In this chapter we aim to provide an overview of the variety of topics and methods that characterise the evolving set of environmental justice discourses in Western Europe. In the first section of this chapter the range of discourses on environmental justice in Western Europe is introduced through an overview that focuses on the forms of concern and normativity that have been central to environmental justice claim-making. This is followed by an overview of similarities and differences in methodological approaches and results regarding distributional inequalities, based on selected studies. In the second section the role of spatial and environmental planning and the involvement of citizens in planning processes and access to information will be dealt with, focusing therefore on questions of procedural justice. Decision making in this context will be focused on the specific context of implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the European Union. In the final section we take the dimension of future generations into account and discuss the relation between environmental justice and sustainability using the example of the energy sector and ways of dealing with nuclear power.
ABSTRACTSeveral simple theories of government coalition formation are described and tested. A statistical method is presented for comparing the theories and evaluating each of them relative to a certain null hypothesis. The statistical tests are based upon the formation of 132 government coalitions in twelve countries of Western Europe during 1945–71.
In the paper I try to answer the question, whether there is a genuine constitutional theory of 'illiberal constitutionalism,' recently advocated in some East-Central European member states of the European Union, especially in Hungary and Poland. As I demonstrate, court ideologists of populist autocrats use Carl Schmitt's concept of political sovereignty and collective identity of the people, or misuse Max Weber's leader democracy or Richard Bellamy's or others' political constitutionalism ideas to legitimize authoritarian aims. I argue that the constitutional concept, which rejects liberalism as a constitutive precondition of democracy, cannot be in compliance with the traditional idea of liberal democratic constitutionalism. This concept has nothing to do with any majoritarian constitutional model based on the separation of power, or with political constitutionalism, or any kind of weak judicial review, and it misuses the concept of constitutional identity. One of the reasons of the illiberal turn has been that there was a lack of consensus about liberal democratic values at the time of the transition. In the beginning of the democratic transitions in these new democracies, preference was given to general economic effectiveness over mass civic and political engagement. According to some authors, the prospects for liberal constitutional democracy in the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe following the 1989–90 transition were diminished by a technocratic, judicial control of politics, which blunted the development of civic constitutionalism, civil society, and participatory democratic government as necessary counterpoints to the technocratic machinery of legal constitutionalism. But, there is nothing to suggest that an earlier and more participatory constitution-making process would have prevented the populist turn. Those proponents of participatory constitutionalism do not sufficiently take into account the rise of populism and the lack of civic interest in constitutional matters, due to poor constitutional culture. The recent success of illiberalism in the region seems to indicate that the special historical circumstances require a longer period of time the build up a liberal democratic political and constitutional culture. But the democratic backsliding is not a proof of the failure of liberal democracy altogether, as illiberal leaders and their court ideologists want people to believe.
Hjärpe, Jan: Introduction: boundaries and belonging. - S. 7-11. (...) Todorov, Nicolai: The Ottoman and the Balkans. The urban-rural dimension. - S. 112-126. (...)