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This report aims at identifying the particular needs and constraints faced by the poorest women and men when accessing the judicial system. Similarly to the Judicial Functional Review,6 the scope of this report focuses primarily on the courts because they are the main vehicle for justice service delivery and the primary institutions of justice in Serbia. The scope includes all types of services and covers litigious and non-litigious aspects of civil, commercial, administrative, and criminal justice. The focus is on the actual implementation and day-to-day functioning of the sector institutions that deliver justice to people, rather than the law on the books . The scope includes other institutions in the sector to the extent that they enable or impede service delivery by the courts, including: the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the High Judicial Council (HJC), the State Prosecutorial Council (SPC), the courts, the Public Prosecutor Offices (PPOs), the Judicial Academy, the Ombudsperson s Office, the police, prisons, and justice sector professional organizations (such as the Bar, notaries, bailiffs, and mediators). The focus of this report is on access to justice services, including relevant financial, informational, and geographic barriers to such access.

After almost a year of political, economic, and security upheaval, Yemen has now embarked on a new political path based on an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and overseen by the United Nations, or UN and the international community. The agreement was signed on November 23, 2011, after former President Saleh, the ruling party (GPC), and the opposition parties agreed to a political transition, dialogue, and political reforms. A transitional government of national unity was formed and confirmed by the Parliament in early December 2011. The transition President Hadi was elected on February, 21 2012, for the period spanning to the planned next general elections in the first half of 2014. In an environment of political tensions, the President made progress in reforming the security institutional set-up, in reducing the influence of Al-Qaeda forces, and in preparing for a national dialogue.

The Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) program had a clear and modest objective: supplement consumption for poor households facing unprecedented price increases. In 2005 subsidy cuts raised household fuel prices by an average of over 125 percent with 88, 186, and 105 percent increases in gasoline, kerosene, and solar (diesel) fuels respectively. BLT, a direct cash transfer in four installments over one year, funded from the implied budgetary savings from subsidy reductions, was in many respects the most significant Government of Indonesia (GOI) response to these programmed increases in fuel prices. It was targeted to the poor households who were benefiting least from the old subsidy regime and most at risk from the negative impacts on consumption from price increases. A mostly-similar BLT was introduced again in 2008 when international crises in both financial markets and in food prices combined with another domestic reduction to fuel subsidies. BLT provided just-in-time cash assistance to households affected by an economic shock. BLT added cash amounts to a household's budget equal to approximately 15 percent of regular expenditures in 2005. These transfers were more than enough to cover increased expenditure on fuels. Benefits continued for one year as shocks from government policy reverberated through the rest of the macro-economy, allowing beneficiaries time to readjust spending patterns to new relative prices.

The authors present a political economy model in which policy is the outcome of an interaction between three actors: government (G), managers and workers (W), and transfer recipients (P). The government's objective is to stay in power, for which it needs the support of either P or W. It can choose slow privatization with little asset stripping and significant taxation, thus protecting the fiscal base out of which it pays pensioners relatively well (as in Poland). Or it can give away assets and tax exemptions to managers and workers, who then bankroll it and deliver the vote, but it thereby loses taxes and pays little to pensioners (as in Russia). The authors apply this model to Russia for the period 1992-96. An empirical analysis of electoral behavior in the 1996 presidential election shows that the likelihood of someone voting for Yeltsin did not depend on that person's socioeconomic group per se. Those who tended to vote for Yeltsin were richer, younger, and better educated and had more favorable expectations for the future. Entrepreneurs, who had more of these characteristics, tended to vote for Yeltsin as a result, while pensioners, who had almost none, tended to vote against Yeltsin. Unlike Poland, Russia failed to create pluralist politics in the early years of the transition, so no effective counterbalance emerged to offset managerial rent-seeking and the state was easily captured by well-organized industrial interests. The political elite were reelected because industrial interests bankrolled their campaign in return for promises that government largesse would continue to flow. Russia shows vividly how political economy affects policymaking, because of how openly and flagrantly government granted favors in return for electoral support. Bur special interests, venal bureaucrats, and the exchange of favors tend to be the rule, not the exemption, elsewhere as well.

This paper develops a framework to assess organizational performance in the delivery of social safety nets. Specifically, it provides guidance to task teams and program managers for identifying indicators of governance and service quality in targeted cash transfer programs. The paper identifies governance issues along the results chain of service delivery and suggests policy and performance indicators for assessing program inputs, human resources, financing and resource management; and program activities, operational procedures, Management Information Systems (MIS) and control. It also suggests indicators of organizational performance and the quality of outputs, including demand-side accountability mechanisms.

The firming of the economic recovery is putting the policy spotlight back on the longer term challenge of faster, more inclusive Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Modest investment rates despite attractive returns and low savings rates despite favorable demographics are important impediments. A virtuous cycle of faster capital accumulation, job creation (especially for the youth), and technological advancement needs to be stimulated. There are no quick fixes that can produce the desired stimulus. The quest for inclusive growth calls for a different, bolder approach. Integration of the advanced and less-developed economies and more effective integration with the global economy, using factory Southern Africa as a platform, hold considerable potential. South Africa's medium-term growth prospects point to a strengthening recovery. GDP growth is projected to be 3.5 percent in 2011, 4.1 percent in 2012 and 4.4 percent in 2013. The long term potential growth rate under the current policy environment is estimated at 3.5 percent. In light of South Africa's low national savings, the reemergence of high current account deficits, financed mostly through volatile portfolio flows, will reemerge as the biggest cause for macroeconomic concern over the medium term. With considerable strengthening of the economic recovery and GDP projected to reach its potential by 2014, the focus shifts back to the longer term challenge of raising GDP growth to 6-7 percent and making it much more inclusive to tackle the extremely high unemployment. This first issue is anchored in the national aspirations of faster and more inclusive growth, with special emphasis on the issues of savings and investment.

The theoretical case for industrial policy is a strong one. The market failures that industrial policies target in markets for credit, labor, products, and knowledge have long been at the core of what development economists study. The conventional case against industrial policy rests on practical difficulties with its implementation. Even though the issues could in principle be settled by empirical evidence, the evidence to date remains uninformative. Moreover, the conceptual difficulties involved in statistical inference in this area are so great that it is hard to see how statistical evidence could ever yield a convincing verdict. A review of industrial policy in three non-Asian settings El Salvador, Uruguay, and South Africa highlights the extensive amount of industrial policy that is already being carried out and frames the need for industrial policy in the specific circumstances of individual countries. The traditional informational and bureaucratic constraints on the exercise of industrial policy are not givens; they can be molded and rendered less binding through appropriate institutional design. Three key design attributes that industrial policy must possess are embeddedness, carrots-and-sticks, and accountability.

Part 1. Challenges of the Modern Economy as Barriers to Sustainable Development -- 1. Statistic Indicators for Assessing the Measuring Efficiency to Counter Economic Sanctions -- 2. The Innovative and Sustainable Development of Energetics Under the Conditions of the Post-pandemic Recovery of the Economy -- 3. Scenario Analysis of the Development of the Russian Digital Economy Until 2025 -- 4. The Post-pandemic Analysis of the Specifics of Industrial Economies' Development from the Positions of Innovativeness and Sustainability -- 5. The Post-Pandemic Model of the Sectoral Development of Emerging Economies' Industry -- 6. Perspective Role of Digitalization in the Well-Balanced Development of the Global Economic System of the Future -- 7. The Role of Digital Security for the Stable Development of the Global Economic System of the Future -- 8. Sustainable Development of the World Economy of the Future on the Basis of Digitalization: the 2030 Perspective -- 9. Dialectics of Systems Development -- 10. Problems of Consideration of Environmental Factors in Urban Planning as a Mechanism for Sustainable Development -- 11. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Agri-Food Policy as a Component of the Economic Security of the Region -- 12. Employment of Workers in Green Jobs: Industry, Product and Skill Approaches -- 13. Problems and Implementation Prospects of Experimental Legal Regimes in Russia -- 14. Globalization as a Factor of Influence on Russian Federation's Foreign Economic Activity: Engineering Exports -- 15. Import Substitution: the Main Directions of Import Substitution, the Pros and Cons of the Implemented State Program, Some Success Stories of Import Substitution and its Prospects -- 16. Problems and Prospects for the Development of Import Substitution in the Agro-Industrial Complex of the Russian Federation -- 17. Cooperation, Humanism, Tolerance: Realities of History and Modernity -- 18. Features of the Sustainable Development of the Tourism Economy in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic -- 19. Development of the Cooperative Movement in the Republic of Bashkortostan: Problems and Prospects -- 20. Supervision and Control over the Investigation of Crimes in the Field of Entrepreneurial Activity -- 21. Countering Aggressive Tax Planning -- 22. Problems of Economic Security of Special Economic Zones -- 23. Conceptual Approach to the System of Controlling in the Public Sector -- 24. Sustainable Development Based on Knowledge Sharing: An International Aspect (a review of the problem) -- 25. New Functional Product as a Result of International Interaction -- 26. Anti-Corruption Strategies: Forms and Mechanisms of Participation of Civil Society Institutions -- 27. Methods of Acquisition and Termination of Subjective Rights to Immovable Property as an Element of Social Security of Citizens -- 28. Problems of Practical Application of Legal Norms Containing Accessory Obligations in the Legislation of the Russian Federation in the Conditions of the COVID-19 Pandemic -- 29. Uncertainty and Risk as Factors in the Development of Insurance -- 30. School and University Cooperation in the Aspect of Studying Linguistic and Cultural Literacy of Migrant Children -- Part 2. Economic and Legal Foundations and Cooperative Mechanisms for Sustainable Development -- 31. Program-Targeted Approach to the Innovative Development of Industrial Economies under the Modern Post-COVID Conditions -- 32. State and Corporate Management of Industrial Economies for Their Sustainable Development and Recovery after the Pandemic -- 33. Credit Cooperation in Russia: Problems and Possible Solutions -- 34. Leasing as an Effective Tool for the Implementation of Investment Projects in Different Countries -- 35. Optimization of the Use of the Potential of Specially Protected Natural Areas within the Framework of the Sustainable Development of Domestic Tourism in the Russian Federation -- 36. Changes in Cooperative Legislation in the Context of Solving Socio-economic Problems -- 37. Development of Legislation on Cooperation in Ukraine in 1992-2014 -- 38. Assessment of the Socio-economic Sphere of the Countries of the European Union in the Context of the Implementation of Joint Strategies and Programs -- 39. Role of Consumer Cooperatives in Overcoming Unemployment in Contemporary Russian Society -- 40. Development of Cooperation Legislation in Germany -- 41. Agricultural Cooperatives in France: Toward Environmental Neutrality and Sustainability -- 42. A National Model of Cooperation as a Track of Sustainable Development of New Zealand -- 43. Development of the Cooperative Sector in Canada: Features of the National Model -- 44. Infrastructural Factors of the Digital Economy Development and Their Management in the Interests of Accelerating Its Growth -- 45. New Opportunities for Human Potential Development in the Digital Economy and Their Implementation in Developed and Developing Countries -- 46. Integration Mechanisms of Development of the Digital Economy and the Prospects for Their Activation in Russia -- 47. Designed Innovative and Investment Development of the Region in the Conditions of Digital Economy to Ensure Economic Security -- 48. State Regulation of the Development of Cooperative Formations in Agriculture of the Republic of Bashkortostan -- 49. Regional Features of Digital Transformation During the Pandemic -- 50. Formation of a Conceptual Tourist Product for the Effective Development of Territories Without a Pronounced Tourist and Recreational Potential -- 51. Sustainable and Advanced Development of Region's Economy Based on Digital Competitiveness -- 52. Regional Aspects of the Development of the Consumer Lending Sector in Russia during the Pandemic -- 53. Methodological Aspects for Assessing the Financial Stability of Regions in the Context of the Coronavirus COVID-19 in 2021 -- 54. Development of the Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet as a Strategic Priority of the Arctic Region -- 55. Sustainable Development Capital of Rural Territories: The Role and Significance of Cooperation -- 56. Methods for Quality Control of Products of the Kamchatka Territory -- 57. Improving the Competitiveness of the Regional Fishery Complex by Strengthening Foreign Economic Relations of the Region -- Part 3. Advanced Digital Technologies and Their Contribution to Sustainable Development -- 58. Current Vectors of Investment Security of the Krasnodar Territory -- 59. Social Orientation of the Regional Economic Cluster of Consumer Cooperation -- 60. Prospects for the Development of the Cooperative Movement in Public Catering Enterprises of Almetyevsky District of the Republic of Tatarstan -- 61. Cluster Cooperation as a Factor in Ensuring Sustainable Development of the Region -- 62. Development of Agricultural Cooperation in the Republic of Tatarstan -- 63. Industrial Cooperation in Chuvashia in the Post-war Years: Historical and Legal Aspect -- 64. Role of Agricultural Cooperation in the Development of Regional Food Markets -- 65. Formation of the Model of the Social-Oriented Cluster as Method of Cooperation of the Subjects of SMEs of the Smolensk Region -- 66. Methods of Organizing the Design of Construction Works -- 67. Corporate Social Responsibility in Industrial Economies as the Basis of their Innovative and Sustainable Development in the Post-COVID Period -- 68. Digital Mechanisms of the Future Development of Social Entrepreneurship and Humanisation of Economic Growth -- 69. Formation of Experimentation Skills in Children 5–6 Years Old through Visual Modeling -- 70. Project Technology in Education as a Promising Form of University and Business Cooperation -- 71. Innovative Corporate Strategies as Sources of Sustainable Development -- 72. Strategic Guidelines for the Development of Non-profit Corporate Structures in the Context of the Transformation of the Regional Information -- 73. Standard for the Development of Competition in the Subjects of the Russian Federation as a Tool for the Development of Entrepreneurship in Regional Commodity Markets -- 74. Innovations in Corporate Relations and their Contribution to the Development of Cooperation -- 75. Cooperative Strategy in Sociosystems -- 76. Strategic Management, Analysis, and Control: General Provisions -- 77. Development of Professional and Qualification Potential of an Employee -- 78. Efficiency of the Organization's Performance as a Factor of Sustainable Development and Economic Security -- 79. Controlling as an Accounting and Analytical System of Personnel Management -- 80. Foreign Language Training of Specialists in the Economic Sphere as a Factor of Sustainable Development: Historical and Pedagogical Aspect -- 81. Entrepreneurship Development as the Basis for a Competitive Environment After the Pandemic -- 82. Service System and Service Targeting as a Key Aspect of the Company's Competitiveness -- Part 4. Prospects for the Sustainable Development of Countries: Review of International Experience -- 83. Formation of Responsible Cooperative Entrepreneurship Based on Socially-Oriented Cluster -- 84. Efficiency of Biopreparation Treatment of Wheat Grain; Baking Properties of Flour and Quality of Baked Bread in Consumer Cooperative Enterprises -- 85. Experience of Cooperation of All Levels of Education in the Process of Project Development -- 86. Problems of Liability for Illegal Entrepreneurship Committed within the Framework of Cooperative Legal Relations -- 87. Business Support During the Pandemic: View of the Representatives of the European Cooperative Movement -- 88. Biosocial Essence of Person and Crime -- 89. Assessing the Institutional Framework for Russia's Foreign Trade Cooperation with North African Countries: Foreign Trade and Customs Aspects -- 90. Modern Marketing Technologies in Promoting Consumer Cooperation Organizations -- 91. Actual Issues of the Development of Consumer Cooperation Legislation in Addressing Social Questions -- 92. Development of Cooperation between the Europea.

To many observers, the leadership of President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has marked an emerging shift in the Indo-American relationship, pointing towards a new era of mutual alignment. A plethora of bilateral summits proclaiming a "high-level of engagement" to craft "an enduring India-U.S. partnership," expanded joint-defense collaboration, the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues, deepening technological linkages, and shared security interests regarding the rise of China indicate there may have been a substantial shift in Indian strategy.While relations are undeniably strong, policymakers should remain skeptical that this stems from an underlying geopolitical alignment. Despite moving closer to the Western camp, India maintains a strategy of multi-alignment and will likely continue to do so in the coming decades.We Have Been Here BeforeThis is not the first time that there has been an apparent Indo-American rapprochement. India's doctrine of nonalignment, combined with their linkages to the Soviet Union and American diplomatic relations with Pakistan, caused distrust throughout the Cold War. Yet, the partnership blossomed after the turn of the millennium under the Bush administration, with significant cooperation in counter-terrorism, advanced technological development, democracy promotion, and environmental protection.Despite India's nuclear program and subsequent nuclear tests violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), George W. Bush lifted economic and military sanctions in 2001. In 2006, India and the United States signed the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which allowed access to civilian nuclear reactor technology.Much like today, there were several joint agreements. If you file off the dates, many mirror Biden and Modi's pledges, with commitments to expand joint exercises, defend democracy, and create cooperative groups such as the Defense Policy Group (DPG), which resulted in new American arms sales to India.There was considerable optimism at the start of the Obama administration that India would officially pivot into the Western camp. However, this hope was illusory. New elections in India brought in elites who favored strategic autonomy. Obama inflamed fears around American credibility by improving relations with China and discussing a potential G-2, a core Indian concern. Despite inching closer towards alignment for the past decade, India rapidly flipped away from the United States by joining China-led initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Furthermore, India continued to maintain its reliance on Russian arms, which limited the potential for joint military planning.Obama tried to mend the rift, but it was too little, too late, and the alliance has maintained a distinctly transactional feel until the present day. A lesson should be learned: seemingly strong Indo-American bonds can crack when security interests shift.Flashpoints for TensionsMuch like in the Obama administration, a confluence of factors could easily reverse recent gains. India and Russia remain partners despite the invasion of Ukraine. In line with much of the Global South, they have consistently abstained from condemning Russian actions and refused to sanction Russian oil (although allegedly this may have been in line with Washington's desire to stabilize oil prices). Perhaps most importantly, India's military remains reliant on Russian arms. Recently, they started to somewhat distance themselves from the Russian defense industry, but India still calculates that a strong relationship with Moscow is necessary to prevent isolationism that would push them further into China's strategic orbit.This limits India's commitment to one of the main American security architectures in the Indo-Pacific, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Russian arms are not interoperable with the rest of the QUAD's forces, which could dampen air and sea superiority in a crisis. But even if India tried to fully transition away from Russian arms, Russia has sold them the largest share of weapons for decades. The limited interoperability of Russian and American arms complicates any large-scale shift by magnifying costs and risking Indian defenses in the meantime. Regardless of how the American relationship develops, Russia will continue to be a fixture in Indian security interests for the foreseeable future. India has new concerns about American reliability, especially after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Already, there are concerns that the weapons left behind are arming Kashmir separatists trying to split from India in favor of Pakistan. While relations under the Trump administration were not hostile, a return to an 'America First' foreign policy could make India calculate they need to hedge their bets away from the United States if they don't trust Trump's willingness to assist in a crisis.Perhaps the most recent flash point in the relationship was the attempted assassination against Sikh activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, an American citizen, on American soil. All signs point to Indian officials being directly involved with the plot, which could be unacceptable to the United States.This points to a broader divergence between New Delhi and Washington: Indian democratic backsliding. It seems increasingly doubtful that Indo-American relations, as some have argued, can be grounded by shared ideological values. The rise of Hindu nationalism has tarnished Indian democracy, leading to discriminatory legislation against Muslim Indians and a substantial increase in hate crimes. Modi himself recently implied Muslims were "infiltrators," a common Islamophobic trope in Hindu nationalist hate speech. Outside extra-judicial killings, Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has increasingly escalated assaults against India's democratic principles. Political opponents, from politicians to activists to journalists, have been jailed under the pretense of anti-corruption measures, with peaceful protests violently stamped out. Most measurements of democratization have downgraded democratic India's status to "partly free" or even an "electoral autocracy."None of this is to gloss over the United States' electoral flaws, but India's trajectory is directly contradictory to the "shared values" expressed in the joint summits and implies that should security interests diverge, there won't be much tethering Indo-American coordination.Indian Multi-Alignment and Great Power AmbitionsIt is undeniable that Modi's foreign policy choices are motivated by great power desires. India is the world's most populous country and in a position to surge economically. A consumer boom and wage growth are likely incoming, with plenty of room for industries to meet the needs of the growing consumer class. Its population size will create a powerhouse working class to power growing markets for emerging technologies, clean energy, and businesses seeking new supply chains outside of China. Additionally, India is increasingly trying to position itself as the voice of the Global South, which often puts it in opposition to American and European interests. India has one of the strongest militaries in Asia and the ability to project power regionally. The Indian Ocean's name is no coincidence. India will not give up regional hegemony without a fight. To achieve these goals, India cannot play second fiddle to America forever. It is increasingly clear that India's strategic approach is to keep its options open so it can take advantage of whatever side best suits its interests. This is not to imply that there will be an imminent breakup. For the time being, there is a growing bipartisan understanding in Washington that China is the largest long-term threat to American security, which makes for a natural partnership with India, which fears Chinese territorial encroachment. India's threat perceptions seem to be locked in after military crises in 2014, 2017, 2020, and 2022.As of now, the BJP is positioned to maintain power after the 2024 election, making it unlikely to impact the trajectory of the relationship barring an unforeseen anti-American faction gaining footing. Should the party expand its hold over Parliament, the surface of the relationship may remain the same, but centralizing Modi's power would only exacerbate his authoritarian and hawkish leanings.Still, India's growing illiberalism shouldn't be a barrier for the moment. The United States has a long history of working with dictatorships that have questionable human rights records. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pinochet-controlled Chile immediately come to mind. Security interests frequently trump moral qualms. But should the security situation change — as a result of U.S.-China rapprochement, a surprise change in Indian or American leadership, or a crisis of credibility — policymakers may find that there is not much at the core of the relationship. India may be useful to American strategists who want to balance China for now, but make no mistake, India will not sacrifice its core interests to appease the United States. Security relationships can seem momentarily strong, but they are a house of cards vulnerable to shifting geopolitical winds.

Robert Fico has long been a dominant figure in Slovakia, having served as prime minister from 2006-10, 2012-18, and then 2023-present. He has upset many believers in transatlantic unity for various reasons — chiefly his opposition to the West's arming of Ukraine, which shares a 60-mile border with Slovakia. Depicting the war there as an "American-Russian conflict," Fico campaigned last year on giving Kyiv "not another bullet." Often characterized as a "pro-Kremlin" politician, he has criticized Western sanctions on Moscow.On May 15, Fico was the target of an assassination attempt. A gunman shot him five times at close range in Handlová, a small town in central Slovakia. Fico survived albeit in critical condition. The attack marked the first assassination attempt on a European prime minister in 21 years. According to Interior Minister Matúš Šutaj Eštok, the alleged assailant, Juraj Cintula, was politically motivated and possibly not acting alone. The attempt occurred shortly after presidential elections, which one of Fico's allies, Peter Pellegrini, won in the second round.Political and social divisionsSlovakia's politics are extremely polarized. Among Slovaks, many staunchly support Fico while many others loathe him. There are those in the country who embrace Western-style liberalism and believe Bratislava's foreign policy should be closely aligned with its Western allies in NATO and the EU, both of which Slovakia joined in 2004. On the conservative end of the spectrum, a majority of Slovak voters support Fico's government as a defender of Slovak traditions by, for example, rejecting "gender ideology.""Each group not only holds different visions for Slovakia's future but also perceives the other's agenda as a direct threat to their way of life and values, and this is exaggerated and weaponized as a means of political capital," Zuzana Palovic, co-author of "Czechoslovakia: Behind the Iron Curtain," told RS.The murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée in 2018, the government's COVID response, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 all deepened polarization in Slovakia. Fico's government routinely criticizes the opposition for serving the Western liberal order while his opponents attack him for being too Moscow-friendly and rolling back media freedoms. Many point to Russian propaganda as a significant driver of polarization in this former Soviet satellite, which is the case in other EU member-states too.In the 2020-23 period, a number of Fico's political allies were indicted for corruption and subsequently convicted. "While some of the cases were half-baked, Fico's defense always has been that everything is just a political witch hunt—yes, he sounds like Trump here," according to Andrej Matišák, a journalist who works for the Slovak daily Pravda. "By undermining the work of policemen, prosecutors, and judges, he created another piece of the polarization puzzle," he told RS."The Slovak politicians themselves contributed to the status quo in Slovakia. Political accusations are never ending in Slovakia," said Lívia Benko, a research fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. "The recent political landscape reveals that the number of hateful statements from politicians is on the rise," she added.The assassination attempt has exacerbated tensions within Slovak society. Outgoing President Zuzana Čaputová has emphasized the need to prevent further escalation. But her appeal thus far appears to be ignored by both sides of the political spectrum."The appeal for calmness and unity is not being respected to the extent it should be by either the polarized society, in which family members do not speak to each other over politics, nor by the coalition and opposition," Benko noted."The current political landscape in which politicians and their family members are getting threatening letters is very complex," she added. "Slovak politics are full of conspiracy theories and disinformation. This is all reflected on social media platforms."Talk of 'civil war'Following the assassination attempt, Eštok warned that the country is "on the edge of a civil war" due to the rhetoric on social media. According to Palovic, such language coming from the minister "reflects concerns about the stability and unity of Slovakia — mentally, emotionally, and socially."Matišák said Eštok's talk of civil war was understandable given the powerful emotions at that moment. But he also described it as a "very unfortunate statement.""Only the government has the means to start the civil war, and, in that case, it wouldn't even be a civil war; it would be some kind of putsch against the democratic regime in Slovakia. I don't believe that will happen, so I read the minister's words as an attempt to communicate with his own electorate to suggest that first of all the 'other side' is responsible for what happened. As I said, it is unfortunate, and he should know better," Matišák said."It's the rhetorical equivalent of firefighters starting their job by throwing a canister of gas into the fire," Matej Kandrík, a co-founder of Adapt Institute, a Bratislava-based think tank, told RS."It's both irresponsible and dangerous. Slovakia is nowhere close to a civil war. Unfortunately, [Eštok] is speaking like he is a candidate running in the election and not as a minister of the interior."The road aheadUnsurprisingly, this month's assassination attempt has clearly raised serious concerns about the trajectory of Slovakia's deep-seated societal and political divisions. What comes next will depend heavily on the government's actions, according to Benko, particularly regarding how the state may use the attack as a pretext for cracking down on the opposition and independent civil society groups and media.Doing so, on the other hand, could negatively affect its standing with the EU, an important source of financial and development assistance."The terrible shape of public finances increased the relative importance of EU funds for Slovakia. Suppose the European Commission will stay adamant about protecting the rule of law and the quality of democracy. In that case, it should prevent the most aggressive moves to solidify the power of the government," Kandrík told RS. "Still, I expect the situation to worsen for all pro-democratic actors.""In a normal country, the normal reaction would be for all political elites to lock themselves around the principles of democracy and the rule of law. However, it seems that some people in Slovakia, especially from the pro-government spectrum, are intensifying the polarization," said the Slovak journalist."I am afraid that the main aim of the majority of the players from the governing coalition is to use the current events to strengthen their grip on power [rather than] to calm down the situation. On the other hand, I very much hope I will be proved wrong."Implications for US foreign policyBack in the 1990s, when the autocratic leader Vladimir Mečiar was independent Slovakia's first prime minister, the Slovak government basically ran the country like a mafia state. In the mid-1990s, NATO delayed Slovakia's membership application due to the country's domestic issues. By 1998, then-U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright called Slovakia a "black hole in the center of Europe." That was only six years before it joined the transatlantic alliance and the EU.Today, Washington has much at stake in the future of Slovakia, which sits on the fault line of a divided Europe. Having militarily cooperated closely with the U.S. since 1993, Slovakia remains an important U.S. ally on NATO's eastern flank at a time of intensified hostilities between Russia and the West.Amid a period in which Fico and Hungary's Viktor Orbán increasingly align their countries with Moscow in ways that many Western policymakers believe is a thorn in the EU's side, debates over how Washington and Brussels should try to influence these "renegade EU leaders" in Bratislava and Budapest are sensitive. There is reason to consider how Western pressure on these Russia-friendly NATO and EU members has potential to backfire in ways that further erode the West's unity against Moscow.This month's attempted assassination risks manifesting in an exacerbation of Slovakia's internal tensions, as well as those between Bratislava and Brussels. This would be especially so if Fico's government pushes through initiatives that weaken the rule-of-law. Although the immediate implications of the attempt on Fico's life for Washington's interests are currently difficult to assess, instability in Slovakia could have major ramifications for U.S. foreign policy interests in this part of Europe, particularly within the context of the continent's evolving security architecture.

For the United States to commit itself in advance to take the side of some other country that becomes involved in an international conflict is an extraordinary step that is justified only under extraordinary circumstances. There needs to be a credible external threat to the country being protected. And there must be enough commonality of interests and values between the United States and the protected state that the difference between that state falling or not falling to external aggression is highly significant for U.S. interests.A possible standard for measuring the appropriateness of security commitments is the grandest such U.S. commitment, under the North Atlantic Treaty. Whatever one may think of NATO's later expansion and out-of-area activities, the circumstances justifying a U.S. security commitment were present when the alliance was created in the late 1940s. The Soviet Union's military had overrun Eastern Europe and converted its states into satellite communist dictatorships. If the then-fragile democracies of Western Europe experienced the same fate, the result would have been disastrous for U.S. interests.Nothing remotely resembling those circumstances exists today in the Persian Gulf region. No Red Army is poised to take over the region. No would-be regional hegemon exists. Certainly not Iran, weakened by sanctions, preoccupied with internal divisions, and facing the disadvantage of being an ethnic and religious minority in a region that is largely Arab and Sunni.Saudi Arabia is the state that has had the most recent go at something approaching regional hegemony. It has employed military force outside its borders to prop up an unpopular regime in Bahrain and, on a much larger scale, to try to impose its will on Yemen through a highly destructive air war. That attempt failed, and Riyadh evidently has come to realize that its security is better served through accommodation rather than a quest for domination.Nor is there anything in the region like the difference, in terms of values and interests, that there was in 1940s Europe between Western democracies and Soviet satellite dictatorships. The Gulf Arab states are absolute monarchies. The only thing in those states that sounds close to democracy is a mostly elected National Assembly in Kuwait, but whenever that body gets too noisy and difficult to suit the ruling regime, the emir simply dissolves it.Despite these circumstances, the Biden administration is extending security guarantees to Gulf states, most recently by signing a Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Bahrain. The agreement commits the United States, "in the event of external aggression or the threat of external aggression" against Bahrain, to "immediately meet at the most senior levels to determine additional defense needs and to develop and implement appropriate defense and deterrent responses as decided upon by the Parties, including in the economic, military, and/or political realms."An anonymous administration official took pains to point out that the agreement is not a treaty and therefore does not need approval by the U.S. Senate. But apparently seeking to have it both ways, the official also stated that the agreement is "legally binding."No effort was made to identify what external aggression the parties have in mind. Iran, of course, is the state that automatically gets mentioned as a supposed threat. But the image of Iran mustering a D-Day-like invasion fleet and crossing the gulf to conduct an amphibious invasion of Bahrain is so fanciful as to be absurd (whether or not U.S. warships were in the gulf).Bahrain certainly has had its differences with Iran, probably at least as much as does any other member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Historical baggage in the relationship includes an old Iranian claim to Bahrain as the "14th province" of Iran, but in recent decades Iran has not tried to act on any such claim. The situation is quite unlike, say, the one involving Taiwan, in which China constantly declares to the world that it considers the island a part of China and periodically uses military saber-rattling to advertise the possibility of an invasion.To the extent the regime in Bahrain faces a security threat, it involves not external aggression but instead internal strife stemming from an unpopular Sunni regime repressing a largely Shia population. The Saudi military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 was intended to help the Bahraini regime suppress an Arab Spring-era popular uprising.The regime oppression and popular discontent continue. This year, Bahraini prisoners conducted a months-long hunger strike to protest harsh conditions in the prison. The hunger strike was suspended when the regime, on the eve of crown prince's trip to Washington to sign the new security agreement, eased some of the conditions. But Bahrain remains a serious violator of human rights.The unlikelihood of any external aggression against Bahrain means the clause in the new agreement that dictates the response to such aggression probably will not be invoked. The disadvantages of the agreement lie principally in two other areas. One involves getting more deeply in bed with an oppressive regime, with everything that implies regarding the U.S. image among, and relations with, the Bahraini population and Shia generally, among others. Many external and internal critics of Bahrain are reportedly angered and disappointed by the agreement. The director of the Britain-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy said that Bahraini authorities would interpret the agreement as a "green light" to increase political repression.The other main ill consequence of the agreement is that it runs counter to and undercuts a beneficial trend toward reducing international tensions in the Persian Gulf region. Bahrain's fellow GCC members have all been moving in the direction of warmer, less confrontational, relations with Iran. Kuwait and Oman have long had businesslike relations with Tehran and have at times served as diplomatic intermediaries for others. Similarly with Qatar, which shares with Iran exploitation of a huge gas field. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has been improving its relations with Tehran, and this month Saudi Arabia and Iran exchanged ambassadors as implementation of their agreement earlier this year to restore diplomatic relations.The issue of confrontation versus rapprochement with Iran gets into the larger game that the Biden administration is playing and of which the Bahrain agreement is only a part. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during the signing ceremony, "We're looking forward to using this agreement as a framework for additional countries that may wish to join us in strengthening regional stability, economic cooperation and technological innovation."The additional country the administration clearly has most in mind is Saudi Arabia, which has identified a security pact with the United States as part of the price it is demanding in return for upgrading its already significant relationship with Israel to full diplomatic relations. The administration evidently hopes the agreement with Bahrain can be a model for the kind of pact that would satisfy the Saudi demand while bypassing likely opposition on Capitol Hill.Despite the effort the administration is putting into brokering an agreement to upgrade relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, it still has not explained how any such agreement would serve either U.S. interests or the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East. In fact, it would do neither, and instead would only prolong and even increase confrontation and instability in the region. To understand why, note the principal Israeli objectives in seeking exchanges of embassies and ambassadors with the Persian Gulf Arab states, with which it is not at war.One objective is to intensify and institutionalize confrontation with, and fear and loathing of, Iran, thereby keeping it as a bête noire that can be blamed for all problems in the region and divert international attention from any problems that involve Israel's conduct. This means more, not less, tension and risk of escalation in the Persian Gulf region. And that is even before considering more of the Saudi regime's price for upgrading relations with the Israelis, including more unrestricted arms sales and help with a Saudi nuclear program.The other Israeli objective is to demonstrate that Israel can enjoy normal relations with regional states while continuing its occupation of Palestinian-inhabited territory. Far from being a "peace" agreement, an upgrading of relations with Saudi Arabia — like the earlier upgrading with Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE — would be about Israel not making peace with the Palestinians.Given the extreme right-wing nature of the Israeli government, led by a prime minister determined to keep his coalition intact and keep himself away from prosecution for corruption, any gesture toward the Palestinians that Riyadh and Washington could wring out of Israel would be little more than that — a gesture. It is inconceivable that the current Israeli government would do anything substantial that would bring closer a Palestinian state or any other resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.In short, the administration's project of buying an upgrade of Arab relations with Israel is not justified. And thus, neither is the agreement with Bahrain that is one part of that project.