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If the idea of familiarizing individuals with savings is an old one, it is especially since the early 2000s that the economist's modern concept of financial literacy has been the object of particular attention. The literature, essentially empirical, has developed considerably since then. It is during this period that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched its Financial Literacy Programme.The objective of this chapter was to describe financial literacy and financial education programs in Western Europe: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. A first observation concerns financial literacy: to varying degrees, the residents of these countries are far from financially literate. A second observation concerns the heterogeneity of financial literacy. In all countries, financial literacy depends on age, education, and gender (higher among men, older people, and graduates). Some determinants appear to be more specific to the culture of each country (for example, political opinion in France, political past history in Germany (West vs. East), or language area in Switzerland). Finally, it appears that financial education programs have been in Western Europe since the mid-2000s, probably offered more systematically in centralized countries. ; Si l'idée de familiariser les individus avec les outils de l'épargne n'est pas nouvelle, c'est surtout depuis le début des années 2000 que le concept moderne de littéracie financière s'est développé chez les économistes. La littérature dans ce domaine, essentiellement empirique, s'est depuis lors considérablement enrichie. C'est aussi à cette période que l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques(OCDE) a d'ailleurs lancé son programme d'éducation financière pour développer la culture financière des ménages. L'objectif de cet article est de décrire les programmes de culture financière et d'éducation financière en Europe occidentale:France, Allemagne, Italie, Espagne, Suisse et Pays-Bas. Un premier constat ...

International audience ; In this paper, I show that Polleit and Mariano (2011) are right in concluding that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are per se unobjectionable from Rothbard's libertarian perspective on property rights and contract theory, but that they fail to derive this conclusion properly. I therefore outline the proper explanation. In addition, though Polleit and Mariano are correct in pointing out that speculation with CDS can conceivably hurt the borrowers' interests, they fail to grasp that this can be the case only in some peculiar circumstances that I identify. In other words, they miss the bigger picture, the one outside special circumstances, in which CDS trading has the opposite effect. That is, CDS facilitate debt accumulation, including government debt accumulation. Finally, I point out how this can precipitate the collapse of fiat money regimes. An incidental goal of the analysis is to provide a better account than Polleit and Mariano of recent government interventions in and around CDS markets.

International audience ; In this paper, I show that Polleit and Mariano (2011) are right in concluding that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are per se unobjectionable from Rothbard's libertarian perspective on property rights and contract theory, but that they fail to derive this conclusion properly. I therefore outline the proper explanation. In addition, though Polleit and Mariano are correct in pointing out that speculation with CDS can conceivably hurt the borrowers' interests, they fail to grasp that this can be the case only in some peculiar circumstances that I identify. In other words, they miss the bigger picture, the one outside special circumstances, in which CDS trading has the opposite effect. That is, CDS facilitate debt accumulation, including government debt accumulation. Finally, I point out how this can precipitate the collapse of fiat money regimes. An incidental goal of the analysis is to provide a better account than Polleit and Mariano of recent government interventions in and around CDS markets.

International audience ; As well as the current one, the wave of globalization culminated in 1913 was marked by increasing accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. But what did 'reserves' mean in the past, how were they managed, and how much relevant are the differences between then and now? This paper is the first attempt to investigate 19 th-century reserve management from central banks' perspective. Building on a significant case study (the National Bank of Belgium, i.e. the 'inventor' of foreign exchange policy, in the 1850s), it shows that risk management practices in the past differed considerably from nowadays. The structure of the international monetary system allowed central banks to minimize financial risk, while poor institutional design enhanced operational risk: this is in stark contrast with the present situation, in which operational risk has been minimized and financial risk has considerably increased. Yet 19 th-century reserve management was apparently not conducive to major losses for central banks, while the opposite seems to have been the case in the 21 st century.

International audience ; As well as the current one, the wave of globalization culminated in 1913 was marked by increasing accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. But what did 'reserves' mean in the past, how were they managed, and how much relevant are the differences between then and now? This paper is the first attempt to investigate 19 th-century reserve management from central banks' perspective. Building on a significant case study (the National Bank of Belgium, i.e. the 'inventor' of foreign exchange policy, in the 1850s), it shows that risk management practices in the past differed considerably from nowadays. The structure of the international monetary system allowed central banks to minimize financial risk, while poor institutional design enhanced operational risk: this is in stark contrast with the present situation, in which operational risk has been minimized and financial risk has considerably increased. Yet 19 th-century reserve management was apparently not conducive to major losses for central banks, while the opposite seems to have been the case in the 21 st century.

Stock market indices are today a vital and daily tool for both economists and actors in the financial world. The multiplication and the very importance given to these indices raise the question of their accuracy and of the reliability of the methods that are used to construct them. We begin an investigation on these questions by studying the early history of these indices. We show that stock market indices appeared in the daily press in the United States at the end of the 19th century; that around World War One, they became the focus of the interest of very different groups of people, so that their construction became a more complex and specialized task. The scientific study of indices did not result initially from the stock market's importance in finance (for firms financing, for savers' portfolio choices or for investment banks' decisions), since most of the initial interest came from economists that looked at the stock market only as a measure or an index of the macroeconomic situation. The development of indices dedicated to financial studies came only in the late 1920s, and accelerated only with the birth of modern finance. This article describes the origins of stock-market indices in the interwar period, with an emphasis on France and the United States. It links this evolution with contemporary economic theories, index number theory, financial practices, and the other motivations of their authors. It examines the consequences of the methodological choices that were made and suggests that they had a surprisingly large impact on the results. In particular, we analyse in detail the motivations and technical characteristics of the most important indices that were produced during the interwar period by the French government statistical office (the Statistique générale de la France or SGF). We suggest that these indices cannot be easily compared to most usually discussed indices for other countries and that new calculations are required before international comparisons. ; Les indices boursiers sont aujourd'hui ...

Stock market indices are today a vital and daily tool for both economists and actors in the financial world. The multiplication and the very importance given to these indices raise the question of their accuracy and of the reliability of the methods that are used to construct them. We begin an investigation on these questions by studying the early history of these indices. We show that stock market indices appeared in the daily press in the United States at the end of the 19th century; that around World War One, they became the focus of the interest of very different groups of people, so that their construction became a more complex and specialized task. The scientific study of indices did not result initially from the stock market's importance in finance (for firms financing, for savers' portfolio choices or for investment banks' decisions), since most of the initial interest came from economists that looked at the stock market only as a measure or an index of the macroeconomic situation. The development of indices dedicated to financial studies came only in the late 1920s, and accelerated only with the birth of modern finance. This article describes the origins of stock-market indices in the interwar period, with an emphasis on France and the United States. It links this evolution with contemporary economic theories, index number theory, financial practices, and the other motivations of their authors. It examines the consequences of the methodological choices that were made and suggests that they had a surprisingly large impact on the results. In particular, we analyse in detail the motivations and technical characteristics of the most important indices that were produced during the interwar period by the French government statistical office (the Statistique générale de la France or SGF). We suggest that these indices cannot be easily compared to most usually discussed indices for other countries and that new calculations are required before international comparisons. ; Les indices boursiers sont aujourd'hui omniprésents aussi bien dans la vie des affaires que dans la réflexion des économistes et des théoriciens de la finance. Leur multiplication soulève la question de la pertinence de leurs méthodes de construction et de leur adéquation aux problèmes auxquels on les applique. Cet article étudie l'histoire des indices boursiers pour éclairer cette question. Il montre que si les premiers indices sont apparus dans la presse financière américaine à la fin du 19ème siècle, le véritable développement de cet instrument de mesure a lieu autour de la première guerre mondiale, lorsqu'ils éveillent l'intérêt d'économistes professionnels qui leur appliquent les méthodes statistiques inventées à d'autres usages. Ainsi, ces indices servent initialement à l'observation de la situation macroéconomique davantage qu'à des études proprement financières. Ce n'est, au plus tôt, que dans la deuxième moitié des années 1920 que les besoins croissants de l'analyse financière reprennent l'usage des indices, et remodèlent ceux-ci selon leurs besoins. Cette histoire est racontée ici en comparant la situation française à celles des Etats-Unis. On tente d'expliquer les spécificités françaises en remettant le développement des indices à la fois dans le contexte intellectuel, institutionnel et économique de la France des années 1920 et 1930. La diffusion des méthodes statistiques, l'invention de la macroéconomie puis de la théorie financière, l'organisation statistique (Statistique générale de la France vs NBER et Review of Economic Statistics), et les caractéristiques des marchés financiers ont tous un impact sur les spécificités nationales en matière de construction comme d'usage des indices. Enfin, une analyse détaillée de quelques indices majeurs montre que les choix techniques de construction ont un impact majeur sur les évolutions observées, ce qui implique des précautions pour leur utilisation rétrospective.

Stock market indices are today a vital and daily tool for both economists and actors in the financial world. The multiplication and the very importance given to these indices raise the question of their accuracy and of the reliability of the methods that are used to construct them. We begin an investigation on these questions by studying the early history of these indices. We show that stock market indices appeared in the daily press in the United States at the end of the 19th century; that around World War One, they became the focus of the interest of very different groups of people, so that their construction became a more complex and specialized task. The scientific study of indices did not result initially from the stock market's importance in finance (for firms financing, for savers' portfolio choices or for investment banks' decisions), since most of the initial interest came from economists that looked at the stock market only as a measure or an index of the macroeconomic situation. The development of indices dedicated to financial studies came only in the late 1920s, and accelerated only with the birth of modern finance. This article describes the origins of stock-market indices in the interwar period, with an emphasis on France and the United States. It links this evolution with contemporary economic theories, index number theory, financial practices, and the other motivations of their authors. It examines the consequences of the methodological choices that were made and suggests that they had a surprisingly large impact on the results. In particular, we analyse in detail the motivations and technical characteristics of the most important indices that were produced during the interwar period by the French government statistical office (the Statistique générale de la France or SGF). We suggest that these indices cannot be easily compared to most usually discussed indices for other countries and that new calculations are required before international comparisons. ; Les indices boursiers sont aujourd'hui ...

Stock market indices are today a vital and daily tool for both economists and actors in the financial world. The multiplication and the very importance given to these indices raise the question of their accuracy and of the reliability of the methods that are used to construct them. We begin an investigation on these questions by studying the early history of these indices. We show that stock market indices appeared in the daily press in the United States at the end of the 19th century; that around World War One, they became the focus of the interest of very different groups of people, so that their construction became a more complex and specialized task. The scientific study of indices did not result initially from the stock market's importance in finance (for firms financing, for savers' portfolio choices or for investment banks' decisions), since most of the initial interest came from economists that looked at the stock market only as a measure or an index of the macroeconomic situation. The development of indices dedicated to financial studies came only in the late 1920s, and accelerated only with the birth of modern finance. This article describes the origins of stock-market indices in the interwar period, with an emphasis on France and the United States. It links this evolution with contemporary economic theories, index number theory, financial practices, and the other motivations of their authors. It examines the consequences of the methodological choices that were made and suggests that they had a surprisingly large impact on the results. In particular, we analyse in detail the motivations and technical characteristics of the most important indices that were produced during the interwar period by the French government statistical office (the Statistique générale de la France or SGF). We suggest that these indices cannot be easily compared to most usually discussed indices for other countries and that new calculations are required before international comparisons. ; Les indices boursiers sont aujourd'hui omniprésents aussi bien dans la vie des affaires que dans la réflexion des économistes et des théoriciens de la finance. Leur multiplication soulève la question de la pertinence de leurs méthodes de construction et de leur adéquation aux problèmes auxquels on les applique. Cet article étudie l'histoire des indices boursiers pour éclairer cette question. Il montre que si les premiers indices sont apparus dans la presse financière américaine à la fin du 19ème siècle, le véritable développement de cet instrument de mesure a lieu autour de la première guerre mondiale, lorsqu'ils éveillent l'intérêt d'économistes professionnels qui leur appliquent les méthodes statistiques inventées à d'autres usages. Ainsi, ces indices servent initialement à l'observation de la situation macroéconomique davantage qu'à des études proprement financières. Ce n'est, au plus tôt, que dans la deuxième moitié des années 1920 que les besoins croissants de l'analyse financière reprennent l'usage des indices, et remodèlent ceux-ci selon leurs besoins. Cette histoire est racontée ici en comparant la situation française à celles des Etats-Unis. On tente d'expliquer les spécificités françaises en remettant le développement des indices à la fois dans le contexte intellectuel, institutionnel et économique de la France des années 1920 et 1930. La diffusion des méthodes statistiques, l'invention de la macroéconomie puis de la théorie financière, l'organisation statistique (Statistique générale de la France vs NBER et Review of Economic Statistics), et les caractéristiques des marchés financiers ont tous un impact sur les spécificités nationales en matière de construction comme d'usage des indices. Enfin, une analyse détaillée de quelques indices majeurs montre que les choix techniques de construction ont un impact majeur sur les évolutions observées, ce qui implique des précautions pour leur utilisation rétrospective.

International audience ; In this article, tests for globalization and contagion are separated using an ex ante definition of crises, and contagion tests are neutralized with respect to globalization effects. A large database is constructed to study the stability of correlation matrices for four asset classes : equities, government bonds, and corporate bonds – investment grade and high yield – in four geographical zones. Overall, the results confirm the instability of correlations and point to a combination of globalization and flight to quality, while emphasizing that contagion on the equity markets appears as an artifact due to globalization.

International audience ; In this article, tests for globalization and contagion are separated using an ex ante definition of crises, and contagion tests are neutralized with respect to globalization effects. A large database is constructed to study the stability of correlation matrices for four asset classes : equities, government bonds, and corporate bonds – investment grade and high yield – in four geographical zones. Overall, the results confirm the instability of correlations and point to a combination of globalization and flight to quality, while emphasizing that contagion on the equity markets appears as an artifact due to globalization.

This paper analyzes the sensitivity of the three Fama-French factors in relation to the US economic uncertainty, by using three proxies of uncertainty measures in macroeconomics, financial markets or economic policy from January 1985 to December 2011. We examine the extent, speed and duration of response of the three (market, size and value) risk premia to movements in the US uncertainties under low and high volatility regimes through the Markov-regime switching VAR model. We find clearly two (high and low) volatility regimes, where each regime is highly persistent. The high volatility regime is the prevailing regime between periods of 2000 to 2003, and 2008 to the end of 2012. We show a negative effect of changes in financial and economic policy uncertainties on value risk premia during the high volatility regime. This finding imply that investors move to growth stocks from value stocks in high volatility regime when volatility is expected to increase. The latter suggests that value firms can be more risky than growth firms during high volatility periods. We also propose an aggregate measure of economic uncertainty by using Principal Component Analysis based on the three uncertainty proxies. The results on value risk premia are confirmed. We find a negative relationship between the market risk premium and the change in the economic uncertainty index in high volatility regime. Finally, by adding a liquidity risk factor we find a positive effect of financial uncertainty on liquidity factor during the high volatility regime, suggesting that investors preferring liquidity stocks when market uncertainty increases.

If the idea of familiarizing individuals with savings is an old one, it is especially since the early 2000s that the economist's modern concept of financial literacy has been the object of particular attention. The literature, essentially empirical, has developed considerably since then. It is during this period that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched its Financial Literacy Programme.The objective of this chapter was to describe financial literacy and financial education programs in Western Europe: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. A first observation concerns financial literacy: to varying degrees, the residents of these countries are far from financially literate. A second observation concerns the heterogeneity of financial literacy. In all countries, financial literacy depends on age, education, and gender (higher among men, older people, and graduates). Some determinants appear to be more specific to the culture of each country (for example, political opinion in France, political past history in Germany (West vs. East), or language area in Switzerland). Finally, it appears that financial education programs have been in Western Europe since the mid-2000s, probably offered more systematically in centralized countries. ; Si l'idée de familiariser les individus avec les outils de l'épargne n'est pas nouvelle, c'est surtout depuis le début des années 2000 que le concept moderne de littéracie financière s'est développé chez les économistes. La littérature dans ce domaine, essentiellement empirique, s'est depuis lors considérablement enrichie. C'est aussi à cette période que l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques(OCDE) a d'ailleurs lancé son programme d'éducation financière pour développer la culture financière des ménages. L'objectif de cet article est de décrire les programmes de culture financière et d'éducation financière en Europe occidentale:France, Allemagne, Italie, Espagne, Suisse et Pays-Bas. Un premier constat ...

International audience In this paper, I show that Polleit and Mariano (2011) are right in concluding that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are per se unobjectionable from Rothbard's libertarian perspective on property rights and contract theory, but that they fail to derive this conclusion properly. I therefore outline the proper explanation. In addition, though Polleit and Mariano are correct in pointing out that speculation with CDS can conceivably hurt the borrowers' interests, they fail to grasp that this can be the case only in some peculiar circumstances that I identify. In other words, they miss the bigger picture, the one outside special circumstances, in which CDS trading has the opposite effect. That is, CDS facilitate debt accumulation, including government debt accumulation. Finally, I point out how this can precipitate the collapse of fiat money regimes. An incidental goal of the analysis is to provide a better account than Polleit and Mariano of recent government interventions in and around CDS markets.

Forthcoming, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control International audience Recent estimates of the output Euler equation for the United States indicate that the elasticity of aggregate demand to interest rates is not significantly different from zero. We first argue that this result may hide a structural break: the estimated elasticity is a convolution of two coefficients with opposite signs across the samples 1965-1979 and 1982-2003. The sign of the coefficient in the earlier sample is inconsistent with standard economic theory and intuition. We outline a model with limited asset markets participation that can generate this change in sign when asset market participation changes from low to high, and provide institutional evidence for such a change in the United States in the late 70s and early 80s.