Suchergebnisse

The article examines the practices associated with the veneration of the portrait of the Rybnitser Rebbe (Chaim Zanvl Abramovich, 1902–1995) that are currently common among natives of Rybnitsa (now Transnistria). The study is based on field research in Rybnitsa in 2011–2019, as well as on the analysis of hagiographic literature in Yiddish and Hebrew, published in the United States after the death of the rebbe. The ambivalent attitude towards the depiction of the tzaddik is studied in the context of general ideas concerning portraits of rabbis in Hasidism. In many oral narratives, the motive of the constant justification of the practice of referring to the portrait of Chaim Zanvl remains. The image of the rebbe, a portrait printed on canvas, is kept in almost every family that remember the Rybnitser rebbe. The portrait was given to the people of Rybnitsa by the rebbe's widow, who in the early 2000s collected materials for writing a hagiographic book about her husband. The photograph for the portrait was made in the classical style of rabbinical portraits of the 19th and 20th centuries. The Rebbe is depicted sitting over a holy book, in ritual dresses such as tallit with tefillin on his head, looking straight at the viewer. Despite the fact that it is not customary for Jews to have icons, pictures, etc., the interviews reveal the fact that the portrait of the tzaddik functions precisely like holy image. People talk to the portrait and pray to it; they hang it in a significant place at their homes; they keep it as a card in a wallet or as a small picture on key chains, in cars and on phone screensavers. In addition, for people from Rybnitsa the portrait of Chaim Zanvl becomes an icon of Jewish identity, a tool of social connection within the community and beyond.

The analysis attempts to justify a new concept of Ukraine's place in the international security system. According to the results of the study, there was carried out an analysis of the historical preconditions for overcoming the postcolonial factors of the Ukrainian elite. The authors emphasized on the exclusive role of Crimea for the dominant state of the Black Sea region and hypothesized about assigning such a role to Ukraine. The use of the comparative method made it possible to distinguish the mental and behavioral principles of the European, Asian, and African archetype. Ukrainian advantages establish a transition to limiting one's own needs, conscious passionate philanthropy. The normative-value method was used to clarify the historical determinants of Russia's common good. The passionate abilities of the Ukrainian elites were confirmed on the basis of historical regularities, for which the activity method was used. It is recommended to take into account the exceptional importance of the Circumpontian community/civilization, which will eliminate Russia's ambitions within the Black Sea. The regional aspirations of the Russian Federation have faced strong opposition from Turkey and Ukraine in recent years. The European Union's position on Turkey has been described as controversial. Getting rid of a toxic partner competitor of the Russian Federation for the EU will create a new geopolitical reality in which priority will be given to respect for international law. Russia's occupation administrations are pursuing a policy of depletion and destruction in states seeking to break out of its orbit of influence. These were the pro-Russian enclaves of the Black Sea region – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Donbass, Crimea, Transnistria or Pridnestrian region. The builders of the "Russian world" are planning and implementing a plan for the disintegration of the European community, to which A. Merkel drew attention. It is proposed to change the priorities in relation to the modern system of ineffective security system and ...

It was reviewed the concept of the «effective control» in context of neo-institutional theory and practice of the European Court of Human Rights, through which the occupant manages the occupied territories. It was realized the comparative analysis of the three occupation regimes cases operating at the territories of North Cyprus, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. It was described the features of the effective control of occupant in classical military occupations and in occupations by proxy. It was considered the specificity of the occupation facts determination by the European Court of Human Rights: test for the effective territorial control, application of the normative model of occupation in accordance with the Hague Regulation of 1907, the use of special informational base to confirm the existence of occupation regimes at the respective territories. It was paid attention on the emphasis shifting in the modern occupation regimes from the military to the political aspect: from the direct territorial control of the occupant to the powers delegation by the puppet authorities of the local agency. The motive part of the article is based on the neo-institutional approach as the most optimal, methodological basis of the specific institutions study of the modern occupation regimes in the author's opinion. This method allows to identify and characterize the institutional impact of the occupying state on the territories controlled by such state, as directly as through the system of the local puppet authorities. This method also allows to identify and systematize the military, economic, financial and political means of influence through which the occupant provides loyalty of the local political elites and population of the occupied territories. In conclusion to this article it was defined definition of the effective control as a specific institute of modern occupation regimes with the appropriate formal and informal rules of "game" established and supported by the occupant and its agents.

The theoretical framework of this study into the contested identity of the Moldavian population follows postcolonial approaches for a post-Soviet context. It tries to avoid naturalising differences and moves beyond still relevant structuralist and essentialist positions. Instead of biased hegemonic Western formulae and assumptions derived from Cold War dichotomies, our examination employs post-socialist points of view to shine a light on the complex imbrications o f the Moldavian layers of identity. The paper is conceptually rooted in scales of analysis, ranging from local to supranational. But the hybrid, complex and fractured traits of the Moldavian identity cannot be reduced to a constructivist logic, hence differentiation of characteristics by scales is the heuristic tool of choice. As our study points out, from a local point of view and for the purpose of today's Moldavian self-definition, the rural character of the population and the intensifying urban-rural splits were the most significant. The still-evolving differences between Moldovan urban spaces are reminders of the relevance of geographical place. Further characteristics refer to the peculiar circumstances of resisting Romanian centralisation endeavours especially by rural (allegedly Romanian) inhabitants, and the conservation (or even deepening) of urban-rural inequalities of the Soviet era. The assessment of the Moldavian identity differs also according to region. Political debates on the Moldavian territory are far from over, resulting in either enhanced migration or forced expulsions that created cultural cleavages and existential and social dividing lines. Not surprisingly, in now autonomous Gagauzia and separatist Transnistria, the emergence of a Moldavian identity and a rapprochement with Romania are still not unequivocal. Therefore, the Moldavian identity is so inextricably intertwined in time and space that instead of a singular and overarching frame of a putative Moldavian nationalism, multiple nationalisms were at stake, influenced ...

This dissertation is an examination of records relating to the Romanian Orthodox Church during the Second World War. Using primarily resources from The Romanian National Archives in Bucharest, the research focuses primarily on the decisions made by the Church's leaders in the Holy Synod. The Romanian government leading up to the war was a dictatorship led by a king and had a close relationship with the Church.During the war the Church remained close to the central government under Marshall Ion Antonescu, who was an ally to Germany's Hitler. Publicly the Church was one of Antonescu's greatest supporters. The Church's leaders rationalized supporting the Romanian government before and during Antonescu's regime using popular notions of Romanian nationalism. Antonescu reciprocated the Church's support with laws and policies that favored the Romanian Orthodox Church legally and financially above otherconfessions. One of these policies was to put restrictions on certain minority religious groups and outlawing them. Their resources were confiscated and often gifted to local Orthodox parishes. Another important law prohibited Jews from becoming Christians. The Orthodox Church's implementation of this law demonstrates that the Church supported the Romanian government's anti-Jewish philosophy and policies. The actions of other Christians who ignored the prohibition are used as contrasting examples to the Orthodox Church's policy.While the Church did not participate with the Romanian government and military in perpetrating the Holocaust, the Church's strong presence in Transnistria indicates that the Church's clergy had direct knowledge of the violence there. The failure to take action in this area represents a moral failure by an institution that touted itself as Romania's moral compass. Based on the Church's wartime actions it was complicit in the Antonescu regime's crimes. Following the Antonescu regime's collapse in August 1944 the Romanian Orthodox Church quickly reversed its stance on many of its wartime policies.

This article aims to analyze the main changes and factors which have an impact on Romania's foreign policy agenda, considering the fact that our country is a member state of the European Union and also a NATO member. The goal is therefore to identify the possible changes in the decision-making process as far as Romanian foreign policy is concerned, in the context of its accession to the European Union and the major topics that may involve an adaptation to the European Foreign and Security Policy. Romania's accession to the European Union involves that domestic foreign policy structures function in the spirit and according to the European norms, which means that certain changes and transformations need to be assumed in order to be able to fulfil the proposed objectives. This also implies a revision and ongoing adaptation of the main topics on the Romanian foreign policy agenda, such as, for instance, the issue of how viable the deployment of Romanian troops in Iraq is and its implications in the long term on our country's relations with the other EU members as well as with the other allies in NATO, or the conflict in Transnistria. With regard to this matter, it is interesting to point out that this situation has sparked off greater interest among the European audience only over the last few years, as Romania joined the European Union, rendering Brussels more sensitive to this issue which, however, is still far from being properly tackled. This has prompted Romanian decision-makers to consider in a more pragmatic and dynamic manner relations with its Eastern neighbours, through already existing instruments such as the Black Sea strategy and the ones still under elaboration, like the European Danube Strategy. Keywords: foreign policy, Romania, Eastern Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Black Sea Synergy. (Romanian Journal of European Affairs / SWP)

The South Ossetians living under the authority of the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia make up one of those peoples, like their fellow Caucasians the Abkhazes or the Transnistrians, trapped in a complete juridico-political limbo. The political entities that "claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" over them are not those juridically representing them in the international arena. Having met three of the four criteria required to be recognized as a state according to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State (1933)-that is to say, having a permanent population, a defined territory and a government-the de facto authorities still crave international recognition. This situation is more than a mere juridical imbroglio. It has concrete and specific repercussions for the people living in these territories. Stuck in the midst of competing state-building attempts, from the de facto authorities wanting to cling to power to the de jure authorities trying to extend their influence over the territory, the local population finds itself politicized from all sides. Generally dubbed "frozen conflicts," especially in the Caucasus (in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and in Transnistria, this actual denomination ignores the dynamic logic at work in these regions. The recent conflict in South Ossetia, triggered by the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali on 7 August and the following military response by the Russian army, clearly showed the limits of this perspective. After describing the current political setting in South Ossetia and examining the logic of a "zone of conflict," this article analyzes the oppositional logic between the competing state-building attempts in South Ossetia, led by Russia and Georgia, respectively. Showing how the local population is literally squeezed between the militarization of both parties, the article contends that South Ossetians themselves ought to be taken into account in order for a genuine state-building process to take root in South Ossetia.

The Republic of Moldova is an important trade and economic partner of Ukraine. Shared border, closeness of foreign policy positions and interaction in the international arena, the commonality of history, culture, historically close cooperation in the economic and trade spheres, in dealing with contemporary challenges and threats, etc., necessitate a closer study of this country. This article is intended to highlight and analyze the main historical, geographical, socio-economic and cultural features of the development of Moldova. A thorough study of the processes in the modern Moldovan society, the nature of their emergence, etc. will allow different interested structures of Ukraine, including state authorities, to make more effective use of the opportunities of the two countries to build up mutually beneficial cooperation, both within the framework of multilateral and international platforms. This may contribute to solving similar problems facing the Ukrainians in building a completely new legal community in our country, a society based on recognized European and Euro-Atlantic values. The article is based on available scientific research, including copyrights on the Republic of Moldova, which in general provides an objective and useful cross-section of the basic features of this country. The article highlights the major historical milestones of state-building in Moldova, from ancient times to the present, formation of its basic public institutions, informs about the activities of state leadership and public figures, the state and administrative-territorial structure of the modern Republic of Moldova. The work shows the current political, socio-economic and humanitarian situation, in particular in the fields of culture, education and religion, level of relations of this country with Ukraine, place and role of the Ukrainian community both on the Right Bank and on the Left Bank (Transnistria) in the life of Moldova, etc. Prominent place in the article is devoted to the coverage of the basic parameters of the physical and geographical location of the Republic of Moldova, which determines its natural features, economic development, the structure of the national economy, tourist attractiveness and more.

El proyecto secesionista de una parte de la sociedad de Cataluña exige reflexionar sobre cómo se han comportado y cómo se comportan actualmente tanto los Estados que se han creado mediante secesión como las entidades de facto, no reconocidas por la comunidad internacional, en lo que respecta a los derechos humanos de las minorías resultantes en ellos. En países como Estonia y Letonia se aprecian situaciones anómalas en relación con la denegación de la nacionalidad a la población de origen ruso por su desconocimiento del idioma nacional; en Eritrea se impidió el regreso de los eritreos que vivían en Etiopía, por desconfianza con su movilización a favor del nuevo Estado; en Macedonia se manipularon los distritos electorales para minimizar la representación parlamentaria de los albaneses; etc. Al no haber una norma internacional general que asegure que los nuevos Estados siguen obligados por los tratados en materia de derechos humanos del Estado matriz, el único recurso para asegurar la vigencia de los mismos es la actuación de los organismos internacionales supervisores. En el caso de los Estados mediante la formulación de una 'doctrina de los derechos humanos adquiridos' que impide el vacío legal, para el TEDH o el Comité de Derechos Humanos de la ONU. Y en el caso de las entidades de facto, como Nagorno-Karabaj, Transnistria o la República Turca del Norte de Chipre, con un juego de reglas que impiden ese vacío de responsabilidad, y en virtud del cual se presume la del Estado titular de la soberanía, presunción que se destruye -sin perjuicio de mantener 'obligaciones internacionales positivas'- si una parte del territorio es ocupada militarmente por otro Estado, siendo éste el responsable, y sin perjuicio de que, incluso habiéndolo, también pueda exigirse a una autoridad local insurgente si no actúa bajo el control efectivo de esa potencia ocupante. Esta práctica revela una situación jurídica ciertamente peligrosa para la vigencia de los derechos humanos de las minorías resultantes en Estados y entidades ...

Article analyses formation and development of the conflict studies in Russia as a sub-discipline within political sciences, on the edge between political theory and studies of international relations and international security. Article defines stages of formation of conflict studies in Russia, analyzes social request for studies of conflicts, considers influence of foreign and international institutes and research, both form the CIS and from other foreign countries, onto the conflict studies in Russia. Author postulates turning of the "New Political Thinking"paradigm elaborated by Gorbachev that allowed reconsidering Moscow's attitude towards various conflicts and rethinking of theoretical principles of conflict analysis, that are not anymore limited to class struggle and ideological contradictions. Introduction of more pluralistic concepts of "socio-political model" and "world order" instead of Marxist category of "socio-economic formation" led to remodeling of international relations along new lines, as well as study contradictions within one social system. Splash of inter-ethnic and separatist conflicts in the first half of the 1990s led to shaping of "practically oriented conflict studies" reflecting political interests of conflict sides in conflicts in Karabakh, Georgia/Abkhazia, Georgia/South Ossetia, Moldova/Transnistria. On the eve of 1990s-2000s formation of theoretical systemic conflict studies as a discipline took place, and this discipline was already quite strongly interfaced with international and foreign conflict studies theory. Article considers role of various institutes of the Russian Academy of Science, research centers including Russian Council on International Affairs, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy? Russian Pugwash Committee, Center for Political and International studies, Moscow Carnegie Center, Russian institute for Strategic Studies, Institute for the USA and Canada Studies, etc. As a separate direction of studies article tackles studies of post-soviet conflicts by foreign institutes and centers, like UNIDIR (Geneva), SIPRI (Stockholm), EU ISS (Paris), British Royal institute of International Affairs. Interaction of Russian and Swiss scientists on the basis of Geneva-based GCSP and DCAF attracts special attention. In conclusion typical issues in focus, as well as theme fields of the Russian conflict studies as a sub-discipline within political sciences are formulated.

The world order of the 21st century is characterized by transformational processes changing the spatial-temporal coordinates of international life. The features of the present stage are ambivalent processes (integration and disintegration; globalization and deglobalization).The article analyzes the transformation processes in post-Soviet space. The relevance of the study is caused by the presence of several frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space that have changed the configuration of the region and have been enhancing its conflict potential since they are far from settling and constructive resolution. The conflict potential of the post-Soviet space is increased because of the presence of new state formations: the unrecognized de facto states thePridnestrovianMoldavianRepublicand theNagorno-KarabakhRepublic, and partially recognized Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia.The article also deals with the statehood acquisition and the formation of a new status of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, theNagorno-KarabakhRepublicand Transnistria. It emphasizes the necessity to solve the problem of obtaining external legitimization of the sovereignty of these political-territorial entities not only within the legal framework, but also within the political and social sphere.The actualization of frozen conflicts is only a matter of time, and in the context of the deterioration of relations between global players pursuing their own interests in the region, it can be used as an argument for aggravating the international situation.The principal approach to the study of this problem is the combination of comparative historical, institutional and situational methods that allow us to comprehensively consider the forms of international legitimization of small states in contemporary international relations and analyze conflict situations.The article presents various theoretical concepts on the problem of unrecognized states; the possibilities of further development of these partially recognized states are discussed. The difficulties of political integration and the difficulties of resolving frozen conflicts, in particular, due to the lack of a full-fledged dialogue between all parties to the conflict, are highlighted.The article is valuable as an analytical material for practical use by agencies and organizations involved in the development of political content in theSouth Caucasusregion.The authors conclude that in the issue of the existence of unrecognized States of the post-Soviet space, the time factor is essential because in these territories new generations of people are born who perceive themselves as full-fledged citizens of sovereign States.

В статье рассматривается участие Европейского союза в урегулировании международных конфликтов в рамках многосторонних переговорных форматов. Выявлены особенности участия ЕС в урегулировании ближневосточного и приднестровского конфликтов. Рассмотрена эволюция подхода Европейского союза к урегулированию международных конфликтов в процессе развития европейской интеграции. Выявлены внешние и внутренние факторы, которые оказали влияние на формирование позиции ЕС и его деятельность. Определены особенности включения Европейского союза в состав многосторонних переговорных форматов по урегулированию ближневосточного и приднестровского вопросов: Квартета и переговоров «5+2». Дана оценка эффективности деятельности ЕС в их составе. Определена роль, которую Европейский союз отыгрывает в процессе урегулирования, а также факторы, которые препятствуют полной реализации потенциала ЕС. На основании проведенного исследования автор проводит сравнительный анализ участия ЕС в Квартете и переговорах «5+2» по Приднестровью. В результате были выявлено, что подход Европейского союза к этим переговорным форматам и роль, которую ЕС играет в них, во многом идентичны. Автором обозначены общие черты и различия в подходе Европейского союза к урегулированию международных конфликтов в рамках многосторонней медиации. ; The article considers EU participation in international conflict settlement in the framework of multi-party negotiation formats. The main features of European Union involvement in the settlement of Middle East and Transnistrian conflicts were out-lined. The author analyses the evolution of European Union approach towards inter-national conflict settlement in parallel to the development of European integration and the formation of common foreign and security policy. Both external and internal factors influencing the EU position and its activities were defined. The article explains the reasons for the inclusion of the EU in the negotiation formats using the examples of Middle East Quartet and «5+2» negotiations on Transnistria. Their analysis has allowed to conclude the efficiency of European Union"s activities in multi-party negotiations. The author defines the EU role in conflict settlement, and outlines the factors impeding the full realization of EU potential. Based on this research the comparative analysis of EU participation in the settlement of the Middle East and Transnistrian issues was conducted. It revealed that the approach and the role of the EU in these multi-party negotiation formats is in many ways identical. In the end, the author explores commonalities and differences of EU participation in Middle East Quartet and «5+2» negotiations on Transnistrian issue.

The article describes and debates main points and recommendations of the Report-2015 of the Independent High Level Group on the UN Peace Operations. The author analyses doctrinal innovations and practical guidelines suggested by the Group and debates consequences of the recommended "politicizing" of the UN operations (assuring the leading role for the UN in any political peace process supported by UN peacekeepers, and avoiding operations where the UN role is limited to passive disengagement of conflict sides). Necessity for and limits of reconsidering traditional principles of peacekeeping, such as impartiality, consent of conflict parties, and use of force for self-defence are questioned. Trends in UN operations are compared with trends in operations related to conflicts in the Post-Soviet space (South Ossetia/Georgia, Abkhazia/Georgia, Tajikistan, Transnistria/Moldova, etc.). The author advocates timeliness for an extended interpretation of the "defence of the mandate" formula instead of the classical "self-defence of the contingent". It is suggested to practically erase the dividing line between operations of the "peacekeeping" type under the UN DPKO, and "political missions" under the UN Political Department. The arsenal of the UN instruments for conflict resolution must be widened from non-intrusive observation missions, conflict prevention and mediation, through support of ceasefire agreements and implementation of peace accords, down to coercive peace enforcement, offensive elements, and UN Charter Chapter VII-based collective operations against aggressive regimes and states. Poorly defined functions and insufficiently clarified use of force limits for the SC-mandated "UN Intervention Brigade" in Democratic Republic of Congo lead to unnecessary involvement of the UN into coercive actions. The experience of the UN "infrastructural hubs" establishing, like the one in Entebbe (Uganda) used for supplying eight African UN operations, is described. New technology for peacekeeping, like the use of unpiloted flying drones, opens new opportunities, but creates legal and practical problems. A distinction of functions between "blue helmets" (specially trained multinational UN contingents) and "green helmets" (regular national armies used by states in foreign conflicts) is recommended, including avoidance of counter-terrorism tasks and strong coercive tasks for the UN peacekeepers. Parallel and interfaced "partnerships" between the limited UN operations and more forceful national/coalition operations in the same areas are suggested instead.

Das Abspaltungsprojekt eines Teils der katalanischen Gesellschaft macht es erforderlich, darüber zu reflektieren, wie sich sowohl die geschaffenen Staaten als auch die de facto entstandenen Gemeinwesen, die nicht von der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft anerkannt werden, in Bezug auf die Menschenrechte und die Rechte ihrer enthaltenen Minderheiten verhalten bzw. verhalten werden. In Ländern wie Estland und Litauen sind Unregelmäßigkeiten dahingehend zu beobachten, dass der russischstämmigen Bevölkerung die Nationalität verweigert wird, da sie nicht die Landessprache sprechen; in Eritrea wurde denjenigen Eritreern die Rückkehr verweigert, die in Äthiopien Ihren Wohnsitz hatten, aus Misstrauen wegen ihres Einsatzes für den neuen Staat; In Mazedonien wurden die Wahlbezirke verändert, um die Vertretung der Albaner im Parlament zu reduzieren; usw. Da es keine allgemeinen internationalen Normen gibt, die sicherstellen, dass die neugebildeten Staaten bei der Einhaltung der Menschenrechte an die ratifizierten Verträge Ihrer Ausgangsstaaten gebunden sind, hängt alles vom Eingreifen der internationalen Überwachungsorganisationen ab. Im Fall der Staaten mittels einer «Lehre von den erworbenen Menschenrechten», die das Rechtsvakuum verhindert. Zuständig wäre bei Staaten der EGMR, der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte der UNO. Im Falle der «de facto» Gemeinwesen, wie Bergkarabach, Transnistrien oder die Türkische Republik Nordzypern erfolgt die Normbindung durch ein paar Spielregeln, die das Verantwortlichkeitsvakuum verhindern. Hierzu wird die Souveränität des herrschenden Staats anerkannt, jedoch —ohne staatliche internationale Verpflichtungen— bis das Gebiet wiederum von einem neuen Staat besetzt wird und dieser nun in der Verantwortung steht. Diese Verantwortlichkeit, kann auch gegenüber einer Aufstandsbewegung innerhalb dieses besetzten Gebiets geltend gemacht werden, wenn diese nicht unter der effektiven Kontrolle der Gebietsbesetzer steht. Diese Praxis offenbart gewiss eine gefährliche juristische Situation für die Gültigkeit der Menschenrechte der resultierenden Minderheiten in den abgespaltenen Staaten oder Gemeinwesen. Diese Situation sollte korrigiert werden, besonders im Bereich der europäischen Regionen, um zu verhindern, dass diese Situation sich bei anderen Abspaltungsprozessen wiederholt, so wie es in Katalonien der Fall sein könnte. ; The secession project of part of Catalan society involves reflecting on how they have behaved and currently behave those states created by secession as well as the de facto ones, which have not been internationally acknowledged, with regards to the human rights of the minorities being created in them. In countries such as Estonia and Latvia we can find rare cases where a Russian nationality is unacceptable for those subjects with a lack of knowledge of the local language; Eritreans living in Ethiopia were banned in Eritrea on their way back under suspicion of support of the new state. In Macedonia constituencies were manipulated not to let Albanians win the power. This is just to name but a few examples. Since there is no general international law which guarantees the new states' compliance with treaties regarding human rights created by the source state the only resource to assure the validity of such treaties is international surveillance bodies taking action. As for such states with a wording on the lines of «a tenet of acquired human rights» which tends to avoid legal void, it should be the European Court of human Rights or the Human Right Committee of the UN. Regarding de facto entities such as Nagorno-Karabaj, Transnistria or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a play on rules would avoid such responsibility void and will presume that of the State which owns sovereignty. Having said so such presumption disappears (positive international duties permitting) if one part of the territory is taken by the army of another state, in which case the latter becomes the responsible one. Upcoming authorities could also be claimed responsible if they do not act guided by the other party's effective control. Such practice proves to be an extremely delicate legal case for the validity of the human rights of the upcoming minorities in both secession states and entities and such case must be corrected, particularly within a European regional frame in order to prevent it from happening again eventually in parallel secession processes such as the one happening in Catalonia. ; El proyecto secesionista de una parte de la sociedad de Cataluña exige reflexionar sobre cómo se han comportado y cómo se comportan actualmente tanto los Estados que se han creado mediante secesión como las entidades de facto, no reconocidas por la comunidad internacional, en lo que respecta a los derechos humanos de las minorías resultantes en ellos. En países como Estonia y Letonia se aprecian situaciones anómalas en relación con la denegación de la nacionalidad a la población de origen ruso por su desconocimiento del idioma nacional, en Eritrea se impidió el regreso de los eritreos que vivían en Etiopía por desconfianza con su movilización a favor del nuevo Estado, en Macedonia se manipularon los distritos electorales para minimizar la representación parlamentaria de los albaneses, etc. Al no haber una norma internacional general que asegure que los nuevos Estados siguen obligados por los tratados en materia de derechos humanos del Estado matriz, el único recurso para asegurar la vigencia de los mismos es la actuación de los organismos internacionales supervisores. En el caso de los Estados, mediante la formulación de una «doctrina de los derechos humanos adquiridos» que impide el vacío legal para el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos o el Comité de Derechos Humanos de la ONU, y en el caso de las entidades de facto, como Nagorno-Karabaj, Transnistria o la República Turca del Norte de Chipre, con un juego de reglas que impiden ese vacío de responsabilidad en virtud del cual se presume la del Estado titular de la soberanía, presunción que se destruye —sin perjuicio de mantener «obligaciones internacionales positivas»— si una parte del territorio es ocupada militarmente por otro Estado, siendo este el responsable, y sin perjuicio de que, incluso habiéndolo, también pueda exigirse a una autoridad local insurgente si no actúa bajo el control efectivo de esa potencia ocupante. Esta práctica revela una situación jurídica ciertamente peligrosa para la vigencia de los derechos humanos de las minorías resultantes en Estados y entidades secesionadas, situación que debe ser corregida, especialmente en el ámbito regional europeo, para evitar que se repita en eventuales procesos secesionistas, como el que podría acontecer en Cataluña.

This article analyzes the manifestations of regionalism in the context of a deep socio-political crisis in Ukraine. With the development of the political crisis that followed the coup d'etat in February 2014 in Ukraine, there was a noticeable actualization of issues and problems related to regionalism, society as a whole demonstrated a request for the redistribution of powers between the power center and the regions. This is reflected in numerous initiatives of regional authorities and public organizations aimed at expanding the financial base, functions and rights of local authorities and self-government, as well as in policy documents of political forces. At the same time, in some cases, the idea of establishing a contractual relationship between the Central government and the regions was put forward, which is typical for the Federal model of government. In response to this request, the Executive branch made another attempt to implement local government reform under the slogan of decentralizing the country's state structure. Since 2014, Ukraine has developed two multidirectional trends – centrifugal and centripetal, the ratio of which will determine the dynamics and severity of political manifestations of regionalism. Despite numerous autonomist statements, Ukrainian regionalism remains within the "rigid" model formed in the post-Soviet period. The conflict in the South-East of the country and the deep involvement of the leading powers – Russia, the United States and the European Union-are the determining factor that predetermined the "freezing" of regionalization processes in Ukraine after 2014. After the signing of the Minsk agreements, the implementation of which means for Ukraine to introduce elements of Federal relations into the system of state structure, the reform of the state structure and territorial administration has become inextricably linked with Kiev's strategy towards the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass. Manifestations of regionalism were perceived by Kiev to a large extent in the context of threats to the territorial integrity of the country, which significantly limited the possibility of implementing the policy of decentralization. In addition, Russia and the United States have demonstrated in practice different approaches to the interpretation and implementation of the Minsk agreements, which has had a negative impact on the regionalization processes in Ukraine. The nature of the processes of regionalization in Ukraine allows to draw Parallels with the situation in Transnistria and around him, and to talk about common Moldovan and Ukrainian models hard regionalism, the hallmark of which is the transformation of the regionalization processes in a tool to achieve political goals of Russia and the West in conflict with the nature of their interaction on post-Soviet space.