Suchergebnisse

Volltext // 2011 digitalisiert von: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München. Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- 2 Per. 13-20

2023 revealed a quiet but booming relationship between Taiwan and Indonesia, and 2024 looks to be similarly robust. More educational exchanges, more technology collaboration projects, and more Indonesian migrant workers in Taiwan are planned.

The purpose of this research is to address the issue of the interaction between the author of a literary text and the reader in the system of linguocognitive intention. The article covers the problems of contextual interpretation of the author's linguistic and artistic strategies, their personality traits, verbal means of creating the image of the author in the addressee's consciousness. In order to get the image of the recipient of the text, one has to make subconscious inferences from the author's comments, statements addressed to the reader, lyrical and epic digressions, etc. The analysis of the texts by modern Ukrainian authors – their linguopoetic paradigm and the intimization of speech technique deployed in order to produce a greater illocutionary effect on the addressee – has made it possible to establish the means and strategies which stimulate communicative process and enhance understanding between the author and the reader. Another problem highlighted in the research is critical perception of the text creator's ego conception and the probability of providing feedback within the 'author/reader' dimension

Die Kurzumfrage über aktuelle Fragen zum Klimaschutz, Schwerpunkt: Ernährung wurde vom Meinungsforschungsinstitut Kantar im Auftrag des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung durchgeführt. Im Erhebungszeitraum 25.01.2023 bis 31.01.2023 wurde die deutschsprachige Bevölkerung ab 14 Jahren in Privathaushalten in telefonischen Interviews (CATI) zum Klimaschutz befragt. Schwerpunkt dieser Ausgabe sind Fragen zur Ernährung, zum Kauf von Lebensmitteln und zu aktuellen politischen Maßnahmen im Zusammenhang mit Lebensmitteln. Die Auswahl der Befragten erfolgte durch eine mehrstufige Zufallsstichprobe im Rahmen einer Mehrthemenbefragung (Emnid-Bus) unter Einschluss von Festnetz- und Mobilfunknummern (Dual-Frame Stichprobe).

Was passierte im vergangenen Quartal in den digitalen Sphären von Demokratiefeind*innen? Im Radar teilen wir zentrale Ergebnisse unseres datenbasierten Monitorings und analysieren die sich abbildenden Trends. Im Zentrum stehen dieses Mal die polarisierenden Debatten zum Umgang der deutschen Bundesregierung mit dem Krieg in der Ukraine und die daraus resultierenden Mobilisierungen unter dem Friedensbanner, die die Grenzen zwischen politischen Lagern zu verwischen scheinen. Um den Durchblick in dieser neuen Unübersichtlichkeit behalten zu können, bedienen wir uns einer ausgefeilten digitalen Toolbox – dieses Mal mit einem Schwerpunkt auf der sogenannten Friedenskundgebung am Brandenburger Tor im Februar 2023.

Volltext // 2012 digitalisiert von: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München. Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- 4 Z 37.43-20

"Während viele Studien auf der Individualebene eine fragmentierte, mehrdimensionale und nicht-kumulative Struktur politischer Partizipation aufzeigen, kommt dieser Vergleich von 22 Nationen Europas auf der Makroebene zum Ergebnis, dass verschiedene Formen politischer und sozialer Beteiligung sowohl kumulativ als auch eindimensional sind. So können im Hinblick auf die Partizipation Länderfamilien definiert werden. Da diese weitgehend mit jenen Länderfamilien übereinstimmen, die sich aus anderen Studien ergeben haben, eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit einer weiter reichenden Generalisierung, die vielfältige soziale, ökonomische und politische Ländercharakteristika umfasst. Darüber hinaus werden verschiedene theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung von Ländergruppen und Partizipationsmustern überprüft mit dem Ergebnis, dass dies am besten mit einem Netz eng verwandter Indikatoren gelingt, namentlich der demokratischen und ökonomischen Entwicklung, der Regierungseffizienz, niedriger Korruption, hohen öffentlichen Ausgaben in den Bereichen Bildung und Gesundheit sowie Rechtstaatlichkeit. Diese Faktoren bilden ein sich gegenseitig verstärkendes System von Ursache und Wirkung, das in einer engen Verknüpfung mit dem Ausmaß an Beteiligung in verschiedenen Bereichen steht." (Autorenreferat)

The Biden administration's foreign policy record in 2023 won't give the president much to boast about in next year's election. The U.S. is even more overstretched at the end of 2023 than it was at the beginning, and the president has had very few policy successes. For most of the year, there weren't any major debacles, but that changed over the last two months as the president gave the Israeli government a blank check to wage a brutal war in Gaza. The president committed Washington to support another foreign war in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel while the conflict in Ukraine settled into a stalemate. Even though the U.S. was under no obligation to support this war, the president made a point of turning it into one of his signature policies and linked it closely with support for Ukraine in his public rhetoric. Biden did not, and has not made a compelling case that unconditional support for Israel's campaign is in the best interests of the United States, and the costs of that support have been rising ever since. Furthermore, backing the war exposed U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria to renewed attacks from local militias, and it has also led to increasing risks for U.S. ships in the Red Sea as the Houthis have been launching attacks on commercial shipping to protest the war. The risks that the conflict could escalate and spread into other parts of the region have been growing, and so has the risk that the U.S. could become directly involved in a multi-front war. The president's instinct to back Israel to the hilt has made a wider war more likely and it has put U.S. forces in greater danger.U.S. support for Israel in Gaza has not only overshadowed the rest of Biden's foreign policy agenda, but it has also tied the U.S. to an indiscriminate bombing campaign and a punishing siege that is driving hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians into famine conditions. The Biden administration has not only torched whatever remained of Washington's credibility on human rights and international law, but it has closely associated the U.S. with the war crimes committed against Palestinian civilians.The damage to America's reputation has already been considerable, and the damage to American interests in the Middle East and beyond over the longer term will likely be significant.The setback for Biden's own agenda has been undeniable. The administration's biggest diplomatic initiative of 2023 — the ill-advised pursuit of Saudi-Israeli normalization — stalled when the war in Gaza showed the administration's understanding of the region to be fundamentally flawed. Having bought into the false assumption that U.S.-facilitated normalization agreements between Israel and Arab clients would stabilize the region, the administration failed to recognize how bad things were getting in occupied Palestine. Like their predecessors, the Biden administration did nothing to keep Netanyahu's coalition government in check as it pursued its creeping annexation of the West Bank. Believing that the Palestinians could be safely sidelined and that their grievances could be ignored, the administration was trying to find out what inducements it would take to get Mohammed bin Salman to endorse normalization. If they had been successful, it would have meant another security commitment and more costs for the United States, so it was just as well that this policy was derailed.It isn't clear how much of a factor the push for Saudi normalization was in contributing to Hamas' decision to attack, but it clearly wasn't helpful for the U.S. to waste so much effort on trying to entice the Saudis into a deal while tensions between Israel and the Palestinians was about to explode. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's infamous line uttered shortly before the start of the war about how the region was quieter than it had been in decades reflected how much the administration had come to believe its own press releases. Support for the war has cost the U.S. a lot of goodwill in countries of the Global South, and the administration's stubborn opposition to a ceasefire has left the U.S. as deeply isolated at the United Nations as it has ever been on a major issue. The administration had earlier emphasized the importance of competing for influence with other major powers in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, but with its hardline position on Gaza it seems to have frittered away most of whatever gains it has made. Especially for an administration that constantly talks about the importance of America's leadership role, it has outdone itself in alienating and driving the rest of the world away from the U.S. on this issue.U.S. support for the war in Ukraine has been undermined by backing for the war in Gaza in two ways. First, it has diverted U.S. attention and resources away from Ukraine as the U.S. has turned its focus once again to the Middle East. It has also made a mockery of the administration's rhetoric in support of Ukraine. The U.S. spent the better part of two years extolling the importance of international law to rally support for Ukraine, and then demonstrated that the U.S. doesn't hold its own clients and partners to the same standard that it expects from other states. The Biden record this year wasn't all bad. On the plus side, the U.S. made some modest progress in stabilizing relations with China near the end of the year after months of deteriorating ties in the wake of the spy balloon incident in February. There was a small diplomatic breakthrough with Iran in the summer that led to the release of five Americans that had been wrongfully detained by the Iranian government. Unfortunately, the administration then reneged on releasing Iranian funds that had been frozen under "maximum pressure" sanctions because they didn't want to be seen as "rewarding" Iran following Hamas' attack.The administration also recently secured another prisoner release agreement with the Venezuelan government. While these were positive results, they were also hardly earth-shattering.The Biden administration had more success in working with established allies. They further developed the technology-sharing AUKUS arrangement with Australia and Britain, and they took advantage of a temporary improvement in relations between South Korea and Japan to strengthen ties with both. In both cases, the administration was pushing on an open door, and it is questionable whether either arrangement will endure, but they can at least point to these things as examples of advancing Biden's agenda. Even more than in previous years, the Biden administration's foreign policy in 2023 has been defined by too much reliance on military tools and too little effort put into diplomatic engagement. That may be one of the reasons why the public now broadly disapproves of Biden's handling of foreign policy. Both for his own sake and for the sake of U.S. interests, the president needs to make some major course changes in 2024 in Gaza and in his overall approach to the world.

KRIEGSBILDER NR. 20 1915 Tagespost (-) Kriegsbilder Nr. 20 1915 (Nr. 20 1915) ([1]) [Abb.]: Kaiser Wilhelm während der Schlacht am San. General v. Emmich unterrichtet den Kaiser an Hand der Karten über den Verlauf des Kampfes. (Links von General v. Emmich der Chef des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral v. Müller.) ([1]) Zum ersten Angriff der österreichisch-ungarischen Flotte gegen die Ostküste Italiens. (2) [3 Abb.]: (1)Der Kanal von Rimini. Im Hintergrunde die Stadt Rimini. (2)Das Arsenal von Venedig. (3)Unteres Bild: Die Stadt Ancona. (2) [5 Abb.]: (1)General d.Inf. von Linsingen, der Oberbefehlshaber der deutschen Südarmee in Galizien, wurde mit dem Orden "Pour le mérite" ausgezeichnet. (2)Generalleutnant von Conta (X), Divisionskommandeur der deutschen Südarmee. (3)Generalleutnant Fleck, Kommandeur des 8. Reservekorps, das bei Souain die mehrfach erfolgten französischen Angriffe zurückschlug. (4)Oesterreichisch-ungarische Munitions- und Priviant-Kolonne unter Begleitung deutscher Husaren auf dem Wege zum San-Abschnitt. (5)Unteres Bild: Vorgehende Truppen auf einer Serpentine der Dukla-Paß-Straße. Links ein Naphtha-Bohrturm. (3) Was Italien von Oesterreich haben wollte. (4-5) [11 Abb.]: (1)Trient: Neptunsbrunnen auf dem Marktplatz. (2)Kastell Duino bei Grado, die der italienischen Grenze am nächsten gelegene österreichische Befestigung an der Küste Istriens. (3)Felsenstraße am Strand bei Miramare. (4)Bozen: Denkmal Walters von der Vogelweide. (5)Tenno bei Riva mit dem malerisch gelegenen Kastell. (6)Ein Teil des Hafens von Triest. (7)Torbole am Gardasee, die südlichste Stadt der Monarchie. (8)Rovigno an der Küste von Istrien. (9)Arco, der vielbesuchte österreichische Luftkurort. (10)Die "Drei Zinnen", der bekannteste Berggipfel der Dolomiten. (11)Der weltberühmte "Rosengarten" bei Bozen. (4-5) Der Soldat im Spiegel des Sprichwortes. (6) [3 Abb.]: (1-2)Vom Höhlenleben unserer Feldgrauen im Zarenreich. (1)Offizier und Mannschaften beim Mittagsschläfchen. (2)Klein und eng, aber doch urgemütlich. (3)Beerdigung gefallener Helden in einem Reihengrab auf dem Militärfriedhof in Cambrai. Das Ehrengeleit stellte eine Kompagnie eines Landsturmbataillons. (6) [2 Abb.]: (1)Von der Feier der Annahme des Ehrentitels Ghazi durch den Sultan. Türkische Matrosen unter Führung deutscher Offiziere. (2)Der feierliche Umzug türkischer Truppen: An einem Tor der alten byzantinischen Mauern. (7) [4 Abb.]: (1)Die Telephonzentrale eines Panzerzuges, von der aus die Befehle des Kommandanten nach den einzelnen Wagen weitergegeben werden. (2)Nachtdienst in der Telephonzentrale bei einem Oberkommando. (3)Quer über die Straße gezogener russischer Schützengraben in Gorlice. (Links verwundete Russen.) (4)Unten: Mit Grabsteinen ausgebauter russischer Schützengraben vor Gorlice. ( - )