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The protection of national security has traditionally been an exception to general norms of public accountability. While prerogative powers were typically engaged, the last three decades have seen efforts to bring national security closer to the normal constitutional control mechanisms of parliament and the courts. The design of and changes to mechanisms of accountability have, however, been accepted without discussion of the often narrower purposes for which they were first established (most notably for oversight of surveillance), the extent of their departure from constitutional principles, or their impact in embedding new forms of exceptionalism in the constitutional framework. This article critically assesses these developments, prompted for example by the Law Commission's recommendations to reform official secrets laws, which adopted models without full consideration of historical and contemporary concerns or the exceptionalism on which they were based. Though focused on the UK, our account provides a cautionary tale for national security law reform in any modern democracy.

The protection of national security has traditionally been an exception to general norms of public accountability, based on prerogative powers. The last three decades have seen efforts to bring national security closer to the normal constitutional control mechanisms of parliament and the courts. The design of and changes to mechanisms of accountability have, however, been accepted without discussion of the often narrower purposes for which they were first established (most notably for oversight of surveillance), the extent of their departure from constitutional principles, or their impact in embedding new forms of exceptionalism in the constitutional framework. This article critically assesses these developments, prompted for example by the Law Commission's recommendations to reform official secrets laws, which adopted trusted intermediary and indirect accountability models without full consideration of historical and contemporary concerns or the exceptionalism on which they were based. Though focused on the UK, our account provides a cautionary tale for national security law reform in any modern democracy.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 dramatically punctuated almost a century of efforts to make the leadership, management, and use of American armed forces more cohesive and efficient. The primary approach was an increasing centralization of civilian authority, including the creation and further strengthening of the Office of the Secretary of Defense by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments. Nonetheless, the armed services remained in a divisive and contentious framework under the intentionally emaciated authority of a weakly centralized collectivity on the uniformed side of the defense establishment. The Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to fix the problem by centralizing the uniformed side of the Pentagon in parallel with the civilian side, running the risk that this could lead to civil-military conflict instead of a smooth partnership between the defense secretary and the sharply enhanced Joint Chiefs of Staff's chairman immediately under him. This article analyzes the main consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the first four years since it was signed into law.

TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. DRUG WAR HAS FAILED, IT IS NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO ITS EARLIEST DAYS, FROM 1969 TO 1973, WHEN THE CURRENT STRATEGY WAS ESTABLISHED AND FAILURE WAS INSTITUTIONALIZED. THEN, AS NOW, CONVENTIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WERE JUDGED INCAPABLE OF HANDLING THE EFFORT; THE WHITE HOUSE ORGANIZED (AND REORGANIZED) THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN; BETTER INTELLIGENCE WAS DEMANDED FROM THE CIA; INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DRUG TRADE WERE LAUNCHED BY CONGRESS AND RESISTED BY THE EXECUTIVE. MOST IMPORTANTLY, DRUG ENFORCEMENT BECAME A MATTER OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY.

In the spring of 1981 I designed and taught what I considered, at the time, a "high risk" seminar for seventeen junior and senior political science majors. There were to be no textbooks, no lectures, no examinations and no term papers, those hallmarks of the traditional college course. Nevertheless, when the thirteen week course was over, the students were exhausted and claimed that they had never worked so hard in their college careers.The adventure that my students (and I) undertook was a semester long simulation of the United States National Security Council (NSC), dealing with actual global events as they happened. As Washington dealt with a problem, we dealt with the same problem. The simulation was initially offered during the deteriorating situation in Iran and instability in the Gulf region.

Ausarbeitung eines Papiers zur Konferenz "South Africa and the changing security environment" 7.9.1989 Inst. for Strategic Studies, Universität Pretoria. Anwendung allgemeiner Theoreme zur nationalen Sicherheit (von S. Hoffman, W. Lippmann, R. McNamara, H. Kissinger u.a.) auf die Republik Südafrika: Furcht vor äußerer Bedrohung durch die Sowjetunion wird als "übertrieben" kritisiert. Wirkliche Bedrohung von innen durch "revolutionären Widerstand" mittels "Terror" und "Sabotage". Falls die Einbeziehung von ANC und Inkatha in das politische System mißlingt, droht Revolution; falls sie gelingt, "weißer Gegenschlag". Auf keine dieser Drohungen gibt es eine militärische Antwort. Will die Regierung Sicherheit erreichen, die über den "Kasernenstaat" hinaus Freiheiten bewahrt, muß sie die Absichten des Gegners (ANC, AZAPO) erforschen; anstelle militär-taktischer Planung mit dem "Scenario des schlimmsten Falls" ist politisch-strategische Analyse der wahrscheinlicheren Fälle gefragt. (Der Verfasser leitet das Dept. of International Politics, University College of Wales.) (APAF-Ans)

In recent times, some scholars have discussed a new way in which to view presidential power, one that considers the president's ability to effect policy change unilaterally without the consent of Congress or the courts. The limits of presidential power can still be defined essentially by the ability and willingness of Congress and the courts to constrain it. However, the use of national security directives poses particular challenges to the abilities of both Congress and the courts to constrain effectively the president's power to act unilaterally in setting public policy. Drawing upon continuing research, this article offers some preliminary observations and insights into the role of national security directives and how they have contributed to shaping U.S. national security policy.

Prior to World War II, American national security policy was formed by a loosely connected elite that generally operated from a business-financial base in the northeastern United States. It was from this group that secretaries of state and war were drawn and among this group that serious long-range thinking on important security issues was undertaken. The power of this community continued after the war, probably reaching its zenith in the 1950s, when an important change occurred. Unversities like Harvard, Yale, and Chicago gained prominence at this time, but the more interesting phenomenon was the emergence of so-called "defense intellectuals" at places like the Rand Corporation and other think tanks.

Political, media, and academic observers have consistently noted the adverse impact of post‐9/11 antiterrorism measures on civil liberties, yet Attorney General John Ashcroft and others in the administration insist that the measures are consistent with constitutional values. The national security versus civil liberties debate has special saliency during wartime, particularly an open‐ended war against terrorism. Responding to the attacks as a war—instead of a crime against humanity—has led to two domestic developments for the presidency: first, the centralization of authority in the White House, and second, the securitization of the domestic sphere, specifically the administration's view of civil liberties as a weakness in the system that can be exploited by terrorists. This study focuses on the second of these developments. It examines how the conception of liberties as points of vulnerability compels the administration to restrict individual rights while, at the same time, to deny that it is doing so.

International migration has become a major domestic political issue in many countries and a major topic of international debate. Thus far, most of the attention has centered on the plight of refugees or on ways to curb the flow of illegal immigrants. As more and more migrants cross interstate boundaries, however, governments are realizing that immigration and asylum problems cannot be separated from broader socio-economic and political issues; nor can they be resolved by countries acting unilaterally. Even with this understanding, attempts to develop multilateral strategies to ease internation

National security now-a-days is a much broader and comprehensive concept which apart from military security takes into account all dimensions affecting human security with inclusive consideration to all Elements of National Power of a Nation State. Similarly, globalization means interdependence, advancing integration, and homogenization of the world. Globalization has assumed profound power this century, which captures the opinion that happenings in one part of the globe will have significant influence on the regions and the world at large. This research article will explore several dimensions of notion of globalization, its linkages and effects on national security.