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In autumn 2004 massive protests against reforms of the unemployment benefit -- known as the "Hartz IV reform" -- rose overall in Germany. Shortly afterwards, right-wing-extremist parties were substantially successful in the following federal elections. Not only politicians, but also theories of deprivation & disintegration indicate a causal relationship in presuming that unemployment leads to an affinity with right-wing political parties. We analyzed the relation of unemployment & political affinity (political orientation, negative evaluation of the established parties & voting intention) with respect to right-wing & left-wing populism. 1150 individuals, participating in demonstrations in East- & West-Germany, were interviewed with standardized questionnaires. As hypothesized, unemployment influenced political affinity. However, it turned out that the actual state of occupation hardly had an effect. More in detail, subjective fears of unemployment by those, who are in work, & subjective fears to be directly or indirectly concerned by Hartz IV by those, who are not employed, count for political affinity with specific patterns for East & West Germans. While only some of the differences between East- & West-German participants can be explained by differences in objective & subjective deprivation, the effect of deprivation is mainly explained by the agreement with right- & especially left-wing populism. On the whole, only a small proportion of variance of political affinity can be explained by East West origin, state of occupation & populism. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

In spring 2005, villagers in Dongyang County, Zhejiang were unhappy. For four years they had been complaining about pollution emitted by 13 factories located in the Zhuxi Chemical Park, but nothing had been done. So they set up a tent encampment to block delivery of supplies to the factories. At first, they employed restrained tactics, including going about daily life in the tents, badgering cadres sent to demobilize them, and kowtowing. After a harsh repression produced hundreds of injuries and left dozens of damaged vehicles and other evidence of police action strewn about, the tent-sitters switched to more aggressive tactics, including denouncing local leaders, carrying out mock funerals, interrogating factory owners and ransacking the homes of 'traitors'. The authorities' ill-considered and poorly-timed repression led to tactical escalation, helped draw thousands of people to the scene, and ultimately resulted in the chemical park being closed. This episode speaks to the 'dissent–repression nexus' and suggests that repression can be counterproductive when it encourages protesters to ratchet up their tactics and a 'protest spectacle' ensues. In today's China, striking displays and theatrical performances, especially in the wake of a crackdown, can attract an audience, bring in financial support and create a carnival-like atmosphere in which popular acclaim, the breakdown of social order and the inversion of power hierarchies grants protesters leverage and induces the authorities to make concessions.

This in-depth exploration of culture, media, and protest follows South Korea's transition from the Korean War to the political struggles and socioeconomic transformations of the Park Chung Hee era. Charles Kim explores how state ideologues and mainstream intellectuals expanded their efforts by elevating the nation's youth as the core protagonist of a newly independent Korea.

Since early 2020, the covid-19 pandemic has unfolded as a global crisis that poses significant challenges to governments and societies.1 Governments have reacted quite variably, with policies ranging from strict lockdowns over a longer period of time to flexible approaches with restriction of freedoms at very low thresholds of intrusion into citizens' rights.2 While the pandemic does not affect everyone equally, and some countries are more advanced in containing the virus than others, the sense of vulnerability and insecurity is widespread. In addition to the 6.5 million people who have died from covid-19 as of late August 2022, many more are affected by ongoing symptoms of long covid-19. Increased economic disparities and new forms of inequality only exacerbate the degree of uncertainty and the feeling that life is out of control.3 However, the popular yearning to regain control has not led to an unambiguous "desire for the state."4 Rather, trust in governments has fluctuated in the wake of the pandemic. If there was a "rally around the flag" effect, it was certainly not found in every country.5 Even if support for government regulations and restrictions were prevalent within a state, it was not shared equally by different parts of the population. In several countries, the pandemic has also given rise to substantial protests against the restriction of civic, economic, and social liberties, often driven by fears of state surveillance, libertarian rebellion against state paternalism, and conspiratorial beliefs.6

Celem artykułu jest określenie, w jakim stopniu protesty antyreżimowe w Rosji pomagają opozycji antysystemowej budować swój kapitał polityczny. Autorytarny system rosyjski ogranicza udział w życiu politycznym rzeczywistym oponentom Kremla, dlatego jednym ze sposobów przedstawienia swoich zarzutów wobec rządzących jest organizacja protestów i próba zmobilizowania wokół haseł opozycyjnych jak największej liczby obywateli. Analiza koncentruje się na protestach zorganizowanych przez Aleksieja Nawalnego i jego współpracowników w marcu, czerwcu i październiku 2017 r., przy czym dwa pierwsze to protesty przeciw korupcji, natomiast protest październikowy dotyczy poparcia dla Aleksieja Nawalnego jako kandydata na prezydenta. To zróżnicowanie tematyki protestów pozwala określić to, na ile hasła przewodnie protestów zainicjowane przez tego samego organizatora determinują społeczne poparcie dla akcji ulicznej i wpływają na kapitał polityczny lidera protestów. Należy pamiętać, że ze względu na trudności w precyzyjnym określeniu stopnia politycznego kapitału określonego polityka istotne wydaje się uchwycenie samej tendencji jego zmiany, tzn. czy dana decyzja, działanie polityka wpłynęło na zwiększenie czy zmniejszenie jego politycznego kapitału. Ewaluacja kapitału politycznego Aleksieja Nawalnego została dokonana na podstawie takich parametrów, jak wiedza, umiejętności, postawa, bliskość władzy i zasoby.

Although thirty years of violent sectarian conflict ended with the 1998 peace agreement, public spaces and politics in Northern Ireland remain contested. Paramilitaries and violence persist, affecting daily lived experiences. Following the death of journalist Lyra McKee in April 2019 at the hands of a dissident paramilitary group, a grassroots social movement developed, demanding to "re-boot" the peace agreement. Lyra's Walk for Peace engaged in a three-day 68-mile walk across Northern Ireland to acknowledge shared memories of loss and protest persistent sectarianism in politics and public life. Using embodied walking ethnography, I examine what meanings participants assigned to participation and what these narratives tell us about the embodied experience of walking in protest. Participants and organisers initially created a collective identity based on three themes: history, collective suffering, and an imagined future. This identity did not remain static throughout the protest. Instead, the meaning and identity of Lyra's Walk evolved through embodied experiences of public hospitality, solidarity and the bodily pain of walking which together generated strong emotions. Although the protest began with an orientation towards the past and future of Northern Ireland, by the end, the focus had shifted towards the embodied present.

GBS_insertPreviewButtonPopup('ISBN:9780748639915');The Scottish National Party has played a significant role in the politics of Scotland in the last forty years. In particular it has contributed to and shaped the impact and dynamics of devolution. This collection brings together academics, writers, commentators and analysts of Scottish politics to address the nature of the SNP: its position in Scotland, its influence on devolution, its role as a minority administration and its relationship with other institutions in Scotland, the UK and Europe."

In Nordafrika führen Umweltprobleme zunehmend zu politischen Protesten. Umweltverschmutzung und knappe Ressourcen wirken sich negativ auf die Lebensbedingungen und Einkommen von bereits marginalisierten Gruppen aus und führen zu Unruhen. Eine häufig stark zentralisierte Umweltpolitik berücksichtigt die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung nur ungenügend. Das politische Umfeld ist seit dem "Arabischen Frühling" weiterhin instabil – die doppelte Herausforderung zunehmender Umweltprobleme verbunden mit sozialen Unruhen erfordert daher neue Ansätze. Eine verantwortungsvollere Umweltpolitik könnte nicht nur helfen, umweltpolitische Probleme und Bedürfnisse anzugehen, sondern eine langfristig demokratischere (d. h. transparente, verantwortungsvolle und partizipative) Regierungsführung unterstützen. Der Zugang zu Umweltinformationen spielt in dieser Hinsicht eine wesentliche Rolle: Nur wenn die Bürger um die Verfügbarkeit, Qualität und Nutzung natürlicher Ressourcen wissen, können sie auch fundierte Entscheidungen diesbezüglich treffen und ihre Rechte geltend machen. Institutionen können unter Einbeziehung der Bürger Rechenschaftspflicht stärken und öffentliche wie private Akteure für ihr Verhalten rechtlich zur Verantwortung ziehen. Internationalen Standards unterstützen dies: Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte, die Rio-Erklärung über Umwelt und Entwicklung und die Aarhus-Konvention bestätigen, wie wichtig der Zugang zu Umweltinformationen ist. Auch nationale Umwelt-Chartas und die neuen Verfassungen von Marokko und Tunesien unterstreichen eine partizipative und verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung. Wie Analysen in Marokko und Tunesien zeigen, können Regierungen und Entwicklungspartner den Zugang zu Umweltinformationen und damit auch eine verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung fördern. Erstens sollten eine verantwortungsvolle Umweltpolitik und der sektorübergreifende Zugang zu Umweltinformationen gestärkt werden. Demokratische Institutionen sollten in Umweltthemen involviert und entsprechende Kapazitäten aufgebaut, Organisationen und Vorschriften für eine bessere Rechenschaftspflicht gestärkt, und das Verständnis der Bürger und der Verwaltung über die neuen Rechte und Pflichten verbessert werden. Weiter müssten neue sektorübergreifende Allianzen geschmiedet und die Länder noch stärker in internationale Initiativen für eine verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung einbezogen werden. Zweitens können internationale Initiativen solche Reformen unterstützen: Die Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDG) oder Strategien zum Klimaschutz und zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel bieten hier neue Möglichkeiten. Auch muss Entscheidungsträgern bewusster werden, wie sich die Umweltpolitik auf Menschenrechte und auf die politische Stabilität auswirken kann. Der Zugang zu Umweltinformationen sowie entsprechende rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen und institutionelle Ressourcen sollten weiter gefördert werden. Schließlich können soziale Unruhen vermieden oder bewältigt werden, indem Projekte umfassenden Umwelt- und Sozialverträglichkeitsprüfungen unterzogen und Protestbewegungen in einen konstruktiven Dialog mit der Verwaltung und dem Privatsektor einbezogen werden.

In Nordafrika führen Umweltprobleme zunehmend zu politischen Protesten. Umweltverschmutzung und knappe Ressourcen wirken sich negativ auf die Lebensbedingungen und Einkommen von bereits marginalisierten Gruppen aus und führen zu Unruhen. Eine häufig stark zentralisierte Umweltpolitik berücksichtigt die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung nur ungenügend. Das politische Umfeld ist seit dem "Arabischen Frühling" weiterhin instabil – die doppelte Herausforderung zunehmender Umweltprobleme verbunden mit sozialen Unruhen erfordert daher neue Ansätze. Eine verantwortungsvollere Umweltpolitik könnte nicht nur helfen, umweltpolitische Probleme und Bedürfnisse anzugehen, sondern eine langfristig demokratischere (d. h. transparente, verantwortungsvolle und partizipative) Regierungsführung unterstützen.Der Zugang zu Umweltinformationen spielt in dieser Hinsicht eine wesentliche Rolle: Nur wenn die Bürger um die Verfügbarkeit, Qualität und Nutzung natürlicher Ressourcen wissen, können sie auch fundierte Entscheidungen diesbezüglich treffen und ihre Rechte geltend machen. Institutionen können unter Einbeziehung der Bürger Rechenschaftspflicht stärken und öffentliche wie private Akteure für ihr Verhalten rechtlich zur Verantwortung ziehen. Internationalen Standards unterstützen dies: Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte, die Rio-Erklärung über Umwelt und Entwicklung und die Aarhus-Konvention bestätigen, wie wichtig der Zugang zu Umweltinformationen ist. Auch nationale Umwelt-Chartas und die neuen Verfassungen von Marokko und Tunesien unterstreichen eine partizipative und verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung.Wie Analysen in Marokko und Tunesien zeigen, können Regierungen und Entwicklungspartner den Zugang zu Umweltinformationen und damit auch eine verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung fördern. Erstens sollten eine verantwortungsvolle Umweltpolitik und der sektorübergreifende Zugang zu Umweltinformationen gestärkt werden. Demokratische Institutionen sollten in Umweltthemen involviert und entsprechende Kapazitäten aufgebaut, Organisationen und Vorschriften für eine bessere Rechenschaftspflicht gestärkt, und das Verständnis der Bürger und der Verwaltung über die neuen Rechte und Pflichten verbessert werden. Weiter müssten neue sektorübergreifende Allianzen geschmiedet und die Länder noch stärker in internationale Initiativen für eine verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung einbezogen werden.Zweitens können internationale Initiativen solche Reformen unterstützen: Die Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDG) oder Strategien zum Klimaschutz und zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel bieten hier neue Möglichkeiten. Auch muss Entscheidungsträgern bewusster werden, wie sich die Umweltpolitik auf Menschenrechte und auf die politische Stabilität auswirken kann. Der Zugang zu Umweltinformationen sowie entsprechende rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen und institutionelle Ressourcen sollten weiter gefördert werden. Schließlich können soziale Unruhen vermieden oder bewältigt werden, indem Projekte umfassenden Umwelt- und Sozialverträglichkeitsprüfungen unterzogen und Protestbewegungen in einen konstruktiven Dialog mit der Verwaltung und dem Privatsektor einbezogen werden.

The recent violence in New Caledonia erupted following a bill approved by the National Assembly in Paris that would expand voting rights to people who have lived on the islands for 10 or more years. If approved, this would mark a significant change from the current law and one that could marginalize the indigenous Kanak population's voice in local politics. This fear builds upon recent tensions (and a much older struggle for independence) in New Caledonia's relationship with Paris. French president Emmanuel Macron is now traveling to the archipelago to "set up a mission," without yet explaining what that would entail. The indigenous Kanaks make up around 40% of the 270,000 or so inhabitants, with the remainder constituted by descendents of white European colonialists (whom the locals call Caldoches) and more recently arrived people from mainland France (many of whom often only spend part of the year on the archipelago). This change would overturn the previously (and constitutionally) agreed measure by allowing some 25,000 out of around 42,000 new voters into electoral rolls, thus likely weakening any future movements for independence. New Caledonia is a set of islands off the eastern coast of Australia in the Pacific Ocean. The territory has been granted generally broad political rights as a French territory, however, the movement for full independence had increased in recent years. Following a landmark agreement in 1988, the Nouméa Accord, the French government restricted voting rights in such a way that was designed to give greater voice to indigenous peoples and those with a deep connection to the territory. The Accord also stipulated the holding of three independence referendums, which took place in 2018, 2020, and 2021. he last of which was boycotted by pro-independence parties and turnout only reached 41%. Those who abstained cited the unfair conditions which the referendum was held under due to a high number of COVID cases at the time. Nevertheless, all three referendums resulted in a majority favoring the maintenance of their current status, and the French government says the issue is now resolved.The recent violence has left six dead and hundreds more injured. French forces have launched an operation, vowing to end the unrest.Further complicating matters, disputes of the far away Armenia and Azerbaijan have had some effect on these recent developments in New Caledonia.France has been part of the negotiations over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1990s as a member of the OSCE's Minsk Group Co-Chairs alongside the U.S. and Russia. Given France's large Armenian diaspora and Paris' general sympathies with Armenia, Azerbaijan had long criticized France's role in that negotiating process. Since Azerbaijan's war for Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, tensions between Baku and Paris have exacerbated greatly. Pointing to the presence of Azerbaijani flags and other placards at protests in New Caledonia, the French interior minister, Gerald Darmanin, stressed that "this isn't a fantasy. It's a reality," when asked if Azerbaijan (and China and Russia) were interfering in New Caledonia. He went on to say, "I regret that some of the Caledonian pro-independence leaders have made a deal with Azerbaijan." He stressed that, "It's indisputable." "We completely reject the baseless accusations," Azerbaijan's foreign ministry spokesman said, adding, "we refute any connection between the leaders of the struggle for freedom in Caledonia and Azerbaijan."However, the connection between Azerbaijan and certain groups in Caledonia and other French overseas territories and dependencies has been increasingly visible in recent years. The Baku Initiative Group is an organization established in 2023, amidst Azerbaijan's blockade of the over 100,000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, that "supports peoples fighting against colonialism." The group organized a video conference last Thursday, which was attended by pro-independence movements in New Caledonia, French Polynesia, French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Corsica. The joint statement issued following the conference strongly condemned French actions and expressed their solidarity with "our Kanak friends and support their fair struggle."While the French view their increasing support for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Armenia itself as justified in the face of ethnic cleansing, persecution, and continued military threats by Azerbaijan, Baku is working to show Paris that its action in the South Caucasus will have repercussions. As France licks its wounds from geopolitical setbacks in its former colonies across the Sahel, Azerbaijan is working to keep the pressure up by rather cynically exploiting France's colonial past and its occasional present hypocrisy for its own political gains.

The spilling of blood in modern political protest is an exceptional event. This article discusses the deployment of blood as a means of struggle by the members of an extra-parliamentary movement, known as the 'red shirts', in March 2010, in the course of their prolonged attempt to topple the government of the Thai prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. Two contesting discourses of blood are discussed: the symbolic discourse of blood as a self-sacrificial act deployed by the protesters to curse their enemies, and the medical counter-discourse deployed by the authorities, in an effort to neutralise the protesters' act. Several issues raised by the blood-spilling act are examined: its perceived appropriateness, its ritual roots and its disputed effectiveness as a curse. In conclusion, it is suggested that the blood ritual constitutes a reflective move to counter the prevailing 'regime of images' in Thai society. (J Southeast Asian Stud/GIGA)

"In this paper, the concept of rituals to the field of collective action is applied. It is argued that rituals are not merely forces of 'being', but of 'becoming', that is, of the transformation of a group of individuals into a mutually recognized social unity. For this dynamic process to enjoy some success and culminate in the formation of a recognizable social actor, regular ceremonies of gathering and protest appear to be an inescapable precondition. The Basque Country is selected as case study, which according to all available data, is the most contentious country in the Western world. The relevance of mass demonstrations for a single social actor is shown, namely the MLNV (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco: Basque National Freedom Movement), to become and survive as an actor. As long as it generates group solidarity, the performance of symbolically loaded, regular, and standardized protest by this nationalist group creates lasting links among participants. Regular demonstrations staged by this actor, which is endowed with a sound social and cultural infrastructure, impart a lasting character to its collective identity. Besides aiming at influencing the authorities and public opinion under certain circumstances that are analyzed throughout the paper, ritual protest might also purposely bring about inner cohesion. With such an assumption, the author departs from instrumentalist approaches to the study of collective action and highlights the creation of enduring bonds of solidarity as a latent function that ritualized protest fulfills." (author's abstract)