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The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. solidified the treatment of fair use as an affirmative defense. However, treating fair use as an affirmative defense shifts the burden to the defendant while in most fair use cases plaintiffs are able to easily prove a prima facie case of infringement. This Article identifies that, despite its decision in Campbell, the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken a thorough analysis of whether Congress intended fair use, as codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, to be treated as an affirmative defense. In fact, as explored in this Article, the legislative history cuts against viewing fair use as an affirmative defense, and the legislative history explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not intend fair use to be an affirmative defense; a defense, yes, but not an affirmative defense. The negative consequences of labeling fair use an affirmative defense support shifting back to what Congress intended. Fair use should not be seen as an affirmative defense, but should instead be treated as a defense that shapes the scope of a copyright owner's rights.

Introduces a forum on the interdisciplinary dialogue between the fields of international relations & international law. References. D. Edelman

Drawing on an analysis of contested States like Palestine and Ukraine, this book seeks to ascertain the normative value and effects of recognition in various situations. It also provides an updated overview of the history of recognition, the positions of various governments, and a critical summary of domestic and international jurisprudence.

The article addresses a set of problems pertaining to nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, and missile defense. The author states that as a derivative of nuclear deterrence strategic stability can only be applied to military-strategic relations between Russia and the United States. This concept "does not work" in all other cases, including the multilateral format of relations. Nuclear deterrence is more universal and impacts, among other things, the decision-making process in relatively strong and weak nuclear states that oppose each other. The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is not determined solely by the balance of opposing forces. No less important is the assessment by a potential aggressor of all the negative consequences of its decision to strike first, which creates the "self-deterrence" effect that outweighs even the aggressor's absolute confidence in the complete military success of its nuclear attack. The author also insists that missile defense is undeservedly considered a "destabilizing" weapons system, because the baseline scenario involving a massive exchange of nuclear strikes, which is used for estimating the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and the level of strategic stability, is completely far-fetched.