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Public and political organizations exist to maintain societies in more or less democratic settings. Both political and public sector organizations have traditionally been blamed for several ills in society including inefficiency, bureaucracy, serving their own needs above others' and corruption. Though each public sector and political organization is a product of its own time and environment, there seem to be certain global trends that challenge them: rapid change, use of social media, citizen diversity, and novel forms of citizen activism for example question the more traditional means of communication. How public entities and politicians communicate with citizens and publics is of strategic importance: there is a global need to change from one-way information provision toward ongoing dialogue. This chapter looks at public sector and political communication globally. Despite their central task in society, partly due to the complex setting, short-term election cycles, diverse stakeholders, and slightly negative sector reputation, many communication efforts of public and political organizations fail. Though communication alone cannot solve the many sector-related challenges, this chapter analyzes public and political communication and reflects how public and political organizations could better utilize communication to improve their functions. ; peerReviewed

To an unprecedented degree, the nation's welfare now depends on constitutionally sound outcomes to disputes between Congress and the President over executive branch information. Yet we still lack a satisfying theoretical account of the optimal method for achieving those outcomes. In the years since Watergate, courts and scholars have embraced a theory premised on an unexamined faith that the Constitution's structure embeds in the political process the tools and incentives necessary for each branch to vindicate its interests. Judicial interference, this conventional model further assumes, is both unnecessary and unwise; left to their own devices, the political branches will pursue a salutary course of escalating battle that will ultimately yield the correct constitutional balance in any given information dispute. This Article subjects that conventional theory to the rigorous examination it has thus far escaped. It begins by dispelling the notion that the theory describes a unique mechanism endemic to one species of constitutional conflict. In fact, the Article reveals, this conventional model is a faithful translation to the separation-of- powers context of an approach that has long (and controversially) governed the relationship between the federal government and the states. Building upon that recognition, the Article exposes an unjustifiable inconsistency between the conventional model and the Court's treatment of broader executive- legislative disagreement. The Article then assesses the model on its own terms, finding powerful reason to doubt that the political process alone will produce a satisfactory allocation of authority over information. Courts, the Article concludes, must play some substantive role in a coherent system for resolving interbranch conflicts of this kind.

The growing prominence of comparative political theory has inspired extensive and fruitful methodological reflection, raising important questions about the procedures that political theorists should apply when they select texts for study, interpret their passages, and assess their arguments. But, notably, comparative political theorists have mainly rejected the comparative methods used in the subfield of comparative politics, because they argue that applying the comparative method would compromise both the interpretive and the critical projects that comparative political theory should pursue. In this article, I describe a comparative approach for the study of political ideas that offers unique insight into how the intellectual and institutional contexts that political thinkers occupy influence their ideas. By systematically describing how political thinking varies across time and over space in relation to the contexts within which political thinkers live and work, the comparative method can serve as the foundation for both deconstructive critiques, which reveal the partial interests that political ideas presented as universally advantageous actually serve, and reconstructive critiques, which identify particular thinkers or traditions of political thought that, because of the contexts in which they developed, offer compelling critical perspectives on existing political institutions.

A theory of political change -- The Confucian authority structure -- Claiming political authority -- State builds nation -- Changing of the guards -- State-led industrialization -- Shifts in authority structure -- Shaping of national political culture -- The logic of political order.

In the current economic context, one of the issues of concern is the growth of public spending of municipalities of Mexico and thus increasing public debt. This combines the traditional interest that literature has been devoted to the relationship between economics and politics from the perspective of Political Budget Cycle. The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of elections in public expenditure management. To this end, a system based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which uses instrumental variables based on delays and differences of all variables in the model estimator was used. Our findings indicate that there is an expansion of total expenditure, spending on public works and infrastructure and current expenditure contracted work, indicating the preference of politicians for using investment spending to influence voter behavior. The work also notes that citizens value the policies of public expenditure management when making their voting decisions.

AbstractOne of the best-known empirical findings in the political sciences is the gender difference in political knowledge: women show less political knowledge than men. Conventional research argues that this difference is mainly a product of socialization, structural factors, and biology. Our paper brings a new perspective to the explanation of the gender gap in political knowledge. Based on an online survey and an experiment1, we emphasize the relevance of gender stereotypes as a situational pressure that reduces the performance of women in a political knowledge test. Two conclusions emerge from the analysis: First, our results indicate the existence of a negative stereotype related to the political knowledge of women. Second, the activation of gender stereotypes affects performance on a political knowledge test. Consistent with previous research on stereotype threat, our results indicate that the performance of men on a political knowledge test is affected by gender stereotypes.

This paper draws on data from over 35,000 respondents in twenty-two public opinion surveys in ten countries and finds strong evidence that ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened by exposure to political competition. In particular, for every month closer their country is to a competitive presidential election, survey respondents are 1.8 percentage points more likely to identify in ethnic terms. Using an innovative multinomial logit empirical methodology, we find that these shifts are accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the salience of occupational and class identities. Our findings lend support to situational theories of social identification and are consistent with the view that ethnic identities matter in Africa for instrumental reasons: because they are useful in the competition for political power.

In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant's optimum and the government's optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.

In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant's optimum and the government's optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.

I. From Autocracy to Democracy: Political Institutions at the End of the Ch'ing Dynasty -- 1. Transformation from Absolute to Constitutional Monarchy -- 2. Causes of the Constitutional Movement -- 3. Preparation for Constitutionalism -- 4. The Principles of Constitution, September 22, 1908 -- 5. The National Legislative Council (Tse-cheng Yuan) -- 6. The Provincial Assembly (Tse-I Chu) -- 7. The Beginning of Local Self-Government -- 8. The Revolution and the Nineteen Articles of November 3, 1911 -- II. Democracy in Experiment: Political Institutions During the Early Republican Period -- 1. Preparations for a Provisional Government -- 2. Analysis of the Organic Law of the Provisional Government -- 3. Inauguration of the Provisional Government at Nanking -- 4. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, March 11, 1912 -- 5. The Change of the Provisional Presidency and the Seat of Government -- 6. The Establishment of Parliament -- 7. The Drafting of the Constitution and the Election of President -- 8. The Judicial System of the New Republic -- 9. The Local Government System -- III. Monarchism vs. Republicanism: Political institutions Under the Dictatorship of Yüan Shih-K'ai -- 1. Yüan Shih-k'ai vs. Constitutional Democracy -- 2. Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Constitutional Compact of 1914 -- 3. The Reorganized National Government Under Yüan Shih-k'ai -- 4. The Local Government System Under Yüan Shih-k'ai -- 5. The Rise and Fall of Yüan's Monarchial Movement -- IV. Split Between the North and the South: Political Institutions During the Period of Internal Dissensions -- 1. Developments under the Regime in Peking -- 2. The New Parliament and the New Constitutional Draft -- 3. Parliament's Second Restoration and its Adoption of the 1923 Constitution -- 4. The Constitution-Protecting Government in the Southwest -- 5. The Peking Government Under Provisional Chief Executive Tuan -- 6. The Local Government System -- V. The Nationalist Party in Power: Unification of China Under Kuomintang Programs -- 1. The Reorganization of the Nationalist Party in 1924 -- 2. Basic Principles and Programs of the Nationalist Party -- 3. The Northern Expedition and the Unification of China -- 4. The Beginning of Political Tutelage -- VI. The Five-Power Constitution at Work: Political Institutions During the Period of Political Tutelage -- 1. The National Government Before 1928 -- 2. The National Government Since 1928 -- 3. The National People's Convention and the Promulgation of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for the Period of Political Tutelage -- 4. Nationalist Efforts to Carry out Party Principles and Programs -- 5. The Preparation for Constitutional Rule in China -- 6. The Local Government System During the Period of Political Tutelage -- VII. Communism Versus Nationalism: The Chinese Communist Party and Soviet Regimes (1921–1945) -- 1. The Formation of Communist Organizations in China -- 2. The First United Front of the Nationalists and Communists -- 3. Armed Uprisings and the Change of Leadership -- 4. The Establishment of Soviet Regimes in China -- 5. The Second United Front and Expansion of the Communist Regimes -- VIII. China at War: Political Institutions During the Period of the Sino-Japanese War -- 1. The Hostilities Between China and Japan -- 2. The Formal Establishment of Chiang Kai-shek's Leadership -- 3. Wartime Party Alignments -- 4. The Supreme National Defense Council — The Highest Organ of Wartime China -- 5. The Triple-linked Administrative System -- 6. The Wartime National Government -- 7. The People's Political Council -- 8. The Wartime Local Government -- 9. The Local Representative Bodies -- IX. From the Mainland to Taiwan (Formosa): Political Institutions during the Postwar Period -- 1. Peace Negotiations Through the Political Consultative Conference -- 2. The Convocation of the National Assembly and the Constitution of 1946 -- 3. The Central and Local Governments Under the Constitution of 1946 -- 4. The First Session of the First National Assembly -- 5. The Nationalist Debacle and Retreat to Taiwan -- 6. The National Government in Taiwan -- 7. The Local Government System in Taiwan -- 8. Taiwan Today -- X. The Communist Party in Power: Mao's Political Thought and the Party Organization -- 1. On the Road to Victory -- 2. The Political Thought and Strategy of Mao Tse-tung -- 3. The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party and its Guiding Principles -- 4. The Organization and Functions of the Communist Party -- 5. The Communist Youth League -- 6. The Communist Relationship with Minor Political Parties and Mass Organizations -- XI. Fundamental Laws of the People's Republic: From the Common Program to the Constitution of 1954 -- 1. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) -- 2. The Common Program of 1949 in the Nature of a Provisional Constitution -- 3. The Central Government System, 1949–1954 -- 4. The Local Government System, 1949–1954 -- 5. The Adoption of the Constitution by the National People's Congress -- 6. General Principles of the Constitution of 1954 -- XII. The Government of "Democratic Centralism": Political Institutions under the Constitution of 1954 -- 1. The Present System of Government -- 2. The National People's Congress -- 3. The Head of the State -- 4. The State Council -- 5. The People's Courts and Procuratorates -- 6. Local People's Congresses and Councils -- 7. Self-Government Organs of National Autonomous Areas -- 8. The Communist Government in Action -- Appendices.

Xi Jinping has been pushing to make his thought a major addition to China's ideology, which guides China's direction of travel. No other Chinese leader apart from Mao Zedong had their theoretical contributions elevated to this status. This book provides a contextualized reading of Xi Jinping Thought and examines how it has been implemented in practice. While China's political system remains a Leninist party-state, how it operates has been substantially modified following the introduction of Xi Thought. What has happened is akin to replacing the operating system of a computer. This book conceptualizes the modified system as a Sino-centric consultative Leninist system. The Chinese Communist Party is being reinvigorated as a Leninist machine, by which the Party leads everything. A new de facto social contract is offered to the Chinese people, who are being indoctrinated by Xi Thought so they will think like "one patriotic people." China's economy is being restructured following Xi's vision of a "socialist market economy," while its interactions with the rest of the world, his reconstruction of the ancient tianxia, or all-under-heaven, world order, which commits to a "China First" principle. The end goal set in Xi Thought is the fulfillment of "the China Dream of national rejuvenation" by 2050 at the latest. Whether this will come to pass or not, the introduction of Xi Thought has already changed China, with significant implications for the rest of the world.