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Islam in Indonesian and Malay world is very much heterogenuous. Taking Islam Liberal, Islam Hadhari, and Islam Progresif as the subject of analysis, this article deals with the concepts Islam Liberal, Islam Hadhari, and Islam Progresif as products of the trends in Islamic thinking, the impact of these three interpretations of Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia, the similarities and dissimilarities between the three, and their future prospects in the region. It argues that the prominence of the debates surrounding the three currents of Islamic thought is the result of struggles for power and authority in Islamic discourse in the region. It further argues that the Indonesian-based Islam Liberal differs from the Malaysian-based Islam Hadhari in that it does not originate from government sources. Islam Progresif is more of an umbrella term referring to various strands of thought developed by Muslims opposed to the status quo. Although Islam Hadhari is a newly-coined term, it contains many elements in common with other schools of Islamic thought including Islam Liberal and neo-modernist Islam.

In the post-Soviet era, democracy has made little progress in Central Asia. In Chaos, Violence, Dynasty, Eric McGlinchey presents a compelling comparative study of the divergent political courses taken by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan in the wake of Soviet rule. McGlinchey examines economics, religion, political legacies, foreign investment, and the ethnicity of these countries to evaluate the relative success of political structures in each nation. McGlinchey explains the impact of Soviet policy on the region, from Lenin to Gorbachev. Ruling from a distance, a minimally invasive system of patronage proved the most successful over time, but planted the seeds for current "neo-patrimonial" governments. The level of direct Soviet involvement during perestroika was the major determinant in the stability of ensuing governments. Soviet manipulations of the politics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the late 1980s solidified the role of elites, while in Kyrgyzstan the Soviets looked away as leadership crumbled during the ethnic riots of 1990. Today, Kyrgyzstan is the poorest and most politically unstable country in the region, thanks to a small, corrupt, and fractured political elite. In Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov maintains power through the brutal suppression of disaffected Muslims, who are nevertheless rising in numbers and influence. In Kazakhstan, a political machine fueled by oil wealth and patronage underlies the greatest economic equity in the region, and far less political violence. McGlinchey's timely study calls for a more realistic and flexible view of the successful aspects of authoritarian systems in the region that will be needed if there is to be any potential benefit from foreign engagement with the nations of Central Asia, and similar political systems globally

In the last quarter of the 20th century, the political processes in the Islamic world showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that religion is still a viable part of public life in the Muslim countries. Moreover, certain states, such as Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, have restored religion to its rightful place in their policy. The comment by American political scientist John Esposito to the effect that Islamic ideology, symbols, slogans, and actors became prominent fixtures in Muslim politics suits these countries well. The stable influence of Islam on sociopolitical life is largely explained by the particular features of Muslim teaching. Islam is usually considered a system that regulates many aspects of people's lives. In this interpretation, Islam is not only a religious system, but also offers a model for organizing society. Moreover, some Muslim scientists believe that sociopolitical activity is a religious duty in Islam, and that it is a religious obligation for a Muslim to remain aware of the political realities around him. The "ideological meaning" of Islam, in the opinion of Shaukat Ali, a representative of Islamic thought, is also increased by the fact that every Muslim is under religious obligation to understand and respect the past. The "past" implies the "unique period" of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs. In this way, the "ideal past" serves as a model for a perfect human society, to which believers should strive. As Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), an Egyptian ideologist of Islamism, claimed that the conflict characteristic of Europe between spiritual and secular principles, between religion and the state, has no place in Islam …The Christian idea of "give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's" is missing here, since everything belongs to Almighty Allah. From this point of view, Islam is not only a religion, but also a "way of life," it contains the solution to social, political, and other secular issues. According to Muslim fundamentalists, reform in Islam does not mean modification or changes in the way of thinking and practice established by the Prophet and his companions, rather "purifying Islam" of "alien" elements which supposedly deprive it of its original clarity, simplicity, and power.

The Masyumi Party, which was active in Indonesia from 1945 to 1960, constitutes the boldest attempt to date at reconciling Islam and democracy. Masyumi proposed a vision of society and government which was not bound by a literalist application of Islamic doctrine but rather inspired by the values of Islam. It set out moderate policies which were tolerant towards other religious communities in Indonesia. Its achievements were nonetheless precarious: it was eventually outlawed in 1960. Many of its leaders then turned to integralism, a radical doctrine echoing certain characteristics of 19th-century Catholic integralism, which contributed to the advent of Muslim neo-fundamentalism in Indonesia. This book examines the Masyumi Party from its roots in early 20th-century Muslim reformism to its contemporary legacy

Informal power structures in Russia and ethno-political conflict in the northern Caucasus / Maxim U. Barbashin -- Islam and the legal system in the northwestern Caucasus / Irina L. Babich -- 'Re-Islamisation' and ethno-nationalism : the Circassians (Adyghe) of the northwestern Caucasus and their diaspora / Chen Bram -- The Republic of Adygheia : perceptions of rights, freedoms and life chances of ordinary people / Cemre Erciyes -- The events of November 1996 in Kabardino-Balkaria and their prehistory / Julietta Meskhidze -- Russian policies towards Islamic extremism in the northern Caucasus and destabilization in Kabardino-Balkaria / Walter Richmond -- Ideology and conflict : Chechen political nationalism prior to, and during, ten years of war / Ekaterina Sokirianskaia -- The Orstkhoy revival : identity and border dispute in the northern Caucasus / Victor A. Shnirelman -- 'I can fight, army against army' : the 1994-1996 Russo-Chechen War, strategies and misconceptions / Yagil Henkin -- Allah's foot soldiers : an assessment of the role of foreign fighters and Al-Qaʻida in the Chechen insurgency / Brian Glyn Williams -- From the challenge of nationalism to the challenge of Islam : the case of Daghestan / Moshe Gammer -- 'Wahhabis, ' Democrats and everything in between : the development of Islamic activism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan / Sofie Bedford -- Demography of north Caucasian Jewry : a note on population dynamics and shifting identity / Mark Tolts

Seit September 2006 trifft sich die vom damaligen Bundesinnenminister Wolfgang Schäuble ins Leben gerufene und nach den Regierungswechseln 2009 und 2013 jeweils neu konstituierte Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK) in regelmäßigen Plenumssitzungen, Arbeitskreistreffen und Tagungen. Unter dem Motto "Muslime in Deutschland - Deutsche Muslime" soll hier erklärterweise die Institutionalisierung des Islams in Deutschland und die Entwicklung eines "deutschen Islams" angestoßen, begleitet und regierungstechnisch angeleitet werden. Das Mittel der Wahl, das politische Instrument hierfür, ist der langfristig angesetzte Dialog, den der deutsche Staat (repräsentiert durch Regierungs- und BehördenvertreterInnen) mit den "Muslimen in Deutschland" (in Person der geladenen DialogpartnerInnen - VertreterInnen von Verbänden und Einzelpersonen) auf der DIK führt. Diesen Islamdialog sehe ich als Feld vielfältiger Auseinandersetzungen, in dem sich ein Prozess spezifischer "Teilwerdung" des Islams in Deutschland beispielhaft betrachten lässt. Mit einem starken Fokus auf die im Dialog entwickelten und angewandten Politiken der als "Muslime" adressierten und zur DIK geladenen IslamvertreterInnen wird den Praktiken der Grenzziehung nachgegangen und nach den Auseinandersetzungen um Bestehen, Transformation und Aufhebung der diskursiven Trennlinie zwischen Islam und Deutschland im politischen Dialog der DIK gefragt. Hierbei geht es nicht zuletzt um die Verhandlung dessen, was es heißt "deutsch" zu sein sowie von Ideen der nationalen Gemeinschaft und Staatsbürgerschaft unter Bedingungen europäischer und globaler Transnationalisierung und Migration. Empirische Grundlage der Untersuchung bilden die Dokumente der ersten Runde der DIK.