the 'Asian values debate' and, through an analysis of trends in crime, crime definition and crime control in China and Japan, of organised crime across the region, as well as selected examples of state‐organised crime, seeks to provide a perspective on the developing criminological discourses of 'the Orient'. The paper argues that, although cultural aspects are important and interesting in understanding the crime situation in the region, ultimately it is changes in politics and governance, economy and society that are most efficacious in explaining current criminological trends and developments.Sheptycki, J. 2007. 'High Policing in the Security Control Society.'Policing 1(1): 70–9, Oxford University Press.This article considers the nature and practice of high policing in the security control society. It looks at the effects of the new information technologies on the organization of policing–intelligence and argues that a number of 'organizational pathologies' have arisen that make the functioning of security intelligence processes in high policing deeply problematic. The article also looks at the changing context of policing and argues that the circuits of the security–intelligence apparatus are woven into, and help to compose, the panic scenes of the security control society. Seen this way, the habits of high policing are not the governance of crisis, but rather governance through crisis. An alternative paradigm is suggested, viz. the human security paradigm, and the paper concludes that, unless senior ranking policing officers – the police intelligentsia'– adopt new ways of thinking, the already existing organizational pathologies of the security–intelligence system are likely to continue undermining efforts at fostering security.Sheptycki, J. 2007. 'Criminology and the Transnational Condition: A Contribution to International Political Sociology.'International Political Sociology 1: 391–405.This article contributes to international political sociology and the further enhancement of the interdisciplinary study of the global system by introducing the vocabulary of critical criminology into the discourse. It suggests that the contemporary global system is ripe with existential anxieties that are symptoms of momentous historical change and it argues that, for good or for ill, issues of crime definition and control have become central to the transnational condition. As a consequence, criminological theories should be introduced into theoretical discussions about the nature of the contemporary global scene. Such conceptual thinking is vital, given the centrality of the language of criminal threats in the language of global governance and the language of governance globally.Online materialsThe Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces http://www.dcaf.ch/ Small Arms Survey http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ One World Trust http://www.oneworldtrust.org/ Open Society Institute http://www.soros.org/ The Jack and Mae Nathanson Centre on transnational human rights, crime and security http://nathanson.osgoode.yorku.ca/ The drug policy alliance network http://www.drugpolicy.org/homepage.cfm The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index190EN.html The Environmental Investigation Agency http://www.eia‐international.org/ Corporate Watch http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/ SyllabusTopics for lecture and discussion I Introduction and overview Definitions, problems and issues: What is policing? What is crime? What do the terms internationalisation, globalisation and transnationalisation refer to? What consequences follow from a world‐system without world policing?Outside reading:Castells, M. The Rise of the Network Society, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell (1996).Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraon 1999. The Global Transformations Reader. Cambridge: Polity Press.Held, D. 2003. Cosmopolitanism, a Defence. Cambridge: Polity.Sklair, L. 2001. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford: Blackwell. II Issues in comparative criminology What is crime and how to academic criminologists study in comparative perspective? The use and abuse of statistics in understanding crime cross‐nationally, cross‐culturally and cross‐jurisdictionally. The uses of qualitative data in interpreting problems in comparative criminology. The comparative study of crime and the emerging world system.Outside reading:Hofstede, Geert 2001. Culture's Consequences, Comparing Values, Behaviours, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations. Beverly Hills: Sage.Reichel, P. 2007. Comparative Criminal Justice Systems, a Topic Approach. Harlow: Pearson Education. III Issues in transnational criminology What is transnational about transnational crime? How are transnational crime problems defined and prioritized? How are transnational crime problems measured and evaluated? What do we know about the various types of transnational crime?Outside reading:Beare, M. 2004. Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Edwards, A. and P. Gill 2004. Transnational Organised Crime; Perspectives on Global Security. London: Routledge.Reichel, P. 2005. Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice. London: Sage. IV Issues in transnational policing Who are the transnational police? What is Interpol? What do transnational police agents do? How are transnational policing priorities set? Under conditions of transnationalisation, what is the relationship between law and policing?Outside reading:Anderson, M. et al. 1995. Policing the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Andreas, P. and T. Snyder. Wall Around the West. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Andreas, P. and E. Nadelmann 2006. Policing the Globe; Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ratcliffe, J. 2004. Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. NSW: Federation Press.Focus questions

What challenges do researchers interested in comparative criminology face and why?
What are comparative and transnational criminology and how are they different? With reference to the contemporary period, can you think of practical elements, themes or questions that are common to both?
What is transnational policing and how can it be made accountable to the global commonwealth?
What are the practices that feature most prominently in transnational discourses about contemporary policing and how are these understood from a human rights, civil liberties or human security point of view?
What does the study of transnational crime and policing reveal about the nature and character of the world system?

Project ideasBased on knowledge acquired from this course, choose a topic in transnational or comparative criminology and create a briefing portfolio. The portfolio will consist of four items: (i) three page statement of purpose; (ii) annotated bibliography; (iii) poster and presentation; and (iv) written essay. As part of the project, students should prepare a poster presentation (approx. 18″× 24″) detailing the chosen topic through the display of quantitative and qualitative types of data together with key concepts, case‐study vignettes, maps and pictures. Students will give an oral presentation based on their poster and create an annotated bibliography and write a short essay on their chosen topic based on the feedback they receive. Some suggested topics: comparative study of gun‐homicide in two or more countries/cultures; comparative study of rape and sexual assault in two or more countries/cultures; comparative student of family violence in two or more countries/cultures; environmental organized crime; policing the global money system; policing and the global drug prohibition regime; controlling piracy on the high seas – then and now; transnational crimes of the powerful and the powerless; policing, tourism and crime; corporate crime and state crime – spot the difference.

Susheel Kumar Sharma's Unwinding Self: A Collection of Poems. Cuttack: Vishvanatha Kaviraj Institute, 2020, ISBN: 978-81-943450-3-9, Paperback, pp. viii + 152. Like his earlier collection, The Door is Half Open, Susheel Kumar Sharma's Unwinding Self: A Collection of Poems has three sections consisting of forty-two poems of varied length and style, a detailed Glossary mainly on the proper nouns from Indian culture and tradition and seven Afterwords from the pens of the trained readers from different countries of four continents. The structure of the book is circular. The first poem "Snapshots" indicates fifteen kaleidoscopic patterns of different moods of life in about fifteen words each. It seems to be a rumination on the variegated images of everyday experiences ranging from individual concerns to spiritual values. Art-wise, they can be called mini-micro-poems as is the last poem of the book. While the character limit in a micro poem is generally 140 (the character limit on Twitter) Susheel has used just around 65 in each of these poems. Naturally, imagery, symbolism and cinematic technique play a great role in this case. In "The End of the Road" the poet depicts his individual experiences particularly changing scenario of the world. He seems to be worried about his eyesight getting weak with the passage of time, simultaneously he contrasts the weakness of his eyesight with the hypocrisy permeating the human life. He compares his diminishing eyesight to Milton and shows his fear as if he will get blind. He changes his spectacles six times to clear his vision and see the plurality of a reality in human life. It is an irony on the changing aspects of human life causing miseries to the humanity. At the end of the poem, the poet admits the huge changes based on the sham principles: "The world has lost its original colour" (4). The concluding lines of the poem make a mockery of the people who are not able to recognise reality in the right perspective. The poem "Durga Puja in 2013" deals with the celebration of the festival "Durga Puja" popular in the Hindu religion. The poet's urge to be with Ma Durga shows his dedication towards the Goddess Durga, whom he addresses with different names like 'Mai', 'Ma' and 'Mother'. He worships her power and expresses deep reverence for annihilating the evil-spirits. The festival Durga Puja also reminds people of victory of the goddess on the elusive demons in the battlefield. "Chasing a Dream on the Ganges" is another poem having spiritual overtones. Similarly, the poem "Akshya Tritya" has religious and spiritual connotations. It reflects curiosity of people for celebration of "Akshya Tritya" with enthusiasm. But the political and economic overtones cannot be ignored as the poem ends with the remarkable comments: The GDP may go up on this day; Even, Budia is able to Eat to his fill; Panditji can blow his Conch shell with full might. Outside, somebody is asking for votes; Somebody is urging others to vote. I shall vote for Akshya Tritya. (65-66) "On Reading Langston Hughes' 'Theme for English B'" is a long poem in the collection. In this poem, the poet reveals a learner's craving for learning, perhaps who comes from an extremely poor background to pursue his dreams of higher education. The poet considers the learner's plights of early childhood, school education and evolutionary spirit. He associates it with Dronacharya and Eklavya to describe the mythical system of education. He does not want to be burdened with the self-guilt by denying the student to be his 'guru' therefore, he accepts the challenge to change his life. Finally, he shows his sympathy towards the learner and decides to be the 'guru': "It is better to face/A challenge and change/Than to be burden with a life/Of self-guilt. /I put my signatures on his form willy-nilly" (11). The poem "The Destitute" is an ironical presentation of the modern ways of living seeking pleasure in the exotic locations all over the world. It portrays the life of a person who has to leave his motherland for earning his livelihood, and has to face an irreparable loss affecting moral virtues, lifestyle, health and sometimes resulting in deaths. The poem "The Black Experience" deals with the suppression of the Africans by the white people. The poem "Me, A Black Doxy", perhaps points out the dilemma of a black woman whether she should prostitute herself or not, to earn her livelihood. Perhaps, her deep consciousness about her self-esteem does not allow her to indulge in it but she thinks that she is not alone in objectifying herself for money in the street. Her voice resonates repeatedly with the guilt of her indulgence on the filthy streets: At the dining time Me not alone? In the crowded street Me not alone? They 'ave white, grey, pink hair Me 'ave black hair – me not alone There's a crowd with black hair. Me 'ave no black money Me not alone? (14) The poem "Thus Spake a Woman" is structured in five sections having expressions of the different aspects of a woman's love designs. It depicts a woman's dreams and her attraction towards her lover. The auditory images like "strings of a violin", "music of the violin" and "clinch in my fist" multiply intensity of her feelings. With development of the poem, her dreams seem to be shattered and sadness know the doors of her dreamland. Finally, she is confronted with sadness and is taken back to the past memories reminding her of the difficult situations she had faced. Replete with poetic irony, "Bubli Poems" presents the journey of a female, who, from the formative years of her life to womanhood, experienced gender stereotypes, biased sociocultural practices, and ephemeral happiness on the faces of other girls around her. The poem showcases the transformation of a village girl into a New Woman, who dreams her existence in all types of luxurious belongings rather than identifying her independent existence and finding out her own ways of living. Her dreams lead her to social mobility through education, friendships, and the freedom that she gains from her parents, family, society and culture. She attempts her luck in the different walks of human life, particularly singing and dancing and imagines her social status and wide popularity similar to those of the famous Indian actresses viz. Katrina and Madhuri Dixit: "One day Bubli was standing before the mirror/Putting on a jeans and jacket and shaking her hips/She was trying to be a local Katrina" (41). She readily bears the freakish behaviour of the rustic/uncultured lads, derogatory comments, and physical assaults in order to fulfil her expectations and achieves her individual freedom. Having enjoyed all the worldly happiness and fashionable life, ultimately, she is confronted with the evils designs around her which make her worried, as if she is ignorant of the world replete with the evils and agonies: "Bubli was ignorant of her agony and the lost calm" (42). The examples of direct poetic irony and ironic expressions of the socio-cultural evils, and the different governing bodies globally, are explicit in this poem: "Bubli is a leader/What though if a cheerleader./The news makes her family happy."(40), "Others were blaming the Vice-Chancellor/ Some others the system;/ Some the freedom given to girls;"(45), and "Some blame poverty; some the IMF;/ Some the UN; some the environment;/ Some the arms race; some the crony's lust;/ Some the US's craving for power;/Some the UK's greed. (46-47). Finally, Bubli finds that her imaginative world is fragile. She gives up her corporeal dreams which have taken the peace of her mind away. She yearns for shelter in the temples and churches and surrenders herself before deities praying for her liberation: "Jai Kali,/ Jai Mahakali, Jai Ma, Jai Jagaddhatri,/ Save me, save the world." (47). In the poem "The Unlucky", the poet jibes at those who are lethargic in reading. He identifies four kinds of readers and places himself in the fourth category by rating himself a 'poor' reader. The first three categories remind the readers of William Shakespeare's statement "Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them." At the end of the poem, the poet questions himself for being a poet and teacher. The question itself reflects on his ironic presentation of himself as a poor reader because a poet's wisdom is compared with that of the philosopher and everybody worships and bows before a teacher, a "guru", in the Indian tradition. The poet is considered the embodiment of both. The poet's unfulfilled wish to have been born in Prayagraj is indexed with compunction when the poem ends with the question "Why was I not born in Prayagraj?" (52). Ending with a question mark, the last line of the poem expresses his desire for perfection. The next poem, "Saying Goodbye", is elegiac in tone and has an allusion to Thomas Gray's "The Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard" in the line "When the curfew tolls the knell of the parting day"; it ends with a question mark. The poem seems to be a depiction of the essence and immortality of 'time'. Reflecting on the poet's consideration of the power and beauty of 'time', Pradeep Kumar Patra rightly points out, "It is such a phenomena that nobody can turn away from it. The moment is both beautiful as well as ferocious. It beautifies and showcases everything and at the same time pulls everything down when necessary" (146). Apparently, the poem "The Kerala Flood 2018"is an expression of emotions at the disaster caused by the flood in 2018. By reminding of Gandhi's tenets to be followed by people for the sake of morality and humankind, the poet makes an implicit criticism of the pretentions, and violation of pledges made by people to care of other beings, particularly, cow that is worshiped as "mother" and is considered to be a symbol of fertility, peace and holiness in Hinduism as well as the Buddhist culture. The poet also denigrates people who deliberately ignore the sanctity of the human life in Hinduism and slaughter the animal cow to satisfy their appetites. In the poem, the carnivorous are criticized explicitly, but those who pretend to be herbivorous are decried as shams: If a cow is sacrosanct And people eat beef One has to take a side. Some of the friends chose to Side with cow and others With the beef-eaters. Some were more human They chose both. (55) The poet infuses positivity into the minds of the Indian people. Perhaps, he thinks that, for Indians, poverty, ignorance, dirt and mud are not taboos as if they are habitual to forbear evils by their instincts. They readily accept them and live their lives happily with pride considering their deity as the preserver of their lives. The poem "A Family by the Road" is an example of such beliefs, in which the poet lavishes most of his poetic depiction on the significance of the Lord Shiva, the preserver of people in Hinduism: Let me enjoy my freedom. I am proud of my poverty. I am proud of my ignorance. I am proud of my dirt. I have a home because of these. I am proud of my home. My future is writ on the walls Of your houses My family shall stay in the mud. After all, somebody is needed To clean the dirt as well. I am Shiva, Shivoham. (73) In the poem "Kabir's Chadar", the poet invokes several virtues to back up his faith in spirituality and simplicity. He draws a line of merit and virtue between Kabir's Chadar which is 'white' and his own which is "thickly woven" and "Patterned with various beautiful designs/ In dark but shining colours" (50). The poet expresses his views on Kabir's 'white' Chadar symbolically to inculcate the sense of purity, fortitude, spirituality, and righteousness among people. The purpose of his direct comparison between them is to refute artificiality, guilt and evil intents of humanity, and propagate spiritual purity, the stark simplicities of our old way of life, and follow the patience of a saint like Kabir. The poem "Distancing" is a statement of poetic irony on the city having two different names known as Bombay and Mumbai. The poet sneers at its existence in Atlas. Although the poet portraits the historical events jeering at the distancing between the two cities as if they are really different, yet the poet's prophetic anticipation about the spread of the COVID-19 in India cannot be denied prima facie. The poet's overwhelming opinions on the overcrowded city of Bombay warn humankind to rescue their lives. Even though the poem seems to have individual expressions of the poet, leaves a message of distancing to be understood by the people for their safety against the uneven things. The poem "Crowded Locals" seems to be a sequel to the poem "Distancing". Although the poet's purpose, and appeal to the commonplace for distancing cannot be affirmed by the readers yet his remarks on the overcrowded cities like in Mumbai ("Crowded Locals"), foresee some risk to the humankind. In the poem "Crowded Locals", he details the mobility of people from one place to another, having dreams in their eyes and puzzles in their minds for their livelihood while feeling insecure especially, pickpockets, thieves and strangers. The poet also makes sneering comments on the body odour of people travelling in first class. However, these two poems have become a novel contribution for social distancing to fight against the COVID-19. In the poem "Buy Books, Not Diamonds" the poet makes an ironical interpretation of social anarchy, political upheaval, and threat of violence. In this poem, the poet vies attention of the readers towards the socio-cultural anarchy, especially, anarchy falls on the academic institutions in the western countries where capitalism, aristocracy, dictatorship have armed children not with books which inculcate human values but with rifles which create fear and cause violence resulting in deaths. The poet's perplexed opinions find manifestation in such a way as if books have been replaced with diamonds and guns, therefore, human values are on the verge of collapse: "Nine radiant diamonds are no match/ To the redness of the queen of spades. . . . / … holding/ Rifles is a better option than/ Hawking groundnuts on the streets?" (67).The poet also decries the spread of austere religious practices and jihadist movement like Boko Haram, powerful personalities, regulatory bodies and religious persons: "Boko Haram has come/Obama has also come/The UN has come/Even John has come with/Various kinds of ointments" (67). The poem "Lost Childhood" seems to be a memoir in which the poet compares the early life of an orphan with the child who enjoys early years of their lives under the safety of their parents. Similarly, the theme of the poem "Hands" deals with the poet's past experiences of the lifestyle and its comparison to the present generation. The poet's deep reverence for his parents reveals his clear understanding of the ways of living and human values. He seems to be very grateful to his father as if he wants to make his life peaceful by reading the lines of his palms: "I need to read the lines in his palm" (70). In the poem "A Gush of Wind", the poet deliberates on the role of Nature in our lives. The poem is divided into three sections, perhaps developing in three different forms of the wind viz. air, storm, and breeze respectively. It is structured around the significance of the Nature. In the first section, the poet lays emphasis on the air we breathe and keep ourselves fresh as if it is a panacea. The poet criticizes artificial and material things like AC. In the second section, he depicts the stormy nature of the wind scattering papers, making the bed sheets dusty affecting or breaking the different types of fragile and luxurious objects like Italian carpets and lamp shades with its strong blow entering the oriels and window panes of the houses. Apparently, the poem may be an individual expression, but it seems to be a caricature on the majesty of the rich people who ignore the use of eco-chic objects and disobey the Nature's behest. In the third and the last section of the poem, the poet's tone is critical towards Whitman, Pushkin and Ginsberg for their pseudoscientific philosophy of adherence to the Nature. Finally, he opens himself to enjoy the wind fearlessly. The poems like "A Voice" , "The New Year Dawn", "The New Age", "The World in Words in 2015", "A Pond Nearby", "Wearing the Scarlet Letter 'A'", "A Mock Drill", "Strutting Around", "Sahibs, Snobs, Sinners", "Endless Wait", "The Soul with a New Hat", "Renewed Hope", "Like Father, Unlike Son", "Hands", "Rechristening the City", "Coffee", "The Unborn Poem", "The Fountain Square", "Ram Setu", and "Connaught Place" touch upon the different themes. These poems reveal poet's creativity and unique features of his poetic arts and crafts. The last poem of the collection "Stories from the Mahabharata" is written in twenty-five stanzas consisting of three lines each. Each stanza either describes a scene or narrates a story from the Mahabharata, the source of the poem. Every stanza has an independent action verb to describe the actions of different characters drawn from the Mahabharata. Thus, each stanza is a complete miniscule poem in itself which seems to be a remarkable characteristic of the poem. It is an exquisite example of 'Micro-poetry' on paper, remarkable for its brevity, dexterity and intensity. The poet's conscious and brilliant reframing of the stories in his poem sets an example of a new type of 'Found Poetry' for his readers. Although the poet's use of various types images—natural, comic, tragic, childhood, horticultural, retains the attention of readers yet the abundant evidences of anaphora reflect redundancy and affect the readers' concentration and diminishes their mental perception, for examples, pronouns 'her' and 'we' in a very small poem "Lost Childhood", articles 'the' and 'all' in "Crowded Locals", the phrase 'I am proud of' in "A Family by the Road" occur many times. Svitlana Buchatska's concise but evaluative views in her Afterword to Unwinding Self help the readers to catch hold of the poet's depiction of his emotions. She writes, "Being a keen observer of life he vividly depicts people's life, traditions and emotions involving us into their rich spiritual world. His poems are the reflection on the Master's world of values, love to his family, friends, students and what is more, to his beloved India. Thus, the author reveals all his beliefs, attitudes, myths and allusions which are the patterns used by the Indian poets" (150). W. H. Auden defines poetry as "the clear expression of mixed feelings." It seems so true of Susheel Sharma's Unwinding Self. It is a mixture of poems that touch upon the different aspects of human life. It can be averred that the collection consists of the poet's seamless efforts to delve into the various domains of the human life and spot for the different places as well. It is a poetic revue in verse in which the poet instils energy, confidence, power and enthusiasm into minds of Indian people and touches upon all aspects of their lives. The poverty, ignorance, dirt, mud, daily struggle against liars, thieves, pickpockets, touts, politician and darkness have been depicted not as weaknesses of people in Indian culture but their strengths, because they have courage to overcome darkness and see the advent of a new era. The poems teach people morality, guide them to relive their pains and lead them to their salvation. Patricia Prime's opinion is remarkable: "Sharma writes about his family, men and women, childhood, identity, roots and rootlessness, memory and loss, dreams and interactions with nature and place. His poised, articulate poems are remarkable for their wit, conversational tone and insight" (138). Through the poems in the collection, the poet dovetails the niceties of the Indian culture, and communicates its beauty and uniqueness meticulously. The language of the poem is lucid, elevated and eloquent. The poet's use of diction seems to be very simple and colloquial like that of an inspiring teacher. On the whole the book is more than just a collection of poems as it teaches the readers a lot about the world around them through a detailed Glossary appended soon after the poems in the collection. It provides supplementary information about the terms used abundantly in Indian scriptures, myths, and other religious and academic writings. The Glossary, therefore, plays pivotal role in unfolding the layers of meaning and reaching the hearts of the global readers. The "Afterwords" appended at the end, enhances readability of poems and displays worldwide acceptability, intelligibility, and popularity of the poet. The Afterwords are a good example of authentic Formalistic criticism and New Criticism. They indirectly teach a formative reader and critic the importance of forming one's opinion, direct reading and writing without any crutches of the critics.

Millainen on Euroopan unionin kansainvälinen asema? Onko Euroopan unionilla uskottavaa ulkopolitiikkaa? Vaikka Euroopan unioni on yksi maailman merkittävimmistä toimijoista kaupan ja kansainvälisen vaihdon alalla sekä maailman suurin avunantaja, vaikuttaa siltä, että poliittisesti sillä ei ole vaikutusvaltaa. Väitöskirjassani tutkin, onko talouden jättiläinen todellakin poliittinen kääpiö. Tutkimuskirjallisuutta analysoimalla olen etsinyt niitä EU:n piirteitä, joiden on nähty estävän unionia toimimasta todellisena kansainvälisenä toimijana; samalla olen pyrkinyt selittämään, millainen kokonaisuus EU on verrattuna tavanomaiseen ulkopoliittiseen toimijaan, valtioon, ja miten EU sopii kansainväliseen ympäristöön. Lopuksi tutkin EU:n politiikkaa laajentumisprosessissa, jossa jäseniksi otettiin Keski- ja Itä-Euroopan valtioita. EU:n ulkopolittisen toimijuuden esteinä on usein nähty puuttuva tai vaillinainen sotilaallinen aspekti ja heikko päätöksentekojärjestelmä. Kun ulkopolitiikka perinteisesti ymmärretään sotilaalliseksi toiminnaksi kriisitilanteissa, EU:n on nähty olevan kyvytön sekä määrittelemään intressinsä ja tekemään päätöksiä että toimimaan sotilaallisesti tilanteen ratkaisemiseksi. Miksi kansallisen identiteetin ja intressin puuttuminen sekä sotilaallisten toimintamahdollisuuksien vajavuus ovat niin merkittäviä ongelmia globalisoituvassa maailmassa, jossa taloudellisen vallan uskotaan olevan poliittista tärkeämpää? Kun valtiot yhä enenevässä määrin määrittelevät turvallisuusuhkansa toisin kuin sotilaallisin termein, miksi kyky sotilaalliseen toimintaan on yhä olennaista? Valtio on ollut kansainvälisen politiikan hallitseva toimija niin kauan, että meidän on vaikea tunnustaa, että tämän hetken kansainvälisessä politiikassa toimija tarvitsee erilaisia piirteitä kuin ne valtion tunnusomaiset piirteet ja kapasiteetit, joiden avulla se saattoi vahvistaa asemansa ensisijaisena toimijana. Tämän hetken kansainvälisessä järjestelmässä EU:n monenkeskisyyteen ja neuvotteluihin perustuva päätöksentekojärjestelmä saattaa osoittautua pikemminkin vahvuudeksi kuin heikoudeksi. Parhaassa tapauksessa EU pystyy hyväksikäyttämään globalisaation aiheuttamia muutoksia valtion suvereenisuuteen ja tehtäviin, ja rakentamaan tehokkaamman hallitsemisen järjestelmän. EU:n asema ei-valtiollisena toimijana mahdollistaa erilaisten toimijuuden tapojen käyttämisen, minkä seurauksena EU saattaa olla valtiota paremmin varustettu ratkaisemaan uusia turvallisuusuhkia vaikka unionin tavat vaikuttaa ovat näkymättömämpiä kuin sotilaallinen hyökkäys, ne eivät ole vailla vaikutusta. EU ei ole vähemmän kuin valtio, vaan enemmän. Sen kehitys vastaa kansainvälisen järjestelmän kehitystä ja vie sitä osaltaan poispäin valtiokeskeisyydestä. EU:n merkittävin ongelma ei ole sotilaallisen aspektin vajavaisuus, vaan se, miten rakentaa uskottava identiteetti ja saada kansalaisten kannatus Eurooppalaiselle hallinnolle. Tutkimus osoittaa, että vahvistaakseen kansainvälistä asemaansa EU:n ei tarvitse kehittää itseään federalistisempaan suuntaan, vaan käyttää hyväkseen globalisoituvan järjestelmän tarjoamia uusia mahdollisuuksia. ; Dwarf, adolescent or superpower? The European Union on the international field It seems to be a part of common knowledge that the European Union is an economic giant but a political dwarf. Although none can claim that the EU does not possess significant resources, for some reason these resources do not seem to help the EU to have much influence in foreign policy matters. Despite its large network of diplomatic relations, and its position as one of the most significant aid donors and trading partners in the world, many suggest that it has not succeeded in its attempts to develop its economic influence also into a political one. In my study I wish to examine if the EU is such an unfit actor on the international field. I will analyze how the international system (of states) defines the properties of actors, and how the definition is changing. There are two basic questions in this work: First, what position does the international system offer to the EU? Secondly, how does the EU utilize the position given to it? To find answers, I will examine a state as an actor, the international system of states, and the properties and actions of the EU. The EU in the system of states Since the international system is a system of states, the position of a state as a primary actor seems to be universal and eternal. In this thesis it is claimed that the EU is a new kind of a polity challenging the position of a Westphalian state. If the EU succeeds in this, it will have consequences for the whole international system. Yet, to be able to act in the system, the EU must not only challenge the position of a state, but also adapt to the requirements of the actorness; the EU must resemble a state in some respects to get recognized as an actor. There still is an on going test of statehood, and as long as the EU does not pass it, it is hard to consider it as an actor in its own right. The position of a state is connected to the development of the international system overall. The effects of globalization, modernization and democratization are creating new kinds of environments and cultures with new possibilities and threats. Increased interdependence between national economies and production added to the fact that all types of exchange are becoming ever more global restrict the ability of a state to act as fully sovereign . Globalisation includes many processes that affect the position of a state. The meaning of properties like sovereignty and military resources is changing, as well as a state s position on the international field. Change does not happen only inside a state and in its position, however, but also international structures change, affecting the way actors behave with each other. I claim that although the state is losing its position, it is still the dominant actor in international politics, and other polities hoping to get a position of an actor must be comparable with it: after all, structures do not change so quickly, and actors are constituted by them. The changing international context opens up the possibility to increase the importance of the EU. Sovereignty and military resources that once determined the state s position as a dominant actor have partly lost their meaning; not having them should not prevent the EU from being an actor. Furthermore, the EU might have properties that make it better capable to manage in the globalizing and fragmenting world. A foreign policy actor Rather than an international organization, the EU is a new type of political system, made up of national and European institutions that are constituted in relation to each other . The national institutions of member states and the EU institutions are so closely interwoven that they cannot be conceived as separate political systems. On the other hand, the EU is not a state, and we have many reasons to assume that it will not be one (unless the definition of a state changes). While it has some capabilities states traditionally own, it lacks others. This appears to make it an actor in some issue-areas, but not in all of them. Foreign policy has traditionally been connected to a state, it is concerned with the relation of a state to other states in the international system; it is connected to the idea of national aims and interests, and involves mobilizing national resources. Although foreign policy in its most visible form is high politics concerning high diplomacy and war, in practice most of the time it is low politics including low-level diplomatic practices between ministries and also economic policy as a means of reaching foreign policy aims. Foreign policy does not entail military force; as Karen Smith puts it, the recourse to military instruments can indicate a failure of foreign policy . In this work I will suggest that the reason why foreign policy is connected solely to states is not that making foreign policy is possible only for nation states and governments; rather it has to do with states position as primary actors in the international system. When certain conditions are metconcerning among others, a decision-making system non-state actors are also able to conduct foreign policy. There is no single EU foreign policy, but on some occasions member states agree on common interests and objectives, and mobilize national and collective resources to fulfill them: they conduct common foreign policy . For the EU, foreign policy means that its member states and institutions, to use Smith s words, have expressed a unified position in response to external events and/or formulated a plan of action directed towards the fulfillment of specified political/security objectives, and have agreed to use Community/CFSP instruments and/or instruments under national competence in a coordinated way to implement it . Even though the common foreign policy is important for the EU s ability to act as an actor, it must be put into the larger context of external relations, otherwise we fail to see the EU s importance on the international field. The division between political and economic matters has always been vague, but it is even more so at the time of globalization. It seems that those foreign policies connecting intergovernmental and community issue-areas, like the enlargement policy, have been among the most successful policies. The enlargement policy can be considered foreign and security policy because of its political and security-related aims, although the EU has applied the practices of the CFSP ­ common position and joint action ­ only a couple of times during many years of the enlargement policy. Although the EU may appear as a weak actor in high policy areas, it is an effective negotiator of low policy matters, including trade and aid, that belong to the Community issue-area . The EU does not act like a traditional foreign policy player. But what usually is seen as its weakness, may turn out to be a strength. In the contemporary international system it may be a benefit that an actor is able to take different forms in different situations, as the EU is forced to do due to its nature of lying between an international organization and a state. A civilian power There are certain requirements for an actor presented in the literature of IR, and usually these requirements do not include statehood or military resources. However, the polity´s own properties do not determinate totally the entity s position on the international field. Entry to the system is dependent on whether or not the other actors give recognition. It is claimed in this work that usually only states are recognized as actors, but even though the EU is not a state, it has at least partial recognition in practice, since it is accepted as a partner in negotiations, diplomatic relations, trade and aid. But the EU seems to suffer from a lack of credibility, or prestige that prevents it from having much of an influence especially in international crises, like in the Palestinian question. Still, by recognizing the EU as an actor in its own right ­ even partially states decrease the significance of sovereignty, and weaken their own position as primary actors. Hence, the EU may change the structure of the international system, and make room for other polities too; or, it may become a state. One possible direction of developing the EU is to strengthen its image as a civilian power. According to Hans W. Maull, a civilian power accepts the necessity of cooperation with other actors when pursuing international objectives; utilizes non-military, primarily economic means to secure its goals; and is willing to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. In this thesis the term civilian power refers to an actor who trusts in cooperation, respects and enforces international values and norms as defined by international institutions and treaties, and acts through diplomacy, economic means and international institutions. Manners suggests, on the other hand, that the EU may be more important normatively than in an empirical way, since it sets normative world standards. He continues that due to its power over opinion , idée force , or ideological power , the EU would best be conceived as a normative power Europe. The EU s normative power is a significant dimension of this thesis, but I will also examine other ways of using power including the Union s foreign policy instruments. I agree with Manners that the EU s ability to shape conceptions of normality in international relations is what makes it a normative power , but I suggest that it is a part of its special nature as a civilian power ­ although also military powers may use and have used normative power. The EU clearly attempts to gain legitimacy through expansion of democratic and human rights norms, but this is not the whole picture of the EU. It is difficult to evaluate in which direction the EU will develop; even more difficult is to describe the outcome of European integration. More than a state I will propose that the EU lacks some of the properties of a state ­ although I do not see that the difference is so remarkable in the end ­ but that it does not make the EU an unfit actor in the international system; quite the contrary, the European integration includes elements that may make the EU better suitable to the international system than the traditional sovereign state. Hence, it will be suggested that instead of being less than a state the EU is actually more than a state. Within changing structure of the international system, resources and properties of states ­ sovereignty, structure of hierarchy and military resources, among others ­ will not be so significant that they guarantee the state s dominant position; quite the contrary, the strong actor have to be able to handle with global capitalism, regionalism, interdependence, and security threats raising from various sources. When the system has been increasingly perceived as interdependent, and states ability to govern has been deemed to be in question, an entity like the EU seems to be well placed to act on behalf of its members as a manager of the interdependence. Through European integration we also may find new answers to some of the problems caused by the nature of the international system itself. In this connection I will especially consider democracy and security issues, although there exists other similar issues too, for example minorities and refugees. The EU might be ­ or it might become - the first truly post-modern polity, and it is impossible to explain its significance by concentrating only on its CFSP. The change of the international system is important in giving room for an actor like the EU, but structures do not totally create actorness; the development and action of the EU reflects the dynamic relationship between structures and agency. The EU is born from the combination of external demand and opportunities, and political will and imagination of its founders. Hence, the importance of the EU cannot be evaluated by studying either its internal capacities or external opportunities; they both together create the EU s capacity to act and have an influence on the international field. Yet, internal factors associated with legitimacy and efficacy of policy processes influence the perceptions other actors have of the EU, and create expectations of the EU s ability to act. Additionally, states must create new ways of acting in the changing international system, this suggests that our picture of an actor and its ways of having an influence and making policy may be at least partially out-dated. I wish to suggest that by studying the EU within an approach that takes both structures and internal capabilities into consideration we might get new ideas about actorness overall.