Suchergebnisse

Analyzes the fragility of the first post-communist Russian state, the Constitution as amended by executive fiat on Sept. 21, 1993, and the role of the Constitutional Court.

"States that now contemplate constitutional reform often grapple with the question of whether to constitutionalise social rights. This book presents an argument for why, under the right conditions, doing so can be a good way to advance social justice. In making such a case, the author considers the nature of the social minimum, the role of the court among other institutions, the empirical record of judicial impact and the role of constitutional text. He argues, however, that when enforcing such rights, courts ought to adopt a theory of judicial restraint structured around four principles: democratic legitimacy, polycentricity, expertise and flexibility. These four principles, when taken collectively, commend an incrementalist approach to adjudication. The book combines theoretical, doctrinal, empirical and comparative analysis, and is written to be accessible to lawyers, social scientists, political theorists and human rights advocates"--

Notes - A handwritten article by Ruth Gorman, Alberta (2 pages) ; WCC

"Using a theoretical and comparative perspective, Aileen Kavanagh argues that protecting rights in a constitutional democracy is a collaborative enterprise between all three branches of government: the Executive, legislature, and courts. With examples from multiple jurisdictions, this book documents the dynamics of collaborative constitutionalism"--

Abstract
In a period of less than a year, two decisions of the newly established Constitu­tional Court of the Republic of Kosovo resulted in the resignation of two Presidents of the new State. Ruling on the unconstitutionality of the act of simultaneously holding the position of the head of State and that of his political party, in one case; and ruling on the unconstitutionality of his election due to procedural irregularities in the other, the Court prompted fundamental changes to the political landscape of Kosovo that in the first case led to new and extraordinary elections, whereas in the second to a political arrangement that would ultimately lead to constitutional reforms. Following the Court's decisions, both Presidents (Sejdiu and Pacolli) resigned from their posts.
This article offers a textual analysis of the merits and controversies surrounding both decisions, which will be situated in the broader context of the seemingly powerful role of Constitutional Courts in certain societies in transition. The overall analysis demonstrates the weaknesses inherent to the initial stages of State formation, and to the foundational con­stitutional instrument, indicating the importance of the Constitution's clarity for political stability. In an environment characterized by a dominant perception of a politicized judiciary, the Court's decisions testify to the judicial activism of the Constitutional Court and, in terms of the substance and consequences of its key decisions, also to judicial supremacy. The Court's decisions have also had some significance for testing the country's political culture, a test that has been met in both cases eventually with compliance by those most affected.