Suchergebnisse

Background The Greek economy went through a steep recession for ten years in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. What started as a unique episode of a sovereign debt crisis in a monetary union, triggered a banking sector crisis and a sequence of adjustment programmes aiming at macroeconomic stabilization and economic recovery. … Continued

The article appeals to particular reasons for the recent crisis in Eurozone. It includes research on the measures taken to address the goals of public finance, banking systems and financial markets stabilization. Initiatives on overcoming the conflict between the single currency and a national sovereignty of European states, establishing more solid institutional basis for monetary union are under consideration.

THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES THE ROLE PLAYED BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EVOLUTION OF SPANISH EUROPEAN ECONOMIC POLICY BETWEEN 1986 AND 1994. THE ARTICLE FINDS THAT EUROPEAN POLICIES OF THE PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPANOL (PSOE) GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU), SHIFTED OVER THE EARLY 1990S, COMING TO ACCORD GREATER PRIORITY TO SHORT-TERM NATIONAL INTERESTS.

Only a decade ago, slow growth and high unemployment plagued Germany, but the "sick man of Europe" has now moved to outperform the Eurozone average growth since the second quarter of 2010. This confirms Germany's recovery and its status as the growth engine of the continent. This surely is a success story. While Germany (also Austria and the Netherlands) is prospering, the peripheral countries in the Eurozone are confronted with a severe sovereign debt crisis. Starting in Greece, it soon spread to countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In the course of the debate, Germany was blamed for the imbalances in Europe. In short, German export performance and the sustained pressure for moderate wage increases have provided German exporters with the competitive advantage to dominate trade and capital flows within the Eurozone. Thus, Germany is seen as the main beneficiary of the EURO. This argument, however, is vehemently disputed within Germany. Many economists and political leaders reject this argument and point to the flagrant lack of fiscal discipline in many of the peripheral countries. Some prominent economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn, even disputes that Germany was the main beneficiary of the Eurozone. The paper analyzes the two sides of the controversy, and asks whether we are witnessing a more inwardlooking and Euroskeptic Germany. These issues will be analyzed by first focusing on the role of Germany in resolving the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, and the European Union negotiations for a permanent rescue mechanism. We conclude by discussing some possible explanations for Germany's more assertive and more Euroskeptic position during these negotiations.

Die Grundthese dieses Artikels lautet, daß kurzfristig auftretende Veränderungen der amerikanischen Geldpolitik, übertragen durch den internationalen Geldmarkt, die europäischen Staaten zu einer engeren Koordinierung ihrer Wechselkurs- und Geldpolitik zwang. Der Autor überprüft seine These in bezug auf die wirtschaftliche Integration innerhalb der EU, indem er vier Perioden analysiert, in denen die USA durch ihre Politik zur Stabilisierung der internationalen Geldmärkte beitrugen, und sieben Perioden, in denen die USA Störungen in diesem Systen hervorriefen. Die europäischen Regierungen und Zentralbanken schränkten ihre geldpolitische Kooperation ein, wenn die USA systemstabilisierend wirkten, und weiteten sie aus, wenn Störungen verursacht wurden. (swp-clv)

Chapter 1: Introduction: Why to Study "The Portuguese Escudo Monetary Zone and its Impact in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa" -- Part I. The Origin of the Escudo Monetary Zone -- Chapter 2: The Escudo Monetary Zone -- Chapter 3: The Difficulties in launching the Escudo Monetary Zone -- Chapter 4: War, Confidence, and Expectations. Adjusting the Rules of the Escudo Monetary Zone -- Part II. The Transition to a Revised Escudo Monetary Zone -- Chapter 5: The Heritage from the 1963–1968 Period. Marcelo Caetano and the Decision of Asking for Studies -- Chapter 6: The Technical and Political Discussion of the Escudo Zone Problems, and the Reform of 1971 -- Chapter 7: The results of the 1971 Reform of Escudo Monetary Zone Union. The Angolan and Moçambican Divergence -- Part III. The End of the Revised Escudo Monetary System -- Chapter 8: Decolonisation and Independence Agreements. Retornados and difficulties of the Banking System -- Chapter 9: The Genesis of the New Currency Units and Banking Systems in the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries. The Co-operation with Portugal -- Chapter 10: The End of the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund in 1980. The continuation of co-operation -- Part IV. Co-operation from Independences to the End of the Millenium -- Chapter 11: The New Currencies in the West-African Portuguese-Speaking Countries and the Portuguese Co-operation -- Chapter 12: The Angolan Kwanza and the Portuguese Co-operation -- Chapter 13: The Mozambican Metical and the Portuguese Co-operation -- Chapter 14: Final Remarks: Conclusions.

Dollars, Euros, and Debt suggests that an increase in public spending is the wrong medicine, because it was precisely the increase in public spending that created some of the structural problems that are now confused with, or have led to, the cyclical slowdowns. The book argues that, over the years, and in a growing number of countries, the high and increasing levels of public spending were, first and progressively, being financed by higher tax levels and, subsequently, by increasing borrowing. In the early years of the twenty-first century governments started facing strong taxpayers' resistance to tax increases. Thus, they relied more and more on public borrowing, pushing the public debts to high levels. More recently they started facing stronger resistance by private lenders, that led to the progressive easing of monetary conditions by central banks. The central banks' actions have made it difficult to separate fiscal from monetary actions and have hidden some of the true deterioration in the fiscal accounts. They have also increased future uncertainty and potential 'time consistency' problems. The book evaluates the effects of 'fiscal stimulus packages', especially when they start from precarious fiscal conditions, and presents a novel 'law of public expenditure growth', and suggests how that law may help in the design of 'exit strategies' from the current crisis. It also discusses similarities and differences between the monetary union that the euro and the monetary union that is the dollar.

The choice of the exchange rate regime implies trade-offs between different values. There do not exist a perfect regime as such and all of them has their positive and negative effects on the economy. It is thus important that politics choose the exchange rate regime that has a significant effect on the welfare of all the economic agents in a country. A currency union is an exchange rate regime in which all members in the union share the same currency and the monetary policies, for the whole union, is jointly determined. A currency union give more currency credibility to its members especially to those that have low historical fiscal performances. Nevertheless, a currency union can be costly to its members. It deprives them of their monetary sovereignty and exposes them to severe external shock. In order to reduce the cost of a membership in a currency union, the union should exhibit an important characteristic. The economic shocks in the union should be asymmetric so that monetary policies in the union has the greatest impact on the monetary region as a whole. To make the shock asymmetric, regional integration should thus be promoted. In this thesis, we analyse the monetary unions in West and Central Africa to estimate the cost and benefit of these unions for their members. First, we analyse the gravity model of trades and FDIs (Foreign direct investments) to determine the effect that a currency union can have on bilateral trades and investments. Then, we run a cluster analysis on the economic performances of the different countries in the unions. Cluster analysis enable us to group objects (countries) into groups (clusters) based on their homogeneities. These homogeneities will be assessed via multiple variables that find their root in the theory of optimum currency area. Results of our cluster analysis show that WAEMU countries (West African Economic and Monetary Union) show the highest convergence among the three regions (WAEMU,CEMAC and WAMZ). This high convergence may reflect the pack of convergence criteria that has been impose to the economy of the different members. CEMAC ("Communauté Économique et Monétaire des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale") countries do not group well together, some CEMAC countries were located in the WAEMU cluster meaning that they show a greater similarity with WEAMU countries than they do with CEMAC countries. ; Master [120] en sciences de gestion, Université catholique de Louvain, 2017

The choice of the exchange rate regime implies trade-offs between different values. There do not exist a perfect regime as such and all of them has their positive and negative effects on the economy. It is thus important that politics choose the exchange rate regime that has a significant effect on the welfare of all the economic agents in a country. A currency union is an exchange rate regime in which all members in the union share the same currency and the monetary policies, for the whole union, is jointly determined. A currency union give more currency credibility to its members especially to those that have low historical fiscal performances. Nevertheless, a currency union can be costly to its members. It deprives them of their monetary sovereignty and exposes them to severe external shock. In order to reduce the cost of a membership in a currency union, the union should exhibit an important characteristic. The economic shocks in the union should be asymmetric so that monetary policies in the union has the greatest impact on the monetary region as a whole. To make the shock asymmetric, regional integration should thus be promoted. In this thesis, we analyse the monetary unions in West and Central Africa to estimate the cost and benefit of these unions for their members. First, we analyse the gravity model of trades and FDIs (Foreign direct investments) to determine the effect that a currency union can have on bilateral trades and investments. Then, we run a cluster analysis on the economic performances of the different countries in the unions. Cluster analysis enable us to group objects (countries) into groups (clusters) based on their homogeneities. These homogeneities will be assessed via multiple variables that find their root in the theory of optimum currency area. Results of our cluster analysis show that WAEMU countries (West African Economic and Monetary Union) show the highest convergence among the three regions (WAEMU,CEMAC and WAMZ). This high convergence may reflect the pack of convergence criteria that has been impose to the economy of the different members. CEMAC ("Communauté Économique et Monétaire des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale") countries do not group well together, some CEMAC countries were located in the WAEMU cluster meaning that they show a greater similarity with WEAMU countries than they do with CEMAC countries. ; Master [120] en sciences de gestion, Université catholique de Louvain, 2017

The euro became an international currency when it was created two decades ago. However, the euro's internationalisation peaked as early as 2005 and it was never comparable to the US dollar. Its international status declined with the euro crisis. Faced with a US administration willing to use its hegemonic currency to extend its domestic policies beyond its borders, Europe is reflecting on how to promote actively the internationalisation of the euro, to help ensure its autonomy. But promoting a more prominent role for the euro is difficult and would involve far-reaching changes to the fabric of the monetary union. -Historically, countries issuing dominant currencies have been characterised by: a large and growing economy, free movement of capital, a willingness to play an international role, stability, an ability to provide a large and elastic supply of safe assets, developed financial markets, and significant geopolitical and/or military power. The monetary union does not meet all these criteria. -The only way for the euro to play a major international role is to improve the institutional setup of the monetary union. First, the supply of euro-denominated safe assets from the monetary union should be increased. To avoid a COVID-19 depression, euro-area countries have increased massively the supply of their debt securities in the last two months. With its new purchase programme, the European Central Bank has ensured that euro-area sovereign bonds retain their safe asset status. Decisions by the Eurogroup also increase the supply of common European safe assets. The European Commission's proposal to issue up to €750 billion in EU debt to finance its recovery plan is a step in the right direction. -In federations, joint issuance typically goes hand-in-hand with federal and central control of spending and a strong grip on revenues. To be politically sustainable, similar central control would be needed in the EU. The treaty-based EU framework is the closest to fulfilling these criteria with political accountability through the European Parliament, political control via the Commission, and a court of auditors and an anti-fraud office, but ultimately the treaty base is insufficient for a true quantum leap. -It is essential to ensure a strong recovery for all countries and thus make the euro area an attractive destination for investment. A strong recovery will also be fundamental to preserve or even improve the supply of safe assets, as growth is crucial for debt sustainability.